Ejercito Vs COMELEC GR No. 212398 25 November 2014

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 742
Information | Reference
Case Title:
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO,
petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR “EGAY” G.R. No. 212398. November 25, 2014.*
S. SAN LUIS, respondents.
Citation: 742 SCRA 210 EMILIO RAMON „E.R.‰ P. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs.
More... HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR
„EGAY‰ S. SAN LUIS, respondents.
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Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is
an independent action that is available only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.·A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is available
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordi-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 211

Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections
nary course of law. It is a legal remedy that is limited to the

resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct
simple errors of judgment. More importantly, it will only prosper
if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to
exist.
Election Law; Disqualification Proceedings; The purpose of a
disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws.·The purpose of a disqualification
proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed
pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states: SEC. 68.
Disqualifications.·Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
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Page 1 of 68
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
Same; Preliminary Investigation; The present rules of
procedure in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses
in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which requires
preliminary investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9386.·It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is
silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it
merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. In
disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its
officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case
and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials.
As aforementioned, the present
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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of

election offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary
investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386.
Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are
Election Officers in the National Capital Region („NCR‰),
Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys,
Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election
Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving
election offenses under the election laws which may be filed
directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the
COMELEC.
Same; Election Offenses; It has been repeatedly underscored
that an election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects.·
The „exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a
preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws‰ stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a
disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an
election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its
criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing, its electoral
aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified
from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding
that is summary in character.
Same; Disqualification Proceedings; Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to
election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient; The electoral aspect of a
disqualification case is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character.·Contrary to
EjercitoÊs claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules is inapplicable.
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating
that it shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
In fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 requires
that documentary evidence should be formally offered in
evidence. We remind again that the electoral aspect of a

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disqualification case is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character.
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Same; Suspension of Rules of Procedure; Since rules of

procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, it is well recognized that the Supreme Court (SC) is
empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case
from the application of a general rule, when the rigid application
thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.
·Granting, for argumentÊs sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court applies, there have been instances when We
suspended the strict application of the rule in the interest of
substantial justice, fairness, and equity. Since rules of procedure
are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it
is well-recognized that the Court is empowered to suspend its
rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a
general rule, when the rigid application thereof tends to
frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. The fact is,
even Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure fittingly declare that „[the] rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission‰
and that „[in] the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these
rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.‰
Due Process; The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain oneÊs side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.·EjercitoÊs dependence on Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), is weak. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain oneÊs
side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is
cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had
the opportunity to be heard thereon. In this case, it is
undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC En Banc. Despite this, he did not rebut the
authenticity and due execution of the advertising contracts when
he decided not to discuss the factual findings of the COMELEC
First Division on
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the alleged ground that it may be construed as a waiver of

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the jurisdictional issues that he raised.
Election Law; Advertising Contracts; Commission on
Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
properly take and act on the advertising contracts without further
proof from the parties herein.·The COMELEC may properly
take and act on the advertising contracts without further proof
from the parties herein. Aside from being considered as an
admission and presumed to be proper submissions from them,
the COMELEC already has knowledge of the contracts for being
ascertainable from its very own records. Said contracts are ought
to be known by the COMELEC because of its statutory function
as the legal custodian of all advertising contracts promoting or
opposing any candidate during the campaign period. As what
transpired in this case, the COMELEC has the authority and
discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts with
the certified true copies of the broadcast logs, certificates of
performance or other analogous records which a broadcast
station or entity is required to submit for the review and
verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of
advertisements aired.
Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 explicitly directs
that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not
be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate,
which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be
submitted to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and
that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the
donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized
representative of the political party.·Notably, R.A. No. 9006
explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the
candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written
acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC,
and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by
the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized
representative of the political party. Conformably with the
mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires
that election propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall
not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written
acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an
official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the
description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and
that, in every case, the adver-
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 215

tising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders

shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation,
should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate,
party or their authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to
broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of
charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without
the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they
bear and be identified by the words „airtime for this broadcast
was provided free of charge by‰ followed by the true and correct
name and address of the donor.

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Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Advertising
Contracts; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot give weight to
EjercitoÊs representation that his signature on the advertising
contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only
for the first time in this petition for certiorari; Matters neither
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below
cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the
Supreme Court.·This Court cannot give weight to EjercitoÊs
representation that his signature on the advertising contracts
was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the
first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary
principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the
first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. It would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow
Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the
COMELEC. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that elementary considerations of
due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim
against him before judgment may be rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the advertising contracts
were executed without EjercitoÊs knowledge and consent, and
whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact.
Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition.·
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed
without EjercitoÊs knowledge and consent, and whether his
signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any
factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is
not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of factual allegations.
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Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by

any other administrative agency exercising expertise in its
particular field of competence, are binding on the Court.
Election Law; Advertising Contracts; Independent
Expenditures; The rulings in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), find bearing only on matters related to „independent
expenditures,‰ an election law concept which has no application
in this jurisdiction.·Even so, the rulings in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), find bearing only on matters related to
„independent expenditures,‰ an election law concept which has
no application in this jurisdiction. In the US context,
independent expenditures for or against a particular candidate
enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to those expenses
made by an individual, a group or a legal entity which are not
authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized
committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate; they
are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with
the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized
committee of the candidate. In contrast, there is no similar
provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006 and its

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implementing rules and regulations specifically make it unlawful
to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print, broadcast or
outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate without the
written acceptance of said candidate.
Same; Foreign Judgments; Resort to foreign jurisprudence
would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available
locally to settle a controversy and that even in the absence of local
statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are merely persuasive
authority at best since they furnish an uncertain guide.·In any
event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign
jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is
available locally to settle a controversy and that even in the
absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are
merely persuasive authority at best since they furnish an
uncertain guide.
Same; Election Campaigns; Limit on Expenses of Candidates
and Political Parties; Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166
sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and
political parties for election campaign.·Section 13 of R.A. No.
7166 sets the
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current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and

political parties for election campaign, thus: SEC. 13. Authorized
Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties.·The aggregate
amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend
for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For candidates –
Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for
other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political
party and without support from any political party may be
allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b)
For political parties – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has
official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign
purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject
to the payment of any gift tax.
Statutory Construction; When the intent of the law is not
apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would
lead to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of
statutory construction may be resorted to such as the legislative
history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that
courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the
law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws
on the same subject matter in order to ascertain the true intent or
spirit of the law.·When the intent of the law is not apparent as
worded, or when the application of the law would lead to
absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory
construction may be resorted to such as the legislative history of
the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that courts may
take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the
deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the
same subject matter in order to ascertain the true intent or spirit

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of the law.
Election Law; Political Advertisement; Freedom of Speech
and Expression; Any restriction on speech or expression is only
incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the
substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising.·The inclusion of the
amount contributed by a donor to the candidateÊs allowable limit
of election expenses does not trample
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upon the free exercise of the votersÊ rights of speech and of

expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a
content-neutral regulation, the lawÊs concern is not to curtail the
message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants
with „deep pockets‰ and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no
more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental
interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political
advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section
4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.
Cruz-Angeles and Paglinawan Law Office for private
respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64,

in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the
May 21, 2014 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which
affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the
COMELEC First Division granting the petition for
disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar „Egay‰
S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon
„E.R.‰ P. Ejercito (Ejercito).
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
San Luis
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 29-49.

2 The COMELEC First Division was composed of Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Christian Robert S. Lim and Al A. Parreño; Rollo, pp.
49A-61.
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Page 7 of 68
before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila

against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate
and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province
of Laguna.3 Alleged in his Petition are as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local
election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna
the so-called „Orange Card‰ with an intent to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is
hereto attached and marked as Annex „C‰ and made as an
integral part hereof;
6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of
Provincial Governor of Laguna, [Ejercito] and his cohorts
claimed that the said „Orange Card‰ could be used in any public
hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs
as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto
attached and marked as Annex „D‰ as integral part hereof;
7. The so-called „Orange Card‰ is considered a material
consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for
[EjercitoÊs] favor in clear violation of the provision of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
„Sec. 68. Disqualifications.·Any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
_______________
3 Records, p. 1.
220

or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,

paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
requirement provided for in the election laws.‰ (emphasis ours)
8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law,
[Ejercito] should be disqualified;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the
Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate.
A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is
hereto attached and marked as Annex „E‰ as an integral part
hereof;
10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC

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Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I
quote:
„Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties.·The
aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spent for
election campaign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and
without any support from any political party – Five pesos (P5.00)
for every voter currently registered in the
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constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of

candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party list groups – Five pesos
(P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring
mine for emphasis)
11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial
Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election
expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX
(P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
12. However, in total disregard and violation of the
aforequoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures
in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television
campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of
Php23,730,784 based on our partyÊs official monitoring on the
following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.
alt
13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as

prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still
222

exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he

Page 9 of 68
paid the sum of P16,611,549;
14. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that
[Ejercito] committed an election offense as provided for under
Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides
and I quote:
„Election Offense.·Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these
Rules shall constitute an election offense punishable under the
first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code in addition to administrative liability, whenever
applicable. x x x‰
15. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec.
68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
„Sec. 68. Disqualifications.·Any candidate who, in an
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80,
83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 223

requirement provided for in the election laws.‰ (emphasis

ours)
16. On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is
provided under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, which states and
I quote:
„Effect of Disqualification Case.·Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of [his] guilt is strong.‰ (emphasis mine)
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed
that:
1. Upon filing of this petition, a declaration by the Honorable
Commission of the existence of probable cause be made against
[Ejercito] for violating the aforequoted provisions of laws;
2. In the event that [Ejercito] will be able to get a majority
vote of the electorate of the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013,
his proclamation be suspended until further order of the
Honorable Commission pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No.

Page 10 of 68
6646;
3. Lastly, a criminal case for VIOLATION OF ELECTION
LAWS be filed against [Ejercito] before the proper court[;] [and]
224

4. Other relief, just and equitable under the premises, are

also prayed for.4
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible
Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible
Proclamation of Respondent.5 However, these were not
acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and
Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice
Governor, respectively, of Laguna.6 Based on the
Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained
549,310 votes compared with San LuisÊ 471,209 votes.7
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with
Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013.8 Ejercito then filed
his Verified Answer on June 13, 2013 that prayed for the
dismissal of the petition due to procedural and substantive
irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as
Provincial Governor.9 He countered that the petition was
improperly filed because, based on the averments and
relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for election
offenses; thus, the case should have been filed before the
COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar,
provincial election supervisor or regional election director,
or the state, provincial or city prosecutor in accordance
with Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10.10
Assuming that the petition could be given due course,
Ejercito argued that San Luis failed to
_______________
4 Rollo, pp. 91-96.

5 Records, pp. 16-28.
6 Id., at p. 49.
7 Id., at pp. 47-48.
8 Id., at pp. 30-32.
9 Id., at pp. 33-49.
10 380 Phil. 745; 323 SCRA 778 (2000).
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show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De

Venecia,11 that he (Ejercito) was previously convicted or

Page 11 of 68
declared by final judgment of a competent court for being
guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of having committed,
the punishable acts under Section 68 of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, as amended (OEC).12
As to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed
that the same are baseless, unfounded, and totally
speculative. He stated that the Health Access Program or
the E.R. „Orange Card‰ was a priority project of his
administration as incumbent Governor of Laguna and was
never intended to influence the electorate during the May
2013 elections. He added that the „Orange Card,‰ which
addressed the increasing need for and the high cost of
quality health services, provides the Laguneños not only
access to medical services but also the privilege to avail
free livelihood seminars to help them find alternative
sources of income. With respect to the charge of having
exceeded the total allowable election expenditures, Ejercito
submitted that the accusation deserves no consideration
for being speculative, self-serving, and uncorroborated by
any other substantial evidence.
Citing Sinaca v. Mula,13 Ejercito asserted that the
petition questioning his qualification was rendered moot
and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected
Provincial Governor of Laguna for the term 2013-2016. He
perceived that his successful electoral bid substantiates
the fact that he was an eligible candidate and that his
victory is a testament that he is more than qualified and
competent to hold public office.
Lastly, Ejercito considered San LuisÊ petition for
disqualification as purely frivolous and with no plain and
clear purpose but to harass and cause undue hardship.
According to him,
_______________
11 442 Phil. 139; 393 SCRA 639 (2002).

12 Approved on December 3, 1985.
13 373 Phil. 896; 315 SCRA 266 (1999).
226

the fact that it was filed only a few days before the May
13, 2013 elections evidently shows that it was lodged as a
last-ditch effort to baselessly derail and obstruct his
assumption of office and function as the duly-elected
Laguna Governor.
The scheduled case conference between the parties on
June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013.14 In the latter
date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in
evidence and the parties agreed to file their respective
memorandum within ten (10) days.15
San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the
Petition in his Memorandum.16 Additionally, he alleged
that:
15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure

documents from the Information and Education Department of
the Commission on Elections showing that [Ejercito] have

Page 12 of 68
incurred advertising expenses with ABS-CBN in the amount of
[P20,197,170.25] not to mention his advertisement with GMA 7.
Copies of the summary report, media purchase order, advertising
contract[,] and official receipt are marked as EXHS. „B-1,‰ „B-
2,‰ „B-3,‰ and „B-4‰ (Annexes „A,‰ „B,‰ „C‰ and „D,‰
supplemental to the very urgent ex parte motion)[.]17
It was stressed that the case is a „Special Action for

Disqualification‰ seeking to disqualify Ejercito as
gubernatorial candidate for violation of Section 68(a)(c) of
the OEC. He prayed that „[t]he Petition BE GRANTED
[and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and
PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of
Laguna.‰18 In refutation of EjercitoÊs defenses, San Luis
argued that it is precisely because of the commission of the
election offenses under Section 68 of the OEC that he
(Ejercito) should be disqualified. Also, citing
_______________
14 Records, pp. 50, 56; Rollo, p. 135.

15 Records, pp. 57, 59.
16 Rollo, pp. 153-161.
17 Id., at p. 157.
18 Id., at p. 160.
227
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 227

Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,19 San Luis

contended that EjercitoÊs proclamation and assumption of
office do not affect the COMELECÊs jurisdiction to continue
with the trial and hearing of the action until it is finally
resolved.
For his part, Ejercito filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of
Memorandum)20 restating all the arguments set forth in
his Verified Answer.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division
promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First

Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
(1) GRANT the Petition for Disqualification filed against
respondent Emilio Ramon „E.R.‰ P. Ejercito;
(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code;
(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST
from performing the functions of the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Laguna;
(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(5) DIRECT the duly-elected Vice Governor of Laguna to
assume the Office of the Provincial Governor by virtue of
succession as provided in Section 44 of the Local Government
Code; and
_______________

Page 13 of 68
19 Otherwise known as „The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.‰
20 Rollo, pp. 140-152.
228

(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with

the Law Department of this Commission for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation into the alleged violations of campaign
finance laws, rules and regulations committed by respondent
Ejercito.
SO ORDERED.21
On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division

held that the title of San LuisÊ petition and its reliance on
Section 68(a)(c) of the OEC as grounds for his causes of
action clearly show that the case was brought under Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,22 as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,23 which allows petitions
for disqualification to be filed „any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the
date of proclamation.‰ No credence was given to EjercitoÊs
contention that the petition was mooted by his
proclamation as Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC First
Division opined that the case of Sinaca is inapplicable,
because it was not about SinacaÊs eligibility or whether he
committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 68 of the
OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections,24 it was declared that EjercitoÊs garnering of
more votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections is not
tantamount to condonation of any act or acts that he
committed
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 60-61.

22 Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or the „Rules
Governing Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the COMELEC or
any of its Offices,‰ which was promulgated on February 15, 1993,
pertains to disqualification of candidates.
23 In the Matter of the Amendment to Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure for Purposes of the May 13, 2013
National, Local and ARMM Elections and Subsequent Elections
(Promulgated on September 25, 2012).
24 G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
229
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 229

which may be found to be a ground for disqualification

or election offense.
The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive
issues put forth in the petition for disqualification in this
wise:
Anent [San LuisÊ] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented

Page 14 of 68
the Sworn Statement dated [May 7, 2013] of a certain Mrs. Daisy
A. Cornelio, together with the „Orange Card‰ issued to Mrs.
Cornelio, marked respectively as Exhibits „A-4‰ and „A-3‰ as per
[San LuisÊ] Summary of Exhibits · to prove that [Ejercito]
committed the act described in Section 68(a) of the OEC. After
reviewing Mrs. CornelioÊs Sworn Statement, we do not find any
averment to the effect that the Orange Card was given to the
affiant to influence or induce her to vote for [Ejercito]. Affiant
only stated that she was given the Orange Card „last April of
this year‰ and that she was „not able to use it during those times
when [she] or one of [her] family members got sick and needed
hospital assistance.‰ Aside from Mrs. CornelioÊs Sworn
Statement, there is no other evidence to support [San LuisÊ]
claim, leading us to reject [San LuisÊ] first cause of action.
With respect to the second cause of action, [San Luis]
presented Exhibits „B-1‰ to „B-4,‰ which are submissions made
by the ABS-CBN Corporation as mandated by Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9006 („RA 9006‰ or the „Fair Election Act‰),
implemented through Section 9(a) of Resolution No. 9615.
Exhibit „B-3‰ is an Advertising Contract between ABS-CBN
Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. („SCI‰).
The details of the Contract are as follows:
alt
230

The Contract contains the signature of [Ejercito] signifying his

acceptance of the donation by SCI, the latter represented by its
Executive Vice President, Ms. Maylyn Enriquez. In addition to
the advertising contract, Exhibit „B-4‰ was submitted, which is a
photocopy of an Official Receipt issued by ABS-CBN for the
contract, with the following details:
alt
Upon verification of the submitted Exhibits „B-1‰ to „B-4‰

with this CommissionÊs Education and Information Department
(EID), the latter having custody of all advertising contracts
submitted by broadcast stations and entities in relation to the
[May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections, we find the said
Exhibits to be faithful reproductions of our file copy of the same.
A comparison of [EjercitoÊs] signature on the Advertising

Page 15 of 68
Contract and that on his Certificate of Candidacy show them to
be identical to each other, leading us to the conclusion that
[Ejercito] had indeed accepted the Php20,197,170.25 donation in
the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBNÊs
Channel 2. Even if we were to assume that only Php6,409,235.28
was actually paid out of Php20,197,170.25 advertising contract,
this amount is still more than Php4,576,566.00, which is
[EjercitoÊs] total authorized aggregate amount allowed for his
election campaign, computed as follows:
alt
231
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 231

While not presented as evidence in this case, we cannot deny

the existence of another Advertising Contract dated [May 8,
2013] for one (1) spot of a 3.5-minute advertisement scheduled
for broadcast on [May 9, 2013], amounting to Php3,366,195.05.
This Contract also contains the signature of [Ejercito] accepting
the donation from SCI and is accompanied by an ABS-CBN-
issued Official Receipt No. 279513 dated [May 7, 2013] in SCIÊs
name for Php6,409,235.28. If we add the amounts from both
contracts, we arrive at a total cost of Php23,563,365.29, which,
coincidentally, is the product of:
alt
This matches the data gathered by the CommissionÊs EID

from the reports and logs submitted by broadcast stations as
required by the Fair Election Act. According to the 99-page Daily
Operations Log for Channel 2 submitted by ABS-CBN covering
the period of [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013], [EjercitoÊs] 3.5-
minute or 210-second advertisement was aired seven (7) times.
The specific details on the dates of airing, program or time slot
when the advertisements were aired, and the time when the
advertisements as culled from the 99-page Daily Operations Log
are summarized as thus:
alt

Page 16 of 68
alt
232

Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both contracts

only amounted to Php12,818,470.56 as substantiated by the two
(2) Official Receipts issued by the ABS-CBN on [April 26] and
[May 7, 2013], or even if we were only to consider Exhibit [„B-4‰]
or the Php6,409,235.28 payment to ABS-CBN on [April 26,
2013], it nevertheless supports our finding that [Ejercito]
exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of Php4,576,566.00
which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68(c) and
concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in
relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.25
Only Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration

before the COMELEC En Banc.26 After the partiesÊ
exchange of pleadings,27 the Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division was unanimously affirmed on May 21, 2014.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its
First Division that San LuisÊ petition is an action to
disqualify Ejercito, reasoning that:
x x x First, the title of the petition indicating that it is a

petition for disqualification clearly expresses the objective of the
action. Second, it is manifest from the language of the petition
that the causes of action have relied primarily on Section 68(a)
and (c) of the OEC[,] which are grounds for disqualification x x x.
Third, notwithstanding that the relief portion of the petition
sounded vague in its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito,
the allegations and arguments set forth therein are obviously
geared towards seeking his disqualification for having committed
acts listed as grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of OEC.
Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First Division,
San LuisÊ Memorandum addresses and
_______________
25 Rollo, pp. 57-60.

26 Id., at pp. 62-89A.
27 San Luis filed a Comment/Opposition, while Ejercito thereafter
filed a Reply and Supplement (To: September 30, 2013 Motion for
Reconsideration) (See Rollo, pp. 162-209).
233
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 233

clarifies the intention of the petition when it prayed for

Ejercito to „be disqualified and prevented from holding office as

Page 17 of 68
Governor of Laguna.‰ While there is a prayer seeking that
Ejercito be held accountable for having committed election
offenses, there can be no doubt that the petition was primarily
for his disqualification.
Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power
to take cognizance of an action or protest seeking the
disqualification of a candidate who has committed any of the acts
listed therein from continuing as one, or if he or she has been
elected, from holding office. One ground for disqualification
listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by law. It is exactly on said
ground that San Luis is seeking the disqualification of Ejercito.
The jurisdiction of COMELEC over the petition, therefore, is
clear.28
The alleged violation of EjercitoÊs constitutional right to

due process was also not sustained:
Ejercito insists that he was deprived of his right to notice and

hearing and was not informed of the true nature of the case filed
against him when San Luis was allegedly allowed in his
memorandum to make as substantial amendment in the reliefs
prayed for in his petition. San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek
for EjercitoÊs disqualification instead of the filing of an election
offense against him.
As discussed above, the allegations in the petition,
particularly the causes of action, clearly show that it is not
merely a complaint for an election offense but a disqualification
case against Ejercito as well. San LuisÊ memorandum merely
amplified and clarified the allegations and arguments in his
petition. There was no change in the cause or causes of action.
Ejercito[,] therefore, cannot claim that he was not aware of the
true nature of the petition filed against him.
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 33-35.
234

Likewise, Ejercito cannot complain that he was deprived of

his right to notice and hearing. He cannot feign ignorance that
the COMELEC First Division, throughout the trial, was hearing
the petition as a disqualification case and not as an election
offense case. He was served with Summons with Notice of
Conference on [June 4, 2013] and was given a copy of the
petition. He likewise submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Commission when he filed his Verified Answer. He also
participated in the Preliminary Conference on [June 27, 2013]
wherein he examined evidence on record and presented his own
documentary exhibits. Lastly, he filed a Manifestation (in lieu of
Memorandum) incorporating all his allegations and defenses.
Ejercito contends that amending the reliefs prayed for is
prohibited under Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. He asserts that the relief prayed for in the
memorandum is not the same as that in the petition. However, a
scrutiny of said amendment shows that no new issues were
introduced. Moreover, there was no departure from the causes of

Page 18 of 68
action and no material alterations on the grounds of relief. The
amendment[,] therefore[,] is not substantial as it merely rectifies
or corrects the true nature of reliefs being prayed for as set forth
in the petition.
The records of the case will show that Ejercito has been
afforded the opportunity to contest and rebut all the allegations
against him. He was never deprived of his right to have access to
the evidence against him. He was adequately aware of the
nature and implication of the disqualification case against him.
Thus, Ejercito cannot say that he was denied of his
constitutional right to due process.
It is important to note at this point that Ejercito, in his
motion for reconsideration, deliberately did not tackle the merit
and substance of the charges against him. He limited himself to
raising procedural issues. This is despite all the opportunity that
he was given to confront the evidence lodged against him.
Therefore, there is no reason for the COMELEC En Banc to
disturb the find-
235
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 235

ings of the COMELEC First Division on whether Ejercito

indeed overspent in his campaign for governorship of Laguna in
the [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections.29
Anchoring on the case of Lanot v. Commission on

Elections,30 the COMELEC En Banc likewise debunked
EjercitoÊs assertion that the petition was prematurely and
improperly filed on the ground that the filing of an election
offense and the factual determination on the existence of
probable cause are required before a disqualification case
based on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed. It held:
As discussed in the case of Lanot vs. Comelec, each of the acts

listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC
has two aspects · electoral and criminal which may proceed
independently from each other, to wit:
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether the offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in
character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an
election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its
Law Department, which determines whether probable cause
exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 44-46.

30 537 Phil. 332; 507 SCRA 114 (2006).
236

Page 19 of 68
Law Department, files the criminal information before the

proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification
of the offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office.‰ (Emphasis supplied)31
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign
overspending before the Commission is heard and resolved
pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68 of the OEC. It is an
administrative proceeding separate and distinct from the
criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to
undergo in order to determine whether he can be held criminally
liable for the same act of overspending. It is through this
administrative proceeding that this Commission, initially
through its divisions, makes a factual determination on the
veracity of the partiesÊ respective allegations in a disqualification
case. There is no need for a preliminary investigation finding on
the criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the
Commission can act on the administrative or electoral aspect of
the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As
enunciated in Lanot, „(a)n erring candidate may be disqualified
even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice versa.‰
Moreover, EjercitoÊs reliance on Codilla is misplaced.

The COMELEC En Banc opined that the portion of the
Codilla decision that referred to the necessity of the
conduct of preliminary investigation pertains to cases
where the offenders are charged with acts not covered by
Section 68 of the OEC, and are, therefore, beyond the
ambit of the COMELECÊs jurisdiction. It said that the
decision refers to this type of cases
_______________
31 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
237
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 237

as criminal (not administrative) in nature, and, thus,

should be handled through the criminal process.
Further rejected was EjercitoÊs argument that the
COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification the moment he was proclaimed as the
duly-elected Governor of Laguna. For the COMELEC En
Banc, its First Division thoroughly and sufficiently
addressed the matter when it relied on Maquiling instead
of Sinaca. It maintained that Section 5 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, not COMELEC Resolution No.
2050,32 is relevant to the instant case as it states that the
COMELEC shall continue the trial and hearing of a
pending disqualification case despite the proclamation of a
winner. It was noted that the proper application of

Page 20 of 68
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 was already clarified in
Sunga v. COMELEC.33
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on one of San
LuisÊ contentions in his Comment/Opposition to EjercitoÊs
motion for reconsideration. He argued that he becomes the
winner in the gubernatorial election upon the
disqualification of Ejercito. Relying on Maquiling, San Luis
declared that he was not the second placer as he obtained
the highest number of valid votes cast from among the
qualified candidates. In denying that Maquiling is on all
fours with this case, the COMELEC En Banc said:
In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a non-

candidate by reason of his disqualification under Section 68 of
the OEC. He was a candidate who filed a valid certificate of
candidacy which was never cancelled.
Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not
because of any ineligibility existing at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the rules of
candidacy. His disqualifying circumstance, that is, his having
overspent in his
_______________
32 Promulgated on November 3, 1988.

33 351 Phil. 310; 288 SCRA 76 (1998).
238

campaign, did not exist at the time of the filing of his

certificate of candidacy. It did not affect the validity of the votes
cast in his favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he
remains the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes.
Ejercito cannot be on the same footing with Arnado in the
Maquiling case. Arnado was disqualified from running for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Sur because he was a dual citizen not
qualified to run for election. His disqualification existed at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The effect,
pursuant to the Maquiling case, is that the votes he garnered are
void, which in turn resulted in having considered the „second
placer‰ · Maquiling · as the candidate who obtained the
highest number of valid votes cast.
San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the
disqualified winning candidate remained valid. Ergo, San Luis,
being the second placer in the vote count, remains the second
placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the winner.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,
which governs Section 68 petitions for disqualification,
enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit:
Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition.·In the event a
Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted by final judgment as
defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the disqualified candidate
obtains the highest number of votes, the candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed and the
rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall be observed. In the
event the rule of succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist
for such position.34

Page 21 of 68
On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a
Petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a
status quo
_______________
34 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
239
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 239

ante order or temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of

preliminary injunction (WPI).35 Without issuing a
TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice, Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno, issued on May 28, 2014 an order to respondents
to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period
of ten (10) days from notice.36 Such order was confirmed
nunc pro tunc by the Court En Banc on June 3, 2014.37
Meantime, on May 26, 2014, Ejercito filed before the
COMELEC En Banc an Omnibus Motion to suspend
proceedings and to defer the implementation of the May
21, 2014 Resolution.38 On the same day, San Luis also filed
an Extremely Urgent Motion to Declare COMELEC En
Banc Resolution of May 21, 2014 and First Division
Resolution of September 26, 2013 Final and Executory and
to Issue Forthwith Writ of Execution or Implementing
Order39 invoking Paragraph 2, Section 8 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, in relation to Section 13(b), Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.40
_______________
35 Id., at p. 3.
36 Id., at pp. 210-211.
37 Id., at pp. 224-225.
38 Records, pp. 228-233.
39 Id., at pp. 234-239.
40 Paragraph 2, Sec. 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:
Section 8. Effect if Petition Unresolved.· x x x
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a
Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, or in cases of rulings of the Commission En Banc,
no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court within five (5) days
from receipt of the decision or resolution.
On the other hand, Sec. 13(b) Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.·
xxx
b. In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolutions of
the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
240


Page 22 of 68
On May 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Banc issued an
Order denying EjercitoÊs omnibus motion, granted San
LuisÊ extremely urgent motion, and directed the Clerk of
the Commission to issue the corresponding writ of
execution.41 On even date, Vice Governor Hernandez was
sworn in as the Governor of Laguna at the COMELEC
Main Office in Manila. The service of the writ was deemed
completed and validly served upon Ejercito on May 28,
2014.42
In his petition before Us, Ejercito raised the following
issues for resolution:
THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN THAT:
(I) IT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT RULED FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION
OF PETITIONER EVEN IF IT WAS NEVER PRAYED FOR IN
THE PETITION. WORSE, THERE IS YET NO FINDING OF
GUILT BY A COMPETENT COURT OR A FINDING OF FACT
STATING THAT PETITIONER ACTUALLY COMMITTED THE
ALLEGED ELECTION OFFENSE OF OVERSPENDING;
(II) IT RELIED ON A DOCUMENTARY EXHIBIT
(ADVERTISING CONTRACT) WHICH WAS NOT EVEN
FORMALLY OFFERED AS EVIDENCE; [AND]
(III) IT DISQUALIFIED PETITIONER FOR AN ACT DONE
BY A THIRD PARTY WHO SIMPLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHT
TO FREE EXPRESSION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF PETITIONER[.]43
The petition is unmeritorious.
_______________
41 Records, p. 242.
42 Id., at pp. 249-250, 260-262.
43 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
241
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 241

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in

relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is
available only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution
of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple
errors of judgment.45 More importantly, it will only prosper
if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually
proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or

tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it
contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
law. x x x.47

Page 23 of 68
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its
assailed Resolution with grave abuse of discretion.
We now explain.
The petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is for

the latterÊs disqualification and prosecution for
election offense
Ejercito insists that his alleged acts of giving material

consideration in the form of „Orange Cards‰ and election
overspending are considered as election offenses under
Section 35
_______________
44 Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22,

2014, 723 SCRA 223.
45 Juan v. Commission on Elections, 550 Phil. 294, 302; 522 SCRA
119, 128 (2007).
46 Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, supra.
47 Juan v. Commission on Elections, supra.
242

of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,48 in relation to

Section 1349 of R.A. No. 9006, and punishable under
Section 26450 of the
_______________
48 Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9006,

Otherwise Known as the „Fair Election Act,‰ in Connection to the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections
(Promulgated on January 15, 2013). Sec. 35 of which states:
SECTION 35. Election Offense.·Any violation of RA 9006 and
these Rules shall constitute an election offense punishable under the
first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code
in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. Any
aggrieved party may file a verified complaint for violation of these Rules
with the Law Department of the Commission.
49 Section 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules;
Election Offenses.·The COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all
political parties and candidates and the mass media entities the rules
and regulations for the implementation of this Act, consistent with the
criteria established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and
Section 86 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by
authority of this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their
publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation.
Prior to effectivity of said rules and regulations, no political
advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate or political
party shall be published or broadcast through mass media.
Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC
issued to implement this Act shall be an election offense punishable
under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
50 Sec. 264. Penalties.·Any person found guilty of any election
offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less
than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to

Page 24 of 68
probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which
shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political
party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of
243
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 243

OEC. Considering that San LuisÊ petition partakes of

the nature of a complaint for election offenses, the
COMELEC First Division has no jurisdiction over the
same based on COMELEC Resolution No. 938651 and
Section 26552 of the OEC.
Still, Ejercito contends that the COMELEC erroneously
sanctioned a change in San LuisÊ cause of action by the
mere expedient of changing the prayer in the latterÊs
Memorandum. According to him, San LuisÊ additional
prayer for dis-
_______________
not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such
party after criminal action has been instituted in which their
corresponding officials have been found guilty.
In case of prisoner or prisoners illegally released from any
penitentiary or jail during the prohibited period as provided in Section
261, paragraph (n) of this Code, the director of prisons, provincial
warden, keeper of the jail or prison, or persons who are required by law
to keep said prisoner in their custody shall, if convicted by a competent
court, be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prisión mayor in its
maximum period if the prisoner or prisoners so illegally released
commit any act of intimidation, terrorism of interference in the election.
Any person found guilty of the offense of failure to register or failure
to vote shall, upon conviction, be fined one hundred pesos. In addition,
he shall suffer disqualification to run for public office in the next
succeeding election following his conviction or be appointed to a public
office for a period of one year following his conviction.
51 Rules of Procedures in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Election Offense Cases in the Commission on Elections (Promulgated on
April 13, 2012).
52 Sec. 265. Prosecution.·The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any
complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file
the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
244

qualification in the Memorandum is a substantial

amendment to the Petition as it constitutes a material

Page 25 of 68
deviation from the original cause of action · from a
complaint for election offenses to a petition for
disqualification. Since such substantial amendment was
effected after the case was set for hearing, Ejercito
maintains that the same should have been allowed only
with prior leave of the COMELEC First Division pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 953 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
which San Luis never did.
The arguments are untenable.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws.54 A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed
pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.·Any candidate who, in an

decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having: (a) given money or other material
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
_______________
53 Sec. 2. Amendments Only by Leave.·After the case is set for

hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of the
Commission or the Division, as the case may be. Such leave may be
refused if it appears to the Commission or the Division that the motion
was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or
defense is substantially altered. Orders of the Commission or the
Division upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon
motion duly filed, and after the adverse the party has been notified and
afforded an opportunity to be heard.
54 Sunga v. COMELEC, supra note 33 at p. 324; p. 88, and Abella v.
Larrazabal, 259 Phil. 992, 1000; 180 SCRA 509, 517 (1989).
245
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 245

and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
requirement provided for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68(e) refer to

election campaign or partisan political activity outside the
campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or
defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83);

Page 26 of 68
certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation
of rules and regulations on election propaganda through
mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261[d]);
threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device
or other forms of coercion (Section 261[e]); unlawful
electioneering (Section 261[k]); release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds (Section 261[v]); solicitation of
votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the
election within the restricted areas (Section 261[cc],
subpar. 6). All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to
election offenses under the OEC, not to violations of other
penal laws. In other words, offenses that are punished in
laws other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a
Section 68 petition. Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify

candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
[OEC]. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of
the [OEC], the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders
before the regular courts of justice, viz.:
246

„Section 265. Prosecution.·The Commission shall, through

its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from its filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 268. Jurisdiction.·The regional trial court shall
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.‰55
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and

COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed
by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of
election offense but for disqualification as well. Indeed, the
following are clear indications:
_______________
55 Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 11 at pp. 177-178; pp. 670-

671. See also Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229,
October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105, 129; Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1, 29; and

Page 27 of 68
Blanco v. COMELEC, et al., 577 Phil. 622, 633-634; 554 SCRA 755, 765
(2008).
247
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 247

1. The title of San LuisÊ petition shows that the case was
brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9523.56 This expresses the objective of the action since
Rule 25 is the specific rule governing the disqualification of
candidates.
2. The averments of San LuisÊ petition rely on Section
68(a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action.
Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position
and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be
disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has
been elected, from holding the office.
3. Paragraph 2 of San LuisÊ prayer in the petition states
that „[in the event that [Ejercito] will be able to get a
majority vote of the electorate of the Province of Laguna on
May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further
order of the Honorable Commission.‰ San Luis reiterated
this plea when he later filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent
and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent.
The relief sought is actually pursuant to Section 657 of R.A.
No. 6646 and Section
_______________
56 Sec. 3 Rule 25 of which provides:

Section 3. Period to File Petition.·The Petition shall be filed any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation.
57 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.·Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
248

5 Rule 2558 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, both of

which pertain to the effect of a disqualification case when
the petition is unresolved by final judgment come election
day.
4. San LuisÊ Memorandum emphasized that the case is a
„Special Action for Disqualification,‰ praying that „[t]he
Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE
DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding
office as Governor of Laguna.‰

Page 28 of 68
With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of
the true nature and intent of San LuisÊ petition. This
considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss the
applicability of Section 2, Rule 9 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, there being no substantial amendment to San
LuisÊ petition that constitutes a material deviation from his
original causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution
No. 9386 and Section 265 of the OEC do not apply since
both refer solely to the prosecution of election offenses.
Specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an
amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while
Section
_______________
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
58 Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of
Canvass.·If a Petition for Disqualification is unresolved by final
judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner may file a motion with
the Division or Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to
suspend the proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the
evidence for the grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, at
least three (3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the Commission
shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners
copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition
to disqualify is proclaimed winner, the Commission shall continue to
resolve the said Petition.
249
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 249

265 of the OEC is found under Article XXII of said law

pertaining also to election offenses.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not

required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a
disqualification case
Assuming, arguendo, that San LuisÊ petition was

properly instituted as an action for disqualification,
Ejercito asserts that the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated
under Section 68 of the OEC were indeed committed is a
requirement prior to actual disqualification. He posits that
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is
silent on the matter of preliminary investigation; hence,
the clear import of this is that the necessity of preliminary
investigation provided for in COMELEC Resolution No.
2050 remains undisturbed and continues to be in full force
and effect.
We are not persuaded.
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
states:
Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before

Page 29 of 68
Completion of Canvass.·If a Petition for Disqualification is
unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the
petitioner may file a motion with the Division or Commission En
Banc where the case is pending, to suspend the proclamation of
the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the
grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, at least three
(3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the Commission shall
prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners
copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending
Petition to disqualify is proclaimed winner, the Commission shall
continue to resolve the said Petition.
250

It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is

silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because
it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals with
disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the
COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are
members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to
receive evidence only in cases involving barangay
officials.59 As aforementioned, the present rules of
procedure in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary
investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No.
9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC
who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region
(„NCR‰), Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional
Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors,
Regional Election Directors and lawyers of the Law
Department are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under the election laws which may be filed directly with
them, or which may be indorsed to them by the
COMELEC.60
Similarly, EjercitoÊs reliance on COMELEC Resolution
No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050,
which was adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a

number of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of the
provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on
matters of procedure in dealing with cases of this nature and the
manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;
_______________
59 Sec. 5, Rule 23 in relation to Sec. 4 Rule 25 of COMELEC

Resolution No. 9523.
60 Sec. 2.
251
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 251

Page 30 of 68
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the

disposition [of] disqualification cases contemplated under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep.
Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite
policy in the disposition of this specific class of disqualification
cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the
Commission En Banc:
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following
rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed
by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered
candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly
with the Commission before an election in which the respondent
is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in
fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission
results in a finding before election, that the respondent
candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the
Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent
candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election,
the Commission may motu proprio, or [on] motion of any of the
parties, refer the complaint to the [Law] Department of the
Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such
recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the
respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act
No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has
already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
252

However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary

investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before
proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall,
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However,
the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to
the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the
corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary
investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral
and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the

Page 31 of 68
Commission En Banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of
guilt, it shall submit with such study the Information for filing
with the appropriate court.61
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,62 the Court stated that the

above quoted resolution covers two (2) different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for

disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired
into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether
the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the
inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC
shall order the candidateÊs disqualification. In case the complaint
was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu
_______________
61 See Bagatsing v. COMELEC, 378 Phil. 585, 593-595; 320 SCRA

817, 826-827 (1999).
62 Id.
253
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 253

propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said

complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for
preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for
disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a)
who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has
already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint
shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred
to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the
corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong.63
However, with respect to Paragraph 1 of COMELEC

Resolution No. 2050, which is the situation in this case, We
held in Sunga:
x x x Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit

infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case.·Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candi-

Page 32 of 68
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 595-596; pp. 827-828.
254

date whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (italics

supplied)
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word
„shall‰ signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The
implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but
to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.
Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the
election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial
legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and
is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its
authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or
administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their
general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or
administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself
cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law
and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not
difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would
be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal
of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to
determine before the election if the offenses were indeed
committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that
the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics
so that the disqualification case based on the commission of
election offenses would not be decided before the election. This
scenario is productive of more fraud
255
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 255

which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the

law.64
The „exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a

preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws‰ stated in Par. 1 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal
aspect of a disqualification case. It has been repeatedly
underscored that an election offense has its criminal and

Page 33 of 68
electoral aspects. While its criminal aspect to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject
of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain
whether the offender should be disqualified from office can
be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summary in character. This Court said in Sunga:
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well

as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate.
Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown
hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction
is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other
hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be
disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a
clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
„shall be heard summarily after due notice.‰ It is the electoral
aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal
conviction.65
and equally in Lanot:
_______________
64 Supra note 33 at pp. 322-324; pp. 86-87. See also Lonzanida v.

COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625, 639-641; 311 SCRA 602, 615 (1999) and
Bagatsing v. COMELEC, id., at pp. 596-597; p. 829.
65 Supra note 33 at p. 324; p. 88.
256

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines

whether the offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in
character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, and vice versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an
election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its
Law Department, which determines whether probable cause
exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its
Law Department, files the criminal information before the
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification
of the offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office.
The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on
disposition and resolution of disqualification cases filed before or
after an election. When the disqualification case is filed before
the elections, the question of disqualification is raised before the
voting public. If the candidate is disqualified after the election,
those who voted for him assume the risk that their votes may be

Page 34 of 68
declared stray or invalid. There is no such risk if the petition is
filed after the elections. x x x66
We cannot accept EjercitoÊs argument that Lanot did not

categorically pronounce that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation exclusively pertains to the criminal aspect of
an action for disqualification or that a factual finding by
the
_______________
66 Supra note 30 at p. 360; pp. 139-140. See also Bagatsing v.

COMELEC, supra note 61 at p. 600; pp. 830-831 and Blanco v.
COMELEC, et al., supra note 55 at p. 632; p. 763.
257
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 257

authorized legal officers of the COMELEC may be

dispensed with in the proceedings for the administrative
aspect of a disqualification case. According to him, a close
reading of said case would reveal that upon filing of the
petition for disqualification with the COMELEC Division,
the latter referred the matter to the Regional Election
Director for the purpose of preliminary investigation;
therefore, Lanot contemplates two referrals for the conduct
of investigation · first, to the Regional Election Director,
prior to the issuance of the COMELEC First DivisionÊs
resolution, and second, to the Law Department, following
the reversal by the COMELEC En Banc.
For easy reference, the factual antecedents of Lanot are
as follows:
On March 19, 2004, a little less than two months before
the May 10, 2004 elections, Henry P. Lanot, et al. filed a
Petition for Disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of
the OEC against then incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente
P. Eusebio. National Capital Region Director Esmeralda
Amora-Ladra conducted hearings on the petition. On May
4, 2004, she recommended EusebioÊs disqualification and
the referral of the case to the COMELEC Law Department
for the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the
possible violation of Section 261(a) of the OEC. When the
COMELEC First Division issued a resolution adopting
Director LadraÊs recommendations on May 5, 2004, then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos informed the
pertinent election officers through an Advisory dated May
8, 2004. Eusebio filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May
9, 2004. On election day, Chairman Abalos issued a
memorandum to Director Ladra enjoining her from
implementing the May 5, 2004 COMELEC First Division
resolution. The petition for disqualification was not yet
finally resolved at the time of the elections. EusebioÊs votes
were counted and canvassed. After which, Eusebio was
proclaimed as the winning candidate for city mayor. On
August 20, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the
COMELEC First DivisionÊs order to disqualify Eusebio and
referred the case to the COMELEC Law Department for
preliminary investigation.

Page 35 of 68
258

When the issue was elevated to Us, the Court agreed

with Lanot that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the
disqualification case pending preliminary investigation of
the COMELEC Law Department. Error was made when it
ignored the electoral aspect of the disqualification case by
setting aside the COMELEC First DivisionÊs resolution
and referring the entire case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the criminal aspect. We noted that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, upon which the
COMELEC En Banc based its ruling, is procedurally
inconsistent with COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, which
was the governing rule at the time. The latter resolution
delegated to the COMELEC Field Officials the hearing and
reception of evidence of the administrative aspect of
disqualification cases in the May 10, 2004 National and
Local Elections. In marked contrast, in the May 2013
elections, it was only in cases involving barangay officials
that the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who
are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to
receive evidence.67
The COMELEC En Banc properly considered as

evidence the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013
Ejercito likewise asserts that the Advertising Contract

dated May 8, 2013 should not have been relied upon by the
COMELEC. First, it was not formally offered in evidence
pursuant to Section 34, Rule 13268 of the Rules and he was
not even furnished with a copy thereof, depriving him of
the opportunity to examine its authenticity and due
execution and
_______________
67 Supra note 59.

68 SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.·The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
259
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 259

object to its admissibility. Second, even if Section 34,

Rule 132 does not apply, administrative bodies exercising
quasi-judicial functions are nonetheless proscribed from
rendering judgment based on evidence that was never
presented and could not be controverted. There is a need to
balance the relaxation of the rules of procedure with the
demands of administrative due process, the tenets of which
are laid down in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.69 And third, the presentation of the
advertising contracts, which are highly disputable and on

Page 36 of 68
which no hearing was held for the purpose of taking
judicial notice in accordance with Section 3, Rule 12970 of
the Rules, cannot be dispensed with by COMELECÊs claim
that it could take judicial notice.
Contrary to EjercitoÊs claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules is inapplicable. Section 4, Rule 171 of the Rules of
Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to
election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. In
fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
requires that documentary evidence should be formally
offered in evidence.72 We remind
_______________
69 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

70 Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.·During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
71 Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable.·
These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.
72 Sec. 4, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states that,
except in motu proprio cases, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Rule
260

_______________
23 shall apply in proceedings to disqualify a candidate. Sec. 4 of Rule

23, in turn, provides:
Section 4. Procedure to be observed.·Both parties shall observe the
following procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of
the Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where
personal service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the
Petition, or the respondentsÊ whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the
petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances
therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of
service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;
2. The petition intended for the Commission shall be in eleven (11)
copies. Upon receipt of the Petition, payment of the filing fee of
P10,000.00 and legal research fee of P100.00 and official receipt, the
Office of the Clerk of the Commission shall docket the Petition and
assign to it a docket number, which must be consecutive according to the
order of receipt, and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA (DC);
3. The Petition shall contain the correct information as to the
addresses, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, and electronic mail of
both parties and counsel, if known;
4. No Petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the

Page 37 of 68
preceding paragraphs have been complied with;
5. Upon the proper filing and docketing of the Petition, the Clerk of
the Commission shall, within three (3) days, issue summons with notice
of conference through personal service, or in the event of impossibility or
shortness of time, resort to telegram, facsimile, electronic mail, or
through the fastest means of communication to the respondent and
notice of conference to the petitioner;
6. Within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of
summons, the respondent shall, personally or through his authorized
representative, file his verified Answer to the Petition with the Office of
the Clerk of the Commission in ten (10) legible copies, with proof of
personal service of answer upon the petitioner. A motion to dismiss shall
not be admitted, but grounds thereof may be raised as an affirma
261
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 261

_______________
tive defense. The failure of the respondent to file his verified Answer
within the reglementary period shall bar the respondent from
submitting controverting evidence or filing his memorandum;
7. The Clerk of the Commission or, in his/her absence, his/her duly
authorized representative, shall preside during the conference. It shall
be the duty of the parties or their duly-designated counsel, possessing a
written authority under oath, to appear during the conference. Should
the petitioner or his authorized counsel fail to appear, the Petition shall
be dismissed. Should respondent or his authorized counsel fail to
appear, the Petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. If the
petitioner or respondent is not present during the conference, the failure
of the counsel to produce a written authority under oath shall have the
effect of nonappearance unless the counsel has previously filed a
pleading bearing the conformity of his client. The following matters
shall be taken up during the conference:
a. Production of a written authority under oath of counsel;
b. Comparison between the original and/or certified true copies and
copies of documentary and real evidence; and
c. Setting of the period to file the partiesÊ respective memorandum,
which shall not be later than ten (10) days from the date of the
conference.
8. Unless the Division or the Commission En Banc requires a
clarificatory hearing, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution
upon the receipt of both partiesÊ Memoranda or upon the expiration of
the period to do so, whichever comes sooner;
9. The Memorandum of each party shall contain, in the above order
herein indicated, the following:
a. „Statement of the Case,‰ which is a clear and concise statement of
the nature of the action, a summary of the documentary evidence, and
other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the
controversy;
262

again that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case

is done through an administrative proceeding which is

Page 38 of 68
summary in character.
Granting, for argumentÊs sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court applies, there have been instances when
We
_______________
b. „Statement of the Issues,‰ which is a clear and concise statement of

the issues;
c. The „Argument‰ which is a clear and concise presentation of the
argument in support of each issue;
d. The „Objections to Evidence,‰ which states the partyÊs objections to
the real and documentary evidence of the other party and stating the
legal grounds for such objection;
e. The „Relief,‰ which is a specification of the judgment which the
party seeks to obtain. The issues raised in his/its pleadings that are not
included in the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned.
The Commission may consider the memorandum alone in deciding or
resolving the Petition, said memorandum being a summation of the
partiesÊ pleadings and documentary evidence; and
f. Annexes · which may consist of the real and documentary
evidence, including affidavits of witnesses in lieu of oral testimony, in
support of the statements or claims made in the Memorandum.
10. Prior to promulgation of a decision or resolution, a Division or the
Commission En Banc may, in its discretion, call for a hearing in the
event it deems it necessary to propound clarificatory questions on
factual issues;
11. No other pleadings seeking affirmative relief shall be allowed. If
after termination of the Conference, but prior to promulgation of a
decision or resolution, a supervening event occurs that produces
evidence that could materially affect the determination of the grant or
denial of the Petition, a party may submit the same to the Division or
Commission En Banc, where applicable, through a Manifestation.
263
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 263

suspended the strict application of the rule in the

interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity.73 Since
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, it is well-recognized that the Court is
empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular
case from the application of a general rule, when the rigid
application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote
the ends of justice.74 The fact is, even Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure fittingly
declare that „[the] rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote the effective and efficient implementation
of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission‰ and that „[in] the interest of justice and in
order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof
may be suspended by the Commission.‰ This Court said in
Hayudini v. Commission on Elections:75
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are

subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to

Page 39 of 68
liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the
interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its
objectives · ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC.
Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued
with public interest. It involves
_______________
73 See Llanes v. Republic, 592 Phil. 623, 633-634; 572 SCRA 258,
268-269 (2008) and AB Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Comm. of
Internal Revenue, 453 Phil. 297, 308; 405 SCRA 380, 383 (2003).
74 Llanes v. Republic, id., at pp. 633-634; p. 269.
75 Supra note 44.
264

not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of

rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And
the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their
rightful leader.76
Further, EjercitoÊs dependence on Ang Tibay is weak.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain oneÊs side or an opportunity to seek
for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.77 Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had
the opportunity to be heard thereon.78 In this case, it is
undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc. Despite this, he did not
rebut the authenticity and due execution of the advertising
contracts when he decided not to discuss the factual
findings of the COMELEC First Division on the alleged
ground that it may be construed as a waiver of the
jurisdictional issues that he raised.79
We agree with San Luis and the Office of the Solicitor
General that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129,80 the
COMELEC
_______________
76 Id.
77 Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147257, July 31, 2013, 702
SCRA 566, 583 and A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 494, 503.
78 See National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms,
Inc. (NASECORE) v. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERB), G.R. No.
190795, July 6, 2011, 653 SCRA 642, and A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v.
Office of the President, id.

Page 40 of 68
79 See page 26 of EjercitoÊs Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
(Rollo, p. 87)
80 Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.·A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
265
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 265

has the discretion to properly take judicial notice of the

Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013. In accordance
with R.A. No. 9006, the COMELEC, through its Campaign
Finance Unit, is empowered to:
a. Monitor fund raising and spending activities;

b. Receive and keep reports and statements of candidates,
parties, contributors and election contractors, and advertising
contracts of mass media entities;
c. Compile and analyze the reports and statements as soon as
they are received and make an initial determination of
compliance;
d. Develop and manage a recording system for all reports,
statements, and contracts received by it and to digitize
information contained therein;
e. Publish the digitized information gathered from the reports,
statements and contracts and make them available to the public;
f. Develop a reportorial and monitoring system;
g. Audit all reports, statements and contracts and determine
compliance by the candidates, parties, contributors, and election
contractors, including the inspection of Books and records of
candidates, parties and mass media entities and issue subpoenas
in relation thereto and submit its findings to the Commission En
Banc;
h. Coordinate with and/or assist other departments/offices of
the Commission receiving related reports on Campaign Finance
including prosecution of violators and collection of fines and/or
imposition of perpetual disqualification; and
i. Perform other functions as ordered by the Commission.81
_______________
are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known

to judges because of their judicial functions.
81 Sec. 1, Rule 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476.
266

The COMELEC may properly take and act on the

advertising contracts without further proof from the
parties herein. Aside from being considered as an
admission82 and presumed to be proper submissions from
them, the COMELEC already has knowledge of the
contracts for being ascertainable from its very own records.
Said contracts are ought to be known by the COMELEC
because of its statutory function as the legal custodian of
all advertising contracts promoting or opposing any
candidate during the campaign period. As what transpired

Page 41 of 68
in this case, the COMELEC has the authority and
discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts
with the certified true copies of the broadcast logs,
certificates of performance or other analogous records
which a broadcast station or entity is required to submit
for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time
and duration of advertisements aired.
To be precise, R.A. No. 9006 provides:
Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and

Broadcast Election Propaganda.·
xxxx
4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to
the candidate or political party shall not be printed, published,
broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by the
said candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall
be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to
the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.
_______________
82 Sec. 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 26. Admission of a party.·The act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
267
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 267

Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space.·All

registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal
access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be
amplified on by the COMELEC:
xxxx
6.2
xxxx
(b.) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for
a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty
(60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes
of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast
station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its
broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and
verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of
advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC
with a copy of all contracts for advertising, promoting or
opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for
public office within five (5) days after its signing. x x x
The implementing guidelines of the above quoted

provisions are found in Rule 5 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9476 ·
Section 2. Submission of Copies of Advertising

Contracts.·All media entities shall submit a copy of its
advertising and or broadcast contracts, media purchase orders,
booking orders, or other similar documents to the Commission
through its Campaign Finance Unit, accompanied by a summary
report in the prescribed form (Annex „E‰) together with official

Page 42 of 68
receipts issued for advertising, promoting or opposing a party, or
the candi-
268

dacy of any person for public office, within five (5) days after
its signing, through:
a. For Media Entities in the NCR
The Education and Information Department (EID), which
shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the
Commission.
b. For Media Entities outside of the NCR
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned who shall
furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information
Department of the Commission within five (5) days after the
campaign periods. The EID shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission.
xxxx
It shall be the duty of the EID to formally inform media
entities that the latterÊs failure to comply with the mandatory
provisions of this Section shall be considered an election offense
punishable pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006. [RA
9006, Secs. 6.3 and 13]
and in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 ·
SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the

Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media.·All
parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to
media time and space for their election propaganda during the
campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or
limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda
xxx
Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement
contract be furnished to the Commission, thru the Education and
Information Department, within five (5) days from contract
signing.
269
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 269

xxx
d. Common requirements/limitations:
xxx
(3) For the above purpose, each broadcast entity and website
owner or administrator shall submit to the Commission a
certified true copy of its broadcast logs, certificates of
performance, or other analogous record, including certificates
of acceptance as required in Section 7(b) of these
Guidelines, for the review and verification of the frequency,
date, time and duration of advertisements aired for any
candidate or party through:
For Broadcast Entities in the NCR –
The Education and Information Department (EID) which in
turn shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit

Page 43 of 68
(CFU) of the Commission within five days from receipt thereof.
For Broadcast Entities outside of the NCR –
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in
turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and
Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn
shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU)
of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt thereof.
For website owners or administrators –
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in
turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and
Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn
shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU)
of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt thereof.
All broadcast entities shall preserve their broadcast logs for a
period of five (5) years
270

from the date of broadcast for submission to the Commission

whenever required.
Certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of
performance, and certificates of acceptance, or other analogous
record shall be submitted, as follows:
For subsequent elections, the schedule for the submission of

reports shall be prescribed by the Commission.
Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his

election campaign an amount in excess of what is
allowed by the OEC
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between

ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed by an identified
supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact,
his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming
that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he
should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties
who acted on their own without his consent. Citing
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission83 decided
by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has
the right to support a particular candidate in accor-
_______________
83 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

Page 44 of 68
271
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 271

dance with the free exercise of his or her rights of

speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.84 He believes that an
advertising contract paid for by a third party without the
candidateÊs knowledge and consent must be considered a
form of political speech that must prevail against the laws
suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence.
Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC
Resolution No. 947685 distinguishes between „contribution‰
and „expenditure‰ and makes no proscription on the
medium or amount of contribution.86 He also stresses that
it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the
limit set by law applies only to election expendi-
_______________
84 Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
85 Rules and Regulations Governing Campaign Finance and
Disclosure in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections and Subsequent Elections Thereafter (Promulgated on June
22, 2012).
86 Sec. 94 of the OEC states:
SECTION 94. Definitions.·As used in this Article:
(a) The term „contribution‰ includes a gift, donation, subscription,
loan, advance or deposit of money or anything of value, or a contract,
promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally enforceable,
made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections but shall
not include services rendered without compensation by individuals
volunteering a portion or all of their time in behalf of a candidate or
political party. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily
donated by other persons, the money value of which can be assessed
based on the rates prevailing in the area.
(b) The term „expenditure‰ includes the payment or delivery of
money or anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to
make an expenditure, for the purpose of influencing the results of the
election. It shall also include the use of facilities personally owned by
the candidate, the money value of the use of which can be assessed
based on the rates prevailing in the area.
x x x x x x x x x
272

tures of candidates and not to contributions made by

third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature
imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is
presumably because discussion of public issues and debate
on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the government.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts

Page 45 of 68
between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed without EjercitoÊs
knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First
Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence
by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the
COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express
conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because noncompliance is considered as an election
offense.87
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast
advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be
broadcasted without the written acceptance of the
candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and
that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by
the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representative of the political party.88
Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC
Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda
materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted
unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said
candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt
in the name of the candidate and must specify the
description of the items donated, their quantity and value,
and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media
purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the
candidate concerned or by the duly authorized
representative of the party and, in case of a donation,
should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the
candidate, party or their authorized representa-
_______________
87 Sec. 13, R.A. No. 9006.

88 R.A. No. 9006, Sections 4.3 and 6.3.
273
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 273

tives.89 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also

unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to
broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of
charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate
without the written acceptance of the said candidate and
unless they bear and be identified by the words „airtime
for this broadcast was provided free of charge by‰ followed
by the true and correct name and address of the donor.90
This Court cannot give weight to EjercitoÊs
representation that his signature on the advertising
contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised
only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a
rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged
in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below
cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the
Supreme Court.91 It would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that
was not brought up before the COMELEC.92 While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that elementary considerations of due process
require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against

Page 46 of 68
him before judgment may be rendered.93
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were
executed without EjercitoÊs knowledge and consent, and
whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues
of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65
petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not
equipped to receive
_______________
89 Rule 5, Sections 1 and 2.

90 Sec. 7(b).
91 People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343, 349; 267 SCRA 682, 689
(1997).
92 See F. F. Mañacop Construction Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 334
Phil. 208, 211-212; 266 SCRA 235, 238 (1997).
93 Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., G.R. No. 169548,
March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 362, 379.
274

evidence and determine the truth of factual

allegations.94 Instead, the findings of fact made by the
COMELEC, or by any other administrative agency
exercising expertise in its particular field of competence,
are binding on the Court. As enunciated in Juan v.
Commission on Elections:95
Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their

specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts,
and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented,
they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the
governmental structure, should not be disturbed. The
COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized
constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has
more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or
conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.
x x x96
Having determined that the subject TV advertisements

were done and broadcasted with EjercitoÊs consent, it
follows that Citizens United does not apply. In said US
case, a nonprofit corporation sued the Federal Election
Commission, assailing, among others, the constitutionality
of a ban on corporate independent expenditures for
electioneering communications under 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b.
The corporation released a documentary film unfavorable
of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for
the Democratic PartyÊs Presidential nomination. It wanted
to make the film available through video-on-demand
within thirty (30) days of the primary elections, and it
produced advertisements to
_______________

Page 47 of 68
94 Typoco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 186359, March 5,
2010, 614 SCRA 391, 393-394 and V.C. Cadangen, et al. v. Commission
on Elections, 606 Phil. 752, 760; 588 SCRA 738, 745 (2009).
95 Supra note 45.
96 Id., at p. 303; p. 129.
275
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 275

promote the film. However, federal law prohibits all

corporations · including nonprofit advocacy corporations
· from using their general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for speech that is an
„electioneering communication‰97 or for speech that
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate
within thirty (30) days of a primary election and sixty (60)
days of a general election. The US Supreme Court held
that the ban imposed under § 441b on corporate
independent expenditures violated the First
Amendment98 because the Government could not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speakerÊs identity as a
non-profit or for-profit corporation. It was opined:
Section 441bÊs prohibition on corporate independent

expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a „restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign,‰ that statute „necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached.‰ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct.
612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Were the Court to
uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech
by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the
speech process. See McConnell, supra, at p. 251, 124 S. Ct. 619,
517 L. Ed. 2d 491 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (Government could
repress speech by „attacking all levels of
_______________
97 An electioneering communication is „any broadcast, cable, or

satellite communication‰ that „refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office‰ and is made within 30 days of a primary election, § 434(f)
(3)(A), and that is „publicly distributed,‰ 11 CFR § 100.29(a)(2), which in
„the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means‰ that
the communication „[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a
State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days.‰ (See
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 [2010])
98 The First Amendment provides that „Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.‰
276

the production and dissemination of ideas,‰ for „effective

public communication requires the speaker to make use of the
services of others‰). If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would
believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on

Page 48 of 68
speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices
the Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the
means to hold officials accountable to the people. See Buckley,
supra, at pp. 14-15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 („In a republic
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential‰).
The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First
Amendment „Âhas its fullest and most urgent applicationÊ to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.‰ Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223,
109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989) (quoting Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d
35 [1971]); see Buckley, supra, at p. 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed.
2d 659 („Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution‰).
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws
that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws
that burden political speech are „subject to strict scrutiny,‰ which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction „furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.‰ WRTL, 551 U.S., 464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d
329 (opinion of Roberts, CJ.). While it might be maintained that
political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a
categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 124, 112 S.
Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment),
the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient framework
for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this
case. We shall employ it here.
277
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 277

Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First

Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects
or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865
(2000) (striking down content-based restriction). Prohibited, too,
are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d
707 (1978). As instruments to censor, these categories are
interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking
the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speakerÊs voice. The Government may not by
these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions
that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these

Page 49 of 68
rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental
entities to perform their functions. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed.
2d 549 (1986) (protecting the „function of public school
education‰); Jones v. North Carolina PrisonersÊ Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977)
(furthering „the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system‰ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974)
(ensuring „the capacity of the Government to discharge its
[military] responsibilities‰ [internal quotation marks omitted]);
Civil Service CommÊn v. Letter Car-
278

riers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796

(1973) („[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious
performance rather than political service‰). The corporate
independent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would
not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are
inapposite. These precedents stand only for the proposition that
there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate
without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By
contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political process that
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in
order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin,
the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a class of speakers
from the general public dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to
this conclusion.
The previous decisions of the US Supreme Court in

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce99 (which ruled
that political speech may be banned based on the speakerÊs
corporate identity) and the relevant portion of McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission100 (which upheld the limits
on electioneering communications in a facial challenge)
were, in effect, overruled by Citizens United.
Like Citizens United is the 1976 case of Buckley v.
Valeo.101 In this much earlier case, the US Supreme Court
ruled, among other issues elevated to it for resolution, on a
provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended, (FECA)102 which limits independent political
expenditures by an individual or group advocating the
election or defeat of
_______________
99 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

100 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
101 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
102 18 USCS 608(e)(1).
279

Page 50 of 68
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 279
a clearly identified candidate for federal office to $1,000

per year. Majority of the US Supreme Court expressed the
view that the challenged provision is unconstitutional as it
impermissibly burdens the right of free expression under
the First Amendment, and could not be sustained on the
basis of governmental interests in preventing the actuality
or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the resources
of candidates.103
_______________
103 The US Supreme Court ruled in Buckley:

The discussion in Part I-A, supra, explains why the ActÊs expenditure
limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and
association than do its contribution limitations. The markedly greater
burden on basic freedoms caused by § 608(e)(1) thus cannot be sustained
simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the
less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of §
608(e)(1) turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its
support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core
First Amendment rights of political expression.
We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify
§ 608(e)(1)Ês ceiling on independent expenditures. First, assuming,
arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers
of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large
contributions, § 608(e)(1) does not provide an answer that sufficiently
relates to the elimination of those dangers. Unlike the contribution
limitationsÊ total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to
candidates, § 608(e)(1) prevents only some large expenditures. So long
as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are
free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his
views. The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary
to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitationÊs
effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating
circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a
candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to
believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that
skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but
nevertheless benefited the candi-
280

_______________
dateÊs campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served

by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that
permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited
sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for
elective office. Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 220.
Second, quite apart from the shortcomings of § 608(e)(1) in
preventing any abuses generated by large independent expenditures,
the independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently

Page 51 of 68
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to
those identified with large campaign contributions. The parties
defending § 608(e)(1) contend that it is necessary to prevent would-be
contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations by the simple
expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for other
portions of the candidateÊs campaign activities. They argue that
expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his
campaign might well have virtually the same value to the candidate as
a contribution and would pose similar dangers of abuse. Yet such
controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions
rather than expenditures under the Act. Section 608(b)Ês contribution
ceilings rather than § 608(e)(1)Ês independent expenditure limitation
prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or
coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions. By
contrast, § 608(e)(1) limits expenditures for express advocacy of
candidates made totally independently of the candidate and his
campaign. Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may
well provide little assistance to the candidateÊs campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo
for improper commitments from the candidate. Rather than preventing
circumvention of the contribution limitations, § 608(e)(1) severely
restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished
potential for abuse.
While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core
First Amendment expression. For the First Amendment right to „speak
oneÊs mind... on all public institutions‰ includes the right to engage in
„Âvigorous advocacyÊ no less than Âabstract discussion.Ê‰
281
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 281

_______________
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 269, quoting Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
429. Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is
no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the
discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or
defeat of legislation.
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy
of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by § 608(e)(1)Ês
expenditure ceiling. But the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed „to secure Âthe widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources,Ê‰ and Âto assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.‰ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra,
at pp. 266, 269, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 484. The First AmendmentÊs
protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot
properly be made to depend on a personÊs financial ability to engage in
public discussion. Cf. Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127,

Page 52 of 68
139 (1961).
The CourtÊs decisions in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), held that
legislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political
candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First
Amendment. In Mills, the Court addressed the question whether „a
State, consistently with the United States Constitution, can make it a
crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to write and publish an
editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues
submitted to them.‰ 384 U.S. 215 (emphasis in original). We held that
„no test of reasonableness can save [such] a state law from invalidation
as a violation of the First Amendment.‰ Id., at p. 220. Yet the prohibition
of election-day editorials invalidated in Mills is clearly a lesser intrusion
on constitutional freedom than a $1,000 limitation on the amount of
money any person or association can spend during an entire election
year in advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for public office.
More recently in Tornillo, the
282

Even so, the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find

bearing only on matters related to „independent
expenditures,‰ an election law concept which has no
application in this jurisdiction. In the US context,
independent expenditures for or against a particular
candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to
those expenses made by an individual, a group or a legal
entity which are not authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an
agent of the candidate; they are expenditures that are not
placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a
candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the
candidate.104 In contrast, there is no similar provision here
in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its
implementing rules and regulations106 specifically make it
unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print,
broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the
candidate without the written acceptance of said
candidate.
If at all, another portion of the Buckley decision is
significant to this case. One of the issues resolved therein
is the validity of a provision of the FECA which imposes
$1,000 limitation on political contributions by individuals
and groups
_______________
Court held that Florida could not constitutionally require a

newspaper to make space available for a political candidate to reply to
its criticism. Yet under the Florida statute, every newspaper was free to
criticize any candidate as much as it pleased so long as it undertook the
modest burden of printing his reply. See 418 U.S. 256-257. The
legislative restraint involved in Tornillo thus also pales in comparison to
the limitations imposed by § 608(e)(1).
For the reasons stated, we conclude that § 608(e)(1)Ês independent
expenditure limitation is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
104 See Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 101.
105 Sec. 4.3 in relation to Sec. 13.

Page 53 of 68
106 Sections 1 and 2 Rule 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 and
Sec. 7(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
283
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 283

to candidates and authorized campaign committees.107

Five justices of the nine-member US Supreme Court
sustained the challenged provision on the grounds that it
does not violate First Amendment speech and association
rights or invidiously discriminate against nonincumbent
candidates and minority party candidates but is supported
by substantial governmental interests in limiting
corruption and the appearance of corruption. It was held:
As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the

primary First Amendment problem raised by the ActÊs
contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the
contributorÊs freedom of political association. The CourtÊs
decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the
right of association is a „basic constitutional freedom,‰ Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 57, that is „closely allied to freedom of speech
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a
free society.‰ Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See,
e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960);
_______________
107 Buckley explained: „Section 608(b) provides, with certain limited

exceptions, that Âno person shall make contributions to any candidate
with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate,
exceed $1,000.Ê The statute defines ÂpersonÊ broadly to include Âan
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any
other organization or group of persons.Ê § 591(g). The limitation reaches
a gift, subscription, loan, advance, deposit of anything of value, or
promise to give a contribution, made for the purpose of influencing a
primary election, a Presidential preference primary, or a general
election for any federal office. §§ 591(e)(1), (2). The $1,000 ceiling applies
regardless of whether the contribution is given to the candidate, to a
committee authorized in writing by the candidate to accept
contributions on his behalf, or indirectly via earmarked gifts passed
through an intermediary to the candidate.
§§ 608(b)(4), (6). The restriction applies to aggregate amounts
contributed to the candidate for each election · with primaries, run-off
elections, and general elections counted separately and all Presidential
primaries held in any calendar year treated together as a single election
campaign. § 608(b)(5).‰
284

NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at pp. 460-461; NAACP v. Button,

supra, at p. 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the
fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental
„action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.‰ NAACP v. Alabama,
supra, at pp. 460-461. Yet, it is clear that „[n]either the right to

Page 54 of 68
associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute.‰ CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973). Even
a „Âsignificant interferenceÊ with protected rights of political
association‰ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.
Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, at p. 488; NAACP v. Button, supra, at
p. 438; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at p. 488.
Appellees argue that the ActÊs restrictions on large campaign
contributions are justified by three governmental interests.
According to the parties and amici, the primary interest
served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a
whole, is the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or
imagined coercive influence of large financial
contributions on candidatesÊ positions and on their
actions if elected to office. Two „ancillary‰ interests
underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered by the
$1,000 limits on contributions. First, the limits serve to
mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the
election process and thereby to equalize the relative
ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.
Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some extent act
as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns
and thereby serve to open the political system more
widely to candidates without access to sources of large
amounts of money.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the ActÊs primary purpose ·
to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions · in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient
285
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 285

justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation. Under a

system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking
immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial
contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to
conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the
communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and
polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of
large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an
effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions
are given to secure political quid pro quoÊs from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined. Although the
scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably
ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the
1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory
one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.
In CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, the Court found that the danger
to „fair and effective government‰ posed by partisan political
conduct on the part of federal employees charged with
administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to
justify broad restrictions on the employeesÊ right of partisan

Page 55 of 68
political association. Here, as there, Congress could legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper
influence „is also critical... if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.‰ 413 U.S. 565
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be
invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure
requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with
„proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.‰ But laws
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only
the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to
influence governmental action. And while disclosure re-
286

quirements serve the many salutary purposes discussed

elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was surely entitled to
conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that
contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a
system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when
the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.
The ActÊs $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on
the problem of large campaign contributions · the narrow
aspect of political association where the actuality and potential
for corruption have been identified · while leaving persons free
to engage in independent political expression, to associate
actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a
limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting
candidates and committees with financial resources.
Significantly, the ActÊs contribution limitations in themselves do
not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust
and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by
individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties.
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review
established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served
by restricting the size of financial contributions to political
candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.
(Emphasis supplied)
Until now, the US Supreme Court has not overturned

the ruling that, with respect to limiting political
contributions by individuals and groups, the GovernmentÊs
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance was „sufficiently important‰ or „compelling‰ so
that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny.108
_______________
108 See McCutcheon, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S.

Ct. 1434 (2014).
287
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 287

Page 56 of 68
In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to

foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or
jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy
and that even in the absence of local statute and case law,
foreign jurisprudence are merely persuasive authority at
best since they furnish an uncertain guide.109 We prompted
in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric
Company:110
x x x American decisions and authorities are not per se

controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive for no
court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be
construed in accordance with the intention of our own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our
own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our
laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is
distinct and different from others.111
and once more in Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas:112
x x x [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the

American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are
no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law
is concerned.... [I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which
are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different
_______________
109 See VDA Fish Broker v. National Labor Relations Commission,

G.R. Nos. 76142-43, December 27, 1993, 228 SCRA 681 and Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 263 Phil. 806, 817; 185 SCRA 110, 121
(1990).
110 449 Phil. 118; 401 SCRA 130 (2003).
111 Id., at p. 127; p. 134.
112 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).
288

constitutional settings and needs. Indeed, although the

Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged.113
Indeed, in Osmeña v. COMELEC,114 this Court, in

reaffirming its ruling in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections115 that Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
6646116 does not invade and violate the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression, remarked in

Page 57 of 68
response to the dissent of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero:
On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the

present case, in batting for an „uninhibited market place of
ideas,‰ quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of
some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment
which was designed to „secure the
_______________
113 Id., at p. 598; pp. 387-388, citing Francisco, Jr. v. House of

Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 889; 415 SCRA 44, 130 (2003).
114 351 Phil. 692; 288 SCRA 447 (1998).
115 G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992, 207 SCRA 1.
116 Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.·In
addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station,
other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell
or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections
90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such
during the campaign period.
This so-called „political ad ban‰ under R.A. 6646 was later repealed
by R.A. 9006.
289
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 289

widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and

antagonistic sources‰ and „to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.‰
But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to
justify striking down a limit on campaign expenditure on the
theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view that
government may not restrict the speech of some in order to
enhance the relative voice of others also think that the campaign
expenditure limitation found in our election laws is
unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one
vote, is this not based on the political equality of voters? Voting
after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of the people ·
even of God. The notion that the government may restrict the
speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others
may be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the
Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of
that document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, § 4 is not the only provision in the
Constitution mandating political equality. Art. XIII, § 1 requires
Congress to give the „highest priority‰ to the enactment of
measures designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II,
§ 26 declares as a fundamental principle of our government
„equal access to opportunities for public service.‰ Access to public
office will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot even have

Page 58 of 68
access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. What
fortress principle trumps or overrides these provisions for
political equality?
Unless the idealism and hopes which fired the imagination of
those who framed the Constitution now appear dim to us, how
can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the
Constitution, of which § 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to §§
90 and 92 are part, be considered infringements on freedom of
speech? That the framers contemplated regulation of political
propaganda similar to § 11(b) is clear from the following portion
of the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:
290

MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of

the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges or
concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision that
during the election period, the Commission may regulate, among
other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This has to do with the media of communication or
information.117
Proceeding from the above, the Court shall now rule on

EjercitoÊs proposition that the legislature imposes no legal
limitation on campaign donations. He vigorously asserts
that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes
between „contribution‰ and „expenditure‰ and makes no
proscription on the medium or amount of contribution
made by third parties in favor of the candidates, while the
limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates.
We deny.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166118 sets the current allowable
limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for
election campaign, thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political

Parties.·The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered
political party may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
_______________
117 Osmeña v. COMELEC, supra note 114 at pp. 713-714; pp. 472-
473.
118 Entitled „An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
Therefor, and for Other Purposes‰ and was signed into law on November
26, 1991.
291
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Page 59 of 68
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice
President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for
every voter currently registered in the constituency where he
filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate
without any political party and without support from any
political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for
every such voter; and
(b) For political parties – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where
it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party
or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to
the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift
tax.119
_______________
119 Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 provides:

Section 1. Authorized expenses of candidates and parties.·
The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spend for an
election campaign shall be as follows:
a. President and Vice President – Ten Pesos (Php10.00) for every
registered voter;
b. For other candidates – Three Pesos (Php3.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy;
c. Candidate without any political party and without support from
any political party – Five Pesos (Php5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy; and
d. Political parties and party list groups – Five Pesos (Php5.00) for
every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official
292
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 292

Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed
by R.A. No. 7166.120 These provisions, which are merely
amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned,
read:
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.·

No candidate shall spend for his election cam-
_______________
candidates. [RA 7166, Section 13, Paragraphs 2 and 3]

For the May 2013 elections, Sec. 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
reiterates:
SECTION 5. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties.
·The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spend for
election cam
paign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy.

Page 60 of 68
b. For other candidates without any political party and without
support from any political party – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for
every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
The exemption from donorÊs tax is stated in Sec. 3 Rule 3 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476.
120 Sec. 39 of R.A. No. 7166 provides:
SEC. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause.·Sections 107, 108 and
245 of the Omnibus Election Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the
inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of the violations
of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among election
offenses is also hereby repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive
effect.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order
Nos. 144 and 157 and all other laws, orders, decrees, rules and
regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.
293
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 293

paign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty

centavos for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses
herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused
to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind,
including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the
campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or
aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used
is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount
commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on
the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the
total expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political
parties.·A duly accredited political party may spend for the
election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates an aggregate amount not
exceeding the equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for every
voter currently registered therein. Expenses incurred by
branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be
included in the computation of the total expenditures of the
political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be
considered as expenses of their respective individual candidates
and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election
expenditures.·No person, except the candidate, the
treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by
such candidate or treasurer, shall make any expenditure in
support of or in opposition to any candidate or political party.
Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the treasurer
of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such
candidate or political party.
294

Page 61 of 68
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy

of which shall be furnished the Commission signed by the
candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the
expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full name and
exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis
supplied)121
The focal query is: How shall We interpret „the expenses

herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to
be incurred by the candidate‰ and „except the candidate, the
treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by
such candidate or treasurer‰ found in Sections 100 and
103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude
from the allowable election expenditures the contributions
of third par-
_______________
121 Pursuant to the law, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476

in the same way states:
Section 2. Coverage of the Expenses.·The expenses herein
referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be
incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the
use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign.
If the foregoing are owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, and the use of which are given free of charge to the
candidate, the candidate shall assess and declare the amount
commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the
prevailing rate in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses
incurred by the candidate. [n]
The Commission shall have the power to determine if the assessment
is based on the prevailing rates in the locality and effect the necessary
correction. [OEC, Sec. 100]
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.
·No person, except the candidate, the treasurer of the party, or
any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall
make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or
the party. Such expenditures, if duly authorized, shall be considered as
expenditure of such candidate or party. [OEC, Sec. 103, Par. 1]
(Emphasis supplied)
295
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 295

ties made with the consent of the candidate? The Court

holds not.
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or
when the application of the law would lead to absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory
construction may be resorted to such as the legislative
history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that
courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of

Page 62 of 68
the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as
prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain
the true intent or spirit of the law.122
Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101,
and 103 of the OEC are substantially lifted from P.D. No.
1296,123 as amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which
specifically provide:
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.·No

candidate shall spend for his election campaign an amount more
than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one
year attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided,
That the expenses herein referred to shall include those
incurred by the candidate, his contributors and
supporters, whether in cash or in kind, including the use,
rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided,
further, That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the
candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is
hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use
_______________
122 See Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648
SCRA 400, 455; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 183505, February 26, 2010, 613 SCRA 774,
778-779; and League of Cities of the Phils., et al. (LCP) v. COMELEC, et
al., 592 Phil. 1, 30; 571 SCRA 263, 319 (2008).
123 Otherwise known as „The 1978 Election Code.‰
296

thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall

be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa,
they shall not spend more than sixty thousand pesos for their
election campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties,
groups or aggrupations.·A political party, group or aggrupation
may not spend for the election of its candidates in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates an
aggregate amount more than the equivalent of fifty centavos for
every voter currently registered therein: Provided, That
expenses incurred by such political party, group or aggrupation
not duly registered with the Commission and/or not presenting
or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be considered as
expenses of its candidates and subject to the limitation under
Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters
or committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be
included in the computation of the total expenditures of the
political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election
expenditures.·No person, except the candidate or any
person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political
party, group or aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in
support of, or in opposition to any candidate or political party,
group or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the

Page 63 of 68
candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation
shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate or political
party, group or aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy
of which shall be furnished the Commission, signed by the
candidate or the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation and
showing the expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full
name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis
supplied)
297
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 297

Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known

as the „Election Code of 1971‰) was enacted.124 Sections 41
and 42 of which are relevant, to quote:
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates.·No

candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the
total amount of salary for the full term attached to the office for
which he is a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties
and Other Nonpolitical Organizations.·No political party as
defined in this Code shall spend for the election of its candidates
an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of one peso for
every voter currently registered throughout the country in case
of a regular election, or in the constituency in which the election
shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in
conjunction with a regular election. Any other organization
not connected with any political party, campaigning for
or against a candidate, or for or against a political party
shall not spend more than
_______________
124 R.A. No. 6388 was approved on September 2, 1971. It repealed,

among others, Sections 48 and 49 of R.A. No. 180 that was approved on
June 21, 1947. Sections 48 and 49 state:
SEC. 48. Limitation upon expenses of candidates.·No candidate
shall spend for his election campaign more than the total amount of the
emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a
candidate.
SEC. 49. Unlawful expenditures.·It is unlawful for any person to
make or offer to make an expenditure, or to cause an expenditure to be
made or offered to any person to induce one either to vote or withhold
his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate, or any aspirant for the
nomination or selection of a candidate of a political party, and it is
unlawful for any person to solicit or receive directly or indirectly any
expenditure for any of the foregoing considerations.
In turn, the above provisions were lifted from Sections 42 and 43 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was approved on August 22, 1938.
298


Page 64 of 68
a total amount of five thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
Much earlier, Section 12(G) of R.A. No. 6132,125 which

implemented the resolution of both Houses of Congress
calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated:
Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Pro-

paganda.·The following provisions shall govern election
spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act:
xxx
(G) All candidates and all other persons making or
receiving expenditures, contributions or donations which
in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose
the candidacy of any candidate, shall file a statement of all such
expenditures and contributions made or received on such dates
and with such details as the Commission on Elections shall
prescribe by rules. The total expenditures made by a
candidate, or by any other person with the knowledge
and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two
thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101,

and 103 of the OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the
intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the
years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the
aggregate limit of the formerÊs election expenses those
incurred by the latter. The phrase „those incurred or
caused to be incurred by the candidate‰ is sufficiently
adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or
donated in the candidateÊs behalf. By virtue of the legal
requirement that a contribution or donation should bear
_______________
125 Otherwise known as „The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act‰

(Approved on August 24, 1970).
299
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 299

the written conformity of the candidate, a

contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as „any
person authorized by such candidate or treasurer.‰ Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.126 (Where the
law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should
be no distinction in the application of a law where none is
indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to
the candidateÊs allowable limit of election expenses does
not trample upon the free exercise of the votersÊ rights of
speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,127 the lawÊs
concern is
_______________

Page 65 of 68
126 Plopenio v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 161090,
July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 537, 543.
127 In Chavez v. Gonzales, et al. (569 Phil. 155; 545 SCRA 441
[2008]), the Court distinguished between content-based and content-
neutral regulations:
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act
constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction
has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-
defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.
The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged
act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress
any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of
judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach · somewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the
compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The
test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely
rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions
be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant
governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this
manner:
300

_______________
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the

constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the
content-based restraint will be struck down.
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must
also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would
bring about · especially the gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm · otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, „but only by showing a substantive and imminent
evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.‰ As
formulated, „the question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.‰
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an

Page 66 of 68
important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.
Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than
what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. A restriction that is
so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest will be invalidated. The regulation, therefore,
must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose,
with the least restrictive means undertaken.
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral
regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based
regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will
pass constitutional muster only if justified by a com-
301
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 301

not to curtail the message or content of the

advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to
ensure equality between and among aspirants with „deep
pockets‰ and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is
no more than necessary to achieve the substantial
governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity
in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objectives set out in
Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section
1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.128 Indeed, to rule otherwise
would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for
political advertising, which skews the political process and
subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of
government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21,
2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 13-
06 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution
of the
_______________
pelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad

nor vague. (pp. 204-208)
128 Art. II, Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service x x x.
Art. IX-C(4). The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits from the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or -controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor for public information
campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that x x x reduce x x x political inequalities x x x
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
302

Page 67 of 68
COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for

disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar „Egay‰
S. San Luis against petitioner Emilio Ramon „E.R.‰ P.
Ejercito, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion and Jardeleza, JJ., No part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, resolution dated May 21, 2014 affirmed.
Notes.·The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for

certain remedies to assail a candidateÊs bid for public office.
Among these which obtain particular significance to this
case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section
68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. (Tagolino vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 574
[2013])
The petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their
right to be heard on the merits because of the Court of
AppealÊs (CAÊs) unreasonable obsession to reduce its load.
(Heirs of Amada A. Zaulda vs. Zaulda, 719 SCRA 308
[2014])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 742

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 211

nary course of law. It is a legal remedy that is limited to the

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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of

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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 213

Same; Suspension of Rules of Procedure; Since rules of

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the alleged ground that it may be construed as a waiver of

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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 215

tising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders

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216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by

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current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and

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218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

upon the free exercise of the votersÊ rights of speech and of

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64,

1 Rollo, pp. 29-49.

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 219

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before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,

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constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of

13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he

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requirement provided for in the election laws.‰ (emphasis

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224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4. Other relief, just and equitable under the premises, are

Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very

4 Rollo, pp. 91-96.

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 225

show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De

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11 442 Phil. 139; 393 SCRA 639 (2002).

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure

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It was stressed that the case is a „Special Action for

14 Records, pp. 50, 56; Rollo, p. 135.

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 227

Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,19 San Luis

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First

In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a non-