Managing A Crisis

MANAGING
A CRISIS
A Practical Guide
Tom Curtin
with
Daniel Hayman and Naomi Husein
Managing a Crisis
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MANAGING
A CRISIS
A Practical Guide
Tom Curtin
with
Daniel Hayman and Naomi Husein
© Tom Curtin 2005
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
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Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their right to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2005 by
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CONTENTS
Introduction ix
Acknowledgements xi
Section A What Makes a Crisis 1

Chapter 1 The Three Types of Crisis 3
Chapter 2 Evolution of a Crisis: the Crisis Curve 10
Chapter 3 Predicting a Crisis 18
Chapter 4 Why Managing a Crisis Matters 28
Section B The Organisation and its Universe 33

Chapter 5 Organisations and their Leadership 35
Chapter 6 The Media in a Crisis 42
Chapter 7 The Politicians and Regulators 50
Chapter 8 The Activists: Making Crises Happen 64
Chapter 9 Other Stakeholders: Dealing with the Public,
Customers and Suppliers 72
Section C Design,Testing and Implementation 77

Chapter 10 Overview of the Process 79
Chapter 11 The Importance of Third Party Advocates 81
Chapter 12 The Crisis Management Team 94
Chapter 13 Responsibilities and Logistics 108
Chapter 14 The Crisis Management Handbook 118
vii
viii Contents
Chapter 15 Managing Media Relations 129
Chapter 16 Internal Communications 141
Chapter 17 Managing Politicians and the Public 150
Chapter 18 Training, Testing and Refinement 155
Chapter 19 Business Continuity 165
Index 175
INTRODUCTION
Most organisations place great store on their reputation. They see that
companies with a good reputation have strong brands and this can mean
greater profitability. In addition, it helps with credibility and credit rating.
It also makes recruitment less difficult if the company’s reputation is solid
and good; those with good reputations tend to attract good people.
A badly handled crisis can damage or ruin that reputation. It hits
internal morale and can impinge on productivity among employees. It is
also deeply uncomfortable for management; no one wants to play golf
with the CEO whose company is a major polluter.
So, there are real commercial reasons for managing crises well. A
brand which is supported by many millions of dollars of advertising can be
damaged overnight. It is an investment in a word, a name, an image. Its
insurance policy is good crisis management strategies.
Managing a crisis well can actually bring benefits. In the case of the
Kegworth disaster for British Midland, sales for the company rose after
the crisis because it had been open, honest and sympathetic to those who
had been injured and the bereaved.
Johnson & Johnson found that its branded analgesic Tylenol actually
gained in sales after it had been open and honest when faced with a black-
mailer who threatened to poison the products.
But when Perrier decided that the tiny trace levels of benzene in its
bottled mineral water were of no real consequence, it was proved wrong
and the private company was taken over by Nestlé. Shell, Monsanto and
the nuclear industry will all testify to how a badly managed crisis can
damage not just the brand but the fabric of the company.
In essence, manage a crisis well and your brand is enhanced; manage it
badly and you can lose the company.
The rules of the game are very simple:
1. Look carefully at the signals. What is the worst-case scenario? – that is

probably what you are heading for.
ix
x Introduction
2. A little expense now saves a fortune later on.
3. Don’t rush – the person who made time made plenty of it. A deadline
is the great enemy of good planning in delicate issues.
4. Overcompensate – to be accused is to be guilty. This is grossly unfair,
but then so is life.
5. Things will get worse before they get better, so the ostrich syndrome –
hoping it will go away if you ignore it – is not an option. It is here
to stay.
Yet how often, as this book will illustrate, do we see these simple rules
flouted?
Handle a crisis well and your reputation, sales and profits will all be
enhanced. Handle it badly and you risk losing the company. This book
attempts to give some guidelines on how to achieve the former.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank a number of people who have helped with the
book, giving us their time, support and advice. Thanks to Kevin Howlett
for his work on the case studies within the book, Sue Poole for her help
and fantastic organisational skills and all the staff at Green Issues Commu-
nications who have given their support. Our thanks especially to Stephen
Rutt of the publishers and to those at IMD, especially Jacques Horovitz,
Roger Hooijberg, Victoria Giorginni and Sonia Dutoit. Of course, our final
thanks go to our friends and families who were there for us throughout.
The authors and publisher would like to thank Mirrorpix for permission to
use copyright material from the Daily Mirror on page 44.
Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders but if any
have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make
the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity.
xi
SECTION A
What Makes a Crisis
1
CHAPTER 1
The Three Types of Crisis
In essence, there are three types of crisis. First, there are those such as
plane crashes, accidents, spillages of chemicals, product defects and so on,
which befall a company.
Second, there are those that are manufactured. For example, the Brent
Spar would have caused no controversy for Shell had Greenpeace not
become involved.
Finally, there are those crises which escalate from an accident. For
example, when the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded, the green
groups were quick to seize on it as a means of attacking the nuclear
industry throughout the world.
Accidents will happen
Crises that arise from major accidents are often the most tragic but the
easiest to deal with.
THE SWISSAIR CRASH
In 1998, flight SR111 took off from New York. After one hour, the plane had disappeared
and 229 people had died. The cause of the crash remains a mystery, but numerous
conspiracy theories have been put forward.
On the night, Swissair reacted with commendable haste and immediately made infor-
mation available. It held regular press briefings and made sure that it passed on informa-
tion in a humane and systematic manner. It was open and frank with the media, but,
more importantly, made $20,000 available to each victim’s family almost immediately, so
they could visit the scene.
This generous gesture received a warm response.The company was also open on its
website and hosted daily press conferences for the media. For grieving parents, friends
3
4 Managing a Crisis
and family, this became a constant and reliable source of information. Swissair did not try
to blame or fight what had happened, but simply accepted the situation and thought of
the victims.
Analysis
This is almost a classic model for how to handle a crisis well. Swissair was very well
prepared. It reacted swiftly and sympathetically to those who had been bereaved; it
handled the media well, with updates on its website and regular press conferences. The
crisis was handled and blew over and, importantly, the brand was left unscathed.
Ironically, these types of crisis – which involve a large loss of life – are the easiest to
prepare for. Everyone knows that an aeroplane risks crashing and, therefore, it is easy –
although not always – to have the necessary procedures in place.
Also falling into this category are those incidents where there is a
problem with a product. Here, as we will find later with Tylenol, Nike and
other products, the company has no choice but to react quickly. Sunny
Delight did not.
SUNNY DELIGHT
The year 1998 saw the release of an exciting new brand on the market. Sunny Delight
offered kids all the excitement of the popular soft drink brands but, supposedly, with
none of the negative health impacts. Mums were sold on this bright sparkling drink –
surely orange juice could not be this sexy.
Within months of its launch, Sunny Delight had become the biggest selling soft drink
in the UK, after Coke and Pepsi. Sales stood at £160 million a year. It was truly a
marketing phenomenon, as supermarkets ran out of stock and children couldn’t get
enough of this new beverage.
Soon, however, the appeal wore off as the much-trumpeted, healthy qualities of the
drink came under fire. The brand was knocked as national newspapers and consumer
groups woke up to the high sugar content of the supposedly healthy drink. Confidence
in the drink was all but shattered when it was revealed that a five-year-old girl had
turned orange after drinking excessive amounts, almost 1.5 litres a day. This coincided
with an embarrassing Christmas TV advert depicting a snowman drinking the ubiquitous
brew and promptly turning orange.
The brand was attacked from all sides, from the health watchdog and the food
commission to BBC’s Watchdog programme and Radio 4. Sales slumped, the revenue ran
dry and eventually Procter & Gamble were forced to sell the brand.
Analysis
So what went wrong? Two things: the first mistake was to oversell the product, or ‘over-
claim’ the healthy qualities of the drink. Procter & Gamble had seriously misjudged the
sophisticated consumer who was now more wary of corporate power and less willing
to trust implicitly. In 2004, Coca-Cola ran into the same problem with Desani – which
The Three Types of Crisis 5
was filtered tap water in a fancy bottle – sold at the same price as bottled water, usually
derived from natural sources.
Having been deemed to have misled the public, the management behind Sunny
Delight then made its second mistake; to hide and stay quiet.The team behind the project
had developed a reputation for being secretive and unresponsive to public concerns.This
is something which Jon Walsh, Sunny Delight brand manager, admitted: ‘We didn’t enter
the debate. We stayed in our little castle thinking if we don’t say anything, the debate will
go away.’ It was as if the creators believed that the public would simply forget the negative
images and once again be attracted back to the product. By the company not explaining
itself, the public were left to believe the worst about Sunny Delight.
Consumers will no longer take what companies say for granted – they
will test it, quiz it and then make their own judgements. Certainly
marketing and advertising helps, but it cannot overcome a product problem,
especially when the product or brand behind it hits a crisis. We live in
a world which is less deferential to the god of marketing and much more
self-aware.
Compare Sunny Delight’s behaviour with the actions of a much
smaller company which had a similar problem.
O DW A L L A
Odwalla’s fruit juice drinks were extremely popular in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
The company had grown at a rapid rate year on year and had achieved a high level of
customer loyalty and attachment to its brand.
However, the company was thrown into crisis when US officials discovered a link
between Odwalla’s apple juice drink and the E. coli bacterium. Over 60 people were
taken ill after consuming the drink and, more tragically, a child died. Immediately the
company’s shares fell sharply, by over a third, customers sued and sales stood at 10 per
cent of their pre-crisis figure.
Odwalla sprung into action and accepted responsibility. Even before the cases
were confirmed, the CEO, Stephen Williamson, recalled the product from the shops.
He was also interviewed by a number of different media and always took the oppor-
tunity to express sadness for the victims and their families. The company wanted to
appear responsive and responsible. As a gesture, Odwalla also agreed to pay medical
costs. By answering the concerns of customers, the company had begun to win back
their support.
However, the company did not stop there, it made sure that customers and
employees were kept up to date with the news via a number of communications tools,
including a website which was established almost immediately. In addition it quickly
changed its processes to adopt the safest and cleanest method for making the juice –
again a responsive move, taking to heart the questions asked of the company.
6 Managing a Crisis
Analysis
The company managed to keep much of the trust and brand identification it had
established with its customer base. By putting its customers first in these difficult
circumstances, rather than watching the bottom line, the company was seen to be
actually taking care of its customers – which one would admit is rare today. Those
values which had established Odwalla were able to bring it through the crisis and
recover sales.
Odwalla learned the first rule of crisis management:

If you think you have a problem, then you probably have one.
React accordingly.
If someone else thinks you have a problem, then you definitely have.
React unilaterally.
Manufacturing a crisis
The green groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are, for the
most part, unelected and therefore unaccountable. The huge noise – and
the ensuing crises – against projects such as Brent Spar and genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) are orchestrated and managed by just a few
people. Certainly they are successful in changing public opinion on these
issues, but this is not a fault of the system. This is the fault of the
companies and they cannot shirk this. Certainly, the media will play its
part, but that is known and expected. Politicians will play their part, but
their behaviour, again, is both known and predictable.
The case of Monsanto and Greenpeace shows how a project which was
scientifically valid was knocked totally off course by a crisis generated by
Greenpeace. Although Monsanto did all the running and had huge and
powerful political backing (the president of the US and the UK’s prime
minister), it still lost the war, thanks to the crisis tactics employed by green
activists, shining a harsh and alarmist spotlight on the issue.
M O N S A N TO A N D G R E E N P E AC E
Greenpeace is vehemently opposed to the use of GMOs. In fact, so strong is its opposi-
tion that it does not believe that any research should be undertaken in this area.
Although the research has the backing of governments, Greenpeace is not interested in
the results: it has made up its mind that it wants no truck with GMOs. Full stop.
And it uses powerful emotional arguments, that is,’ Frankenstein Food’. Monsanto, on
the other hand, tried to appeal to rational arguments (incidentally, the similarities
between its approach and that of Shell, in the Brent Spar case explained later, are
remarkable).
Monsanto ran a huge public relations and advertising campaign in an attempt to lay
the facts in front of the people and allow them to make a rational decision. In the
industry magazine, PR Week, Monsanto's PR agency Good Relations said it wanted to
move the debate ‘onto a rational footing’.The debate was lost at this point. Putting food
for your children into a shopping basket is not a rational decision. It is an emotional deci-
sion and one where the vast majority of people – no matter how well educated on the
facts and the rationality of the arguments – are not willing to take risks.To quote the old
maxim of the experienced newspaper editor: ‘When in doubt, leave it out’.
Those speaking against Monsanto were a wide-ranging group. On a BBC Newsnight
programme, Monsanto put forward its spokespersons, but Greenpeace was not to be
seen. Instead there were academics (independent, without doubt) and the chief execu-
tive of the frozen food retailer Iceland (the irony of a spokesperson for one form of
food modification – freezing – speaking out against another form of modification was
lost on the audience and obviously on the BBC). The result was a total victory for
Greenpeace who were not even there.
Analysis
So keen was Monsanto to show how fair it was being in the debate on GM foods that
it actually printed Greenpeace's web address on the advertisements. By doing this, what
was Monsanto saying to the world? Here are some thoughts:
■ By far the most important stakeholder we have is Greenpeace, more important than
our employees, our scientists, our customers, the politicians and regulators.
■ In particular they are more important than the independent scientists who under-
took much of the research work for us on GM foods; ignore these people and listen
instead to Greenpeace.
■ The minute we convince Greenpeace that GM food is safe, and this won't be long,
they will endorse our stand.
Even if these thoughts were not in the minds of the Monsanto communications experts –
and no doubt they were not, even if they should have been – this is the strong perception
which came across. Greenpeace was, of course, delighted and redoubled its efforts to stop
even testing.
This is a typical manufactured crisis. An unelected NGO seizes on a

cause and escalates it into a crisis. No one has died, yet the furore caused
by GM foods is much greater than that caused by the Swissair crash, with
its loss of more than 100 lives, and appeals to the media and the public in
an alarmist and photogenic way. The use of boiler suits and gas masks
when activists destroyed crops was a clever ‘branding’ tactic – using the
PR world’s rules against itself.
8 Managing a Crisis
However, the damage to brand and reputation is huge. In the UK, GM
foods have almost become an ‘anti-brand’, with the trucks of one of the
country’s largest retailers, Marks & Spencer, proudly displaying signs that
the company does not use GM foods, and many more supermarkets and
brands have followed suit.
Crises from accidents

With the Swissair crash, the company performed well and survived and,
indeed for some time afterwards, thrived. (It took the attack on the Twin
Towers in New York – which led to a sudden drop in passenger numbers –
to force Swissair into administration.)
So, if one is open and transparent, one can recover from a crisis. But
what happens if one isn’t?
C H E R N O B Y L – D E AT H O F T H E N U C L E A R I N D U S T RY ?
Chernobyl was the site of a nuclear power station in the Ukraine. It was built to a design
that the west had deemed unsafe because if it were not managed properly, there was a
risk – in extreme circumstances – that the reactor could explode.
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station took place on the night of April
25/26 1986. The plan was to test whether the turbines could produce sufficient energy
to keep the coolant pumps running in the event of a loss of power until the emergency
generator was activated.
In order to conduct this test, the safety systems were deliberately switched off. For
the test, the reactor had to be powered down to 25 per cent of its capacity. For reasons
which are still not known, the reactor power level fell to less than 1 per cent.The power
therefore had to be slowly increased. But 30 seconds after the start of the test, there
was a sudden and unexpected power surge. The reactor’s safety systems, which should
have stopped the chain reaction, failed.
Almost instantly, the power level and temperature rose many times over and there
was a violent explosion. The 1000-tonne sealing cap on the reactor building was blown
off and at 2000°C the fuel rods melted. The fire that followed meant that radioactive
particles were sent into the atmosphere. The graphite covering of the reactor then
ignited. In the ensuing inferno, the radioactive fission products released during the core
meltdown were sucked up into the atmosphere.
The accident killed 30 people, including 28 from radiation exposure. A further 209 on
site were treated for acute radiation poisoning and, among these, 134 cases were
confirmed (all of whom recovered).
However, the plume of radioactive particles moved through the atmosphere and was
soon picked up in routine monitoring in Scandinavia. It took some days to figure out
what had happened and eventually the Ukrainian authorities had to admit they had
suffered an accident.
Analysis
The consequences were immense. The radiation travelled extensively and was soon
deposited all over western Europe. For many years, sheep farmers in Wales were not
allowed to graze their sheep on some areas which had been contaminated.
Although the economic, medical and sociological effects on the Ukraine were devas-
tating, the whole of the nuclear industry was tarnished by the brush of Chernobyl.
Although western Europe rightly said that a similar accident could not happen in the
west, the green groups scorned this.They pointed to the secrecy surrounding the explo-
sion as being indicative of the industry’s secrecy worldwide; they pointed to the cata-
strophic effect and asked: Can you guarantee that something similar will never happen in
the west? No one can guarantee that, especially with the shadow of Three Mile Island at
the back of everyone’s mind.
Since Chernobyl, almost no nuclear power stations have been constructed in the west.
And this is a huge potential crisis in the making for the energy-hungry western
economies. From the accident, a real crisis has been manufactured.
Of the three types of crisis, it is apparent that those which are manu-
factured can bring the most lasting damage. They are also the most diffi-
cult to predict and plan for.
CHAPTER 2
Evolution of a Crisis: the Crisis Curve
Most large companies, as part of their risk assessment, undertake an

assessment of how likely it is that a particular crisis will hit them. It is an
extremely valuable exercise and should be undertaken with due rigour.
This exercise is outlined in Chapter 3. However, anyone who takes
comfort that they now fully understand the total implications of a crisis
is naive indeed. Certainly, one can look to many indicators, for example
the vulnerability of the industry to environmental damage. However,
these indicators are not, in themselves, totally reliable and some highly
crisis-prone industries continue without a crisis for decades. When the
management of crises goes badly wrong, it is usually because the corpor-
ation has either ignored or failed to recognise the significance of some of
the indicators.
A crisis is like an earthquake – it is difficult to predict when and if it
will strike. However, seismologists today look to certain indicators in an
effort to predict earthquakes. Volcanologists too now have good indicators
based on geological phenomena of when a volcano is likely to erupt.
However, none of these are precise sciences.
It is therefore important to understand how a crisis evolves and the
‘crisis curve’ is a good means of illustrating this evolution.
The crisis curve
The crisis curve plots the time elapsing against the intensity of the crisis –
effectively mapping its lifeline. To illustrate this, we will use the case of
the Brent Spar.
10
Evolution of a Crisis: the Crisis Curve 11
A crisis curve
E. Secondary F. Plateau
tremors
D. Plateau
Intensity of the crisis
G. Resolution
C. Crisis
escalation: point
of no return
H. Damage to
reputation
B. Pre-tremor
A. Crisis in warning
gestation
Time elapsing
Point A: Crisis in gestation
Consider the following. In the North Sea to the north of Germany and the
east of Britain, there is a redundant oil installation. It is not near any
people and, for sound environmental reasons, the company which
manages it wishes to dispose of it. It has taken all the soundings with tech-
nical experts on safety on an environmental impact and all are agreed that
the best way to get rid of this installation is to dispose of it deep at sea in
the North Atlantic. After years of detailed and technical studies, the
government scientists are also content that this is the best way forward. As
well as all the rational arguments, there is also an emotional argument.
During the last two world wars, numerous tons of shipping went to the
bottom of the sea with no apparent environmental impact. One more oil
installation – almost totally clean of any polluting materials – surely could
not make much difference.
You have been asked by Shell to advise on the implications of this.
The honest answer is that most communication professionals would
say that there should be very few. After all, the installation is not near
anyone – no one lives there. It is also far away from the main media
centres of Europe. The likelihood of an event becoming a major news
story is in inverse proportion to its proximity to the capital city. (Stories
from Washington DC have a lot more currency than those from Seattle.)
12 Managing a Crisis
And it has all the technical tick boxes including support from the govern-
ment. There should not be a problem.
Yet, Brent Spar became one of the great causes célèbres of the envi-
ronmental movement and had repercussions within Shell which are still
felt to this day.
B R E N T S PA R – P O I N T A
Brent Spar started life in the 1970s as a means of transporting oil to tankers. But, by the
1980s, new technology had rendered the Spar obsolete. Shell, the Spar’s operator, had to
dispose of it.
After some four years of technical, safety, environment and other studies, the
company came to the conclusion that disposal deep at sea was by far the best option. It
was the safest and most environmentally friendly.The company then set about getting all
the necessary permissions from the UK government.These were duly forthcoming.
At this stage, we are at point A of the crisis curve. Certainly, Shell was aware that
environmental issues were rising in the public consciousness, but it had chosen the best
practical environmental option. As Eric Faulds, head of construction at Shell UK stated:
‘We look at problems and come up with balanced solutions, based on science and facts
alone. We can’t base it on emotions.’
By the 1980s, Greenpeace was an organisation in crisis. It had become not a lean,
mean campaigning organisation, but a fairly substantive corporate bureaucracy. It had
moved on from the days of dinghies harassing nuclear-powered submarines and was
now a more sedate organisation. However, as noted later, there is fierce corporate
competition for members (sales) between NGOs and Greenpeace was losing out. It
needed something high profile and sensational in order to improve its brand.
Greenpeace’s siege of the Brent Spar was dreamt up ahead of a meeting of European
politicians to discuss the North Sea.The symbolic value was there for all to see.This was
Greenpeace attempting to go back to its old-fashioned, high-profile stunts. It was looking
for dramatic images to recapture some of the support it had lost over the years,
following a run of unsuccessful and low-profile campaigns.
Plans were drawn up by German activists in April 1995. The board of Greenpeace
approved the plans the next day. Greenpeace then began planning for the operation.
This involved bringing in climbers and necessary equipment for the campaign.This stage
took just two weeks.
On April 27 the Greenpeace boat set sail carrying volunteers determined to climb
onto the rig. On April 30 Greenpeace boarded the Brent Spar. Essentially Greenpeace
had caught Shell by surprise. When Shell had become aware that they had set sail, it
called an urgent meeting to discuss what could possibly happen as a result. Shell’s secu-
rity adviser at the time said ‘the worst-case scenarios were discussed, but before any
plans could be implemented they [Greenpeace] boarded’. Shell was not prepared in any
way for what was about to happen.
Point B: Pre-tremor warning
We are now at point B on the crisis curve. The Spar is occupied by

activists. What should Shell do now?
Of course, all this is easy in hindsight, but this blip on the curve cannot
and should not be ignored. There were two options open to Shell:
1. attempt to remove the trespassers

2. ignore them until they went away.
Shell chose the former option. This was a key decision – from this point on
there is no turning back.
Suppose Shell had decided to leave the protesters on the Spar, what
would have happened? The main news angle had been documented,
boarding the Spar was already well covered and the media is a fickle
beast – it bores very easily. After a month on the Spar and possibly sooner,
the media would have got thoroughly bored. After all, news is just news
once: the headline ‘Greenpeace protesters still on Brent Spar’ is not
exactly riveting news.
Point C: Escalation: point of no return
Most organisations do not walk away from problems, they solve them.
There was a project and there was a project plan, so Shell decided to take
Greenpeace on.
Greenpeace is probably one of the best public relations agencies in the world and
when it boarded the Spar, it brought £300,000 worth of broadcast equipment on
board. Within a few hours of boarding, it began broadcasting live from the rig. Reports
were beamed into the homes of millions as Greenpeace, in effect, launched its own live
newsroom. Greenpeace had also set up a press office onshore, to make sure that its
message was heard first and heard most. Greenpeace was able to dictate the news
agenda. It was Greenpeace who supplied the ‘facts’ and therefore determined the spin
on the story.
By the third week, Shell was making its way through legal documents searching for a
plan which would allow it legally to evict the ‘squatters’ from the Brent Spar. On May 23,
just over three weeks after Greenpeace had boarded, Shell moved to get the Green-
peace activists off the rig. Naturally Greenpeace alerted the world’s media, who were
now in the North Sea in huge numbers. Shell commandeered one of the largest oil rigs
in the area to launch its attack on the Spar. A pitched battle ensued, with Shell’s security
force being repelled back by Greenpeace activists. Because the security staff were in a
suspended cradle as they tried to board the Spar, this made highly entertaining televi-
sion. It was classic entertainment – and the media has a huge entertainment agenda – in
the best Hollywood style. Greenpeace retaliated by throwing smoke bombs at the
advancing ‘troops’. Shell eventually reclaimed the Spar and the world’s media recorded
the activists being taken off Brent Spar.
Point D: Plateau
At this stage, the battle of perception was totally lost. Greenpeace became
the David, Shell the Goliath. With images of ‘have-a-go heroes/plucky
campaigners’, call them what you will, in the clutches of an all-powerful
opponent, it was not difficult to predict on which side the sympathies of
the public would fall. Shell’s carefully nurtured reputation was in tatters.
Greenpeace certainly had achieved its first aim – to raise the whole issue
of sea dumping in the minds of the public. But Shell felt that it too had won
a victory for itself and the rule of law. After all, Greenpeace’s trespassing
was illegal. The company now settled down to get on with its project. But
the battle was not over yet, as Greenpeace opened a second front.
The German media in particular had covered the Brent Spar story with great zeal. They
had strongly taken the Greenpeace line. Germany has one of the largest green parties in
Europe and it regularly polls up to 20 per cent of the vote. Greenpeace drew on this
sympathy and began to organise boycotts of Shell products.
It also kept up the pressure around the Brent Spar by providing ongoing media
opportunities for the cameras. Shell was an unwitting and willing accomplice to these
antics. For example, if a small Greenpeace boat neared the Brent Spar, Shell defended
its property by firing high-powered water cannons. Greenpeace made a number of
daring forays into these dangerous waters, narrowly escaping being hit by the full force
of these cannons.
This made for great television. Media boats were all around, capturing ever y
moment, every shot fired and every narrow escape by Greenpeace. If the media
went away or were not available, Greenpeace used its own broadcast equipment to
record the events and then sent the video tapes by helicopter to the studios of the
world’s press.
Greenpeace knew that it was winning the propaganda war. However, it did not rest
on its laurels.The campaign group organised a number of carefully stage-managed events
designed to be easily and powerfully broadcastable. The most memorable of these
pictured the media going out on the Greenpeace tug to ride through the spray gener-
ated from the water cannons. Importantly, it placed the media in the same position in
relation to Shell as Greenpeace. Suddenly, viewers were seeing events directly through
the eyes of Greenpeace activists. They had been transferred into their world – they
were in effect joining the Greenpeace campaign.
At this stage, Greenpeace began to look for friends and allies and
found a most unusual one in the shape of the German Lutheran Church,
which has a boycotting committee, which gave its support to the campaign
to boycott Shell products.
Despite the boycotts and the antics at sea, Shell must have seen a calmer
scene. The Spar was being prepared for disposal and had been rigged with
explosives. Certainly there was noise, but the company held a firm nerve. It
was used to controversy and, without doubt, once the Spar was disposed of,
the fuss would blow over and that would be the end of the matter. It could
then go about the business of repairing its reputation and brand.
Point E: Secondary tremors
For Greenpeace, there was a real fear that Shell might be right. It needed to
up the stakes fairly urgently before the story went cold. And the all-impor-
tant meeting of EC ministers was fast looming. It was vital for Greenpeace
that its campaign climaxed at this time.
June 8 saw the arrival of politicians for the North Sea conference. At the same time,
boycotts of Shell merchandise were taking effect and protesters had camped outside the
conference centre. By the second week of June, Shell’s takings in Germany were down
by 30 per cent.The political heat was turning up.
On June 16, Greenpeace ratcheted up the pressure even more by attempting its most
daring stunt. The pressure group flew a helicopter out to the Brent Spar and dropped
activists down onto the oil rig. The scenes were dramatic as the helicopter perilously
ducked and dived, manoeuvring its way through the spray of the water cannons.This was
real danger and there was no doubt who the public would be supporting. Activists even-
tually managed to land on the Spar, setting up base once more in their temporary home.
Activists remained on board while Shell continuously fired its water guns at the Brent
Spar. Shell had become embroiled in a siege. The company was trying everything to
smoke out the squatters. And it was all captured by the cameras.
But the campaign had now reached a bigger political stage. In the media and in parlia-
ment, John Major, the British prime minister, consistently and vociferously backed Shell’s
plans for deep sea disposal. He was attacked by the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl,
who publicly berated him for his defence of Shell UK. German public opinion had moved
so far against Shell that it had become virtually impossible for the chancellor not to
express some level of opposition to the company’s actions.
Over the following two nights there were incidents of terrorist activity against Shell
targets in Germany.Two garages were hit by so-called ecoterrorists. Shell was now seri-
ously rattled.
On June 20, Shell sent security staff on board the Brent Spar forcibly to evict the
Greenpeace campaigners. They succeeded. However, this represented something of a
Pyrrhic victory.
The Spar was ready for disposal – its anchors were lifted and it was
ready to make the journey to the North Atlantic. Shell – and Greenpeace –
could begin to see the beginning of the end.
Following the bombings in Germany, Chris Fay, Chairman of Shell
UK, was confronted by his colleagues from other countries. He was essen-
tially told to abandon the Brent Spar operation. Public opinion, particu-
larly in northern European countries, had forced Shell’s executive to
consider this option seriously, regardless of the implications.
On June 20, Chris Fay went back to London and called the Department of Trade and
Industry to inform them of what he was about to do.The crisis then took one final twist.
Clearly the message of Shell’s decision had not reached Number 10 Downing Street. As
John Major, the prime minister, stepped up to the dispatch box at Prime Minister’s Ques-
tions (a then twice weekly chance for MPs to grill the prime minister on issues of the
day), he defended Shell UK’s decision to dump the Brent Spar in the Atlantic. Shell’s real
decision was later made public, undermining John Major’s position.
Chris Fay, chairman of Shell UK:‘We did things too properly, we covered all the scientific,
technical and legalistic angles. However, we didn’t take into account hearts and emotions.’
Points G and H: Plateau and resolution
Following Shell’s decision, the media soon lost interest and the curve
heads towards low intensity. Fifteen years later few people know the
details of the Brent Spar. If we were to look at the crisis curve for Brent
Spar, it would probably look something like this.
Brent Spar’s E. Meeting of

EC ministers F. Plateau
crisis curve approaches
D. Spar being
prepared for
disposal G. Brent Spar

operation
C. Shell takes abandoned
Greenpeace on
B. Spar
occupied by H. Damage to
A. Crisis in reputation
gestation activists
Time elapsing
Analysis
Shell – one of the oligarchs of the oil industry, indeed of world industry –
had been badly damaged. The damage to its reputation is measured as
Point H of the graph. This means that the organisation is now more vulner-
able to future crises. And so, when accusations of corruption in Nigeria
were made against the company, its enemies piled in again. This time
Greenpeace found a new ally in the shape of The Body Shop chain, an
international company with a high-profile, green consciousness. The next
crisis followed the same curve as the first one and again more reputation
damage was done.
Shell has worked hard since then to repair its reputation, and there has
been reorganisation of its board structure. But a further crisis hit in 2004
when it was revealed that oil resources were understated, leading to the
resignation of the chairman.
The lesson from the crisis curve is simple: if you do not handle a crisis
well, you will stay in crisis mode for a long time.
CHAPTER 3
Predicting a Crisis
The sheer size of today’s corporations – and they are getting bigger –
means that they are more vulnerable than ever to crises, either from
natural origins or those manufactured. As noted earlier, crises are
extremely difficult to predict. This problem is exacerbated by the trend in
the 1970s and 80s to develop managers as specialists. The finance director
knows about finance and little else; similarly the marketing director, the
technology director and the operations director all have their specialist
fields. This smokestack approach – like tennis balls in a box – leads to
gaps in the management structure. This means that a finance director,
driven rightly by profits and earnings per share, would often lose sight of
the bigger picture. However, in the 1990s, this trend began to be reversed
and the manager as a generalist as well as a specialist began to come into
vogue. MBA programmes widen their focus and smaller programmes,
such as the excellent Programme for Executive Development as run by the
IMD in Lausanne, produce managers who are far more rounded than they
were previously.
This rounding of management knowledge is an ideal net in which to
capture emerging crises. Ideally, senior or general managers should have
a working knowledge of politics, the media, reputation and brand values,
and social and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Unfortunately, these
are rather vague topics and whilst courses such as MBAs and others can
do much to address this, they are not formal enough to put in place a
proper management procedure. Whilst it is not in the remit of this book
to cover corporate social responsibility, it is within this area that the
nascent crises can be identified and nipped in the bud before they become
real problems.
18
Predicting a Crisis 19
Checklist
1 Are all managers aware of the power and influence of:

■ Politics and the political environment in which they operate
■ The media and its realms and influence and how to deal with it
■ The value of a company’s reputation
■ Stakeholder management
■ Corporate social responsibility?
2 Is there a formal mechanism – such as a questionnaire – by which
managers can identify those areas they think might be problems for the
company?
3 Is there a procedure for analysing and auditing this information and
acting where appropriate?
4 Are there early warning systems and escalation procedures?
Part of the art of the modern manager is to ensure that chaos is contained
and that the company continues along its chosen path. In other words, the
manager’s job is to stop Murphy’s Law (see below) taking root and, if it
does, stamp it out immediately. This is easier said than done.
Crisis prediction – some guidelines
The prediction of which events will become crises is as difficult – as

outlined earlier – as the science of earthquake prediction. Whilst there may
be indicators, it is not foolproof and will never be 100 per cent reliable.
Hard and fast definitions are, therefore, difficult. However, there are
certain common factors that surround all crises. They should be:
■ Simple in concept
■ Scientifically complex
■ Data-rich
■ Slogan-ability
■ Open to speculation
■ Related to issues.
Simple in concept
The crisis must be simple and capable of being defined as either black or
white. This allows sides to be taken, particularly by the media. So for Brent
Spar, the issue of sea dumping was bad and recycling of the structure on
land (as advocated by Greenpeace) was good. GM foods are bad – we do
not know enough about them. Organic foods are good. Nuclear power is
bad (even though almost all developed nations use it) as the waste cannot
be disposed of; green energy is good. So some members of the Lutheran
Church – which boycotted Shell products – did not even know whether it
was the North Sea or the North Atlantic the Spar was going to. Nor did they
need to. The concept was simple: no sea dumping; the science of where it
was to be dumped, and the reasons behind it, did not need to be understood.
Scientifically complex
Paradoxically, the science surrounding the crisis must be extremely

complex and impenetrable to the ordinary person. This is essential as
otherwise people would be able to make reasoned decisions on what is
right and what is wrong. So the science surrounding the disposal of the
Brent Spar was very complex – how many pollutants were on the Spar and
how much damage would they do? Would the structure, as it sunk to the
bottom of the North Atlantic, provide a haven for the sea creatures there?
Or would it damage the ecology of the ocean floor? The learned rent-a-
quote professors were wheeled out and argued over the heads of the
people, confusing the issue further and moving the scientific arguments
out of the national debate and into conference rooms and lecture halls.
At a local level, the simple act of building a road, a shop or a housing
estate now throws up reams of statistics. Every major new development in
the UK requires a Traffic Impact Assessment, which is all but impene-
trable except to the consultants who wrote it. In addition, these statistics
are capable of interpretation in many ways. By hiding behind a wall of
figures, it makes the company look bad. Emotions are what are needed,
and what get a response. This is why green groups can quickly take the
agenda – the environment is an emotional issue.
Data-rich
Today’s corporation makes available more data about its performance than
it ever did. This is published by the various agencies and is available to the
public. Even confidential information is not safe: leaks of sensitive infor-
mation are now commonplace. One sure way to get a document noticed
and carefully read is to mark it as ‘confidential’.
Even before the Internet, we lived in a world that was rich with data
albeit slightly less accessible. In the USA, the Freedom of Information Act
means that almost all data can be made available to everyone on request.
No secrets – just transparency. The major activist groups can spend
months trawling through data. It is then presented as ‘a major leak of a
secret report’ in order to increase its media saleability.
ALUMINIUM AND ALZHEIMER’S
Of course, the problem with all data is that when you turn it into information, it can be
construed and interpreted in a number of ways. So, for example, in the late 1980s, there
was a thought that Alzheimer's might be linked to the intake of aluminium. There were
numerous studies that seemed to point that it could be a causal factor.
The environmental groups were quick to latch onto the fact that there were traces of
aluminium in tap water and they turned this into a crisis for the water companies in the
UK. They used this fact to claim that drinking tap water could lead to the disease. This
was at the height of an unpopular privatisation of the water industry in the UK and it got
substantial coverage. The result: bottled water companies rubbed their hands in glee as
sales got a boost.
As it turned out, the link between aluminium and Alzheimer's is now thought to be
highly unlikely. The amount of aluminium in tap water is not even comparable to the
dose you might get from, say, wrapping your sandwiches in foil.
Analysis
The point is that, in environmental issues, there is no truth, only data. From this data, one
can manufacture, quite legitimately, information, perspectives and assumptions and this
can be accepted by people (like those who bought bottled water) as knowledge.
Knowledge is our perception of what the facts are. In today’s world, in

dealing with environmental and similar issues, there is no reality, just
perceptions. These perceptions are what people believe and must be taken
into account when dealing with the public. They may not necessarily be
correct; however, they cannot be ignored.
Slogan-ability
The crisis must be capable of being summarised in a couple of short

words. This is also the essence of good branding: BMW is ‘The Ultimate
Driving Machine’, for Avis – ‘We try harder’ and so on. So the disposal of
nuclear waste is: ‘Out of sight, out of mind.’ GM foods are ‘Frankenstein
foods’. Brent Spar is akin to dumping a car in the village pond.
Slogans like this are hard to argue with – generally because they have
enough truth in them to make them credible, and they have no ‘small print’
to qualify them. In addition, large organisations – even though they may
be brilliant at marketing – are not good at responding to this type of attack.
The Law of the Absolute gets in the way (see below). These slogans are
hard to counter.
The semantics of science are appalling compared to the semantics of
marketing, which is what the green groups exploit. They – like the devil –
always have the best tunes. There are ‘radioactive dumps’ and ‘Franken-
stein foods’. But is science much better at describing the same things:
neither ‘repository’ nor ‘genetically modified organisms’ exactly trip off
the tongue and sound less palatable. For the media, there is no choice:
the words to be used are those that are most understandable (the charitable
view) or those that shock most (the cynical view). When trying to explain
controversial scientific advances in the mass media, unfortunately those
that generate the most understanding and shock are usually the same word.
The Law of the Absolute
There has to be some element of doubt within the debate – which is why
scientifically complex and data-rich projects make ideal environmental
issues. There is a corollary to the law which says: the more you know, the
less you know. So as science advances and more complex instruments are
developed that are capable of identifying the presence of even the most
minuscule levels of a substance, the more difficult it becomes to proclaim
anything safe. More and more, as science makes advances, it throws new
light, but it also shows how imperfect our knowledge is. Hence the Law of
the Absolute. So, to the question ‘Can you categorically assure me that
drinking mineral water with tiny traces of benzene will never ever harm
me?’, the categorical answer of ‘no’ is not available. The next best answer
is not good enough for our first world, health conscious populace. This is
powerful and its use by the media is examined later in the book.
Naturally, environmentalists love the Law of the Absolute. It means
that there is danger inherent in everything, which they are happy to point
out to anyone who will listen, including a grateful media.
Related to issues
As Henry Kissinger said: ‘Do not let an issue become a crisis.’ Yet that is
what usually happens. The crisis may not be dramatic. A scientific report
showing that the populations of certain whales were diminishing rapidly

led to the campaign to save them. The safety of ocean-going supertankers
only became an issue after the crisis of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska in the
1980s. By then, the memory of the last disaster, the Torrey Canyon, off the
south coast of England in 1967 had been forgotten.
Indeed, it could be argued that an issue is not an issue until it either
becomes, or has been, a crisis. The nuclear industry is typical of one which
went from being a motherhood cause – promising unlimited supplies of
electricity which was ‘too cheap to meter’ – to today where the likelihood
of building new nuclear power stations in most western European coun-
tries is almost zero. To become such as issue, the industry suffered a
number of crises, from Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, radioactive
prawns and more.
The stronger the issues, the more likely the industry is to suffer crises.
To this day, Shell is suffering the aftermath of Brent Spar and 17 years
later, in 2004, the chairman resigned in another crisis as oil reserves had
been understated. Once a corporation is in crisis mode, it is – like a fast-
moving Ferris wheel – difficult to get off.
Murphy’s Law
This planning, the practicalities of which are outlined in Section C, is all

very well except for one factor that no one can predict – Murphy’s Law.
One variant of this states: ‘Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.’ It is
uncanny that when a crisis strikes, it always seems to be at either the time
of holidays, weekends or when people are not prepared.
Certainly the active green groups, if they are manufacturing a crisis,
will choose their timing with deadly accuracy. For example, when Oxfam
wanted to attack Nestlé (see the case study in Chapter 8), it chose the week
before Christmas.
There are a number of corollaries to Murphy’s Law:
1. ‘No one is ever in the right place at the right time.’ As noted above,
crises do not occur to order, and training (dealt with in Section C)
and careful planning are essential. Training must be real and happen
unexpectedly, not like the chief executive of one firm we were
working with who tried to stop the crisis simulation happening until
he was ready.
2. Mini-Murphys will come to the fore. In other words, things and people
which generally operate to the highest efficiency seem suddenly to fail.
3. ‘Things always get worse before, or indeed if, they get better.’ This is
the escalation to the second plateau outlined in Chapter 2.
E X X O N VA L D E Z
On March 24, 1989, shortly after midnight (Murphy’s Law), the oil tanker Exxon Valdez
hit a reef in Alaska, spilling more than 11 million gallons of crude oil – the biggest in the
history of the US oil industry. The spill affected the sensitive ecosystem in the area and
eventually it was estimated that some 250,000 birds were killed, including around 150
bald eagles, as well as 5,000 otters, 300 seals and 22 killer whales.
Analysis
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez incident, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, which greatly increased the powers of the authorities to regulate the oil industry.
But the escalation process as predicted by Murphy’s Law continued. For a start,
Exxon had to pay $1 billion in damages. Then the industry as a whole was hit with a
one-off 25 cents per barrel assessment to create a $50 million fund for use in the event
of an incident.
And of course when other oil-related incidents – such as Brent Spar –

arise, the reputation damage to the oil industry accumulates and makes it
even more difficult for the industry to defend itself in a crisis. Even when
a crisis does not cause much real damage, a company or industry which
has crisis-related scars will be more vulnerable.
T H E B R A E R – T H E E X X O N VA L D E Z T H AT N E V E R W A S
On January 5, 1993, the engines of the oil tanker Braer failed and the tanker ran aground
off the Shetlands in Scotland. This could have had a huge impact on the local wildlife. It
immediately attracted the world’s press who followed events with great interest. Wild
speculation abounded – from a number of parties – as to the massive damage that the
spill would cause.
Because of the bad weather and high seas, none of the oil could be taken from the
tanker. A week after running aground, the Braer began to break up and the entire cargo
of 600,000 barrels of crude oil spilled into the sea. However, the choppy seas proved to
be useful as they stopped a slick from forming on the sea’s surface and the spill broke up
quickly.The use of dispersants also helped.
Initially, there was talk of another Exxon Valdez but, as it turned out, the damage to
wildlife was relatively minor, involving about 1,500 seabirds, some farmed salmon and
four otters. Ironically two of the otters were killed when they were hit by a TV camera
crew, who were covering the spill.
It is interesting to note that the co-owners of the Brent Spar were

Exxon, who kept a remarkably low profile during the Spar crisis. Perhaps
it had learned too well the damage that can be inflicted on reputation from
the crisis of six years earlier.
EXERCISE: How likely is the organisation to have a crisis?
In effect, this is what this book is about – how to prepare for and then
manage a crisis. As noted at the beginning, the basis of predicting a crisis
is a difficult one. However, just because it is difficult does not mean that it
should not be attempted.
The following chart does not attempt to provide a definitive system or
methodology for identifying what might become a crisis. Rather, it is more
like an early warning system. Try it with one particular project or aspect of
your business or organisation. A rating system has been adopted with the
following measures:
5 Yes or Very High or Very Likely

4 Probably or High
3 Average
2 Unlikely or Low
1 No or Very Low or Very Unlikely
Indicators Key questions Ratings

(out of five)
■ Simple in concept ■ Can this be easily and quickly understood by a
non-scientist?
■ Does it provide the potential for real danger – not
just to humans but to animals and plants also?

■ Do those who oppose look simply like the good
guys or you look like the bad guys i.e. you are
profit-making?
■ Scientifically complex ■ Is it possible for a mischievous scientist to totally
misrepresent this issue?
■ Is there seemingly contradictory evidence?
■ Is it a new field or an old one under modification?
■ Data-rich ■ Is there a substantial body of legislation?

■ Are there a great many scientific and technical
studies?
■ Has someone tried to suppress any of this data?
Indicators Key questions Ratings

(out of five)
■ Slogan-ability ■ Is there a simple slogan which summarises the
argument? (If one exists, the probability is that the
issue will be returned to.)
■ Is it photogenic? Can it be made so?
■ Can it involve children, animals or fauna?
■ Open to speculation ■ Is it possible to claim that it might kill or badly

hurt people, animals or plants – even if this risk is
minuscule?
■ Is it impossible to give categorical assurances
on safety?
■ Are there rent-a-quote professors or stakeholders
who will speak out against the issue?

■ Issues prone ■ Has the industry been hit before?
■ Is there a siege mentality in the organisation?
■ Is there a fear of media, politicians, etc?
■ Internal issues ■ Has there been a substantial HR-generated change
programme (culture)?
■ Have processes changed?
TOTAL Max: 100
75–100: Those projects, industries or aspects of industries which score about 75

should definitely have both proper crisis management and issues management
programmes in place. Indeed, it is highly likely that they have, as they have
been targeted before. The waste disposal, nuclear and chemicals industry and,
nowadays, the oil industry will come into this category. However, if the
rating is high and there is no history, one should be prepared. This was the
situation all industries were in before it became an issue.
50–75: Companies which fall into this rating are less likely to be subject to crises.
However, times change and change quickly. It was only 40 short years ago
that the nuclear industry was being hailed as the saviour of the planet and that
Perrier was the drink of choice in fashionable downtown Hollywood.
25–50: Risk of becoming an issue is much lower here. This is where cattle rearing
was before BSE. It looks harmless, it looks safe but, given the right circum-
stances, it can explode. Again, it was an internal factor – the feeding of sheep
carcasses to vegetarian cattle – which saw a multibillion pound industry go
into crisis.
20–25: Only the purest of the pure of the environmental groups can achieve this score.
Another useful exercise is to put oneself on the other side of the fence.
Assume you are the local action group, the pressure group or whatever and
predict how you would react.
Whilst exercises like the one above are useful and help to concentrate
minds, all organisations must assume that – sooner or later – they are
going to face something which will become an issue. And, almost always,
when they eventually realise it is an issue, that is because it is now a crisis.
And in any crisis, the best that one can hope for is damage limitation.
For most organisations, this means fairly radical change in the way
they approach their communication programmes. In order to do this, most
have to change dramatically.
Prediction is imprecise? Yes, but then so is the world. Those who
subscribe to chaos theory are well suited to become crisis managers whose
motto might be: ‘Expect the unexpected and then be really prepared.’
Conclusion
There are often a huge number of divergent factors which lead to a crisis,
so prediction is difficult. For example, with Brent Spar there was the
important meeting of the EEC ministers, an organisation which was trying
to find itself as a real campaigning organisation again and, possibly, the
complacency of Shell as to the serious impact these events would have.
However, in manufactured crises, those with very good reputations
will be less scarred and recover more quickly. Therefore crisis manage-
ment has a linkage to corporate social responsibility. Therefore it is impor-
tant to handle issues well, for example in dealing with suppliers,
employees (particularly in less well developed countries), corporate citi-
zenship and so on. The company and its brand must reflect this in its tone
of voice and the way it handles issues, its honesty and openness and trans-
parency in dealing with the media, politicians and others and a generous
corporate giving scheme.
In other words, a company which handles issues well will be less
prone to crises and will recover more quickly from them. That is not to say
that either Shell or Monsanto had poor CSR credentials; even the strongest
can be hurt by a carefully and powerfully orchestrated campaign such as
that mounted by Greenpeace in these two cases.
CHAPTER 4
Why Managing a Crisis Matters
A badly managed crisis can severely damage a company, its reputation and
its brand. Handle it badly and one risks losing the company; handle it well
and your reputation is enhanced, sales increase and the brand is stronger
than ever. As noted in the Introduction, Johnson & Johnson reacted
promptly and unequivocally in withdrawing Tylenol when the analgesic
was threatened by a blackmailer. And that is how Nike, the sports goods
manufacturer, reacted when it was faced with a problem.
N I K E A N D G L O B A L I S AT I O N
Nike is at the forefront of what most people understand as globalisation. It is a brand

that reaches across the world but ultimately encapsulates the value system of its country
of origin, the USA. The company’s trainers are fashionable items bought by those in the
west and, whenever possible, by those in the developing world. It is a symbol of aspira-
tion in many countries.
A storm, however, was whipped up following one of the company’s designs for a new
Nike Air trainer in 1997. On the back of the shoe, Nike had designed what looked to
the untrained western eye like an image resembling flames burning. That was to the
western eye. However, complaints came flooding in when Muslims claimed that the
image was close to the Arab script for Allah.
Nike’s response was as quick as it was unequivocal. Instead of questioning whether in
fact there was any justification for these claims, Nike acted in a way which suggested it
was sympathetic to the sensitivities of others. Nike immediately recalled over 38,000
pairs of the trainers.The company also pulled a clever PR stunt to show just how much
it cared by offering to pay for the construction of playgrounds for Muslim families.
Analysis
The crisis dissipated as soon as it had arrived. Certainly, there was a cost in recalling
thousands of trainers. But it was a fraction of the cost of fighting an unwinnable battle.
28
Why Managing a Crisis Matters 29
Nike appeared as though there was absolutely no doubt it had ever intended to offend
the Muslim population and that it was willing to offer a kind of peace offering.The result:
the crisis passed quickly and the Nike brand went unscarred.
Looking at Nike on the crisis curve, it is clear that at the first warning
(point B) it reacted quickly.
Nike’s crisis curve

H. Reputation
B. Pre-tremor F. Nike withdraws undamaged
warning – trainers
Muslims
A. Crisis in complain G. Crisis
gestation about image dissipates
Time elapsing
In simple terms, it is worth repeating the rules for managing a crisis:
1. Look carefully at the signals. What is the worst-case scenario? – that is

probably what you are heading for.
2. Make sure immediate costs to possible brand damage are in perspective.
3. Don’t rush – make a rational decision in good time.
4. Overcompensate – in response to criticism, be the big man and make
the big gesture. This can save time and pain later on.
5. Things will get worse before they get better, so the ostrich syndrome –
hoping it will go away – is not an option. It is here to stay.
Both Johnson & Johnson and Nike were quick to react and their reputa-
tions were enhanced. Sales improved and the organisations got on with
their businesses. Perrier was not so lucky.
THE BUBBLE BURSTS
The world famous Perrier drink is iconoclastic. It has long been associated with a refined
taste and was hugely popular with yuppies in the 1980s and 90s. It could do no wrong –
it was the epitome of a natural drink coming from deep within the earth where, as it
said on the label, it was naturally carbonated. Ideal for the generation who saw their
bodies as temples.The drink’s traditional markets in Europe had widened and now it was
hugely popular in North America as well.
In 1990, scientists had noticed that there were tiny amounts of benzene in the water.
These amounts were rising and still the management ignored the warnings. This is not
unreasonable; anyone who works in a chemistry laboratory will be familiar with this
compound which is a fundamental chemical tool.
Despite the label, what most people did not know was that the Perrier water and the
gas that carbonated it did not come from the same underground sources. They came
from different sources and were mixed together at the surface. It was here that the
contamination had seemed to occur. Perrier did nothing. It ignored the pre-tremor
warning.
But American health regulations are tight and, soon after, North Carolina health regu-
lators claimed they had found the chemical benzene in bottles of Perrier. Naturally the
general public was not particularly aware of what this meant, but it sounded scary. The
fear of the unknown is always great. It leads to speculation, claim and counterclaim.
Anxiety levels rose, stimulated by the media’s coverage of the story. Perrier was now at
point C – the point of no return – the arrow had left the bow; it could not be recalled.
Despite this warning, Perrier took a half-hearted approach to solving the problem.
Rather than going for a total recall, as Johnson & Johnson and Nike did, it went for a
partial recall as it believed the problem to be a small one, isolated to one or two cases. It
decided to withdraw only a limited number of bottles, specifically from the North Amer-
ican market. The company tried to play down the importance of the benzene – despite
claims that the chemical was carcinogenic. In the media, it played down the importance of
the story and tried to reduce its financial exposure by recalling more bottles.
However, in the event of trying to prevent a crisis, Source Perrier ensured that was
exactly what was going to happen. When the news came through that benzene had also
been found in Europe, urgent action was required to recall all bottles – worldwide.
Although Source Perrier had now done the necessary, it had effectively been forced
into doing so. The company had seemed arrogant and unresponsive – recklessly disre-
garding the health of millions of its customers. The media characteristically pulled no
punches. Perrier bore the brunt of continued negative publicity.
By 1995 sales of the bottled water in America had shrunk by 50 per cent compared
to 1989. Source Perrier suffered further ignominy in 1990 when it was forced to ditch its
slogan ‘naturally sparkling’ after the benzene incident alerted officials to the company’s
carbonating process which was now seen to be not at all natural.
It later became clear that the levels of benzene found in the drink were virtually negli-
gible.To put it into context, a pack of cigarettes has 2000 times the level of that found in
Perrier bottles.The company has survived the incident, but sales of the drink have never
Why Managing a Crisis Matters 31
fully recovered. With proper management of the crisis, Source Perrier would not have
had to endure such a media attack.
Perrier was damaged irreparably and now the company is part of the Nestlé Group
who have worked hard and successfully to re-establish what was, after all, a reputable
and sound brand.
Analysis
Still, the lesson is a salutary one: getting your crisis management wrong means you are in
a weak position to control the crisis when it breaks. This is serious and in the worst
cases, like Perrier, you lose the company. Perrier’s crisis curve is shown below.
Perrier’s crisis curve E. Secondary

tremors – it is
not naturally F. Plateau
carbonated
D. Plateau –
worldwide recall
G. Resolution –
C. Crisis escalation: point sales fall by 50%
of no return – Perrier
decides on partial recall
A. Crisis in H. Damage to
gestation – B. Pre-tremor reputation – Perrier
Perrier warning – US sold to Nestlé
scientists detect scientists detect
benzene benzene
Time elapsing
No room for error
In a crisis, the room to manoeuvre is effectively nil. You have been

accused, therefore you must be guilty. This is extremely unfair, but this is
the hand with which you must play.
ANTHRAX IN THE POST
After the events of September 11 2001, America was on a state of heightened alert to
the threat of terrorist activity.The nation reacted with horror when reports were issued
that anthrax had been sent to government officials in the post.
The media whipped up a frenzy, generating increasingly doom-laden stories for an
eager public to digest who feared that they could be next to receive a package coated
in the deadly virus.The panic was tangible.
The US Postal Service (USPS) acted quickly to try to prevent a further escalation of
the situation.The USPS quickly positioned itself as a champion of the people. It sent 145
million homes throughout the country a card which advised people on what to do to
avoid being exposed to any anthrax which may have been concealed in their mail. This
card also emphasised the company’s concern for the wellbeing of the American people.
It read: ‘The USPS places the highest priority on the safety of our customers and
employees and the security of the mail.’ In addition USPS took other measures to ensure
that the public had every possible way of finding out the truth of the situation, for
example a website to offer further advice was set up and regularly updated.
By ensuring that it appeared to be responsive to people’s concerns, USPS distanced
itself from being the carrier of the anthrax virus and instead repositioned itself as part of
the war against terror.
Analysis
Call it an overreaction to send 145 million postcards, but that is what is needed. Under-
reaction – the ostrich syndrome – is a recipe for disaster and would have seriously
damaged the USPS. Of course, it was also a great advertisement for the mail – using
your own service to warn of the dangers that the same service might bring in the form
of anthrax.
Total openness and transparency are the only way forward. This is how –
in the charged atmosphere of the US – post September 11, the US Postal
Service handled a most difficult situation.
SECTION B
The Organisation and
its Universe
33
CHAPTER 5
Organisations and their Leadership
When a company is in a crisis, it tends to become defensive and inward-

looking. This is not surprising – it is the caveman response. In pre-historic
times, people would retreat into their caves for safety, to have three solid
walls around them at the time of attack. In medieval times, people pulled
up the drawbridge as the same response and tried to defend against the
attackers. Therefore most crisis management procedures draw only on
internal resources. As outlined in the second half of this book, good crisis
management procedures are absolutely essential, but organisations are
very slow to shout ‘help’. So, for example, in the Brent Spar case, Shell
did not call on Exxon even though it was a 50 per cent owner of the instal-
lation. Nor did Monsanto call on those professors who had done numerous
studies on the safety of GM foods.
The reasons for going alone are many, but they can include fear,
embarrassment and arrogance.
Fear
There is a strong control fixation within organisations which, in most
cases, rightly tries to control messages and how they are disseminated.
There is a real concern that if others are allowed to defend the company,
they may not do so as well or as robustly. As any army general will attest,
however, alliances are absolutely essential in fighting a war. In both world
wars, the European alliances worked hard to encourage a reluctant United
States to enter the war. In World War I, it took the sinking of the civilian
ship The Lusitania to bring the US into the war and in World War II, it
took Pearl Harbour. The European nations, however, particularly Britain,
recognised the need for an alliance if the war was to be won.
Similarly in a crisis, an organisation must draw on resources other than
its own if it is to win the battle in the long term.
35
Embarrassment
Corporations in particular tend to have a very strong image which they are
careful to cultivate for certain audiences, particularly the financial commu-
nity. Weakness does not look good for the management who have to
portray that they are following a carefully thought-out strategy. Therefore,
it can be embarrassing if they are seen to seek help from other organisa-
tions, particularly when their antagonists are perceived to be a small NGO.
Arrogance
This is the most dangerous of all human characteristics. At the best of
times, most of us are not as good as we think we are and in a crisis, none
of us are. Arrogance is the equivalent of putting on a blindfold and running
along a cliff path.
The legal department
Large organisations are very cautious in a crisis. It is hard to do much else

when you are in a cave. It is important that all statements are carefully
cleared and management prepared in advance.
E L E C T R I C I T Y TO O C H E A P TO M E T E R
In the 1950s, at the beginning of the nuclear era when atomic power was just emerging,
it seemed as if it was a panacea for the world’s energy needs. There was a lot of opti-
mism throughout the world following the war a decade earlier.
Nor were there the environmental and safety concerns which exist today and which
are thousands of times more rigorous than they were then. At that time, an American
scientist said that one day nuclear power would be so cheap, it would be too cheap to
meter. In other words, the economic cost of a meter would not make sense because the
power itself would be so inexpensive.
Unfortunately, it has still not come to fruition and today nuclear power is extremely
expensive, mainly because of safety and environmental concerns which are rightly
tackled by the industry. However, this statement ‘too cheap to meter’ is used again and
again by NGOs who want to attack the industry. It is put forward as overoptimism, as
trying to spin the truth or as a plain lie. It is extremely difficult to defend.
Analysis
An organisation needs to be careful what it says about its activities, whether it is in crisis
or not. Unfortunately, a crisis can lead to injudicious statements which can never be
withdrawn and which will haunt the organisation and its reputation for ever.
Organisations and their Leadership 37
Often what emerges from an organisation during a crisis is late and

with little content. This is not very media or stakeholder friendly. The
problems are that the legal department – for good reasons – wants to
ensure that the organisation does not expose itself during a crisis. As one
cynic said, the default position of all lawyers is to say nothing.
Tone of voice
In a crisis, organisations tend to adopt one of three tones of voice, defen-

sive, aggressive and business as usual.
Defensive
This is the caveman response and it can look very weak. The organisation
is under attack – is in crisis – and yet nothing is heard. This gives the
impression of a cover-up, incompetence or worse.
Aggressive
This is based on the principle that attack is the best form of defence.
Unfortunately, when an organisation is in crisis, attack is not appropriate.
At best it can look uncaring, at worst it can look arrogant. A typical
example of an aggressive response could be during an environmental crisis
when the organisation says: ‘Certainly there seem to have been a number
of fish killed in this incident; however, the source of the pollution has been
cleared up and we believe that we have worked extremely hard to mitigate
the damage. In fact, without our quick and appropriate action, the damage
could have been much worse’. This aggressive response is inappropriate
and is the equivalent of a shrug of the shoulders – the ‘so-what’ response.
Business as usual
This is a form of denial which is best represented by the phrase: ‘Crisis,
what crisis?’ Even though you may not be in crisis, to be accused of being
in crisis is to be in crisis.
P A R M A L AT
The downfall of this Italian food and dairy company is an example of how businesses can
face bankruptcy by both self- and public deception.
Parmalat is one of Italy’s best known businesses.The company’s core product, long-life
milk, is ubiquitous in Mediterranean countries and throughout the world. Despite its
success, the company was declared officially insolvent at the end of 2003. So how did
this happen?
The troubles began when Parmalat was unable to account for a stray B4 billion.The
company said that some 38 per cent of its assets were held in an offshore bank account
in the Cayman Islands. However, it soon became clear that the company was unable to
produce this cash, that the account was in fact a fiction. Following this discovery, the
ensuing investigation uncovered that managers had invented assets to offset over B14
billion in liabilities and falsified accounts over a 15-year period.
The final figure of debt then was much higher than the original B4 billion. Parmalat,
once found out, failed to reveal the extent to which it was in trouble.This had the effect
of compounding the crisis for the company. It was not the amount of debt that was the
problem, but the manner in which Parmalat attempted to cover it up. All confidence in
the company had been slashed.
After these events, key figureheads of the company were dragged into the public eye
and unceremoniously prosecuted for their corporate crime. Former Chief Executive
Calisto Tanzi, his son Stefano and brother Giovanni, former Chief Financial Officer Fausto
Tonna and 16 other individuals were all taken to court to face charges.
Analysis
Parmalat committed the worst of sins in crisis management. By not admitting to the
truth, the company became further embroiled.
The tone of voice should be modest but firm, drawing on the lifebelt state-
ments outlined in Chapter 15. It must leave all triumphalism behind. Nor
is it the time for corporate breast-beating of any sort. For example, state-
ments such as ‘we have a very proud environmental record and have won
a number of awards for our work’ are a waste of time. People do not want
to know the corporate PR. In fact, in a crisis, it is best if you do not believe
any of your own PR.
The role of the chief executive
In Section C of the book, details of the practicalities of setting up a crisis

management team are explained. However, there is an important player
outside the team, who will also have an important role in the crisis process.
In essence, there are three broad roles which the chief executive of an
organisation can take during a crisis:
1. Lead from the front and take total control of the crisis
2. Leave the management of the crisis to the crisis management team
3. A combination of the above – poolside management.
Lead from the front
Most chief executives tend to gravitate towards this position. After all,
their organisation is under fierce attack and it is only right that the
general of the army is seen to be on a white steed, sword in hand,
defending it to the death. There are, unfortunately, a number of problems
with this position:
■ It leaves the leader of the organisation fully exposed. Certainly,

many famous generals such as Napoleon at the Arcole Bridge, who
ran into a hail of bullets, or Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo led
successfully from the front. However, these people are rare and if the
leader is attacked and loses his/her position, then this leaves the
organisation highly vulnerable. For example, in 2003 Shell was in
crisis over under-statement of its oil reserves. The chief executive
was brought into the fray and promptly lost his job. This was very
damaging for Shell.
■ There is still an organisation to run. Although the crisis, because of its
intensity and short time burst, seems to be overwhelming and the
organisation of a response and nothing else seems to be of any impor-
tance, there is still a corporation which needs management. (This is
covered in detail in Chapter 19 on business continuity.) This is partic-
ularly so during a crisis, when those who are not directly involved can
feel isolated. Even during the most intense crisis, however, there is still
a certain amount of ‘business as usual’. Even at the height of the Brent
Spar incident – when Shell stations in Germany were being fire-
bombed – there was still a huge multinational organisation selling its
products throughout the world.
■ Time for training. Ask most chief executives if they can take five or six
working days out of their year, for what many see as a game, albeit an
important game, but a game all the same. They will answer they have
no time for games. The result is that they do not have a full under-
standing of how a crisis management team works. This is extremely
dangerous if they are to lead it, or take a key role in its organisation.
For these reasons, it is probably best if the chief executive does not lead
the crisis management team because as the chief executive of the company,
he is running it as a totality rather than one specific project – the crisis.
Leave it to the crisis management team
In this scenario, the chief executive does not involve himself or herself
directly in the crisis management team. This is by far the best and most
preferred option. It does not mean that the chief executive has no part or is
not aware of what is happening within the crisis, but he or she is not an
active part of the management team. Of course, there is a role for the chief
executive and this is outlined below.
Poolside management
This is the situation where the chief executive has agreed that he/she will
not be a part of the crisis management team. However, like a moth to a
flame, he/she is drawn to the crisis; as has been pointed out in other parts
of the book – a crisis is fun. It brings out all the thrills of the chase. Now
the chief executive is drawn magnetically and begins to offer direction.
Because it is the chief executive, this direction is extremely difficult to
resist. In fact, in many companies it can be career-limiting to countermand
the orders of the chief executive.
This situation is exacerbated when the chief executive is remote from
the crisis management team and the crisis management room. Numerous
telephone calls come in, generally after each news bulletin, offering
advice, comfort and threats.
The ideal role for the chief executive
There is a key role that the chief executive can take and, given that we do
not live in a perfect or ideal world, this must be agreed in advance. This
means it is written down within the procedures and then explained care-
fully in writing to the chief executive what his/her role will be. Some time
should be taken over this explanation. Ideally, a couple of hours should be
taken to explain the crisis management procedures and the chief execu-
tive’s role within it.
If this is not done in advance, there is a real problem. Trying to
explain the CEO’s role in the middle of a crisis is difficult, in fact it is
another crisis.
So what then is the role of the chief executive? The following case is
an excellent illustration of how the role can work.
THE BRITISH MIDLAND CRASH
In 1989, an internal British Midland flight from London crashed near Birmingham. A
number of people were killed and many were injured. As is common with many crises, it
happened on a Sunday evening.
British Midland had good crisis management procedures in place and the crisis
management team was assembled. Sir Michael Bishop, the chief executive, even though it
was a Sunday night/early Monday, went to the crash site. Here he sympathised with
victims and their relatives. He said that the company would do all in its power to find
out what had gone wrong and would look to compensate those people who had been
affected. Obviously, this was all captured by the media and presented the company as
being very customer-focused and sympathetic.
Certainly Sir Michael spoke to the media as he was trained to do, but did not involve
himself in any of the technical aspects of the crisis, for example what had gone wrong.
These questions can easily be batted back well with the ‘lifebelt’ statement of: ‘We will
need to conduct a full investigation and no doubt the results of this will be made fully
public in due course. In the meantime, our thoughts must be with the family and friends.’
Analysis
This friendly and sympathetic approach was important to protect British Midland’s repu-
tation. It is also an ideal role for the chief executive. It is seen to be leading from the
front, while not actually being on the front line which is the crisis management centre.
Long term, the crash did little damage to British Midlands’ reputation and sales rose.
Conclusion
An organisation in crisis can turn inward-looking and defensive. Some-

times it will not look to third party advocates (TPAs) and will struggle on
as a lone fighter. This is a mistake. A well-trained and articulate chief
executive has a key role in the crisis, but not in managing it. Well
deployed, the CEO can almost become a key TPA for the company.
CHAPTER 6
The Media in a Crisis
By far one of the most informative books in the world is your local tele-
phone directory. Usually it is totally accurate and is full of useful informa-
tion. It has only one problem: it is boring. People – unless they are very
bored – do not read telephone books.
Look at your newspaper. What are the stories (note that word – we
will come back to it) that it carries? In essence, they fall into two broad
categories:
■ information
■ entertainment.
The media as entertainer
Certainly most journalists would like to think – and many would insist –
that they are in the information business. And indeed some are. But most,
by far, are also – and many predominantly – in the entertainment business.
If you do not believe this, then stop at your local newspaper kiosk on the
way home and buy any of the many publications which feature an almost
exclusive diet of sex, violence and sport. In other words, entertainment
and conflict. And a crisis is real conflict.
Conflict is entertaining – that is why we enjoy sport. It is also why
some of us enjoy blood sports such as fox-hunting.
And a crisis is sport. It is entertaining to watch a great big corporation
wriggling on the end of a hook, whilst the world throws rotten tomatoes
at it.
42
The Media in a Crisis 43
D OW C O R N I N G
Dow Corning, the silicone implant company, was at the forefront of the plastic surgery
business. If you lived in Hollywood, you would have seen its ‘products’ every day, as pneu-
matic starlets and ordinary folk alike graced the boulevards of tinsel town. As with most
things Californian, however, it made its way into the lives of people all over the world.
The bubble soon burst after it was revealed that each implant was a potential time
bomb waiting to explode.The dangers of the silicone leaking and the damage this would
cause, once it was apparent, sounded the death knell for the company.
The company’s nemesis was hastened by a media storm. Journalists were extremely
happy to report such a story with its sexual overtones and they took delight in high-
lighting the countless law suits filed against the company. Dow Corning’s reaction,
however, was a classic example of what not to do in a crisis situation.
The company reacted by acting as if the problem didn’t exist. It retreated into its
offices hoping that, by keeping its head in the sand, the whole thing would blow over.This
was a fateful miscalculation. The story had such obvious selling power in the media that
there was little chance of the coverage calming down. Coupled with this, as the profile
of the story grew and grew, more and more women came forward, expressing either
concern or evidence of harm caused by their leaking implants. The effect was that the
crisis became almost self-perpetuating.
This all had the effect of making Dow Corning look as though it was hiding the truth
from the public – many in the media concluded that it was. Dow Corning was accused
of being deceptive and lying to its customers.
Although Dow Corning employed all the resources at its disposal, it was failing to win
the battle. This is something which Dow Corning itself soon recognised. The manage-
ment lamented: ‘The message agenda had been led for far too long by journalists, special
interest groups and medical commentators often lacking solid scientific evidence.’
Analysis
As we have seen before, scientific evidence is no substitute for rumour, scaremongering
and anxiety. This is much more interesting and easy for the layman to understand. Swift
action to make the public aware of the issues was needed. Ideally, this should have been
led by third party advocates. It was not to be. Unfortunately the company reacted too
late. When it began to become more open, a sceptical media came to the conclusion
that it had only done so because its hand was forced. Its message was lost in the fog of
hysteria and accusations of cover-ups.
The media also loves an underdog, just as in a football match all the
neutral supporters tend to support the weaker team – the giant killer. Jour-
nalists often see themselves as consumer champions and so have no diffi-
culty in siding against the big corporation in a crisis. After all, it is this
journalistic attitude that spawned various ‘doorstepping’ investigative
programmes across the world, each looking for that big story that could
make a career.
Today, even the most staid of news programmes looks for entertain-
ment value; they have no choice; the battle for readers, listeners and
viewers is a fierce one. News, for the most part, is intrinsically boring.
People say they find politics ‘boring’ and faraway wars in little known
countries have little impact or attraction for the viewing public in the race
for ratings. However, celebrity magazines are news, so why do we think
one superstar’s new boyfriend is more important than the future of a
country? Is it because – simply – it is easier to understand?
In a crisis, we often have the basis of a Hollywood movie. The good
guys, the underdogs – in the shape of the eco-warriors, local residents or
the general public, guardians of all that is good – and the bad guys, the
corporation, supported by heavies in the form of the police and so on.
Media want to present news and ideally this information should also
be entertaining. However, if the company in crisis helps the entertainment
value, then they can assured of high media attention – little of which will
be positive.
News only becomes interesting when it becomes entertaining. That is
the role of the media, and also recognised by NGOs. Entertainment comes
in many forms, but by far the two best components remain those that are
well recognised in Hollywood: sex and violence. Brent Spar was violence
at its Hollywood best. We all knew no one would be killed, there was a
great big baddie in the shape of Shell and the good guys in the shape of
Greenpeace. No wonder the BBC and the rest were led by the noses to
transmit it: this was high-grade entertainment.
A mantra for the modern media might be:
Entertain them and you can tell them anything, bore them and you can tell
them nothing.
Look at newspapers from around the turn of the century (opposite page,
left). They had lots of close type and were very information-intensive.
Compare them with today’s newspapers with their sensational headlines
and photos (opposite page, right). The shift from information to entertain-
ment – known in the trade as ‘dumbing down’ – has gathered pace as time
has passed.
The role of the media in a crisis
People have a low level of trust in the media. According to the 1998
British Social Attitude Survey, quoted in the UK Press Gazette, only 15
per cent of the population trust the country’s journalists to pursue the truth.
In addition, people have little or no respect for journalists, rating them just
above estate agents.
What then is the problem? Why not ignore the media? After all, if no
one believes or trusts the media, why should any organisation care about
it? The answer is a fairly simple one and was first formulated by Chen in
1963 in the book The Press and Foreign Policy:
The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.
So people expect the media to be inaccurate, they do not expect even to

read the truth in their newspapers, so why is the media well read and
heeded in these circumstances?
It is this ability to act as a spotlight that gives the media such power.
And not only is it a spotlight, it is also a magnifying glass. It is fairly well
accepted in most corporate cultures that the person who controls the
agenda and the minutes is in a powerful position. This is exactly where the
media sits. It can set the agenda and then write the minutes.
And reading those minutes in a crisis are the politicians, the regulators
and other media, in essence, those people who can deliver – or revoke
your licence to operate (see Chapter 9). Although they may not take their
opinions from the media, and filter out the wilder speculation, they are still
influenced by what they see, hear and read. The fact that they are taking
the time (precious as it is) to actually pay attention to the media means
they have an investment in the media. They would not be reading the
newspaper if they did not want something from it. Therefore the media
cannot be ignored.
The truth – the first casualty in a crisis
During the Brent Spar case, the media took Greenpeace’s word as being
gospel. Even when it miscalculated the amount of toxic substance on the
platform by many orders of magnitude – and had to apologise to Shell –
these inaccuracies were faithfully broadcast by an entertainment-hungry
media.
Greenpeace offered no apologies for the inaccuracies in its advertising.
When asked if it was being naughty in its interpretation of the facts, the
Greenpeace spokesman said: ‘If you are a political pressure group, you
have to be a bit naughty.’
So whilst the media has a duty to inform, this will always be over-
ridden by the instinct for survival. And these survival instincts are fuelled
by more readers, listeners and viewers. And information alone will not
bring them in.
Ironically, the highest information quotient is often found in the adver-
tising. Advertising, unlike the editorial, is subject to fairly stringent regula-
tion. The editorial content is not. Whereas it may not be fair for journalists
to speculate, there is little to stop them getting speculation from other
sources. There is no compunction on those who speculate to be accurate.
In fact, in many cases, it is against their interest to be accurate, as wild and
unfounded speculation is often far more entertaining.
However, this drive to entertain can have a frightening effect on the
truth. In newspaper offices the talk is not of ‘news’ or ‘facts’, but of
‘stories’. This is a strong and tacit acceptance that the media has a role to
play in ‘telling a story’. In fact, in the cynical world of newspapers, there
is an adage which says:’Never let the facts get in the way of a good story.’
In a court of law, witnesses are asked to swear that they will tell the
‘truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’. So what is the difference
between the ‘truth’, the ‘whole truth’ and ‘nothing but the truth’? Why are
there three elements? In an adversarial system of justice such as the Amer-

ican or British one, the prosecution (the state) can intentionally hide pieces
of evidence which would be beneficial to the defendant, but detrimental to
the prosecution case. Is this the ‘whole truth’?
By definition, no piece of news can be completely accurate. Editors
are, after all, editors. But editing, by its very definition, distorts the truth,
even if it is done with the best intention and in an unbiased way. Ironically,
the fewer words that a medium has to play with, the more accurate the
story is likely to be. So, for example, a 30-minute television news bulletin
may contain 15 separate news items and between 2000 and 3000 words.
This is about one page on a fairly dense broadsheet like the New York
Times, but covering only three or four stories.
Therefore, editors have a very difficult job. They have to select the
facts and assemble them in such a way as to present what they believe is as
complete a picture as possible which represents the truth.
The problem in a crisis is that facts are often hard to come by. But the
media cannot tolerate a vacuum – there are hectares of newsprint to be
filled, hours of broadcasting. If the facts are not available, then speculation
will have to do.
However, journalists are generally fairly moral and ethical people.
Certainly, some will speculate off their own bat, but others will look for
someone ‘to stand the story up’. This is where pundits and experts come
in. To become an expert is fairly easy: just put the title ‘doctor’ or
‘professor’ in front of your name and you are 90 per cent there. You could
also start up your own organisation; after all, in this technologically
advanced world, we all have access to the web, email and a vast new
world of members.
The activist groups are often ready and willing to come forward as
experts in a crisis. After all, they are looking for the publicity that will
attract new members.
Meantime, the organisation at the heart of the crisis is still trying to get
a statement cleared. In the Nestlé case in Ethiopia, outlined in Chapter 8, it
took five days to get a media statement. Meantime, Oxfam had a field day.
And when the media statement did appear, it was on December 27 when
much of the world was comatosely recovering from Christmas.
The balancing comment
Ever since the penny dreadfuls of Victorian times, readers of newspapers

have liked to be shocked, in much the same way as people like horror
films. However, there is a line and newspaper editors have to be careful
not to transgress it.
But surely there must be balance. Of course, it is called the ‘balancing
comment’. When the reporter has written the shock-horror story, the
organisation is then approached for a comment ‘to balance out the piece.’
Even if the company manages to say something strong and sensible or
even manages to refute totally the story as a tissue of lies, this will appear
at the very bottom of the story.
Of course, reporters and editors are aware that there is a huge decay
curve in how newspaper stories are read. Nearly everyone reads the head-
lines, but by the time they get to the balancing comment, only a tiny
proportion of the readers remains. The headline itself is 90 per cent of the
impact and if the subeditor has any qualms about one, such as ‘Local Firm
Will Wipe Out Last of the Newts’, it is just put into quotation marks – after
all the green group did say it.
In the Brent Spar incident, Greenpeace initially accused Shell of
wanting to dump the platform in the North Sea. In fact, it was the North
Atlantic – a totally different stretch of water. A Greenpeace spokesperson
discounted this as being immaterial – it’s the principle that counts. This, of
course, is the same organisation that demands meticulous accuracy from
all those it attacks.
Dealing positively with the media
So what can a large organisation do? The response of most is based on

classical public relations. However, the problem with classical PR is that it
is based on consumerism. Here the customer is willing to buy (or at least is
wanting to consider buying) the product. In crisis communications, the
opposite is true. There is antagonism towards the company.
Compare, for example, buying a new car and having a chemical
factory explode in your village. In the first case, you are happy to read
about the model you wish to buy: in fact, the more glowing the press
reports, the more reassured you are about your buying decision. In the case
of the factory, you want to believe everything that is bad. And you defi-
nitely will not believe anything the promoting organisation wishes to tell
you about. They would say that, wouldn’t they?
However, the media – as Greenpeace found out – can be also manipu-
lated for the company’s own ends. It means that one has to be fleet (dead-
lines are always tight) and willing to think laterally. Here’s how the Allied
Irish Bank (AIB) handled what could have become a Barings Bank/Nick
Leeson story. Barings was eventually sold to ING Bank of the Netherlands
for £1. AIB was luckier, or was it just better prepared?
AIB B ANK
The Allied Irish Bank is Ireland’s biggest banking and financial services organisation. The
company was formed in 1966 and grew from humble beginnings into a multinational
corporation employing 31,000 people in more than 1000 offices.
In early 2002, the company was thrown into crisis when it was reported that one of
its traders had defrauded it of $750 million.
Almost as soon the news reached the press, John Rusnak, the rogue trader in ques-
tion, was labelled as the next Nick Leeson. This was bad news indeed for AIB. Leeson
famously brought about the collapse of Barings Bank by running up £830 million in
losses on unauthorised derivatives trades.The implication was there for all to see.
The situation threatened to spiral out of control as it appeared that Mr Rusnak had
disappeared. Sensing a story with Hollywood blockbuster qualities, the media concluded
that he was on the run. Speculation was rife and the media was hooked.
The bank called a crisis meeting to discuss quite how it could have got into this situ-
ation. Almost at the same time, AIB received some fortunate news: Mr Rusnak had
spoken to the FBI. It transpired that he was not on the run, after all, but was visiting
family in Baltimore.
Seizing on this opportunity, the bank took the initiative to distance itself from
comparisons to Nick Leeson and Barings Bank. The bank immediately briefed the press.
First it explained the situation with Mr Rusnak and, more importantly, it acted to quell
rumours that as a result the company would go under. AIB informed the watching public
that the financial blow it had taken was not on anything like the same scale as that which
befell Barings Bank.
Analysis
In a master stroke, AIB issued a good news story.The bank told journalists that the figures
showed that, despite the loss, the company would still report a profit for the year.
Effectively, the stories of collapse and the damaging prospect of a prolonged man-
hunt for Rusnak were killed in an instant. Not quite crisis averted, but certainly crisis
curtailed.
Conclusion
In a crisis, you have no choice but to handle the media. It must be done,
and the practicalities are outlined in Section C. However, what most
organisations fail to do – Greenpeace being an honourable exception – is
to invoke the power of third party advocates. How TPAs can be used in a
crisis is covered in Chapter 11.
CHAPTER 7
The Politicians and Regulators
When asked what goes wrong in politics, the former British prime
minister, Harold Macmillan, said: ‘Events, dear boy, events.’
A crisis is certainly an event. Because, as Macmillan said, it is events
which make things go wrong, politicians tend, unless they are drawn in, to
steer well clear of crises. Because politicians are the fountainhead of
power, those who are attacking the corporation (often the pressure groups)
try hard to embroil the politicians in the crisis. Of course, if the politicians
are embroiled, it is all the more exciting for the media which, in turn,
further escalates the intensity of the crisis.
Characteristics of a politician
In order to understand the role of politicians in a crisis, it is important to

understand the nature of the beast. Whilst stereotyping is always dangerous,
there are two characteristics which are common to most politicians:
altruism and ego.
Altruism
Most politicians have a strong sense of duty. One of the reasons they go
into what is a tough and often unrewarding profession is to ‘serve their
communities’. Publicly, they would present a strong sense of duty and
loyalty to that community. If the community is attacked, as it is often
perceived to be during a crisis, then they will jump to the defence of that
community. This is to be expected and should be planned for.
50
The Politicians and Regulators 51
COKE WASN’T IT
Coca-Cola is one of the most ubiquitous of global brands – it seems it can be bought on
any corner of any foreign land.
A company like this can rely on the strength of its brand to see it through most
things. However, complacency in a crisis is a dangerous thing indeed. In 1999, Coke
suffered a serious setback. It did not threaten the survival of the company – that would
require a seismic shift in the public’s attitude – but it did seriously damage the company’s
reputation and dent its stock market value.
On June 14 1999, the Belgian Government banned the sale of Coca-Cola. A month
earlier 43 school children had complained of nausea and vomiting after drinking it. Coco-
Cola ignored this and carried on with business as usual. As the cases grew, however, the
company began to apportion blame elsewhere. It refused to accept responsibility for the
ill health of customers. It also refused to stop production.
As the weeks progressed, the evidence was mounting. More than 250 people had
reported feeling ill after drinking Coke. The company, however, remained defensive and
the media began to attack. Coca-Cola’s stock plummeted.
While it continued to deny any connection, the Belgian Government took action to
ban the drink. Coca-Cola issued a statement confirming that the product had been cont-
aminated, but that it would only cause minor discomfort to those who drank it. The
government and the people of Belgium had expected a different response. They were
looking for apologies, explanations and compensation. Coca-Cola refused to act.
The panic spread. Governments in three other European countries ordered that
Coke be recalled from the shelves.
In July, Coca-Cola decided that it would apologise – but this apology was made
primarily to shareholders in the form of a letter. Even in this letter the apology was not
complete. Douglas Ivestor, chairman of Coca-Cola, blamed what he called ‘bad’ carbon
dioxide for the problems. Later this was challenged by scientists. Whatever the cause, the
media was cynical and unimpressed by this belated response. Coca-Cola also tried the
tactic of giving away millions of drinks to the Belgian population. However, this also fell flat.
Analysis
Politicians will steer clear of a crisis for as long as possible. After all, when there is mud
flying, they don’t want it to stick on them. However, there comes a time when politicians
must step in to defend the communities they represent. A company should act long
before this happens. In the end, Coca-Cola had to launch a huge public relations exercise
to try to regain its customers.
Ego
The world of politics is not one for shy, modest or retiring individuals.
Whereas most politicians would like to give the impression that they have
been forced to take up office, exactly the opposite is true. They will often
present this dilemma with quotes such as: ‘If there are those in my party
who would force me to allow my name to go forward, then of course I will
bend to the wishes of the party if it should believe that this is in the best
interests of my constituents and my country.’
To be a successful politician, one needs huge amounts of self-belief
and self-confidence. Ambition, it goes without saying, is another absolute
prerequisite. Obviously, as ambition can often be perceived as naked greed
for power, politicians are careful to hide it beneath a veneer of modesty.
Even the mildest, self-effacing politicians need a high level of ambition if
they are to be in any way successful.
The politician in a crisis
When a crisis breaks, politicians, and again this has been stereotypical,
have two simple choices: either get involved or not. For most people, in
the vicinity of a lab explosion, the natural reaction is to duck and run for
cover. This is also the natural reaction of the politician.
However, outside forces may not allow that actuality to occur.
A U S T R A L I A N A S Y L U M S E E K E R B O AT
Saving lives at sea must always rank ahead of politics.

This quote is from Arne Rinnan, the Norwegian boat captain who rescued 438 refugees
stranded about 75 nautical miles north of Christmas Island. He had received a general
call from the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) that the Palapa (the
refugees’ ship) was stranded and in a bad condition and that any nearby vessel’s assist-
ance was required. Rinnan’s ship, the MS Tampa, was the closest and rescued all the
refugees. Rinnan was originally due in Singapore and intended to continue on this route.
However, the asylum seekers became agitated at this, threatening various actions,
including jumping overboard. The captain decided to sail for the Australian Christmas
Islands instead.
Now the crisis really began.
Upon approaching the islands, the captain requested permission to unload the
refugees. The Australian government, however, refused permission for the ship to enter
Christmas Island terriotorial waters, citing the inadequacy of the island’s facilities to cope
with such numbers. Others knew the underlying reason, however, as the growing unrest
in Australia over the number of immigrants and asylum seekers. If these people set foot
on Australian soil, the argument went, they could legitimately claim asylum. In addition,
there was to be a general election within months.
This then exploded into a diplomatic fracas, involving Australia, Indonesia, Norway, the
UN and NGOs such as Amnesty International. The weight of international opinion was
against the Australian government. Norway reported the country to the UN and the
International Maritime Organisation for forgoing their obligations and Amnesty Interna-
tional criticised Australia, by accusing it of violating the UN Refugee Convention.
Eventually a solution was brokered which had the Australian government paying for
the refugees’ carriage to the Pacific island of Nauru – the world’s smallest republic.
Rinnan was given the Nansen award for 2002 from the UNHCR for his efforts to
follow international principles for rescuing people at sea, despite threats from the
Australian government to imprison him and impound his ship.
Analysis
Where did Australia go wrong? Asylum seekers are one of the problems of our day and,
excluding the difficult and complicated reasons as to why they exist, how should states deal
with them? Democratically elected leaders must pay attention to their electorate or face
the consequences. In addition, a neutral ship’s captain who had rescued hundreds of
people from certain death seemed to be vilified by the government. A more pragmatic
approach, with swifter outcomes, should have been adopted. Accept some of the refugees
(say, women and children) and then broker with Indonesia for the rest. In the end it was
likely that all of them could have ended up in the same place but dealing with the problem
efficiently would have kept the issue out of the media at a crucial pre-election time.
There are other crises in which a politician has no choice but to

become involved. For example, when there is a major catastrophe, and
particularly if there is a loss of life.
THE MADRID BOMBING
On Thursday March 11 2004, Madrid witnessed the most catastrophic terrorist incident
in Europe since the crash of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988.The Spanish capital was hit by 10
bombs exploding on four trains in three stations during the early morning rush hour.The
attack was coordinated and dramatic and had been designed to create chaos and take
the lives of as many Spaniards as possible.
At 07.39 three bombs exploded in the third, fourth and sixth carriages of a train
which had just pulled into the busy Atoche station in the centre of Madrid. Four further
bombs exploded in another train just behind the first. Down the line at El Pozo station
a train passing through the area was rocked by explosions in two of its carriages, and a
minute later a fourth train was hit as it passed through Santa Eugenia station. It was later
discovered that the bombs had been remotely detonated using mobile telephones.
The initial reports were hazy and the scale of the atrocity was unclear. Throughout
the day, however, 24 news stations beamed the scenes of devastation into the homes of
millions throughout the world and the horror of the situation became all too apparent.
Reporters were quick to realise the importance of this event. With just under 200
people killed and thousands of others injured, this was an act of terrorism previously
unparalleled in Europe.
However, this case study does not examine the incident itself nor the handling of it by
the Spanish emergency services, but rather the reaction to the events of the Spanish
government, led by Jose Maria Aznar.
Almost directly the reports of the bombings entered the global news arena, ques-
tions were asked as to who the perpetrators of this crime were. Because of the scale of
the event and the dramatic death toll, people’s minds turned to al-Qaeda and
September 11. With war in Iraq dominating the news agenda and polarising the interna-
tional community, was this the Islamic terrorists’ first major ‘successful’ mission in Europe?
Pundits pointed to the fact that Spain and the UK were the only European countries
with substantial levels of troops in Iraq in support of US forces.
‘No, not so’, said the Spanish government. Aznar appeared on national television.
Clearly grief-stricken by the tragedy of the event, he was quick to state who he believed
was behind the attack. The Spanish prime minister argued that the evidence pointing
towards the Basque separatist group ETA was incontrovertible.
At first this assumption appeared reasonable. ETA is the major terrorist group within
Spain. Formed in 1959 whilst the country was under the dictatorship of Franco, the
movement set about the task of securing an independent state for the Basque people.
Since then the group has targeted Spanish politicians and more recently tourist
hotspots like the Costa del Sol to make its case. Up until then, however, ETA had been
involved in relatively small-scale terrorist incidents. This would have represented a
dramatic shift in tactics.
Aznar has a personal history with ETA. He was once the subject of an assassina-
tion attempt by the group and, since being elected to government in 1996,
has vowed to wipe out the organisation. This personal battle was later used by some
to accuse the prime minister of prematurely concluding that ETA was behind
the attacks.
The world’s media and politicians appeared to take Aznar’s comments at face value.
News commentators and opinion writers in national papers all concluded that this
represented a dramatic shift in tactics for the group but that nevertheless it was respon-
sible. The Spaniards themselves also believed their government. Millions took to the
streets of Madrid, Seville and Barcelona to protest against terrorism. Many banners
simply read ‘No to ETA’. In a moving scene, the people of the Basque city of Bilbao
walked silently through the city centre, poignantly sending their own message to, suppos-
edly, those who were fighting for their independence.
The international community was so convinced by the Spanish government’s insis-
tence that ETA was responsible that an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council
was held officially to denounce the acts of ETA. George Bush, president of the USA, and
Tony Blair, prime minister of the UK, both central figures in the campaign against terror,
stood united with their Madrileño companion.
The Spanish government’s mistake was to seem so certain of ETA’s culpability. It also
appeared to be withholding information about the attacks. How could the government
be so certain; surely it must have been in possession of incriminating information? This
and other questions began to make their way into the media. The government did not,
however, respond directly.
Questions were raised again when evidence was found which linked the bombing to
al-Qaeda.Tapes playing verses from the Koran were found in a car in the Madrid suburbs.
News crews jumped on this.The Spanish government, however, remained unmoved.
At the time of the bombing, Spain was a country in the throes of an election
campaign. The election was due to be held on the Sunday immediately following the
bombings of Thursday. Against this backdrop, the media and the Spanish public began to
question their leader’s motives once the Islamic tapes were found.
The decision to go to war was hugely unpopular in Spain, with the vast majority of
the public opposing the war. Aznar had been a popular prime minister and had enjoyed
an extended period of office – a change from the largely socialist governments of the
past. Spain was fast becoming a wealthy nation, a big player in the European club.
Despite this success, Aznar’s reputation had been significantly damaged by the decisions
he made on Iraq. The last thing he wanted was an unavoidable reminder of this three
days before the country went to the polls.
The Spanish public began to see things in light of this.The tone of the street protests
changed. Banners appeared to attack Aznar as much as the terrorists. ‘No to ETA’ signs
were noticeable by their absence. The government was slow to react. The crisis hit
quickly as news changed throughout the day. By the evening of March 11 a letter was
sent to the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Quds. This letter was written on behalf
of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda. The group
claimed that it was responsible for the atrocity.
The Spanish government found itself forced into admitting that there were other
possible culprits besides ETA. As ministers appeared on television, concessions were
made – the government’s line had changed – there was a possibility that it was someone
else, but the government was still convinced that ETA was the number one suspect.
On March 13 five men were arrested following the discovery of a mobile phone
inside a pack of explosives. On March 14 a video claiming responsibility for the attacks
was found.The message was recorded by an al-Qaeda spokesman based in Europe and
explained the reason for this act of revenge: ‘[for] collaboration with the criminal Bush
and his allies’.
It was then that the Spanish government was backed into a corner. All the evidence
now pointed towards al-Qaeda, not ETA. March 14 was the day of the election and by
now the Spanish public had grown increasingly sceptical of their prime minister’s asser-
tions. Until the last minute the ruling Popular Party was on course to win the election,
but with a reduced majority. As evidence emerged of the al-Qaeda link, the Spanish
public reacted angrily. Voters turned up to the polling booths hurling abuse at the
Popular Party workers, shouting ‘manipulator’ at Aznar as he cast his vote.
The election results came in early in the morning of March 15.The Socialist Workers’
Party (not to be confused with the far left party of the UK) had won through, with 43
per cent of the vote and 164 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.The Popular Party (led
by Rajoy after Aznar stood down) received only 37 per cent of the vote and won only
148 of the seats.This represented a dramatic turnaround in voting intentions.
Often when a nation is hit by a tragedy, the public rallies behind the current administra-
tion. War is a great unifier. However, the circumstances in Madrid were quite different.
The Popular Party managed not only to lose any of the goodwill it may have gained as a
result of a united and newly patriotic country, but also contrived to lose heavily an elec-
tion it was on course to win handsomely.
Categorising politicians
In most modern democracies, there are three broad levels of political

activity:
■ Government. In many democracies there are two houses – an upper

house and a lower house, the Senate and Congress in the USA being an
obvious example, and the House of Lords and House of Commons in
the UK. In general, one of these has an executive role, and this is the
more important one in a crisis.
■ Regional politics. Countries with a federal structure will have a federal
government, as is the case in Germany and the US. These often subsume
many of the responsibilities and authorities of a national government.
■ Local government. This is often subsegmented and local councils or
communes are often the lowest tier in the tax-gathering hierarchy. In
the UK, for example, local government is divided into county, district
or borough level (often based around one city) and parish level which
is around a small community.
In a crisis, all these levels of government must be briefed and mechanisms

for contact must be put in place. No matter what their level of power or
authority, politicians need to know what is happening in their communi-
ties, whether community is the whole country or one tiny village. Politi-
cians do not like getting information directly from the media, because this
information is often tainted as it has been passed to the media from yet
another source. Politicians like to be briefed. In other words, they need to
know the information before they are approached by someone else. They
see this as a key part of their role as community leaders.
If they are blind-sided, they have a number of options, all of them bad
for the company which is in crisis:
1. Take the journalist’s information as gospel. This, as noted above, is

dangerous. In a crisis, truth is an early casualty and comments based
on untrue or distorted facts can be misleading. Unfortunately for the
politician, U-turns are difficult manoeuvres to undertake and they are
often stuck with the first comment. Certainly, it will come back to
haunt them if they decide to change their mind.
For example, following a major disaster, say an explosion at a chem-

ical plant, a politician, having been told that up to 50 people may have
died, may say to the local media: ‘This is an absolute disaster for my
community and I will not rest until those who are responsible are brought
to justice.’ If it later transpires that there was a small explosion, causing
only minor damage and no injuries, the politician is still stuck with the
quote. He now looks doubly foolish as he has grossly overreacted to
what was a non-incident. In the eyes of his community, he appears not to
be in touch and to be isolated from those who pass out information, in
other words, those in power. In essence, he looks ineffectual.
2. Speculate. This is equally dangerous. News-hungry journalists –
anxious for a quote in order to round off their story – will often tend to
ask leading questions. For example:
Councillor Johnson, if it were the case that 50 people had died, how would
you react to this?’
Unfortunately, the reaction is exactly that of above and has precisely
the same effect. It is difficult for the politician to unhook himself at a
later date.
3. Try to get information from the company. This is a responsible course
of action, but if the politician has not had dealings with the company in
the past, he will be scrabbling around for telephone numbers, email
addresses and even names of those with whom he should be in contact.
In a crisis, the key people will already be tied up in managing the crisis
and so the politician is frustrated in his or her efforts to get any infor-
mation from the company.
4. Seek information from other sources. In the absence of information
from the company, the politician may go to other sources – often those
which are not friendly towards the corporation. So if an activist group,
for example, has commented on the activities of the corporation, the
politician may remember this and go to it for his information. For
obvious reasons, this is also dangerous.
5. Information may come to the politician. The enemies of a corporation –
and few are the companies which do not have some – will be quick to
see the vulnerability of the organisation in a crisis. If the activists are
quick, they start issuing press releases, making calls and updating the
website. As these groups are often quick off the mark, they may
approach the key politicians and offer them briefings on their side of
the story. With a vacuum of information, the politician may reach for
this and take it as the truth.
In summary, a politician without information will react exactly as the
columnist C Northcote Parkinson predicted in his quote:
The vacuum created by failure to communicate will quickly be filled by rumour,

misrepresentation, drivel and poison.
A politician without any other information will quickly begin to feed

on this and the damage may be irreparable, both during the crisis and in
the future.
The proactive approach
From the above, it is obvious that if a company or corporation does not put
across its side of the story, the vacuum caused by a failure to communicate
is soon filled with rumour, misrepresentation, drivel and poison.
However, there is little time for scrabbling around to put together a
communication programme in the middle of a crisis. A crisis is like a
major forest fire – it consumes all resources available to it and continues to
demand more. There is no time to plan in a crisis. Preparation, therefore,
must include all of the following:
1. A thorough and understandable research document, the ‘diagnostic’ of

who are the key players and who might be affected should the company
have a crisis. A diagnostic is effectively a review of key stakeholders
and issues that may affect or play a part with the company (described in
Chapter 11).
2. A ‘stakeholder segmentation’ exercise to decide who is key to the
company’s survival, its wellbeing, and who will attack it (also described
in Chapter 11).
3. It is essential to gather together details of how these people may be
contacted. It is a rare chancellor or prime minister, however, who hands
out their own home numbers on the Internet. So their organisations
must be contacted well in advance to ensure that there is a legitimate
route by which to reach key people. For example, many government
departments are willing to have their civil servants be the first point of
contact who can then sift the information and pass it on as necessary.
There is a risk here that the information may not be passed on in time,
but it is better to have this conduit in place rather than have nothing. It
is also important that this interface is at the highest possible level.
It takes time to build these contacts and to win their trust in order to
ensure that the recipients see the legitimacy of the company’s need to be in
a position to communicate with it in a crisis. However, if this is ‘sold’
carefully, with understanding, then most government departments and
politicians will react favourably.
When sensitive information, mobile phone numbers, private emails,
and so on, is received, it is absolutely essential that it remains confidential
and is only shared among those in the crisis management team.
The protocol of dealing with politicians
As noted earlier, politicians hate to be blind-sided and do not like to get

their information second-hand. They believe that they have been elected
by their communities and their constituents to represent them. This is not
the role of the media. Too often, organisations are most keen to brief the
media, leaving politicians and other key stakeholders behind.
Although the media have huge power in influencing what people think
about, it is worth remembering that their power is not in changing politi-
cians’ minds, it is in setting the agenda. As stated earlier, the media may
not be spectacularly successful at telling people what to think – after all, if
you do not agree with what a paper says, you stop buying it – but it is
spectacularly successful in telling readers what to think about. Politicians
are not immune.
Therefore, whilst the media have influence, they cannot, by them-
selves, put a company out of business. Politicians – through their regula-
tory powers – certainly can. One should never forget this.
C A L I F O R N I A P OW E R C U T S
To many, California is represented as the holy grail of the hi-tech world. This rich state
has an iconic quality, heralded as the apotheosis of the American dream, with its sun-
kissed, wealthy, happy beautiful people. Yet in 2001, it was subjected to the first manda-
tory power cut since World War II.
The problems arose after the unsuccessful liberalisation of the energy industry in
1996. Companies such as Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric were
the initial beneficiaries of this liberalisation as they were handed what they thought
would be lucrative contracts. However, the companies ran into financial trouble and to
balance the books decided to close a number of their power stations and reduce
investment. This proved unsustainable as California's economy continued to boom.
Essentially, California was running out of energy as more and more users placed a drain
on the system.
Energy had to be shipped in from other locations to avoid power cuts. This meant
that the cost of energy provision rose sharply. Deregulation was meant to result in
supposed lower costs for the consumer, but in reality it had led to price hikes as the
companies pushed costs on to the consumer. Californians reacted against this.They took
their protests to the federal government and sought political assistance to stop the
companies overcharging. In August 2000, the US administration decided to take action
and capped charges.
The effect of this price capping acted as a catalyst for the energy crisis. Energy
providers argued that because they were unable to pass on the increased costs of
energy provision to the consumer, they were now facing near bankruptcy.
Further bad news came when in January 2001 storms hit California.To meet demand,
the power companies were forced to buy electricity at prices 10 times higher than the
previous year.
Analysis
The companies failed to avoid a crisis because of a number of decisions. Firstly they had
not planned for worst-case scenarios. The business plan had clearly not anticipated the
growth of the economy, nor had it correctly costed the price of importing electricity. Of
course with the arrival of storms, Murphy’s Law had really taken hold. The companies
then took the ill-advised step of coming into conflict with their customers and, by impli-
cation, the politicians who represented them. By refusing to bend to their demands and
not appearing to offer the public anything to hold on to, the electricity companies
appeared arrogant and at odds with the people they were trying to win over.
The regulators
Today most modern corporations are, in effect, broadly self-regulating.

Even in the vital area of tax collection, most countries have high levels of
self-assessment. In addition, companies have their own internal audit
teams which monitor financial performance, look out for fraud and seek to
ensure the company gets best value. Overall, good self-regulation makes
good sense and links into good corporate responsibility.
In most modern democracies, the elected representatives are supported
by a civil service or unelected officials. Among these are the regulators.
Although independent of the elected representatives, they work closely
with them and their policies are often set by the government of the day.
They cover areas such as finance, for example the Financial Services
Authority in the UK and the environment, for example the USA’s Environ-
mental Protection Agency, as well as the style and type of houses which
can be constructed, through building regulations and planning permits.
Regulators can also be spread across all tiers of government – from the
national level right down to the local council or community parish council.
However, they are often treated like internal auditors: performing an

important function, but at the same time often seen by operating divisions
as little more than a nuisance. Certainly they have to slow – and some-
times stop – the flow of work so that they can go about their business. This
can generate resentment.
Similarly, government regulators are seen in the same light. For an
organisation that is prone to crisis, this is a dangerous position to adopt.
When a crisis strikes, there is little doubt that the regulator will have to be
involved, almost from the beginning. Therefore, it is prudent and good
business practice to ensure that they follow these rules:
■ Make sure they are aware of your crisis management procedures. If

the regulators are knowledgeable about your procedures and how you
are going to react, it gives them a strong comfort factor. At worst, they
know that you are planning for emergencies and that fact, in itself, is
the sign of a responsible organisation. The point at which the regulator
becomes involved in the crisis should also be delineated and agreed.
■ Have good contacts. As part of the crisis management procedures, it is
essential that people within the company know which named individ-
uals within the regulatory body are to be contacted and at what point.
Rather like a rugby lineout, each person in the organisation should
have a specific regulatory body to deal with. Obviously, they will have
telephone numbers, mobile telephone numbers, emails and so on.
■ Involve them in your testing procedures. At the annual or biannual test,
it is good to have the regulator play his or her own role. This way the
organisation will get an insight into the mindset of the regulators, what
they are looking for and how they may react. Relationships are
strengthened and tensions are reduced.
R E G U L AT O R S U N D E R T H E M I C R O S C O P E
In the UK each August thousands of 18-year-olds await the results of examinations

which could determine the course of their adult life in the UK. A-level results day is for
some a joyous occasion which rewards two years of hard work with a place at their
chosen university. For others, the day is less of a cause for celebration as disappointed
students who have failed to get their required grades decide what to do next.
In 2002, however, the situation was quite different from normal as students were left
wondering whether their results were worth the paper they were written on.
The scandal centred on the accusation that A-level papers had been deliberately
marked down, because of political pressure to keep the number of people attaining the
top marks under control. Many teenagers’ dreams were shattered as they found that
their actual grades bore no relation to their predicted grades and consequently univer-
sity places which they thought were theirs no longer were.
The crisis hit the public domain when head teachers across the country questioned
the results, and ultimately demanded an inquiry.The crisis threatened to rock the educa-
tion system to its foundations. The national papers lamented the fall in standards and
seemed to write off a whole generation of school leavers. Industrialists expressed
concern that employers would no longer place trust in the A-level system.
The efforts to bring the crisis under control were first made by the decision to hold
an inquiry into the scandal by someone who was – in effect – an independent regulator,
so meeting the demands of head teachers.
The Tomlinson Report was published on September 27 and sought to answer all the
questions posed by the public in the weeks following results day. The report concluded
that pressure had been brought to bear on examination boards to keep the results
down, so that they would be in line with those achieved the following year.
The report recommended that some A-level papers should be re-marked. This gave
some students some cheer, but equally importantly a recognition of their situation. The
government also announced that universities would honour offers made to students
whose grades may be marked up. A caveat was added to this: universities which had
already filled their spaces would have to ask students to defer for a year if they still
wished to take up their place.
Analysis
The report provided a focal point for the anger and anxiety of those involved. The
report, although it could not serve as complete closure, would act as a sign of action
being taken – as a mark in the sand.The independent regulator had a key role in taking
pressure off the government. In effect, the regulator acted as a third party advocate.
The questions about the education system still remain, and efforts are being made
to change the way in which the nation’s young adults are tested. However, this crisis
was contained by the setting up of an independent inquiry – yet another quasi-regu-
lator – which conveniently led to minimal heads rolling, but produced the results most
had wanted.
Regulators and the media
As soon as a crisis becomes public, it is likely that the regulator will be

immediately contacted for a comment by the media. They will also be
asked for assurance or otherwise by politicians. Generally, they will also
come under fierce pressure from activist groups who will immediately
condemn the organisation in crisis, particularly if relationships with the
activist groups have been acrimonious. They will also put pressure on the
regulatory agencies to come out against the company in crisis.
If the regulator does not have the comfort of knowing that the
organisation is handling the crisis well, then he or she may well bow to
that pressure.
It is essential, therefore, at an early stage, to inform regulators that
there may be a problem. To adapt the old adage from Northern Irish poli-
tics (vote early, vote often), companies in crisis should: ‘Contact early,
contact often.’ Organisations can be reticent and so there are feelings in
some organisations that they do not want to be seen ‘crying wolf’ all the
time and wasting energies. Again, this is a dangerous attitude. Regulators
hate to be blind-sided.
Regulators as third party advocates
Regulators not only have to be independent, they have to be seen to be

independent. Often this means that their public position is much harder
than their private stance. This is important and is, paradoxically, useful.
If the regulator is involved in a crisis from the beginning – and is
seen to be involved – he/she is also part of the problem and, potentially,
the solution. It can be reassuring for politicians, the media and the public
to see that the regulator has been involved. Although their comments
may be critical and harsh at times, it is better to have them inside rather
than outside.
However, regulators, who are publicly funded for the most part, can be
slow to involve themselves in a public stance on the crisis. They may at
some stage have to stand in judgement on the crisis and comments made
now can come back to haunt them.
However, if the crisis-stricken organisation can openly say that it has
been in dialogue with its regulators from an early stage, then it has shown
openness and honesty, which is extremely reassuring.
Conclusion
Politicians will tend to avoid becoming embroiled in a crisis, but there are
times when they must get involved. A proactive approach – realising that
they are the ultimate regulators – is the best approach.
So the first steps must be to contact the key politicians and their
bureaucracies very early on in the crisis. Without pestering those in power
or who regulate power, it is important that they are fully briefed and even
if the crisis fizzles out, they will appreciate being alerted well in advance.
CHAPTER 8
The Activists: Making Crises Happen
Beginning with the environmental groups in the 1960s, today activist

groups surround almost every industry and sector. The environmental
movement is now a huge industry, with turnovers measured in billions of
dollars. Although they try to portray themselves as altruistic amateurs,
nothing could be further from the truth. These are finely honed, well-
financed and highly efficient publicity machines. Just ask Shell, Exxon,
Monsanto, Nestlé or almost any multinational.
Manufacturing a crisis
A crisis is a clarion call to the NGOs. When they are on television as

pundits and experts, lobbying government around the issues that caused
the crisis, they are suddenly seen to be independent experts.
NESTLÉ V OX F A M
From its involvement in milk powder as a substitute for breast milk, Nestlé has been a
target for left-wing activist groups. The logic of having a substitute for those mothers
who could not produce enough milk – a not uncommon occurrence in famine-stricken
Africa – was not a consideration for activists. Nor was the fact that the company was no
longer involved in this business. When mud is thrown, it sticks.
The company is intrinsically linked with stories of third world exploitation. In many
ways, this is most unfair. For example, in June 2002 – the year of the Ethiopian crisis –
Nestlé gave B2 million to a Red Cross initiative aimed at fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa,
prompting the Red Cross to call for more corporate support for health programmes in
Africa. Corporate social responsibility indeed. In fact, the Red Cross praised Nestlé by
saying that more companies should give in this manner.
64
The Activists: Making Crises Happen 65
On December 18, 2002 – and the timing close to Christmas is crucial – the third
world charity Oxfam disclosed that Nestlé was demanding millions of dollars in
compensation from famine-stricken Ethiopia. At the time, the country was experiencing
an extreme drought that put over 11 million people at risk of starvation. Simultaneously,
the price of coffee beans, one of Ethiopia’s main export earners, had fallen, exacerbating
the country’s crisis. Nestlé is the world’s largest coffee company.
Nestlé claimed that it was owed $6 million as compensation for a business owned by
a German company – since taken over by Nestlé – that was seized by Ethiopia's military
dictatorship in 1975. Oxfam was quick to point out in its press briefing materials that
Nestlé turned a profit of Swfr 6.68 billion ($3.92 billion) in 2001 and its annual sales
amounted to about Swfr 85 billion. During the first half of 2002, the group's net profit
grew 79 per cent to Swfr 5.65 billion compared to the same period a year earlier.
For its part, the Ethiopian government had also offered Nestlé a settlement of
around $1.6 million which the company had refused to accept.This issue centres around
exchange rates; Nestlé worked at 1975 exchange rates, Ethiopia offered it at the current
exchange rate. It was offering what it thought was a fair price. Oxfam then launched its
campaign against the coffee giant’s actions, attacking it both for the timing and the prin-
ciple of its demands.
But getting people to boycott Nestlé coffee products would also damage the people
of Ethiopia, who produced the beans. So Oxfam was clever in its approach. ‘Boycotting
Nestlé products won't help the poor farmers who sell to the company,’ said Justin
Forsyth, head of policy at Oxfam. ‘What people should do if they want to help is to
write or email Nestlé and ask it to drop the claim.’
Almost immediately, 8500 people had emailed the company to complain about its
treatment of the Ethiopian government, the fastest response Oxfam ever had to a
campaign. In all some 40,000 wrote to Nestlé to protest. A crisis had indeed been
manufactured.
Nestlé was quick to react – as fast as a multinational can be when it is trying to find
out what is happening in a developing country with poor communications. By Tuesday,
December 23 – five days later – Peter Brabeck, the company’s chief executive, made an
announcement admitting that he had been taken by surprise by a demonstration outside
Nestlé's British offices.This forced the company – in the period just before Christmas –
to promptly scramble to find ‘an external Ethiopian lawyer engaged by a small German
subsidiary of Nestlé Germany who is handling the sporadic negotiations’.
Mr Brabeck said that as the Ethiopian government has already offered $1.6 million, it
would immediately make this sum available for famine relief in Ethiopia.
It also reacted well by using third party advocates – even though the Red Cross
proved be a slightly hesitant bride. Mr Brabeck said Nestlé had asked the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies on ‘how best to direct’ addi-
tional funds.
The Red Cross confirmed that it had just been contacted by the Swiss multinational
but that it was still in internal negotiations and that any response would be premature.
The Red Cross has more in common with Oxfam than it has with Nestlé, despite the $2
million donation for HIV/AIDS work earlier in the year.
That should have been the end of the matter. Europe was heading into Christmas
and the festivities would soon banish all thoughts of Ethiopia. But this crisis – as most of
them do – carried on. Nestlé had a sting in the tail. Mr Brabeck also announced: ‘We will
do the same with any additional sums resulting from a final settlement,’ indicating that
Nestlé had not given up further compensation.
Nestlé continued to insist that it would be good for Ethiopia to pay the rest of the
money owed to it. ‘It is in the Ethiopian government's interest to reach a deal as a way
to ensure continued flows of foreign direct investment in the country,’ said a company
spokesman. ‘We are flexible about the timing and the amount but we are not flexible
about the principle.’
Naturally, this gave a story another fillip. Oxfam was back. The aid agency dismissed
Nestlé's claim that Ethiopia will find it hard to attract foreign investors unless it pays the
compensation bill. Its spokesperson said: ‘This is absurd and unfair.This is not about legal
rights but what is morally right. When 11 million people face famine, exceptions should
be made. I hope that Nestlé reconsiders and realises they don't need the money as
much as Ethiopia. I hope they drop the issue altogether.’
Nestlé’s crisis curve E. Nestlé says

Ethiopia should F. Oxfam
still pay more responds
D. Nestlé announces
it will give money
to famine relief
G. Christmas
C. Crisis
escalation –
Oxfam pickets
Nestlé in London
A. Nestlé B. Famine
threatens – H. Damage to
negotiates with reputation
Ethiopia profits rise
Time elapsing
Analysis
Oxfam chose the days before Christmas, in essence, ensuring that Murphy’s Law and its
corollaries were in place from the start. Like it or not, large organisations allow their
people to take holidays near Christmas and guards are down.
Newspaper journalists were quick to see the appeal of the story. Here was the west –
in a bout of rampant consumerism – and a giant corporation which was trying to get
money from a famine-stricken country. Journalists also drew on the Band Aid song ‘Do
they know it’s Christmas?’ as part of their headline writing.
Returning to the crisis diagram, it can be seen that a crisis will rumble along the
bottom of the curve for a long period of time before it actually erupts. This is true of
almost all the crises which are featured in this book. There was the whole concept of
negotiating with a developing country for what is a paltry sum while profits were rising.
Again – in hindsight – it is easy to see this. It is not as simple in the day-to-day running
of a business; especially as Nestlé saw what it was doing as the right solution.
However, there is a key point (C) when a crisis could have been curtailed. This was
immediately as Oxfam went public with its press release. Whilst it is easy with hindsight
to indicate what should have been done, it is obvious that Nestlé, at this stage, should
have decided, as it eventually had to do, to wipe out the debt. A difficult task. Communi-
cations with Ethiopia in the pre-Christmas period would not have been easy, communica-
tions with developing countries never are.
Once a crisis goes into trajectory (point C), it is almost impossible to pull it back. As
seen earlier, the media will become interested and as the media watches the media, the
crisis will escalate further and further. Rather like an arrow unleashed from a bow, it is
impossible to pull it back and retrieve the arrow after it has left. This is exactly the case
with a crisis.
Nestlé, which has its critics, is a forward-thinking, modern company which most inde-
pendent commentators would agree tries to do its best by its customers, suppliers and
its stakeholders. However, even with its huge resources, it was caught rudely unawares
when a pressure group decided to attack it.
The damage done from the breast milk substitute days has stuck and this is some-
thing from which the company will take a very long time (decades) to recover. It must
accept this. Any business plan will have to factor this in and any crisis management
strategy must be aware of this situation.The sheer size of the company has meant that it
has been able to withstand the negative publicity and the boycotting of its products.
However, these crises are damaging to the brand and the company must ensure they do
not happen again. In a huge organisation, operating in almost every country in the world,
with differing cultures, this is indeed a tall order.
For Oxfam, this was a coup. It had generated huge publicity – not just in the UK – but
throughout the world.
The NGOs as marketeers
As the activists grew in power and maturity, they realised that they should
have a more influential role with government. In a classic rebranding exer-
cise, they emerged in the late 1980s as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). The name has stuck and although it is meaningless – any organi-
sation which is not part of the government is a non-governmental organi-
sation – it is used in this book, given its huge currency.
As in any economic segment, there is competition between the various
environmental corporations. So, if you ask Friends of the Earth which
organisation poses the greatest threat to it, it should answer Greenpeace. It
seeks the same members and so competes for funds.
The NGOs, however, now know that their marketplace is big enough
for there to be a piece of the action for everyone. So there has – either
consciously or unconsciously – been a market segmentation exercise. So
Greenpeace does whales, Oxfam concentrates on developing states issues
and the Worldwide Fund for Nature does furry animals.
Despite the competition, the NGOs are far better than mainstream
corporations at forming strategic alliances. They are willing to set aside
their differences and work together. Of course, companies have trade asso-
ciations to represent them, but these are never as effective as direct coop-
eration on the ground.
However, whilst many people support the aims of these organisations,
not all are members, so the NGOs have ongoing marketing campaigns
through the usual methods used by mainstream corporations: direct mail,
press relations campaigns, advertising and the like. These are expensive to
mount, but there are more and more of them, so the NGOs, whilst decrying
the modern communications industry, have little hesitation in using its
methods and becoming reference standards in the industry. These groups
try to play down their PR activities, which they prefer to call campaigning
and they are among the most effective publicists in the world.
NGOs and democracy
Unlike governments, these organisations are not elected by anyone. For

example, green groups – as reasonably reflected by the Green Party – poll
particularly badly in democratic elections, with the possible exception of
Germany. Here they became part of Schroeder’s power-sharing govern-
ment in 1998 and control a number of regional assemblies. The Green
Party is also represented in the French cabinet. However, in most coun-
tries, the green vote is well below 5 per cent.
It is not suggested for a moment that minorities – no matter how
insignificant – do not have a right to be heard. They do. But only within the
framework of a democratic society and its laws. The acts of Greenpeace on
the uprooting of trials of GM plants in the UK were outside the law.
This was justified by Greenpeace in an article in The Times, July 31,
1999:
I am clear that what we did was not illegal. We were justified in removing this
pollution…The paradox is that Greenpeace is only ever accused of being
undemocratic when we represent the views of millions of people in a way

which can’t be ignored.
Nor should there be any further curtailment on the right to protest – always
enshrined in a modern democracy. The only caveat is that protest should
be within the law, and, in particular, it should not cause wilful damage to
private property – as was the case with the GM crops protest.
Politicians and NGOs
Politicians, outside the green parties, are also quick to associate them-
selves with environmental causes and a great many are members of
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and so on. In particular, the environment
is a motherhood cause and is fairly safe from attack.
Members of national parties in many countries are active members of
NGOs. This in part explains why the Green Party never does particularly
well. Someone else has stolen its clothes.
Broadly, politicians would like to be on the side of the NGOs, particu-
larly if they are fighting a faceless multinational. David will always get
more support than Goliath.
The media and NGOs
There is a strong symbiotic relationship between NGOs and the media. At

the start, NGOs are often seen to represent the smaller organisation or
individual. This sort of campaigning is very much in tune with the jour-
nalist’s own crusades to expose truth, fight corruption and generally be
guardians of the common good.
In addition, the media (see Chapter 7) also has a strong role to enter-
tain and, of course, NGOs can often provide an entertaining or horrific
story. For example, Nestlé demanding money from the Ethiopian govern-
ment, violence (Brent Spar) and horror (Frankenstein foods). Therefore
the media is happy to be fed stories by green groups.
The media is also about speculation – it is the substance of most polit-
ical stories. Therefore when the NGOs speculate in a crisis, the media is
more than happy to take this speculation as fact. The NGOs and the media
can both work on the Law of the Absolute. So to the question, ‘Can you
promise that this incident will not cause any damage now or in the
future?’, the answer has to be ‘I don’t know’ or ‘no’.
Dealing with NGOs
In dealing with NGOs, often it is helpful to use a moderator who is neutral.
Universities can provide a neutral forum and a neutral moderator in the
form of a senior professor or lecturer. The debate then can move to some
of the scientific issues surrounding the organisation’s plans and the NGO’s
objections to them. Also by meeting on neutral ground, it gives added
credibility to the discussions, as there is no hint that the organisation is
trying to brainwash, persuade or manipulate the NGO.
An NGO is diametrically opposed to the aims and ambitions of the
organisation with which it is dealing. For example, Greenpeace is totally
opposed to nuclear power and GM foods. Therefore, is there any point in a
dialogue? The answer is yes for a number of reasons.
First, good corporate social responsibility dictates that an organisa-
tion should deal with all its stakeholders – even those totally opposed to
it. Even if no progress can be made in dialogue, it is good to be seen
having that dialogue. So for example, the nuclear industry will regularly
sit down with Greenpeace. This gives an advantage to the industry, in
that it can say to government: ‘We are good corporate citizens in that we
talk to all our stakeholders, not just those who support us.’ For Green-
peace, there is also a benefit. It can be seen to be a responsible NGO –
rather than just an activist group – and it too gets further credibility with
the government. For both sides, the name of the game is to keep face and
increase their profile.
So it is important to engage in a dialogue at an early stage with NGOs.
As part of the stakeholder segmentation exercise (see Chapter 11), these
groups will have been identified. They should then be approached.
In general, the approach should be informal and early meetings should
have little or no agenda. An agenda will evolve over time. Certainly, the
objective of the NGO may be, say, to shut a plant or stop a process, but
there are a number of issues around the main objective with which the
organisation can deal with the NGO. For example, there can be an agree-
ment on information sharing. One has to be careful here, of course, to
ensure that others – particularly the government and regulators – are also
getting the same information so that they are not blind-sided by the NGO,
who may seek to take immediate advantage.
Who should undertake this work?
This is definitely not a job for the chief executive or indeed the most senior
people in the company. However, it needs to be seen to be taken
seriously – as it is a serious matter – and the task should be delegated to a

senior manager – ideally, someone who has a deep knowledge of the
issues which are involved. The corporate communications department also
has a role here in ensuring that the company’s line is maintained and that
key messages are fine-tuned before these meetings.
Conclusion
NGOs can be powerful in generating a crisis, as Nestlé found out in

Ethiopia. They are also magnetically drawn to a crisis as it provides an
excellent marketing opportunity. As part of any crisis management proce-
dure, dealing with NGOs is an important part of the process and should be
considered carefully.
The objective here is not to win round NGOs but to ensure that they
are aware of the organisation’s position. Certainly during a crisis, they
may still choose to attack the company, but they have to do it with the full
knowledge that they know the real facts, even if they choose to ignore
them. It also leaves the organisation in a much stronger position, in that it
can say it has been in dialogue with all its stakeholders including those
who vehemently oppose it. This gives added credibility during a crisis.
CHAPTER 9
Other Stakeholders: Dealing with the

Public, Customers and Suppliers
As soon as a crisis breaks in the media, it will immediately attract public

attention. For most people, the crisis will generate idle curiosity and little
else. They will take the information given to them by the media, make
their judgements on it and move on. However, a small minority – for what-
ever reason – will take a more direct interest. This small minority can
sometimes be just hundreds or, at other times, thousands of people. For
example, if a bank has a problem with hackers getting into its systems,
potentially almost all the bank’s customers are affected. This can be
millions of people and thousands of these will be concerned that the
details of their accounts have been made public. These people can vary
from the naturally paranoid to errant fathers who have not been paying
proper maintenance for their children and are keeping their financial
details secret from their former spouses.
SPAM EMAILS
In November 2003, the usual flood of spam emails entering people’s inboxes had a
criminal flavour. A spate of emails from spammers attempted to fool people into
entering their private security data for online banking. Potential victims are encouraged
to verify their account information on fraudulent sites which posed as the real thing.
This information would then be collected by the spammers and used to defraud
customers of their money.These fraudulent emails were sent to numerous people using
spamming software in the hope of reeling in a few victims, and accounted for almost one
in ten spam messages at their peak.
Halifax Bank, one of the institutions mentioned in the emails, took almost immediate
action. Well aware that there is already huge suspicion about the Internet and security, it
72
Other Stakeholders: Dealing with the Public, Customers and Suppliers 73
took the major step of taking its ebanking site offline in response to the widespread
circulation of these fraudulent emails targeting its customers.
In a statement emailed to customers, Halifax said: ‘In the interests of the security of
our customers we have temporarily closed the online service in order that we can
communicate the issue to online customers and to make improvements in the service
to further safeguard online accounts. Please note that we would never send you emails
that ask for confidential or personal security information.’
A spokesman for the bank later commented: ‘We felt it was better to bring the site
down and make changes and then bring everything back up together. We want to tackle
the problem in its totality.’
Analysis
Although this move did inconvenience some customers, it proved that the bank was
putting the concerns of its customers first and foremost. No doubt the move did
create extra work for the bank in taking more queries by telephone or at branches, but
it was seen to be doing the right thing. It also engaged the consumer by calling on its
ebank customers to be alert, and making sure that this event did not turn into a crisis
of confidence.
An organisation can expect to receive hundreds of telephone calls in a

short period of time after a crisis breaks. It must be prepared for this.
Dealing with the public in a crisis
Unlike the media and politicians, most members of the public only want
the top line facts. For instance, if, during a storm, the power lines are
knocked down and electricity is cut off, the question everyone asks is:
‘When will the power come back on?’
In the banking crisis mentioned above, the question is: ‘Have my
details been put in jeopardy?’ If, for example, only a tiny number of
customers’ details were affected, then it is easy to reassure all the rest. A
simple statement which says: ‘We have contacted all those customers who
have been affected. If you have not been contacted, it means that the confi-
dentiality of your account has not been breached’ will satisfy the vast
majority of people.
W I L D C AT S T R I K E S
In late October 2003, British Royal Mail staff began small-scale strike action. Initially the
strike broke out in small, localised pockets in London. By the second week, the strikes
had spread to Chelmsford, Colchester, Coventry, Maidstone, Milton Keynes, Oxford,
Portsmouth, Slough, Southend and Swindon. In reality though, much of the country was
affected, as one-fifth of the country’s mail passes through London.
As the crisis deepened and millions of letters were stuck, the Royal Mail took the
dramatic step of sealing up post boxes and urging people not to send any post at all.
Effectively this is the Royal Mail’s nuclear option – to stop the service it is supposed to
provide. At the time, many predicted that this strike could have permanently reduced
the Royal Mail’s share of the market.
After the crisis was over, the company went about trying to restore its image and its
place in the British psyche. As a goodwill gesture, the Royal Mail donated £1 million to
London’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games to apologise for the effects of the strike.
Chief Executive Adam Crozier explained: ‘This is a donation that benefits the UK. We let
our customers down and this is a straightforward way to say sorry.’
Analysis
This is a classic case of how things got worse before they got better. First, the strike
spread from isolated cases to widespread action and, second, the action taken by the
Royal Mail effectively suspended the service it provides. However, by taking this drastic
action, things began to get under control. The media offensive from the company after-
wards is recognition from senior management that it had lost ground in the marketplace.
The worst was over, but efforts to rebuild the public’s trust must be continued to avoid
another crisis occurring.
As always, preparation is key.
The media as a TPA in dealing with the public
As most members of the public will find out about a crisis from the media,
the media has a powerful role in turning messages from the organisation. It
is also deemed to be independent and messages from the media are much
more believed than those from the organisation. In effect, the media can
act as a third party advocate.
Therefore it is essential that media are briefed early and given correct
information. It is also essential – as we saw in Chapter 6 on the media –
that third party advocates from other organisations, for instance the regula-
tors, feature in the media.
AIR FRANCE CONCORDE
To many, Concorde was the ultimate flying machine, graceful and elegant yet powerful
and expeditious. It was symbolic of an era; iconic in its association with rich, famous and
glamorous people; and unrivalled in its appeal.
Other Stakeholders: Dealing with the Public, Customers and Suppliers 75
On July 25, 2000 these dreams came to a tragic end. Flight AF4590, an Air France
Concorde en route to New York from Charles de Gaulle airport, crashed shortly after
taking off.The aircraft crashed in flames into the Hotelissimo hotel in Gonesse, just two
minutes north of Paris.
The full horror was captured on the hand-held video camera of an eye witness.The
tragic frailty of the swanlike plane falling to ear th seemed all the more poignant
replayed through the amateur camerawork of a passerby. The images were beamed
around the world.
The severity of the situation was immediately recognised. Not only had 113 people
lost their lives, but the entire future of Concorde lay in the balance. How would the
public react to the shocking images? Would confidence ever be restored in the aero-
plane? Would people think that this signalled the end for an aircraft already over 25
years old?
The company acted quickly and decisively to manage the crisis. The first thing it did
was to realise the importance of key stakeholders to the success of Concorde.
Concorde is clearly not a product for everyone; it is out of most people’s price range.
For the wealthy, however, Concorde is seen as perhaps the only way to travel.There is a
feeling of an elite club of flyers who use the airline. It was recognised that Concorde
must appeal to these customers, to reassure them that they would be able to fly on the
aircraft with absolute security in the future. The chief executive then took the move of
contacting customers. The best customers, that is, the customers who flew most regu-
larly, were contacted personally by the chief executive whilst thousands of others were
contacted by a personally signed letter.This showed that the company cared and that it
valued its customers. It also helped maintain that feeling of belonging to a club, encour-
aging customers to associate themselves with the fate of the aircraft, taking a stakehold
in its future.
Crucially, the company continued this programme of contact. The customers were
kept up to date with developments over the weeks and months following the crash, with
newsletters and seminars.
Analysis
Eventually, Concorde flew again and it seemed to those involved that they had got their
extraordinary product back. The crisis was managed because of visible and immediate
leadership and the company’s willingness to talk openly and candidly about the tragedy
and the efforts to rectify the problems with the ageing aircraft.The crisis eventually saw
the plane withdrawn from service throughout the world, but the reputation of Air
France was enhanced.
Nowadays, we are dealing with a public which is far more aware. It is

essential to remember this.
SECTION C
Design, Testing and
Implementation
77
CHAPTER 10
Overview of the Process
Putting a crisis management plan into action does not have to be a long
and arduous process; however, it does have to be approached methodi-
cally. The process needs to start with a discussion of what one would like
to see as an outcome, what are the key aims of installing a crisis manage-
ment procedure and how can these be put into place?
Throughout the process, these aims need to be kept in mind. What are
we doing this for? How will this help the company? These will help to
keep the process from becoming bureaucratic and overweight. It is essen-
tial that the development of crisis management procedures is given time.
This time, however, must be channelled in the right direction and enthu-
siasm and motivation maintained.
There are essentially three important elements to any crisis manage-
ment plan:
1. Most important, the people that make up the crisis management team.
This group of individuals has to be carefully picked to reflect not just
skills but personalities to ensure they can work together as a team and
also work well under pressure. These people will underpin the whole
process and time needs to be taken in their selection.
2. The processes, how the team will work, what guidelines and parame-
ters the team will be set and what resources will be available to them.
This is all covered within the crisis management handbook – the
processes ‘bible’. Testing and refining the procedures is extremely
important to help keep the crisis management process organic and flex-
ible – as every good crisis management plan should be.
3. Environment, where the team will work, what resources are required to
keep the team running and how best to ensure that the environment is
the best place to actually work. Should a dedicated room be consid-
79
ered? Are there enough telephone lines, fax machines and computers
which will be used exclusively by the team?
It is these three elements that underpin any crisis management proce-

dure. Before anyone embarks on such uncharted territory, however, they
must know what they are working with. Scoping out the needs of the
company and what the company already has in place is the springboard for
crisis management procedures. It is important that this pool of
knowledge – be it formal or informal – is fed into the emerging procedure.
This is crucial both in building a cohesive and understandable strategy, but
also in bringing along the rest of the company.
This assessment should look at:
■ How the company has coped previously in a crisis situation

■ What procedures are already in place
■ Whether the existing procedures work well
■ Whether they have been tested before, and what were the results
■ Whether there are any employees who can add value to the process
within the company.
By looking carefully at what is already there, ideas begin to emerge on

how to evolve them – be they bulky and bureaucratic pieces of docu-
mentation that have yet to be read or flexible thought processes. In some
respects, it is better to have none at all rather than have overenthusiastic
and restrictive guidelines, procedures, rules and regulations. After all,
one cannot be bound or held back by what is not there. This is also a
potentially dangerous situation, however, and can lead to the headless
chicken syndrome.
Building on this background, it is important to have buy-in to any proc-
esses which are introduced. Therefore this has to be backed by everyone,
from top management to those on the ground. It should not be seen as a
chore but a process that can add real value to the company. It is much more
than another hoop that needs to be jumped through or box ticked.
Obviously, as with any new ‘process’, a real need has to be shown and
this can be a hard sell. Often, many of the key people have not been
involved in a crisis and again the ostrich syndrome takes over: ‘it hasn’t
happened yet, it may never happen’.
The next chapters cover the processes in detail, from the formation of
the team to communicating with internal and external stakeholders.
Always keep in mind, however, that the end result needs to be simple and
flexible. These are the keys to any successful crisis management strategy.
CHAPTER 11
The Importance of Third Party

Advocates
The successful management of a crisis depends on communication. This is

self-evident. However, given the intensity of a crisis – particularly in the
early stages – it is vital that a company is able to marshal its communica-
tions effectively in areas which need it most, not necessarily those that
shout the loudest.
Who is this almost silent majority? They are possibly the key people
who could leap to the defence of the project or company; however, a good
understanding of them is required beforehand. These stakeholders can
mean the difference between winning and losing the battle, and you need
to know them – well.
But what is a stakeholder in an organisation? The broad definition is an
individual or group who may be affected – either beneficially or detrimen-
tally – by the activities of the organisation. Obvious stakeholders include
shareholders, employees, local communities and so on.
But today the definition is much wider. Companies are quick to accept
that anyone who claims to be a stakeholder in their enterprise must be one.
This is a dangerous argument. So, before going any further, it is important
to perform some sort of market segmentation – as one would do in any
communications exercise – in those who claim to be stakeholders. For
example, is Greenpeace a stakeholder in Shell? Is EarthFirst! a stakeholder
of the North American logging industry?
So now one must adopt a broad definition of a stakeholder. This is: an
entity either affected by the operations of another organisation or one
which perceives itself as having an interest in the activities of that organi-
sation for whatever reason.
This definition means that every organisation is potentially a stake-
81
holder of every other organisation and the same applies to individuals.
This definition is next to useless, yet it is the one which is most commonly
used. It is also the back door by which pressure groups can claim to be
stakeholders in organisations to which they are vehemently opposed.
For example, Greenpeace, which is completely and irrevocably
committed to the end of nuclear power on this planet, can enter into a
dialogue with the likes of the nuclear industry, which is totally and irrevo-
cably committed to the furtherance of nuclear power.
Therefore, as an initial broad segmentation, it is fair to say that there
are three categories of stakeholder:
■ Those who want the organisation or project to succeed for their own
benefit: employees, customers and so on
■ Those who want it to fail so that it no longer affects them: Greenpeace
versus the nuclear industry, for example
■ Those who really are not overly concerned with the arguments, but
who will be affected nonetheless (always by far the vast majority). For
example, 78 per cent of French electricity comes from nuclear sources,
so every citizen is a stakeholder in the nuclear industry, yet almost
none are concerned about it.
What generally happens is that the views of the vast majority of the
unconcerned citizens are not heard at all. This is normal and is the way of
democracy.
The stakeholder diagnostic
Before we approach people in advance of – or during – a crisis, it is impor-

tant that we know something about them. We do not do business with total
strangers. Therefore, we need to understand the universe in which an
organisation operates, so that we can manage it. We need to know who are
the key movers and shakers (for and against), what is their past history
with the company, who knows whom and many other issues.
The way to do this is through the ‘stakeholder diagnostic’. This
detailed map is the first step in getting to know and understand the
complex and difficult entity that is the organisation’s universe.
To a greater or lesser degree, most modern democracies have a fairly
open form of government where information is freely available. In addition,
there is free press that for the most part is unfettered. These two factors
mean that there is a huge amount of information in what is generally called
The Importance of Third Party Advocates 83
the public domain. Yet this information is for the most part ignored. Even
worse, it is not collated into a usable form so that it can be applied.
From information available in the public domain, it is possible to put
together a good map – on a number of scales from the macro to the micro.
THE DIAGNOSTIC IS A MAP
There are few people who would think of embarking on a long and complex journey
without a map. There are whole shops devoted to maps and getting the right one is
important. Here are the main problems with communications maps.
The wrong map. It would seem to be an obvious statement that one should ensure
that one had the right map: for example, a map of Spain is of little use if one is visiting
Italy. Yet that is exactly what happens in complex issues-related communication
programmes. People rely on hearsay, stereotypes and gross misinformation when making
decisions. When Christopher Columbus headed into the unknown in search of a
western route to India, he and his crew were convinced that the seas were full of weird
and wondrous monsters that could devour them.
Old maps. Even worse, they rely on old and obsolete information.The restaurant and
hotel guide produced by Michelin in 2000 will have very different listings from the one
produced 50 years ago. Things change, people change. Look at political parties: who
could have believed that socialist parties across Europe would not only allow privatisa-
tion of state industry, but actually actively promote it, as is the case with Renault in
France, not to mention the London Underground and Air Traffic Control in the UK. And
political maps change much more quickly than restaurant guides.
Maps of the wrong scale. Next, people take a map of the wrong scale. A general map
of Europe is of little use if one is going hill-walking in the Alps. So, for example, it is
assumed that just because a political party has a national policy on a certain issue, then
this is slavishly followed in the regions. Nothing is further from the truth. Political parties
are broad churches: one only has to look at the UK Conservative Party’s totally differing
views on the UK’s role within Europe to understand this. In addition, some of the bitter-
ness of national politics dissipates at local level.There are numerous dialogues across the
political divide in local politics. Anecdotally, we know of numerous politicians who have
better relations with some of the opposition than their own party colleagues.
This background information is vital. Even if it does mean disturbing the

placid millpond that characterises most communities, it must be garnered.
And in as much detail as possible. On each project, we try to build a
careful diagnostic of the field we are working in.
Without getting this information, we will always be on the back foot –
we do not ‘know’ our stakeholders. Of course, merely having this know-
ledge is not enough in itself – in fact, it is far from it. But without it we
cannot even make the first step.
Initially one needs to know who are the key political and other players
in the area – they are the movers and shakers, the great and the good. This
is all garnered from publicly available information. It should cover:
1. The sitting member of the European Parliament

2. The sitting MP
3. The previous MP if relevant, that is, if he or she is going to stand again
4. The local county council: its political composition and track record
5. The district or borough council: again politics and track record
6. The local ward councillors for both the county and district: their views
if known (through, for example, letters to newspapers, and so on)
7. The local parish council or residents association: its leading lights,
views on issues and so on
8. Local hot issues: for example the closure of a hospital or school, the
need for new roads
9. The local media: its campaigns and views
10. Local groups: their campaigns and activities
11. National stakeholders: trade organisations and so on
12. Other relevant information.
Of course the areas and fields are tailored to the size of the company, but
let us imagine that this is a medium-sized company with a number of
chemical plants dotted in the south west of the UK. Let us now work our
way through some of these areas in turn, to see what a diagnostic might
look like. It should be stressed that the following represents ‘edited high-
lights’ and is not complete.
The local European Parliament representative (probably equivalent to the
Senator in the United States)
Constituencies of the European Parliament are huge – with hundreds of
thousands of people in each one. Of course, if the project has a European
dimension, then the relevance of the MEP will be proportionately greater.
However, for most projects, the role of the MEP is not highly relevant.
It is useful to know the agenda of this person: Is he/she a keen envi-
ronmentalist? What is his/her view of the trade union movement? And so
on. There is one key exception – if the project affects the area close to
where the MEP lives. It is only human nature that we should take an
interest in that which is most local and it would be folly to assume that
MEPs, who have probably risen through local politics in any event, are
any different.
The local parliamentary representative or Member of Parliament (equiva-

lent of congressman or woman in the United States)
The same comments apply as above, but the local parliamentary represen-
tative will take a much more keen interest in events on the ground. He or
she likes to be aware of what is happening. If he or she has represented the
constituency for any length of time, he or she will know it like the back of
his/her hand as well as all the movers and shakers in all parties.
The role of the sitting MP is important: he or she is the pinnacle of
local political thought and their opinions matter. However, these opinions
cannot run counter to those who elect them and it is important to
remember that the foundation of these opinions lie with the regional
districts councils and community councils.
Format of the research
For the fictional MP, we have put together a brief report which illustrates
the detail which would be useful before approaching any stakeholder,
regardless of status.
The sitting MP – Garry Goodwin (Labour)
Background
Garry Goodwin is the sitting MP for Pretty Town, having won the seat from
the Liberal Democrats in 1997. His majority is 3218 (6 per cent), which
represented a substantial swing of 13 per cent. The seat is therefore marginal.
The son of an architect, he is 55. He has spent many years trying to get
elected to either Westminster or Europe. He contested the elections in
Diamondshire in 1984, Mt Ommaney (Euro MP) in 1986, Maidesville in
1989, Grassy Hill (MP) in 1992 and was finally elected to the Commons
in 1997.
Garry Goodwin was born and educated in Surrey, before taking a
BEng at the University of Ripley. He then joined the University of
Diamondshire where he rose through the ranks and was head of the engi-
neering department prior to his election
Garry Goodwin is a member of the teachers’ union, the NATFHE. He
lists his interests as local government, green issues and developing nations.
For hobbies, he enjoys football, gardening, films and his family.
Parliamentary performance
Garry Goodwin is not one to latch himself onto controversial causes. He
cannot afford to upset people. He seldom embroils himself in rows and is
a great advocate of ‘motherhood causes’: schools, school transport, the
local hospital and so on.
In his maiden Commons speech, he (like most backbenchers) used a
local issue – the need for maintaining the local school (which is under
threat of being downgraded).
Given that his seat is by no means safe, he spends much time on
constituency affairs; so it is not surprising that he does not have a particu-
larly high profile in Parliament. Given the added factor of his age, he will
not be on the list of high flyers. Not surprisingly, he only sits on one select
committee on trade and industry.
He voted against the government on changes to the schools curriculum
but otherwise he toes the party line.
Environmental interests
Garry Goodwin has recently agreed to speak for the Newts Society in the
House of Commons. Given that Pretty Town’s pond boasts great crested
newts, this is worthy of note. He is a member of Greenpeace, although he
does not seem to be active in any campaigns.
The next election

The party will have made it clear that they see his re-election as his prime
goal as, unlike some of the other marginals, this is winnable again at the
next election. Therefore he will be expected to have a strong constituency
focus. His chances of retaining the seat are reasonable. Being the sitting
MP gives Garry Goodwin an advantage – he can get things done. In addi-
tion, the opposition is in disarray.
At the next election, this seat will be fought bitterly. Both parties will
have it on their list of key marginals, which means that it will be given
extra resources.
The county council

The next level of power is the regional council. Depending on which
country one is in, this power varies enormously. Often this power is histor-
ical. For example, Italy only loosely united in the middle of the last
century, so still has a strong regional structure where the central govern-
ment has reduced influence. Hence Italy – despite having a government a
year since the war – is prosperous.
The USA has devolved many powers down to state level and further.
States can set taxes and behave autonomously. Similarly the federal
system in Germany – modelled after the war on the US system – sees high
levels of federal power. On the other hand, in the UK, the power of local
councils was gradually whittled away in the 1980s by the then Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher.
Although councils have had much of their tax-gathering powers either
removed or curtailed, they still have huge influence, and in a project where
there is likely to be a substantial community impact, they will almost
certainly have the right of veto – often through the planning system.
In many countries, there is a dual system of local government with a
county council (department in France or canton in Switzerland) and the
more local district councils.
The district council
In regional government, one often finds that power is devolved to the

district, borough or city level. In many cases, this is the decision-making
body on controversial projects, so it is extremely important that it is care-
fully analysed.
The parish or town council/commune
Again these vary from country to country, but they are very powerful. In the
UK, the parish or town council does not have a statutory role. However, they
are always consulted on sensitive or controversial matters. The views of the
real local people are listened to most carefully by more senior politicians.
These parishes often cover small areas, and contact with individual
factories would be more appropriate than contact from a main office. They
deal with local issues from a local perspective.
Often district councillors and, indeed, MPs, will also take part so that
they can keep their fingers on the pulse of local opinion. If there are going
to be problems, it is here that they will start.
Not surprisingly, getting information in a non-intrusive way at this
level is difficult. Parish councils do keep minutes, but generally by writing
them into a ledger maintained by the parish clerk. This is the only record!
However, local libraries and the ‘village notes’ pages of the local paper
can be informative in this area.
Other organisations
In addition, views should be taken on other local organisations, environ-

mental groups and so on. A look should also be taken into national bodies –
trade associations, researchers and so on who may also be interested in the
area of operation. These can and should be rallied before any crisis hits.
Newspaper campaigns
Local and national newspapers try to gain an affinity with their readership
for altruistic and purely financial reasons. This affinity holds old readers
and attracts new ones. Therefore one does need to be aware of recent
issues in localities, should the ‘crisis’ be encompassed by a campaign, for
example ‘clean our river’ would be affected by a chemical spill from one
of the local factories.
Stakeholder segmentation
As seen in the case of Monsanto and Greenpeace, the organisation which

makes the most noise is seen as the most important and (often) the only
stakeholder. However, there are five types of stakeholders:
1. Dependent stakeholders: employees, suppliers and so on

2. Impacted stakeholders: for example those living near a facility
3. Unknown stakeholders: for example those who have not made them-
selves known
4. Supporting stakeholders: subsets of the above three categories
5. Intractables: those intractably opposed.
Stakeholder mapping or analysis is useless, however, if it is an acad-

emic exercise which is undertaken as a stand-alone research project. Too
often, this exercise is undertaken to find out who an organisation’s enemies
are. This is the worst possible use of this exercise. Of course, the exercise
does isolate the intractable stakeholders, but they are only a tiny minority,
usually unrepresentative and with their own agendas.
It is important to understand that if the stakeholder segmentation is
undertaken to isolate these so that they can be ‘dealt with’ (in either sense
of that phrase), the beginning of the end is near. As we saw, to try to seek
consensus with one’s enemies is a waste of time – they just want to get
close enough to you to kill you.
No, a key objective of the stakeholder analysis is to find those who
may be able to help the organisation. This research must be applied to be
of benefit – it must be put into action.
In particular, it must be used to isolate the special group we call the
supporting stakeholders or third party advocates (TPAs), drawn from each
of the dependants, the impacted or the unknowns.
Every organisation can divide its stakeholders into the groupings
outlined above. In our experience, this can be a fairly simple and, indeed,
enjoyable exercise, consisting of five steps:
1. Undertake the diagnostic. The level of detail needed has been outlined
in the last chapter. However, the diagnostic is not revealed at this
stage. If it was, it would tend to skew the exercise and would – in
particular – hinder the coming forward of the unknown stakeholders,
who are often critical.
2. Form a brainstorming group. The next step is to bring together a
group of six to ten people with an independent moderator, who has a
working knowledge of the company and can guide and direct the
group in its deliberations. It should be wide-ranging and include a
number of disciplines. Ideally, it should include:
■ Someone with first-hand, frontline operational experience, espe-
cially if he or she has been involved in a contentious issue and has
some scars
■ Human resources departments can bring an internal/employee
dimension
■ Research and development people (if they exist) can bring a more
existential feel which, in its blind rationality, can often bring the
group back to earth: the ‘facts are facts so what is the problem?’
approach
■ Outside consultants (no more than one of these, otherwise they
start competing), particularly from the lobbying field
■ Someone fairly senior from the public relations department.
The group should definitely not be more than ten (six is not a bad
number), otherwise it turns into a mob and can run out of control. The
objective is to get as wide a range of views as possible.
Eventually, this may form the basis of a project steering group
which will be dealt with later in the chapter. This initial brainstorming
group, however, can – and should – involve people who are well
outside the project and may have no other involvement in it after this
exercise. This is to ensure as wide a range of inputs as possible.
3. Stakeholder search. The moderator asks the group members to name
whom they believe to be stakeholders in the company. Each of these
names is written on a large piece of card. Post-It notes are too small – it
is important that the card can be read from a distance. At this stage, no
names are ruled out. The objective is to get as wide-ranging a list as
possible. Individuals as well as organisations are welcome and the
moderator makes this clear. At the end of this part of the exercise, there
should be a substantial number (sometimes many hundreds) of names.
When this phase has been exhausted, the moderator brings forward
the key names which have been isolated by the diagnostic. What is
surprising is that most of these names mean nothing to the group. They
are just a list of names.
4. Stakeholder positioning. This is a key part of the proceedings. The
group discuss their relative importance – generally from their own
experiences, but also from a general standing until consensus is
reached.
A good moderator will challenge each assumption and ask for
concrete reasons for each categorisation. Only when there is concrete
evidence and the entire group accept the categorisation is an organisa-
tion or individual labelled. What appears is the lack of knowledge of
key stakeholders. Phrases such as: ‘I was always under the impression
that…’ or ‘I remember they had a particularly vocal member who gave
us a lot of trouble some years ago…’ will emerge.
Individuals cannot, unless they are nominated to do so, represent an
organisation. So, for example, if a local councillor who was a member
of the Liberal Democrat group spoke out against a new road, it would
be wrong to assume that all his party was now anti-roads. He may have
been speaking in an individual capacity, because it went past his aunt’s
front door.
5. Stakeholder categorisation. The cards are then regrouped into one of
the five categories:
■ dependent
■ impacted
■ unknown
■ supporting
■ intractable
As noted earlier, it is surprising how big the unknown category turns
out to be. It is important that this exercise is done openly and that
everyone agrees – hence the large cards mentioned earlier.
At this stage, the work is not finished. There are more potential
stakeholders who need to be isolated. This forces the group to think
laterally and positively along the lines of:
■ Who else might be able to help you?
■ What other organisations are in the same position as yourself?
■ Who are the key individuals?
■ Have they always been that way?
■ What would be needed to change their minds?
■ And many, many more questions.
In this latter part of the exercise the real surprises begin to emerge.
Organisations which were not even considered as being relevant
suddenly seem like potential friends.
The basic message is not to categorise from past behaviours and
always be prepared for surprises. Supporters can be found in the most
unlikely places, but they need to be cultivated and this takes time.
The power of third party advocates

Third party advocates have a key role in dealing with the media. In the
Brent Spar case, Greenpeace enlisted the help of the German Lutheran
Church. This church has a boycotting committee and it decided to boycott
Shell’s products. This was very powerful – even Shell would find it diffi-
cult to take on God. But it also gave an independence to Greenpeace’s
statements that gave it added weight.
Too often they are ignored by companies for a number of reasons:
■ Reliability: Large organisations are afraid that TPAs will not say
exactly what is required. Of course they won’t, but that is what makes
them so powerful. Journalists do not want to interview puppets.
■ Control: Companies like to control all their statements. However, TPAs
are not making company policy in their statements. They are free agents.
■ Availability: Often an organisation does not know who its TPAs might
be and none are available.
Independence
Third party advocates are, by definition, independent. And they must be

kept that way. It is particularly damaging to try to coach them or get them
to be even more favourable. Ironically, a hint of cynicism or antagonism
from TPAs makes their statements all the more powerful. So, the following
is strong from a TPA:
No, I must disagree – this company has taken every possible precaution to miti-
gate the damage from its facility. I believe it has now solved the minor problem
it had and that all will be well.
However, the following is much stronger:
As you know, in the past I have been critical of the performance of this
company. However, I now believe it is making an honest effort to get things
right. But, it is early days and we should wait and see.To attack it now just when
it is getting its act together is not helpful and one must doubt the motives of
those doing so.
The second statement is far more powerful. It is more cautious and less
sycophantic – but then that is exactly what makes a good TPA.
T P A I N B R E N T S PA R
At the height of the Brent Spar crisis, something strange happened. Off his own bat,Tony
Rice, a professor at the Institute of Oceanographic Studies, wrote to The Times to say
that he believed that, rather than causing any environmental damage, the Spar would be
quickly colonised by sea creatures who would find it a welcome home.
Speaking on a BBC programme after the crisis he said:
Greenpeace were overegging the cake. They were suggesting disposal of the Brent
Spar in the deep sea would cause severe damage. Even if the effects were increased
by two, five or even tenfold, my point of view would remain unchanged. Brent Spar is
a small deal.
Unfortunately, that was the last that was heard of him. Imagine if he had maintained his
campaign, or indeed – and more impor tantly – was encouraged to maintain his
campaign. Professor Rice is a powerful third party advocate and one that Greenpeace
would find difficult to attack. Imagine also if he got his professional institute –
comprising many other scientists – to support his position. Now there is a force to be
reckoned with.
Analysis
Organisations are far too willing to fight alone. Allies must be sought. Even the world’s
greatest superpower – the United States – sought allies in the recent Iraq War. Although
in terms of fire power, it probably did not need countries like the UK and Spain to fight
beside it, in perceptual and political terms, it was essential.
Checklist for identifying your stakeholders and TPAs
As we have said throughout this chapter, it is vital to identify your stake-

holders and forge relationships prior to a crisis occurring. The following
checklist should help you to do this.
Factor Yes/No Action

1. Have you identified all your stakeholders – including suppliers
and politicians?
2. Is the company aware of its local community and political surroundings?
3. Has the company undertaken a political and community diagnostic in

order to do this?
4. Has a brainstorming group been formed to identify stakeholders?
5. Has the brainstorming group completed a stakeholder segmentation

exercise, categorising stakeholders into A, B and C groups in terms of
importance to the company?
6. Have relationships with key stakeholders been forged prior to

a crisis occurring?
Conclusion
TPAs are generally not helping a project from a profit motive; often their
involvement is altruistic although, of course, they may have their own
win–win projects. They can speculate openly and even inaccurately and
the Law of the Absolute does not bind them. So, to the question, ‘Do you
think this plant is absolutely safe?’, they can answer ‘yes’ without being
stuck with caveats.
Like journalists, TPAs must be cultivated well in advance of the crisis.
However, well-placed, well-informed and articulate TPAs can have a
powerful role. They can certainly defend and promote the company strongly.
CHAPTER 12
The Crisis Management Team
Putting together a crisis management team (CMT) is one of the most

important aspects of forming effective crisis management procedures.
Without an effective team, which works well and understands its role,
procedures and planning mean nothing. Choosing the team is a key part of
the strategy, mixing depth, knowledge and leadership.
When a crisis hits, managing it is like managing a destroyer in a sea
battle. At sea, when a battle is imminent, the captain calls ‘battle stations’
and everyone must move to preassigned roles. In such a situation, if
people do not do exactly as expected – moving accurately and quickly to
their own stations – then the battle risks being lost.
This is not the time for thinking. Thinking is dangerous. All ad hoc
manoeuvres must be stopped. The person who decides – even with the best
of intentions – to override the overall plan and take independent actions is
a danger to him/herself and his/her colleagues. There is a bigger picture
and this must be adhered to precisely.
This is a time for callousness. When teams of explorers attempt to
climb Mount Everest, there is an honour code which says that those who
cannot make it are left behind to die. It is the only way to ensure the safety
and lives of the majority of the team. By helping those who are too weak to
help themselves, not only are you endangering yourself, but also the rest of
your team. This is exactly how it is in a crisis. You must stick to the plan,
even if immediate events are dragging one towards a different activity.
So, for example, if you have been delegated to contact the local mayor
and the telephone rings with a call from CNN, demanding an immediate
comment, you will stick with your plan. You will give CNN the number of
the press office and quickly and politely hang up. Certainly CNN is impor-
tant, but there are others to deal with as well. It is not your job now. And
the local mayor is important too. After all, CNN will move on, the local
mayor won’t.
94
The Crisis Management Team 95
Setting up a crisis management team
Navies have had many years experience in putting together their action
plans and setting battle stations. Nothing is left to chance. A battle is a
crisis and the navy prepares carefully and makes sure that it is as ready as
possible; after all, that is its job.
Even though most countries are almost permanently at peace, the navy
is still busy. It organises exercises and manoeuvres to test itself in battle
conditions, sailors and officers are trained as to their roles in battle and
everything is in the highest state of readiness – waiting for the next crisis
when they can be called upon at any moment.
Like the navy, a modern corporation does not just have a crisis to deal
with, it must also get on with its business. However, the same principles
still apply:
1. Each person who is involved in a crisis must be assigned a role.

2. No person should take on another person’s role.
3. Each person must be fully equipped to handle the role correctly and
precisely.
4. Each person must be tested in the role.
5. Each member of the crisis team must be aware of the roles of the other
team members.
Assembling the team
Any crisis management team must be easy to assemble. Reactions will

need to be quick. In general, it should be possible to assemble the team
within an hour. In highly sensitive industries, such as chemical or aviation,
this period is probably 30 minutes.
This has practical implications. The key members of the crisis team –
and it is a condition of entry into the team – must live within reasonable
distance of the crisis management centre. They are of little use to anyone if
they are stuck on a motorway.
Duplication of roles
Murphy’s Law says that a crisis generally strikes on the last holiday
weekend of August. Therefore it is important that all roles within the crisis
team are duplicated – and in some cases triplicated – to allow for holiday
and sickness. The practical implication of this is that, for example, the
crisis management team leader (CMTL) and the deputy CMTL cannot take
holiday at the same time and must coordinate their diaries.
Given the importance of this key role, if the CMTL goes away, then
the deputy should appoint someone else to take on the role of CMTL in the
event that he or she should not be available.
This is onerous on staff, but then a crisis is like war – it is a tough
place and preparation is everything.
The crisis management team’s key roles are:
■ To make key tactical, operational and strategic decisions

■ To clear information for public use
■ To manage the support teams.
These roles are considered in more detail later in this chapter.

Reflecting the navy, each member of the CMT should look to separate
roles within the team, so that each person has their own responsibilities
and procedures during the crisis. This is to ensure that the team runs effi-
ciently, rather than risking the same tasks being duplicated, or, worse still,
not done at all. It is also a time for ruthlessness. If a person, no matter how
senior, does not have a specified role, then he/she should not be in the
team. Again, this is often easier said than done.
The role of the CEO
The best place for any CEO to be when disaster hits is away from the
office, in public and at the epicentre – be that outside the headquarters or
at the scene of the crisis. It is here that the full strength of the CEO can be
put to good use. The diagram on the next page shows a typical crisis
management team.
What needs to be understood is that there are not just the technical
factors but also emotional factors involved in a crisis. People respond to
emotion; after all it is a very human response to any situation. In a crisis
situation, facts and figures mean nothing and arguments cannot be won or
lost on this ground. This is something that many companies forget.
During Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol crisis, with the concerns over
possible contamination by a blackmailer of its products, the then CEO
Jim Burke publicly apologised and announced the decision to pull the
product from shelves. This human and moral response helped put a face
Structure of a Crisis
typical crisis management
team leader
management team (CMTL)
Secretary CEO
Officers Customers/ Internal Legal

Operations Media Political
suppliers communications
Call centre/
Sailors Human
Press room Political sales
resource
team liaison team manager
team
team
behind the brand and showed that the company put people first. This was
something which the general public, somewhat jaded by images of
corporate greed, could relate to.
To this end, the CEO should report into and be guided by the crisis
management team.
The crisis management team leader (CMTL)
As with any ship, there can only be one captain. Again, using the navy
analogy, the most high-ranking admiral is subservient to the ship’s captain
whilst he is on board that captain’s ship. This is how it must be in a crisis.
In the crisis management team, this is the crisis management team
leader. Those with experience of sailing – even in the smallest boat – will
immediately recognise that there can only be one leader. Regardless of
whether crew members are unsure of a decision or strategy, they do not
stand and argue – they follow. Removing or second-guessing the captain at
the height of battle is madness.
Debate obviously plays an important role, as in any team, but the time
for debate is before the crisis, not during it. In these crises, however, there
is no time for a 30-minute discussion to precede every little action; the
larger strategy – yes. However, the smaller details need a large amount of
trust, leadership and vision.
These are the key attributes of any team leader and are increasingly
important as the pressure rises. Obviously it is important that the crew has
respect for their captain, but this needs to be built in advance – not queried
in the height of battle.
With this in mind, it is essential that it is recognised that the leader’s
main role is to make all strategic decisions. The buck stops here in the
decision-making process. They must therefore be empowered to make
these decisions and this forms the crux of the crisis management team, the
role within the wider company, the responsibilities and, more importantly,
the accountabilities.
The secretary
A secretary should be present in the crisis room and have full knowledge
of the company and its procedures. The secretary is responsible for
logging every event during the crisis. Members who leave the room should
inform the secretary of where they will be. In general, the secretary to the
crisis should be the secretary of the crisis management team leader. It is
important that they have a close working relationship.
The secretary can also fulfil the role of butterfly – a role which is
outlined in detail in Chapter 13.
The officer cadre
Beneath the leader – or CMTL – in ranking order, will be the officer cadre,
those who are trusted to advise on the decisions that need to be made. This
is generally a team of five or six people where each is assigned a specific
area of responsibility.
This is common not just in the navy, but also in all walks of life. It is
their job to gather, interpret and filter the right information, reducing the
noise that can strangle the process, suffocating decision makers with
useless facts and irrelevant situations.
They will work closely with the leader by facilitating actions and
decision making. A key role of the officer is to make sure all actions
are implemented and maintain a constant information flow with the
remaining members of the crisis team as well as the chief executive and
board members.
Whilst each corporation is different, the following generic areas are

common to most, and should act as rough guidelines for the distribution of
responsibilities within the officer cadre:
■ Operations
■ Public affairs
■ Media
■ Internal communications
■ Customers/suppliers
■ Legal.
Operations
The role of the officer with responsibility for operations is to ensure business
continuity and that all business operations are adapted in light of the crisis.
We touch further on business continuity – which should run almost parallel
to the crisis team – in Chapter 19. However, regardless of whether this
consists of a fully fledged business continuity team or backup outside the
crisis management team, the operations leader must liaise with these bodies
and ensure that the crisis does not interfere excessively with operations.
The media
The officer in charge of the media must liaise with reporters, organise
press releases and news conferences and ensure that those who are
handling external calls from the media, such as in a press room, are fully
updated at all times. It is key that this person has wide experience in
handling the media.
Public affairs
This role will mainly entail liaison with the political community and pres-
sure groups and ensure dialogue with key politicians and stakeholders.
Again, during a crisis situation this can become a heated role and needs to
be reflected in the individual chosen.
Internal communications
Employees are the ambassadors of the company and the officer with
responsibility for employees must ensure that employees are kept updated
and informed. He/she must also ensure that there are sufficient personnel
to aid the crisis team. For this role, some consideration of existing human
resources staff may be worthwhile, as they have an idea of internal issues,
company structure and dealing with employees.
Customers and suppliers
Maintaining the reputation of the company is a key priority during a crisis.

Ensuring solid and consistent customer service is therefore crucial. The
role of the officer with the responsibility for customers is to converse
directly with large customers and ensure that the call centre is fully
updated and operating at the correct capacity for customers to access it.
Legal
The role of the lawyer in a crisis is to ensure that the company acts, oper-
ates and makes statements that are legally correct. A secondary role is to
ensure that the company does not make commitments which might, in the
future, damage it.
Maintaining and managing responsibilities
As there will almost definitely be overlap between each of these sectors, it

is essential that each is keenly aware of who is handling what and the
extent of their remit and responsibility. By far the greatest problem in a
crisis – and it happens all too easily – is mixed messages. Slight variations
are quickly seized upon by opponents and turned against the company.
Even when the same message is interpreted by two different people, if this
is then expressed in two different ways to the same stakeholder, the result
is a very confused stakeholder. Mixed messages reinforce an image of
confusion and incompetence.
Certainly, there may be other emergencies – or events – which happen
during a crisis which are not directly relevant to any particular role and, if
they are relevant, they must be assigned by the CMTL to one of the offi-
cers. It is vital that each person retains their preassigned role throughout in
order to achieve consistent messaging.
Creating a strong crisis team
It cannot simply be assumed that once a crisis team is appointed it will

be able to operate effectively. This is not the case. Boundaries need to
be defined.
Most thinking on crisis management in recent years has stressed the
importance of having a crisis team and identifying the roles that are
needed within it. However, establishing the responsibilities for the team
members alone will not ensure that the team is a good team.
As any chef knows, getting the right ingredients is only the first step
in a recipe. The next step is to ensure that he has the right mix – other-
wise it is quite easy to end up with a finished product which is too spicy
or too bland.
It is a truism to state that teamwork is vital in meeting the challenges
faced during a crisis. However, many companies have examples of teams
which are disorganised and where personalities clash. This effect is height-
ened in the pressure cooker situation of a crisis management room and can
quickly become an explosive combination.
It is therefore totally unrealistic to assume that, with the additional
stress generated by a crisis, the team will suddenly be able to operate in a
seamless and high-performance way. On the contrary, the normal break-
downs that block team performance are exacerbated by the crisis.
The following are some problems common to crisis teams. A key objec-
tive is to ensure that the team is strong enough to weather the storms ahead.
Working to the same goals
In a crisis management team, there will be representatives from a number

of different departments from within the business, from legal to opera-
tional, security to financial, each with their own interpretation of what is
right for the company.
In the normal, everyday running of any business, these departments
may come into conflict with one another – operations managers feel the
firm should be spending more on high-quality components, marketing
departments think that more should be spent on advertising and typically
finance feel that there should be less on both. All, however, probably
believe that their solution is the right, and possibly the only, one that will
maximise profit and be the best for the company in the long run.
In a stressful crisis environment, representatives from these depart-
ments not only have to work in close proximity but have to make crucial
decisions concerning the future (and at times survival) of the company,
and it is in these situations where conflicting viewpoints come to the fore.
A particular example of this conflict is that between the legal and
public relations department. Stereotypically, the legal department will
want to take the cautious approach and say as little as possible. The
public relations department will want to say as much as it can, to kick
the issue out into the open, and inform the media, customers, consumers
or the community. The PR department knows that during a crisis the
vacuum of information created by a lengthy silence can potentially cause
more serious consequences than any financial or legal ramifications.
This is where preparation comes in. The PR and the legal department
should role-play a number of crises as part of their training. It is from
these that the lifebelt statements emerge (see Chapter 15). These pre-
prepared statements can easily and quickly be modified to give a rapid
response to key audiences.
In general, the first response by the team should be to collectively sit
down and work out this response and then rapidly agree on priorities.
Working together
Because of the smokestack nature of today’s corporations, it is possible

that those within the team have never actually worked operationally with
one another before and will therefore have different views and attitudes.
These will naturally be brought into the crisis room and can affect opera-
tions and decisions within the crisis team.
During crisis management training, rather than during the crisis itself,
one should establish all the team members’ understandings and values.
Crisis management training is an excellent method of team building (see
Chapter 18). The focus needs to be on building trust and for each team
member to get to know his or her colleagues and their strengths and weak-
nesses and, most importantly, accept them.
It is dangerous to simply assume that individual values and expecta-
tions will be shared by the other team members. This is rarely the case
even if they do work for the same company. Structures will help to keep
this in check.
Who should be in your team?
Stress and emotions can run high during a crisis which, if not properly
understood and channelled, can naturally lead to a negative effect on the
team’s ability to make decisions and solve problems.
The environment that a crisis creates means that team members’
personality traits are likely to be accentuated and enhanced. What is easier
to control in a normal working environment is less easy to manage when
time is limited and the decisions are of paramount importance. Tension,
the emergence of internal company politics and disagreements can there-
fore emerge within the team. They have no place in the team and must be
managed out before the crisis.
Therefore, it may not necessarily be the heads of divisions who take
on the roles of the chief advisers or the officer cadre. Although it is
certainly likely that at least some of these will end up in the crisis team,
their ranking within the company alone is not enough to justify this. For
example, the head of a division may have an important operational role,
which means that he or she is more valuable elsewhere. The selection
process has to be based on the person’s overall value to the company
rather than routine position in the organisational hierarchy.
Important questions need to be asked of people in order to determine
this. Will they fold under enormous pressure? Are they willing to work
around the clock to get the job done? For many people, do they understand
that a crisis situation needs be handled differently from routine work and
are they willing to learn and learn quickly? These are the key elements of
a good crisis team member.
It is the responsibility of the leader to decide who the members of the
team should be and, here, he or she must be as ruthless as a football coach
or manager. As always, the leader’s word is final.
Choosing a crisis management team leader
The CMTL must have the following key personality traits:
■ Authoritativeness: The CMTL needs the respect of the other crisis

team members and the workforce. In a crisis, which is an unsettling
time, the leader must give assurance that the crisis team is in control
and acting in the best interests of all concerned.
■ Decisiveness: Difficult decisions will have to be made within a short
space of time. A company needs to be seen to be acting during a crisis
and acting quickly.
■ Ability to communicate: The CMTL needs to be a first-class communi-
cator in order to get important messages across to the team and others
quickly.
■ Diplomacy: Although as leader and captain, the CMTL has absolute
power, he or she will use this with discretion and tact. Otherwise, the
team will be broken and, in the worst cases, a mutiny may occur.
The officer cadre
The officer cadre needs the following key traits:
■ Communication skills: The other members of the crisis team must also
have excellent communications skills in order to:
■ Communicate messages quickly and effectively to the other officers
■ Filter important information to the CMTL and the chief advisers
■ Get messages through to those outside the team, both internally
and externally
■ Converse with important stakeholders and delegate tasks to
internal departments.
■ Discipline: The officers need to know when to provide assistance and
backup and when to implement changes to the plan. They must work
with the CMTL, however, and should not act unilaterally and risk the
overall plan. Once decisions have been made, they must not be second-
guessed.
■ Commitment: A crisis is an intense period in which the intensity will
undoubtedly increase rather than decrease. The officers need to be able
to go into autopilot and be highly motivated from the start and main-
tain this until the end.
■ Team players: The importance of teamwork has already been stressed.
The officers need to be cooperative and work on building relationships
rather than causing confrontation.
■ Decision makers: They are the CMTL’s chief counsel and need to be
fast thinking in helping him or her make vital strategic decisions. They
cannot therefore be ‘yes men’, but must strike the balance between
working together with the CMTL and being relied upon to speak up
when they feel changes are needed or the wrong course of action is
being taken.
■ Be responsive: As we will learn in Chapter 13, the CMTL and the offi-
cers will need to react quickly to information provided to them.
■ Be able to look at the wider picture: The officers must each provide
specific expertise, but each must also be able to take into account the
whole perspective in relation to the company.
■ Be calming: They must be able to stay calm, remain as unstressed as
possible and remember that their job is to alleviate the concerns of the
CMTL rather than add to them. Their role is to provide counsel rather
than additional problems. They must be practical and logical.
■ Be able to delegate: Decisions made by the CMTL and the officers
must be filtered through, implemented and facilitated effectively.
Checklist for establishing the CMT
Before you move on to form support teams or the next stages in prepara-
tion for crisis management, use the checklist below to help you to see what
actions you need to undertake in order to establish your CMT.
Factor Yes/no Action

1. Is there a crisis management team?
2. Have roles been identified and assigned within the team?
3. Is each person fully equipped to handle the role correctly

and precisely?
4. Is each member of the crisis team aware of the roles of

the other team members?
5. Do the team members work well together?
6. Is the team robust under pressure?
7. Is it easy to assemble the team?
8. Are roles duplicated in the event of team members being

ill, unavailable or on holiday?
Information flows: the support teams
As noted earlier, the key roles of the crisis management team are to take
key decisions, clear information for public use and manage the support
teams. In order to be able to fulfil this function, a calm and considered
atmosphere is essential, as is an appropriate flow of information.
When a crisis strikes, the amount of information (not to mention
questions) generated is enormous. In the days before email, everyone got
on the telephone to ask his or her colleagues what was happening.
Result: information gridlock. Today, it is even worse, because with
email, one can send a message to hundreds of colleagues with the click
of a mouse.
From the outside, the pressure can be enormous. As we will see in
Chapter 15, the media watches the media. Go to the office of a national
newspaper news editor and you will find a bank of TV screens, with
CNN, BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg and so on. If a story breaks on one
media, then it will be relayed around the world in a matter of seconds.
This in turn creates an avalanche effect and the media queries come
piling in.
Obviously, all this information needs to be managed. This is a key role
for the support teams.
For example, in a crisis including an operational element, the informa-
tion is first scanned by the filtering room (manned by operations
managers) and key information is then fed into the crisis management
team. This ensures that only the key facts are passed on. This information
needs to be logged (more on this later) before being considered by the
crisis management team. If a decision is made to act on the information,
this can be taken in a calm and considered manner.
If the company’s public statements need to be modified, this can be
completed and the new statement passed to the support teams, media,
public affairs and so on. This is the role of the butterfly, which is outlined
in Chapter 13.
Checklist for establishing and preparing support teams
The checklist below will help you see what actions you need to undertake
in order to establish your support teams.
1. Has a press team been established?
2. Has a political liaison team been established?
3. Has a call centre or sales manager team been established to

handle all other queries?
4. Has a human resources team been established for internal

communications and operations?

5. Have separate and adequate rooms for the CMT and support
teams been prepared which are in close proximity to one another?
6. Has each been supplied with the adequate equipment?
7. Is security adequate?
8. Has a filter room been established?
9. Has a ‘butterfly’ (see Chapter 13), a member of the CMT, been

appointed to liaise between the CMT and the filtering room?
10. Has a secretary been appointed to record the crisis?
The roles and operating environments of the CMT and each of the
support teams are considered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 13
Responsibilities and Logistics
It is of little use telling a journalist from a major national TV channel that

the reason he did not get a response to his query was due to the fax
machine being broken. Or telling your local mayor’s constituency office
that the phone call went unrecorded and therefore the question raised went
unaddressed.
Everything is intensified in a crisis. Time constraints are greater. There
is a huge increase in internal and external communication. The decisions
that are made take on a whole new level of importance. Throughout all
this, accuracy and consistency are of the essence, otherwise mistakes will
happen. A suitable environment is paramount, because it is all too easy
for the smallest of mistakes to allow the crisis to escalate and spiral out
of control.
Watching five directors of a major multinational company fiddling with
a broken photocopier for fifteen minutes was undoubtedly one of the most
amusing crisis incidents I ever witnessed, but during a crisis is not the time
for your senior management to have to worry about resources. It sounds
simple, but one of the most vital things you can do in preparing for a crisis
is to ensure that you have adequate equipment and it is all in working order.
The crisis room and the press room should be big enough to include all
equipment as well as giving those present plenty of room to work.
Ensure that there is a checklist of the equipment that each room will
need and ensure that the electrical equipment is regularly checked. The list
should include the following items:
■ Landline phones with numbers that are not widely disseminated so

they cannot be tied up
■ Computers with Internet access and electronic whiteboard facilities
108
Responsibility and Logistics 109
■ Fax machines
■ Television, radio and video to monitor the media
■ Flip charts and whiteboards.
There should be a stationery cupboard and a photocopier nearby.

As well as what to include, it is equally important to know what to ban
entirely from all rooms used by the teams, and the single most important is
mobile phones.
In the previous chapter, the structure of the crisis management team
was outlined. Here we look to their specific roles and responsibilities
The Crisis Management Team (CMT)
In a battleship, the area from which all major strategic decisions are made
is the bridge. The bridge is not filled with 22 officers and 37 crew
members. Generally it has a small number of people within it – the captain
and a few others.
Similarly, the room from which all major decisions are made should
consist of no more than seven people. This should be the CMTL and the
officers, as outlined in Chapter 12.
Responsibilities
The crisis management team has the following main responsibilities:
■ Making all major strategic decisions

■ All communications including:
■ Updating the press team and call centre, and supplying the content
of external messages
■ Internal communication and delegation
■ Communication with top level politicians
■ Communication with head office, parent companies and major
shareholders
■ Keeping the CEO fully updated
■ Ensuring business continuity
■ Making approvals relating to budget and so on.
The hymn sheet
The CMT team is also responsible for preparing, agreeing and seeing to the
distribution of the company’s statements or hymn sheet to the support
teams. There is more on these in Chapter 15, but each should be numbered,
timed and dated, no matter how they are distributed.
Equipment
As the crisis management room is a place for decision making and infor-
mation dissemination, not a huge amount of equipment is needed. What is
required is now outlined.
An electronic whiteboard
The crisis room team should have regular updates on the progress of the
crisis and decisions that are made. This will ensure that new information is
not misplaced and that internal and external statements remain consistent
and up to date. Therefore decision sheets need to be kept, which log every
decision made, the time it was made and who authorised it.
These can be kept on an electronic whiteboard attached to a computer
with a printout facility. Team members can focus on the crisis without
having to make individual notes and everyone receives the same informa-
tion, with no miscommunication or omissions.
Three computers with printers
One computer is used by the secretary and the others are for general use.
Many PR people, for example, cannot work without a computer. The
computers should have an email facility with a separate account name and
be used primarily for outgoing mail.
Telephones
The exact number will be determined during training (Chapter 18), but if
everyone has a telephone in a small space, then no one can hear and
chaos results. Therefore three among the team is probably enough. The
numbers should be only disclosed to a small number of people in the
support teams.
Mobile phones are banned. Each team member should leave these with
their secretaries who can filter messages as they come through.
Fax machine
Although fax is rapidly being overtaken by email, it is still important.
Murphy’s Law says that when you want to communicate with the prime
minister, that is exactly the day that the email won’t work, but the fax will.
The butterfly
The role of the butterfly can be taken by the secretary, but this depends on
the scale of the crisis and how busy the secretary is likely to be. The
butterfly is part of the CMT.
Responsibilities
The key role of the butterfly is to disseminate information and decisions.

For example, communication between the crisis management room and
the filtering room should be by this individual. The butterfly also ensures
that key decisions and updates on the company’s position are passed to the
other support teams, for example, the press office. The butterfly is prob-
ably the only person to leave the CMT room during the crisis. Again, with
email, even this may not be necessary.
The filtering room
The number of decisions to be taken is few, but it is important that they are
taken with the best possible information available at the time. In a crisis, a
huge amount of information is generated and much of this is of little value.
However, there is a real possibility that important information can be
either mislaid in the rush or obscured by sheer volume. Therefore, a mech-
anism for filtering information needs to be put into place.
Responsibilities
In the diagram in Chapter 12, the filtering room reports to the operations
director, which assumes that the crisis is an operational one. This room
deals with information coming inwards and going outwards. Every ship
has an engine room and, in a crisis, it is the filtering room which serves
this purpose. It is occupied by a maximum of five to seven people from the
next tier of management in the operations division.
The team in the filtering room is responsible for:
■ Updating the crisis management team

■ Filtering the requests of the crisis management team through to the
various departments and divisions throughout the company
■ Passing down through the operations part of the company the various
decisions made by the CMT.
Equipment
The equipment in the filtering room is similar to that in the CMT’s room
and includes:
■ Electronic whiteboard
■ Computers
■ Telephones (mobiles are also banned here)
■ Fax.
The filtering room should be located close to the CMT, ideally next door.
This is not so that members of the filtering room can visit the CMT, who
should be left in peace, it is so that the butterfly can move paper-based
information quickly.
The press office

Chapter 15 deals in detail with press relations. This section puts the press
function in perspective with regard to the others in the crisis manage-
ment team.
The press office is going to be a busy place in a crisis and a customised
and separate room should be pre-prepared. No one from the press office
has access to the crisis management room – it is already represented on the
CMT by its officer.
Responsibilities
The press team is responsible for keeping all the media informed. As with
all public statements from the company, the same one is used for all audi-
ences: media, politicians, employees and so on. The press office will also
decide on which interviews to grant, arrange press conferences and ensure
that statements are placed on the website.
To ensure that information given to the press room is not duplicated or
that messages do not conflict, only one person from the crisis room – the
butterfly – should feed press statements to the press team. Naturally, the
press office will communicate with its CMT media member so that he or
she can input into the strategic decisions being made by the team.
In a major crisis where there are thousands of calls, others may be
drafted in to deal with media queries. These need not be skilled press rela-
tions professionals, but they should be trained to stick strictly to the hymn
sheet and not stray from it. Whilst this may be frustrating for journalists, it
is essential that the company maintains a line and is not drawn into specu-
lation. For the journalist, the result may be that some information is better
than no information and this often suffices.
Equipment
The press office should be in a separate pre-prepared room with a tele-

phone and computer for each person. Mobile phones have to be allowed
here, as a competent press officer will ensure that he or she has good
contacts in the media and that they have his or her mobile number.
However, there is a case for the mobiles being given to a secretary and
again messages can be filtered.
A notice board on which statements and printouts from the CMT’s
whiteboard can be pinned is useful.
Political liaison
Many companies may hold the dangerous assumption that because the
crisis does not have a direct political impact, it is of no interest to politi-
cians. Politicians are interested in everything that affects their constituents.
After all, they have been elected to represent them.
Responsibilities
The political liaison team is responsible for keeping key politicians

informed of what is happening. This should be done on a proactive rather
than reactive basis. Politicians hate to be blind-sided, especially where
their constituents’ welfare is concerned. The answer ‘I don’t know’ is not
popular with elected representatives; it is their business to know.
Pretraining of key managers is essential. Again, it is vital that
managers stick to the hymn sheet, but with the politicians who are known
to the company (and they should be), managers should have some leeway
to open up – without any wild speculation – in order to engender trust and
maintain their relationship.
Equipment
This team can often work from their own offices once a robust means of
getting the hymn sheet to them is in place.
The call centre
Responsibilities
Presuming that the organisation has a call centre or some form of sales
centre, this is an ideal place from which to handle all customer calls and
calls from members of the public. Again, they must stick to the hymn sheet
and not – under any circumstances (as they don’t know who is on the end
of the phone) – be dragged into any speculation.
Equipment
Presuming that the hymn sheet statement can be sent by email, the call
centre can operate as normal. Given the large volume of calls, however, it
may be wise to set up a separate free phone number to handle crisis calls.
This should have a prerecorded message.
For example, when electricity companies have power cuts – due to
storms or the like – useful messages go as follows: ‘We are aware that there
has been a power cut, but supplies should be restored by midday.’ This
satisfies most people’s need for information and keeps the call centre free.
Employees
As well as being sound management sense to keep one’s employees

informed during a crisis, they can also be important ambassadors for the
organisation. It is not helpful to have an employee telling the media, if
they are suddenly asked: ‘To be honest, I haven’t a clue what is
happening.’ The role for keeping staff informed usually falls to the human
resources department, and this is covered in greater detail in Chapter 16.
Responsibilities
To ensure employees are informed of the crisis and the company’s

response to it. Again, they will work from the hymn sheet.
Equipment
There is no particular need for any special equipment and, working with
their respective CMT member, this function can be performed from
regular offices.
Contact record sheets
Contact record sheets should be kept for all contact from the media, share-
holders and politicians. They should be laid out as follows:
■ Personal details including name, organisation, contact details, who

spoke to them and at what time
■ Issues and questions raised during the conversation
■ The response that was given
■ Further actions.
This should be kept simple, as shown opposite.
Distribution of statements
As noted above, one of the key responsibilities of the CMT is to prepare,

agree and arrange the distribution of statements and information. Statements
Contact record sheet
Journalist Name: Joe Smith, regional reporter

Organisation: CNN
Telephone number/email address: 01234 567890,
joesmith@cnn.co.uk
Mobile (evening): 07771 234567
Date: 1/1/2000 Time: 2:13pm
Contacted by: Anne Brown, Press Team
Issue/Questions:
What are we doing to ensure the safety of the
community?
Is it true that there is cyanide in the river?
All the fish are dying, what are you doing to save
the fish?
Has heard it will take up to a year to completely flush
the system of toxins. What do we plan on doing to
address this?
Our response:
Apologise for what has happened, as of yet not
ascertained whether the contamination is cyanide,
however, we are doing everything possible to identify
the cause and are working closely with the local
authorities in an emergency clean-up exercise.
Further actions
Prepare media response, spokesperson from company
to speak in 6 o’clock news slot
relating to the most common crises should be prepared in advance so that

they can be released immediately. Update statements can then be prepared
every 30 minutes, if the crisis has evolved or more frequently should there
be a need.
Some statements, however, can be pre-prepared and these should be
cleared with the legal department, again in advance. These are called
‘lifebelt statements’ and this is a typical one:
We are very much aware of our customers’ concerns and we are working hard
to resolve them as quickly as possible. We work very hard to try to ensure high
standards. However, we accept that some customers are dissatisfied with our
service and we offer our apologies and will correct circumstances where we
can as soon as possible.
This gives the press office and others a holding statement with which they
can begin to give some comment rather than remain silent. As with all
statements, this draft must be cleared by the CMT even though it is fairly
anodyne. It is then distributed by the butterfly.
All statements should be maintained on an electronic whiteboard
attached to a computer with a printout facility and they must be consistent
for all audiences.
Security
Tighter security is needed during a crisis. The company can still remain
open, friendly and caring through its external responses and the decisions
that it makes regarding its employees, stakeholders and the media. In
particular, front reception needs to be strengthened and the crisis area
needs to be sealed immediately.
Conclusion
No matter how prepared you are or how organised your company, during a
crisis Murphy’s Law not only rules, it takes on a life of its own. What can
go wrong will go wrong, and if it doesn’t, it will soon. Therefore, the
better the environment is to deal with unforeseen eventualities, the easier it
will be to tackle these eventualities head on.
CHAPTER 14
The Crisis Management Handbook
The crisis management handbook should never be viewed as an instruc-

tion manual for each individual emergency or crisis situation. Nor should
it be a record of every intricate detail, procedure or evacuation plan of
the entire corporation, spidering into a myriad of teams, groups and
subgroups to such a point that, in a rushed situation, the right informa-
tion is there but cannot be simply accessed or understood. It is in such
situations that too much information is almost worse than no information
at all.
The crisis management handbook should be a simple pool of informa-
tion which can be relied upon to provide accurate guidance. The general
principle within the team, that each member has an area of responsibility,
is reflected in the handbook. Therefore responsibility devolves to each
member to ensure that data are kept accurate and up to date. This mecha-
nism maintains these documents and ensures that they remain current and
also short.
There are a number of crisis management plans sitting on shelves of
businesses across the world that have not been read.
The principle behind a crisis management handbook is that it should
be easy to read, easy to use and simple to understand. The last thing any
team needs in a crisis is a vague knowledge of ‘something in the crisis
handbook somewhere’ which can be misinterpreted in the heat and pace
of the crisis situation. The best model for a crisis management hand-
book is the phone book. It is useful, referred to frequently and is simple
to use.
When was the last time anyone read the phone book cover to cover?
However, did this stop it from being useful last time a number was
required? The answer is clearly ‘no’ to the latter – and hopefully ‘never’ to
the first. The phone book is laid out in such a way that the information
118
The Crisis Management Handbook 119
needed is directly to hand, quickly available, easy to reference and in a

form that can be taken and used within seconds – no interpretation required.
This should be the form of any successful crisis management hand-
book, not commentary, reams of regulations and procedures, but
succinct, important information which is relevant and useful to any
crisis. The objective is to do the donkey work now, when the time is
available to complete what can often be an onerous paper trail, so that it
does not have to be undertaken in a situation where time is short and
nerves are frayed. In essence, the handbook is an essential stage of
preparation.
Obviously, the contents of crisis management handbooks vary from
company to company and can come in a variety of shapes, styles and
formats. The most successful ones have one common attribute – they are
short. They do not need to be books, but more like a collection of leaflets
pulling together information from across departments and the business.
It is essential that the handbook is easily accessible, but not, for
obvious reasons, openly available. There should be a current copy in the
crisis room. For those on the move, the handbook should be available
securely on the company’s intranet site.
Layout and style

The layout of the crisis management handbook is clearly something which
has to be individualised to the company, and contents will vary, but the
basis and the ideas behind the contents are fairly standard. After all, any
good crisis management handbook does not address the crisis situation,
but gives the tools available to help to tackle it.
Again, it is important to stress that each section should be short and to
the point. Why write a paragraph when a bullet point will do? Do not
explain the obvious and use as few words as possible. These books are
produced as a directory and an aide-mémoire, rather than a comprehensive
book intended to teach the process from scratch. Hiding details in long,
lengthy paragraphs and carefully explaining their existence are not needed.
For example, the paragraph above could be displayed thus:
1. Keep each section short and to the point.
In essence, the handbook must be short, flexible and useful. The contents
of the handbook should mirror the roles of those who play a key role in the
crisis management team, and they are given the responsibility for keeping
it updated.
Content
This section is a ‘rules of engagement’ document. It doesn’t need to be,

and shouldn’t be, a weighty or lengthy part of the document. It should,
however, include points on:
■ How to use the plan

■ Basic tips on managing the crisis
■ The remit of the crisis team.
Forming the crisis team
This section should simply describe how the crisis team is initially
manoeuvred into action. A central point of contact is needed and telephone
numbers, contact names and details should be included to ensure that the
team can assemble quickly and easily.
Procedures
This page should contain what is a basic outline of the crisis procedures
and how the team works. Again this should not be long and lengthy –
reflecting points rather than passages. It should set out:
■ The rooms, teams and roles

■ Agreed contacts and mechanisms for distributing information.
Roles
This section of the crisis management handbook should look at the tools
required by each of the roles, tailored not just to the area of responsibility
but to the individuals charged with this role. This not only focuses the
mind but cuts down on bureaucracy and ensures that the documents
produced are genuinely useful and relevant. The roles already covered
earlier in the book are:
■ The crisis management team leader

■ Operations
■ Public affairs
■ Media
■ Internal communications
■ Customers/suppliers
■ Legal.
A general page should first set out the members of the team, their substi-
tutes, their departments of operations and all contact details – including
home address and telephone numbers, pagers and mobile telephones.
These are key pages which bring the team together at the given location.
For each of the roles, the corresponding page in the manual has to have
a number of points to ensure that communications run smoothly.
Suggested content for these pages should be:
■ Agreed role and area of responsibility

■ Telephone numbers and contact details of key contacts within the
department and area of responsibility
■ Key details relevant to their particular roles.
An example of what to include is shown below.
Public affairs
Names and contact details for:
■ Local council information and structure (leader and so on)

■ Local politicians covering the area(s) of operation
■ Key national contacts representing area of work and operation
■ Local residents and action groups
■ Contacts at key local and national newspapers
■ Internal press office resources
■ Lifebelt statement.
This key section will be referred to during the crisis for details, resources
and contacts to call on for support.
Telephone directory
The phone numbers, direct lines, mobile numbers, faxes and email addresses
of all team members should be listed. Also included should be key members
from outside the team who may be required to step in during the crisis. This
simple step can save a huge amount of time searching for details and can be
easily updated by human resources or a similar department on a regular basis.
There should also be a separate list of key customers, suppliers, regula-
tors, authorities, the media and so on, listing almost every business they may
need to call on. In addition, there should be a short listing of useful numbers
of local services such as hotels, pizza delivery, bus lines and so on.
Checklists
All good processes require a good checklist. Forms can be a chore in

everyday life, but in a crisis, they have a vital role. Firstly, they direct and
guide the user to input information which is directly relevant. Secondly, they
make it easier to process, as all the correct information has been gleaned.
In a crisis situation, this is very important. The crisis team needs to make
decisions and communicate them. It needs the right information and time
taken to extract this, or reference it, takes time from these core objectives.
The role of the crisis management team is not to process data, but to act on it.
As with all lists, an external eye is always useful. These checklists
should be agreed by the whole team, as often additional input can be
sought from those outside the sourcing department.
A typical checklist may look something like this.
Assessment
1. Identify and have an understanding of the
situation
2. Ensure staff and workplace safety
3. Determine if additional support is needed
4. Call upon crisis team, and support for team
Crisis team remit

1. Assemble in crisis rooms
2. Core team:
■ Confirm roles within team
■ Review facts and form key messages – timeline
■ Consider strategy – including outside support
■ Notify external stakeholders
■Develop and distribute information

■ Begin media interactions
3. Work with stakeholders and employees:
■ As knowledgeable sources of rumours
■ To convey information
Company-specific information
1. Designate resources/communication mechanisms
for the following:
■ Stakeholders
■ Employees
■ Customers and suppliers
2. Identify a crisis team liaison member
3. Provide services as needed
4. Distribute appropriate information/aid
Review
1. Review the actions of the day:
■ Hourly reviews of crisis intervention activities
■ Identify weaknesses and strengths of crisis
interventions
■ Review status
■ Prioritise needs and personnel needed for the
next day
■ Plan follow-up action
These checklists are vital, so it is essential that time and energy are put into
these areas beforehand to ensure that actions relevant to each individual
company are minuted and processed for action. For example, a chemical
factory may have to secure the premises and inform government agencies
during a fire, which is a different course of action from that required in the
case of an office block fire.
In a more general sense, checklists for procedures within the team
should be short and rarely call upon members outside the crisis rooms.
Contact record sheets
Within the team, each member has a number of areas of responsibility and
a number of contacts. In the crisis management handbook, there should be
forms to keep records of contact and ensure that actions are caught. A
typical layout would enable the form to be filled in by hand – often easier
to fill in when on the telephone and making calls. Or it can be computer-
based which is often easier for distribution by email.
The header of the form should incorporate contact details and adminis-
tration areas to allow the form to be filed and used effectively. Although
this seems like an administrative chore, and unnecessary, the team needs to
be able to find all information logged rather than hunting in notebooks and
piles of paper. The details that need to be included are:
■ Name of contact
■ Team member
■ Time/date of call
■ Contact details for further contact.
The following headings should take the remainder of the space, with the
majority set aside for the contents of the contact:
■ Aim of call – key messages

■ Summary of conversation and points made
■ Actions and next steps.
The contact form then needs to address the reason for, or aim of, the
call (did the stakeholder call the team or did the team initiate contact?) and
also the content of the message. This is purely for consistency and to
ensure that the team can be updated with other members’ contacts.
One of the most important parts of any contact record sheet is the
actions and next steps section: were there any actions promised? Was a
further call required? These must be captured and followed up. By doing
this, these reports can be faxed outside the team, if possible, and a
complete picture of the contact can be given and acted upon by those not
part of the core operations (for example sending off to a key stakeholder a
copy of the press release or annual report). As outlined in the previous
chapter, contact record sheets should look something like this.
Contact record sheet
Name of contact:
Team member:
Date of call: Time of call:
Contact details for further contact:
Telephone number: Email address:
Mobile (evening):
Aim of call – key messages:
Summary of conversation and points made:
Actions and next steps:
By keeping accurate records in a way which is useful to the team,

these reports help in managing the crisis and also drawing learning from it.
Background material
As part of the handbook, it is important that there are some facts, figures
and information which can be drawn upon in a time of crisis. This is not
the place to fill pages with corporate brochures or information which can
be obtained from general documents. This is for real facts and figures:
company turnover; number of employees; information on processes used
by the company. It is also the place for additional information on details
listed on the roles pages.
For example, background material could include notes on key media
and politicians, background to the area, sample press statements and so on.
This section is less of a directory and more of a brief guide to the company
and key statistics.
Format of the handbook

The crisis management handbook – once the information has been
compiled – has become not just an important document, but also a sensi-
tive one. There is information here that identifies both strengths and
weaknesses. Therefore it is important to ensure this is recorded and
treated as such. Clearly, a crisis management plan needs to be easily
accessible and there are a number of formats it can take. The most
obvious is a book format, or ring binder, which ensures that it can be
frequently updated in part, rather than new documents issued every time a
telephone number is changed.
With modern technology, a number of businesses are moving to elec-
tronic versions and there are obvious benefits. An electronic format
allows much more information to be placed, easily referenced and
searched through. The temptation, however, can arise to produce too
much – simply to fill a space.
Secure Internet sites are clearly a good format for the handbook,
provided Murphy does not make it crash! In a crisis, human nature dictates
that one turns to what can be trusted and easily referenced – paper. Many
believe that email has cut down on paper consumption; however, impor-
tant documents are always printed. Therefore it is key to the design of any
electronic web page that the whole document can be easily printed and
used as a paper version.
Electronic versions do offer one useful benefit – they can be easily
updated with minimum effort, so ensuring that all members of the team
always have the most recent document at their fingertips.
In reality, most people tend to use both electronic formatting and
paper, so it is best to have both available.
Distribution and updating of the handbook

A key role of the handbook is not only to give direction, but to give help.
Frequent testing of the crisis management procedures can ensure that it
remains updated and – essentially – remains useful to the process. As prev-

iously mentioned, once the plan becomes bulky or outdated, it becomes
irrelevant to the process. Updates should be produced regularly, probably
monthly or even quarterly. Again, this is a simple task, but ensures that the
information is current.
After each test, the handbook should be updated to reflect any learning
points or additional contact which was helpful. If paper copies are
produced, new versions should be signed in and out, to ensure that each
member has handed back previous copies and received new ones. Obvi-
ously, each is numbered with a version number.
Checklist for writing the crisis management handbook
Writing your crisis handbook need not be a daunting task. You can use the
following checklist to help you prepare and ensure that your handbook
serves its purpose in your crisis management preparation.

1. Does your company have a crisis management handbook?
2. Is it easy to read, easy to use and simple to understand?
3. Is it no longer than 25 to 30 pages?
4. Does it contain concise sections on:

– forming the crisis team
– procedures
– roles
– public affairs
– and a telephone directory with all important internal and
external contacts?
5. Does it contain simple checklists on:

– assessment
– crisis team remit
– company-specific information
– reviewing?
6. Does it contain contact report templates to record all contact

with relevant stakeholders?
7. Does it contain background information and statistics about

your company that are relevant and useful in a crisis?
Conclusion
The handbook is very much a tool and should not be seen as a restriction,
or something that pushes aside the creativity or problem-solving of the
team. The aims of the handbook and checklists are simply to be resources,
a mind jog or a best practice guideline. Overall, in the production of the
handbook, it is necessary to ensure that this is kept in mind.
CHAPTER 15
Managing Media Relations
If one looks at the impact of external communications, then the channel

with the greatest impact is the media. It is instantaneous, independent and
universal. From newspapers to TV and radio and now the Internet, the
media is everywhere. As noted in Chapter 6, the media sets the agenda, it
acts as magnifying glass on tiny details and it is relentless.
Therefore, whilst other audiences – politicians and regulators – are far
more important in their long-term effects on a company, they will also take
their lead from the media. No one wants to be associated with trouble and
the media can make trouble.
Getting the message right
One of the most important pieces of advice that can be given regarding
external communications in a crisis is to be prepared.
The lifebelt statement
The press release (see below) is useful for print media as they can take
direct quotes from it. For broadcast media, however, it is also useful to
have a key sound bite prepared, which, of course, is exactly the same as
that which appears in the press release – it is just an extract.
This key message is a lifebelt statement, which interviewees can use if
they get into trouble on the key benefits or defences (if bad news) which
are contained in the release. Politicians are masters of this. Their rule is:
Always answer the question you had hoped you might be asked. A
129
company in crisis cannot be so cynical, but it is important that you get the
message across, even if one is being led down a different path.
A sample lifebelt statement could be:
Let me assure you that this company is doing everything it possibly can and that
we are working closely and openly with the authorities to solve whatever prob-
lems there may be. It would be wrong of me to speculate, but we are doing
everything in our power to find the answers.
The lifebelt statement does not have to be long, about 20 seconds is an

ideal length for a sound bite for a news programme and so on.
Questions and answers
A common ancillary to any media statement is the question and answer

sheet. This is a useful exercise which looks at all the difficult questions
that might arise from the issuance of the press release.
Most public relations departments can produce question and answer
sheets to cover the most difficult questions. These can also be read care-
fully by a spokesperson before an interview.
The Q&As attempt only to cover potentially contentious issues. The
questions are deliberately framed in an aggressive way – such as one
might get at a raucous public meeting. They do not cover basic facts
that can be gleaned from published information. They should not run to
more than two pages, otherwise they would not be properly assimilated
or used.
The Q&As should form a consistent hymn sheet from which there is no
deviation. Answers should be formulated in such a way as to make them
specific, but also broad enough to be used as statements for other questions.
There are some fairly simple rules surrounding these Q&As:
1. They should not state the obvious facts – they should only deal with
that which is contentious.
2. They should not take up more than two pages of A4 – if they run to
more, you should reconsider whether you actually really want to send
out this release at this time. If it is raising more questions than it is
answering, it may be fundamentally flawed.
3. They should not contain any ‘land mines’. In other words, there should
be no facts buried within them which are not evident from the press
release. There is no room for being economical with the truth.
Managing Media Relations 131
These key messages and statements should be consistent and should be

used for all audiences, not only the media. Inconsistency is the great
failing in most crisis management programmes. Get it right once – and the
media are the toughest audience – and then repeat the message for
everyone else.
Crisis preparation for the media
Too often, crisis preparation is almost totally internal and this is often the
case with the media. This preparation is obviously important and is dealt
with later. But much can be done in advance of a crisis. For example, it is
common sense to state that we all work better with people we trust and
trusting someone means knowing them. Yet it is amazing how few organi-
sations make the effort to get to know the journalists. They have not built
relationships on trust.
As part of any crisis preparation, a programme of journalists’ briefing
is essential. Ideally these are best done as one-to-one meetings to get to
know journalists on a personal as well as professional level. Naturally,
journalists are slightly cynical when first approached. Therefore, it is
important to have a story or at least a suggestion of a story to bring to the
meeting. The company need not write this story – particularly not in the
press release format – in advance of the meeting. This more informal
approach allows the journalist to come to the story rather than having it
thrust upon him or her. In this forum, a press release can be seen as threat-
ening. In addition, if the meeting occurs over lunch, and the press officer is
buying, there is a hint of bribery.
Initially these meetings are best undertaken by a company press
officer, who will often be a former journalist. If this works well, other
initiatives can be undertaken with the same journalist.
The chief executive
There is little doubt that by far the best PR person in every company is the
chief executive. This is not because of his or her communications skills,
but because journalists like to get as near the top as possible to give greater
credibility to their stories.
Therefore, one-to-one briefings with known journalists and the chief
executive are very fruitful. Ideally, these should be undertaken without the
presence of a ‘minder’ in the form of a press officer. Brief the CEO well
and then trust him or her. After all, when something has been said, it
cannot be unsaid so the minder has no real role.
Obviously, other members of senior management can also undertake
this role but they are never as powerful as the CEO.
Media training
Today’s media can be very tough and there is little mercy shown to an
organisation in trouble. Therefore, as with any military training, those who
are to face the media must be subjected to the sounds of battle. This is
media training.
For key spokespersons, such as the chief executive, a full-day, one-to-
one session is recommended, with refreshers every six months. Certainly,
this is time-consuming, but then what is the company’s reputation worth?
For others, half-day sessions in groups of three are adequate. Obvi-
ously the session is recorded and analysed. The best sessions work with a
real journalist, who breaks the training into three phases:
1. Knock them down. This is particularly for those chief executives who
are used to getting their own way and who often surround themselves
with yes men. A good frightener from the journalists sets the tone. It is
wise that as few people as possible witness this.
2. Build them up. The second part allows the participant to become
familiar with the media, prepare answers and understand the danger of
the situation.
3. Build confidence. The final sessions show how to be prepared, treat the
media with respect and hold one’s ground in a confident and non-
arrogant way.
Dealing with the media
In general, one interacts with the media in three ways:
■ by press release
■ by interview – in person or by telephone
■ at a press conference.
Press releases
Without doubt, the sooner a company in crisis gets out a statement, the
better. Even if this statement is anodyne and fairly content-free, saying
something is better than saying nothing. At least it shows that the company
is aware something is happening to which it should react. This statement
can be built upon as the crisis evolves and be posted on the Internet, which
makes it easy for journalists to use as it can be cut and pasted.
As the company wants to show a human face, the press release should
contain quotes from a senior person, but not the chief executive in the
early stages. There is too much uncertainty and one does not want to
lumber the company figureheads with something which may be damaging
later on.
However, as a crisis evolves and reaches a plateau, the press release
can run into a number of problems:
■ Lack of continuity: For any communication to be effective, it needs to

be intensive. For example, TV advertisements are repeated many times
in order to have the desired effect. The problem in a crisis is that, after
the first few press releases, they run out of things to say. In addition, by
its very definition, news is new. Newspaper editors are not in the busi-
ness of rerunning stories.
■ Journalistic cynicism: In addition, these releases are viewed cynically
by journalists. As well as ‘they would say that, wouldn’t they’, there is
a lingering impression that an organisation is only releasing good news
and suppressing bad news. This is particularly so if the organisation
will not put up any spokespersons for interview. It looks like one is
hiding behind the release.
■ Door opening: Never open a door that one cannot shut. A press release
is a public document and puts the company in the spotlight. Is every-
thing else in order or will the release just cause a number of other
awkward questions to be asked? For example, you have fixed this
plant, but how about the others which are still subject to further crisis?
■ The legal department: A press release is effectively a statement of
company policy. Therefore, it will have to be vetted by a number of
people, not least the legal department. (If your legal department is
not vetting your press releases – well, good luck – you now have a
real problem.) These cautious folk can very quickly emasculate a
strong press release into nothing. In a crisis, this is of little use to the
journalists.
The impact of the release
When one is dealing with a crisis, the mere fact of actually sending out a
press release is a significant event in its own right. But the impact of the
press release as it lands on the journalist’s desk is difficult to gauge.
The journalist may decide on a number of courses of action:
1. Put it in the bin – often the least dangerous from the organisation’s
point of view.
2. Check in the cuttings library to see what has happened to the company
previously. In this case, the organisation must be aware and be ready to
defend everything that has happened in the past.
3. Call the opposition to get their views. The press release can then be
turned on its head, with the protest or green group getting their
message across instead of the organisation that issued the press
release.
The use of the release
However, press releases do not have the same level of control as that
offered by advertising. One has to allow another individual – this time a
journalist – to alter the content before it can be used.
There is one sure fact about the press release: it will not be used
verbatim. (Of course, certain media will often take advertorial and use text
exactly, but they usually demand advertising support – which, in effect,
makes it advertising by any other name. Other lazy media will use it
verbatim, but, by definition, these types of outlet have no clout and are
useless.) And, as noted above, if the journalist is any good, he or she will
need balancing comment, but in this case it is to balance your arguments
and counter them.
A useful exercise is to role-play the journalist in one of the media you
would like to have use the press release. Then judge the likely reactions –
what will he or she do when they get it? If you do not know the answer to
this, you are effectively walking in the dark with a hand grenade, with the
pin pulled out in your hand.
Then attempt to write the story as they might write it. As noted, most
organisations have ex-journalists in their PR department, so this is a fairly
simple exercise. However, it may not be a pleasant one. When the finished
article is passed around senior management, it often tempers their enthu-
siasm for using the press as a mechanism of influence.
Using the press release in a crisis
If you have bad news to announce to the media, the best way to do it is
through route one – the direct, open and honest way. Put the news up front.
In addition, do not drip feed bad news. The company which announces
that it had a small leak of effluent gets some bad headlines on the day.
However, if that leak – after investigations by the regulatory authorities –
turns out to be 40,000 litres, then it is another bad story – how the
company tried to cover up the original ‘small’ leak.
One or two strong, honest press releases at the beginning of a crisis –
like the opening moves in a chess game – often determine the outcome for
the company.
As always, many variants must be prepared in advance and they must
be cleared by the legal department in advance. Otherwise nothing of any
real meaning or value will emerge.
Interviews
The chief executive should be the face of the company during the crisis.
However, although he or she is a primary spokesperson and a key one, he
or she should not be the sole spokesperson. The fact is that some chief
executives are brilliant businesspeople but not very effective in-person
communicators. This doesn’t matter for written communications and may
not matter for some audiences. As identified in the previous chapter, in
many instances the mere presence of a chief executive to show the ‘caring’
and ‘human’ face of a company is enough.
However, in a major crisis, one person cannot be everywhere and
several other spokespersons will be needed to speak to the media during
press conferences, in interviews and in important meetings with key politi-
cians and stakeholders. Developing a list of qualified personnel in different
areas of the organisation who could serve in this role gives flexibility of
response. Perhaps some are from the crisis team, but this will have to be
carefully judged: after all, the crisis team’s role is decision making and
information dissemination. It might be as well not to distract them from
their task. Certainly the press office and its members have a role here.
Image communicates as strongly as facts, as politicians know well. You
only get one chance to make a first impression. It is estimated that 58 per
cent of the impact made is down to appearance; a further 35 per cent to tone
of voice and only 7 per cent to the words actually used. So in the words of
the Canadian media pundit, Marshall McLuhan: The medium is the
message. And you must choose this medium carefully, so it is extremely
important to choose the right spokesperson.
As is often the case, it is easier to pick on those types one should not
choose rather than those who might just be right for the role. There are certain
types of people who, though capable and probably excellent in other areas
within the company, are not suitable as spokespersons for the company:
■ Zealots: ‘I am great, the company is great and we have done nothing

wrong.’ Zealots are those who believe that the company and what it
does is fantastic. Most senior members of a company will contain
elements of this within their working persona and this is naturally
commendable within the business, as it shows loyalty and motivation.
The only problem with zealots is that no one believes them. They may
appear arrogant, as if they are avoiding the questions, in dealing with
the public and the media – thereby projecting an image of a ‘suit’ who
talks only in ‘PR-speak’. By injecting technical jargon and refusing
to apologise during a crisis, the company’s biggest advocates can
be lethal.
■ Loose cannons: They can be members of the public or a pressure
group and here they have a valuable role for these organisations, as
speculation is great media fodder. But they make dangerous
spokespersons within an organisation. Key personality traits in loose
cannons is that they do not think before they speak, are unpredictable
and do not respond well to stress. They may therefore project an air
of insensitivity on behalf of the company. Since you are never sure
what loose cannons may say under stress, it is best to keep them out
of the spotlight.
■ Honest Joes: Honesty is the cornerstone of effective crisis manage-
ment, and honest Joes have their heart in the right place. An honest
Joe feels compelled to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth in the most sincere way possible – including the most
confidential of internal information. However, honest Joes may fail
to understand the importance of the proper response at the proper
time, expressed in the proper manner. In that way, they resemble
loose cannons.
■ Timid Noras: Some personalities are not meant for the spotlight even
though they are some of the most highly qualified people in the
company. Scientists (and two of the authors come from this back-
ground) often fall into this category. Timid Noras feel intimidated by
close questioning or confrontations. They act nervous and upset; they
may even feel guilty. And, in the media, if you look guilty, you are
guilty. They do not make effective or credible spokespersons.

So, what type of person does make an effective spokesperson?
■ The straight shooters: This is a person who has a deep understanding
of the media and the mindsets of journalists. Many will have been
former journalists. They know that flannel and whitewash will not
work. They are confident without being arrogant; diffident without
being weak; open without being injudicious; friendly without being
overfamiliar; calm without being complacent. They are also rare.
It is important that these people are in place, trained and ready to step
into action. This credible face is 93 per cent of the image – and the reputa-
tion – of your company.
What should be said
The most important thing to remember in a crisis is that if you do not

speak up for yourself, then – unless you have prepared very well – no one
else will. It is hard to make friends when you are down. Politicians are
quick to take sides – usually with the underdog not the big corporation.
Remember, the vacuum caused by a failure to communicate is soon filled
with rumour, misrepresentation, drivel and poison.
Facts are always scarce and the truth is an early casualty. The real
facts – when they emerge – do little to wipe out the perceptions that have
been created during the crisis.
The media have no obligation to report the facts: conjecture and wild
speculation make far more interesting and entertaining topics. But you are
constrained – you must tell the truth. Do not tell lies or speculate. It will
always come back to haunt you. Remember Bill Clinton. Every sensitive
document will be leaked – treat all information as being public, it will
come out – probably sooner rather than later.
If you are interrupted (even unfairly), do not interrupt back. The inter-
viewer will lose audience sympathy and you will gain it. Speak slowly. If
you are a rapid speaker, slow down. Try it with a Dictaphone – we all
speak too fast.
During a crisis there are no better words than ‘please’, ‘thank you’ and,
above all, ‘sorry’. Even if you have prepared the longest, most factual of
explanations, it is these words which will speak volumes.
The interview environment
It is important that the interview is conducted in a calm and quiet environ-

ment. One cannot have the hubbub of the crisis in the background.
Remember, perceptions are everything and if it looks like chaos, people
will assume it is and nothing anyone says will overcome this.
If the media is to come to you for an interview, pick either a quiet
room – do not use corridors – or an outside location, which often looks
better, where you will not be disturbed. If the media is to turn up at the
company’s headquarters, a secure meeting room on the ground floor
should be prepared so that they can use this as a base.
Press conferences
The world of the press conference is changing, with the emergence of the
Internet as a major new dissemination medium. Nowadays, a company can
easily post a media statement on its website and that will satisfy the needs
of most journalists.
However, a press conference is a good way of disseminating a substan-
tial amount of information in an open and fair way. It also has the
secondary benefit of showing that the company is willing to face its public
in a transparent way and be questioned about its problems, plans and
intentions.
It is extremely important that external comments are consistent. In a
press conference, you must be sure of the facts, ensuring that everything
stated is accurate and justifiable. This is not the time for speculation, it will
be seen as a cover-up further down the line.
Here are some basic guidelines for a press conference.
Security
The press conference room must be secure. If it is held at the company’s

headquarters, the names of all invited journalists should be given to the
security at the front gate. Those who turn up – and are not on the list –
should be met at the gate by a press officer. If they are authentic and not
members of an activist group, they should be allowed to attend. If the
press conference is not held on company premises but on neutral premises
such as a hotel, security – although much more difficult – is important.
However, if activist groups make enough fuss, it is difficult to exclude
them. The mere act of exclusion can escalate the crisis even further, partic-
ularly if there is any suggestion of manhandling.
Registration
Ensure all journalists are registered as they enter. Journalists should enter
by one door, company personnel by another and they should leave by the
same doors. This is to avoid impromptu press conferences where journal-
ists try to pick off-the-cuff comments.
Chairing the meeting

It is important that the press conference is tightly chaired, with agreed
terms of reference set out at the start by the chairman. For example, he or
she may say that the company will present its information and all ques-
tions will be held until the end.
Length of the press conference

The best rule here is: as long as it takes. Trying to truncate a press confer-
ence is a form of hiding. It is best to have all the questions and get every-
thing – as far as possible – in the open.
Timing
There is not much point in having a press conference if there is little to
say. Therefore it may be some time, maybe 24 hours, before a normal
press conference is held. Of course, there will be interaction with the
media in advance of this, but a press conference needs careful preparation
and thought, given that it is a public examination by a group of journalists
in front of – often live – TV cameras.
Frequency
In a major accident crisis – such as the Swissair crash (Chapter 1), press
conferences were held daily. This was a useful way of getting information
into the public domain. Also, journalists knew when the next press confer-
ence was scheduled for and this took pressure from the company.
Company website
A section of the company website should be put aside for the media. The
media should then be alerted that statements will be posted on this
website. Obviously, some media will forget about this, but they can be
quickly directed to it in the event of a crisis. This has the advantage of
giving a fast response and also, for print media, the benefit of a cut and
paste electronic statement.
Conclusion
The media is a powerful means of disseminating information. It should be

used for this purpose. However, it can also be extremely damaging and it
is important that a company prepares and trains well for dealing with the
media. Others will be taking their lead from it.
CHAPTER 16
Internal Communications
In a crisis, as the outside world begins to attack the carefully crafted brand
and company that has taken years to painfully build up and nurture, you
forget your friends. In particular, one set of friends that are much more
loyal to a company than you may think – the employees.
To ensure that they have the right information and are able to join you
in defending the company and its reputation while working through the
crisis, a process has to be put in place to ensure that everyone has the same
message and the same information, regardless of whether they are internal
or external facing.
Most companies make great play of what a valuable asset their
employees are – hence the term human resources. But, in a crisis, when
events are moving quickly, employees can end up like the cuckolded
husband – the last to know. The target is not simply to pull the company
through, but to make sure you bring everyone along with you. This is the
reason why internal communications are important. What is a company
without its employees? For internal piece of mind and consistent external
messaging, internal communications need to be effective.
The rumour machine
Mushroom management – keeping employees in the dark and pouring

manure on them from time to time – is not acceptable. Yet, even the best
companies tend towards this extreme in a crisis. Who cares about the fitter
in the maintenance department when the reporter from CNN is looking for
an interview? This can have a huge impact on morale and staff motiva-
tion. The company will – one hopes – continue after the crisis. These well-
motivated people will be very important then.
141
If internal communications is sidelined during a crisis, the next best
communication mechanism – used by offices and companies all over the
world – will take over. The system is effective and is the modern day
version of the tribal drum – office gossip. In the absence of anything else,
it will become the communication that will be trusted and relied upon by
employees. The space left by a lack of information is filled by rumours –
and this is also very much the case with internal communications.
The water cooler becomes less of a utility and more of an opportunity
to discuss the latest events and trade the recent titbit of information
gleaned from their work. This can be damaging for a number of reasons:
1. If you hear the same thing enough times, it becomes the truth
In the absence of any other direction or information, repetition breeds
fact. If the same misinformation is heard from a number of sources, it
is deemed to be true. In a time where it is crucial that there is consis-
tent and honest messaging, this can be potentially damaging while the
company works through the situation.
2. If no information is being conveyed, something must be seriously wrong
If there is no flow of information, people assume that the company is
in such serious straits that they must be hiding information and hence
speculate as to the extent of this.
The gossip chain is clearly a damaging and obvious complication and

hence the flow of information is not interpreted by the usual rumour mill.
There are, of course, other advantages to good internal communica-
tions. After all, it is key that the right hand of the company is well aware of
what the left hand is doing so that resources can be carefully managed at a
time when the company is often stretched.
Means of communication: email and web pages
The most obvious form of communication is through the Internet and

intranet and by email. This is by far the most effective form of communi-
cating to large bodies of people. However, caution must be used and the
information carefully balanced to provide as much information as possible,
whilst being aware that whatever is distributed is likely to end up in the
public domain at one time or another. Again, the same key messages should
be delivered from the hymn sheet. Treat them not as press releases but on a
par with them.
Internal Communications 143
Email groups in this situation are useful and important. Emails should
be sent regularly, but not so often that they create more work and less
benefits can be drawn from them. A useful time period, in the early hours
of a crisis, is every two hours. Any longer and the rumour mill will fill in
the gaps. They should be sent to everyone, with the provision that it is
simply an internal update.
However, the internal communications manager and the crisis team
itself should be very much aware that with one click of a button, the email
could appear in a local or national newspaper or be distributed worldwide.
UK government adviser Jo Moore found this out when she noted in an
email that the aftermath of September 11 would be a good time to ‘bury
bad news’. It was soon all over the newspapers. In effect, there is no such
thing as ‘for internal use only’. Everything is in the public domain, so treat
all missives as if they were going to Reuters.
With this in mind, any email and other such communications noted
below should be plain in style, spin-free and as practical as possible. For
example:
Update: 11:43 3/5/04
As you might now be aware, there has been a suspected effluent

leak reported in the River Fleuve, which is speculated to have
come from one of our plants on the riverside, namely the
Diveneago plant. We are testing, independently, the water and
investigating the effluent from the plant. It is worth noting that
there are five other plants which may have also caused this, and
they are also doing the same.
While this testing is happening, there may be questions and so

on from customers and from other stakeholders. If they would
like any further information, patch them through to Jane or
Steve on *4483.
We have a team looking into this, and will keep you posted. If,
however, you would like any further information, please email
info@supacleaninc.com or give Gary a call on *8656.
Messages should include the following points:
■ Time of last update

■ Current understanding of situation
■ What the company is doing about the issue
■ The company’s views on the situation
■ How it is handling the media (optional – depending on intensity)
■ When the next update can be expected.
All this information is not just useful, but is important in ensuring that it
stops misinformation from spreading and it also reduces the divide
between management and employees.
Web pages
There are, of course, other ways of quickly disseminating information. Staff-

only web pages, or web logs, are a useful way to communicate for those
who may be dotted around the company. But remember that the warning
given about email also applies here – everything is in the public domain.
These can be a focal point for more frequent updating, and useful for
those where sending an email would be a disruption and drain on
resources. Web logs act almost like bulletin boards – a central page where
information can be exchanged. Such web logs have successfully been used
in a number of different areas to ensure updated information is exchanged
in an easily accessible location. For example, the US presidential primary
candidates effectively used the technology to motivate supporters and
ensure that those working on the campaign were up to date with the latest
statistics and information. This was an incredibly effective and time-
saving way to ensure that, in a frantic situation, one action can update a
number of people.
In the short term, when the focus of energy is predominantly on tack-
ling the issues, these instantaneous methods of communications work very
well. A key role is not to feed too much information so that the situation
becomes confusing, but to quench the thirst for information.
Written communications
In a crisis, the more traditional methods of internal communication, such

as staff newsletters, monthly meetings and the slow filtering of informa-
tion through management structures, are useless (in any event, for the
majority of companies, the company newsletter is an organ that is
produced in good faith, but rarely read). In a crisis, because messages
change so quickly and lead times are so lengthy, the newsletter would be
redundant before it is printed.
The CEO’s letter
However, there is a role for thoughtful and timely written communications

in a crisis. Ideally, this should come from the CEO and should be individ-
ually addressed. Again preparation is essential here – of envelopes,
addresses and so on. But, given the nature of the communication, this is
not the cover all, chest-thumping newsletter, but a thoughtful letter
explaining exactly what is going on – from the hymn sheet – no deviation.
It explains the company’s position, what its next steps are and the impor-
tance of the employees at this time.
Notice boards
If all staff are based in a central building or concentrated into a certain

area, a less technical way of spreading information is to have a central
whiteboard or notice board to which information such as press releases or
more general update information can be posted. This is a less effective
way of spreading the information, but it can be put together quickly and if
placed near a common place of entry or gathering area can be an effective
way of keeping people generally updated with the details.
Personal contact
There is nothing like a face-to-face meeting. No matter how useful, email

is impersonal and – like all written communications – open to misinterpre-
tation, depending on the mood of the recipient and the sender. British
Airways has – over the years – often had stormy relationships with its
employees. In the delicate business climate of 2003, a crisis in the form of
a strike could have ruined the company.
B R I T I S H A I RW AY S
In July 2003, British Airways was hit by a wildcat strike. The company was forced to
ground all its flights from Heathrow Airport’s Terminal One. Close to 90 flights were
cancelled after baggage handling and BA ticket staff walked out en masse, leaving
10,500 passengers stranded while it was estimated that around 100,000 were affected
in total.
The strike was in response to BA’s plans to introduce a swipe card entry system
which employees would have to use. Ostensibly it was designed to enable managers to
monitor employees’ working hours. Employees, however, feared that this would enable
managers to send employees home during quieter periods and call extra staff in at short
notice during busy periods. This new system was imposed on BA staff after months of
negotiation had not addressed workers’ concerns.
British Airways’ brand rested on how quickly it could reach agreement with the
unions. The company had already been hit by the global economic slowdown, the
impact of the war in Iraq, the post 9/11 effect and the recent outbreak of SARS in
Asia. If that were not enough, in July BA announced pre-tax losses of £45 million
for the second quarter of the year. This dispute could not have come at a more crit-
ical time.
The threat of strikes continuing through the summer would have been potentially
devastating for BA. After 10 days of talks, the Chief Executive Rod Eddington stepped in,
meeting each of the union leaders in person. He quickly brokered a deal and the strikes
were called off.
Analysis
Although better internal communications would have prevented the problem turning
into a crisis, BA did act relatively quickly. In terms of the crisis curve, Rod Eddington
stepped in after the crucial point where the crisis kicks into life. However, he
managed to prevent the crisis turning into a disaster. The point of no return was
avoided. This meant that whilst BA was damaged and could never return to how
things were before the incident, the company was nevertheless able to return to a
similar position.
The relay team
The crisis team will not have time to deal directly with staff – even those
in their own divisions. The relay team provides a useful firewall between
employees and those dealing with the crisis.
This internal communications body, usually up to four people
depending on the size of the company, can be chosen in advance; often
they may be PAs or secretaries who will pass on only what they have been
given and will not speculate or gossip.
This may seem like a cumbersome task with an unnecessarily large
organisational structure. However, given that the majority of employees
will be happy simply to be told what is happening by email, calls to the
relay team should be minimal. It is an important firewall that can stop
rumours from starting and gives a good indication to the internal tempera-
ture of the company. The structure and its interaction with the crisis team
are expressed diagrammatically below.
Employees
Internal
Crisis team communications Relay team
manager
It is important that the majority of employee contact goes to the relay

team, leaving the internal communications manager to take an overall
view of the situation and plan strategy. Getting the message right is just as
difficult internally as externally. The relay team should produce reports on
any feedback, of which there should be little if the correctly tailored infor-
mation is distributed. Any information should aim to satisfy curiosity
rather than drown it in detail.
Internal communications and the media
In the world of the Internet and 24-hour television news, communication

to employees – if not done by the company – will be done by the media
with whatever spin they care to place on the information. Therefore, press
releases should be available to members of staff, so that they may also
keep abreast. These should not be circulated as a matter of course, but
made available perhaps via a website, web log or internal resources
folder/mechanism. This will ensure that staff can see what the company’s
viewpoint is. However, this is not force-fed, as workloads should not
permit too much information to be digested.
Staff contact with media
A key question often asked by employees is: ‘what should I do if I am

approached by the press?’ This can easily happen outside a factory gate,
for example.
There are two options:
1. Threaten all staff with dismissal if they speak to the media without
authorisation. This is very common. The downside is that the company –
when it is under fierce attack – looks autocratic and bullying.
2. Train staff to respond politely that all queries on the crisis should be
passed to the press office and make sure they have the number. This is
far more preferable and also will never be broadcast. It would take a
desperate TV producer to broadcast footage of an employee reading
out the press office’s number.
After the crisis
For longer term issues, clearly the focus can shift to internal communica-
tion mechanisms with a different slant. More use can be made of tradi-
tional methods such as newsletters. However, they need to take into
account a balance of facts and also that they will be seen in the public eye.
Wider and more public displays of strength and loyalty can be taken
towards staff, ensuring again that you bring them along with you.
Good examples of this can been seen at a wide number of multi-
national companies where employees remain informed during long and
drawn out processes such as those described in Chapter 11, where
companies in the US can spend months in a technical and restructuring
limbo while complicated proceedings are taken by a small number of indi-
viduals. Companies such as WorldCom and ntl – both previously hugely
successful telecom companies – have emerged from these proceedings.
Employees have to be kept informed and involved with the proceedings.
Following a crisis, the internal communications manager needs to fully
brief the existing internal communications team in a handover session (if
he is not already a member), with agreed objectives for any further
communications set by the crisis management team and messages again
set by the team. The crisis team, following the intense action of a rising
crisis, will still need to tidy the remains of any particular event and it is
through these actions that the internal communications team can play a
role in ensuring that employees are not forgotten on the road to recovery.
Further initiatives, for longer term strategies, may involve debriefing
managers, who can then in turn debrief their employees. This should never
be used as a method during the crisis itself – it would almost be a case of
Chinese whispers, and just as damaging.
Once the crisis has passed, a further letter from the CEO or chairman
is appropriate. Again, this should be straightforward, honest and spin-free.
This alone can give a great boost to morale, and is so easy to do yet often
overlooked.
Checklist for internal communications
The checklist below will help you to prepare your internal communications.

1. Have effective communication channels been established
internally prior to a crisis occurring?
2. Are managers and employees kept regularly updated as to

events and changes within the company?
3. Has a relay team been established to convey information to

employees during a crisis?
4. Have web-based and written communication channels been

established that can be used during a crisis?
5. Have staff been trained to handle media and other queries?
6. Are all the staff within the support teams prepared?
Overall, internal communications at least have to keep pace with

external communications – after all, they are third party advocates in their
own right and should be utilised as such.
CHAPTER 17
Managing Politicians and the Public
For a senior politician, not being able to speak with a senior member of the
company is insulting. For a key customer, being transferred from depart-
ment to department causes aggravation. For a journalist, having to wait for
an extra half an hour due to consultation needing to take place with a
parent company (which leads to a missed deadline) causes frustration. And
for the company, all this is extremely damaging to reputation.
Preparation and testing before the crisis occurs is crucial. Are all your
links functioning properly? Is information passed through the appropriate
channels without the facts being distorted? The crisis team needs to
routinely test all networks to ensure that external communication channels
are operating effectively, as during a crisis, they must do so.
The politicians
Most large companies have a public affairs department, often supported by

consultants, whose role is to provide advice on regulations which may affect
the company, lobby on behalf of the company and keep the organisation
informed of legislative or other changes which may affect its wellbeing.
As noted in Section B, politicians hate to be blind-sided – especially
when approached by media – so it is important that they be contacted
proactively rather than reactively.
As always, preparation is key and the crisis management handbook –
or a section of it, depending on the sensitivity of the information – should
be reserved for key public representatives. It may be that certain phone
numbers are reserved for the head of public affairs and his deputy: one
does not want the home telephone number of the environment minister in
everyone’s hands.
150
Managing Politicians and the Public 151
Communications at the highest government level
Prior to the crisis, the public affairs department should be delegated the
responsibility of pulling together all this information. It should also be its
role to delegate to managers within the company who should contact
which politicians. In football terms, who’s marking whom?
So, for example, the company’s president or chief operating officer
may be delegated to contact either the prime minister, president or the
secretary of state for the relevant department. The chief financial officer
may be in touch with the treasury or the finance department of the govern-
ment. The operations director may be in touch with the environment
agency or other key government departments which have a responsibility
for the operations of the company.
Communications at the regional level
This again needs to be decided in advance and can be delegated to the

facility which is based in that particular region. For example, the general
manager of a factory may be delegated to be in touch with the leader of the
regional assembly. It is important that this manager, who may not have
much public affairs experience, be fully briefed. Ideally, if he or she is a
wise and far-seeing manager, he or she will have joined local organisations
such as the chamber of commerce, which will allow him or her to ‘rub
shoulders’ with these key people. In addition, he or she will put together a
formal procedure, as outlined above, so that he or she has access at the
highest levels when it is needed.
Communications at the community level
Again, this becomes the responsibility of the regional manager, with

advice from the crisis management team and the public affairs depart-
ment. A localised diagnostic (Chapter 11) would have been completed
so that the key movers and shakers in the community are known and
methodologies for contacting them are well understood and rehearsed.
Again, good networking should ensure that there are personal contacts
in place, so that in a crisis people can contact those who are affected
and those who are affected have easy access to those who are managing
the crisis.
The public
In the Oxfam and Nestlé case (Chapter 8), the NGO managed to generate
40,000 emails in a few days for Nestlé. This is the sort of level of intensity
of communications one can expect in a real crisis.
As stated in Chapter 9, an organisation can expect to receive hundreds of
phone calls in a very short period of time. To get information to the public,
there are a number of mechanisms available which are now discussed.
The call centre
Organisations with large marketing or sales teams or a customer services

department will, nowadays, almost certainly have a call centre. Generally
these are linked into the email system so it is easy to get information to
them quickly. Therefore the hymn sheet must be given to the call centre at
the earliest point and they must be constantly updated. Naturally, they
must also be trained in advance. They should then be able to handle calls
in a quick and efficient manner.
The website
The website can be prepared in advance so that people can immediately

access information. The crisis page must be linked – only during a crisis –
to the home page for ease of access. The page for the public should be
different from the page for the media, although the information is essen-
tially the same. The media page will have more background information
and, of course, for the more insistent members of the public, it is also
available. It is important, however, that the media is seen to be treated
more specially and differently from members of the general public.
Toll-free telephone numbers
Again, these need to be sourced and prepared well in advance and kept at
the ready for when a crisis strikes. If it is possible to answer most queries,
this information should be put on the toll-free number, before it is routed
through to the call centre. Often a simple message will suffice.
Similarly, the organisation’s main switchboard can have a message
placed on it which gives simple basic information. For example: ‘We are
Managing Politicians and the Public 153
aware that we have had difficulties with power supplies in the central area.
Our engineers are working on this and we hope to have electricity supplies
returned to all people by midday at the latest.’ This simple message satis-
fies the vast majority of people’s need for information. They do not need to
know the technical details about generators, power supplies or anything
else. A point of detail: it is important to apply the maxim ‘underpromise
and overdeliver’. As it is likely that some people may still not have elec-
tricity until mid-afternoon, it is better to say that for all people.
Dealing with customers
At the height of a crisis, it is all too easy to forget one’s customers and
suppliers, what with the media, politicians and other exciting stakeholders
to deal with. However, the media and political circus will move on and
you are still left with a business to run.
Therefore, one part of the crisis team should be delegated to deal with
customers and suppliers. Again, training and testing are important, as are
key messages – from the hymn sheet. The customer relations department
or similar is ideal to handle this.
The approach must be proactive. Contact them before they can worry
about you. This illustrates a positive and proactive approach.
Restoring reputation after a crisis
Even if a company handles a crisis well, there will inevitably be some

reputation damage. Most organisations tend to heave a sigh of relief when
a crisis passes and do little else. However, just as after a storm, one
replaces tiles on one’s roof, then the storm damage of a crisis must also be
repaired. Otherwise – and remember the second escalation – one risks
losing the whole roof the next time a squall hits you.
Checklist for establishing your external communications

in a crisis
In this chapter, along with Chapter 15, we have examined how to deal with
the media, politicians, the public and your customers during a crisis. The
checklist below can be used to determine which actions you need to take
in regard to your external communications.

1. Are all external communication channels – to the media,
politicians, suppliers, the general public, customers and so
on – effective, quick and operational?
2. Do all these people know who to contact within your

company and how to do so?
3. Has a sample lifebelt statement been prepared?
4. Has a sample Q&A sheet been prepared?
5. Have internal spokespeople been identified and prepared?
6. Has prior liaison with key media figures and so on been

undertaken?
7. Has a website or website link been prepared whereby

members of the public can easily access information
during a crisis?
8. Have toll-free numbers been established that can be used

by members of the public during a crisis?
Conclusion
The public and its representatives must be handled well in a crisis, other-
wise the mishandling itself can become a crisis. Remember your
customers – after all they are your business, no matter what distractions
take you away from them.
CHAPTER 18
Training, Testing and Refinement
Once the hard work has been completed, the plan is in place and the team
is ready to go, it is almost time for a well-deserved break. However, these
plans are still theoretical – they may not even work. Too many plans are
based around what the company would like to happen in a crisis rather
than what might happen. Remember Murphy.
These plans have only been simulated in the team’s minds. To be
effective and robust, they must be tested and tested hard. Then they must
be refined and refined again. A plan which, once devised, is left like a
bottle of fine wine will not mature, it will rot.
On paper the plans may appear to work fine. However, the real test
would be in a crisis situation. During a real crisis is not the time to be testing
procedures for the first time. There is little room for error. It is here that
testing of procedures needs to play a key role.
Firstly, when setting out to test any crisis management procedures, it is
important that any scenario which is used to test the plan is realistic. It is
almost counterproductive if the scenario cannot be believed by its partici-
pants and makes learning difficult. These testing opportunities should not
simply be taken as a matter of course, or approached as ‘something which
has to be done’. They are important learning initiatives, where improve-
ments and problems can be drawn out to ensure both that the plan and its
participants work well together and that, when a crisis hits, the majority of
the bugs have already been ironed out.
Setting the scene
When running any crisis management scenario, an important objective is

to have a clear understanding from the whole team about what they want
155
to achieve from the exercise. What exactly do the team want to draw from
the activity to make it worthwhile? This needs to be agreed. For example,
the public affairs team may wish to test further their knowledge and skills
of working with politicians on a national scale; internal communications
may wish to look at how best to disseminate information in certain
branches of the business. Whatever the objectives, it is important that
these are agreed beforehand.
The next step is to pull away from the team slightly and begin to work
up a scenario. Clearly, the team must not be aware of the scenario. When
planning a scenario, almost like planning to write a play or television
programme, the plotline, subplots and inputs need to be worked up care-
fully. After all, a crisis does not simply revolve around one small action,
but the repercussions of a number of actions.
Crisis scenarios
For example, a scenario could be based on a recent fire in a large city that
has damaged underground cables. This has led to the loss of both voice and
data services to over 150,000 business and domestic users. The fire and
damage to the tunnel is only part of the crisis. The real crisis revolves
around those who have lost communications – ambulance, police, fire
service, shops, offices and so on. It is these inputs that create the crisis
atmosphere.
Generally a crisis scenario should last up to half a day and therefore
the plot line needs to reflect this. It should be punchy and fast-paced, to
mimic a real crisis. Generally, to put this together internally can take up to
three months. Although time-consuming, it is essential.
Clearly there are a number of inputs which any crisis would have and
these are based on the type of scenario. However, the following inputs can
be taken and adapted to any number of scenarios to test communication
and management procedures.
Telephone roles
The first action by the majority of people in a crisis is to pick up the phone.
Without an effective filtering process, what goes through and what
doesn’t? How are calls rated and who deals with them? These inputs can
be simulated by members of staff who are not part of the crisis manage-
ment team. However, as the scenario needs to be kept secret, it is often
Training, Testing and Refinement 157
better to hire, say, students, to simulate the roles. A number of roles and
situations can be devised to ensure that the crisis team are kept on their
toes. Some example roles are:
■ Employee
■ Union representative
■ Neighbour
■ Local politician
■ Local newspaper reporter
■ Customer
■ Supplier
■ Building agent
■ Community association representative
■ Local businesses.
For our fire example, some roles might be:
■ David Simmons, red button support: Without the telephone lines, old
people living in sheltered accommodation can no longer call for
support if they get into trouble.
■ Judith Baker, local baker: Will the company pay her mobile telephone
bill while she has to use it for business?
■ James Hack, Evening News reporter: How long did the fire go unde-
tected? How long until communications are restored?
■ Joan Keley, employee on the scene: Is the smoke toxic? Are there any
live wires in the tunnel? The fire brigade want to know.
■ Jack Rush – local ambulance man: Will he able to use his radio-based
system if he brings a patient to the hospital?
Each character has a different agenda and should be briefed before the
course. Each operator can have a number of different roles throughout the
scenario – usually about 40 roles can be embellished by the operators.
The role of these operators is to ensure that each member of the crisis
team and their support teams is regularly engaged by an external force (in
a real-life crisis, they would also have internal calls to deal with, so they
have an advantage in that all the decision makers are in one room). This
means that there is the need for a number of role-players to keep the team
members on their toes. These will be providing constant interruptions.
They should have the names of each of the delegates and will be able to
ring and demand to speak to team participants by name.
The media
With all crises, it does not take long for the media to become involved and
this should be reflected in the scenario. The influence of the media is
usually split into two inputs – the journalist and news pieces.
Journalist and media team
A media team, comprised of a professional journalist and a cameraman

with a small camcorder, should be used to circulate around the participants
to doorstep members of the team. With the plethora of 24-hour news chan-
nels broadcasting ‘live from the scene’, the camera crew turning up on the
doorstep is no longer expensive and their arrival at the scene of a crisis is
much more likely than it was ten years ago. It certainly makes the news
more interesting and accessible. Hence dealing with a journalist face to
face, rather than simply by telephone, is becoming a matter of course.
The journalist should initiate contact and demand live interviews. He
or she will be around at all times, reacting to leaks and news as it develops.
Statements – either in writing or oral – will be demanded from the team
and the media centre or press office.
News pieces
With the media, the two most visible presences likely while a crisis
unfolds are print and television. Ideally, pre-recorded television bulletins
are a practical and useful input, reflecting today’s TV news society.
Producing these – including finding willing volunteers and producing
scripts – can be time-consuming, but they are worthwhile and bring a
live edge.
These can be accompanied or replaced by print media articles;
however, the responsiveness of the print media is drastically reduced,
because there is generally only one edition of a newspaper a day. This
hinders the ability to react or be updated as the crisis escalates. The news
pieces play important parts, used to escalate the crisis to the next level.
The following extract is from the telecom tunnel fire story:
A major cable fire has brought chaos to the region as emergency services
struggle to cope with a communication blackout. According to the local news,
emergency services have been stranded after the fire damaged vital communi-
cation links to the heart of the city.
The city ambulance and fire service said it was struggling after the fire
damaged its radio network. Other emergency services have also been hit.
Because of the scale of this fire and the number of connections that have been
wiped out, there are concerns that residents will be unable to access vital
emergency services.
At this early stage it’s impossible to gauge the full extent of the incident, which
has seen the loss of more than 130,000 telephone lines. From banks to airlines,
it seems the fire has brought many companies to their knees, with many busi-
nesses relying on mobile phones and courier services to keep business flowing.
It is important to keep escalating the story during the crisis scenario,

reflecting what would happen in real life. For example, our scenario might
progress thus to the next plateau:
A major mobile phone operator in the area of the recent city fire has said that
some of its network had been hit and that it’s working to reroute calls else-
where because of the loss of connection to the national network and the sheer
volume of calls creating network congestion.
Hosting services have also been hit, as a statement on a national bank website
reads: ‘We’re sorry but the website is currently unavailable. This is due to a
major telecommunications failure in the west of the country. We’re working
hard to restore the service as soon as possible.’ The loss of the website brings
the loss of access to accounts held online – an inconvenience to customers
who rely on Internet banking to manage their accounts.
Fire crews are still dealing with the incident deep down in tunnels beneath the
centre of the city. Black smoke is reportedly billowing out as firefighters use
emergency generators to ventilate the tunnels and try to tackle the blaze.
The news pieces should also include interviews conducted with the
various characters of the scenario (activists, employees, local politicians)
to constantly feed new angles and issues into the scenario requiring imme-
diate action. They will update the situation and give new information.
Everything that could, or could not, go wrong will go wrong, but it is
important that the scenario remains believable. Remember, no one would
have predicted or thought that a scenario based on the tragic September 11
events would have been believable, but it happened and the consequences
were very real.
The loose cannon
Anyone now with an Internet connection, or simply a PC, can have a fully
fledged action group up and running within minutes. People power is still
surprisingly strong across the world, as disillusionment with the political
system begins to set in and voter apathy increases.
In a David versus Goliath battle, everyone enjoys backing the David
character. In any scenario, activists, opponent or otherwise, will find their
way into the crisis to become a nuisance and an instant media pundit. They
are ready to be interviewed on camera and fill in any vacuum of informa-
tion which the company might leave. They should be loud, proud and very
outspoken in order to keep the group on their toes. Their response to our
unfolding scenario might be:
This situation simply highlights the shocking underinvestment by this once great
public utility in the hands of a privatised and money-grabbing market.
The expert
During any crisis, there will be a request for external information. Rather
than taking up valuable internal resources (and possibly confusing various
employees with a ‘scenario’), some of this should be produced already and
an expert should be part of the scenario team and should be the key contact
for further information or passing messages along.
This ‘expert’, as with most people in a crisis, can be difficult to pin
down on exact meanings, implications and even for a conversation.
Correspondence would be full of technical jargon and ‘ifs’, ‘buts’ and
‘maybes’. Information from the expert should be produced beforehand by
a real internal ‘expert’ for authenticity. This is an example of what could
be said:
A fire in deep level tunnels running beneath the streets of the city caused
extensive damage to cables and widespread disruption to phone and broad-
band services in the surrounding area.
The fire is affecting some 150,000 homes and businesses in the centre of the
city. We are currently assessing the extent of the damage and working to
reroute and restore as many of these services as possible.
However, the true extent of the repair will not become clear until the fire
authority have declared the tunnel safe and allow engineers access. It is not
possible at this stage to say how long it will be until services are restored to
normal. A great deal of testing will still have to be carried out on the network.
The timetable
Compiling these elements into a believable plot can be difficult, but quite
fun. Eventually you may have a timetable which reflects the following:
09.00 Crisis scenario starts (unknown to participants) with a telephone call from
the crisis coordinator and they have been asked to assemble. No more
information is available at present
Start of telephone calls, faxes and emails which will continue throughout
the exercise
09:15 Journalist and cameraman arrive downstairs – the media want an inter-
view immediately about the situation
09:25 Group director arrives and attempts to become involved, comes in and
out of the room throughout the exercise
09:30 News bulletin on the TV
09:45 Head of international operations arrives, comes in and out of the room
throughout the exercise
09:50 Activist turns up and demands immediate explanations. Further calls for
press interviews from journalists
10:00 First technical update brief
10:15 Manufacturing department calls re going into crisis mode
10:30 News bulletin on the TV – interview with engineering department
spokesman (very evasive)
Regulatory body calls re local government notification
TV crew arrive for interview
10:45 Media telephone to request to run a forum (with the mayor, activist and
crisis team) on the crisis
10:45 Call from company expert – there is a delay in the technical brief
11:00 Activist turns up again in the foyer claiming there is a cover-up
11:00 10-page update is received
Further escalation
News bulletin on the TV
Regulatory body becomes involved; hints at retribution for the company
TV crew conduct interview with activist in lobby
11:15 Press department issues general statement that some of the allegations
may be correct
Newspaper article is received, further escalation
11:40 TV crew/journalist arrives for press conference
12:00 Press conference
Clearly, to gain best value from these exercises, it may also be worthwhile
considering working with the business continuity team, to ensure that
communications between the teams, and the company as a whole, are
working towards a consistent message.
Checklist – materials
Rules of engagement
An outline of the scenario and rules specific to the testing procedure –

persons within the company they can and cannot call to ensure the test
does not escalate. This should be left in the crisis room.
Roles
Roles should be produced for telephone roles, journalist, activist and expert
to ensure they are updated with the scenario and can move the story
forward at certain points. It is important to train those who are playing roles
some time beforehand so they can become familiar with their characters.
Update briefs
These briefs are written reports updating the team on the current situation
and any further news which has developed. These should be distributed
periodically.
Background material
Any additional background material which may be required to fill the story
and allow it to become believable and ensure that the team has the facts to
hand that they would have in a crisis.
Debrief
Any testing exercise is only as good as the debriefing session afterwards

and the learning drawn from this. It is essential that even the smallest prob-
lems are picked up on, from note taking to communications, which is often
one of the areas where most crisis management procedures fall down.
This debriefing session should review procedures and outputs, looking
at what could be improved in the future. The general topics of discussion
should be:
■ Procedures – how did they work? Could they be improved?

■ Communication – was this effective? How good was the record
keeping and messaging aspect of the team’s work?
■ Record keeping – did this work effectively and were actions recorded
and followed up swiftly?
■ Resources – does the team have the right resources and is it making
effective use of what it has to hand?
■ Team members – does the team require any more members, or
members of a different expertise on hand to offer assistance?
■ Contact externally and internally – were the messages consistent?
Are there any suggested ways of improving how conversations are
held or messages relayed – particularly in respect of the media?
These points are important and allow the team to build on the expertise
they have and the training. From this, the handbook and procedures should
be updated almost immediately. The longer this takes, the more value is
lost from the exercise – learning must be captured and implemented
quickly. Refinements should be discussed and distributed for comment
within the next few days, so that the team has time to think about possible
solutions – rather than implementing them in an adrenaline rush.
It is important that these are held at least once a year, or when a new
member has to join the team. After all, it pays to be prepared.
Checklist for training, testing and refinement
The checklist below will help you to prepare for testing your procedures.

1. Have the crisis management procedures at your company
been tested?
2. Are all CMT members clear and in agreement as to the aims

and objectives of the testing?
3. Has a crisis scenario been designed and carried out to test

procedures?
4. Have areas of improvement been identified?
5. Has the learning been captured and procedures updated and

implemented?
6. Have all team members, including support teams, been trained

as to the new procedures?
7. Has another dry run been organised?

CHAPTER 19
Business Continuity
When a crisis hits, you need to be able to carry on with your business. A
crisis can have serious consequences on your revenue streams. Shell sales
in Germany fell 30 per cent in a month during Brent Spar; Perrier sales
halved. A crisis can be most damaging to the revenue stream – the most
fragile part of any business. Tackling the crisis, managing third party
advocates and trying to ensure that there is one consistent message is an
important part of brand reputation. But what is a brand if there is no way
to sell the product or service?
It is this business continuity process that needs to be given just as
much attention as managing the crisis itself. If the crisis is more than a
branding issue and affects the day-to-day working of a company, it will
begin to drain the company. Companies not producing goods still have to
pay bills, pay staff and have obligations to consumers and customers. It is
these processes that an effective business continuity plan aims to encapsu-
late and address.
A matter of survival
When it comes to a crisis – from a natural disaster to trading difficulties –

all businesses need to know what they would do if such an event were to
strike. More importantly, however, all businesses should know how they
would survive the next few hours, days, weeks or months it would take to
restore normal systems and ways of working and so meet its obligations as
a business.
It is a sad fact, however, that most businesses believe that this will
never happen to them, and possibly quite rightly so. Such events are rare,
and often small enough to be addressed while business continues as usual.
165
What could possibly happen to threaten the future of a successful busi-
ness? Here is one chilling fact. More than 40 per cent of companies
affected by a terrorist bombing in the heart of Manchester went out of
business – for good. An unfortunate, unpreventable and unpredictable
event. However, its ramifications spread much further – damaging busi-
nesses in a way and style no one in the area had seen before or was
prepared for. For the majority of people watching events unfold through
the media, it had an emotional effect, but very little material effect.
However, for those businesses with damaged properties, goods and
services, livelihoods were suddenly in jeopardy. Those with larger cash
reserves were able to survive, while smaller businesses found themselves
in an impossible situation from which many were unable to recover.
As terrorism climbs high on the political and economic agenda, it is easy
to focus on such events, especially as statistics show that 90 per cent of the
disaster relief relating to 9/11 went to small businesses and 10 per cent went
to homeowners. Although a commercial area was badly hit, it was the busi-
nesses which needed the most help. This event unravelled the unfortunate
truth – those who do not plan ahead for such contingencies will fail. It boils
down to survival of the fattest – those with the biggest cash reserves.
With this gloomy scenario, it is easy to think that a large sum of money
in the bank may save any company. Indeed it will certainly help to cushion
the blow, but is this its wisest use? Is it all about the money, or simply
clever planning? As businesses become more dependent on elements such
as technology, it becomes more critical to have a disaster recovery plan.
A 2004 survey showed that the top reason for European countries
taking an interest in business continuity was the realisation that they relied
heavily on IT to remain in business. The common misconception was that
in this world of anti-terrorism initiatives, it is the fear of terror that rules
the agenda. However, only France (12 per cent), the UK (10 per cent) and
Italy (6 per cent) cited September 11 or the threat of terrorism as a factor
that made the board put business continuity on the priority list.
Planning ahead
If a terrifying event, such as a major crisis, was unfortunately to befall a

company – what could be done? How could the problem be overcome?
With no planning or forethought, it is quite simply back to the beginning
and by the time the business is closed or partially functioning, it is haem-
orrhaging money.
Business Continuity 167
It does not have to be an enormous task, after all most businesses take
such measures automatically, almost as common sense – the most obvious
being to back-up the data from the company’s computer servers. However,
this is all well and good if it was the data that were affected by any crisis,
but what if it were the machines, the building, the personnel, facilities and
so on? What would happen then?
It doesn’t really matter what the crisis might be, what matters is that
steps are taken to prepare the company. The first step is to look towards
putting together a business continuity plan. Like a crisis management plan,
this needs to be prepared in advance and procedures reviewed regularly.
The plans can be put together simultaneously and, in the event of a disaster
or crisis, the procedures can quickly be put in place to ensure that the busi-
ness is able to stand up and fight.
Business continuity planning typically involves an assessment of busi-
ness needs and impacts, recovery strategies and a framework plan. This
planning process enables companies to take a close look at the business and
put together thoughts which are designed to be robust enough to cover the
loss of business-critical procedures and infrastructure. Put quite simply, the
business continuity plan is a way to work around problems which may
occur and simply be out of the control of the company and employees.
Most organisations are reliant on just a
few key departments for the lifeblood of the
corporation – a head office and adminis-
trative building, production facilities
and information technology systems.
Stripped down, this is the bare
Ph
bones of most businesses today.

ysi
ple
Every business relies on these

ca
o
la
Pe
factors to keep it alive.

sse
ts
Systems
People, quite obviously, are key to any company, but are often over-
looked as a resource. Systems and physical assets are the management
tools which help the business perform and provide for its customers. This
is a finely balanced triangle. A breakdown in just one of these sides can
lead to degradation of the management structure and the business. Even a
crisis as simple as a fire in a workplace could have huge ramifications on
the structure of the company.
Damage to
property
Low
morale
Ph
le
ysi
op
ca
Pe
l
ass
ets
Systems
Communication
breakdown
An example of such a reliance on assets is IT. It is hard to believe busi-

nesses survived without computers but, at one time, they did. A 2003
survey showed that one in five companies has seen a downtime in IT
services of at least one working day. For a typical company, an outage
longer than this is simply not an option. It is relied on for communication,
systems and is a key physical asset.
However, business have streamlined and adapted, with computers
removing the pools of resources that companies would employ for the simplest
of tasks – services replaced with software. But could any company work effi-
ciently and effectively without them today? With IT being as unpredictable as
ever, how long could any business last without either its data or software?
In a survey which asked what disaster companies across Europe most
feared, all respondents, except those in the UK, said ‘hardware failure’.
UK businesses appear to have a deep-seated fear of fire, with 36 per cent
of respondents saying that the company going up in flames was the thing
that concerned them most. In reality, only 4 per cent of businesses experi-
enced downtime due to fire and, with fire and safety systems constantly
improving, this will no doubt continue to decrease. However, when it
comes to company downtime, the biggest culprit is software failure, with
21 per cent of UK businesses suffering from IT-related problems.
In France and Sweden, most were concerned with hardware failure.
However, it was power failure that had been the biggest cause of system
downtime. It is not the actual risk that makes us prepared – it is what we
perceive as the risks that motivates us. Therefore, any business continuity
plan needs to be able to cope with a number of different crises and eventu-
alities, not just a handful of specific scenarios. As Murphy’s Law states: It
will be a completely different disaster which will affect the company.
Business continuity should not simply be viewed as something a busi-

ness will look at once it reaches a certain size. Granted, the larger the
organisation, the more vulnerable it may become but, conversely, the more
resources it can draw on. Like it or not, there are a number of key parts of
any organisation – large or small – which, if they went down, would bring
the company down with them. In terms of continuity planning, just as in
planning for a crisis, it pays to be prepared. A total of 37% of chief finan-
cial officers (CFOs) said they perceive their firms to be most vulnerable in
the area of disaster recovery. This was followed by security of information
systems, cited by 24 per cent of CFOs. This, for a number of reasons, is a
very startling and worrying figure.
Business continuity planning is not a complicated science, nor does it
require a large team of consultants to produce and prepare. The purpose of
any business continuity plan is to ensure that the business recovers effec-
tively and relatively unscathed from a disaster or crisis and is able to
continue to operate. The plan, similar to a crisis management plan, needs
to include the actions that should to be taken to restore operations to their
pre-disaster level, by whom and in what timeframe.
THE MILLENNIUM BUG – Y2K
The Y2K bug was potentially a ticking time bomb for all major computer applications.
The computer and system application companies came out with year 2000 compliant
operating systems and system software. IT companies around the world spent billions of
dollars to go through their entire application source code to look for the Y2K bug and
fix it. Almost everybody raced to make themselves Y2K compliant before the fast
approaching deadline.
Finally when the big day came, many utilities and other companies switched off their
main computers and put the backup computers to work. When the clock ticked January
1 2000, no major problems were reported. Almost every bank worked fine, no major
power outages were reported, aeroplanes still flew and the whole world went on with
its normal life.
Analysis
Would this have happened without the vast amount of money and time put behind it?
Perhaps, perhaps not, but the risk was assessed, plans were put in place to ensure busi-
ness continuity and it worked.
Creating business continuity plans
The first step in putting together a business continuity plan is to ensure

firstly that the process has buy-in and the benefits of such an approach are
known to management. This process can be time-consuming to set up, but
once the groundwork is completed, like the crisis management plan, it is
easy to maintain.
Assembling a business continuity management team, parallel to the
crisis management team and probably with some common members, is
essential. Each of the main business and operational areas within the
organisation should be represented in the project team, in a similar fashion
to the crisis management team. In most cases, the membership should not
be identical; however, in smaller companies this may be unavoidable.
Each representative from these key business areas should have a
comprehensive understanding of how their department functions, key risk
areas and also a broader view of how this fits into the company as a whole.
As with the crisis management team, this does not necessarily have to be
the most senior person available. In fact, it is often better that the positions
are not taken by these people, as initially the time needed to set up such a
programme may not lend itself to those in such positions. The business
continuity team should see itself as a broad mix, with numbers restricted to
a maximum of eight key people. This team, however, can call on addi-
tional members from across the company, should they be required in
setting up the plan and piecing together the information.
The first meeting of the team needs preparation to be effective. Each
representative needs to be aware of a number of factors in each of their
operational areas:
■ Mission-critical areas and procedures: Which parts of respective depart-

ments, if removed, would stop the businesses from functioning effec-
tively? Thinking laterally is key – IT is an obvious choice, but what
about personnel suffering from access problems, a flooded building,
technical outage regarding phone lines, a wildcat strike affecting the
postal system? All these can, and will, occur at one stage or another.
■ Operational and administrative procedures: How does each depart-
ment work with other departments? Every company is a unique web,
with inputs and outputs flowing to and from departments. If one of
these departments were to be disrupted, what would be the effect on
the surrounding organisation?
■ Existing procedures: The problem with producing new procedures is
that they can often contradict other areas and procedures. In today’s
companies, there exists a myriad of red tape which also has to be taken
into account. However, do not let this area become too restrictive, after
all, these circumstances are exceptional. Regulations regarding health
and safety and evacuation procedures will clearly need to be followed.
Once this information has been assembled, the business continuity

plan can begin to take shape. Although starting such a document can seem
a daunting task, it is essential. If a first draft is not completed at the begin-
ning, it will certainly have to be done so under much more pressured
circumstances at a later date.
Other useful, but not essential, documents for a business continuity
team are:
■ Organisational chart showing names and positions of employees

■ Staff emergency contact details
■ List of suppliers and contact numbers
■ List of professional advisers and emergency contact information
■ List of emergency services and contact numbers
■ Premises layouts, maps and addresses
■ IT specifications and inventories
■ Insurance information
■ Asset inventories.
The first meeting will be an onerous and at times worrying task. Like
running over the details of funeral arrangements, simulating the demise of
the company may seem morbid, but being prepared for the worst-case
scenario is key.
The key to the business continuity plan is that it should be, as with the
crisis management plan, easy to use, easily accessible and containing only
useful information and procedures. At each inclusion, the question must be
asked: Is this essential to the running of the business? Do I need to say this?
Will we require this information? Is it in its simplest form possible? If the
answer is no, do not include it. The last thing you need in any situation is to
have to sift through irrelevant regulations to get to what you want.
The team needs to consider its business-critical systems, communication
mechanisms and performance during a number of possible disruptions. By
running your business through a number of scenarios, you can build up a
picture of how these processes can be managed and disruption overcome.
Physical and IT security measures are also important. Is the building
open to the public? What measures are in place to ensure that it is secured
at night or when the building is not in use? The same goes for computer
security: do staff have passwords taped to monitors? Are portable
computers secured at the end of the day? Is a suitable virus scanner and
backup facility in place? During the exercise, there will be a number of
such elements which might be able to be addressed straightaway – which
is one obvious business benefit there and then.
Running our design and print company, Design Unlimited, through the
scenario, would create a table similar to that below.
Storm Risk Area Business Effects Rating

Flooding or damage to hardware Inability to design using CAD 5
Staff access difficulties Possible closure of branch 5
Disruption of power Inability to design, work, process

payments or invoices. No backup 5
power available.
Minor damage to building, for Some minor disruptions during repair

example broken window and clean-up 2
Disruption of telephones Inability to make and receive calls,

faxes, Internet access 3
Major damage to building Loss of access to building 5
Disruption to suppliers Reliance on suppliers is medium –

alternative suppliers are easily sourced 1
The rating is based on the effect on business revenue. It is important

not to lose sight of the aim of this exercise and the resulting plan is to
ensure that the revenue stream to the company is not disrupted.
Other scenarios with equally complex effects are snow, fire, subsi-
dence, contamination, loss of power through to the more obscure effects of
a health scare and civil unrest. Obscure they may be, but they can be crip-
pling to any business.
From this list, the vulnerabilities of the organisation are considered in
a variety of situations. By role-playing – albeit only on paper for the
moment – and talking through the effects of such crises, a number of
commonalities regarding loss of functions in a business will be uncovered.
The output from this meeting should be a table, as above, listing a
variety of scenarios and their effects on the business. From here, the next
step is to consider what can be done about them.
It is not how it happens, but what happens
Once this exercise is completed, the basis of the business continuity plan is
established.
The format of the plan needs to be agreed for each section in order to
give the handbook consistency. Each team should then produce its own
section, looking at risk areas, contacts and resources required in the event of
an emergency. Look outwards as well as inwards for the resources, but it is

important to ensure that there is not too much overlap between departments.
Each plan needs a manager who will direct the plan and its utilisation.
This role, ideally, should be duplicated within the team to ensure that
absence does not bring the plan down at the first hurdle.
Each section should look at:
■ Team role: What the team usually does in relation to operations within
the company. An overview of its inputs, outputs, management struc-
ture and personnel.
■ Location information: Information about the current location of the
department, equipment, access, floor plans and so on.
■ Backup plans: Existing backup procedures, names and contacts for
those who carry them out. Information regarding evacuation plans and
existing disaster plans.
■ Contacts: Contact information for:
■ Plan coordinator
■ Emergency services
■ Suppliers
■ Contractors
■ Key customers
■ Insurance details
■ Management personnel
■ Staff emergency contact numbers
■ Building maintenance.
■ Key areas and priorities: A list of actions which should be taken if the
department has a failure – backing up of data, contact of key clients
and so on.
■ Business continuity: Plans for the loss of business-critical functions,
including agreed outside contractors, alternative locations, trained
members of staff able to take over specific roles and so on. The contact
number of the crisis management team coordinator should also be in
this section, as with the numbers of the whole team.
■ Activity log: Basic log to record actions of team.
This forms the basis of any business continuity plan. It is important

that general employees know of its existence, rather than its details. It is a
document which will evolve over time and be built upon thorough testing –
in real circumstances and through general training, as identified with the
crisis management plan. It should be updated at least once a year and
preferably on a quarterly basis, as businesses and events can change
beyond recognition in just six months. However, once the document has
been produced, this is not a difficult task.
The plan should be integrated with the crisis management handbook
outlined earlier – a lot of the key themes and responsibilities will be
mirrored and reflected in each team and document and therefore it may be
worthwhile completing the projects in parallel.
Checklist for ensuring business continuity
It is imperative to ensure that your business continuity procedures work

together with your crisis management procedures. The questions asked
in the checklist below will help you in instigating your business conti-
nuity procedures.

1. Has your company designed and implemented business
continuity procedures?
2. Has a business continuity team been assembled?
3. Has an easy to use and easily accessible business continuity

plan been formed which contains only useful and relevant
information and procedures?
4. Does this plan work alongside the crisis management

procedures?
5. Do the CMT and the business continuity team work

alongside one another?
Conclusion
Business continuity is a parallel and then a sequential stage of crisis

management planning. Whereas crisis management is a form of fire-
fighting, business continuity is rebuilding and ensuring survival. Both are
vital for business success.
INDEX
Page numbers in italics indicate case crisis management handbook and

studies 172–3, 174
forward planning 166–9
A revenue stream 165, 172
accidents 3, 8–9 risk perception 168–9
to aircraft 3–4, 41, 74–5 security 171
activists 64–71 survival 165–6
see also non-governmental butterfly 98, 111, 112, 113, 117
organisations (NGOs)
aggressive attitude in a crisis 37 C
aircraft accidents 3–4, 41, 74–5 California, power cuts 59–60
Air France 74–5 call centres 114–15, 152
alliances, need for 35, 93 Chernobyl 8–9
Allied Irish Bank (AIB) 49 chief executive (CEO)
al-Qaeda 54, 55–6 ideal role 40
altruism 50 letters to employees 145, 149
aluminium 21 as primary PR source 131–2
Alzheimer’s disease 21 role in a crisis 38–41, 96–7
anthrax 31–2 Coca-Cola 51
arrogance, in crisis management 36 communication(s)
asylum seekers 52–3 community level 151
dealing with non-governmental
B organisations (NGOs) 70–1
banks, see Allied Irish Bank; Halifax effective use of 81
Bank external, checklist 153–4
Braer 24 failure of 58
Brent Spar 10–17, 19–20, 25 government level 151
crisis curve 10–17 internal, see communications, internal
and Greenpeace 12–17, 27, 46, 48 mixed messages 100–1
third party advocates (TPAs) 91, 92–3 with public 152–3
British Airways, strikes 145–6 regional level 151
British Midland 41 routes of 58–9
‘business as usual’ attitude in a crisis 37 testing 150
business continuity 165–74 communications, internal 141–9
checklist 174 CEO’s letters to employees 145, 149
creating plans 169–74 checklist 149
crisis management teams and 100
175
176 Index
email groups 142–4 sensitivity of 126
with employees 115, 141, 145, 149 style 119
and the media 147–8 telephone directory 121–2
newsletters 144, 148 updating 126–7, 163
notice boards 145 crisis management plans
personal contact 145–6 assessment 80
relay teams 146–7 elements 79–80
rumour and gossip 141–2 process overview 79–80
web pages 142, 144 crisis management room, equipment
written 144–6 108–9, 110–11
computers 167 crisis management team (CMT) 40,
crisis management room 110 94–107
failures 168 assembling 95
filtering room 112 butterfly role 98, 111, 112, 113, 117
press office 113 checklist for establishing 105
security 171 customer service 100
see also information technology decision sheets 110
Concorde 74–5 information flows 105–6
contact record sheets 115, 116, 124–5 internal communications 100
corporate social responsibility (CSR) legal department 100, 102
18–19, 27, 64, 70 media contact 99
county councils 86–7 mixed messages 100–1
crises officer cadre 98–9, 104
escalating 3 operations 99
likelihood of 25–7 problems 101–2
manufactured 3, 6–7, 9, 64–6 procedures 120
prediction of 18–27 public affairs 99, 121
preparation for 58–9 public relations department 102
types of 3–9 responsibilities 100–1, 109
crisis curve 10–17 role duplication 95–6
crisis management roles 120–1
openness in 3, 6, 27, 32 secretary 98
rules for 6, 29 setting up 95–6
training, testing and refinement, see size of 109
training in and testing crisis structure 97
management support teams 105–7
crisis management handbook 79, team leader (CMTL) 97–8, 103–4
118–28 team members 103
availability 119 teamworking 101–2
background material 125–6 crisis mode 17, 23
business continuity plan 172–3, 174 customers, dealing with 153
checklists 122–3, 127 customer service, crisis management
content 120–2 teams and 100
distribution 126–7
electronic versions 126 D
format 126 data, interpretation of 21
layout 119 decision sheets 110
principle underlying 118–19 defensive attitude in a crisis 35, 37
Index 177
democracies 82 F
diagnostic fax
of key stakeholders and issues 58 crisis management room 111
stakeholder 82–5, 89 filtering room 112
district councils 87 fear, in crisis management 35
documentation filtering room 111–12
contact record sheets 115, 116, 124–5
decision sheets 110 G
‘hymn sheets’ 110, 130, 152
genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
newsletters 144, 148
6–8, 68–9
see also communication(s); crisis
Germany, state v. central government 87
management handbook; emails;
gossip 141–2
press releases
government
Dow Corning 43
local 56, 87–8
E national 56
regional 56, 86–7
egotism 51–2 see also politicians
electricity 36 Green Party 68
nuclear power 8–9, 36 Greenpeace 68, 68–9
power cuts 59–60 Brent Spar and 12–17, 27, 46, 48
emails dealing with 70
for internal communications 142–4 Monsanto and 6–7, 27
spam 72–3 third party advocates 91, 92–3
embarrassment, in crisis management
36 H
emotional issues 20
Halifax Bank 72–3
employees
‘hymn sheets’ 110, 130, 152
internal communication with 115, 141,
145, 149
I
staff contact with media 147–8
environmental movement 64, 69 information leaks 20–1
see also activists; Greenpeace; non- information technology (IT) 166, 168,
governmental organisations 170
(NGOs) see also computers
equipment 108–9 Internet, see web pages; websites
call centre 114 interviews with media 135–8
checklist 108–9 choice of spokesperson(s) 135–7
crisis management room 110–11 environment 138
employees 115 issues, and crisis prediction 22–3
filtering room 112 Italy, regional v. central government 87
political liaison 114
press office 113 J
ETA (Basque separatist movement) Johnson & Johnson ix, 28, 96–7
54–5
Ethiopia, Nestlé and 64–7 L
European Parliament representatives 84 Law of the Absolute 22, 69, 93
examinations results 61–2 leadership 35–41
Exxon Valdez 23, 24 legal department 36–7
178 Index
crisis management team (CMT) 100, Monsanto 6–7, 27
102 Murphy’s Law 19, 23–4, 117
press releases 133, 135 mushroom management 141
legality, and democracy 68
lifebelt statements 102, 117, 129–30 N
Nestlé, and Ethiopia 64–7
M newsletters 144, 148
Madrid bombing 53–6 newspapers, see media
management NGOs, see non-governmental
checklist 19 organisations
generalists v. specialists 18 Nike 28–9
rounding of knowledge 18–19 non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
marketeers, non-governmental 6, 64, 71
organisations (NGOs) as 67–8 dealing with 70–1
market segmentation 68, 81 and democracy 68–9
MBA programmes 18 as marketeers 67–8
media market segmentation 68
balancing comment 47–8 media and 69
contact with crisis management team neutral moderators 70
(CMT) 99 politicians and 69
dealing with 48–9, 132–40 see also activists
dumbing down 45 notice boards 113
as entertainer 42–5 nuclear power 8–9, 36
influence of 59, 74
internal communications and 147–8 O
interviews 135–8 Odwalla 5–6
newspaper campaigns 88 oil tankers 23, 24–5
non-governmental organisations and overselling products 4
69 Oxfam 64–7, 68
portrayed in crisis training and testing
158–9 P
press conferences 138–9 parish councils 87–8
press releases 133–5 Parmalat 37–8
regulators and 62–3 Perrier ix, 30–1
role in a crisis 45–6 political liaison 113–14
speculation and 46, 57, 69, 137 politicians 150–1
staff contact with 147–8 briefings 56–8
as third party advocate (TPA) 74 categorisation 56–8
and the truth 45, 46–7, 137 characteristics of 50–2
website statements for 140 in a crisis 52–6
media relations 129–40 European Parliament representatives 84
crisis preparations 131–2 key people 84
moderators 70 Members of Parliament (MPs) 85,
questions and answers 130–1 85–6, 87
training in 132 non-governmental organisations and
Members of Parliament (MPs) 85, 85–6, 69
87 protocol of dealing with 59
Millennium (Y2K) bug 169 see also government
Index 179
poolside management 40 stakeholder diagnostic 82–5, 89

power cuts, in California 59–60 as a map 83
prediction of crises 18–27 stakeholders 72–5
preparation for a crisis 58–9 analysis 88–9
press conferences 138–9 categories 82, 90–1
press office 112–13 definition 81–2
press releases 133–5 dependent 88, 91
in a crisis 135 identification checklist 93
impact of 134 impacted 88, 91
legal department clearance 133, 135 intractable 88, 91
problems 133 mapping 88–9
use of 134 market segmentation 81
products positioning 90
overselling 4 research before approaching 85–8
problems with 4–6 search 90
public supporting 88, 91
dealing with 73, 75 types of 88, 90–1
information channels 152–3 unknown 88, 91
public affairs department 150–1 see also third party advocates
public relations, chief executive role in stakeholder segmentation 58, 70, 88–91
131–2 steps in 89–91
public relations department 102 statements
distribution of 115–17
R ‘hymn sheets’ 110, 130, 152
regulators 60–1, 61–2 lifebelt statements 117, 129–30
and the media 62–3 strikes
as third party advocates 63 British Airways 145–6
relay team 146–7 Royal Mail 73–4
reputation, restoring 153 Sunny Delight 4–5
revenue stream 165, 172 support teams 105–7
risk assessment 10 Swissair 3–4, 8
Royal Mail, strikes 73–4
rumour 141–2 T
telephones
S crisis management room 110–11
security 117, 138–9, 171 directory of numbers in crisis
Shell 27 management handbook 121–2
see also Brent Spar filtering room 112
shipping, oil tankers 23, 24–5 press office 113
shoes 28–9 role playing in crisis scenarios 156–7,
silicone implants 43 162
slogans 21–2 toll-free numbers 152–3
soft drinks, see Coca-Cola; Odwalla; see also call centres
Sunny Delight television
Source Perrier 30–1 in crisis scenarios 158
spam emails 72–3 see also media
speculation, and the media 46, 57, 69, terrorism 53–6, 166
137 al-Qaeda 54, 55–6
180 Index
Madrid bombing 53–6 debriefing 163
testing, see training in and testing crisis materials checklist 162–3
management objectives 155–6
third party advocates (TPAs) 41 training in media relations 132
availability 92 truth, and the media 45, 46–7, 137
Brent Spar crisis 91, 92–3 Tylenol ix, 28, 96–7
identification checklist 93
importance of 81–93 U
independence of 91, 92 universities, as moderators 70
media as 74 USA, state v. central government 87
power of 91–2
regulators as 63 W
reliability 91 web pages, for internal communications
stakeholder analysis to identify 89 142, 144
statements from 92 websites 140, 152
see also stakeholders whiteboards, electronic
Tomlinson Report 62 crisis management room 110
Torrey Canyon 23 filtering room 112
town councils 87–8 Worldwide Fund for Nature 68
trainers (shoes) 28–9
training in and testing crisis management Y
102, 155–64
Y2K bug 169
checklists 162–3, 164
crisis scenarios 156–62

Managing A Crisis

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MANAGING

Section A What Makes a Crisis 1

Section B The Organisation and its Universe 33

Section C Design,Testing and Implementation 77

1. Look carefully at the signals. What is the worst-case scenario? – that is

The Three Types of Crisis

Accidents will happen

THE SWISSAIR CRASH

Odwalla learned the ﬁrst rule of crisis management:

This is a typical manufactured crisis. An unelected NGO seizes on a

Crises from accidents

Evolution of a Crisis: the Crisis Curve

Most large companies, as part of their risk assessment, undertake an

The crisis curve

Point A: Crisis in gestation

Point B: Pre-tremor warning

We are now at point B on the crisis curve. The Spar is occupied by

1. attempt to remove the trespassers

Point C: Escalation: point of no return

Point E: Secondary tremors

Points G and H: Plateau and resolution

Brent Spar’s E. Meeting of

disposal G. Brent Spar

1 Are all managers aware of the power and inﬂuence of:

Crisis prediction – some guidelines

The prediction of which events will become crises is as difficult – as

Paradoxically, the science surrounding the crisis must be extremely

ALUMINIUM AND ALZHEIMER’S

Knowledge is our perception of what the facts are. In today’s world, in

The crisis must be capable of being summarised in a couple of short

The Law of the Absolute

showing that the populations of certain whales were diminishing rapidly

This planning, the practicalities of which are outlined in Section C, is all

And of course when other oil-related incidents – such as Brent Spar –

It is interesting to note that the co-owners of the Brent Spar were

EXERCISE: How likely is the organisation to have a crisis?

5 Yes or Very High or Very Likely

Indicators Key questions Ratings

just to humans but to animals and plants also?

■ Is it a new ﬁeld or an old one under modiﬁcation?

■ Data-rich ■ Is there a substantial body of legislation?

Indicators Key questions Ratings

■ Can it involve children, animals or fauna?

■ Open to speculation ■ Is it possible to claim that it might kill or badly

who will speak out against the issue?

TOTAL Max: 100

75–100: Those projects, industries or aspects of industries which score about 75

Why Managing a Crisis Matters

Nike is at the forefront of what most people understand as globalisation. It is a brand

Nike’s crisis curve

In simple terms, it is worth repeating the rules for managing a crisis:

1. Look carefully at the signals. What is the worst-case scenario? – that is

THE BUBBLE BURSTS

Perrier’s crisis curve E. Secondary

No room for error

In a crisis, the room to manoeuvre is effectively nil. You have been

ANTHRAX IN THE POST

Organisations and their Leadership

When a company is in a crisis, it tends to become defensive and inward-