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The Age of Napoleon
SUSAN P. CONNER
Greenwood Guides to Historic Events 1500-1900

Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, Series Editors
GREENWOOD PRESS
Westport, Connecticut • London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Conner, Susan P. (Susan Punzel), 1947-

The age of Napoleon / Susan P. Conner.
p. cm.—(Greenwood guides to historic events 1500-1900, ISSN 1538-442X)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 - 3 1 3 - 3 2 0 1 4 - 4 (alk. paper)
1. Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821. 2. France—History—
Consulate and First Empire, 1799-1815. I. Title. II. Series.
DC201.C64 2004
944.05—dc22 2003060132
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2004 by Susan P. Conner
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be

reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003060132

ISBN: 0 - 3 1 3 - 3 2 0 1 4 - 4
ISSN: 1538-442X
First published in 2004
Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www. greenwood, corn
Printed in the United States of America
<§>"
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).
10 98765432 11
Copyright Acknowledgments
The author and publisher gratefully acknowledge permission for use of the following
material:
Excerpts from ''Supper in Beaucaire" by Napoleon Bonaparte. Reprinted by permission

of Peters, Fraser, & Dunlop Limited, on behalf of Sir Christopher Frayling, ©: as
printed in the original volume.
"To Joseph Bonaparte, Paris, June 22, 1792" "To Citizeness Bonaparte, April 3, 1796,"
"Constitution Making, September 19, 1797," and "Continental Blockade, January 10,
1810." Copyright © 1998 by Prion Books Ltd. Reprinted by permission.
CONTENTS
Illustrations vii
Series Foreword iX
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Chronology of Events xvii
X
Chapter 1 Napoleon Bonaparte: An Overview 1

Chapter 2 The Structure of Napoleonic France 25
Chapter 3 Napoleonic Society: The New Regime 47
Chapter 4 Dai[y Life in Napoleonic France 69
Chapter 5 Napoleon and the French Armies 89
Chapter 6 War Makes Rattling Good History 111
Chapter 7 The Legend of the Eagle 147
Biographical Sketches: Significant Persons in the Age of Napoleon 161

Primary Documents of the Napoleonic Era, 1799-1815 175
Annotated Bibliography 201
Index 213
A photo essay follows page 110.
This page intentionally left blank
ILLUSTRATIONS
Tables
Table 1.1 Family of Napoleon Bonaparte 20
Table 5.1 Composition of the Grand Army, August 29, 1805 97
Table 5.2 French Casualties by Year, 1803-1814 106
Maps
Map 6.1 Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805 122
Map 6.2 The Extent of the Napoleonic Empire, 1810-1812 135
Map 7.1 The Waterloo Campaign and the Battle of
Waterloo, June 18, 1815 151
SERIES FOREWORD
American statesman Adlai Stevenson stated that "We can chart our
future clearly and wisely only when we know the path which has led to
the present." This series, Greenwood Guides to Historic Events
1500-1900, is designed to illuminate that path by focusing on events
from 1500 to 1900 that have shaped the world. The years 1500 to 1900
include what historians call the Early Modern Period (1500 to 1789,
the onset of the French Revolution) and part of the modern period
(1789 to 1900).
In 1500, an acceleration of key trends marked the beginnings of
an interdependent world and the posing of seminal questions that
changed the nature and terms of intellectual debate. The series closes
with 1900, the inauguration of the twentieth century. This period wit-
nessed profound economic, social, political, cultural, religious, and
military changes. An industrial and technological revolution trans-
formed the modes of production, marked the transition from a rural to
an urban economy, and ultimately raised the standard of living. Social
classes and distinctions shifted. The emergence of the territorial and
later the national state altered man's relations with and view of political
authority. The shattering of the religious unity of the Roman Catholic
world in Europe marked the rise of a new pluralism. Military revolu-
tions changed the nature of warfare. The books in this series emphasize
the complexity and diversity of the human tapestry and include politi-
cal, economic, social, intellectual, military, and cultural topics. Some of
the authors focus on events in U.S. history such as the Salem Witchcraft
Trials, the American Revolution, the abolitionist movement, and the
Civil War. Others analyze European topics, such as the Reformation
X Series Foreword
and Counter Reformation and the French Revolution. Still others

bridge cultures and continents by examining the voyages of discovery,
the Atlantic slave trade, and the Age of Imperialism. Some focus on
intellectual questions that have shaped the modern world, such as Dar-
win's Origin of Species or on turning points such as the Age of Romanti-
cism. Others examine defining economic, religious, or legal events or
issues such as the building of the railroads, the Second Great Awaken-
ing, and abolitionism. Heroes (e.g., Lewis and Clark), scientists (e.g.,
Darwin), military leaders (e.g., Napoleon), poets (e.g., Byron), stride
across its pages. Many of these events were seminal in that they marked
profound changes or turning points. The Scientific Revolution, for
example, changed the way individuals viewed themselves and their
world.
The authors, acknowledged experts in their fields, synthesize key
events, set developments within the larger historical context, and, most
important, present a well-balanced, well-written account that integrates
the most recent scholarship in the field.
The topics were chosen by an advisory board composed of histori-
ans, high school history teachers, and school librarians to support the
curriculum and meet student research needs. The volumes are designed
to serve as resources for student research and to provide clearly writ-
ten interpretations of topics central to the secondary school and lower-
level undergraduate history curriculum. Each author outlines a basic
chronology to guide the reader through often confusing events and a
historical overview to set those events within a narrative framework.
Three to five topical chapters underscore critical aspects of the event. In
the final chapter the author examines the impact and consequences of
the event. Biographical sketches furnish background on the lives and
contributions of the players who strut across this stage. Ten to fifteen
primary documents ranging from letters to diary entries, song lyrics,
proclamations, and posters, cast light on the event, provide material for
student essays, and stimulate a critical engagement with the sources.
Introductions identify the authors of the documents and the main
issues. In some cases a glossary of selected terms is provided as a guide
to the reader. Each work contains an annotated bibliography of recom-
mended books, articles, CD-ROMs, Internet sites, videos, and films that
set the materials within the historical debate.
Series Foreword XI
These works will lead to a more sophisticated understanding of

the events and debates that have shaped the modern world and will
stimulate a more active engagement with the issues that still affect us. It
has been a particularly enriching experience to work closely with such
dedicated professionals. We have come to know and value even more
highly the authors in this series and our editors at Greenwood, particu-
larly Kevin Ohe. In many cases they have become more than colleagues;
they have become friends. To them and to future historians we dedicate
this series.
Linda S. Frey
University of Montana
Marsha L. Frey
Kansas State University
PREFACE
While the Napoleonic era comprises only a decade and a half of Euro-
pean history (1799-1815), the changes that the era brought to France
and Europe were monumental. Napoleon brought order out of the
chaos of the French Revolution and preserved revolutionary equality of
opportunity. His troops took revolutionary ideas and the Napoleonic
tenets of governmental organization across Europe. He was enamored
with detail and had a prodigious memory for people, events, and pro-
jects. He dissected everything—from his relations with women, to the
design of imperial monuments, soup kitchens and submarines, to casu-
alty counts on the battlefield. His picture was proudly displayed on the
walls of peasant homes, and he could rely on a majority of the survivors
of Europe's most horrifying campaigns to fight with him again. He sent
armies across the length and breadth of Europe, and he once said that
he would not notice a million deaths. He was obsessed with taming
Great Britain in order to create a greater France to control Europe. He
was a visionary, a pragmatist, a cynical opportunist, and certainly a man
of contradictions. But, he was also the man for whom the era was
named.
Although the bicentennial of Napoleon's birth has passed, the first
decade of the twenty-first century will commemorate his coronation on
December 2, 1804; the creation of the Grande Armee; the inauguration
of the Legion d'Honneur; his victory at Austerlitz; his reorganization of
France; and the promulgation of his law codes. And then there will be
June 18, 2015, the anniversary of Waterloo. Each year a wealth of books
on the Napoleonic era arrives in bookstores throughout the world. The
volumes may be picture-filled coffee table books, analytical studies,
Xiv Preface
period memoirs in the original language or in translation, intriguingly

titled explorations of the era, biographies of contemporaries, or an
addition to the number of military histories that continue to be pub-
lished. It is not surprising to ask: another book on Napoleon? This vol-
ume in the Greenwood Guides to Historic Events 1500-1900, has a
specific purpose. Built around the life and actions of Napoleon, it is also
the study of the era and its impact on the people who lived through it,
whether they were members of Napoleon's court society, foreigners,
inventors, soldiers, workers who passed an afternoon under the red
umbrellas of their local drinking establishments, or residents of the
areas that the Napoleonic armies annexed or occupied. It provides an
overview of the historical debates that surround Napoleon while still
being a general text for anyone new to this period of history.
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the Napoleonic era with an overview
of the life of Napoleon who was born on one island—Corsica—and
died on another—St. Helena. From his origins on Corsica, it traces his
Corsican nationalism, his baptism in revolutionary ideas, and his early
military challenges and triumphs. In Chapter 2 one meets the First
Consul, whose position was first achieved through a coup d'etat and
then finalized by popular vote. He used his prodigious energy to bring
peace and then to conduct the most systematic and comprehensive
organization that France had ever known. Chapters 3 and 4 trace the
changes that took place in everyday life for Napoleon's notables, his
bourgeoisie, and working class men and women. Napoleon's creation
of the Grand Army, his military maxims, and the lives of his soldiers
form the contents of Chapter 5, followed by a narrative and analysis of
the Napoleonic wars in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes with the
Napoleonic legend—first, his extraordinary return from exile to lead
the French again; and second, the legend after his death as represented
by two hundred years of writings, debate, commentary, and popular
culture.
The Age of Napoleon also includes a chronology of events, several
illustrative maps and tables, period illustrations drawn from the collec-
tion at the Bibliotheque nationale de France in Paris, and primary source
documents ranging from a condensed version of Napoleon's first pub-
lished political essay, to selected letters, and memoirs of his contempo-
raries. The book concludes with biographies of key figures during the
period, an annotated bibliography, and a general subject index.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe a debt of gratitude to those individuals who allowed me the

opportunity to write this book. First, my greatest thanks are owed to
Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, the editors of this series, who believed that
I would do justice to Napoleon beyond the battlefields and the widely
known anecdotes. Second, I owe thanks to my colleagues in academe
who assisted me in a wealth of ways: Gary Shapiro, Dean of Arts and
Sciences at Central Michigan University who provided a grant to assist
me in locating illustrations in Paris; Thomas Sosnowski at Kent State
University who provided insight and helpful suggestions; and my stu-
dents who always provide inspiration for my projects. I also offer my
remerciements to the staff of the engravings section of the Bibliotheque
nationale in Paris for leading me to the right catalogues and collections;
to Sheila Clayton, Jeri Harm, and Jill Hosier, who have maintained just
the right amount of encouragement in the midst of crises in the Deans
Office. I owe additional thanks to Florida Southern College for allowing
me to begin my position a week and a half late, since I was still in Paris
on research. I would be remiss not to acknowledge Ron and Pat Currie
who lent me their house in Scotland for my last writing frenzy. Finally,
I owe particular thanks to my husband who rarely has a vacation
because of my vocation, and to Orson Beecher and Donald Horward,
whose instruction in French history continues to inspire me. And,
finally, I thank the supportive staff at Greenwood Press for their
thoughtful and thorough assistance. As any author should rightfully
acknowledge, the errors of fact or interpretation are mine alone.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1768
May 15 France acquires Corsica
1769
August 15 Birth of Napoleon Bonaparte in Ajaccio, Corsica
1779
January 1 Napoleon enrolls at Autun to learn French
April 23 Napoleon transfers to military school at Brienne
1785
October 19 Napoleon completes the program of study at Brienne
and is admitted to the Ecole militaire, the school of
future generals in Paris
September Napoleon commissioned as a second lieutenant in
artillery at Valence, France
1789
July 14 Fall of the Bastille in Paris signals the outbreak of the
French Revolution
1791
April 1 Napoleon promoted to first lieutenant
October 1 Constitution of 1791 creates a constitutional monarchy
1792
April 20 Declaration of war against Austria
XVIII Chronology of Events
May 28 Napoleon arrives in Paris and is present for the

assault on the Tuileries (June 20) and fall of the
monarchy (August 10)
Napoleon promoted to captain
September 21 French National Convention proclaims the First
French Republic
1793
August Publication of Napoleons Supper in Beaucaire
September Napoleon commands the artillery against the English
in and around Toulon
December 22 Napoleon promoted to brigadier general after the
successful capture of Toulon
1794
July Fall of Robespierre and the end of the radical Jacobin
Revolution; revolutionary month of Thermidor
August 9-24 Napoleon imprisoned as a supporter of Robespierre
and the Jacobins
1795
June 22 Napoleon appointed brigadier general in the Army of
the West, but remains in Paris
August 20 Napoleon appointed to the Bureau Topographique of
the French government
August 22 Constitution of 1795 voted into existence creating a
new government called the Directory, 1795-1799
September 15 Napoleon's name is stricken from the officer list
because of his refusal to accept a post in the Army of
the West
October 5 Napoleon suppresses a major uprising against the
constitution with the "Whiff of Grapeshot." This
event is also called the 13 th Vendemiaire from its date
on the revolutionary calendar.
October 26 Napoleon assigned as commander of the Army of the
Interior
1796
March 2 Napoleon assigned as commander of the Army of
Italy
Chronology of Events XIX
March 9 Napoleon marries Josephine de Beauharnais

March 26 Napoleon reaches his headquarters at Nice, opening
the First Italian Campaign against the Austrians
May 10 Battle of Lodi (Italy)
November 15-17 Battle of Arcola (Italy)
1797
May-July Creation of the new Republic of Venice, Ligurian
Republic, Cisalpine Republic
October 17 Treaty of Campo Formio signed, ending the First
Italian Campaign
December 6 Napoleon assigned as commander of the Army of
England
1798
February 15 Creation of the Roman Republic
March 29 Creation of the Helvetic Republic
April Napoleon assigned as general-in-chief of the Army of
the Orient
Julyl Egyptian campaign begins with Napoleon's landing
at Alexandria
July 21 Battle of the Pyramids
August 1 Battle of the Nile
December 29 Formation of the Second Coalition against France
1799
March-May Siege of Acre in the Egyptian Campaign
October 9 Napoleon returns to France from Egypt
November 9-10 Coup of 18 Brumaire brings Napoleon to power as
First Consul
December 25 Constitution of 1799 (VIII) creates the Consulate
December Amnesty granted in the Vendee
1800
January 6 Bank of France created
February 17 Local governments reorganized
May 15-23 Napoleon crosses the Alps at the St. Bernard Pass in
the Second Italian Campaign
XX Chronology of Events
June 14 Battle of Marengo

December 24 Unsuccessful assassination attempt against Napo-
leon (Infernal Machine)
1801
February 9 Treaty of Luneville signed between France and Aus-
tria
July 15 Concordat finalized with Pope Pius Vll
September French forces evacuated from Egypt
October Peace assured with Russia and Portugal; commercial
treaties finalized
1802
March 25 Peace of Amiens concluded with Britain
April 8 Concordat of 1801 along with the Organic Articles
promulgated in France
April 26 Emigres granted amnesty to return to France
May 19 Legion of Honor created
May Slavery reinstituted in the colonies; War in the
Vendee ends
August 2 Consulate for Life approved by plebiscite (Constitu-
tion of X)
September Insurrection begins in Saint Domingue
1803
March-April Holy Roman Empire reorganized
April 12 Creation of the livret for all workers
May 3 France sells Louisiana Territory to the United States
November 30 Saint Domingue declares independence from France
1804
March 21 Napoleonic Code inaugurated
May 18 Constitution of XII creates the First French Empire
December 2 Napoleon crowned as Emperor of the French in the
Cathedral of Notre Dame
1805
January Levy of 60,000 soldiers for the international war
May 26 Napoleon crowned King of Italy in Milan
Chronology of Events XXi
August 9 Third Coalition formed against France

October 21 Defeat of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar by
Lord Nelson
December 2 French victory at the Battle of Austerlitz
December 26 Treaty of Pressburg signed with Austria
1806
March-June Creation of the satellite kingdoms: Naples, Holland,
Berg
May British invoke the Orders-in-Council blockading the
Continent (Brest to the Elbe River)
July 12 Creation of the Confederation of the Rhine
July Fourth Coalition mobilizes against France
August 6 Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire
November 21 Napoleon inaugurates the Continental System with
the Berlin Decrees
1807
January British expand the Orders-in-Council
June 14 Battle of Friedland
July 7-9 Treaties of Tilsit signed between France, Russia, and
Prussia
Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
November First phase of the Peninsular War begins
Portuguese royal family flees to Brazil; French armies
enter Lisbon
December 17 Napoleon expands the Continental System with the
Milan Decrees
1808
March 17 Creation of the Imperial University
May 2 Dos de Mayo uprising in Madrid
July 7 Joseph Bonaparte proclaimed King of Spain
August 1 Joachim Murat proclaimed King of Naples
July-August French armies evacuate Madrid
French armies evacuate Portugal after Convention of
Cintra
XXII Chronology of Events
December 13 Napoleon enters Madrid victoriously

British withdraw to Portugal
1809
March Second French invasion of Portugal
May 17 Papal States annexed to France
June 11 Pope Pius VII excommunicates Napoleon
July 6 French troops arrest the Pope
July 5-6 Battle of Wagram
October 14 Treaty of Schonbrunn with Austria
December 15 Napoleon divorces Josephine by Senatus consultum
1810
April 1 Napoleon marries Marie-Louise of Austria
July 9 Napoleon annexes Holland to France
December 13 Napoleon annexes the north German states to
France
Russia leaves the Continental System
1811
March 20 Birth of the King of Rome (Napoleon II), Napoleon's
son
March-April French armies begin retreat through Spain
December Massive conscription of 120,000 soldiers
1812
June 24 Napoleon begins invasion of Russia
September 14 Napoleon occupies Moscow
October 19 French troops begin retreat from Moscow
October 23 Malet attempts coup in Paris
December 18 Napoleon reenters Paris
1813
January-February France renews conscription
June-August Grand Alliance (Sixth Coalition) formed against
Napoleon
October 16-19 Battle of Leipzig (Battle of the Nations)
French armies retreat
Chronology of Events XXIII
1814
January Allies invade France
March 31 Paris surrenders to the Allies
April 6 Napoleon abdicates first to his son and later uncon-
ditionally
May 4 Napoleon arrives in Elba as the Emperor of Elba
May 30 First Peace of Paris promulgated
November Beginning of the Congress of Vienna
1815
February 25 The Flight of the Eagle—Napoleon leaves Elba
March 1 Napoleon lands on French soil
March 20 Napoleon reenters Paris instituting the Hundred
Days
June 18 Battle of Waterloo
June 22 Second abdication of Napoleon
July King Louis XVIII reenters Paris
Napoleon surrenders to the British
October 16 General Bonaparte arrives at St. Helena
November 20 Second Treaty of Paris formalized
1821
May 5 Death of Napoleon at St. Helena
1832
July 22 Death of Napoleon's son, Napoleon Frangois Charles
Joseph (Duke of Reichstadt)
1840 Return of Napoleon's remains to France
December 15 Napoleon interred at Les Invalides
CHAPTER 1
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE:
A N OVERVIEW
The Fire of Heaven

"I am nailed to a rock to be gnawed by a vulture," wrote Napoleon on the
island of St. Helena. He had been exiled there in 1815 after his final defeat
at Waterloo and his surrender to the English. He was ill, and he scarcely
resembled the dashing general who had once led his troops across the
Alps into Italy and across the battlefields of Europe. On that rocky wart
of an island in the South Atlantic where Napoleon had been forced to
spend his remaining years, he was consumed by the memory of his power
and was gnawed by the powerlessness that had become his fate. He was
isolated from his admirers and most of his friends; he was kept under the
watch of his English jailers, as he thought of them. His residence was less
than a cottage by his standards and no more than a "gentleman's country
seat" by the standards of the elite, elegant, and powerful people of
Europe; nonetheless, Longwood House was where he finished his life. He
had never willingly retired, and he had little to do at St. Helena except to
reflect on his life, his accomplishments, and the manner in which he
wished to be remembered. His prose poem continued, "Yes, I have stolen
the fire of Heaven and made a gift of it to France." 1
Between August 15, 1769, and May 5, 1821, the dates of Napoleon
Bonaparte's birth and death, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
the Western world was altered dramatically and permanently. His armies
had spanned Europe from Portugal on the west to Russia on the east. His
satellite kingdoms had stretched from Holland on the north to Italy on
the south. He had once fancied a worldwide empire, and he had looked
to the east: the Levant and the Orient. He had looked also to the west
2 THE AGE OF NAPOLEON
and sent his troops to Saint Domingue (Haiti). He had visualized a polit-
ical and economic community in Europe (albeit with French hege-
mony)—a common coinage, common laws, and unified diplomacy and
trade—long before the European Economic Community of post-World
War II Europe was created or the Treaty of Maastricht was ever contem-
plated.
When Napoleon looked back on that period of history with his
companions at St. Helena, he took pleasure in laying the groundwork for
its interpretation. He said, in his confident way, "Posterity will judge
only by the facts." 2 And facts for this period abound. Among the primary
sources of the Napoleonic era are 32 volumes of Napoleon's correspon-
dence, 28 of which average 700 pages each and in total contain some
22,067 letters and documents. There are hundreds of volumes of decrees
and legislation that provide an official chronicle of the French govern-
ment, and articles and essays from the contemporary press are available
as well. Cartons of other Napoleonic records fill archives throughout
France and Europe. Regardless of what Napoleon said—that the facts
would pronounce all judgments on his period—even he knew that more
than simple facts, dates, narratives, and names would be necessary to
create a portrait of the age and of himself.
Time and history's abiding fascination with the small, slightly dark-
complexioned Corsican have left a legacy that is sometimes compli-
mentary to the point of hagiography and sometimes thoroughly
damning, but the bibliography is massive. Commemorations of the
bicentennial of Napoleon's birth in 1969, for example, brought forward
hundreds of books and articles to join the 100,000 titles that had already
been catalogued by historian-bibliographer Friedrich M. Kircheisen by
1912. In that same year, the Revue des etudes napoleoniennes was inau-
gurated in France to serve as a sounding board for scholarly research.
Since then, the Revue has been joined by dozens of other journals and
reviews during the twentieth century. In the United States, groups like
the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe began meeting in 1972 to give
presentations and discuss current research on the revolutionary and
Napoleonic era. Annually, the Consortium publishes its Proceedings and
Selected Papers. In recent years, Internet sites have further expanded
Napoleonic scholarship. They include the Web site of the Napoleonic
Alliance that was established for scholars, interested parties, and stu-
dents of the period, and the Dutch omnibus site (in English) called the
Napoleon Bonaparte: An Overview 3
Napoleon Bonaparte Internet Guide. The site of the French Napoleonic

Foundation (also in English translation) includes an internet magazine,
illustrations, a library, and receives 20,000 hits a month. 3 Further
sources can be found in the bibliography at the end of this volume.
What does all of this mean? Certainly there is no scarcity of inter-
est in Napoleon even today, and judgments about history, even those that
we believe to be firmly grounded in facts, bear different interpretations
and conclusions. Facts do not speak for themselves. They are found in
a variety of sources, for example, government documents, correspon-
dence, memoirs and recollections, plans and maps, places and place
names, ephemera and artifacts. They provide the basis for history and its
visions and revisions. They allow us to consider this period again. So it
is, from thousands of documents and later interpretations, that Napo-
leon has been described as a modern tyrant, a dictator like Hitler, a new
Alexander the Great, a caesar, a romantic tempered by Realpolitik, an
heir of the Revolution, the reincarnation of an eighteenth-century
enlightened despot, a masterful opportunist, or a genius who blundered
into glory.4
As historian Alan Schom reminded us in his recent book on Napo-
leon, "Being neutral about Napoleon has never been easy."5 While
Schom was speaking about Europeans who remain extremely divided
about their interpretations of the Napoleonic era, the same could be said
for most writers about the period. What Napoleonic historians have
tried to do is to lay out the evidence for comparison, search the facts and
sources for internal inconsistencies and biases, and then come to con-
clusions about the man who so dominated Europe. What we do know,
when all is said and done, is that a period of nearly two decades of his-
tory was named the Age of Napoleon and the title remains the same
today.
Very Little Time to Be a Child

Five years before Napoleon Bonaparte was born on the island of
Corsica, the famous English essayist James Boswell traveled there. The
year was 1764, and Boswell described the small island as "agreeable," not
so far from the coasts of France and Italy, with a temperate climate and
over 200,000 inhabitants, most of whom were illiterate and lived prim-
itively by European standards. The people were "frank, open, lively, and
4 THE ACE OF NAPOLEON
bold, with a certain roughness of manner."^ The island contained a vari-

ety of flora and fauna, good harbors and rolling hills, and most notice-
ably an incredible, passionate, powerful patriotism. Boswell's visit, which
brought Corsica into the European vocabulary, came the same year that
Carlo Buonaparte, Napoleon's future father, married Letizia Ramolina.
At that time, the island was still under the legal control of the republic
of Genoa. For a decade, however, the Corsicans had treated themselves
as independent, but disputes with the Genoese had left a legacy of blood-
shed.
In 1768, the Genoese gave up their hold on Corsica, selling it to the
French. The French then dispatched a government official known as an
intendant to oversee their new territory, but they were met with hostility
equal to Corsican hostility to the Genoese. The French had no recourse
but to send an additional 4,000 seasoned troops to deal strongly with the
Corsican insurgents. The success of the French sent the battered but still
belligerent leader of the Corsican patriots, Pasquale Paoli, fleeing to
England with many of his supporters. Carlo Buonaparte, a Corsican
patriot at heart, considered fleeing with his countrymen but chose to
remain on the island to support his wife and first son. Carlo Buonaparte
resolutely attached himself to the new government, both as a realist and
as an opportunist. He was not so different from many other Corsicans.
Carlo, who carried with him generations of noble lineage on the island,
saw an advantage in serving the new French government, and he used his
education and training in the law to secure a position as a royal assessor.
In the summer of 1769, Carlo and Letizia became the parents of
Napoleone, whom Carlo called Nabulio. 7 He may have been named for
a distant member of the family or the name may have been given to him
because of his birth on August 15, the birth date of an obscure saint of
the same name. In any case, Napoleon was the second surviving child
of the couple and the second son to be born. His mother, who was
among the most beautiful women of Corsica, was chestnut haired, with
dark eyes, an aquiline nose, and an air of nobility. She had been 14 at
the time of her marriage to Carlo and was still only 18 when Napoleon
was born. She had been given little formal education and had been
taught almost exclusively in her role as a mother, as was customary in
late eighteenth-century social circles. Out of that environment, Letizia
became a strong matriarch and a severe steward to her eight children
while learning to manage family affairs in the absence of her husband,

who was frequently away on business. 8
"I was born when my country was dying," Napoleon wrote about
Corsica. He painted a scene of "thirty thousand Frenchmen disgorged
upon our shores . . . drowning the throne of Liberty in a sea of blood."
It was a "spectacle that offended my infant eyes. My cradle was sur-
rounded, from the very day of my birth by the cries of the dying, the
groans of oppression, and the tears of despair." 9 Above all, Napoleon had
learned to be a Corsican patriot, vehemently opposed to all things
French. His writing was hyperbole, of course, but Napoleon had always
been passionate about the things in which he believed and the causes
that he embraced. He was irascible, quarrelsome, quick to pick on his
older brother Joseph, and the only one of the Bonaparte siblings who was
not nursed by his mother. When he later described his early years, he
noted, "I feared nobody, beating one, scratching another; making myself
redoubtable to all. It was my brother Joseph who most often had to suf-
fer." Napoleon concluded with a certain pride, "He was slapped, bitten,
scolded, and I had already complained against him before he had time to
recover himself." 10 There is no doubt that Napoleon's Corsican experi-
ence influenced his personality and framed many of his views. There was
always a certain clannishness about him, and his competitiveness was
extraordinary.
By the time Napoleon was nine, his father had risen well within the
Franco-Corsican hierarchy of the island. He had qualified for French
nobility based on his Corsican claims to the aristocracy, and then Carlo
obtained a royal scholarship for Napoleon, in whom he saw more prom-
ise for the military than Joseph. The scholarship, which had been desig-
nated as a royal scholarship for noble boys who could document their
poverty and literacy, first sent Napoleon to Autun to learn French and
then to boarding school to complete his education, with the hopes that
he might later qualify to enter the prestigious Ecole Militaire in Paris.
After three months of language instruction in 1779 to make him mar-
ginally fluent, Napoleon moved to Brienne where he stayed for five and
a half years, only seeing his mother and father once. The regimen was
harsh, but Napoleon thrived on his studies. While he was ridiculed for
the way he spoke French (as though he had "straw in his nose," a play
on the way he pronounced his own name) and his inveterate Corsican
6 THE ACE OF NAPOLEON
patriotism, Napoleon concentrated on his work. Five and a half years

later, not yet 15 years of age, he went off to Paris to learn the art of war.
If there were influences on Napoleon that came from these early
years of his life, they would include his isolation from others, partially
imposed by those around him and partially imposed by himself, and his
interest in mathematics and history, almost to the exclusion of every-
thing else. He also exhibited feelings of responsibility toward his family
since the death of his father, continued contempt for the French oppres-
sors of his island even though his studies were the result of their largesse,
a lack of interest in religion bordering on agnosticism, and a marked
seriousness of temperament. Napoleon's graduation certificate from Bri-
enne catalogued those years: "Constitution and health, excellent; char-
acter, obedient, amenable, honest, grateful; conduct, perfectly regular;
he has throughout distinguished himself by his steady work in mathe-
matics. He knows his history and geography pretty well. Fencing and
dancing very poor." 11 Napoleon had no particular interest in social
graces, as his later behavior would attest. His handwriting was cramped
and hard to decipher; his mastery of French, his second language, left
much to be desired. But he was quick to learn those things that inter-
ested him and what he wanted most was admission to the school of
France's finest officers.
In October 1784, Napoleon entered the Ecole Militaire in Paris,
where scarcely a year later he graduated and was commissioned as a sec-
ond lieutenant of artillery stationed at Valence, France. Much has been
made of his rank of 42 n d in a class of 58, but he had passed through
France's leading military school in one year rather than two or three, and
he had been the first Corsican to do so, working in a language and a
society that he had known for less than seven years. It was now 1785,
and Napoleon Bonaparte was 16 years old.
For the next seven and a half years, Napoleon lived a double life.
In one life, he continued his serious military experience, as he fulfilled
his responsibilities and read more history and literature. In the other, he
roamed Paris, returned to his roots in Corsica, organized patriot groups,
and found himself immersed in the writings of Rousseau in which he
found renewed passion. Likewise, he was fascinated by England and cat-
alogued all of her possessions, analyzed Frederick II of Prussia (Freder-
ick the Great), looked to the Orient for inspiration, and wrote both
fiction and military tracts. Twice before the Revolution he asked for and
Napoleon Bonaparte: An Overview
7
received leave from his commission in the French army to return to Cor-
sica. Four more times after 1789 he went as well, one of them as a lieu-
tenant colonel in the Corsican Volunteers, still hopeful that he could
assist his countrymen in expelling the French occupation. Ultimately his
partnership with Paoli, whom Napoleon once held up as the savior of
Corsica, proved to be doomed as was the liberation of Corsica from
France. His family was forced to flee from Corsica; Napoleon renegoti-
ated his military career, which he had almost lost because of his pro-
tracted absences (29 months in all); and he committed firmly to France
as his homeland. Gone were the impassioned words that he had said
about his island and his denunciation of the "French chains" that had
enveloped it. "In the eyes of God," he had written describing what
France had been doing to Corsica, "the worst crime is to tyrannize over
men." 12 That era of his life was over; he resolved to move on.
They Have Seen Nothing Yet

When the French Revolution began in 1789, Napoleon was ini-
tially more concerned about what was going on in Corsica than what
was occurring in France. Shortly, however, neither he nor anyone else
could ignore the events in and around Paris that moved France closer to
constitutional monarchy and then to republicanism in a short three and
a half years. The Old Regime, as the period predating the Revolution
came to be called, was over. Napoleon had been born a citizen of France,
and as such, he would be designated as an active citizen by the govern-
ment, giving him all of the rights provided by the new French order. 13
For success, he no longer needed the aristocratic coat of arms that his
father had worked so hard to guarantee. All he needed was to take
advantage of the opportunities that were opening before him.
During the decade between 1789 and 1799 when Napoleon
assumed the mantle of government, his rise was neither linear nor mete-
oric. During the first four years of that decade, Napoleon's double life
continued. Alternating between Corsica and France for extended peri-
ods of time, by the summer of 1792, Napoleon learned that he had lost
his regular commission in the French army. French politics were grow-
ing increasingly divisive, King Louis XVI was charading as a constitu-
tionalist while intriguing against his detractors, and the French declared
war against Austria in April of that year. The French economy continued
to decline, bread remained scarce, and the army officer corps was sorely
lacking qualified personnel. In spite of Napoleon's mixed allegiances, his
commission was returned to him, and Napoleon was promoted to cap-
tain.
It is not possible to place Napoleon in early French revolutionary
events because of his disinterest in French affairs, his preoccupation with
his family, and his obsession with Corsica. Napoleon had, in fact, missed
all of the early events of the French Revolution including the calling of
the Estates-General in 1788, one of the most severe winters in eighteenth-
century French history that damaged an already seriously impaired econ-
omy, and the fall of the Bastille. A newly established National Constituent
Assembly had abolished the vestiges of feudalism and aristocratic privi-
lege in the late summer of 1789 and had begun work on a written con-
stitution, the first in French history. The Declaration of the Rights of Man
had been decreed, although it went unratified by the king for months.
The Revolution was speeding forward as leaders like the abbe Emmanuel-
Joseph Sieyes; Antoine Barnave; Charles Maurice, prince de Talleyrand;
Honore-Gabriel Riquetti, comte de Mirabeau; and Marie Joseph Yves
Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, brought forward their recom-
mendations for a liberal, constitutional regime to replace absolutism in
France. As would become true, Mirabeau had once remarked that the
question was not how to propel a revolution; it was how to hold it back
once it had achieved momentum. Further, revolutionaries had uncere-
moniously dismantled the Catholic Church and its formerly inviolate
lands while they ceremoniously celebrated the new order, later adopting
a revolutionary anthem, reveling in their fraternal consciousness, and
establishing a new scheme of revolutionary festivals. Citizenship had
taken on real meaning in the new order. Political clubs and associations
were widespread and numerous, and they quickly established themselves
as serious partisan contenders in national and local politics.
When Napoleon arrived in Paris on May 28, 1792, the Revolution
was already moving toward its more radical phase. He had nothing to
do with the events that had transformed France from a kingdom to a
nation and that had transformed Louis XVI from "Louis, by the grace of
God, King of France and Navarre," to "Louis, by the grace of God and
the Constitution of the State, King of the French." The change from King
of France to King of the French was enormous. Subjects had become cit-
izens; the kingdom had become the state. But it should be remembered
9
that "Napoleon," as historian J. M. Thompson wrote, had not "made the
revolution." Napoleon was only a member of "the generation that inher-
ited it." 14
Spring of 1792 was in many ways pivotal to the French Revolution
and, in a very different way, pivotal to Napoleon. The declaration of war,
the levy of troops for the international contest, and the continuing civil
disarray in France sparked continued partisanship and unrest in the cap-
ital. The international war was not going well, yet the king refused to
bring troops to Paris for training. Government ministers were replaced,
and the Legislative Assembly became more active. It is not surprising
that the streets became more active as well. On June 20, 1792, a mixed
assemblage of thousands of working class Parisians and local leaders
marched to the Assembly and then to the Tuileries Palace, where the
royal family had been residing in Paris since they were forced to leave
Versailles in the fall of 1789. Napoleon was there, and he chronicled the
events to his brother two days later. The mob that overcame the National
Guard "mounted cannon against the King's apartments," broke down the
entry gates, and dismantled interior doors. The demonstrators were
"armed with pikes, hatchets, swords, muskets, spits and pointed stakes."
They were excessive, overwrought, and out of control. 15 Napoleon could
not countenance the actions of a mob; they could in no way be justified
under the guarantees of the Constitution of 1791. But by this time,
Napoleon had also ceased to be a supporter of the ineffective king. Inside
the Tuileries, away from Napoleon's gaze, the king had smiled benignly
to the rabble that had assaulted his palace, raised a pewter cup filled with
wine to toast the nation, and placed a red cap of liberty on his head. The
crowd had disbanded, but the summer of 1792 was far from over. See
Document 1: Napoleons Letter to His Brother Joseph, June 22, 1792 in Pri-
mary Source Documents at the end of this book.
By August 10, neither a toast to the nation nor a benign smile could
save Louis XVI's constitutional position. In a carefully planned assault
on the Tuileries beginning with the sounding of the tocsin at midnight
the night before, thousands of armed demonstrators laid siege to the
palace. The king, not wishing to cause harm, ordered his guards to lay
down their weapons, and he and the royal family fled to the Legislative
Assembly where they took refuge. As a result, the Tuileries became a
scene of bloodshed and carnage as hundreds of the Swiss Guards, the
traditional palace detachment, were killed and dismembered in the
courtyard. Across the street from the assault, Napoleon watched the
events unfold. He had heard the bells sounding the assault and made his
way through the swirling mob. Accosted by members of that crowd, he
had been forced to cry vive la nation (long live the nation) beneath a
bloody head mounted on a pike. Ultimately the courtyard that he saw
was littered with bodies greater in number than on a battlefield. Bodies
of the fallen troops were stripped; according to some sources, women in
the mob clipped off the private parts of dead guardsmen "and stuffed
them in [the dead soldiers'] gaping mouths." 1 6 In yet another of his let-
ters to his brother Joseph, Napoleon rued the ineffectiveness of the king.
If only he had mounted his horse, Napoleon wrote, "victory would have
been his." 17
There were to be no more chances for the king, who was removed
from office and placed under guard. In the fall of 1793, the government
of France declared itself the First French Republic, and four months later
the former king was executed. From King of France to King of the
French, Louis XVI became simply Citizen Louis Capet who went to the
guillotine for his crimes against the people and the nation.
By summer of 1793, the entire Bonaparte family was forced to
change its way of life, as Napoleon tied his future to the Republic, the
powerful Committee of Public Safety, and to Maximilien Robespierre, its
most visible member. What ultimately brought about Napoleon's first sig-
nificant command was Napoleon's allegiance to the principles of the
Jacobins and his support from fellow Corsican and government repre-
sentative, Christophe Saliceti. It was Saliceti who recruited Napoleon for
an artillery command, its objective to expel the British navy from the
French Mediterranean port city of Toulon. As Napoleon began his suc-
cessful preparations for forcing the British out of Toulon, he also com-
pleted Le Souper de Beaucaire: Dialogue entre un Militaire de Varmee de
Carteaux, un Marseillais, un Nimois et un Fabricant de Montpellier, sur les
evenements qui sont arrives dans le Qi-devant Comtat a Varivee des Marseil-
lais (translated in shortened form as Supper in Beaucaire). This was his
first published work, although he had already completed his Corsican Let-
ters and various writings on military affairs and other topics, and had
once entered a competition sponsored by the Academy of Lyon. 18 Supper
in Beaucaire, however, was different from his earlier works. It was an
imaginary conversation between a soldier in Carteaux's army in the south
of France (a not particularly veiled image of himself), two conservative
11
defenders of Marseilles' decision to resist the Jacobins, a manufacturer

from Montpellier, and a man from Nimes. But more importantly, it laid
out Napoleon's support for the Jacobin causes that included order and a
centralized state authority as well as his belief in military prowess, par-
ticularly the efficiency of the artillery and the strength of the troops. As
the men dined and debated in the small town of Beaucaire, the soldier
took more and more control of the arguments, and by the end of the
evening the men from Marseilles were left with the bill for the champagne
they had consumed during their evening. Napoleon also took a very prac-
tical position in the pamphlet: to support the political leadership that
would ultimately be victorious. He had written earlier, "If one must
belong to a party, it must be that which triumphs; it is better to be the
eater than the eaten."19 An edited version of Supper in Beaucaire is
included as Document 2.
The British roust from the port of Toulon could not have been more
important for Napoleon. Putting together the pieces of a plan that had
not been enacted earlier under a less skilled commander, Napoleon mas-
tered the heights around the port so that the siege could take place. The
British had little recourse except to withdraw their fleet. In the process
of the assault, Napoleon was wounded by a British bayonet, one of only
two injuries he received in his career of nearly two decades in harm's
way. Although Napoleon was not individually credited for the victory at
Toulon, he was well rewarded. He was promoted from lieutenant colonel
to brigadier general, and correspondence from the men who had served
with him and who had seen him in action was consistently laudatory. He
was, according to the Chevalier Du Teil "a most uncommon officer."20
In the meantime, Napoleon continued to work in the south of
France under the watchful eye of Saliceti. Through his compatriot, he
received the continued support of the Jacobins in Paris. He also partici-
pated in the amalgame, strengthening the armies of France by merging
the new recruits and volunteers of 1793 with veterans. By the early
spring of 1794, Maximilien Robespierre's bother Augustin had also
noticed Napoleon. He wrote to his brother, "I add to the names of patri-
ots whom I have mentioned to you citizen Bonaparte, an exceedingly
meritorious general in command of the artillery"21 The praise was short
lived, as were the lives of Maximilien and Augustin Robespierre and
hundreds of their compeers. Napoleon, named so visibly as a Jacobin
patriot, was not immune from the proscription that followed the quick
and bloody coup that unseated the Jacobin stronghold on the Commit-
tee of Public Safety in July 1794.
If Napoleon had been stationed closer to Paris, one does not know
what his fate might have been. As it was, Napoleon was imprisoned in Fort
Carre near Antibes as a Jacobin sympathizer and a threat to the new gov-
ernment. Again Saliceti came to his rescue, by obtaining Napoleon's release
after only 10 days and then by sending him toward his destiny. Napoleon
was transferred to Paris and assigned first to the topographic office of the
Army and then to the Army of the West. The latter was an appointment
over an infantry brigade serving in the Vendee. But the civil war that had
been spawned in the west of France in 1791 by the confiscation of the lands
of the Catholic Church and then by its reorganization had grown more
bloody. Conscription to fill the armies of France in the international war
was the new provocation. In the Vendee, it was brother against brother,
family against family, and a traditional church against a revolution. Napo-
leon's appointment in the Vendee was not what he had in mind, and he
refused it. He was well aware, and even remarked, that civil wars bring no
military glory to their combatants. Saliceti and Paul Barras, who was also
well placed in government circles, managed to keep Napoleon in Paris.
Fortune again smiled upon Napoleon as he found himself instru-
mental in averting the next constitutional crisis. On October 5, 1795,
mobs assembled and began their march against the Convention (leg-
islative body of France) that had presented a new constitution to France.
While the constitution had been established legally, it contained provi-
sions that some Parisians found particularly abhorrent. Simply, a codicil
to the constitution preserved the power of those men who had unseated
Robespierre and the Jacobins. The preservation of one group of revolu-
tionaries over another, however, was not precisely the problem. Rather,
the issue was that the economic crisis that beset France continued
unabated and the international war raged on, in spite of the promises of
those men who remained in power. Parisians asked why the new Con-
stitution of 1795 was a more legitimate solution to the problems of
France than a royalist restoration.
In the midst of this turmoil, Barras turned to the youthful brigadier
general Napoleon Bonaparte to defend the new government (soon to be
called the Directory). That is precisely what Napoleon did. Unafraid to
use serious crowd control, Napoleon brought in forty cannons, arrayed
them to aim down the narrow streets that led to the Convention, and
filled the cannon barrels with nails, scrap iron, and chains. No com-
mander had ever before taken such strong action against a revolution-
ary mob in Paris. What took place became known, half a century later,
as the "Whiff of Grapeshot." 22 As the crowds marched on the Conven-
tion, they were mowed down in a bloodbath of shrapnel spewing from
the mouths of the cannons. Napoleon saved the new government, and
his efforts went exactly to plan. Casualties on his side were light, and he
reported to his brother Joseph that "I haven't had a scratch." 23 His invin-
cibility now became an aura.
Napoleon's Parisian adventure in 1795 brought him into the social
circles of the capital, into the new society that was much less inhibited
than it had been under Jacobin control in 1793-1794, and into the arms
of Marie-Josephine-Rose Tascher de La Pagerie [de Beauharnais].
Uncharacteristically foolish and giddy for this brief period of his life,
Napoleon drank in the "luxury, enjoyment and the arts" that defined a
reborn Paris where life was exceedingly agreeable. Napoleon wrote,
"Anyhow, who could be a pessimist in this mental workshop, this
whirlwind of activity?" 24 He frequented book stalls, took in public lec-
tures, and enjoyed the sight of scantily clad, beautiful women who could
be seen everywhere. In the salons of Paris, he courted the widow of an
Old Regime aristocrat who had lost his life during the Terror. More
important, perhaps, was Josephine de Beauharnais's well-known former
liaison with Barras, who had given Napoleon his opportunity for recog-
nition in the "Whiff of Grapeshot" and who later supported Napoleon's
appointment as commander of the Army of Italy. In December 1795,
Napoleon was agog with Josephine's charms: "I awake all filled with you.
Your image, and the intoxicated pleasures of last night, allow my senses
no rest." 25 Josephine, who had been born in Martinique, was a quintes-
sential hostess and a model of perfection in the arts of grace and charm.
To the socially inept Napoleon, she must have appeared a goddess. See
Document 3 for one of Napoleon's early letters to Josephine. Also see the
biographies at the conclusion of this book for more information on
Josephine.
On March 9, 1796, Napoleon married Josephine, in spite of her two
children by a previous marriage and in spite of the fact that she was six
years his senior in age. In only two days he was on his way to Nice to
take up the command that would make his name a household word and
begin his progress toward the throne of France.
When Napoleon arrived to take command of the Army of Italy, the
French government (the Directory) saw it only as a diversion from the
more significant contest that pitted the main French armies against Aus-
tria, the only remaining continental power in the First Coalition against
France. What neither the Directory nor the seasoned, veteran com-
manders in Italy could know was that Napoleon intended to change the
rules of war. In the end, not only did Napoleon make Italy the main the-
atre of the war, his personal courage so won over his troops that the aura
of his invincibility was renewed time and time again. He created his own
war chest, supplied his men, and negotiated his own military and diplo-
matic settlements. By October 1797, the contest was over and the Treaty
of Campo Formio was signed, ending the First Coalition. Only Britain
remained in the contest against republican France.
Napoleon had managed to do what no other commander in the
French military had achieved at that time. It was "a miracle of leader-
ship," according to historian Owen Connelly 2 6 What Napoleon had
done was to show his commanders, most of whom were older and taller
than he, that war required infinite information, strategic planning, excel-
lent rapport with his men, and a cool deference to loss of life. He
accepted no sloth or lack of preparation from his commanders; he was
an homme terrible (a man who brought fear to their hearts and beings).
Andre Massena, who later joined Napoleons closest circle of friends and
companions, first saw his new army commander as a small, unimpres-
sive general who looked out of his depth. Napoleon was only 26 at the
time and in command of one of Frances five armies. Massena later
admitted, however, that when Napoleon placed his general's hat on his
head, he "seemed two feet taller." 2/ Few later questioned Massena's
analysis, especially when the campaign was dispatched with such effi-
ciency and so many rewards for the French republic. See the biographies
at the end of this book for more information on Massena.
In concluding this First Italian Campaign, as it came to be called,
Napoleon had already begun a reorganization of Europe that would
characterize his later empire. Napoleon shepherded into place the cre-
ation of the Ligurian Republic from Genoa and the construction of the
Cisalpine Republic from parts of Austria, papal territories, and Venetia.
It should be remembered that, at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
15
tury, modern Italy did not yet exist. The Italian peninsula was comprised
of a number of independent states and principalities until the last half
of that century when Italian unification was achieved. From what had
existed, however, Napoleon moved boundaries, organized diplomatic
conferences, and exchanged islands. In the process he spread the bene-
fits of the Revolution as he saw them—the abolition of feudalism and the
guild system and the implementation of civil liberties in the areas where
French troops passed.
By 1797 only Britain remained an enemy of France, and Napoleon
was again in Paris. He had been elected to the prestigious Institut de
France; and he felt, for the first time, the jealousies of government offi-
cials and military leaders who suddenly realized how visible and poten-
tially powerful he had become. This time, Napoleon's plans were in
league with Foreign Minister Talleyrand's program that looked to the
East for relief from the British. The point was to attack Britain through
her back door—the British trade through Egypt and the Levant—rather
than a direct assault across the Channel that had originally been pro-
posed. Napoleon's Egyptian campaign was memorable for its sheer scale
and its aims that were well beyond its military objectives.
On May 19, 1798, Napoleon began the Egyptian campaign to bring
Britain to its knees and to create a stronghold for the French in the East.
When all was said and done 43,000 men, approximately 300 ships of all
sizes, several thousand horses, hundreds of artillery pieces, and a group
of scientists and scholars to study the treasures of Egypt departed for the
Orient. From their first encounter at Malta to protect the Mediterranean,
to their Battle of the Pyramids, to their contest in Turkish lands to the
north, Napoleon oversaw the operations. Furthermore, he oversaw a
complete recreation of the governmental infrastructure in Egypt, includ-
ing reshaping political boundaries, naming new governmental repre-
sentatives, building needed hospitals and social care facilities, coining
new currency, and trying to make headway in a medieval system of com-
merce, while respecting religion and local customs. What Napoleon
could not guarantee, however, was the skill of his naval commander and
the role of the Ottoman Empire in this contest. In both cases he mis-
judged. Almost upon arrival, his fleet was destroyed at Abukir Bay, and
shortly he learned that Talleyrand's representative had failed in negotia-
tions with the Turks. The French could no longer be guaranteed that the
Ottoman Empire would not challenge the French inroads into Egypt.
Regardless, Napoleon declared that he had come with the blessings of

the Sultan of Turkey and the Koran, and he promised his men permanent
colonies and a share in the wealth of the Orient. Instead, plague and
casualties devoured his troops by 1799; yet, Napoleon reported to the
Directory, "We lack nothing here. We are bursting with strength, good
health, and high spirits." 28
What Napoleon awaited was an opportunity to change the course
of French history, much more than the Egyptian campaign was
intended to do. As he consolidated what he could, Napoleon also took
care to create a legacy and to build his own version of the campaign.
He formed the Institute of Egypt in Cairo, and its multivolume Le
Description de VEgypte became one of the lasting results of the cam-
paign. The volumes that were published later included the most com-
prehensive set of plans and drawings of the monuments of Egypt that
had ever been prepared or seen in Europe. Napoleon also mastered the
art of propaganda. To the Sultan of Darfour and to the Divan of Cairo,
Napoleon began his letters, "There is no other god but God, and
Mahomet [Mohammed] is his prophet! ' 29 He pledged ecumenism, but
he responded in very practical ways: those who supported his occupa-
tion were granted their local customs and rights of worship, but those
who did not support the French would bear the wrath of Napoleon's
military. Napoleon set forward his rules from his headquarters in Cairo:
"Instruct an officer in command of the place to decapitate all prisoners
taken with arms in their hands. . . . [T]heir headless bodies are to be
thrown in the river." 30
The Egyptian campaign, as it turned out, was among the most bru-
tal of the wars of the French republic and empire. As he took on the
Turkish armies, who were supported by the British, the sieges became
murderous. In one of the sieges, out of Napoleon's 13,000 men, more
than one-third were killed in action, left crippled, or left as victims of
disease. According to one of Napoleon's subordinates, Jean-Baptiste
Kleber, "Bonaparte was the kind of general who needed a monthly
income of ten thousand men." 31 As Napoleon turned back toward Cairo
and Alexandria from the Turkish lands to the northeast, he learned that
the victories of his glorious Italian campaign had been squandered:
Naples and Austria were at war with France, along with Turkey and Rus-
sia. Almost unnoticed, Napoleon turned over his command, gathered a
few of his closest military confidants, and sailed for France to establish
himself again and to assure his fortune. What he had done, although his
letters and army bulletins presented a story to the contrary, was turn "the
Egyptian romance, which had begun in a blaze of glory [into] a con-
spirator's flight."32 To the French, whose appetite had been whetted by
stories of the Orient and narratives of the illustrious campaign, it mat-
tered little that the French army was stranded and the objectives of the
campaign were never to be achieved.
When Napoleon arrived on French shores again, France's borders
were endangered by the armies of the new coalition, the Directory gov-
ernment was in disarray after the Conspiracy of Equals and two elec-
toral coups in the previous three years, and the economy had not fully
recovered from its malaise. Napoleon, on the other hand, had returned
from his glories in Egypt; there was something exotic about him. Fur-
thermore, he was still bathed in his success from Italy nearly three years
earlier. Napoleon's timing was impeccable. There was no question that
the Directory government needed to be replaced; the question was by
what type of new government and by whom. Almost at once Napoleon
found himself involved with conspirators who included his former
benefactor Barras, his younger brother Lucien, and one of the earliest
revolutionaries and constitutionalists, Sieyes. In what came to be called
the coup of 18-19 Brumaire (because of its date in November accord-
ing to the revolutionary calendar), Napoleon and his co-conspirators
took over and dissolved the Directory. Napoleon began the "cynical
business of politics."33 He constructed a new constitution—the fourth
since the Revolution had begun—to create the Consulate of France. In
a series of shrewd maneuvers, Napoleon, who had been enlisted in the
conspiracy primarily to provide the military power for the coup moved
himself into the position of First Consul. The French had seen nothing
yet. Returning to the field, Napoleon ended the coalition against France
on the continent, made successful overtures to Britain for peace, and by
1801 had begun his plan to remake France. He later noted that he had
brought order out of chaos; he had solidified the best of the Revo-
lution.34 "We have finished the romance of the Revolution"; Napoleon
told his Council of State in 1800, "history must now begin."35 From
then until 1815, it was Napoleon who was puppet master, controlling
the strings of history
Work Is My Element
From the coup and constitution that brought Napoleon to power
until his first abdication, Napoleon was tireless in remaking France and
Europe. During those years, both France and Europe were irrevocably
changed. Those changes fall into the following categories: Napoleon's
search for political stability, his work toward France's economic recov-
ery, the creation of a court society befitting the French, a massive reor-
ganization of the French government including an overhaul of the
infrastructure of the state, constitutional reform and a commitment to
religious toleration, support for the arts and industry, and an uncom-
promising commitment to the family—whether it was the larger family
of France or the family of each citizen of the fatherland.
When Napoleon negotiated the first peace that France had known
since 1792, he took great pleasure in reorganizing the French state. "It
is the epoch of my life," he said, "in which I have shown the most abil-
ity" 3 6 Efficiency was important to the First Consul, but so were stabil-
ity, civil accord, and a sound infrastructure. At the turn of the nineteenth
century, the civil war in the Vendee and elsewhere in France continued
and the economy showed improvement sporadically only after 1795;
regardless of all of the ideological statements of the French during the
Revolution, the rights of citizenship had not been systematically defined,
education remained somewhat illusory, society was viewed as coarse and
vulgar, and so much needed to be accomplished.
In the years between 1801 and 1814, Napoleon's metamorphoses
took him from First Consul to Life Consul to Emperor of the French.
In each case, a constitution defined Napoleon's growing powers, and a
popular vote (a countrywide plebiscite) confirmed the constitutional
authority that he was assuming. Napoleons conception of government,
as it was transformed in the three constitutions that he designed, was
neither a republic nor a constitutional monarchy, both of which the
French had tried during the Revolution. Nor did it attempt to combine
the two political ideologies; rather, Napoleon prided himself that his
constitutions were popular in origin but that in practice, France was a
centralized, fundamentally absolutist state. Under his authority as chief
of state, one of Napoleon's earliest decisions was to encourage a blend-
ing of the nobles who had fled during the Revolution with those
Frenchmen who had become the new governing class. Careers, he said,
should be open to talent and merit. The Old Regime's reliance on aris-
tocratic bloodlines, venality, and privilege was to be erased from repub-
lican and imperial France. While the transition was not immediate,
Napoleon welcomed back aristocrats whose services he could use, estab-
lished his own award for talent and merit through the Legion of Honor
(that still exists today as one of France's highest honors), organized a
civil service devoid of partisan politics, and created a new aristocracy.
The society that he fashioned mimicked in some ways the old dynasties
of Europe, but he was prepared to compete on equal standing with them.
His coronation harkened back to Charlemagne, and he felt perfectly
comfortable in making marriage alliances with the ruling families of
Europe for his brothers and himself. He was a patron of the arts, public
works, and education; although he practiced censorship and was decid-
edly anti-intellectual when French and foreign intellectuals criticized
him. He centralized police authority throughout France, and brigandage
and local rivalries were subdued. He created new economic institutions
to stabilize the French economy and championed a system of favored
status and protective tariffs, not only to expand French industry but to
usurp British trade domination.
Napoleon also turned to the laws that governed France and to the
religious disputes that had unraveled order particularly in the west of
France. By 1801, through his actions and the diplomacy of his brother
Joseph, he had made a Concordat (an agreement) with the Roman Cath-
olic Church. After a decade, the civil war was finally quieted, and Napo-
leon had reached a revolutionary settlement with the Church that
remained until 1905. He had, through his actions, proclaimed religious
toleration that later, in various forms, also included Lutherans, Calvin-
ists, and Jews. As far as the laws of France were concerned, Napoleon
achieved what no French leader had ever managed. He created the first
comprehensive codification of French civil law, called the Code Napo-
leon. Undaunted by the magnitude of his endeavors, he oversaw the cre-
ation of six additional codes: a criminal code, a code of criminal
instruction, a code of civil procedure, a rural code, a commercial code,
and a penal code.
Finally, he worked toward a Grand Design for Europe—perhaps a
federation of nationalities or a greater France (much larger than even
Louis XIV had dreamed). It is here that the greatest disagreement among
historians may be found. Even Napoleon's own words are not definitive.
t
Table1.1
1.1
Family of Napoleon Bonaparte

CARLO MARIA BONAPARTE = MARIA LETIZIA RAMOLINO
174-6-1785 1750-1836
oseph, Kit ig o f Naples N A P O L E O N m. (1) Josephine Tasc het- Lucien, El sa Louis, King of Pau me Ca ro line
an4 King o f Spam 1769-1821 4e la Pagerie Pt-ince o f Canmo 1777-1820 Holland 1780-1825 1782-1839
1768-184-4 1763-18U 1775-1840 m. 1778-1846 m. <ri.
m. ( 2 ) Mane Louise m. Felix Bacciochi, m. CD Victor Joachim Murat,
Julie Clary o f Austria (1) Catherine Boyer Grand Puke of Hortense 4e Emmanuel Leclerc King o f Naples
1777-1845 1791-184-7 1773-1800 Lucca, Parma, Beauharnais 1772-1802 1771-1815
( 2 ) Alexan4i-ine 4e Piacenza 1783-1837 C2) Camillo, Prince
Bleschamps Jouberton 1762-1841 Borghese
1778-1855 1775-1832
Napoleon, I
King o( Rome,
Puke o f Reichstadt
I
Napoleon Charles Napoleon Louis Charles Louis m. Eugenie Maria
180 2 - 1 8 0 7 1804-1831 Napoleon 4e M o n t i jo
1811-1832
(Napoleon III)
1808-1873
Napoleon Louis
(Prince Imperial)
1856-1879
Jerome, m. CD Elizabeth Patterson

King of Westphalia C2) Catherine o f
1784-1860 I Wurttemberg
1782-1835
Pescen4ants of Jerome an4

Catherine comprise the surviving
members of the family
21
On the one hand, he claimed to Arch Chancellor Jean-Jacques Cam-
"
baceres, "I am not a fire-eater. Nobody loves peace more than I do.
On the other hand, he also said, "War justifies everything." 37 From 1804
on, Napoleon continually challenged his neighbors through diplomacy,
the threat of war, and war itself. If the revolutionaries had constantly
spoken of "exporting the French Revolution," it was really Napoleon
and his armies who spread revolutionary ideas that he had tamed and
organized. His enemies knew that on the battlefield he was without peer,
and when he commanded his troops in person, his mantle of invincibil-
ity remained strong (until the latter years of the Empire). Indeed, very
few individual commanders ever challenged him.
While detractors of Napoleon challenged many of the words that
he wrote and uttered, few would question his analysis of himself. He
wrote: "work is my element." He had been "born and built for work." 38
His colleagues and companions knew that he scarcely slept, that he led
a regimented life that they were required to follow, and that he nearly
always mastered a situation. He had retrieved the crown of France from
the gutter, he once said. He picked it up, placed it on his head, and left
a legacy that dominated European diplomacy throughout the nineteenth
century and only recently has found parallel in European affairs. See
Document 4 for "Napoleon's Legacy as Viewed from St. Helena."
Notes
1. Napoleon, quoted in The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from His Writ-
ten and Spoken Words, Edited and Translated by J. Christopher Herold (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955), 281. The description of Longwood House is
from Charles Darwin, quoted in J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix
Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2001), 392.
2. Quoted in Owen Connelly, The Epoch of Napoleon (Malabar, Fla.:
Robert E. Krieger, 1972), 2.
3. See the annotated bibliography of Napoleonic Web sites and their
Internet addresses at the end of this volume.
4. See Frank A. Kafker and James M. Laux, Napoleon and His Times:
Selected Interpretations (Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Publishing Company, 1989); as
well as David Nicholls, Napoleon: A Biographical Companion (Santa Barbara,
Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1999); David Lloyd Dowd, Napoleon: Was He the Heir of the
Revolution (Hinsdale, III: Dryden Press, 1957); and Pieter Geyl, Napoleon: For
and Against (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963).
5. Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),

xviii.
6. James Boswell, Account of Corsica (1768), quoted inj. M. Thompson,
Napoleon Bonaparte, 2.
7. Napoleon was christened Napoleone Buonaparte, and he used the
Corsican spelling of his name until the First Italian Campaign in 1796 when he
first signed his dispatches as Bonaparte. While some historians use Napoleon's
surname Bonaparte until his coronation as emperor in 1804, I have chosen to
simplify and use Napoleon throughout this book. Although Napoleon is spelled
in French with an accent (Napoleon), I have chosen to follow standard spelling
in English and not include the accent.
8. Harold Parker, "The Roots of Personality," in Kafker and Laux, Napo-
leon and His Times, 4.
9. Napoleon to General Paoli, June 12, 1789, quoted in Napoleons Let-
ters: Selected, Translated and Edited by J. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998),
4. (Hereafter cited as Napoleons Letters.)
10. Napoleon, quoted in Harold Parker, "The Roots of Personality," in
Kafker and Laux, Napoleon and His Times, 3.
11. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 8.
12. Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 11.
13. Under the Constitution of 1791, French citizens were either desig-
nated as active citizens or passive citizens. The first category included all native-
born males who were at least 25 years of age and who paid a certain amount of
taxes (meaning that they owned some property). Passive citizens did not meet
the criteria (e.g., males without property, servants, insane, felons, women).
They were provided the protections of the law, even though they had no right
to participate in making the law.
15. Napoleon to Joseph, June 22, 1792, in Napoleons Letters, 11-12.
16. Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New
York: Knopf, 1989), 615.
17. Connelly, Epoch of Napoleon, 10.
18. See Napoleon Wrote Fiction, trans. Christopher Frayling (Salisbury,
U.K.: The Compton Press, Ltd., 1972). Napoleon's essay, which did not win the
award from the Academy of Lyon, was on the topic of "What Sentiments and
What Truths should be inculcated in Men for their Happiness?"
19. Introduction to Supper in Beaucaire, Napoleon Wrote Fiction, 118.
21. Ibid., 41.
22. The name "Whiff of Grapeshot" was coined by Thomas Carlyle in his
The French Revolution: A History (1837).
23. Napoleon to Joseph, October 6,1795, quoted in Napoleons Letters, 16.
24. Napoleon to Joseph, July 12, 1795, quoted in ibid., 14-15.
23
25. Napoleon to Josephine de Beauharnais, December 1795, quoted in
ibid., 16.
28. Napoleon to the Directors (1799), quoted in J. Christopher Herold,
The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), 71.
29. Napoleon to the Sultan of Darfour, June 30, 1799, and Napoleon to
the Divan of Cairo, July 21, 1799, quoted in Napoleons Letters, 51-52.
30. Napoleon to General Berthier, October 23, 1798, quoted in Napoleons
Letters, 50.
31. Herold, Age of Napoleon, 73.
32. H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleon (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,
1967), 39.
33. "An Introduction to the Age of Napoleon," Napoleon: International
Journal of the French Revolution and Age of Napoleon (Fall 2000), 42.
34. Conversation (1816), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, Til..
36. Napoleon to Claire-Elisabeth, comtesse de Remusat, quoted in Fisher,
Napoleon, 42.
37. Napoleon to Cambaceres (1813), and Napoleon to Alexandre
Berthier (1808), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 206, 208.
38. "Some Maxims of Napoleon," in Fisher, Napoleon, 148.
CHAPTER 2
THE STRUCTURE OF
NAPOLEONIC FRANCE
The Merchant of Hope

The time was nearly midnight on November 10, 1799. Just southwest
of Paris at Saint-Cloud, Napoleon and two of his countrymen prepared
to take an oath to "the Republic one and indivisible, the representative
system, the division of powers, liberty, equality, security and property."
That night, by a decree of the Legislative Body, a new French government
was created. Three consuls, who were named by the outgoing legislators,
headed the provisional government. Two 25-member commissions, serv-
ing as the legislative branch, were charged with preparing changes to the
constitution, framing a civil code, and dealing with "urgent matters of
police, legislation, and finance." In cases of extreme urgency, for exam-
ple, "for the ratification of peace or [to deal with] serious public danger,"
they could convene in special session.1
On first reading, the Brumaire Decree2 (as the decree of November
10, 1799 has been called), seems straightforward, very legitimate, and of
no particular consequence. A new government replaced the old; the
Consulate replaced the Directory. At the helm of the government was a
three-person consulate, instead of a five-member Directory Two com-
missions replaced the former bicameral legislature. The change, how-
ever, was not straightforward, nor was it legitimate. Furthermore, the
consequences were enormous. In truth, the change that brought
Napoleon into a position of political power had been cloaked in con-
spiracy. It was the result of a military-supported coup d'etat.
Only a day earlier on November 9, 1799, the conspirators who cre-
ated the Consulate had initiated their plan to overthrow the Directory.
They planned to place themselves in power, stabilize the government of

France, and consolidate the best of the Revolution for their countrymen.
Among the conspirators were Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, the well-known
constitutionalist and revolutionary; Roger Ducos, a member of the gov-
ernment that was being overthrown; Lucien Bonaparte, a staunch repub-
lican and president of the Council of Five Hundred; Charles-Maurice de
Talleyrand-Perigord, a former aristocrat and a former and soon-to-be
Minister of Foreign Affairs; Joseph Fouche, a former terrorist and Min-
ister of Police; and Napoleon himself. For more information on Tal-
leyrand and Fouche, see the biographies at the end of this book.
The plan was reasonably simple, but it was based on a careful
chronology. First, placards would be posted throughout Paris warning
of an alleged radical threat to the government, and rumors would be cir-
culated to add credence to the story. Second, once the threat of potential
insurrection was planted, the Council of Elders would be encouraged to
leave Paris for Saint-Cloud, a former royal property that continued to
belong to the state. Saint-Cloud, however, was outside the constitutional
radius and therefore unlikely to rise in revolt against any challenge to the
government. Third, Napoleon, the widely known military hero, would
be given command of the troops of Paris, ostensibly to maintain order
but, in fact, to guarantee the resignation of less willing government
members. Fourth, the Directors would resign, either by force or as
adherents of the coup; and fifth, the Legislative Body (the Council of
Five Hundred and the Council of Elders) would create a provisional gov-
ernment formalizing the events. The steps to the plot were clear, and
those who were aware of it appeared supportive.
The first day of the coup went almost precisely as planned. The
Councils agreed to move to Saint-Cloud, and Napoleon was appointed
commander of the troops in and around Paris. The latter act was uncon-
stitutional, but no one challenged Napoleon's appointment. A decree for-
malizing the changes was issued immediately. The government was,
according to the decree, taking action to "curb the factions" that might
unsettle the government and the economy. "Be calm," the decree con-
cluded. "Common safety and common prosperity" will be assured.3
Late on the afternoon of the second day of the coup, the plot began
to unravel; and the responsibility can be placed, at least partially, on
Napoleon's own actions. Leaving his troops outside, Napoleon entered
the meeting hall to join members of the Council of Elders who were in
The Structure of Napoleonic France 27
deliberation. Not surprisingly, they demanded to know what was really

taking place. After all, a uniformed military commander in their pres-
ence was nothing less than a threat to their civilian authority. Napoleon's
speech did not reassure them, and members of the Council found the
young general "incoherent," his words troubling. "Yesterday," Napoleon
informed them, "I was staying quietly in Paris, when I was summoned
by you to provide military support for the transference of your session
to Saint-Cloud. Now I am attacked as a second Caesar or Cromwell." 4
They already had been informed that no Jacobin insurrection had bro-
ken out in Paris. In essence, there had been no valid reason to move the
assemblies to their new location. Instead, the five directors were no
longer at the head of the government—four had resigned and one was
under police protection. There were murmurings about the events, but
the Council of Elders knew that their course had been set for them. The
conspirators, including Napoleon, had already begun to dismantle the
Directory, and their task was to confirm its dissolution. Napoleon left
them with little room for debate: "1 am not an intriguer: you know me
well enough for that. . . . But if anyone calls for my outlawry, then the
thunderbolt of war shall crush him to the earth. Remember that I march
hand in hand with the god of fortune and the god of war." 5
From the Council of Elders, Napoleon went to the Council of Five
Hundred to encourage them to take similar action. Accompanied by four
uniformed, armed grenadiers from the Legislative Guard, Napoleon
entered the chamber. The meeting hall was cold, and members of the
Five Hundred were weary from waiting to know what had transpired.
Tempers were on edge, and the initial hostility of seeing troops in their
governmental chamber quickly made the atmosphere of the room turn
from cold to volatile. Members of the Council pushed into the aisles,
scuffled with the guardsmen, pressed and manhandled Napoleon, and
screamed and shouted, "Down with the dictator!" and "Outlaw him!" It
was a fracas by any account. 6 Pandemonium reigned, and even Lucien
Bonaparte, president of the assembly, could not bring order. Napoleon,
who either fainted or was stunned, was carried from the room. Guard
action was required, and Lucien, who feared that all of their plans would
be destroyed, left the room to bring in guardsmen from outside. He had
assured the troops that Napoleon was in danger and that only Napoleon
could restore order to France. In a dramatic, almost theatrical moment,
Lucien mounted his horse and drew his sword. Wielding it, he threat-
ened to run his brother through if Napoleons republican motives were

not as pure as theirs. Theatrics triumphed.
Orders to the guard were dispatched; they wTere to clear out the dis-
sidents as quickly as possible. Members of the Council of Five Hundred,
who were in the process of debating a motion to outlaw Napoleon (i.e.,
to take away his civil rights and protections), spilled from the hall and
leaped out of the large first-floor windows as the guard swarmed in.
According to accounts of the event, they "ran, tripping over their toga-
like robes of office and clutching their plumed hats" as they raced
through the gardens, behind the shrubs and trees, and into the fields of
Saint-Cloud. 7 To an observer, it looked like a bad comedy. To those who
fled, it was clear that the government had been overthrown.
Later as Napoleon described the events that had transpired, his
published account was interestingly quite different. "I presented myself
at the Council of Five Hundred," he reported, kWalone, unarmed, my head
uncovered, just as the Elders had received and applauded me; I came to
remind the majority of its wishes, and to assure it of its power." He then
continued, "The stilettos . . . were instantly raised against their liberator;
twenty assassins threw themselves upon me and aimed at my breast." 8
The guardsmen, who remained at the door in his version, rushed in to
save him and to extricate him from the crush of hostile and murderous
deputies. Only after he left the room did additional troops enter to res-
cue Lucien from the brawl. Disloyal dissidents fled, and the loyal mem-
bers of the government remained. According to Napoleons story, he had
liberated France from its dangerously ineffective and vice-ridden gov-
ernment. He was a liberator, not a conspirator.
That evening, those who remained at Saint-Cloud formally dis-
solved the Directory and named Napoleon, Ducos, and Sieyes as the pro-
visional consuls. By December 13, 1799, only a month later, a new
constitution had been written and accepted. The Constitution of the Year
VIII, as it was called, was the fourth constitution of the French Revolu-
tion in less than a decade. In many ways, it should also be considered the
first constitution of the Napoleonic period, and it will be treated here in
that manner. 9 In its 95 articles, Napoleon set the tone for the document.
According to Napoleons vision, the government would not be republi-
can, but it should appear to be so; it would bring order to France
through greater centralization, but it should appear to be broad based.
Firmly and adamantly he imprinted his ideas on the document. See Doc-
ument 5: Napoleon Bonaparte's Letter to Talleyrand on Constitution Mak-

ing at the end of this book.
The constitution, as it was issued in final form, retreated from rev-
olutionary republicanism. It was, in fact, one step on the way to empire;
yet it received the largest popular vote of any of the revolutionary con-
stitutions that had preceded it. The French were tired of the Directory,
unclear about its principles, weary of the international war that had been
going on since 1792, and ready for economic recovery. All they
demanded was that the principles of the Revolution be safeguarded in
some manner. As they perceived it, the new constitution could be no
worse than the last. Perhaps it would even be better. When it was pre-
sented to French voters, after already becoming effective on December
25, 1799, there was no backlash. No demonstrations took place. Neither
a bang nor a whimper escaped from the masses of the French.
The Revolution, Napoleon announced, was over. "Frenchmen!" he
proclaimed, "A constitution is presented to you. It terminates the uncer-
tainties which the provisional government introduced into external rela-
tions, into the internal and military situation of the Republic." He
further instructed, "The constitution is founded on the true principles
of representative government, on the sacred rights of property, equality
and liberty. . . . Citizens, the Revolution is established upon the princi-
ples which began it: It is ended." 10 When the votes were counted,
Napoleon's mandate was clear: 3,011,007 votes for the new constitution
and 1,526 against. 11 Order finally seemed assured, confidence was
returning, and even the Paris exchange was showing strength again.
Through much of his earlier life, Napoleon had mused about govern-
ment and governing. Now his time had come. He had noted, "One can
govern people only by showing them the future; a head of state is a mer-
chant of hope." 1 2 A merchant of hope had arrived for France.
The Short and Obscure Constitutions of France

The Constitution of the Year VIII (1799), which ushered in the
Consulate, was not based on any other historic or contemporary model.
While it contained provisions for the executive, judicial, and legislative
functions of government, it was neither parliamentary nor republican.
In fact, it was a creative hybrid. Napoleon had taken great care to design
a government that would be far less susceptible to the results of direct
elections, partisan groups, and personalities than former constitutions

had been. He had also taken care to preserve the revolutionary language
of popular sovereignty, while in reality transmitting authority to himself
as First Consul.
In creating the constitution, Napoleon followed advice that "Con-
stitutions should be short and obscure," and the Constitution of the Year
VIII was certainly representative of that maxim. 13 It was the shortest con-
stitution that the French had known up to that time, and Napoleon con-
trived it so that substantive change was obscured by revolutionary
appearances. There was a certain Machiavellian tinge to it. The consti-
tution, for example, began with an explicit recognition of France's revo-
lutionary past. "The French Republic is one and indivisible," it stated.
The language was identical to the first paragraph of the revolutionary
Constitution of the Year I (1793) in which popular sovereignty had
defined the government. Then, carefully buried within the reasonably
brief document was the language that defined where authority lay: "the
decision of the First Consul shall suffice."14 In theory, sovereignty was
guaranteed to the citizens of France as a legacy of the Revolution, yet in
reality, sovereignty had been entrusted to the First Consul.
Title I of the constitution provided a definition of citizenship in
revolutionary terms: all males 21 years of age who had been born
in France and who currently resided there were counted as citizens. The
constitution also contained some common disclaimers—persons who
had become naturalized citizens of another country could not retain
their rights to citizenship, nor could felons. The rights of citizenship
were suspended when a Frenchman became a wage-earning domestic
servant. While this latter provision may sound strange to modern ears,
it was commonly believed that servants, whose loyalty lay with their
masters, would be unable to exercise their vote independently. In
essence, a master could stuff the ballot box by demanding his servants'
loyalty.
Voting, as governed by Title I, became a curious system of lists, pro-
viding for direct election only at the local level but having the appear-
ance of democratic elections throughout the process. In each town,
township, or city electoral district, citizens listed the names of persons
best qualified to administer public affairs. Those citizens who were listed
most frequently were selected for the final list, and from that list, public
functionaries were selected. The list could contain no more than one-
tenth of the names of qualified citizens of the particular voting district.

Citizens on the first list would then designate one-tenth of their mem-
bership for a departmental list. Members of the departmental list would
select one-tenth of their membership to be sent forward for selection at
the national level. As specified in the constitution, the first elections were
not scheduled to take place until 1800, so in practice, nearly all govern-
ment officials were initially selected by Napoleon and his advisors. While
the constitution did not set qualifications for each of the electoral lists,
enabling legislation spelled out increasing property requirements for
membership on each of the lists. In the end, only one man in 1,000 might
be designated for a national post. In the prerevolutionary Old Regime,
however, that statistic would have been far lower.
On paper, the legislative power of the Constitution of the Year VIII
was shared, but, in practice, the First Consul also controlled it. Accord-
ing to policy, the government (i.e., the First Consul with the assistance
of his Council of State) drafted legislation that was then sent to the Tri-
bunate, a body of 100 members who were at least 25 years of age, where
drafts of the laws were discussed and recommendations were made for
their adoption or rejection. The drafts of proposed legislation were then
forwarded to the Legislative Body, composed of 300 members who were
at least 30 years of age. The Legislative Body voted on the proposed leg-
islation, but they did not debate the proposals. So-called orators sent
from the Tribunate provided the pros and cons of the draft legislation.
Then, the First Consul promulgated the law. While 400 of the most
respected citizens were included in the process, in the final analysis, leg-
islation began and ended with the First Consul.
Elsewhere in the Constitution, an 80-member body called the Con-
servative Senate was created. Membership was confined to French males,
at least 40 years of age who met the qualifications for the national list.
In spite of its name, the Conservative Senate was not a legislative body.
It made judgments about the constitutionality of legislative and govern-
mental acts in order to conserve the constitution; and, on the recom-
mendation of the First Consul, it amended the constitution (as senatus
consulta). The document also named the first two Senators. They were
Sieyes and Ducos, both of whom had expected to be seated on the con-
sular platform with Napoleon. Other members of the Senate were
appointed from candidates submitted by the Legislative Body, the Tri-
bunate, and the First Consul.
As far as the Second and Third Consuls were concerned, Napoleon

made his own choices, sidestepping Sieyes and Ducos, who had been co-
conspirators in the events of Brumaire. They were Jean Jacques Cam-
baceres, a well-respected jurist and legal expert who had voted for the
death of the king, and Charles Frangois Lebrun, a former official of the
Old Regime who had royalist tendencies. The opposites did not stop
there; where Cambaceres was a rotund gourmet, Lebrun was thin and
nondescript. A better balance would have been hard to find to avoid crit-
icism from either the political left or the political right. Their positions,
however, were fundamentally advisory. As specified, the First Consul
had the following powers: to promulgate the laws; to appoint and dis-
miss members of the Council of State, ministers, ambassadors, army and
navy officers, local administrators, and commissioners of the courts; and
to appoint all criminal and civil judges. 1 3 In legislation and staffing,
almost everything crossed Napoleon's desk. Through the Council of
State, which was constructed by an executive ordinance in late Decem-
ber, Napoleon monitored nearly every function of government, most
often imprinting his opinion upon it. When the three consuls disagreed,
the First Consul's decision sufficed.
Furthermore, the constitution included specifics about the French
judicial system, economic matters, and threats to the government. Even
though the Constitution of the Year VIII had retreated from the Revolu-
tion, the document still contained some significant revolutionary prin-
ciples: the protection of property, inviolability of domicile, protection
from arbitrary arrest and detention, the individual right to petition the
government, and support for the arts and sciences. What was missing,
though, was a declaration of rights, accountability of officials, the struc-
ture of the ministries that would assist the government, and a represen-
tative method for amending this new constitution.
Only twice more did Napoleon engage in constitution writing.
When the government wished to reward him for his military efforts on
behalf of France, he recommended extending his term, in fact, to make
him First Consul for life. As the constitution was rewritten in 1802,
other changes included creating electoral colleges to replace depart-
mental and national lists, increasing the size of the Senate, and reducing
the size of the Tribunate from 100 members to 50 while also restricting
its powers of debate. In the case of electoral colleges, Napoleon created
a system whereby notables, or men of property, would completely dom-
inate political offices. Shortly, direct election became purely fictional. By

increasing the size of the Senate with 40 additional members whom he
could handpick, Napoleon assured himself that constitutional changes
would be appropriately supportive of his future recommendations. In
restructuring the Tribunate, he removed his most vocal opponents and
minimized its opportunity for criticism. The plebiscite that was called
to confirm the constitutional change provided another mandate for
Napoleon as Life Consul: 3,568,000 votes in favor of the change and
only 8,374 in opposition. 16
The constitutional changes were dramatic, but so were Napoleon's
accomplishments in the previous two years. He had negotiated peace in
Europe, quieted the civil war in France, and brought economic pros-
perity. He had also been the object of an assassination attempt, a widely
publicized event that he used to support his recommendations for a Life
Consulate. 17 Two senatus consulta in August 1802 confirmed the changes
that came to be known as the Constitution of the Year X (Constitution
of 1802), although they were really amendments to the earlier constitu-
tion. One of the more vocal opponents to the change was Napoleon's
own brother Lucien, whose theatrics on November 10, 1799 had saved
the coup. Lucien had, in fact, always been a staunch republican, and in
response to Napoleon's new constitution he published a pamphlet titled
Parallels among Caesar, Cromwell, Monk, and Bonaparte.18 The title said
it all, but the contents were equally inflammatory. Lucien was summar-
ily sent off to exile in Madrid. In general, most other opposition was lim-
ited and without serious threat to the new government.
Regardless of his popularity, Napoleon refused to let public opin-
ion find its own voice or be swayed by critics. On one level, he believed
that people should be governed "as the majority wish to be governed,"
but on another level, he believed that he had the right to tell French cit-
izens what their wishes were. 19 He had created a system for public opin-
ion in the best interest of France, and he relayed it in a later comment:
"The entire secret in governing is knowing when you should take off the
lion's coat in order to put on the fox's."20 When it came to public opin-
ion and propaganda, which he believed were inseparable, he always
played the fox. He turned to his Minister of Police Joseph Fouche to
monitor words, actions, and people. Fouche censored any kind of
printed or written matter including newspapers, magazines, journals,
theatrical productions, and illustrations. He also had the right to inter-
fere with private correspondence. One of Napoleons more annoying crit-

ics counseled her friends: "[Fouche is] always in everybody's shoes." 21
Already in 1800, he and his men had shut down 60 of the 73 political
journals in Paris on grounds of libel rather than censorship. 22 Later he
added national security to his list of excuses. In the end, no more than
four political papers continued to be printed in Paris; each department
could have only one. To carry out the massive chore of monitoring pub-
lic opinion, a legion of informants was employed. In a set of instructions
to Citizen Ripault, who was Napoleons personal librarian and, in prac-
tice, one of his ubiquitous snitches, Napoleon demanded that Ripault
monitor "institutes, literary meetings, sermons, new educational estab-
lishments, or fashionable trials [court hearings], that might be of inter-
est from a political or moral point of view." On the list were also "bills,
posters, [and] advertisements." 23 Whether it was his brother's pamphlet,
street corner smut, an assassination attempt, or an international con-
spiracy, the response was swift and firm.
By 1804, war had broken out again in Europe and another plot to
kidnap or kill Napoleon had been discovered. 24 Timing was perfect for
his third constitution. By a senatus consultum in May 1804, Napoleon's
life consulate was fashioned into the French Empire, and Napoleon
became Napoleon I, Emperor of the French. This time, in a short but not
particularly obscure constitution, Napoleon's salary was increased dra-
matically, a line of succession was spelled out in the document, and his
power to appoint Senators was no longer limited. A plebiscite confirmed
the change to a hereditary imperial house: 3,572,329 in favor of the new
constitution and 2,579 in opposition. The Constitution of the Year XII
(Constitution of 1804) stated in simple terms that the republic of France
had been entrusted to an emperor To a political scientist, what Napoleon
had created was an impossibility in theory or actuality. A republic and
an empire could not coexist in the same space. Napoleon, however, did
not feel that he needed to explain or justify what he had done. France
had returned, for all intents and purposes, to a hereditary monarchy But
in no way did its foundation rest on the monarchy that had been dis-
solved in the heat of the Revolution. His imperial system was firmly con-
stitutional, and French citizens had ratified the change. In December,
Napoleon was crowned in a lavish ceremony at Notre Dame. Again, he
made sure that he was not compared to Louis XVI, the former king of
France, or any of Louis's direct line. He went back even farther to the
glories of an earlier empire to set the stage; he was the "successor to
Charlemagne." 25 With the Constitution of the Year XII and his corona-
tion, Napoleon had ended his constitutional experiment, just as four
years earlier he announced that the Revolution was over.
The Mystery of the Social Order

"Question: What should one think of those who fail in their duties
to the Emperor?
"Answer: According to the Apostle Paul, they . . . [will] make them-
selves deserving of eternal damnation."26
The year was 1806, and the words could be heard anywhere in
France. They came from the mouths of French children who were recit-
ing the Emperor's new catechism. From their voices also came an impor-
tant imperial message. The French people owed "love, respect,
obedience, loyalty, military service and taxes" to Emperor Napoleon I.27
They were rendering unto Caesar those things that were Caesar's.
Relations with the Catholic Church had not always been so cordial
as they appeared in 1806. The Revolution had left a bloody and con-
flicting legacy concerning religion. Religious toleration in its broadest
sense, however, had not been the issue. In fact, toleration, although
imperfect, had been granted two years prior to the beginning of the Rev-
olution, and throughout the revolutionary years, French men and
women found neither their adherence to Protestantism nor their exper-
iments with Theophilanthropism or other cults restricted by the gov-
ernment. The fate of the Catholic Church, however, was something quite
different. Historically it had been allied both spiritually and politically
with the monarchy; so, as revolutionaries dismantled the monarchy, they
also dismantled the Catholic Church. First, the wealth of the Church
was attacked, and then religious orders were dissolved. In 1790, Church
lands were confiscated and nationalized by the Civil Constitution of the
Clergy in an effort to forestall the bankruptcy of France. In the process,
priests were required to take an oath supporting the revolutionary
change. If they refused, they were classed as nonjuring clergy, unable to
practice their vocation. If they took the oath, they were paid by the state
but the pope excommunicated them for their conflicting allegiance.
French citizens were caught in the middle of a dispute that

appeared to pit the Revolution against salvation; they could remain loyal
to nonjuring clergy and become counterrevolutionaries or they could
place their loyalty in the constitutional clergy whose sacraments were
invalid. Pockets of armed conflict broke out, and by 1793, entire regions
of France were in revolt. In 1795, the Directory government declared the
full separation of church and state in France. In this political climate, the
Catholic Church no longer had any standing with the government.
The Church had been disestablished, and salaries of the clergy ceased to
be paid. The civil war raged on and issues of the conflict merged: pro-
tection of Catholic religious practice, support for nonjuring priests,
resistance to taxation and conscription, and support for a return of the
monarchy. Casualties in the conflict were enormous—estimated at
between 180,000 and 300,000—as the civil war set brother against
brother and French troops against their own people. Napoleon had, in
fact, only missed military service in this civil war in the western depart-
ments (the region called the Vendee) because of powerful friends in
Paris. The conflict had sapped the strength of France for the entire rev-
olutionary decade. Something had to be done.
The civil war in the Vendee, however, w7as only one of the problems
that Napoleon had to solve as he became head of the French govern-
ment. The broader issue was domestic order, and there were no simple
solutions to that problem. Rather, domestic order was a puzzle, and the
pieces of the puzzle did not yet fit. As Napoleon worked through the
solution, he had a number of issues to resolve. First, he needed to relax
the laws concerning exiles and emigres (those who had been forced to
leave France or who had fled from France during the Revolution). In
doing so, he hoped to bring back wealthy and talented men who could
support his government and to lessen the chances of unrest sponsored
by malcontents outside of France. Second, he intended to provide
amnesty for those who had been caught in the civil war. Then, he could
formally begin his negotiations with the Catholic Church to resolve rev-
olutionary differences. To restore order would conceivably require other
negotiations, and Napoleon was willing to take them on. By 1808, all of
the pieces of the puzzle had finally been put in place.
Napoleon began gradually, explaining what he was doing at each
stage of his plan for domestic order so that he would not generate severe
criticism or outright hostility. In the process of inviting expatriates to
The Structure of Napoleonic France
37
return, he eliminated the revolutionary lists of emigres that had pro-
scribed them. Furthermore, he reminded emigres that the new French
government was not a partisan creation; it included a former terrorist
(Fouche) and a member of the prerevolutionary nobility (Talleyrand),
along with hundreds of men who were chosen for their merit, not for
their coats of arms. The few exceptions to Napoleon's leniency were the
royal family and their most intractable supporters. In areas of civil war,
Napoleon took a different tack. It was not leniency but firmness that he
projected. His proclamation of amnesty to rebels in western France
allowed them ten days to lay down their weapons. If they rejected
amnesty, they would be rounded up and executed. When he sent addi-
tional troops into the area, he instructed them: "it would serve as a salu-
tary example to burn down two or three large communes chosen among
those whose conduct is worst." 28 It took less than a month to restore
general peace. By March 1800, Napoleon had made the first two pieces
of his puzzle fit: emigres were returning to France, bringing their wealth
and talents with them, and the decade-long civil war was over.
Continuing his secret negotiations with the papacy, Napoleon
moved forward with the third piece of his puzzle. Napoleon wanted an
agreement with the pope to end the schism that the Civil Constitution
of the Clergy had created. Napoleon was not a practicing Catholic, but
he recognized that the majority of French men and women had
remained Catholic throughout the revolutionary years. When it came to
peasants, the figure was closer to 85 percent. What mattered to
Napoleon was that the French government be based on moral order, and
the restoration of religious practice seemed to have the most promise to
insure that end. In order to preserve the principles of the Revolution
while, at the same time, successfully negotiating with the Pope Pius VII,
Napoleon refused to waiver on two principles: first, the irrevocability of
the sale of church lands after 1789; and second, the required resignation
of all French bishops, coinciding with Napoleon's right to appoint new
bishops. In return, the pope retained the right to invest bishops with
their spiritual power and the symbols of their office. When all of the
negotiations were over, Napoleon had achieved his aims. The Catholic
Church was restored to France as the church of the majority of the
French, rather than as the church of France. Implicitly, the agreement
also affirmed religious toleration and the French government's secular
right to register all births, marriages and deaths. The pope w7as guaran-
teed his Papal States in Italy, and the French confirmed that they would
pay clerical salaries because the landed wealth of the church would not
be restored.
In the time between the conclusion of the Concordat in July 1801
and its publication on Easter Sunday in 1802, Napoleon also added a set
of Organic Articles that spelled out the day-to-day practices of the
Catholic Church in France. Included were provisions concerning the
publication of papal letters (acts) in France, specifics on the content of
seminary instruction, and requirements for a civil ceremony prior to per-
forming the sacrament of marriage. Even the dates of religious holidays
had to be state approved. What Napoleon had achieved was no less than
a diplomatic miracle. He had preserved religious freedom in France
while reconciling with the pope. While his detractors fumed about the
restoration of the Catholic Church in France, he had repaired massive
tears in the fabric of society. To Napoleon, that was the point of it all.
"They will say that I am a papist; I am nothing at all; in Egypt I was a
Mohammedan; here I will be a Catholic, for the good of the people." 29
Napoleon had shrewdly rendered to God what was God's, without giv-
ing more to the pope than he wished. Yet, in the end, Napoleon had cre-
ated a rift with the pope that he could never mend. To some members of
French society, the Concordat was instead a Discordat. To others, it was
clear that Napoleon had rejected the formal separation of church and
state that the Revolution had begun. Only time would tell what the set-
tlement really meant.
"For me, religion isn't the mystery of incarnation; it is the mystery
of the social order," Napoleon had also remarked. 30 In that spirit,
Napoleon reconfirmed religious toleration for French Protestants. With
Calvinists and Lutherans, he concluded agreements framed on the
Catholic model, organizing each church at both the national and local
levels and defining its relationship to the state. The French government
paid the salaries of Protestant pastors just as it did for Catholic priests.
To Napoleon, the treatment of French churches had to be parallel, and
he took care not to give preference to any established church. Atheists
alone were excluded from Napoleons largesse.
By 1806, there was only one religious group of French men and
women with whom Napoleon had not dealt. They were the Jews of
France who had been emancipated by the revolutionaries in 1790-1791,
The Structure of Napoleonic France
39
but who had not experienced any of the benefits of religious toleration.
"Dispersed and persecuted," wrote Napoleon, "the Jews have been sub-
jected either to punitive taxation, or to enforced abjuration of their
faith. . . . " Napoleon intended to end both of those practices, but he also
expected the Jews to become French in the process. It was a reciprocal
relationship that Napoleon had in mind, one that would lead to the
assimilation of the Jewish population into the French state. Where the
Jews had been forced into specific occupations, including usurious
money lending, Napoleon expected them to "revive useful arts and pro-
fessions." 31 Where they had been hounded into particular regions, he
intended to erase those boundaries. Other changes would be made as
well, and Napoleon instructed his Minister of the Interior to bring
together the leaders of the Jewish community to begin that work. Later
he convened the Great Sanhedrin to make final recommendations to the
Jews and to the French state.
The instructions, not surprisingly, came directly from Napoleon.
Among the types of questions that required answers were the following:
"Is it lawful for Jews to marry more than one wife?"; "Is divorce permit-
ted by the Jewish religion?"; "Can a Jewess marry a Christian, or a Chris-
tian woman a Jew?" He inquired whether or not Jews regarded
Frenchmen as their brothers, and if French-born Jews saw France as their
fatherland. Were any professions prohibited to Jews under Jewish law?
The most pointed questions dealt with money lending and commercial
activities: "Does the law forbid Jews to practice usury in dealing with
their brethren?" and "Does it forbid or does it allow them to practice
usury in dealing with strangers?" 32 Some of the questions and answers
were humanitarian; others were purely political. On the political side of
the ledger were those questions, for example, concerning marriage and
commerce. Because polygamy was rumored still to take place within the
Jewish community, as part of the settlement with the Jews, Napoleon
intended for the Jews to abjure such a practice in writing and end the
rumor once and for all. In the case of divorce, he wanted to discourage
the dissolution of marriage within the Jewish community just as he had
done with non-Jews. As far as intermarriage was concerned, Napoleon
instructed the Great Sanhedrin to support marriages between Jews and
non-Jews because he believed that tensions would be lessened as their
communities became related. On the question of usury, Napoleon was
insistent: only in places where Jews were still subject to "vexatious treat-
ment" could their religious law tolerate "illicit gains." France had ceased
its discrimination, so usury would not be allowed within its borders. On
the humanitarian side of the ledger, Napoleon insisted that equal treat-
ment be provided to all citizens of France. Citizens were citizens, accord-
ing to Napoleon, regardless of their race or religion. With equal
treatment, he believed that Jews also had an equal responsibility to pay
their dues to the French government and to its armies.
To finalize relations between Jews and the French state, Napoleon
issued an imperial decree in 1808. It confirmed his commitment to
humane and equitable treatment so that the Jews of France would "find
Jerusalem" within his empire. 33 Consistories were established as gov-
erning bodies for communities of Jews, usury was restricted, and Jews
were encouraged to attach themselves firmly to France and French cus-
toms. In the end, through intermarriage, education, inducements, and
incentives, Napoleon wanted to see an end to the separate and distinct
Jewish community that existed in France. He believed that Jewish reli-
gious practice could and should continue, but he wanted intermarriage
and co-mingling of Jews and non-Jews to complete the work of the Great
Sanhedrin and the French decrees that followed it. Ultimately he proph-
esied that "Jewish blood will cease to have any distinctive characteris-
tic," and France would become purely French. 34
Although Jews in Alsace and in other areas of France did not
intermarry in large numbers or merge quickly into mainstream French
culture, their agreement with Napoleon provided equal opportunity
and, as such, a wider scope of activity. For the most part, they consid-
ered him an enlightened administrator as they paid their taxes and sent
their sons to serve in French armies. To later historians, however,
Napoleons relations with the Jews have undergone different interpre-
tations. On the one hand, Napoleon has been held up as the emblem
of toleration in an intolerant age. On the other hand, he has been
viewed as a man of his times whose bias against the Jews led him to
attempt to eliminate their identity as Jews through intermarriage.
Napoleon would have found both interpretations troubling. To him,
religious toleration was a revolutionary principle that he espoused, not
for its solution to religious problems, but for its solution to social tur-
moil. He was committed to social order, and the edict of 1808 repre-
sented that commitment.
Like a Hawk to Food

Among the most lasting of Napoleon's accomplishments was the
Civil Code (better known as the Napoleonic Code or Code Napoleon)
that was promulgated on March 14, 1804 and reissued with minor
changes under an imperial imprimatur on September 3, 1807. It was a
meticulous compendium of law, based in principle on revolutionary pre-
cepts, but also borrowing from Roman law and French custom. The idea
of a codification of French law, however, was not new. In fact, proposals
for a uniform French code dated back centuries, and revolutionaries had
already created five draft proposals. Napoleon's contribution was that the
Code actually came into being. Although it was formulated by a hand-
picked committee of legal experts, Napoleon actually presided at 55 of
the 106 meetings where each of the principles was discussed, debated,
and approved. 35 His imprint on the document is clear, both in the pen-
ciled, marginal notes that he left and in his ideas that are imbedded in
the document, although much of the credit for the Code must also be
given to Second Consul Cambaceres who supervised the work.
In its final form the Civil Code was composed of approximately
120,000 words, and pocket editions became widely available. The Code
was divided into major headings called books and then subdivided into
chapters, titles and paragraphs for easy reference. The three major books
dealt with persons, types of goods and property, and the acquisition of
property. Interestingly, neither case law nor precedent provided the pri-
mary foundation for the provisions. Roman law, instead, provided a par-
tial model. Structure, uniformity, and order were what mattered. The
Code also protected significant elements of the Revolution in its provi-
sions: individual freedom, equality before the law, civil rights, the aboli-
tion of privileges based on bloodlines and social class, inheritance rights,
contractual law, religious toleration, and the inviolability of property.
In its sections on property, the legacy of the Revolution is particu-
larly evident. But, where revolutionary law was frequently cursory, the
Code was explicit. An entire section, in fact, provided meticulous defi-
nitions of the types of goods and property (moveable goods and fixed
goods) that were covered under civil law. Fixed goods, for example,
included real estate, windmills, permanent buildings, animals, and
equipment used in cultivating a farm (because the farm would be
unworkable without them), planted but unharvested grain, perennial
flora, permanently affixed glass, and even statuary if placed in a perma-

nent niche that had been designed for it. In the case of a furnished resi-
dence being sold, the list of goods that could not be removed was also
spelled out: rugs, beds, seating, clocks, tables, decorative items, porce-
lains, and paintings. Elsewhere, moveable goods were defined when an
unfurnished structure was being sold, and other kinds of wealth were
listed: currency, precious metals and stones, books, medals, scientific
instruments, horses and carriages, and wines, among others. 36 While the
lists and definitions were extensive, the point being made was simple.
The law should be explicit about property because "the right to hold
property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute
manner, so long as the use is not prohibited by laws or regulations." 37
French citizens had the right to property, to its wealth, and to its pro-
tection; the Revolution had granted them that right, and Napoleon per-
manently protected it.
The most distinctive part of the Civil Code, however, was its devi-
ation from revolutionary principles where women and children were
concerned. Although women had been granted certain civil liberties
under French revolutionary law, Napoleon found the system personally
uncomfortable, disruptive, and in opposition to the social order that he
was trying to create. His own Corsican upbringing placed the father vis-
ibly in control, and the vision that he had for France was a strict, con-
servative family model. Just as he was head of state, the father would be
head of the family. The provisions of the Civil Code came as no surprise
to French men and women. Napoleon's comments had been widely cir-
culated: "I don't like masculine women any more than effeminate men,"
he was reported as saying in 1803. He had also conveyed his feelings
about women engaging in public activities: "I don't like women to mix
in politics." 38 Much later echoing his earlier statements, he described his
problems with women: "Women receive too much consideration in
France. They should not be regarded as the equals of men; they are, in
fact, mere machines to make children." 3g
On issues of marriage, divorce, and children, Napoleon established
a simple pattern: women and children were subordinate to men under
the law. A woman could have no other residence than her husband's; his
authority was required in nearly all of her dealings including the con-
trol of her dowry; and divorce was made nearly impossible unless her
husband brought his mistress to live under their roof or he was insane
or a felon. In a marriage, a husband had an obligation to provide for his

wife, but he also controlled her person, her goods and the children of
their marriage. According to the Code, "the husband owes protection to
his wife, the wife obedience to her husband."40 Napoleon was adamant
about women's roles in the French family and in the French state, and
in one of the deliberations, he was reported to have said, "the husband
must possess the absolute power and right to say to his wife: 'Madam,
you shall not go out, you shall not go to the theatre, you shall not receive
such and such a person; for the children you will bear shall be mine.' "41
When it came to the control of children, age limits were explicitly set for
marriage (exceptions could only be made by Napoleon), and parents
could stop the marriage of a male under the age of 25 or a female under
the age of 21. In the case of a dispute, the father's decisions were bind-
ing. When miscreant children were the problem, fathers could discipline
them with one month's imprisonment if they were not yet 16 years of age
and six months imprisonment for each misdeed until they reached the
age of majority.
In all aspects of personal and family life, the Napoleonic Code was
intrusive, as it attempted to sweep away what Napoleon believed was the
laxity of the Revolution. Because one marriage in every five ended in
divorce, he would make divorce much more difficult. Because children
had been given too many freedoms, their families would rein them in
and have the right to discipline them more strenuously. Because adop-
tion had become too irregular and illegitimacy too prevalent, regulations
would be put in place to protect families against immorality and licen-
tiousness that led to abortion, infanticide, and abandoned children.
In the final analysis, the Civil Code represented both the revolu-
tionary decade and the Napoleonic era. As one historian described it,
"The Code was the Revolution made law, supported by the full author-
ity of social conservatism."42 Its provisions were carried across Europe
as Napoleonic armies expanded the boundaries of France. Its guarantee
of property rights remains a cornerstone of republican government, and
its restrictions on women were so long lived that they were not repealed
until the middle of the twentieth century. What Napoleon had accom-
plished in the Civil Code, however, was only part of the restructuring of
France that he envisioned. In the end, his regime fathered six additional
codes: the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), the Commercial Code
(1807), the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure (1808), the
Penal Code (1810), and a Rural Code that was never promulgated. 43 He
was obsessed with order, and he intended France to reflect his orderli-
ness. There would be nothing obscure about that. As one historian con-
cluded, "he picked up law, as the hawk food." 44 He probed, he
questioned, and he consulted the depths of his own prejudices. The Old
Regime was gone; and Napoleons choice was to preserve the elements
of the Revolution that he thought were appropriate and efficient for the
new regime. At the same time, no one would forget that he was
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French.
Notes
1. "The Brumaire Decree," November 10, 1799 (19 Brumaire, Year VIII)
quoted in John Hall Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 762.
2. The coup that brought Napoleon to power took place on November
9-10, 1799. The French, however, had already adopted a revolutionary calendar
that gave the dates as 18-19 Brumaire, Year VIII, so contemporaries called the over-
throw of the Director}7 "18 Brumaire," and historians have continued to do so.
3. "Decree Transferring the Legislative Body to Saint-Cloud," Novem-
ber 9, 1799 (18 Brumaire, Year VIII), quoted in Stewart, Documentary Survey,
760.
4. Journal militaire, as quoted in J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte
(Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton, 2001), 141-42.
5. Ibid.
6. Owen Connelly The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era (Chicago:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Inc., 1991), 200. See also J. Christopher Herold,
The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1987), 80, and
Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 142.
7. Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 2000.
8. "Bonapartes Statement upon Becoming Consul," November 10, 1799
(19 Brumaire, Year VIII), quoted in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 764.
9. Ibid., 767-68.
10. "Proclamation of the Consuls to the French People," December 15,
1799 (24 Frimaire, Year VIII), quoted in ibid., 780.
12. Lucian Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit: aphorismes, citations et opinions
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996), 15.
13. Jacques Godechot, "Constitutions," in the Historical Dictionary of
Napoleonic France, 1799-1815. ed. Owen Connelly (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Press, 1985), 129.
14. "The Constitution of the Year VIII," December 13, 1799 (22 Frimaire,
Year VIII), as quoted in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 773.
15. Ibid., 773.

16. "Constitutions," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 129.
17. The assassination attempt, called the Plot on the Rue Nicaise or the
Infernal Machine, occurred on Christmas eve, December 24, 1800 as Napoleon,
Josephine and their entourages crossed Paris to attend a performance of Haydn's
oratorio "The Creation" at the opera. Assassins, who had filled a water cart with
explosives, pushed the disguised "bomb" into the procession of carriages. The
Emperor's carriage took a slightly different route, their timing was off, and they
missed Napoleon, but there were significant numbers of casualties nonetheless.
The assassination attempt proved to be an excellent opportunity to rid France
of Jacobin troublemakers who were immediately rounded up and deported to
the colonies. When evidence revealed that royalists had actually engineered the
plot, the Minister of Police purged them, sending some to firing squads and
some to prison. Propaganda from the office of the First Consul reported that
assassins would be less likely to make attempts on someone who was more vis-
ibly a head of state, like other monarchs in Europe. The life consulate would
provide him that protection.
19. Napoleon (1800) quoted in Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 16.
20. Napoleon (1802) quoted in ibid.
21. Germaine de Stael, quoted in Herold, Age of Napoleon, 159.
23. Napoleon to Citizen Ripault, July 23, 1801, quoted in Napoleons Let-
ters: Selected, Translated and Edited by]. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 71.
24. What has been called the Cadoudal Plot had been monitored by
Fouche for almost a year before the police swept down upon the conspirators.
The plot was complex, international, and extremely dangerous. Allegedly roy-
alists who had fled to London were to join with the republicans in France to
overthrow Napoleon and to place Louis XVI's brother on the throne as Louis
XVIII. Key players included Georges Cadoudal, who had been a commander in
the French civil war, and General Pichegru, who was also in residence in
England. Implicated in the plot were Moreau, a French general in good stand-
ing, who was perceived as the leader of the republican faction, and an unnamed
relative of the former king. When the Minister of Police took action, the con-
spirators were arrested one by one. Pichegru was found strangled in his cell,
Moreau was imprisoned and exiled, Cadoudal was tried and executed, and the
unnamed Bourbon prince was identified as the Due d'Enghien, a distant rela-
tion of Louis XVI who lived just across the French border in Baden. There was
no evidence to support charges against the duke, but Napoleon pressed on with
his court martial. Troops quickly crossed the border in violation of international
law and took him prisoner by surprise. The court martial was brief, and the
charges were never specified. He was executed within the same day. This
attempt on Napoleon became a new propaganda ploy in 1804, but it did not
pass public scrutiny Napoleon had misjudged the French with his contrived
execution of the Due d'Enghien; but with war at hand, they bent to his will and
supported his designs on an imperial crown. The point he drove home, after
refusing to admit the immorality of executing the duke, was that a hereditary
empire would outlast even his death. The point was hard to refute.
25. Napoleon, quoted in Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 46.
26. Herold, Age of Napoleon, 165-66.
27. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 254. The full text of the catechism
is included on 254-55 of Thompson's work.
28. Napoleon to General Hedouville (1800), quoted in The Mind of
Napoleon: A Selection from His Written and Spoken Words, Edited and Translated
by J. Christopher Herold (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 172.
29. Napoleon (June 1801), quoted in Frangois Furet, Revolutionary
France, 1770-1880 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 226.
30. Napoleon, quoted in Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 68.
31. Napoleon to the Minister of the Interior (August 23, 1806), quoted
in Mind of Napoleon, 112.
32. Napoleon to M. de Champagny, August 23, 1806, quoted in
Napoleons Letters, 135-37.
33. Ibid., 137.
34. Napoleon to the Minister of the Interior (November 29, 1806),
quoted in, Mind of Napoleon, 115.
35. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 180. Connelly gives the figure as 57
of 102 meetings. See Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 202.
36. Code Napoleon du 3 September 1807 (Leiden: B. Blankenberg, 1888),
9 5 - 1 0 1 . A full text of the Code in English can be found at <www.napoleon
series.org>.
37. Ibid., 100.
38. Herold, Mind of Napoleon, 14.
39. Ibid.
40. Code Napoleon, 213.
41. Napoleon, quoted in Herold, Age of Napoleon, , 149.
42. Roger Dufraisse, Napoleonn (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 73.
43. "Constitutions," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 295-96.
44. H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleon, (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,
1967), 54.
CHAPTER 3
NAPOLEONIC SOCIETY:
THE NEW REGIME
Impossible Is Not a French Word

Gentlemen tied their cravats more carefully, and women's necklines
inched upwards. Members of French society stopped calling each other
citizen and citizeness, replacing their revolutionary greetings with cour-
tesies such as monsieur and madame. Scaffolding was raised in Paris to
build commemorations of French accomplishments and victories, and
museums were stocked with the treasures of Europe. Nothing was
impossible as Napoleon fashioned a new, more orderly regime. To do so,
not only did he need to be the political arbiter of Europe, he needed to
be the arbiter of fashion, taste, ceremony, education, and literature. If he
needed to create a new aristocracy, he would do so. If he needed to pro-
vide new rewards for the French, he would dazzle them. He could, with
the stroke of his pen, safeguard and expand carriage service; construct
canals to encourage trade and provide water for Paris; appoint a Latin
professor for the College de France; list the 10 most talented painters,
sculptors, composers, and architects in France; and oversee the festivals
that glorified his authority 1 "Impossible is not a French word," he said,
and his efforts supported that assertion. 2
Napoleon had dealt with the legal codes of France, ended turmoil
in the Vendee, stabilized relations with the papacy, and reinforced reli-
gious toleration. In doing so, he had also founded his new regime on cer-
tain principles. There would be a new aristocracy based on talent and
merit, a new educational system in support of public service, a restora-
tion of Paris as the center of Europe, widespread public approval for his
work, and a place for himself in the pantheon of the powerful.
By 1804, Napoleon had survived two serious plots, overseen three

constitutions, and negotiated peace in Europe. He was not just a house-
hold name—he was Emperor of the French. On December 2, 1804, he
stood in Notre Dame cathedral before French citizens, members of his
family, guests from throughout Europe, and his ministers and govern-
ment bureaucrats. In their presence, he lifted the crown of France to his
head. He had found it "in the gutter," he once said. 3 He had picked it
up—through his victories and accomplishments and through the pros-
perity that he had brought to France—and now it was his turn to place
it on his head. The coronation was a "theatrical triumph," wrote one his-
torian, as Napoleon blended Roman imperial pageantry with the pur-
ported memory of Charlemagne's power and splendor. 4 Charlemagne's
sword had been retrieved from Aix-la-Chapelle, and the pope had trav-
eled to Paris to bless the event and to show, by his presence, that he
acknowledged the new French Empire. No expense had been spared.
According to government tallies, the entire cost was over 8.5 million
francs. 5
Only a day before the imperial ceremony Napoleon had spoken to
the Senate: "I mount the throne to which I have been called by the unan-
imous voice of the Senate, people, and the army" 6 He exaggerated some-
what; but, in fact, the mandate that created the Empire was very
impressive.
When the coronation ceremony began in the heart of Paris, Napo-
leon was dressed in a crimson velvet cape over a white embroidered satin
tunic. His cape was adorned with white feathers and diamonds, and he
wore white silk stockings and ceremonial slippers of white velvet and
gold. His garments cost 99,000 francs, but Empress Josephine's robes
were even more expensive. Her train was a massive creation, and two of
Napoleon's sisters were required to carry it as she moved toward the
altar. She was draped in velvet, Russian ermine, taffeta, and satin. A choir
of 400 voices sang Luigi Paisiello's Mass and Te Deum, and street corner
peddlers, who had obtained advance permission, hawked drinks and
hors d'oeuvres to the observers.' Fireworks dotted the Paris sky, a coro-
nation balloon was sent across the Alps to Italy, and Napoleon commis-
sioned his court painter Jacques-Louis David to create a massive canvas
of the event. 8 What Napoleon had achieved was a coronation fit for any
monarch in Europe. But he did not intend to be a monarch according to
the model set by the Old Regime. "To be a king is to inherit old ideas and
Napoleonic Society: The New Regime 49
a genealogy," he remarked. "I don't want to descend from anyone or

depend on anyone. The title of Emperor is greater; it is a bit inexplica-
ble [for France], but it creates a wonderful illusion." 9 Along with his vic-
tories and his reorganization of France, the Corsican soldier had created
a formidable presence both in France and in Europe. See Document 6 at
the end of this book for a description of Napoleon by his private secre-
tary (Description of Napoleon by his Private Secretary Meneval).
A Balloon No Longer Drifting in Air

The splendid coronation ceremony that Napoleon had choreo-
graphed was only one element of his new France. Even before the coro-
nation, he had already begun to put other elements of his new regime
into place. Initially he welcomed back the emigres who had been pro-
scribed and threatened by the Revolution. Then in 1802, he created a
new recognition to reward those men whose abilities and accomplish-
ments set them apart from the rest of French citizens. After the corona-
tion, he continued his work by designing a new nobility to be based on
merit and antiquity.
According to Napoleon, among the most significant of his civil and
military acts was the creation of the Legion of Honor. The award, he
stated, was to be conferred only on those men "who, by their knowledge,
talents, and virtues, have contributed to establish and defend the prin-
ciples of the Republic." 10 They would be his elite, bound together by
honor and devotion to the fatherland. According to Napoleon, they were
a true family of France. Whether in civilian or military employ, they
would be an example of public service at its best. 11
In spite of Napoleons well-stated intentions, even his strongest
supporters found the proposal somewhat difficult to accept. One of the
hallmarks of the Revolution had been the principle of equality, and less
than 13 years had passed since titles, awards, and sinecures associated
with the absolutist monarchy had been swept aside. The memory of
those ill-gotten privileges was still fresh in many minds, and no one
knew yet what Napoleon was doing with his new system of privileges.
So, when Napoleon took his proposal to the Council of State, outright
hostility greeted him. After lengthy discussions, the proposal for the
Legion of Honor passed by a slim margin of four votes in the Council of
State (14-10). When the proposal passed the Tribunate, more than a
third opposed the recognition (50-38), and in the Legislative Body, the
vote was equally mixed: 166 to 110. 12 Furthermore, the law was twice
as long as the Constitution of the Year VIII (1799). Napoleon had made
it clear that he wanted all of the provisions setting up his hierarchy of
military and civilian rewards to be indisputable. There was nothing short
or obscure about the new recognition. Fifteen different levels of distinc-
tion were defined from the grands dignites of the Empire to the grands
officiers and lesser dignitaries. Appointment to the Legion of Honor was
for life and carried a stipend. In some cases, substantial estates were also
granted to the recipients. The distinction, as Napoleon had designed it,
clearly recognized ability, talent, and merit; in reality, it also conferred
significant wealth.
Even after its promulgation by the government, the Legion of
Honor was still regarded with some distaste and concern. The climate
for the Legion of Honor, however, became more welcoming after Napo-
leon distributed the first medals; and later Frenchmen came to covet the
ribbons and medals. In July of 1804, as Napoleon personally handed out
the first decorations, Andre-Frangois Miot (later the Count de Melito)
was in attendance. "It was gratifying," he wrote, "to see services so
diverse, merit and talent so different, rewarded with the same honors." 1 3
A common soldier could stand next to his general; a schoolteacher next
to an internationally known savant. Napoleon, in fact, had been correct
in his judgment about the men who surrounded him. Anyone of ability
could be tapped for the recognition; the Legion of Honor represented
equality of opportunity During that first ceremony at Les Invalides in
Paris, Napoleon led recipients in a spirited oath. "Honor! Fatherland!
Napoleon!" shouted the Grand Chancellor, demanding their loyalty and
their labors for the good of France. Then Napoleon questioned: "Do you
pledge it?" According to reports, "an immense affirmative cry" swelled
from the assembly. A few months later, Napoleon traveled to the military
camp at Boulogne on the English Channel where he continued his dis-
tribution of the Legion of Honor to soldiers in the field. There, when the
awards were granted, a hundred thousand voices pledged their loyalty.14
The medals that Napoleon passed out were white enameled stars
hanging from a red ribbon. Later he incorporated a green laurel wreath
and crown into the design. The design was new. In fact, there was noth-
ing about the decoration that harkened back to prerevolutionary France.
Furthermore, the men who received the distinction were very different
from Old Regime notables. They included musician Etienne Mehul,

engineer Gaspard Monge, artist Jacques-Louis David, astronomer Pierre-
Simon Laplace, writer Jacques-Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, along-
side esteemed generals in the service of France. For the first time in
French history, civilians were recognized in the same manner as military
recipients. In total during the First Empire, 33,000 to 35,000 men wore
the red ribbon and white cross of the Legion of Honor and experienced
its benefits both for themselves and their families. The Legion of Honor,
in fact, became a model recognition for later republican states.
The Legion of Honor was only the beginning of Napoleon's reor-
ganization of French society. In May 1804, the Emperor established an
imperial court, resplendent with titles, livery, and pomp. Later that year,
he selected the symbols that would define his new regime. They
included the eagle and the bee. The bee, for its industry, replaced the
Bourbon fleur de lys on imperial tapestries and garments, and the eagle
became the outward symbol of the power of the Empire. The rooster (le
coq) that had been identified for centuries with France was swept aside.
To Napoleon the choice was simple: "The rooster has no force; it cannot
be the image of an empire such as France. One must choose among the
eagle, the elephant and the lion." Then he chose the eagle: "the bird that
carries a thunderbolt and never turns from the sun." 15
After the empire was established, he increased the rewards of the
Legion of Honor to include education for the daughters of France's most
able citizens. Then in March of 1808, he completed the establishment
of his new nobility with titles and additional rewards for Frenchmen of
talent and merit. Members of the Legion of Honor were designated as
chevaliers, or knights, and their ranks became hereditary. Napoleon fur-
ther expanded his aristocracy with the appointments of princes and
dukes, titles formerly reserved for imperial family members. Other dig-
nitaries such as government officials, councilors of state, bishops, and
mayors became senators, counts, and barons. The final tally came to 31
dukes, 451 counts, 1,500 barons, and 1,474 chevaliers. 16 Along with the
additional estates, stipends, and pensions that were attached to noble
ranks, Napoleon also liberally granted purely honorific peerage to his
military commanders. Their titles became a virtual map of Europe.
Andre Massena, for example, became the due de Rivoli (Italy) and the
prince d'Essling (Germany). Andoche Junot became the due d'Abrantes
(Portugal); Michel Ney became the prince de Muscovy (Russia).
Everything about the new aristocracy had been carefully planned,

including who would be ennobled first. Tt was not without design that
I bestowed the first title I gave on Marshal Lefebvre," Napoleon
explained later. [/ Frangois-Joseph Lefebvre was an interesting choice. He
was rough, earthy and coarse, and he had joined the royal Gardes
francaises as a private in 1773. Parisians remembered him best for his
service as a sergeant of the Guard, long before he had fought in France's
revolutionary wars and had been promoted through the ranks. Further-
more, his wife was outrageous. A washerwoman in the employ of the
armies, she could offend almost anyone by her poor manners, and she
was renowned for her drinking and swearing. Napoleon's chief point,
however, was that Lefebvre was a fine soldier and commander. Good
bloodlines, refined language, an elegant spouse, and old money did not
matter in an appointment to Napoleonic nobility. Lefebvre, in spite of his
dirty boots, lack of education, and colorful wife, was an asset to the
French armies and to the fatherland. As such, he became the due de
Danzig. 18
In the following years, Napoleon also took care not to overlook
prerevolutionary nobles who had returned to France. They, too, could
earn the praise of France for their contributions to the fatherland. As an
observer of people, Napoleon had determined that men were best led by
rewards, whether they were trinkets or baubles, as he sometimes called
the medals that he distributed, or hundreds of thousands of francs in
property and pensions. i g So, he expanded the Legion of Honor and
nobility; and, in the process, he worked toward merging his new
Napoleonic nobility with old nobles so that further distinctions would
cease. When he looked back on what he had done, he was pleased with
his success. Yet, he had not had enough time to invest his nobility with
antiquity so that their European counterparts would have held them in
esteem. Historian Jean Tulard described the legacy in this manner: "[It
was] an extraordinary mixture of refinement and bad taste—of old tra-
ditions and military manners." 2 0 Among his accomplishments, Napo-
leon's nobility carried a mixed message.
Regardless of what others thought, Napoleons guiding principle
was his firm and fervent belief that every state needed some form of
nobility. An aristocracy brought stability to the state; it brought order
and security. Citizens would know who their leaders were and respect
them for their accomplishments. He had taken equality of opportunity
Napoleonic Society: The New Regime
53
to its logical conclusion. During his exile on St. Helena, Napoleon fur-
ther explained what he had intended with the creation of his new nobil-
ity. "A state without an aristocracy," he said, "is like a balloon drifting in
the air." Without an elite group of men on whom he could count, the
balloon would neither land nor take off. Air currents, when least
expected, would bounce it about, and it would never find a direction.
Using a more common metaphor, he also said: "Without [an aristoc-
racy], the State is a rudderless ship."21 He had brought order out of
chaos, and he intended to maintain a firm hand on the ship of state.
A Dynasty Is Born
Along with the direction that Napoleon's aristocracy provided to
the government, Napoleon also intended for his new society to make
Paris a showcase for France and particularly for Europe. Everything had
to be designed toward that end. Regardless of the fact that his regime was
new, there was no room for criticism. When critics scoffed at his court,
he simply attacked them and banished them. When they cast aspersions
on his aristocracy, he countered with equally scathing remarks. Then he
worked harder to assure that appropriate notice was taken. From his
efforts, le style Empire (the imperial style) was born in fashion, interior
decoration, art, architecture, and even coinage.
In women's fashion, the Emperor championed styles reminiscent of
antiquity—of empires of the past. He encouraged the use of decorative,
heavier fabrics to replace the revealing garments that had formerly been
fashionable. His taste included raised waistlines and higher necklines.
Furthermore, in one of his widely quoted remarks, Napoleon made clear
his position on the translucent decolletage that had been the rage of rev-
olutionary and consular society. Surveying the partially exposed chest of
one of his female guests, he paused, then looked her straight in the eye,
and remarked, "I assume you are still breastfeeding your child." She was
speechless, but the point had been made that low-cut, revealing gar-
ments were no longer appropriate. When he wanted others to recognize
his authority and to wear longer sleeves, he commented to another
guest: "my how red your elbows are."22 He also demanded that his fam-
ily purchase only those fabrics that were produced in France, and his
government passed laws restricting the importation of foreign goods.23
Military elements even found their way into women's attire. For the most
part, however, Napoleon expected ornate formality in dress; and women

of the bourgeoisie and new aristocracy conformed to his expectations.
Everyone wanted to know where Empress Josephine found her gar-
ments, where her hair was coiffed, and from where her jewels came. Au
Grand Turc became the rage for silk scarves. Her perfumer was A la
Cloche d'Argent, and only the best lace from Chantilly and Brussels
would do. 24 For whatever reason, watches became a mania as well,
whether they were worn around the neck on elaborate jeweled collars or
as finger rings.25
Fashion and style, however, were not purely the domain of women
during the Empire. Men also looked to the Emperor and his officials for
guidance. The simple rule was that men's fashions should be comple-
mentary to women's attire. As women's garments became more decora-
tive, men at the court found themselves in embroidered coats and
colorful costumes more in keeping with the Old Regime than the
Empire. But Napoleon had a second desire in supporting elegance: the
French silk industry and embroidery needed support. Soon the ball-
rooms of fashionable society saw grisly grenadiers dressed in embroi-
dered silk and a former regicide in a full suit of gold fabric.26 Napoleon,
on the other hand, chose to set himself apart as Emperor. Typically he
wore an unornamented riding habit, along with his greatcoat if the tem-
perature so required. It was not just frugality that governed his decisions;
he preferred to be distinctive. Even his simple attire was carefully pur-
chased. In one requisition, he demanded four military frock coats, two
hunting coats, one civilian coat, dozens of undergarments, and four
dozen shirts, breeches, waistcoats, and vests. Added to the order were
hats, colognes, two dozen silk stockings, and twenty-four pairs of shoes
that were to last in total two years. The cost was not extravagant, but it
was 16,000 francs.27
Interior space also felt the influence of Napoleon. As early as the
First Italian Campaign in 1796-1797, Napoleon began bringing the
treasures of Europe back to France. The Government Commission for
the Research of Artistic and Scientific Objects in Conquered Countries
appropriated canvases, sculptures, and manuscripts to add to the col-
lections of the new national museum housed in the former palace of the
Louvre.28 In Egypt, Napoleon commissioned Vivant Denon and scores
of artists, engineers, cartographers, surveyors, and interpreters to cata-
log the treasures of the Nile. Frequently under a hail of bullets, they fol-
lowed the armies and completed their work in Upper and Lower Egypt.
One of Napoleon's engineers, in fact, discovered the Rosetta Stone that
ultimately unlocked the mysteries of ancient Egypt. Napoleon was also
a patron of the French arts, and he frequently bought or commissioned
artwork that would either glorify the Empire or represent it. In 1805, for
example, he purchased Antoine-Jean Gros's huge canvas titled The
Plague at Jaffa, which was based on a controversial event in his Egyptian
campaign. Smaller artistic purchases that were described in the same
memorandum included landscapes, a scene at a village fair, and a sketch
of the signing of the Concordat in 1801.29
Not surprisingly, decorative arts and architecture also took on the
flavor of Napoleon. Artists and engineers were fascinated by Napoleon's
exploits in Italy and Egypt, and neoclassicism quickly became the most
desirable style. Popularized by Charles Percier and Pierre Fontaine, the
imperial style was financed splendidly by Napoleon. Architecture was, in
fact, a tool of politics; and among Napoleon's first imperial visions were
four triumphal arches to represent the victories at Marengo and Auster-
litz, his concordat with the pope, and peace. Only two of the triumphal
arches were completed. There were also to be fountains erected at the
Place de la Revolution, where the guillotine had once stood, and the Place
de la Bastille, where a gigantic bronze elephant was to be situated.30
Within a decade, the Arc du Carrousel, Arc de Triomphe, Vendome col-
umn, Madeleine (Temple de la Gloire), and Palais des Archives had been
commissioned. Public buildings like the university were under contract,
and slaughterhouses and fountains were built and rebuilt. Four bridges
were constructed across the Seine River, as well as the Odeon theatre, 12
marketplaces, and an expanded site for Pere Lachaise cemetery31 The rue
de Rivoli was completely redesigned with a classical arcade spanning
blocks and blocks of identical fagades.
Order, symmetry, and harmony were architectural mandates. But
Napoleon's projects also had to have an air of grandeur and the monu-
mental. Prior to his coronation, for example, he ordered the demolition
of a topsy-turvy collection of houses and shops that faced and sur-
rounded the cathedral of Notre Dame. His aim was to create a splendid,
open space. Blocks of similar nondescript buildings were cleared from
around the Louvre and Tuileries, and he planned to build a colossal
palace as his royal residence after the birth of his son in 1811. The lat-
ter residence, to be called the Palais du Roi de Rome in honor of his own
son, was planned for the western suburbs of Paris on the heights of
Chaillot. Only the foundations of the palace were built because of the
downturn in Napoleons personal fortune and the fortunes of France, but
he had planned for it to dwarf even Versailles. 32
Even coinage, whether commemorative or official, came under
Napoleon's personal oversight. In 1802, his bust was placed on metallic
currency. His look was austere, stern, Roman, and republican. Although
Napoleon had been heralded by cries of w'Long Live the Emperor" when
he assumed his position as Emperor of the French in 1804, he did not
remove the words "Republique f^ngalse 1 ' from French coinage until
three years later. At that time his image took on a more imperial persona;
the laurel wreath on his head was reminiscent of Caesar. 33 Beyond the
official coinage of the Empire, Napoleon also inaugurated a set of his-
toric medallions, designed competitively by members of the prestigious
Institut de France, and called the Histoire metallique de Napoleon le
Grand [The Commemorative History of Napoleon the Great in Medallions].
The first of the designs showed Napoleon on his return from Egypt.
France, represented by an allegorical female figure, welcomed Napoleon
back from his campaign. Later the national mint continued production
of a significant number of commemorative coins. 34 The collection of
medallions, so carefully overseen by the Emperor, represented yet
another example of neoclassicism and Napoleons interest in his living
legend.
As Napoleon moved further into his creation of an Empire modeled
on antiquity, he also saw himself as the creator of a dynasty. Although
he had been granted the right to adopt an heir and his stepson Eugene
de Beauharnais brought him a great deal of pride, he still wanted his own
son to inherit the Empire. While the Empress Josephine had announced
several times that she was pregnant, as the Empire aged, so did the
Empress with no results. When Napoleon fathered one child by a mis-
tress of his and was expecting another, he determined that Josephine was
sterile, and he began negotiations for their divorce and his remarriage.
The issue was politics, as everyone knew, not his affection for her. To
spare her knowledge of the events as they unfolded, he kept his plans
within his closest circle of associates. On October 20, Josephine arrived
at Fontainebleau to discover that the door connecting their chambers
had been permanently sealed. A month later, Napoleon informed
Josephine that their Deed of Separation would be finalized by a senatus
57
consultum no later than December 15, 1809, in order to proceed with his
plans for remarriage.
Throughout the months of January and February 1810, Napoleon
then negotiated for a new bride from either of the royal houses of Aus-
tria or Russia; and later that spring, Napoleon married Marie Louise von
Hapsburg, archduchess of Austria. She was the daughter of Francis I of
Austria, 20 years younger than the Emperor, and she had twice fled from
the French armies as they laid assault to her homeland. In his marriage,
Napoleon followed quintessential royal style. He had made an arranged
political alliance, and he had sealed the arrangement with proxy nuptials
before Marie Louise even set foot on French soil. He likened his marriage
to Marie Louise to his victory at Austerlitz. Both, he said, had been
superbly planned and executed. Twelve buffets were set up to feed the
throngs who reveled in the new marriage. The menu included 4,800
pates; 1,200 tongues of beef; 1,040 legs of lamb (or horsemeat); 1,000
shoulder roasts; 240 turkeys; 360 capons; 360 chickens; 3,000 sausages;
and "fountains of wine." 35 The stock market climbed, and police reports
confirmed "the old dynasty and the new share pride . . . about the
Emperor's marriage." 36 Even more importantly, within a year Napoleon
had achieved what he wanted. His son, whom he called the King of
Rome, was born. "He has my chest, my mouth, my eyes," Napoleon
proudly reported to the former Empress Josephine. Then he added, "I
hope that he will fulfill his destiny" 3 7 A salute of 101 guns was fired for
the heir to the throne (there would have been 21 guns for a daughter),
and the newspapers reported that Marie Louise was in excellent health.
Celebrations took place throughout the city, and Marie-Madeleine Blan-
chard, a noted aeronaut, lifted off from the Ecole Militaire in her hot air
balloon to announce the child's birth to the environs of Paris and the sur-
rounding countryside. 38 Order was assured; the dynasty was complete.
I Have Always Loved Analysis

Away from the celebrations, the new regime also set a very serious
tone. In 1808, for example, Napoleon sent a memorandum to his per-
sonal librarian. He wanted a portable library of 1,000 volumes, printed
in small type, with no margins "so as not to waste space," and loosely
bound so that the books would lay flat while he read them on campaign.
He estimated that the collection would include 40 volumes on religion,
40 epics, 60 volumes of poetry, 100 novels, and 60 volumes of history,

with the remainder being historical memoirs. Education was personally
important to Napoleon, and he specifically included in the collection
works on nonwestern religions, the geography of the Middle East and
Far East, and detailed histories of France. Having been strongly influ-
enced by Rousseau as a young man, he included Rousseau's Confessions
and Ta Nouvelle Heloise, but he specifically excluded other essays that he
considered "useless treatises." 39 Education, he believed, should be use-
ful to one's position. As Emperor of the French, he knew that he could
not afford to lack the knowledge that he needed. When it came to
women, he believed that religion suited them best. For men who would
serve the fatherland as civilian and military leaders, an education based
on the classics, histories, and practical training was particularly appro-
priate. He even felt that he must educate members of his own family. To
his stepson Eugene, he sent a lengthy epistle on becoming Viceroy of
Italy. Learn Italian, he counseled, and avoid talking too much. Learn
one's limitations and use silence to unnerve opponents and to maintain
control. To his younger brother Jerome, who had joined the navy and
whose skills he often found lacking, he wrote sanguinely telling him not
to lose his watch and to keep his compass dry 4 0 Furthermore, he never
stopped educating himself. "I have always loved analysis," he said.
"Why? and How? are useful questions one cannot too frequently ask
oneself."41 According to a contemporary, his mind was never at rest. 42
From the time of Napoleons coup in November 1799, he had been
interested in reforming French education. His plans became clear by
1801 when he wrote to the Minister of the Interior with very specific
advice for closing the ecoles centrales (secondary schools) that had been
created by the revolutionaries. In Napoleons plan to replace them, boys
younger than 12 years of age would take four courses of instruction. He
wrote, "In the first class [course of instruction] they should learn read-
ing, writing, arithmetic, and the elements of grammar; in the second,
spelling and the principles of Latin." In the third class, they would con-
centrate on higher mathematics and "those parts of education which
cannot be done in a year, drawing, dancing, and the use of arms." Finally,
they needed training in memory skills, natural history, geography,
ancient history, languages, and "patriotic and moral ideals." 43 After the
age of 12, they would be divided into two groups: those who would go
into the military and those who would pursue civilian careers. In each
case, curricula were specified, uniforms were required, and drills and
physical training were mandated. Napoleon further regulated the num-
ber of scholarships per school along with the size and contents of each
library 44
State-supported boarding schools were soon complemented by
lycees and ecoles secondaires that expanded educational opportunities for
worthy young men. By 1805, 39 lycees and 1,083 secondary schools
existed in France, many providing free education for the sons of Napo-
leon's officers.45 The expansion of educational opportunities, however,
also meant that the quality of education had to improve, and Napoleon
focused on the idea of a Teaching Order. Adapted from a Jesuit model,
Napoleon envisaged a system where men would enter the teaching pro-
fession as bachelors and devote themselves to their careers and to their
students until they were wealthy and well situated enough to marry. By
then, they would have been promoted through the professorial ranks to
receive the same esteem as public officials. Napoleon's teaching corps
would not be so different from his Legion of Honor. These men would
form a "body of teachers with fixed principles" that would serve as mod-
els for others. 46
By 1806, Napoleon had finalized his plans for a comprehensive
state system of instruction that included all educational institutions
except local primary schools. In 1808 the plan was implemented, creat-
ing what was called the Imperial University, whose function was to over-
see public education throughout the Empire. In spite of its name, it was,
in practice, a nationwide board of education with extraordinary powers.
There was something almost medieval about the regulations: teachers
had to report where they were going on vacation; they could not visit
Paris without permission; they had to take oaths of obedience to their
administrators; the curriculum was prescribed by the central authority;
and there was no tolerance for innovation. The aim was to produce good
civil servants; and in the process, the state would know precisely what
French students were learning. In 1809, to measure students' achieve-
ments, the baccalaureate examination was instituted as a nationwide
graduation requirement. This nationally administered examination,
which exists today, became an admissions requirement for all French
institutions of higher education.
Just as revolutionaries had dismantled much of the primary and
secondary school system in France, they had also demolished the pre-
revolutionary university system. In its place, they had created special-

ized schools, called les grandes ecoles, in fields like law, medicine, phar-
macy, public works, and teacher education. Napoleon retained these
institutions and established the military academy of Saint-Cyr, based at
least partially on the model of the Ecole Militaire. Beyond these institu-
tions, Napoleon saw little reason for expanding higher education fur-
ther. He simply did not believe that it was necessary "It follows," he said,
"that a school for advanced study is not an educational establishment,
in the ordinary sense, but an establishment devoted to the instruction
of men destined for some particular science or learned profession." 47
To Napoleon, the grandes ecoles were training schools or institu-
tions of advanced professional education. When the Minister of the Inte-
rior, for example, asked Napoleon to consider establishing an institution
for advanced studies in literature, Napoleon found the request to be ill
founded. After all, Napoleon asserted, great writers were born with their
genius; they did not learn it. Therefore, advanced studies in literature,
composition, or grammar were irrelevant. On the other hand, history
and geography were sciences, suitable for advanced study in the
Napoleonic plan, so he recommended that the College de France be con-
sidered for such a role. "Something is surely lacking in a great state," he
concluded, "if a young student cannot get competent advice on the sub-
ject he wishes to study, and is obliged to grope his way, wasting months
or years in fruitless reading, whilst he searches for the information he
really needs." 48 The comment from Napoleon was, of course, autobio-
graphical. He had spent years teaching himself history and geography,
and he resented the fact that no one had helped him in his quest.
Women's education in the Napoleonic era was another issue
entirely. Since girls were not reared to become public servants, govern-
ment officials, professors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, soldiers, or com-
manders, their education did not fall under the purview of the Imperial
University. Nonetheless, Napoleons influence on women's education
was profound. First and foremost, he believed that the best education for
girls was not found in the schools; it was found in the training "a mother
gives her daughters." 49 Yet, Napoleon realized that not all girls and
young women could be guaranteed a mothers education. As a pragma-
tist, he laid plans for a girls' school at Ecouen where orphans and daugh-
ters of members of the Legion of Honor would receive training to
"become wives suitable for poor and humble homes." Unlike the secu-
lar general education that was a hallmark of Napoleon's plan for male
instruction, the education of girls and women would be primarily reli-
gious and practical. Their days would be regimented around prayers,
mass, and catechism. Their curriculum would then include writing,
arithmetic and elementary French (spelling), a small amount of history
and geography, and household economy. "Care must be taken not to let
them see any Latin," since it was not suitable for their minds, and they
should learn physics only to "prevent gross ignorance and silly super-
stition." They should not engage in exercises of the mind that might lead
to reasoning, Napoleon continued, because their brains were weak and
their ideas unstable. "What we ask of education," the Emperor noted, "is
not that girls should think, but that they should believe." 50
Much of the year, Napoleon insisted, should be devoted to manual
labor. At Ecouen, girls and young women should know how to sew,
embroider, and clean. They should be able to calculate prices, practice
economy, and run the household, even if it included a small farm.
Because students at Ecouen would be drawn from the poorer classes,
Napoleon did not want them to experience luxury. They were required
to wear long-sleeved uniforms "as health and modesty require," and
their meals would be simple: soup, boiled beef, and a small entree. While
they would not be expected to cook, Napoleon expected them to learn
the art of baking. He also allowed dancing, as "is necessary for the health
of the pupils," and vocal music. For all intents and purposes, Ecouen
was to be run like a convent. 51 To make the system work, Napoleon
appointed Jeanne-Louise-Henriette Campan as the superintendent. She
had served Marie Antoinette as a lady-in-waiting, but she had also a per-
sonal understanding of useful education for the less fortunate. As it
turned out, the model at Ecouen was translated into other institutions
of women's education throughout the nineteenth century.
Also important over time was Napoleon's interest in care for the ill.
In the case of women, the Minister of the Interior drew up a national
plan for midwifery education shortly after he received Napoleon's
designs for a girls' school. In the memorandum on Ecouen, the Emperor
had stressed that women ought to have "some idea of medicine and
pharmacology," and in 1808 his recommendation was transformed into
the national normal school of midwifery in Paris, called Ea Maternite,
along with departmental institutions patterned after the Parisian model.
Like other Napoleonic institutions, the curriculum was prescribed.
Future midwives should be fully competent in the practice of birthing

babies, vaccinations, therapeutic bleeding, and the use of medicinal
plants. Textbooks and instrument kits were standardized, and female
mannequins were designed for instructional use. In all, some 1,500 grad-
uates of these midwifery schools practiced in Napoleonic France. 52
Other aspects of medicine were regulated as well. Building on the
medical schools that had been created in 1794, Napoleon insisted that
medicine be clinical and practical. While doctors of medicine and sur-
gery were trained at the university level in one of the grandes ecoles,
Napoleon established a second tier of health professionals (les officiers
de sante) who apprenticed under a physician or who were instructed in
a shorter program of medical education. In this manner, he made a
strong commitment to public health at the local level. With these efforts,
medical care became much more available within the boundaries of
France. On the battlefield and in army encampments, however, medical
care was less available than it had been previously Between 1800 and
1802, the number of military medical personnel dropped by two-thirds.
Napoleon claimed that he was responding to the temporary nature of
war as he centralized and economized the profession, but Napoleon was
also caught in an interesting dilemma. As a military commander, he
wanted injured soldiers back on duty as soon as possible; as a head of
state, he was expected to value human life and to have a permanent com-
mitment to the well-being of his citizens, including the long-term care
of soldiers. When his soldiers were on campaign or on retreat, the
wounded were always a burden; and rather than establishing military
hospitals along the way, many soldiers were simply abandoned. As far
as Napoleon was concerned, military medicine was not an imperial pri-
ority. Nonetheless, independent of support from the government, army
surgeons developed the tourniquet and ligation of blood vessels to man-
age injury-induced bleeding and created better surgical and bandaging
techniques. 53
Even as Napoleon believed that education was the pursuit of ideas
and the dissemination of knowledge, he also had strong beliefs about
which ideas should be shared. The case of literature is perhaps the most
notable example. Not only was Napoleon hostile to studies in literature,
he was hostile to contemporary French writers. Compared to the authors
of antiquity, he found them sorely lacking. French writers were, he said,
for the most part "a load of metaphysical windbags" who produced very
little literature of note. 5 4
Fundamentally Napoleon's position on literature was that nothing
in it should tarnish either his reputation or the reputation of France. He
read nearly everything, and what he did not personally review passed
under the scrutiny of government censors and the police. His insistence
went so far as to restrict the use of allusions to historical events and alle-
gorical references if he believed that they could be viewed in critical
ways. In one notable case, Racine's Athalie was purged of the following
line: "The blood of our kings cries out, but it is not heard." Allegedly,
Napoleon argued, the public might be drawn to think unfavorably of the
execution of the Due d'Enghien. In another case, Napoleon asked
Frangois Rayouard, a playwright whose works he customarily admired,
to reconsider the topic of his play. Napoleon wanted a tragedy in which
"a savior of the nation" would mount to the throne. 55
Meeting places and salons of some of the better-known French
writers, philosophers, and scientists also came under scrutiny. The ideo-
logues, as he named them, had taken republican principles and posi-
tivism too far. What was troubling to Napoleon was their materialism,
their belief in human perfectibility, and their failure to include him in
their debates. They "talk, talk, talk," Napoleon had ranted about them,
as they continually tried to meddle in politics. In fact, even though he
had initially enjoyed good debates with members of his Council of State,
times had changed. He relegated men like the Abbe Sieyes, physician
Pierre Cabanis, and others who had survived the Revolution to some dis-
tance from himself. They were never outward opponents, but Napoleon
never felt that he could completely trust them. He could also never
silence them because they did nothing worthy of full-scale censorship.
When asked about his testy relationship with men who were recognized
writers and critics—some of whom had been his earlier political col-
leagues—Napoleon brushed them off. "They have a craze for interfer-
ing with my policies," he said. "These poor scholars don't understand
themselves." 56
Another less defined group of writers included, among others, Ger-
maine de Stael-Holstein and Benjamin Constant. While Napoleon
allowed the ideologues their peccadilloes, he played no games with out-
right detractors and virulent critics, and Mme de StaeT fit both categories.
Initially she had been enamored by Napoleon's organizational skills and

his support of toleration and constitutionalism. Yet, she also believed in
human perfectibility and was a constant critic of Napoleon's practices.
By 1803, her circle of friends, acerbic tongue, feminist and anglophile
writings (in the novel Delphine), and alleged ties to anti-Napoleon con-
spirators brought down his wrath. She w7as exiled from Paris and then
escorted across the French frontier. While outside of France she contin-
ued to write, again facing Napoleon's anger when he read her manuscript
on Germany. "Your latest work is not French," his minister of police
wrote to her, and Napoleon confiscated the manuscript and had it
destroyed? 7 Her colleague and lover Benjamin Constant had an equally
stormy relationship with the governments of consular and imperial
France. As a liberal, he could not countenance the Empire. Constant was
forced to become a political exile by the man whom he called "Attila"
and "Genghis Khan." Regardless of where he was, he continued to send
his message forward: liberty had to be protected from despotism. 58
France, he argued, had to be protected from Napoleon. For further infor-
mation on Mme de StaeT, see the biographies at the end of this book.
Napoleon's response to his critics was consistent with his politics.
He told them that he refused to govern by theories, platitudes, or spec-
ulation. Instead he would govern by "the experience of centuries." The
history of France had shown him that Frenchmen would embrace
monarchy and aristocracy again so long as the principles of the Revolu-
tion were not effaced. They would accept new structures and solutions
so long as they could feel proud and prosperous again. Napoleon was,
after all, a pragmatist. "Politics is only good sense," he remarked,
"applied to great things." 39
Notes
1. J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton,
2001), 195.
2. Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),
297.
3. "Why Did Napoleon Become Emperor?" Napoleon: International Jour-
nal of the French Revolution and Age of Napoleon, 17 (Fall 2000): 45.
4. J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1987), 163.
65
5. Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 351. According to Schom, the cost was

8,527,973 francs in 1804. Using sources posted by the Economic History Series
(http://eh.net) for conversion of the cost, the value would have been approxi-
mately $102 million in 2001 American dollars.
6. Correspondance de Napoleon, no. 7021, quoted in Schom, Napoleon
Bonaparte, 345.
7. Ibid., 346ff.
8. The 19' X 30' painting that now hangs at Versailles was not com-
pleted until 1807, and Napoleon encouraged David to take liberties with the
treatment of the events. Napoleon, who saw almost everything in terms of pub-
lic relations, had his mother placed in the center of the painting, although she
had not attended the ceremony. His sisters, who allegedly had been disruptive
as they carried Josephine's train, were portrayed as standing idly behind the
empress in her moment of glory. The pope was given a particularly command-
ing presence just behind Napoleon. For further information on David's paint-
ing, consult David Lloyd Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic: Jacques Eouis
David and the French Revolution (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1948).
9. Lucian Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit: aphorisms, citations et opinions
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996), 121
10. Title II of the Law of 29 Floreal, year X, quoted in "La Legion d'Hon-
neur" in Dictionnaire Napoleon, ed. Jean Tulard (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard,
1987), 1055.
11. Ibid.
12. Robert B. Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 197.
13. Memoirs of Count Miot de Melito, 353, quoted in George Gordon
Andrews, Napoleon in Review (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 216.
14. "La Legion d'Honneur" in Dictionnaire Napoleon, 1058.
15. Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 123.
16. "La Legion d'Honneur," in Dictionnaire Napoleon, 1059. See also "La
Cour Imperiale," in Dictionnaire Napoleon, 544-45.
17. Napoleon on Napoleon: an Autobiography of the Emperor, ed. Somerset
de Chair (London: Cassell, 1992), 197.
18. "Lefebvre," in Dictionnaire Napoleon, 1051.
19. Jean Robiquet, La vie quotidienne au temps de Napoleonn (Paris:
Librairie Hachette, 1942), 66.
20. Jean Tulard, La vie quotidienne des Francais sous Napoleon (Paris:
Hachette, 1978), 272.
21. The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from His Written and Spoken Words,
Edited and Translated by J. Christopher Herold (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1955), 97
22. Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), 324.
23. Napoleon to Princess Elisa, February 22, 1806, in Napoleon's Letters:

Selected, Translated and Edited by J. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 121.
24. Melanie Byrd, "Women's Fashion during the Empire," in Napoleon:
International Journal of the French Revolution and Age of Napoleon 17 (Fall 2000):
52; Melanie Byrd, "Clothing Fashion, Women's" in Historical Dictionary of
Napoleonic France, 1799-1815, ed. Owen Connelly (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Press, 1985) 117-19; and "Costume" in Dictionnaire Napoleon, 536.
25. Walter Markov, Grand Empire: Virtue and Vice in the Napoleonic Era
(New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 205.
26. Robiquet, Vie quotidienne, 161.
27. Napoleon to General Duroc, Grand Marshal of the Palace, August 19,
1811, quoted in Napoleons Letters, 255-57.
28. "Louvre," in Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 3 1 0 - 1 3 . In
1803, Napoleon renamed the national museum the Musee Napoleon and
appointed Vivant Denon as his director-general of museums.
29. Napoleon to M. Esteve, Keeper of the Privy Purse, January 9, 1805,
quoted in Napoleons Letters, 92.
30. Guerrini, Maurice, Napoleon and Paris: Thirty Years of History (Lon-
don: Cassell, 1970), Appendix II: "Buildings undertaken in Paris during the
Consulate and Empire. Principal Buildings begun, restored or completed."
31. Markov, Grand Empire, 197. See also "Architecture" in Historical Dic-
tionary of Napoleonic France, 18-20.
32. Guerrini, Napoleon and Paris, 225.
33. "Symbolism and Style," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France,
461.
34. "Medailles historiques," Dictionnaire Napoleon, 1154-55.
35. Robiquet, Vie quotidienne, 241.
37. Napoleon to Josephine, March 22, 1811, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
249.
39. Napoleon to Barbier, July 17, 1808, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
193-94.
40. Napoleon to Eugene, June 5, 1805, and Napoleon to Jerome, August
16, 1801, quoted in ibid., 104 and 71.
41. "Some Maxims of Napoleon," in H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleon (Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1967), 147.
42. Frangois Furet, Revolutionary France, 1770-1880 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1992), 222.
43. Napoleon to Chaptal, Minister for Home Affairs, June 11, 1801,
quoted in Napoleons Letters, 68-70. See also Godechot, "Institutions," in Frank
A. Kafker and James M. Laux, Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations
(Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Publishing Company, 1989), 293.
44. Ibid.
67

46. Note on a Teaching Order, February 16, 1805, quoted in Napoleon's
Letters, 95.
47. "Remarks on a Scheme for Establishing a Faculty of Literature and
History at the College de France," April 19, 1807, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
156.
48. Ibid., 160.
49. "Note," May 15, 1807, quoted in Thompson, Napoleon's Letters, 170.
50. Ibid., 168.
51. Ibid., 169-71.
52. "Women, Education of," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France,
511.
53. Dora B. Weiner, "Medicine," Napoleon and His Times, 258-64.
54. Markov, Grand Empire, 119.
56. "Conversation, 1803," quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 69.
57. Savary to Mme de Stael (October 5, 1810) quoted in Markov, Grand
Empire, 118.
58. "Constant, Benjamin," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France,
128.
59. Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 17.
CHAPTER 4
DAILY LIFE IN
NAPOLEONIC FRANCE
Under Red Umbrellas and Along the Footpaths of

France
Although the Napoleonic era is most often equated with military cam-
paigns and the re-creation of Europe as the Emperor envisioned it,
Napoleonic France was also found in villages, behind stone walls and
hedgerows, in marketplaces, in the festivals of the new order, and among
the citizens whom the Revolution had created. As historian Jean Robi-
quet notes, sometimes larger and better-known events hide smaller ones
from us. It is easy to "neglect what took place in the houses along the
rue Saint-Denis, under the red umbrellas of the Parisian markets, or
beneath elm trees in the provinces." There were, after all, 30,000,000
French men and women who were part of Napoleonic France—from
peasants to tenant farmers, from the urban working classes to shop keep-
ers and craftsmen, from the emerging bourgeoisie to new nobles. Their
stories provide an additional image of Napoleonic France away from the
battlefields and corridors of power. Historian Robiquet further suggests,
these are the "details that merit our attention because collectively they
make up history." In fact, they make "history more human." 1
When Napoleon became First Consul in 1799, France was still
fundamentally a peasant state. Eighty-five percent of its inhabitants lived
in the countryside, and agriculture was at the base of the French econ-
omy. Most people traveled little, unless they happened to be drafted into
the Napoleonic armies. Their lives followed the rhythm of the seasons
and the clock tower that intoned the beginning and the waning of each
day 2 While it appeared that little change had occurred in the country-
side, in fact, feudalism had been thoroughly eradicated and more prop-
erty was available for purchase. As part of the revolutionary restructur-
ing of the French state, municipal and departmental governments were
created, and the sale of offices (venality) was ended. Privileges based on
bloodlines and titles were also struck from French law. Yet, it was widely
known that the newly elected officials easily and quickly fell to
favoritism, bribery, and corruption. Under the new order it appeared that
revolutionary functionaries had simply replaced royal officials as the
new thieves and brigands of France.
As Napoleon moved to his seat of power in the Consulate, he was
painfully aware of the quagmire in which he found municipal affairs. In
1799, he wrote to his brother Lucien: "Mayors, assessors or municipal
councilors have stolen the by-road, stolen the foot-path, stolen the tim-
ber, robbed the church, and filched the property of the commune." 3
There was, in his opinion, little that they had not stolen in their posi-
tions of authority. Napoleon was no doubt exaggerating the extent of the
corruption that he saw, but the problem was real. It was a new kind of
brigandage, according to the First Consul, and it had to be stopped.
As rural France struggled with its problems, urban areas were also
not exempt from revolutionary changes. In fact, the dislocation of the
Revolution and the international wars that accompanied it had affected
cities even more fiercely. While towns of 5,000 inhabitants were the
norm for France, significant population centers existed at the time of the
Revolution and Napoleonic era: Paris housed over a half million in pop-
ulation; Lyons over 100,000; Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Rouen between
85,000 and 100,000; Lille and Strasbourg over 50,000; and Amiens and
Caen over 30,000. 4 Unemployment was rampant, and in places where
the French economy was based on exported luxury goods like lace, fab-
rics, and cutlery, warehouses stood empty and the vast majority of man-
ufacturing workshops had been closed. According to one source, the
port city of Bordeaux on the Atlantic was so economically devastated
that the city treasurer could not even pay to fill city street lamps with oil.
The Napoleonic period was long before electricity, and the only means
of street lighting was oil. Without oil, cities were dangerous wastelands
after dark. In the case of Bordeaux, which was darkened by both lack of
use and nightfall, it had become no more than a "ship cemetery" 3
Paris had its own problems. Fast money was made—and lost as
quickly—in gambling; loose women were everywhere; and walls,
Daily Life in Napoleonic France 71
houses, bridges, and streets were in disrepair. Bullet holes could still be
seen in the fagade of the Tuileries palace, and the effects of vandalism
were evident throughout the city. There were no sidewalks, shallow
ditches ran through the center of the streets in the absence of a sewer
system, and garbage collected everywhere. Charnel houses, where the
bodies of the dead were stacked in lieu of burial, were located in the cen-
ter of the city near slaughterhouses and tanneries where the gutters ran
red with blood and foamed with chemicals. From the outskirts of Paris,
cows were periodically herded through the narrow streets to commercial
butcheries. As small herds navigated the streets and lanes, they endan-
gered pedestrians and carriage traffic. If those problems were not
enough, the stench was horrific. And, it was also commonplace. Only a
good rainstorm could provide some amount of sanitation and relief from
the noxious odors, since municipal ordinances were, for the most part,
ineffective.6 House numbering looked more random than planned; and,
according to one visitor to Paris, mail service was almost totally lacking.
"I could with a good wind," Redhead Yorke reported, "send a letter to
Jamaica faster than a letter would arrive from the provinces." 7
Napoleons work awaited him. As he framed the Constitution of the
Year VIII (1799), he also understood that he could not push too quickly
to change the language, the institutions, or the meaning of the Revo-
lution. It had been only a decade since the French experiment with con-
stitutionalism had begun and only seven years since the French had
adopted republicanism. What Napoleon seemed to know intuitively was
that his authority came from his military victories. His long-term popu-
larity, however, could be assured only by his strength as an organizer,
administrator, and manager of the French state. In such a capacity, he
has been pictured both as a drill sergeant and a schoolmaster, the latter
probably with a piece of cane in his hand to rap the knuckles of his less
willing students. It is unlikely that he would have challenged either
image. 8 What he intended to do was to bring order out of chaos, and
immediately he set to work to do so.
As he stood at center stage in France in the fall and winter of
1799-1800, Napoleon Bonaparte looked unassuming. He was, after all,
a republican general who had taken on a new role to stabilize a fragile
government (the Directory) and an equally fragile economy that he
found upon his return from the Egyptian campaign. Physically he was
in his prime, rising early each morning to work without distractions or
to meet with his councils or diplomatic corps. It was rumored that he

dictated from 50 to 100 letters and proclamations a day when he was
fully engaged in civilian and military endeavors. On those days, "he
would wear out several secretaries trying to keep up with him." 9 He fre-
quently ate only two meals a day, avoided etiquette and ceremony unless
a state occasion was scheduled, and looked really quite ordinary. He
liked old hats, according to one writer, and rarely changed the style of
his clothing regardless of fashion. Although he bore a title comparable
to princeps (given by the Roman Senate to Augustus) and was, for all
intents and purposes, head of state, Napoleon limited his quarters in the
Tuileries to a bedroom, bathroom, study dining room, conference room
(audience chamber), and a large antechamber. Only later did he reno-
vate a state residence at Saint-Cloud and establish his court at the for-
mer royal palace at Fontainebleau. Initially, there was little pretension on
his part. His staff remained small: 10 senior attendants (including a
librarian and chef) and 15 subordinates. What Napoleon did was work
tirelessly and make decisions. 10 "Strong coffee, and plenty, awakens me,"
he noted about his work habits. "It gives me unusual force, a pain that
is not without pleasure." 11
As an administrator, Napoleon first sought to avoid unnecessary
antagonisms and to seek out those who could assist him. Although the
coup that had brought him to power had not gone precisely as planned,
the majority of the French had welcomed him as a peacemaker, both
domestically and internationally In his proclamation to the French peo-
ple, he had furthered that image: "To make the Republic loved by its own
citizens, respected abroad, and feared by its enemies—such are the
duties we have assumed in accepting the First Consulship. Its citizens
will love it if the laws and the authoritative acts of Government are
always marked by the spirit of order, justice and moderation." 12 People
flocked to serve Napoleon. Whether it was because they believed in the
program that he wTas fashioning or because the lure of his power
attracted them, Napoleon quickly had a willing and growing staff to sup-
port him.
In his first six months as First Consul, the pace Napoleon set for
domestic affairs was prodigious, but his decisions always reflected the
Revolution from which he had come. The words Republique francaise
(French republic), for example, remained on the coinage, even though
a much less republican Consulate had replaced the government of the
Daily Life in Napoleonic France
73
Directory. Other revolutionary iconography remained as well. At the
same time Napoleon set himself to conducting substantive change: com-
pletely restructuring both the national and local governments and adapt-
ing electoral policies, framing public opinion, establishing order through
a new bureaucracy and system of policing, creating a peasant policy,
restoring and centralizing banking, encouraging industry and agricul-
tural innovation, and raising the lifestyle and material well-being of most
French citizens. His successes were legion. "Everywhere in Europe," he
remarked in 1800, "some chord is for me. There are people who respond
to my laws, others to my victories—everywhere there is at least one
chord. All that needs be done is touch it." 13
New Names, New Times, and a New Administration

After 10 years of massive revolution from 1789 to 1799, new place
names, new children's names, and even new holidays had been created.
They were all unfamiliar under the prerevolutionary Old Regime. And
then, Napoleon celebrated New Years Day. Such an event was extraor-
dinary and particularly meaningful to the French people.
New Year's Day had been abandoned since 1793 when a new cal-
endar replaced the old. The new calendar had changed everything,
including the length of the week (10 days) and even when the year
began. De-Christianization purged France of saint's days, and the revo-
lutionary republicans had eliminated the old names of months and
weekdays that had previously lent order to French citizens' lives. But by
1800, it was widely known that workers and peasants had abandoned
as much of the new calendar as they could, shunning the decadi (the
10th day of the 10-day week) as their day of rest, in spite of earlier gov-
ernment mandates, and reverting to Sundays. Along with other early
Consular acts, Napoleon's official celebration of New Year's Day in 1800
served as an assurance that the Revolution was over. As quickly as the
announcement was made, bakers and confectioners filled their windows
with hastily created delicacies including, not surprisingly, "bonbons a la
Bonaparte." Carriages lined the streets, and one visitor to Paris wrote
that he had not seen anything in a long time quite as humorous as eight
young gentlemen crammed into a carriage and then piling out along
with their celebratory food and drink. Carnivals reopened, masked
dances were scheduled again, and the streets were filled with activity 14
The pattern was set quickly; Paris became known for its pleasures. "The
bonbons and the sweetmeats of the finest sort . . . were much better than
those in Berlin," wrote a Prussian visitor in 1802. "The fact that Bona-
parte's portrait was produced on everything goes without saying. . . ,"15
Celebrations spread to the provinces as well, where peasants and
agricultural workers equally awaited an end to revolution. Certainly
there had been benefits brought by the Revolution, but many of the
changes remained tenuous or incomplete. While the Revolution had
provided religious toleration, it had also spawned a bloody and pro-
tracted civil war. Outside the boundaries of France, the international war
that the king and Legislative Assembly had begun in 1791 still consumed
young conscripts. The Revolution had provided lands for purchase, but
guarantees that those lands would always be available seemed lacking.
A perennial question was whether or not aristocrats would return to
reclaim them, with or without the sanction of the government. Further-
more, the Revolution had reduced and reallocated taxes, yet no one
knew how long the new system would be in place. Commerce and travel
had opened up when Old Regime tolls were eliminated and standard
weights, measures, and currency were put in place; but the transition
had been fraught with problems: hoarding, inflation, and lack of confi-
dence. Frankly, over four-fifths of the French population had yet to expe-
rience the long-term, positive results of a decade of revolution. Always
a pragmatist, Napoleon slowly but surely began to transform their world.
Who were these people? According to Jean Tulard, who has writ-
ten extensively on everyday life in France, the peasants were a diverse
group, in many ways incapable of generalization. They were manual
laborers, seasonal workers, cultivators and planters, domestics, servants,
tenant farmers, owners of small plots of land, agrarian landlords, and
absentee farm owners. 16 In spite of their differences and their different
needs, Napoleon seemed to know how to reach them. First, he proposed
to his brother Lucien, who also served as Minister for Home Affairs (also
called Minister of the Interior), a complete restructuring of local gov-
ernment. While the Revolution had promoted the idea of individual lib-
erty, Napoleon saw collective change as the way to prosperity. "If one is
to regenerate a nation," he wrote, "it is much simpler to deal with its
inhabitants a thousand at a time than to pursue the romantic ideal of
individual welfare. Each local body in France represents 1,000 inhabi-
tants. If you work for the prosperity of 36 thousand communities you
Daily Life in Napoleonic France 75
will be working for that of 36 million inhabitants." 17 Napoleon acknowl-

edged in his memorandum that his proposal was similar in intent to
what Frances well-loved King Henry IV (1589-1610) had put forward
two centuries earlier. King Henry IV was known to every school-aged
child in France for his pledge to put a chicken in every pot by rebuild-
ing France's economy after two decades of religious and political con-
flict. Napoleon saw Henry IV as an excellent model.
To put his plan into action, Napoleon demanded a survey of all of
the municipalities of France to determine which were solvent or nearly
so, which were profitable, and which were hopelessly in debt. The com-
munes that were massively debt ridden would be stripped of their may-
ors, assessors, and councilors. Replacements would be sought, and
France's officials of the state—prefects and subprefects—would practice
strict oversight including frequent and meticulous audits. Within two
years, those mayors who had achieved profitability would be rewarded;
if communes had not achieved solvency within five years, they would be
put into receivership. By the Law of February 17, 1800, the new system
was in place.
Within the new system, Napoleon did not dramatically change the
French administrative order that had been set by the revolutionaries. As
established, departments were administrative units directly under the
national government. Departments were then subdivided into districts,
and districts into cantons and communes (municipalities). What
changed, however, was that formerly elected officials were replaced by
appointed prefects (departments), subprefects (districts) and mayors (for
cities over 5,000 in population). These appointments were, in fact, made
in Paris. In the case of smaller towns and communities, prefects at the
department level made the appointments. Napoleon was aware that
these changes in the method of staffing administrative posts might pro-
voke controversy; so, in order to avoid criticisms that he had abrogated
the principles of the Revolution, he reaffirmed its electoral policies. Vot-
ing privileges remained the right of all male citizens who met certain age
and residency requirements, but elections were no longer direct. At the
local level, voters established electoral lists from which appointments to
governmental posts would be made or from which other lists of eligible
officeholders would be drawn. Eligibility for one or more of the electoral
lists was based on property holding. For whatever reason, the change
from elected officials to electoral lists and appointed functionaries went
into effect almost without notice. Although the change could have
appeared draconian or heavy-handed to French citizens, it began to
restore order and with it, prosperity.
Among the primary concerns of Napoleon was order, and the pre-
fects whom he appointed as his chief administrative officers were
responsible for overseeing a well-managed state. As such, Napoleon
judged his prefects on the comprehensiveness and promptness of their
reports, the efficiency with which they handled conscription, and the
state of public works, including roads, in their departments. They were
expected to work with the subprefects, police, forestry agents, and jus-
tices of the peace systematically to stamp out crime, highway robbery,
and brigandage and to show no leniency toward draft dodgers. His order
was comprehensive, and his intent was to bring an end to the anarchy
that he saw at the local level.
Even senators at the national level were enlisted in centralizing
France and restoring order. In a note for the Secretary of State in 1805,
Napoleon made no pretense about the importance of information to gov-
ern France. Senators were ordered to reside in their jurisdictions no less
than three continuous months per year; "the ostensible object . . . will
be to get to know the situation, character, condition and value of the
property from which the income of your senatorerie is derived." The real
object was "to supply [Napoleon] with trustworthy and positive infor-
mation on any point which [might] interest the government." Reports
were required once a week, without fail.18 The contents of the reports
were also specified: information about the behavior of public officials,
comments about the clergy and their influence, estimates of the num-
bers of draft-dodgers, surveys of public education including specifics
about "teachers of marked ability and . . . those who have done nothing
to deserve public confidence," notes on agriculture including informa-
tion on the rearing of horses, wrool bearing animals and livestock, esti-
mates of food supply and future harvests, evaluations of the condition of
roads and other public works, and, most important, analyses of the state
of public opinion. i g In Paris, Napoleon employed even more stringent
surveillance. There Joseph Fouche, as the French Minister of Police,
oversaw a coterie of spies within the state and throughout Europe, cease-
lessly perused reports from his police informants, began a massive crack-
down on crime, and made sure that the press reflected Napoleon's
positions correctly. To do so, in the first few months of the Consulate,
Da/7y Life in Napoleonic France 77
Fouche was entrusted with closing down 47 of France's newspapers and

ferreting out conspirators against the new regime. His contemporaries
described him as a quintessential policeman, devoid of feeling and
obsessed with order. According to historian Alan Schom, "he rarely
moved, apart from his long, bony hands, only his weasel eyes and alert
ears following everyone and every conversation, noting everything,
missing nothing." 20 He was a man to be feared, and everyone knew it.
Napoleon's administrative plan was also based on another of his
principles—to reward talent and merit in visible ways. Although one of
the chief revolutionary principles was equality, Napoleon made no
apologies for creating a social order that contained distinctions. Those
distinctions were based on something tangible—talent and merit—and
the privileges that accompanied them were earned. Later, when Napo-
leon felt comfortable, he created new military and civilian awards and an
aristocracy replete with coats of arms and titles. In 1800, however, the
time was not yet ripe for a new aristocracy, but the trinkets that he dis-
tributed carried sufficient weight to do what he intended, whether he
scheduled a medal ceremony, invited a mayor to Paris for an audience
with the First Consul, or rewarded an inventor for his new patent.
According to one story, the recipient of an early Napoleonic award was
so awed by the presence of the First Consul as he received his recogni-
tion that he remarked, "Instead of giving me a medal, if he had asked to
sleep with my wife, I would have been just fine with it." 21
For peasants and agricultural workers, the greatest reward was the
expansion of property holding. According to one historian, "The revo-
lution turned the French peasants into free men on free land. However,
this freedom did not simply drop into their laps." 22 In fact, the right to
acquire land did not always translate into the ability to buy it until the
Napoleonic period when banking and currency were stabilized and peas-
ants had more resources. By the time Napoleon had completed two years
as First Consul, one third of the auctioned, available lands was in the
hands of peasants. By the end of his reign as Emperor, the tally was 60
percent, although most of the plots were of modest size or small. At the
same time, a rural middle class, holding larger parcels of land, came into
existence. 23
Napoleon was fully aware that peasants were still the backbone of
the economy as France entered the nineteenth century. In order to
increase the prosperity of France and French citizens, agricultural pro-
ductivity had to increase—not just in output but in quality as well. What

mattered was the willingness and capacity of French farmers to innovate.
Yet, even with the expansion of property holding, Napoleon did not wit-
ness the amount of agricultural innovation that he desired. While farm-
ers were not bound to the medieval two-field system, leaving a field
fallow each year, or the three-field system with crop rotation, neverthe-
less, such agricultural practices remained the norm. Sheep raising,
wheat, and potatoes continued as common agricultural commodities.
By 1805, however, Napoleon was fed up with agricultural stagna-
tion. Instead of working with the Imperial School of Agriculture to make
change, he simply abolished it and designed his own plan for modern-
izing French agrarian practices. Just as he had done when he restruc-
tured the local administrative governments of France, he commissioned
a survey. This time he surveyed agricultural production in the various
departments of France. The results were encouraging in the northern
departments of France, along the Channel, and in the Rhineland, but
elsewhere there was substantial room for improvement. What Napoleon
quickly recognized was that common manual laborers and owners of the
smallest of parcels were too busy simply making a living to be concerned
about improving their holdings and increasing their ability to produce
more. He realized that he could not expect them to buy into his plan
until they were more able to do so. Rather, the wealthier peasants and
landowners were more likely to respond to governmental favor. In
studying wealthier peasant landowners, Napoleon determined that
financial incentives were not sufficient or plentiful enough to bring
about the desired results. He noted: "People of this kind are not encour-
aged by grants or money, but by medals, and decorations, and eulogies
addressed to them by or on behalf of the sovereign."24 He then entrusted
prefects and subprefects with the task of identifying prime candidates for
medals and recognitions. Although Napoleon's decision seemed coun-
terintuitive, time proved him correct.
In the same "Note on Agriculture," Napoleon also expanded the
distribution of Merino sheep from Spain (especially rams), stallions, and
foreign bulls. Furthermore, he counseled, "Good landlords should be
encouraged to send their sons to study the methods in use in Depart-
ments where agriculture is flourishing."25 To Napoleon, good models
almost always served as the best teachers.
When by 1810-1811 French agriculture still did not fully supply

national needs and France's embargo (under the Continental System)
made supply of even the basic commodities a problem, Napoleon again
interceded in agriculture. In this case, by Imperial Decree, he set aside
80,000 acres for sugar beet production and established six schools to
teach the principles of cultivation. Tobacco farmers were instructed to
abandon tobacco in favor of sugar beets; cattle farmers were counseled
to use the waste products of sugar beets for cattle feed.26 Beginning in
1813, the importation of English cane sugar was prohibited, but the pro-
duction of sugar from beets and its profitability remained marginal.
Peasant farmers refused to participate in the program and returned to
wheat, if they had changed to beet production at all. Other projects that
Napoleon endorsed included the production of pastel (blue dyes) and
chicory. In the case of dye, Napoleon's prize had been 100,000 francs for
its successful production. But profitability in the short term was again
the downfall of this experiment. Napoleon's aim had been to have the
French state become self-sufficient, rather than to be held hostage by
colonial or foreign trade. By 1813, with France engaged in withdrawal
from Spain and retreat from Russia, the French no longer had the lux-
ury of experimentation.
Even though Napoleon could not fundamentally alter French agri-
culture, he had shown what needed to be done, and during the Empire,
material life improved for the vast majority of peasants. Only the land-
less migrant workers were left behind by revolutionary and Napoleonic
reforms. As had been true in the past, households were typically com-
posed of multigenerational extended families, including servants.
Houses were cramped, decorations and furnishings were limited, and a
common room served as a space for eating, sleeping, domestic chores,
conviviality, and celebrations. Privacy was only found in the curtained
bed enclosure that provided a haven from the cold and prying eyes when
couples engaged in intimacies. Yet, over the Napoleonic years, wealth-
ier peasant families acquired armoires or wardrobes for their growing
possessions, and some families added clocks, ornamental candlesticks,
and porcelain services to their inventories. Even food was reasonably
plentiful until 1810 when the harvest was mediocre at best. Until then,
families could count on meat and fruit to augment their standard diet of
bread, locally grown vegetables (particularly beans), and occasional
meat from the hunt. Wine, frequently diluted with water, was the most
common drink. 2/
Toward the end of his reign as Emperor, it was common knowledge
that nearly every peasant household displayed a portrait of Napoleon on
its cottage wall. Members of the peasant class considered him the Peo-
ple's Emperor, even when the Napoleonic wars were incessant and their
sons and brothers continued to fight so long and so hard for him.
New Currency, New Incentives, and New Public

Works
In spite of Napoleon's many and varied early efforts as First Con-
sul, the economy did not turn around as quickly as he would have liked,
and he found himself dealing with a shortfall in French revenues, lack
of specie, continued unemployment, and inflation. He quickly shifted
his focus from municipal affairs to banking and specifically to the trea-
sury of France. While Napoleon always felt that he knew7 what he was
doing on the battlefield and in politics, the First Consul recognized that
his knowledge of fiscal matters was really quite limited. When in doubt,
he always turned to men whose mastery of the subject he admired. In
the case of French finances and fiscal policy, he turned to Minister of
Finance Michel Gaudin; Frangois-Nicholas Mollien, director of what
was called the Sinking Fund; and Frangois de Barbe-Marbois, director
and later Minister of the Treasury. Together, their recommendations were
instrumental in bringing France back from the brink of financial disas-
ter. To centralize and stabilize banking, the Banque de France (Bank of
France) was created in 1800. Its authority included setting interest rates
for loans, being a repository for government funds, issuing securities,
and serving private customers as well. The bank was founded with stock
held both privately and by the government, and in 1803 it was granted
the sole right to mint money. Initial deposits came from tolls, the
national lottery, and the sale of securities. Once the Bank of France was
established, additional permanent revenues came from direct taxes
(property and income) as well as customs duties, taxes on luxury goods,
liquors and tobacco, and business and commercial licenses.
Under Michel Gaudin's purview was the Caisse d'amortissement—
a cash reserve to protect the government against France's national debt
(i.e., the Sinking Fund). It alone, however, could not insure confidence
about French solvency, so a significant portion of the French debt was

repudiated or written off by the government. In 1801 by national law, the
debt was reduced from 100 million francs to 37 million francs; and
recently acquired territories and occupied lands were subjected to
extraordinary taxes to bring immediate assets into the treasury. Addi-
tional measures designed to inspire confidence in the government
included payment of pensions and interest on a regular schedule in
specie (gold and silver) and the creation of an Office of Direct Taxation
that took taxation out of the hands of local officials, both to eliminate
corruption and to provide accurate accounts and audits. 28
As far as currency was concerned, the French experience with any-
thing other than precious metals had been tragic, so Napoleon moved
swiftly to return to specie. Early in the eighteenth century, John Law's
experiment with paper currency based on the value of French North
American lands had left France in massive debt and Law in exile. Other
attempts under the revolutionary governments to use paper currencies
called assignats and mandats territoriaux had failed as well. The experi-
ments had been fraught with overprinting, devaluation, inflation, and
ultimately lack of confidence. In the case of the assignats, for example,
their decline had been precipitous. Issued in 1791, they were worth only
3 percent of their value at issue by 1795. To picture a peasant or Parisian
worker with his wheelbarrow heaped with assignats to buy a few loaves
of bread would not have been far from the truth, except that he would
have been unable to find a baker or merchant ready to accept a wheel-
barrow filled with currency. What Napoleon endorsed by a law of March
28, 1803 was the establishment of the franc as the basic unit of currency,
its value based on 5 grams of silver or the equivalent of .322 grams of
gold. As the Banque de France issued bank notes, they were tied
expressly to the value of treasury deposits of those precious metals.
Interestingly, the gold and silver standard set in 1803 remained for 123
years as the basis of the franc. 29
Even before Napoleon engineered his currency adjustments, he
was able to announce a balanced budget of 500 million francs in 1801.
Throughout the Napoleonic period, direct taxes remained equitable
across the population, the franc maintained its value, the Banque de
France remained solvent, and interest on the national debt was paid reg-
ularly. This is not to suggest, however, that the French did not feel the
effects of financial crises during the Napoleonic period. In late summer
and fall of 1805, France experienced a severe run on the Banque de

France, commercial difficulties, and the failure of several private banks.
Rumors exacerbated the problems, but Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz
restored confidence. In 1806-1807 the economy again bottomed out,
and the Banque responded with loans at 2 percent. In 1810-1811, at the
height of the Continental System, Napoleon was forced to extract more
wealth from conquered territories. 30 When he was questioned by mer-
chants and government officials about his policies, he replied testily, "I
am the only one in Europe with money today" 3 1 Regardless of the diffi-
culties, which were almost exclusively tied to the resumption and con-
tinuation of war, Napoleon demanded strict adherence to the fiscal
policy that only he could adapt. And, over all, the combination of a
sound currency and stable banking system—along with steady direct
taxes, indirect taxes as needed, and wealth extracted from conquered ter-
ritories by the Napoleonic armies—proved effective.
Industrial growth was next on Napoleon's agenda. Woefully behind
England in industrialization, Napoleon encouraged French innovation to
make up the pace. Beginning in 1802, Napoleon sponsored trade fairs and
industrial exhibitions, one of the largest taking place in 1806 when 1,400
exhibitors participated. When Napoleon saw7 ingenuity, he rewarded it,
for example Joseph Marie Jacquard, who developed a power loom to pro-
duce and reproduce large patterns in textiles. Frangois Richard, whose
firm was later called Richard-Lenoir, became the "French cotton king"
through his expansion of cotton production and development of blends
of wool and cotton fibers. At the height of his success, over 12,000 labor-
ers were engaged in spinning, weaving, and textile production. 32
Since the Revolution had eliminated guilds, Napoleon envisioned
governmental oversight assuring quality in industrial production. Qual-
ity control was important because Napoleon wanted to see French
industry dominate the continent, fully supplying the state, conquered
lands, and allies. In 1807, for example, writing to the Minister of the
Interior, he enjoined the minister to contact local groups of workers to
tell them "that the local factories are not doing their work in such a way
as to maintain their reputation." What prompted his involvement in tap-
estry production at that moment was his displeasure with the rose and
gold-trimmed green tapestries that they had produced for his residence
at Saint Cloud. He was annoyed because the tapestries were already
looking noticeably worn. "Foreigners [who might visit him]," he
Da/7y Life in Napoleonic France
83
remarked, "are bound to form a very bad impression of the Lyon facto-
ries." 33 French goods needed to be competitive; it was an issue of
national prosperity.
Napoleon's concern for industry was coupled with a drive for full
employment. While France was at war throughout most of the Napoleonic
period, conscription and employment in the military rarely accounted for
more than 3 percent of the population and positions at all government lev-
els for more than 5 percent. In order to track unemployment, Napoleon
turned again to a centralized solution—the livret d'ouvrier—a worker's
passport or identity card that laborers were required to present in order to
work. So long as workers were employed, the employer kept the livret on
file. Workers without livrets or permanent addresses could be arrested as
vagabonds and vagrants and jailed. In such a labor environment, workers
clamored for their livrets to avoid almost certain police action against
them. Since the revolutionary Le Chapelier Law of 1791 continued to be
enforced during the Napoleonic period, labor unrest was at a minimum,
although illegal strikes certainly took place. 34 The Le Chapelier Law,
which was based on the revolutionary principle of individual rights, pre-
cluded collective or unified action by associations of workers. As far as
labor conditions were concerned, the workday averaged 10 hours, down
from the longer days of the Old Regime and revolutionary eras. Nowhere
in Europe, however, had health and safety issues been addressed, and child
labor at early ages remained a constant in France. Not until much later in
the century would further work conditions be addressed.
When the government noticed unemployment creeping up again,
it engaged as many workers as possible in military supply. Cobblers were
set to making shoes for the army, so long as the shoes were of good qual-
ity; hat makers' skills were enlisted to make shakos (military headwear);
and other unemployed workers fabricated baggage carts. 35 When even
those measures could not better the condition of the unemployed and
disadvantaged, Napoleon called for the expansion of soup kitchens for
the distribution of Rumford soup. Created by an American-born inven-
tor-scientist, it was free to indigents and sold at low cost to others.
According to reports, Rumford soup was a miracle broth requiring no
flour in its preparation, and it was allegedly as nutritious as bread. While
communes could, in all likelihood, manage their own distribution,
Napoleon contracted out the building and maintenance of these agen-
cies of social welfare in Paris. By 1812, in Paris alone 30,000 pounds of
bread and ^0,000 0 bowls of Rumford soup had fed the population. The
work had been so successful that Napoleon reported, "We may fairly
boast nowadays that not a single inhabitant of Paris suffers from lack of
food." 36
Through all of the changes, Napoleon kept his fingers firmly on the
pulse of France. At one moment, he might be counseling his ministers
to survey for new bridges across the Seine while instructing them to
erect statues to famous men and figures of antiquity whom French citi-
zens should note: Demosthenes, Alexander, Hannibal, Cicero, Wash-
ington, and Frederick the Great, among others. At another moment, he
reminded his police to enforce the laws on posting anything on the walls
of Paris or displaying anything counter to good morality. Among all of
the activities, he also took interest in regulating gambling and creating
a system for dealing with the ubiquitous prostitutes of the city. In their
case, the French government began its system of registration and medi-
cal checkups to control the spread of sexually transmitted disease. 37 In
one note, he excoriated a priest at Bourges for his "extremely bad ser-
mon"; in another, he approved erecting a statue of Joan of Arc in Orleans
as a symbol that "there is no miracle French genius cannot perform in
face of a threat against national freedom/' 3 8 Cemeteries and charnel
houses with their open graves and decaying bodies were removed from
the center of Paris. Where other public projects unearthed human bones,
they were cleaned and removed to the Parisian catacombs where they
were stacked neatly by bone type as the Romans had done. Ultimately
the catacombs became "a source of wonder and amusement" for special
imperial guests. 39 Reconstruction began on the city sewer system,
although the present gravity-fed underground system was not completed
until several decades later.
If peasant cottages in the countryside always displayed their por-
traits of Napoleon, there wras no need for urban residents of Paris to do
so. The city itself was a Napoleonic emblem—from public parks to pub-
lic art and architecture. Daily life had been permanently altered, and ulti-
mately many French citizens placed Napoleon alongside Charlemagne,
Henry IV, and Louis XIV in the pantheon of great French leaders.
Yet, for all of the constructive changes that had taken place, it must
always be remembered that common French men and women, particu-
larly those who owned little or no property, remained the least touched
by the Revolution and Napoleonic prosperity, as long as it lasted. Histo-
85
rians generally disagree on the reasons for Napoleon's continued popu-

larity with the masses, but they can agree that there was a cult-like qual-
ity to his continued favor. A police report in 1808 intoned: "The
multitude has work and is comfortable. It is content. It loves the
Emperor." 40 For urban dwellers, there had been at least a 25 percent
increase in salaries, although the increase had not affected all French
men and women equally and costs had increased proportionally. Yet,
there was a perception of greater material well-being. In the countryside,
in spite of conscription into the Napoleonic armies, the peasants were
"his warmest partisans." According to one of Napoleon's officials, what
mattered most was that he had "reassured them against the return of
tithes, feudal rights, the restitution of property to emigres, and the
oppression of the lords." 41 He had brought order to them, efficiently and
simply. And, it should never be forgotten, he brought military glory, and
he shared it with them.
Notes
1. Jean Robiquet, La vie quotidienne au temps de Napoleon (Paris:
Librairie Hachette, 1942), 7.
2. Jean Tulard, La vie quotidienne des Francais sous Napoleon (Paris:
Hachette, 1978), 18.
3. Napoleon to Lucien Bonaparte, December 25, 1799, quoted in Napo-
leon's Letters: Selected, Translated and Edited by f. M. Thompson (London: Prion,
1998), 58.
4. Tulard, La vie quotidienne, 198.
5. Robiquet, La vie quotidienne, 14-15.
6. Ibid., 73-78. See also Nicholas Restif de la Bretonne, Les nuits de Paris
or the Nocturnal Spectator (New York: Random House, 1964), Alain Corbin, The
Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and Donald Reid, Paris Sewers and Sew-
ermen: Realities and Representations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1991).
7. Henri Redhead Yorke, Paris et la France sous le Consulat (Paris: Per-
rin, 1896), 302.
8. Owen Connelly, The Epoch of Napoleon (Malabar, Fla.: Robert E.
Krieger, 1972), 169.
9. "Napoleon Governs an Empire," Napoleon: International Journal of the
French Revolution and Age of Napoleon 17 (Fall 2000): 46.
10. Frangois Furet, Revolutionary France, 1770-1880 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1992), 219. See also J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix
Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2001), 156, and J. Christopher Herold, The
Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), 125.
11. "The Dawn of Gastronomy," Napoleon: International Journal of the
French Revolution and Age of Napoleon 17 (Fall 2000): 50.
12. Correspondance de Napoleon, no. 4447, quoted in Thompson, Napo-
leon Bonaparte, 146.
13. The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from His Written and Spoken Words,
Edited and Translated by J. Christopher Herold (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1955), 163.
14. Robiquet, La vie quotidienne, 26-29.
15. J. F Reichardt, quoted in Walter Markov, Grand Empire: Virtue and
Vice in the Napoleonic Era (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 193.
16. Tulard, La vie quotidienne, 22-50.
17. Napoleon to Lucien Bonaparte, December 25, 1799, quoted in Napo-
leon's Letters, 57.
18. Note for the Secretary of State, March 28, 1805, quoted in Napoleon's
Letters, 97.
19. Ibid., 98-99.
20. Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonapartee (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),
264.
21. Robiquet, La vie quotidienne, 37.
22. Markov, Grand Empire, 79.
24. Note on Agriculture, March 1, 1805, quoted in Napoleon's Letters, 96.
25. Ibid., 97.
26. Note for the Minister for Home Affairs, March 18, 1811, quoted in
Napoleon's Letters, 248-49.
27. Tulard, La vie quotidienne, , 55-57. See also Anne-Marie Nisbet and
Victor-Andre Massena, EEmpire a table (Paris: Adam Biro, 1988), 149.
28. Connelly, Epoch of Napoleon, 4 2 - 4 3 and Roger Dufraisse, Napoleon
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 54-57.
29. "Franc," in Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799-1815,5, ed.
Owen Connelly (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 191.
30. Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 395-96, 567.
31. Napoleon's Address to the Council of Commerce and Manufactures,
(Spring 1810), quoted in Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 567.
32. Markov, Grand Empire, 9 1 .
33. Note for M. Cretet, Minister of Home Affairs, September 2, 1807,
quoted in Napoleons Letters, 175.
34. Markov, Grand Empire, 92-95.
35. Napoleon to General LaCuee, May 2, 1811, quoted in Napoleon's Let-
ters, 252.
36. Napoleon to the Ministerial Council, March 11, 1812, quoted in
Napoleon's Letters, 265-66.
87
37. Linda Merians, ed. The Secret Malady: Venereal Disease in Eighteenth-
Century Britain and France (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996). See
also Jill Harsin, Policing Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century Paris (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
38. Napoleon to Portalis (September 19, 1805), and Napoleon to Chap-
tal, February 9, 1803, quoted in Napoleon's Letters, 112, 79.
39. Reid, Paris Sewers, 16.
40. Police report of August 26, 1808, quoted by Raymonde Monnier, "An
Example: the Parisian Wage Earner," in Frank A. Kafker and James M. Laux,
Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations (Malabar,
M Fla.: Krieger Publish-
ing Company, 1989), 165.
41. Jean-Antoine Chaptal quoted by Jean Tulard, "A Survey of Peasants
and City Workers," in ibid., 152.
CHAPTER 5
NAPOLEON AND THE

FRENCH ARMIES
In War There Is Only One Favorable Moment

In 1803, Napoleon approved a resolution to erect a statue of Joan of Arc
in Orleans. In part, the resolution stated: "There is no miracle French
genius cannot perform. . . . The French nation has never known de-
feat."1 Although Napoleon was commenting on Joan of Arc's career, he
was never shy about his own military genius or his ability to remain
undefeated. "Military genius is a gift from heaven," he later wrote; and
the gift had been reserved for himself.2 From Arcola in the First Italian
Campaign in 1797 to his retreat from Russia in 1813, he consistently
described himself as a man who took charge and as a man who was in
control. He could instill a fanatical love for France in his troops and
drive them forward at unheard of speeds. He was a master at seizing an
opportunity, because he knew that there were no second chances on the
battlefield. "In war," he remarked, "there is only one favorable moment.
The greatest talent is to know it." 3
Students of Napoleon quickly learn that battles, operations, and
military campaigns tend to dominate writings on the period. Standard
biographies of Napoleon, for example, often follow a traditional pattern
of chapter titles: from Corsica to Toulon and Nice; to Italy and Egypt;
then, after the Peace of Amiens, either a history viewed through cam-
paigns or defined by his chief enemies (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Britain);
and finally Leipzig, Waterloo, and his personally embattled exile on St.
Helena. 4 Statistics of Napoleonic military history easily confirm the pat-
tern. He fought over 60 battles in his 23 years of active service, and two
million native-born men served in his armies from 1804 until 1815. He
oversaw 32 drafts, and final casualties have been placed at over a mil-
lion men, among them 15,000 officers.3 His campaigns took French sol-
diers from Scandinavia in the north of Europe to Sicily in the south. His
men went as far as Lisbon on the west and Moscow on the east. The
world outside of Europe was also his domain; his men saw duty from the
Caribbean basin all the way to Egypt and Syria on the Mediterranean
Sea. India and the Far East provided an allure, although he was never
able to follow through. Louisiana would not have been impossible
except for the revolt in Saint Domingue (Haiti) that ended his designs
in the New World.
During his time and later, Napoleon was described as the Corsican
ogre, a man of blood, a modern Attila, Robespierre on horseback, and
the prime instigator of Armageddon. But, he was also placed on the list
of redoubtable leaders for his powerful personality, piercing gray eyes,
hypnotic presence, iron determination, prodigious memory, and ability
to analyze. 6 He had amazing energy and the ability to scramble his
troops. He was a master of contingencies, responding to chance and
turning it to his advantage. 7 As he practiced the art and science of war,
he also studied it. In his youth, he had devoured writings on great mil-
itary leaders of the past, and he continued to do so throughout his
life. They included Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Marshal-General
Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, Frederick the Great of Prussia, Alexan-
der the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar. 8 From them he distilled the essence
of his strategy: "to keep [the] forces united; to leave no weak part
unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points." 9 Later he added
additional tenets: "to be up and doing and to be firmly resolved to die a
soldier's death." 10 In the final analysis, the great commanders of history
had also known "how to master chance." 11 When he took to the field, he
appeared unstoppable. He inspired fear, if not terror. In over two decades
of battles, he was only wounded twice; and to his enemies and troops
he appeared invincible. See Document 7 at the end of this book for a
selection of observations on war that he shared with Las Cases during
his exile.
Behind the legends that Napoleon built, there was also a man who
was obsessed with detail. He likened his brain to a cabinet: "Different sub-
jects and different affairs are arranged in my head as a cupboard. When I
wish to interrupt one train of thought, I shut that drawer and open
Napoleon and the French Armies 91
another. Do I wish to sleep? I simply close all the drawers and there I am—
asleep." 12 Just as his brain was organized in a certain way, he systematically
organized his military information. On campaign, for example, he com-
missioned portable boxes with easily accessible compartments that were
designed to hold small cards. Information, regiment by regiment and bat-
talion by battalion, was posted on each card, so that Napoleon would
know at a glance the enemy's position, troop strength, and potential move-
ments. In companion compartments, he could access his own intelligence
data. Napoleon also designated one individual who was fluent in the lan-
guage of the region to maintain the traveling card file.13 Along with his
correspondence and notes, his portable box was never out of his sight
unless it was carefully secured.
It is easy to picture Napoleon as he sat at his camp table, note cards
and documents laid out in front of him. There in the wealth of informa-
tion, he mastered detail, made choices, and let nothing slip by. In one
case, for example, he laid out false information to confuse the enemy. In
another case, while plotting his enemy's troop maneuvers, he interrupted
himself to order a new patriotic song and to commission inspiring plays
for the French public and for performances in his casernes. 14 He knew
that the morale of his country was as important as the morale of his sol-
diers. The drawers in the cupboard of his brain were easily opened; his
card file was always available.
An Argument without End

Although Napoleon was master of Europe for a decade and a half,
the title "Napoleon the Great" was never applied to him; and there are
no simple answers to explain why. Napoleon was, without a doubt, both
a great and controversial figure in his own time, and he remains so today.
In fact, Pieter Geyl, who wrote a classic work called Napoleon: For and
Against (1949), said it best: "History is indeed an argument without
end." 15 In reviewing the writings of historians, Geyl knew that there
were unanswered questions—polemics and controversies that had no
easy answers. In the case of Napoleon's military legacy, the debate cen-
ters on two primary questions. First, what were Napoleon's contribu-
tions to warfare? Did he create a new method? Was there a formula for
victory? Second, was Napoleon a man of peace? Did he ever intend to
have peace? If he did strive for it, under what circumstances would he
have negotiated it? To understand Napoleon as a commander who never
became "Napoleon the Great," we cannot ignore these questions.
In attempting to answer the first question, perhaps we should
restate it. Did Napoleon invent anything new in the theory or practice
of war? Biographer H. A. L. Fisher has provided one of the more cate-
gorical answers to this question. He wrote simply, "He invented noth-
ing." 16 Fisher's judgment may initially sound harsh to students of the
Emperor, but other historians have at least partially agreed. As we
answer the question, we should consider Napoleon's contributions to
warfare in two aspects: the first relates to the theory of warfare and its
use in planning and the second deals with equipment and operations on
the field of battle. As far as theory and planning are concerned, histori-
ans who have relied on Napoleon's writings have found themselves lack-
ing evidence. Napoleon did not help his case. "I never had a plan of
operations," Napoleon was quoted as saying. 17 "Everything is common
sense," he reported, "theory is nothing." 1 8 And it is true that no
Napoleonic battle was a copy of another. If we believe Napoleon's words
that he never had a plan of operations, it was because he had many pos-
sibilities. Napoleons more likely meaning was that he never formulated
so strict a plan that he was irrevocably bound to it. Rigidity had to be
avoided; mobility had to be preserved. To Napoleon, responding to acci-
dent could make all of the difference in the world, so he planned for it
"almost mathematically" 1 9 He laid out what he intended, placed him-
self in the opponent's position, and then recalculated everything—time
and time again. For the most part, he also did not like to commit his
plans to paper. It wras better, he thought, to keep his commanders guess-
ing until the battle was committed. In practice, the latter principle
became one of his hallmarks: unity of command.
In operations, Napoleon borrowed extensively from proven military
tactics; and, when evaluating equipment, he saw no reason to redesign
what had previously proven its worth. For artillery, he followed the lead
of Count J.-B. Vacquette de Gribeauval (1715-1789), who had designed
field pieces for Louis XV and Louis XVI. Gribeauval had, in fact, stan-
dardized guns into three types (12-, 8-, and 4-pounders), complemented
by howitzers and mortars. Furthermore, in recasting weapons, Gribeau-
val had been able to reduce their weight to increase their mobility. Addi-
tional improvements included inclination markers, better sighting,
Napoleon and the French Armies
93
prepackaged shot, and better carriages. Along with Gribeauval's mechan-

ical improvements, Napoleon had learned the lessons of the Chevalier
Jean du Teil (1733-1820), whose book on the use of field artillery coun-
seled the commander to begin battles with artillery fire followed by the
deployment of infantry, and to amass his guns at critical moments. The
advice was well taken. Although one might assume that Napoleon
increased artillery strength because of his training, in fact, Napoleon kept
the ratio of cannon to men approximately what it had been: three can-
non per 1,000 men, although he had hoped to increase the ratio to four
per 1,000 men.
Other influences on Napoleon included Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte
de Guibert's Essai general de tactique (General Essay on Tactics), Pierre
Bourcets writings on mountainous warfare, and Marshal Victor Frangois
de Broglie's use of the division as the standard unit of maneuver, although
Napoleon later adopted the corps instead of the division. From Guibert,
in particular, he learned that an army's speed was critical to its success.
When needed, therefore, an army should reduce or abandon its army
train and live off the land. He also perfected the ordre mixte for the
attack—the use of both line and column. 20 From Frederick the Great,
Napoleon learned guile and cunning, if he did not already know them,
and the importance of a decisive outcome. He followed the Prussian
king's advice on flanking maneuvers, and he made a point of preserving
his line of operations almost at all cost. Lazare Carnot, the "Organizer of
Victory" under the Jacobins and Directory, provided the system of supply,
as well as foundries and factories to support the war effort.
What then was Napoleon's contribution to warfare? Very simply, he
functioned effectively and he achieved victory, battle after battle, year
after year. The rest, most historians would agree, lay in his genius for
taking the lessons of the past, combining them with elements of the pres-
ent, and maneuvering like no one else could have imagined. 21 Accord-
ing to historian Owen Connelly, "Napoleon's personal tactics defy
analysis." While he used patterns set by French revolutionary armies, he
then added something else. According to Connelly:
His rule was "Engage and then see what develops." He normally
held back a large part of his army until the pattern of enemy action
became clear. Then his remarkable intuition came into play Sens-
ing the opponent's weak point, he would hurl overwhelming force
against that point at just the right time—artillery blasting, infantry

rolling forward, and cavalry moving in for the coup de grace. Never,
however, did he leave himself without a reserve, at least the Old
Guard—until Waterloo.22
Genius and intuition, however, are impossible to codify and equally

impossible to teach. Perhaps if Napoleon had achieved a lasting peace,
he might have become "Napoleon the Great," but he did not. Except for
14 months during the Consulate, Napoleon did not sustain peace. This
brings us to the second major question that historians have raised when
dealing with the military history of the Napoleonic era.
What was Napoleon's commitment to peace? Was he a man of
peace, as he sometimes portrayed himself? Again, Napoleon provided lit-
tle personal insight. His writings are inconsistent; his language is trou-
bling at times. On the one hand, Napoleon told the King of England that
he was a man of peace and that his most sincere desire was to assure a
general peace in Europe. On the other hand, his Army Bulletins and pro-
nouncements that were intended for a French audience reminded his
countrymen that France was embattled and that Britain was to blame.
The allies against France, he continually reported, had provoked him,
had preyed upon him, and had caused the continuing contests. Peace
could not be assured until France controlled that peace. In 1805, Napo-
leon had written to his brother Joseph on the topic: "You do not get
peace by shouting 'Peace!' . . . Peace is a meaningless word; what we
need is glorious peace." In 1813, he had further defined peace: "What I
call peace is merely the disarmament of my enemies." 23 Later that year,
in a note chastising his Minister of Police for some indiscreet and
improper remarks, Napoleon reminded him firmly: "I don't make war
my business in life. No one is fonder of peace than I am. But I regard the
conclusion of peace as a serious undertaking; I want it to be lasting; and
I must consider the situation of my Empire as a whole." 24
From the battlefield, Napoleon also sent a mixed message. After
viewing the battle of Eylau in March 1807, Napoleon described the car-
nage. There were ten thousand corpses and five thousand dead horses.
The field was covered with abandoned cannon and carbines, expended
shells and balls. Remnants of the battle lay haphazardly on the snow-
covered plain. "A sight such as this should inspire rulers," he wrote in
his Army Bulletin, "with the love of peace and the hatred of war." His less
public persona, however, often belied his pacifism. Much later during
the Empire in a personal note, Napoleon quoted a Roman emperor: "The
corpse of an enemy always smells sweet." 25
If one listens to Napoleon's own words, then the sweetest smelling
corpse would have been an Englishman. To Napoleon, in fact, every-
thing about peace revolved around Britain's lack of willingness to par-
ticipate in it. He said that he had been forced to fight throughout the
world trying to tame that "nation of shopkeepers," as he derisively called
the English. Britain was always in the background, manipulating poli-
tics, dominating the seas, and at various times and in various theatres
supplying the allies with men. Facts, he said, would support his con-
tention that the blame was not his. In fact, he always noted, he had been
the invader only twice—in campaigns against the English in Portugal
and against Russia. "All my victories and all my conquests were won in
self-defense," Napoleon wrote from his exile at St. Helena; and by then,
he had convinced himself that what he said was true. 26
Recent historians have looked both at peace as an aim of the French
Empire and also at the time when Napoleon's achievements began to
wane and peace was no longer attainable. Among them, David Chandler
pinpointed 1806 as a defining year. After 1806, the campaigns of the
Fourth Coalition showed less genius, he said, and Napoleon took the
first perilous steps in creating the Continental System, aimed at break-
ing England. Alistair Home chose a year later—1807—when Napoleon
concluded the Treaties of Tilsit that granted him "unchallenged, and
unchallengeable, dominion over the mainland of Europe." 27 During the
previous two years, according to Home, Napoleon had achieved victory
at Austerlitz, had commanded a significant number of successful battles,
and had begun his project to tame England. As late as 1812, according
to Owen Connelly, Napoleon might have preserved his dynasty in
Europe. 28 The expansion of the French Empire and military reverses,
however, made that impossible. Napoleon would not stop, and the seeds
of his ultimate defeat were sown. Although Napoleon always protested
that he had no ambition, he also admitted that he might not recognize
it. Ambition was simply part of his being, like "the blood that circulates
in my veins, like the air that I breathe." 29 Power, he also said, was his
mistress.
How serious was Napoleon about peace? Whether it was simply an
occasional flirtation, whether he always set the conditions too high, or
whether his actions placed the conditions outside of his control, Napo-
leon cannot be viewed as a man of peace. Peace could only have been
possible if he had been willing to compromise and to set his sights
lower. 30
A Profession of Positions
When Napoleon organized the Grand Army (Grande Armee) that
was to serve him until his exile, he applied to his task the same interest
in detail that had characterized his reorganization of France and his pre-
vious military campaigns. "A good general, good cadres, good organiza-
tion, good instruction, and good discipline can produce good troops,
regardless of the cause they fight for," he wrote in his Notes on the Art of
War?1 A bit of fanaticism on the part of soldiers never hurt a cause, but
victories could be assured only if all of the details were in place. 32
The Grand Army, that became synonymous with Napoleon's victo-
ries throughout Europe from 1805 on, was created in Boulogne on the
northern coast of France in 1803-1804. At that time, Napoleon looked
across the Channel toward an invasion of England, but in the meanwhile
peace on the continent provided him with the luxury of reorganizing the
military. In 1803, the standing army of France was between 500,000 and
600,000 men, but Napoleon preferred to have a field army of approxi-
mately 200,000 soldiers when he began a campaign. The Grand Army
was precisely that. Furthermore, it was a professional army of French-
men directly under the command of the Emperor himself.
The standing army, therefore, could contain several field armies,
assigned in different areas if the need arose. Below the level of the army
came the corps, typically 20,000 to 30,000 men, commanded by a mar-
shal or a general-in-chief. The corps that Napoleon designed, in fact,
may have been his greatest contribution to wrarfare, and they were cer-
tainly his most powerful weapons against the powers of Europe. To
Napoleon, the effectiveness of the corps was a "general principle at war."
He placed his full confidence in them: "A corps of 25,000 to 30,000 men
can be isolated; well led, it can either fight, or avoid battle and maneu-
ver according to circumstances without experiencing any misfortune,
because it cannot be forced into battle and finally it should be able to
fight for a long time. . . . War is a profession of positions, and 12,000
men are never engaged unless they choose to be. This is even more the
Table 5.1 Composition of the Grand Army, August 29, 1805
Unit Composition Commander* Gross

Strength
The Imperial Guard Jean-Baptiste Bessieres, 7,000
Marshal of the Empire
1 * Corps 2 divisions (3 regiments Jean Bernadotte, 17,000
each or 9 battalions) Marshal of the Empire
1 light cavalry division
2nd Corps 3 infantry divisions General Auguste Marmont 20,000
1 light cavalry division
3* Corps 3 infantry divisions Louis-Nicholas Davout, 26,000
1 light cavalry division Marshal of the Empire
4 th Corps 3 infantry divisions Nicholas Soult, Marshal of the 40,000
1 light cavalry division Empire
5th Corps 3 infantry divisions Jean Lannes, Marshal of the 18,000
6th Corps 3 infantry divisions Michel Ney, Marshal of the 24,000
7th Corps 2 divisions (3 regiments or 9 Pierre Augereau, Marshal of the 14,000
battalions) as a reserve Empire
Reserve Corps 3 divisions (Bavarians, Assembling and unassigned 26,000
WUrttembergers, and
Badeners)
Reserve Cavalry Cuirassiers and dragoons Joachim Murat, Marshal of 22,000
France
Reserve Artillery General E. A. C. Dommartin 5,000
Total strength was 219,000 men; effective strength was 210,500 men and 396 guns. All
of the corps commanders who are listed as marshals had been named to the marshalcy
in 1804, prior to the creation of the Grand Army. Only Dommartin and Marmont did not
carry that title. Marmont was named as marshal of France in 1809.
Adapted from Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 1103, and Napoleon's Correspondence,
XI: 141-44, no. 9137.
case with 30,000 men, especially when these 30,000 are followed by
other troops." 33 Table 5.1 shows the composition of the Grand Army in
1805, particularly the corps.
Each corps was, by definition, a miniature army that was semiau-
tonomous. If needed, a corps could scatter and easily reassemble. It typ-
ically consisted of two or more infantry divisions, a brigade of light
cavalry, six to eight companies of artillery, sometimes a company of engi-
neers, and a limited army train that might include supplies, medical per-
sonnel, equipment, teamsters to handle the horses, and other support
personnel or camp followers. Napoleon believed, however, that a corps
should not have an extensive army train, and his men were expected to
live off the land where feasible. In an age of potatoes and turnips, one
historian noted, living off the land might mean precisely that, as well as
pilfering or purchasing goods from locals. 34
Napoleons army, just like those before, was heavily based on its
infantry, and each infantry division was composed of brigades and regi-
ments that were subdivided into battalions of 3,360 men (4 battalions
of 6 companies of 140 men each). Each of the six companies was orga-
nized by function: four were composed of chasseurs (fusiliers) with one
company each oivoltigeurs and grenadiers. Chasseurs were foot soldiers,
equipped with .69 calibre Charleville (Charleroi) muskets that could fire
two rounds per minute, if the soldiers were well trained, dexterous, and
lucky. The standard was three rounds every four minutes, and reloading
could feel interminable in the heat of battle. Soldiers still mounted their
bayonets, as they had done historically, but the bayonet was more for the
fear it inspired than its usefulness in close quarters. Musket range was
about 170 yards, and accuracy left much to be desired. 35 Massed mus-
ket fire could be effective as a volley; but used by an individual soldier,
a particular target would more likely be missed. Grenadiers in Napoleon's
army were shock troops, the largest men whose name came historically
from their assignment to handle extremely explosive grenades. Instead,
for the most part, grenadiers were used to provide more strength and
force to the infantry. Voltigeurs, members of the sixth company in a bat-
talion, were skirmishers. Selected for their size and agility, Napoleon
threw them into the contest first, either individually or in small groups,
to dislodge and unbalance the enemy troops prior to the main attack. As
expert marksmen, voltigeurs carried .69 calibre carbines and any other
weapons of choice. 36 Somewhere among the troops of the battalion,
there would also always be a band.
Mounted troops during the Napoleonic wars were divided into
light cavalry (chasseurs a cheval, hussars, and dragoons) and heavy cav-
alry (cuirassiers). Light cavalry, according to Napoleon, was to remain
unattached from any infantry corps because its use was to support the
advance guard, rear guard, and flanks of the army as needed. Mobility
was of the essence, so Napoleon prescribed that the light cavalry,
whether officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers, would always
sleep fully clothed. In the fray, they were a reckless lot, "with shako over
the ear, sabre trailing, face disfigured and divided into two by an
immense scar; upturned moustaches half-a-foot long, stiffened with

wax . . . and with this what an air!—the air of a swaggering ruffian." 37
Their equipment necessarily had to be light, but they would be armed
with a carbine and bayonet, a saber, and two pistols. The total weight
could be no more than 11 pounds. Again, Napoleon was prescriptive
about their actions and even how their horses should be treated: "The
[men] will be trained to cross rivers by swimming beside their horses,
grasping them by the mane, and holding the carbine above the water.
The horses will be harnessed as simply as possible. They are expected
to be able to drink while bridled and will be accustomed to watering only
once a day" 3 8
Heavy cavalry included the largest and most heavily equipped of
Napoleon's cuirassiers. "It is in the heavy cavalry that the science of the
mounted man should be carried to the highest degree," Napoleon had
written to his stepson in 1806. 39 Again, no detail missed his attention,
including the weight of their armor, how they could be equipped with
carbines, how they would fire their carbines in spite of their voluminous
protective steel breastplates, and who would serve as their orderlies.
Because of the weight of their equipment, Napoleon also worried about
their ability to fight when dismounted, and he detailed what they should
do. "The cuirassier will be armed with carbine with bayonet, a pair of
pistols, and a straight saber," he wrote in his report on the organization
of the army. "He will carry fifteen cartridges around the pistol holders
and will not have a cartridge box. When forced to fight dismounted, he
will place them in his right pocket and he will receive from the pack fif-
teen additional cartridges, which he will put in his pocket. He will keep
the hooded cape." 40 It was as though Napoleon was looking over their
shoulders at each engagement.
When Napoleon invested himself in the reorganization of the
French military, he left nothing to chance. Knowing that an army was at
least partially at the will of its intelligence, Napoleon then reorganized the
scouts. In 1806, he put forward a plan to have four regiments of scouts
made up of four squadrons of 200 men each. Scouts had to have excel-
lent vision and be no taller than five feet, so that they could ride horses
whose height did not exceed four feet three and a half inches. No saddles
would be issued, rather they would ride only on pads. They would have
one coat, one vest, and one pair of breeches or trousers along with one
multipurpose cloak. Everything that they carried needed to fit in one
valise that could weigh no more than four pounds. They were never to
be separated from their battalion, but they could be used in almost any
manner. "The small size of the horses of scouts makes them especially
capable of following infantry everywhere," Napoleon reported. 41 Fur-
thermore, the army could save significant revenue by using smaller
horses that they could more likely replace while on campaign. As
mounted soldiers, scouts could also be used in the cavalry, if needed. The
plan not only made military sense; it was exceedingly practical.
Finally, Napoleon's greatest pride was placed in his Imperial Guard
that had replaced the consular guard of 1800-1804. The Imperial Guard,
in spite of its name, had nothing in common with a palace guard or
imperial bodyguard; rather it was a small, elite army including infantry,
artillery, cavalry, and support. When Napoleon named it in 1805, the
Imperial Guard stood at approximately 8,000 men. By 1812, it had
grown to 80,000, of whom 56,000 were still effective. Members of the
Guard were hand picked by the Emperor based on their service in at
least three campaigns. They wore the best uniforms, had the best rations
and equipment, were paid more highly than soldiers of the same grade
in the regular army, and were rarely committed to battle. Hence, they
were often called the "immortals" because the Emperor carefully spared
their lives. As veterans, however, Napoleon set them aside because they
had already proven themselves, and he kept them as his most important
reserve. Each time when they were committed, until Waterloo, the
Guard was decisive in the outcome. 42
The Grand Army was a complex organization, and the ingredients
of Napoleon's success also included the Emperor's commitment to good
field security, the speed and mobility of his troops, the ability to assem-
ble and concentrate his men, unity of command, and his uncanny rap-
port with his soldiers. In combination, the ingredients were a chef's
delight. 43 Regardless of what the term "field security" might connote,
what Napoleon meant was fine-honed deception. As Napoleon prepared
for any campaign or potential engagement, he went to extraordinary
lengths to mask the strength of his troops and to veil their objective. For
what seemed like whim, he might detach a division; his cavalry might
veer in another direction or create a screen to protect his real troop
maneuvers. The enemy, he believed, should never know precisely what
was occurring. To keep them unsettled and unbalanced was precisely
what he intended to do. Napoleon also made sure that he controlled his
own press and that his intelligence was as powerful as possible. An
unwary local might be unceremoniously grabbed, bundled up, and inter-
rogated. Post boxes and couriers might be searched and letters confis-
cated. Nothing was safe as the Emperor's troops advanced.
A second ingredient of war was Napoleon's mastery of speed and
mobility. He could move men more quickly than any of his opponents even
contemplated, and he could inspire them in the process. Napoleon
recounted in his correspondence what his grognards (Imperial Guard) had
said about his demands: "The Emperor has discovered a new way of wag-
ing war; he makes use of our legs instead of our bayonets." 44 In fact, Napo-
leon expected his men to be ready for action, bayonets mounted, when the
forced march ended near the field of battle that he had carefully selected.
On the eve of the battle, Napoleon would be there in his faded green coat
and uniform of a corporal of the Guard. They saw him; they heard him.
They felt his commitment. During the evenings long before the battle
began, he had calculated time and space. He had planned his contingen-
cies, and he had factored into his calculations the element of time. To the
enemy, it was the element of surprise. "Strategy is the art of making use of
time and space," he had said.45 To Napoleon, these were not just computa-
tions of the hypothetical; they were real expenditures of men and materiel.
Napoleon's third ingredient for war has been called "assembly and
concentration" based on Napoleon's often-misunderstood maxim that
"the army must be kept assembled, and the greatest possible force con-
centrated on the field of battle." 46 The maxim is, in fact, a two-part pro-
gram. As Napoleon moved his troops into position, he always
maintained mobility. He recognized that even he might have read the
enemy's position incorrectly When he stated that the army must be
assembled, his real message was that all of the corps and divisions
should be within a reasonable and measured distance from where the
battle would occur, so that they could be concentrated when the time
was right. In fact, he used a standard of two days march (certainly no
more than three days) when he positioned the men w h o m he might
need. The measure of two days, however, could also be deceiving in a
quintessential Napoleonic manner: to the enemy it would appear that
his men were two days away, but under conditions of forced march, the
modern equivalent of a blitzkrieg, troops could be on the battlefield
within one day In this manner, the element of surprise would always
be his.
Napoleon's fourth and fifth ingredients of successful warfare were
unity of command and the rapport that he had with his soldiers. We have
already touched upon the meaning of unity of command in an earlier
section of this chapter, but it is worthwhile mentioning again. Its success
lay in the scale of battles that could still be managed by the Emperor
himself. With his prodigious memory for detail and inventiveness, unity
of command was a deciding factor in his victories. But the principle of
unity of command also carried the elements of defeat. When battles grew
larger, distances grew longer, multiple armies were fielded by the coali-
tions against Napoleon, and communications did not undergo any sig-
nificant change, unity of command was impossible.
We Shall Not Rest

Just as Napoleon's tactics may defy analysis, there is at least one
ingredient of Napoleon's warfare that will also never be fully understood.
In spite of the length of the Napoleonic wars and in spite of their cost,
the majority of French soldiers were extraordinarily loyal to him.
Whether it was the legend of "the little corporal," the belief that no mus-
ket ball had been made that could harm him, or his strong presence with
his troops, Napoleon could always rouse his men, gain their immediate
support, and be assured that they would follow him. Even his archrival,
British commander Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington reported: "I
used to say of him that his presence on the field made a difference of
40,000 men." 47
Who were these men whom Napoleon commanded? They were
volunteers and conscripts, the latter having come out of a draft system
that dated back to the closing years of the Revolution. The draft, as it
remained after 1798, applied to all men aged 20 to 25, although they
were required to register at 18. Exemptions included heads of house-
holds, married men, only sons, seminarians, doctors, the disabled, and
those who were deemed physically unfit, including all men whose height
was less than five feet.48 In practice, young men were called up in a lot-
tery by the youngest each year. In military terminology, those inductees
were the class of that particular year. As was standard in most armies of
Europe, revolutionary law had also provided for the purchase of substi-
tutes. Napoleon continued the practice, although he allowed only 5 per-

cent of the draft quota in any year to be filled by men whose services had
been purchased by others. 49 Given the extent of the Napoleonic wars,
one might think that Napoleon's armies conscripted nearly every able-
bodied Frenchman. On the contrary, Napoleon called, on the average,
73,000 men per year until the last critical years of the empire when the
numbers of young men called into service increased dramatically. In
general, the number of inductees was less than one-tenth of those who
were eligible. 50
New recruits and inductees went almost directly from their vil-
lages, towns, and country fields into the Napoleon army, potentially to
the front. They learned their drills within a week, sometimes on their
way to their engagement. Napoleon did not concern himself with what
might be seen as a lack of preparation because he merged his new con-
scripts into an army that was already trained as a finely tuned military
machine. Furthermore, his troops were commanded by veterans who
had served with him previously and whom he trusted. His system was
based on an important principle that he continued from the wars of the
Revolution—the amalgame. Fresh recruits would always be merged into
the existing army of veterans. According to statistics, one out of every
two men in the army of 1805 had fought at Marengo (1800) in the Sec-
ond Italian Campaign, and one in four had served during the wars of the
Revolution. 51 According to Napoleon, the army itself was the best train-
ing ground for his men.
The life of a soldier in Napoleon's army was a series of hopes and
challenges. As far as the army was concerned, it was one of the only
occupations in France where talent and merit could provide immediate
access to promotions, additional pay, and privileged treatment, for exam-
ple, assignment to the Imperial Guard or receipt of the sinecures that
came from military promotions and imperial titles. As far-fetched as it
may sound, Napoleon's soldiers believed that a marshal's baton could be
found in every soldier's knapsack. 52 The truth was far less glamorous:
noncommissioned officers rarely achieved a rank higher than lieutenant,
and promotions above the rank of colonel were conferred solely at the
Emperor's recommendation. Yet, men knew that they could be noticed
and that birth and family were no longer the deciding factors in their
prospects for a better future. Each time a decoration was granted on the
battlefield, as infrequently as the event might have been, the legend grew.
Napoleon encouraged that belief by learning the names of his men and
committing the names and faces so much to memory that he could rec-
ognize them years later. He also took great pleasure in reviewing his sol-
diers and in speaking before them on the eve of battle or on the day of a
victory. "You know what words can do to soldiers," he had written to one
of his generals in 1800. 33 There was incredible truth in that statement.
When he had first marched into Italy he had already felt the power of
his promises. As he stood before his assembled troops at the foot of the
Alps in 1796, his words had resonated with his men:
Soldiers, you are ill-fed and almost naked. The government owes
you a great deal, but it can do nothing for you. Your patience and
courage do you honor but give you neither worldly goods nor glory.
I shall lead you into the most fertile plains on earth. There you shall
find great cities and rich provinces. There you shall find honor,
glory, riches. Soldiers of the Army of Italy! Could courage and con-
stancy possibly fail you? 34
Throughout his campaigns and even after his first exile, his words never
failed him, and they continued to inspire the men who followed him. To
have the Emperor present "excited their exertions," and accounts tell of
Napoleon's remarkable reception even by les Marie-Louise, 16-year-old
boys who had been recruited in the waning days of the Empire to fill the
ranks? 3
Besides the promise of glory, the army offered acceptable rations,
although the military did not always provide them. According to regu-
lations, each soldier could expect one pound of bread, four ounces of
meat, two ounces of dried vegetables, and one ounce of brandy per day.
When troops were supplied with their allowance, their daily food intake
was better than most Frenchmen and eminently better than the food that
French women and children were eating. But, Napoleon attempted to
avoid convoys that cluttered the roads and camps, so the promise often
exceeded reality. There was a fine line that Napoleon and his com-
manders walked. The Emperor had bragged that the French soldier was
the only soldier who could "fight on an empty stomach." But, he also
knew that the health of his men had to be preserved. It was axiomatic
that a "soldier's health [had to] come before economy or any other con-
sideration." 56 Yet, Napoleon always wrestled with the problem of sup-
ply for his men, and in the case of rations, he continued to support
experimentation. By 1809, fundamentally because of pressures from the

military, canning was perfected. A Parisian confectioner named Nicolas
Frangois Appert succeeded in using boiling water to preserve animal and
vegetable matter in glass bottles. Appert's invention, however, was too
late and too costly to supply the growing numbers of soldiers in Napo-
leon's armies; nonetheless he received a coveted prize from the French
government.
As life in the military held promise for Frenchmen, it was not an
easy existence. Infantrymen on campaign were required to carry their
muskets as well as 58-pound packs containing the following items:
"sixty rounds of musket ammunition, rations for a week, a spare pair of
pants, two shirts and two extra pairs of boots." 57 Reports indicated that
their mass-produced boots were a constant problem because the soles
had been glued on rather than stitched. After a battle, they frequently
scoured the field for better-made boots freed by the deaths of their
enemies or allies. When times were difficult and the campaign was
extended, soldiers still needed the bare minimums. "There are five
things the soldier should never be without," Napoleon admonished his
commanders, "his firelock, his ammunition, his knapsack, his provi-
sions for at least four days, and his entrenching tool." 58 On the retreat
from Russia, however, even those requisites were lacking.
Although Napoleon stated firmly that a commander must consider
the needs of his soldiers, it was also part of his nature to win at all costs.
Men had to be prepared to die willingly and gloriously. "Troops are made
to let themselves be killed," he had said. 59 At the battle of Wagram in
1809, for example, casualties were 32,000 men or nearly 20 percent of
the French forces that were engaged. When he wrote to the Empress
Josephine the following day, he remarked, "My losses are high; but the
victory is decisive and complete." 60 He had taken 100 guns and 12 flags.
He noted that he was sunburned, but everything had gone well. No one,
not even Napoleon, would have argued about the cost of the wars that
he fought. He needed soldiers for his armies, and in some ways his need
became a vicious circle. As he expanded beyond existing French terri-
tory into what came to be called his satellite kingdoms, he could con-
script additional men into the army; but he also unleashed nationalism,
and he confirmed the resolve of his enemies to end his empire. At the
worst of times in 1813, in a letter to Clemens von Metternich of Aus-
tria, it is hard to see any amount of concern Napoleon shared for his sol-
Table 5.2 French C a s u a l t i e s by Year, 1 8 0 3 - 1 8 1 4
Year Killed in Action or Died in Prisoners and Hospitalized Totals

Died of Wounds Hospital Disappeared Long Absent
1803 0 1,000 500 500 2,000

1804 1,000 5,500 2,500 1,000 9,000
1805 2,000 7,000 unknown 5,000 14,000
1806 5,000 16,000 2,000 13,000 36,000
1807 7,500 33,000 2,000 4,000 46,500
1808 2,500 16,000 1,000 24,500 54,000
1809 19,000 32,5000 14,000 12,500 78,000
1810 9,000 33,000 11,500 4,00 57,500
1811 7,500 23,500 3,500 7,000 41,500
1812 9,000 26,000 154,000 20,500 210,000
1813 16,500 51,500 124,000 72,500 264,500
1814 7,000 52,000 53,000 66,000 178,000
Date 500 4,500 2,000 5,500 12,500
uncertain
Total 86,500 302,000 369,000 236,000 1,003,500
The figures above do not include 150,000 troop casualties from recently annexed depart-
ments of France and 300,000 casualties of foreign troops that served alongside French
troops. Casualties of soldiers on the battlefield and in the hospital collectively were
388,500 of whom 70 percent were from disease, exposure, or complications of wounds
and injuries. In total, the count was a million men. Other historians have raised the num-
ber to 1.4 or 1.5 million Frenchmen lost in the Napoleonic wars. Casualty counts are
much higher when the French revolutionary wars are added into these figures.
This table was adapted from Jacques Houdaille, "Le probleme des pertes de guerre,"
Revue d'Histoire Moderne ct Contcmporaine (1970), 17: 418, by Owen Connelly in The
French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 233.
diers. Whether it was braggadocio or not, Napoleon wrote: "A man like
me doesn't notice a million deaths."61 lTn war,'1 he said, "men are noth-
ing, one man is everything."62 Table 5.2 provides statistics on the cost
in human lives of the Napoleonic wars from 1803 through 1814.
Was Napoleon an enigma when it came to his soldiers? While his
comments sometimes sound contradictory his message was reasonably
consistent. He intended to do the best that he could for his soldiers on
campaign. He would lead them to fertile plains; he would take them
beyond the reaches of France to extend the Empire; he would bring
them glory and rewards. But, they had to be prepared to pay the price for
107
his dreams. Peace would become a chimera, and their tours of duty
would be extended. Forced marches would take their toll. As the scale
of battles increased, casualties would increase. "We shall not rest until
we have planted our banners on the territory of our enemies," he wrote
on the way to Austerlitz. 63 What they did not know was that for many
of them, their graves would be dug as their banners were planted.
In spite of his ultimate defeat on the field at Waterloo, Napoleon's
warfare remained unmatched by any single army of his time. Welling-
ton again had the last word: "Napoleon was a grand homme de guerre
(man of war), possibly the greatest that ever appeared at the head of a
French army" 6 4 If he never was "Napoleon the Great," then who was this
man who has so fascinated history? Napoleon's imperial dreams and mil-
itary exploits against the powers of Europe are the subject of the next
chapter.
Notes
1. Napoleon to Chaptal, Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 9, 1803,
quoted in Napoleons Letters: Selected, Translated, and Edited hy J. M. Thompson
(London: Prion, 1998), 79.
2. Napoleon (1820), quoted in Lucian Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit: apho-
risms, citations et opinions (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996), 28.
3. Napoleon (1796), quoted in ibid., 25.
4. See, for example, J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix Mill,
U.K.: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2001).
5. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method
of History's Greatest Soldier (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1966),
xxix. Chandler noted that French casualties in World War I were 1,360,000
men or 340,000 per year in a war that was far shorter than the Napoleonic con-
test. Chandler noted: "It is useful to keep the casualty question in proper per-
spective in any attempt to evaluate Napoleon's responsibility as a war lord."
6. Chandler, Campaigns, xxxiv ff.
7. Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleons Military Campaigns
(Wilmington, Del.: A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1987), 1.
8. Generals who are frequently mentioned by Napoleon include Alexan-
der the Great of Macedonia (356-323 B.C.), Julius Caesar (c. 100-44 B.C.),
Prince Eugene of Savoy-Carignan who fought for the Austrian Empire
(1663-1736), Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712-1786), Gustavus Adolphus,
King of Sweden (1594-1632), Hannibal of Carthage (247-183 B.C.), and Mar-
shal-General Henri de la Tour dAuvergne, Vicomte de Turenne who fought for
Louis XIV in his extensive wars (1611-1675). For Napoleon's remarks about
each of these generals, The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from His Written and
Spoken Words, Edited and Translated byf. Christopher Herold (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1955), 224-30 and Napoleon on the Art of War, ed. Jay
Luvaas (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 30-41.
9. The Military Maxims of Napoleon, translated from the French by
Lieutenant-General Sir G. C. DAguilar (London: Freemantle and Co.,
1901), 44.
10. Napoleon to General Lauriston, December 12, 1804, quoted in Napo-
leon's Letters, 90.
11. Napoleon on "The Great Captains," quoted in Napoleon on the Art of
War, 30.
12. E M. Kirchiesen, Memoirs of Napoleon I (London, 1929), 254-55,
quoted in Chandler, Campaigns, xxxv-xxxvi.
13. Napoleon to Berthier, August 28, 1805, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
111-12.
14. Memorandum on Allocations to General Songis, August 16,1799 and
Napoleon to Citizen Chaptal, November 29, 1803, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
83, 53.
15. Pieter Geyl, Napoleon: Eor and Against (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1963), 16.
16. H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleon (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,
1967), 17.
17. Chandler, Campaigns, 134.
18. Owen Connelly, The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era (Chicago:
Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1991), 231.
19. Correspondance, XXIX: 159, quoted in Chandler, Campaigns, 146.
20. According to Connelly, "Guibert recommended the ordre mixte, or
attack with some battalions in column (50- to 60-man front) and others in line
(three ranks), with some battalions moving from column to line for greater fire
power, as they closed with the enemy. For the latter maneuver, he had the first
three ranks move ahead while those behind moved up on their left and right
flanks." (Blundering to Glory, 13.)
21. David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 (London: Arnold,
1997), 8.
22. Connelly, Trench Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 231.
23. Napoleon to Joseph (1805) and a Conversation in 1813, quoted in
Mind of Napoleon, 206-07.
24. Napoleon to Prince Cambaceres, Arch-Chancellor of the Empire,
June 18, 1813, quoted in Napoleon's Letters, 286.
25. Army Bulletin (March 2, 1807) and Conversation with General
Caulincourt (August 17, 1812), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 204-05.
26. Geyl, Napoleon: Eor and Against, 252.
27. Alistair Home, How Ear from Austerlitz? Napoleon, 1805-1815 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), xxii.
109
28. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 62.

29. Conversation (1804), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 47.
30. T. C. W. Blanning's recent work titled The Eighteenth Century: Europe,
1688-1815 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) argues con-
vincingly that peace was never a possibility under Napoleon.
31. Napoleon on the Art of War, 8.
32. Napoleon wrote, "Anything not profoundly contemplated in details
will produce no results." (Regenbogen, Napoleon a dit, 25.)
33. Napoleon to Eugene (June 7, 1809), Correspondance XIX: 8 1 , quoted
in Napoleon on the Art of War, 78.
34. Gates, Napoleonic Wars, 8.
35. Home, How Ear from Austerlitz? 83.
36. See "Army, French" in Owen Connelly, ed., Historical Dictionary of
Napoleonic Erance, 1799-1815 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 23
and Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleon, 228-29.
37. General Baron de Marbot, quoted in H o m e , How Ear from Auster-
litz? 90.
38. "Project d'une nouvelle organization de l'armee," Correspondance,
XXXI: 455, quoted in Napoleon on the Art of War, 50.
39. Napoleon to Eugene (13 March 1806), Correspondance, XII: 183,
quoted in ibid., 54.
40. "Projet d'une nouvelle organization de rarmee," cCorrespondance,
XXXI: 456-57, quoted in ibid., 55.
41. Note Concerning the Organization of Regiments of Scouts (July 9,
1806), Correspondance, XII: 527-28, quoted in ibid., 48-49.
42. "Garde imperiale," Jean Tulard, ed., Dictionnaire Napoleon (Paris:
Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1987), 776-77. As the wars continued, the Imperial
Guard was divided into the Old Guard, Middle Guard, and Young Guard, based
on the time of induction.
43. The phrase "ingredients of Napoleonic War" comes from Chandler,
Campaigns, 144-61.
44. Correspondance, XI: 336 quoted in ibid., 148. Men of Napoleon's Old
Guard were also called les grognards. While the word means a "grumbler" or
someone who is continually displeased, the name was attached to the Guard in
an amicable, bantering manner. Members of the Guard, who had paid their dues
in previous battles, often complained about their conditions (albeit better than
other soldiers) and how the Emperor treated them. Napoleon knew that he
could always count on them, joked about their grumbling, and even encour-
aged them sometimes.
46. Correspondance, XXXI: 418, note 40, quoted in ibid., 153.
47. Earl P H. Stanhope, Conversations with the Duke of Wellington (Lon-
don, 1899), 9, quoted in ibid., 157.
48. Later during the Napoleon wars, height was reduced to 4'9". Even
then, one in four men was rejected as unfit to serve. According to J. M. Thomp-
son, the average height of British soldiers was 5'5", and only one out of 16 was
rejected for service. See Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 283.
49. Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 229, note 2. The
price varied with the department and the year—on the average 500 francs in
1800, 2,000 in 1805, 2,800 in 1809, 3,500-5,000 in 1813-1814.
50. Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 228-29 and Con-
nelly, Blundering to Glory, 74.
53. Napoleon to General Brune (1800), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 214.
54. Proclamation to the Army of Italy (April 10, 1796), quoted in ibid.,
214.
55. Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington, quoted in Thompson, Napo-
leon Bonaparte, 285; see also Chandler, Campaigns, 157.
56. Notes to Chaptal (n.d.) and Correspondence (1813), quoted in Mind
of Napoleon, 281,219.
57. Home, How Ear from Austerlitz? 93.
58. Military Maxims of Napoleon, 33.
59. Conversation (1817), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 211.
60. Napoleon to Josephine, July 7, 1809, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
210.
61. Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society
during the Revolution and Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 19.
62. Note (August 30, 1808), quoted in Mind of Napoleon, 219.
64. Ibid., 285.
•
Symbols of the French Revolution under the Directoire, 1796. Around the alle-
gorical figure of Liberty, who is coiffed with a liberty bonnet, are the symbols of
revolutionary France: a cornucopia representing the plentiful harvest, symbols
of engineering and medicine showing French skills, a rooster representing vig-
ilance and courage, the fasci representing prowess in war surmounted by Vic-
tory who is carrying the flag of the French people (Peuple Erancais). Courtesy
of the Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris.
Bonaparte as General-in-
Chief of the Army of Italy,
1796. Courtesy of the Biblio-
theque nationale de France,
Paris.
Bonaparte at the Bridge at Arcola in the First Italian Campaign, 1797. Courtesy
of the Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris.
•
"The King of Brobdignag (King George III) and Gulliver (Napoleon)." In this
wonderful period cartoon set in 1803, the larger-than-life George III examines
the smaller-than-life Napoleon. "My friend Grildrig, you have made a most
admirable panegyric upon yourself and country, but from what I gather from
your own relation & the answers I have with much pains wringed & extorted
from you, I cannot but conclude you to be one of the most pernicious, little odi-
ous reptiles that nature ever suffer'd to crawl upon the surface of the Earth."
Courtesy of the Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris.
"Diverse Projects for Attacking England," 1803. If Napoleon were to attack England, then he would
have to use everything within his means: balloons to ferry equipment, horses, and men; landing craft;
battleships; and even a forerunner of the Chunnel. Courtesy of the Bibliotheque nationale de France,
Paris.
The Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. Courtesy of the Bibliotheque nationale de France,
Paris.
Napoleon as the Savior of France, 1806. According to the caption, France, which was surrounded by
monsters ready to devour it, was saved by Napoleon, whom the gods sent. Neptune provided the
horses to draw his chariot, Minerva protected him, and the Cyclopes forged his weapons to make him
eternally invincible. Courtesy of the Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris.
• *
Napoleon presenting the Civil Code to Josephine, 1806. Courtesy of the Bib-
liotheque nationale de France, Paris.
"From the Highest to the Lowest... or Causes and Effects," 1814. As Napoleon
overstretched his Empire from Madrid to Moscow, his stilts snapped. At
Fontainebleau, he abdicated. Courtesy of the Bibliotheque nationale de France,
Paris.
"The Pear was Ripe," 1815. In an

interesting drawing from 1815,
Napoleon's profile is seen in the
leaf attached to the pear. The cap-
tion continued: "The [overripe]
pear that fell is Napoleon." Cour-
tesy of the Bibliotheque nationale
de France, Paris.
CHAPTER 6
WAR MAKES RATTLING

GOOD HISTORY
For a decade France had not known peace. From April 1792, when
France declared war on Austria beginning the wars of the French Revo-
lution, until March 1802, when France and Britain concluded the Peace
of Amiens, peace had been no more than a five-letter word. The French
Republic had experienced the threat of foreign and emigre troops on its
soil, and French ports had been blockaded. However, during that
decade, French soldiers had also been successful: the borders of France
had been expanded to the Rhine on the northeast and to the Alps on the
east and southeast. The French dream of natural frontiers was realized. 1
Three constitutions had been designed, two Italian campaigns against
the Austrians had been fought, Napoleon had challenged the British in
Egypt, although the French presence there was short-lived, and he now
wore a Consuls mantle.
The End of the Second Coalition (1800-1802)

The decade of war from 1792 until 1802 had ended, for the most
part, because Napoleon had set his sights upon such an objective. To
achieve peace with France's enemies had required two stages: first, the
French had to defeat Austria on the battlefield and second, peace had to
be negotiated with Britain. In the first case, after the coup of Brumaire
and promulgation of the Constitution of the Year VIII in 1799, Napoleon
had designed a strategy against Austria that allowed for significant con-
tingencies. He put his armies into order, mounted his horse, and
returned to northern Italy On the continent, of the countries that had
participated in the Second Coalition against France, only Austria
remained at war, and French armies were still positioned along the Rhine
in Germany and in Austrian-controlled northern Italy2
Napoleon's strategy for forcing Austria to make peace hinged on
several objectives that were linked by space and time. In fact, his plans
were complex. They relied on French General Jean-Victor Moreau's abil-
ity to push the Austrian troops east coupled with Napoleon's successful
crossing of the Alps, the timely assistance of a corps of Moreau's army
(General C. J. Lecourb), and General Andre Massena's continued resis-
tance to Austrian troops around Genoa. Tactically Napoleon wanted to
remove Austrian troops from northern Italy; strategically he wanted a
decisive engagement to force Austria to make peace. What Napoleon
needed was the element of surprise, impeccable timing, and an almost
impossible achievement from Massena.
Obsessive about details, Napoleon even gave personal attention to
the element of surprise. He would appear faithful to the new French con-
stitution that separated the functions of consul from commander-in-
chief. In such a governmental structure, Napoleon would not look as
though he were preparing an army for himself. Should Austrian intelli-
gence discover troops amassing near Dijon, they would be identified
with Napoleon's chief of staff, General Alexandre Berthier, who was, in
fact, assembling and equipping the 60,000 men whom Napoleon needed
for the campaign. Just as Napoleon had intended, the Austrians looked
away, expecting a traditional assault to be made toward Vienna. In the
meanwhile, Napoleon studied maps and mastered each element of an
alpine crossing. The Austrians remained unaware that even the name,
Army of the Reserve, was a deception.
As French troops crossed the Alps, legend was in the making.
Although the campaign began in May, the weather was severe, and ice and
snow made the crossing difficult.3 Regardless, Napoleon saw himself as
Hannibal, and if the campaign were successful, Napoleon intended to be
remembered in that manner. In reality, the crossing was far less roman-
tic. Berthier had made sure that the soldiers were well equipped with
snowshoes, provisions, and extra clothing, but he could not guarantee
everything. For example, their uniquely designed artillery sleds were too
cumbersome, and they resorted to hollowed-out logs to drag field cannon
across paths that had only known foot soldiers and cavalry in the past.
According to Napoleon's guide, even Napoleon resorted to expediency. As
he traversed the ice-choked slopes and narrow paths, first Napoleon gave
War Makes Rattling Good History 113
up his horse, then he mounted a mule. Then on short descents, he sim-

ply dismounted, sat down, and used ice and the seat of his pants to carry
him down the steep slope. In five days, Napoleon and his men had man-
aged the crossing. On May 30, the Army of the Reserve was on the plain
of Eombardy Two days later, French soldiers were welcomed into Milan,
where Napoleon recreated the Cisalpine Republic (soon to become the
Republic of Italy).
Since the crossing had been successfully completed, the remainder
of Napoleon's plans needed to fall into place. To the north, a series of vic-
tories pushed the Austrian forces away from Switzerland just as Napo-
leon had hoped, but Massena could not hold Genoa. Daily rations for
Massena's men had been reduced to a few ounces of horsemeat and
morsels of sour bread made of bran, oats, straw, and cocoa. His men were
starving to death, and Massena preferred to negotiate an agreement
rather than to accept unconditional surrender. Although Napoleon was
initially enraged over Massena's capitulation, the French soldiers were
allowed to leave Genoa under escort, but still carrying their weapons.
On another day they would fight again. 4 For all of Napoleons earlier
strategy, plans had gone awry. Not only had Genoa been lost, but rein-
forcements from the Army of the Rhine had not arrived. Furthermore,
Napoleon began to make mistakes. He underestimated the Austrians,
and he miscalculated the 71-year-old Austrian field marshal's resolve.
Reports were misleading, maps were inaccurate, and problems with sup-
ply kept Napoleon's army less than fully prepared. Even more important,
as of June 13, Napoleon's scouts and light cavalry could not locate the
Austrians. With no information, Napoleon convinced himself that the
elderly Austrian commander, Field Marshal Michael Friedrich Melas,
was withdrawing without seeking a fight. This was Napoleons gravest
error.
At 6:00 A.M. on Sunday morning June 14, 1800, the Austrian army
made itself known. Artillery sounded the reveille; the engagement had
begun. To the French, the surprise was complete: not only did armies
rarely engage each other so early in the morning, reconnaissance still
seemed to confirm that Melas was withdrawing rather than preparing to
fight. Yet, through the dust emerged three columns of 31,000 men sup-
ported by 100 cannon. By midmorning, the French were paying dearly
for their lack of preparation, and they were still outnumbered two to
one. Napoleon strengthened his right, committed all of his troops
including his reserve, and desperately tried to recall General Louis-

Charles Desaix, whose men had been dispatched earlier to watch for the
Austrians on their withdrawal. By early afternoon, Desaix had not
arrived, and the badly mauled French pulled back. The Austrian com-
mander, who felt assured of victory, retired from the battlefield, assum-
ing that his chief of staff would complete the rout.
At 3:00 P.M., Desaix's men and artillery arrived; they had heard the
sound of battle and marched toward it. Napoleon immediately commit-
ted them to the field. Along with the fortuitous explosion of a munitions
wagon and a daring cavalry assault, Desaix's arrival had changed the
course of the battle. The Austrians, who had appeared victorious in
midafternoon when Field Marshal Melas retired, lost 6,000 men while
8,000 were taken prisoner, including the Austrian commander's chief of
staff. On the field at Marengo also lay General Desaix, whose arrival had
saved the day, but whose life had been lost in the process. 5
Without question, the battle of Marengo shares its stories and leg-
ends with the entire Second Italian Campaign; and when Napoleon
wrote the account of Marengo for his Army Bulletin of June 15, he fash-
ioned his own particular history. Later critics of Napoleon, in fact, noted
that Army Bulletins were no less than pure propaganda. It became a joke
to say, "He lies like a Bulletin." At the time of Marengo, however, victory
was theirs, and Napoleon's detractors were few and far between. Accord-
ing to Napoleon's version of Marengo, only the timing of the Austrian
assault had been a surprise, rather than the assault itself, and Desaix's
arrival was part of the plan, although the timing had been a real test of
French endurance. When Desaix's men appeared on the battlefield, what
invigorated the soldiers was the presence of their First Consul who
"revived the morale of the troops." 6 According to Napoleon, it was
almost as though Desaix had not been there. According to another much
more trivial story, a new dish was also inaugurated the evening of the
battle. Napoleon's chef created Chicken Marengo by de-boning a fresh,
pilfered chicken with his sabre, and cooking it as a casserole in a tomato
base with the herbs and spices of the region. Allegedly it became an
instant favorite with Napoleon/
Three days after the battle of Marengo, Napoleon began his return
to Paris. Regardless of the decisiveness of the victory, the Austrians did
not ask for a permanent peace. Napoleon was disappointed that the Sec-
ond Coalition had not been brought to a quick conclusion, but his
prowess as a commander had been confirmed again. In Paris, he went

back to governing, and Moreau and the Army of the Rhine remained in
Germany as the truce held all summer. In November when the armistice
had not turned into a final peace, Napoleon ordered that hostilities be
reopened, and in December at Hohenlinden, Moreau defeated the main
Austrian armies in a crushing blow. Finally in February 1801, France
and Austria signed the Peace of Luneville, confirming anew the condi-
tions of the Treaty of Campo Formio that had ended the First Italian
Campaign in 1797. France controlled the entire left bank of the Rhine,
compensation was assured for rulers who had lost territory, Tuscany was
placed under the control of the Duke of Parma whose land had been
annexed to the Cisalpine Republic, and the King of Naples was restored.
The treaty also recognized the French sister republics that had been
established during the two campaigns: Cisalpine (Italian), Helvetic
(Swiss), Ligurian (Genoese), and Batavian (Dutch). 8 Napoleon had sub-
stantially altered the map of Europe, and he was a power to be reckoned
with. He had also learned some lessons from the battle of Marengo:
never to violate his principles of keeping a reserve and concentrating his
troops, never to underestimate the power or intentions of his adversaries
or their ability to surprise him, and always to remember the "psycho-
logical advantage of producing fresh troops 'out of the hat' toward the
close of a hard-fought day" 9
The continent fell under a hush, but the British still held out even
though there was nothing left of the Second Coalition that Prime Min-
ister William Pitt had organized. Everyone knew that as long as Pitt
remained in power, it was unlikely that any final peace could be negoti-
ated. Then came Pitt's resignation in early March 1802, and the door was
opened for negotiations. Almost immediately Napoleon's brother Joseph
Bonaparte went to the bargaining table with Lord Cornwallis (known to
Americans for his loss at Yorktown) representing the British govern-
ment. Their work was simplified by agreements that had been reached
the previous October and by Napoleon's insistence that the negotiations
move quickly There was ample reason: the Army of the Orient was in
peril of expulsion from Egypt. In such a case, the French government
would lose any bargaining power it had. Fortunately for Napoleon, by
the time news of the final French capitulation reached Britain, the pre-
liminaries for the Peace of Amiens had been signed and the conditions
were set.
As history has shown, in the Peace of Amiens (March 27, 1802) lay
the seeds of 12 more years of war. According to the provisions of the
treaty, Britain was required to restore all conquests that had been taken
from France or its allies since hostilities had begun. Britain could retain
only Ceylon and Trinidad. British troops were to leave Elba, and Malta
was also to be evacuated and returned to the Knights of St. John. In
return, France was to abandon Egypt (already a fact) and not to interfere
in the affairs or independence of Naples, Portugal, or the Batavian
Republic (Holland). Independence for the Ionian Islands on the Adriatic
Sea was guaranteed, and provisions were set for a commercial treaty
between the two countries. Without such a treaty, it was likely that
worldwide economic sparring between France and Britain would never
end.10 While the Peace of Amiens guaranteed an end to the international
war, the British government resented losing nearly all of its conquests
and feared that the French would regain control of the Mediterranean
when Malta was evacuated. Hence, Britain did not hasten to evacuate the
strategically located island. France, therefore, had an excuse for future
hostilities. On the other side, Napoleon kept garrisons in Naples and
refused any overtures for a commercial treaty, in spite of its urgency.
Without such a treaty, the British believed that he could cordon off most
of Europe from British trade, as he had been trying to do. Regardless of
their signatures, neither side was satisfied with the provisions.
An Uneasy Peace Becomes the Third Coalition

(1803-1805)
Whether Napoleon ever intended to have an extended or perma-
nent peace remains a question debated by historians, but Napoleon did
profit during the period of peace by focusing his mind on the details of
government, domestic peace, the economy and industry, his colonial
schemes, and the frontiers of France. In those brief months, the French
annexed Elba, Piedmont, Switzerland, and Parma making them into
fully participating departments of France; and Napoleon planned to
make Louisiana, which he had acquired from Spain in 1801, into the
"breadbasket for the sugar islands of the French West Indies."11 When
Napoleon's designs for a new empire in the Mississippi valley evapo-
rated, the French sold the Louisiana Territory to the United States for
80 million francs ($15,000,000). The money was to be committed to a
new contest against Britain, whenever that might occur. Designs on the
east were not easily abandoned, and evidence shows that the French
continued to look with interest on Egypt and Syria, as well as on India.
Britain was not amused by Napoleon's activities that seemed to
flout the Peace of Amiens, and in April 1803, the British ambassador was
withdrawn from Paris. The French had already sent out signals that there
was nothing permanent in their agreement, and Napoleon began to build
his new army—the Army of England—at Boulogne on the English
Channel. Britain was to blame, Napoleon said, and he railed against the
Perfidious Albion that had not yet evacuated Malta. By May, French and
British ships in the Channel were firing at each other, and Napoleon
ordered the arrest of all British nationals in France, whether or not they
were residents. Three other events made war on the continent inevitable:
French armies moved into Hanover to extend French control to central
Germany; Napoleon executed the Due d'Enghien with premeditation,
although there was no evidence to link him to the Cadoudal Plot; 12 and
in 1805, Napoleon raised the Iron Crown of Lombardy to his head, nam-
ing himself King of all Italy. With these acts, Napoleon succeeded in
offending the pope and alarming the King and Queen of Naples over the
Kingdom of Italy, challenging Holy Roman Emperor Francis II over the
reorganization of Germany, threatening Tsar Alexander I over France's
potential incursions into the Baltic, and continuing his armed rivalry
with Britain. Among the troubled kingdoms, only Naples remained
allied with France, although Queen Marie Caroline minced no words
when she called the Emperor "the Corsican Bastard." 13 As members of
an old dynasty, the Bourbon rulers of Naples thought of Napoleon as an
upstart; their loyalty was purely a function of circumstance.
The question was what would happen next. Would the British take
action? If not, how would Napoleon tame the Perfidious Albion? Napo-
leon believed that to end the British menace there were only three routes:
a direct assault on the island kingdom, a blockade that would strangle
British trade so fully that the government would be forced to capitulate,
or an assault on Britain through its back door in the Mediterranean.
Napoleon had already tried the latter, so he preferred one of the other
strategies. As Napoleon considered a blockade, the seeds of what came
to be called the Continental System were sown. Already in 1803, Napo-
leon had closed all French ports to British or British-borne colonial
goods. Even neutral shipping was not exempt. In reply, Britain had
declared a blockade of all French ports on the English Channel and

North Sea. Within the next year and a half, the British extended their
blockade to the Adriatic and across northern Europe from Brest to the
Elbe River. By 1806, Napoleon made the blockade as systematic and
binding as he was able to do without strong French naval support. The
Continental System, engineered to wreck British trade and to bring the
government to the bargaining table, however, would take time.14
The third strategy became his choice. He planned an assault on England
across the Channel.
As Napoleon reviewed his options, he believed that the most expe-
dient surrender of Britain could be achieved by a surprise landing, fol-
lowed by an attack on London and its subsequent capitulation. Again,
detail was everything. One hundred fifty thousand men were to be orga-
nized as the Army of England, and flat-bottom boats were to be built
with mounted mortars at their bows and sterns. Instructions were pre-
pared for the invading troops, and orders were given to find English-
speaking interpreters to accompany the soldiers on their assault.
Millions of francs were spent on roads to the Channel ports, and Napo-
leon concocted a scheme to draw the British navy away from England
in time for the crossing. "The Channel is a mere ditch," Napoleon wrote
to Cambaceres. "[It] will be crossed as soon as someone has the courage
to attempt it."15 The English prepared as well, establishing watchtowers
on the coast and taking notes on French maneuvers. Cartoons, some-
times in jest and sometimes with a serious tone, showed Napoleon's
troops reaching England under the sea (a forerunner of the Chunnel),
across the sea via a mammoth bridge or a flotilla, and above the sea in a
massive balloon corps that could carry even horses and artillery.16
In reality, Napoleon's plan was quite simple. He planned to com-
bine the various French squadrons to compose a fleet of 40 ships of the
line. Then he would send them off to the Caribbean to draw the English
fleet after them. Without the English fleet to hinder Napoleon's oper-
ations, he would ferry his army to the opposite coast for the assault. Key
players included Admiral Pierre Villeneuve's squadron at the port of
Toulon in the Mediterranean and Admiral Ganteaume's squadron that
was harbored at Brest, near the mouth of the Channel. As Napoleon
planned the maneuver, it was chancy at best. Could the French admi-
rals join up to conduct the feint successfully? Could they draw the
British to the Caribbean and then hasten back to the Channel in time to
War Makes Rattling Good History
119
carry out Napoleon's invasion? While Villeneuve initially did his part,
Napoleon reviewed the tides, the vagaries of Channel sailing, the
chances of his invasion of England, and the war clouds that were brew-
ing throughout Europe. Napoleon began to reconsider his plans; how-
ever, he continued to wait for Villeneuve's squadron to reach Boulogne.
He pestered Villeneuve to make haste, chastised him for taking the time
to construct a Franco-Spanish fleet after leading the British on their
chase to the Caribbean, and finally demanded that Villeneuve sail north,
threatening to end his career. Focused on the Channel, Napoleon still
always had his eyes on the impending contest on the continent. On Sep-
tember 3, 1805, Napoleon was unwilling to wait any longer for Vil-
leneuve, and he told his advisors that the prime moment to invade
England had been lost. He turned the Army of England away from the
Channel; it was no more. Napoleon's troops were rechristened the Grand
Army, and their new objective was Austria.
With 200,000 soldiers and a reserve of 40,000 men, the Grand
Army was a formidable force when it crossed into Germany. As it turned
out, their march was no less than a blitzkrieg as Napoleon's carefully reg-
imented soldiers marched an average of 20 miles per day At the head,
middle, and rear of each brigade, members of the military band were
placed drumming the cadence of the march; and for five minutes every
hour, the troops rested to the sound of music. The pace, measured later,
was three miles per hour. By early afternoon of each day when the march
was completed, the men foraged, ate, or rested.17
As the Grand Army penetrated into Germany, Napoleon's intelli-
gence reported that the Austrian commander was still unaware of pre-
cisely what the French were doing. Field Marshal Karl Mack was moving
west toward Napoleon's armies, but he did not know the strength of the
French army or its exact location. The Black Forest, along with Napo-
leon's cavalry cloak and his complete press blackout (what Napoleon
called his field security) had provided him with a superb advantage. Until
too late, Mack did not realize that his army had been caught. At Ulm, he
had blundered into a situation that was impossible. He was surrounded,
and the means of escape had been blocked. "The unhappy General
Mack," as he called himself to a French commander, surrendered 30,000
men, including 20,000 cavalry, 60 guns, and 40 regimental flags.18
Napoleon then moved toward Vienna, expecting the remaining Aus-
trian troops and their Russian allies to assemble there to defend the Aus-
trian capital. Instead, after armed sparring took place outside Vienna, the
Austrians declared the city open to the invading armies. Vienna had been
spared battle, but it had fallen. Then on December 2,1805, Napoleon met
the Austrian troops under Archduke Charles (Karl) and the Russian army
which, as yet, had played no significant role in defending the Third Coali-
tion. In the meanwhile, the British navy under the command of Admiral
Horatio Nelson had found Villeneuve's fleet and had annihilated it off the
Cape of Trafalgar.19 Britain had established itself as mistress of the seas,
but Napoleon was becoming master of the continent.
What Napoleon needed was a victory that would smash his oppo-
sition. He faced criticism in Paris for the economic downturn, the
weather that had begun gloriously in September had turned to continu-
ous cold and freezing rain dampening the spirits of his men, and a glo-
riously completed campaign would further solidify his one-year-old
Empire. To assure himself of victory, he needed to draw his enemies into
his snare. As he reconnoitered the area north of Vienna, he chose the
place of his battle. It was one of his primary principles to select the bat-
tlefield and then to force his opponent to use it. In this case, the loca-
tion was Austerlitz. "Gentlemen, examine this ground carefully," he was
reported as saying, "it is going to be a battlefield; you will have a part to
play on it." 20 In the meanwhile, Napoleon moved his troops around,
sometimes using his cavalry to cloak their maneuvers and sometimes
leaving units visible for the deception. Tsar Alexander I, who had
replaced General Mikhail Kutuzov commanding some 86,000 Russian
troops, was drawn into the snare. Napoleon's deception looked real to
the tsar who had finalized his plan on December 1. The tsar gave orders
to strike south against the French right flank, march on the Vienna Road
to sever Napoleon's supply line, attack the rear of the French army, and
force its retreat into the hands of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. Kutu-
zov counseled Alexander I against his plan, but other advisors believed
that Napoleon's army was smaller than it was, that it was far less con-
centrated, and that it was particularly weak at certain points.
On December 2 at 7:00 A.M., Alexander I launched the attack. Sens-
ing that Napoleon's south flank was the weakest, he poured his men
against General Louis-Nicholas Davouts troops that were, in fact, far less
concentrated than they should have been. In doing so as the day pro-
ceeded, Alexander I terminally weakened his own center, while Napo-
leon had the time to strengthen Davout's position. It was midday,
however, when Napoleon's armies were finally in a position to reduce the

Russian flank and center. The location had been chosen carefully, and
as the French center under Nicholas-Jean Soult shifted south, the Rus-
sian soldiers first found themselves pounded into the marginally frozen
marshes at their rear and then hammered and hammered again. The
area, known as Goldbach Brook and Satschan Pond, became a "bloody
killing ground." 21 There was nowhere for the Russians to go. Forward,
they were cut to pieces by close-range artillery. Behind them were the
formerly frozen marshes and lakes that had been diced by artillery fire.
The weight and number of retreating troops further fractured the ice,
turning the lakes and marshes into drowning pools from which there
was no escape. As the day proceeded, the French gained dominance on
the Pratzen Heights in the center of the line of operations. The Austro-
Russian center and right flank, severely weakened by Alexander's com-
mitment of troops against Davout, retreated under direct assault toward
the village of Austerlitz. By sunset, there was no hope, and a ceasefire
was sounded. See Figure 6.1 for a map of the battlefield at Austerlitz.
The Russian army had lost 25,000 men, at least 10,000 who were
killed. Alexander I had even committed his own Chevalier Guard, result-
ing in heavy casualties among his nobly born soldier-elite; but the Rus-
sian tsar would not consider terms. Alexander I simply removed his
troops from the battlefield and returned to Russia. The Austrian
Emperor, however, had no recourse, and he immediately asked for an
armistice. Less than a month later on December 26, 1805, the Peace of
Pressburg was signed. Brutal and humiliating in its terms, the treaty
stripped Austria of territory on the south and west of the kingdom,
including Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia which were added to the Kingdom
of Italy and the Tyrol which was added to Bavaria. Wurttemberg and
Baden, allies of Napoleon, also received land. In addition, Napoleon
became a kingmaker, naming the rulers of Wurttemberg and Bavaria to
that title. 22 There was no question that Napoleon was sending a message
to Austria. Francis was ruler of a second-rate power, and Napoleon drove
the message home by figuratively rubbing salt in his wounds. Napoleon
was pleased with what had transpired. The battle had been won on the
anniversary of Napoleon's coronation as Emperor. And, as the sun had
risen over the field of Austerlitz and the fog had melted away, his power
had never been greater. His health was good, and he was sleeping well. 23
He was 36 years old.
Map 6.1 Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805
Intermission and the Fourth Coalition (1806-1807)

Napoleon had won the campaign of 1805 both strategically and
tactically, and he lost no time continuing his reorganization of Europe.
In order to do so, the Treaty of Pressburg provided him with an inter-
mission.24 In early 1806, Napoleon established one particular ground
rule for his allies: to waffle in loyalty was unacceptable. On that note,
Napoleon sent Massena into the Kingdom of Naples to punish the
Neapolitan King and Queen for their very ill-conceived welcome of an
Anglo-Russian force during the Third Coalition. There was no choice for
Ferdinand IV and Marie Caroline except to flee to Sicily, and Napoleon
brought his diplomat-brother Joseph Bonaparte to their throne. In north-
ern Europe, he manipulated the Dutch into abandoning their republic,
which had been loyal to the French since 1795, and installed his brother
Louis on the throne of the Kingdom of Holland. Elsewhere, he engaged
in imperial matchmaking to add legitimacy to his dynasty; for example,
his stepson Eugene, viceroy of Italy, married the daughter of the king of
Bavaria. In Cleves and Berg, Napoleon's sister Caroline reigned with her
husband Marshal Joachim Murat, and Napoleon's sister Elisa was named
princess of Lucca and Piombino in Italy
As a final act in 1806, Napoleon completed the reorganization of
the German states that he had begun after the Peace of Luneville. When
he was finished, he had created the Confederation of the Rhine (Rhein-
bund) from hundreds of German duchies, principalities, and kingdoms
that had been nominally under the control of the Holy Roman Emperor.
Francis, Emperor of Austria, had also worn that crown. But, with the cre-
ation of the Rheinbund, there was nothing left of the Holy Roman
Empire; it had ceased to be "holy Roman, or an empire." On August 6,
1806, Holy Roman Emperor Francis II abdicated (retaining his sole ti-
tle of Francis I, Emperor of Austria), and over a thousand years of his-
tory ended. Germany now followed French influences and French
demands—from a rewritten constitution to the promise of 63,000 men
for the French armies.
Napoleon then turned his interest to Prussia, which had been
noticeably absent from European affairs for nearly a decade. Yet, Napo-
leon knew that the Prussian king, Frederick William III, had toyed with
joining the Third Coalition. The battle of Austerlitz had changed his
mind, and he had thoroughly distanced himself from his wounded Aus-
trian neighbor. In fact, in mid-December 1805, before the Treaty of
Pressburg had even been signed, Frederick William had allowed himself
to be courted by Napoleon who gave him the right to occupy Hanover
in northern Germany. Acceptance of the offer came with a price. Two
months later Napoleon demanded that Frederick William III make the
arrangement formal. While Hanover was ceded to Prussia, in return,
Hanoverian and Prussian ports had to be closed to British commerce,
and Prussia agreed to recognize certain grants of territory to France and
her allies. Prussian neutrality was becoming less and less of an option
for the king. Napoleon intended to force Prussia into a direct contest
with Britain. While both sides stalled for time, Napoleon negotiated with
Britain to attach Sicily to his brother's Kingdom of Naples. He offered
Hanover as a plum to the British—in spite of the fact that Prussian
troops occupied the north German territory and that it had been ceded
outright to Frederick William III earlier that year. Although French
negotiations with the British over Hanover and Sicily were conducted in
secret, Prussia received word of Napoleons duplicity A Fourth Coalition

was in the making.
Great Britain and Prussia now shared a common duplicitous adver-
sary, and in July 1806, Russia and Prussia also came to an agreement.
The terms of the Russo-Prussian pact were reciprocal: Prussia would not
engage in any attack on Russia, and Russia would aid Prussia in the
event of a French attack. War was on the horizon. With a war party
advising him at court, and jealous and aging commanders spoiling for
battle, Frederick William III agreed to war. He pictured himself as a new
Frederick the Great, and he demanded that Napoleon remove French
troops from southern Germany. Napoleon replied by requesting that
Prussia disarm and return to detente with the French. "The idea that
Prussia could take me on single-handed is too absurd to merit discus-
sion," Napoleon wrote to his Foreign Minister in September 1806. "She
will go on acting as she has acted—arming today, disarming tomor-
row." 25 While Napoleon thought that the idea of a contest with Prussia
was absurd, he refused to let Frederick William III continue his sabre rat-
tling. When the Prussians did not demobilize, he sent an ultimatum to
disarm no later than August 8, and he moved his troops forward. On
October 14, less than a week after the ultimatum expired, Napoleon
pressed the Prussian troops into battle at Jena. Nearby at Auerstadt in a
much bloodier battle, the Duke of Brunswick's Prussian soldiers engaged
Marshal Davout's men. When the twin battles were concluded, the Prus-
sian troops fell back, but there had been heavy casualties on both sides.
Routed and hounded, the Prussians were no protection for Berlin, which
was in French hands by October 25. The king fled to East Prussia to
await further news. In all, Prussian losses were 25,000 casualties, with
140,000 prisoners and 2,000 cannon captured. The campaign had taken
33 days, and Frederick William III had proven to be a miserable succes-
sor to the illustrious Frederick the Great. 26 Although Napoleon had
described the Prussian king as a "good fellow,"2'' Napoleon did not
intend to let him off easily Prussia would pay for its mistakes, and the
French now dominated northern Germany
Russia, nonetheless, remained at bay; and in order to isolate the
continent from Britain, it had to be defeated. The question was where
the battle would take place. As a realist, Napoleon pictured the contest
on the plains of East Prussia with Austria behind him and Russia to the
east. In such an event, Napoleon had to assure the safety of his troops.
His strategy was to enlist the Poles whose hopes of freedom were pow-
erful. Their anger had not cooled against the Russians who, along with
Austria and Prussia, had completed the partition and dismemberment of
the Polish kingdom in 1795. As much as the Poles wanted independence
from their occupation, Napoleon was unwilling to go so far. But, he
never told them what their reward might or might not be. With the sup-
port of Polish troops regardless of his lack of promises, Napoleon con-
trived to force the Russians into a situation from which they could not
extricate themselves. He kept the British occupied in the Middle East
and therefore unable to help Russia, and he fielded an army that he
believed the Russians could not defeat. At Eylau in February 1807, the
French and Russian armies met. While Napoleon had fundamentally set
the conditions for their contest, he could not control everything. In a
blinding snowstorm with an Arctic wind that kept temperatures well
below freezing, they fought savagely against each other until the Rus-
sians withdrew. The field had been more than a foot deep in snow, hid-
ing frozen streams and ponds. Casualties were horrific—possibly as high
as one in three French soldiers—and 23 generals were dead or seriously
wounded. French Marshal Michel Ney who had been there, described
the scene, "What a massacre! And, without results." The Russians had
not asked for a truce; they had not acknowledged defeat. The battle of
Eylau had not been decisive. It was the first time in half a decade that the
Grand Army did not seem invincible. 28
After the battle of Eylau, the Russian and French troops engaged
each other intermittently, and Napoleon remained watchful until spring
when Russian General Levin August von Benningson committed a fatal
mistake. Benningson was found, potentially bottled up just west of
Friedland with a river behind him and few means to remove his troops
to the east, if he should need to do so. As soon as Napoleon was aware
of Benningson's error, under conditions of forced march, Napoleon con-
centrated 80,000 troops against the Russian commander's 58,000. Even
when the battle began, Benningson did not know the scale of his oppo-
sition. The battle of Friedland turned out to be a massacre. The town was
torched, "and into the river the Russians were butchered, drowned, and
burned alive." 29 Casualties were between 18,000 and 20,000 Russians,
and the French had captured 80 guns. The Emperor noted that he had
been feeling well; it was, after all, the anniversary of Marengo. With Ben-
ningson's army lost, Tsar Alexander I had no other recourse than to ask
for peace. Less than a month later, the former belligerents met at Tilsit
to confirm their agreement and to set its provisions. There, between July
7 and July 9,1807, two treaties were signed ending the Fourth Coalition.
The scene was theatrical, and each of Napoleon's adversaries attempted
to play to the Emperor.
The summit, as it has been called, actually took place on a splen-
didly constructed, elegantly decorated, enclosed raft floating in the Nie-
man River. The enclosed chamber, the size of an apartment, was
"surmounted by two weathercocks; one displaying the eagle of Russia,
the other the eagle of France." 30 Within the sheltered compartment, the
initial meeting between Napoleon and Alexander lasted three hours,
away from any witnesses or commentators. Frederick William III, who
had not been invited to the raft, watched on the rain-soaked riverbank
unable to influence the settlement that dismembered his kingdom.
Napoleon intended to make the Prussian king remember the absurdity
of his joining the Fourth Coalition. In the process, Alexander took
advantage of the situation and willingly sold out his former ally. The
result was a reversal of alliances: Napoleon and the Russian tsar would
control the fortunes of Europe, one on the west and the other on the
east. The two found each other to be insufferably alike as they parceled
out Europe. Later, Napoleon wrote to Josephine, "I am satisfied with
Alexander, and he must be satisfied with me. If he were a woman, I think
I would make him my mistress." 31
When the conditions were finalized, the Treaties of Tilsit contained
the following documents. First, there was a Franco-Russian treaty that
created a Duchy of Warsaw for the Poles. Constructed from former Prus-
sian-held Polish lands, the duchy was to be governed by the King of Sax-
ony rather than being an independent state. The treaty also guaranteed
Russian mediation of the dispute between Britain and France and French
mediation of the dispute between Russia and Turkey. If the dispute
between France and Britain could not be resolved, the tsar was to assist
France in gaining Portugal and the Baltic states as partners in the Conti-
nental System. A Franco-Russian military alliance was also created to pro-
vide mutual support for each others diplomatic needs, but more
significantly, it guaranteed separate diplomatic spheres for the new allies.
Second, the Treaties of Tilsit contained a series of secret articles that pro-
vided for Russian territorial cessions to France and guarantees of repara-
127
tions to Ferdinand IV of Naples, who had earlier lost this throne. Third,
a Franco-Prussian agreement was concluded. The agreement slashed
Prussian territory in half, required Prussia to join the Franco-Russian
alliance against Great Britain, and assessed a significant indemnity 3 2 Just
as Napoleon had humiliated Austria in the Treaty of Pressburg, the
French made an intractable enemy of Prussia at Tilsit. Napoleon returned
to Paris content with his work and also content with himself. During the
campaign, his personal life had taken on new pleasures when he met and
seduced Maria Walewska, the Polish beauty who had been given to him
almost as a gift. It was extraordinary, but as soon as officials in Warsaw
had detected Napoleon's interest in Maria Walewska, they quickly
removed her very elderly husband from the city, leaving her free for
Napoleon's advances. From the campaign of 1806-1807, the Emperor
would remember Polish loyalty, although it came with the continued
hope of independence, Maria Walewska's personal loyalty to him that
continued for years, and a child whom he later fathered with his devoted
Polish mistress. 33
The Peninsular War and the Fifth Coalition

(1807-1809)
Almost before the ink was dry on the Treaties of Tilsit, Napoleon
was fully embroiled in new activities. The situations had been forced
upon him, he believed, through circumstances that were initially beyond
his control. Great Britain continued to obsess him, particularly as British
goods found their way into Europe through Portugal, the Papal States,
and other less guarded ports on the continent. 34 Napoleon decided that
there was little else that he could do except to close those ports by force.
His main objective was the Iberian Peninsula, the geographic home of
Spain and Portugal. Spain had been a French ally since 1795; Portugal,
however, was a long-term, committed trading partner of the British. In
order to close the Portuguese ports, Napoleon would have to rely on his
alliance with Spain because his field army could not cross into Portugal
without penetrating Spanish territory. As he laid his plans, there was no
way for him to know that the contest would last until his abdication or
that casualties would tally 240,000 men (100 per day). Nor could he
know that his men would learn firsthand the savagery of guerrilla war-
fare. The Peninsular War, as those eight years of nearly constant warfare
came to be called, was Napoleons l 'ulcer," his Spanish debacle, "the
unlucky war [that] ruined me." 3 3
On July 19, 1807, Napoleon began his actions against Portugal. He
required the maritime kingdom to close its ports under threat of military
occupation. When Portugal refused, Napoleon appointed his longtime
friend General Andoche Junot to command an invasion force of the
country In order to invade, however, Napoleon needed to guarantee safe
passage across Spain for Junot's troops. He quickly negotiated such an
arrangement, along with the authority to post a reserve of 40,000 men
on the Spanish border. Crossing through Spain and Portugal, Junot's
"armed parade" reached Lisbon in November with almost no opposition,
although the Portuguese royal family had been whisked away only hours
earlier by British ships that ferried them to Brazil. Even without armed
engagements, the toll to capture Portugal was high. French troops
quickly learned that they could not live off the land because the peasants
had left them close to nothing and they could trust no one. Disease, mal-
nutrition, and exposure—instead of musket balls—claimed French
lives. Nonetheless, Portugal was under French control. The ports were
closed, and Junot established himself in splendid fashion as he reorga-
nized the government on a French model.
Spain, however, was not such a simple matter. Spain was a French
ally, yet it was also allowing leakage of British goods onto the continent,
and it had to be stopped. The situation in Spain was critical because the
government itself was such a problem. According to one historian, it was
"degenerate [and] wildly ineffective, wasteful, graft-ridden, top-heavy
with officials, burdened with pensioners, and unofficially bankrupt." 3 6
Spain was ruled de facto by Prince Manuel Godoy, who was also known
as the Prince of Peace. Officially however, King Charles IV governed, but
he was known only for his fascination with hunting and his periodic
bouts of insanity His wife, Queen Maria Luisa, was intimately involved
with the Prince of Peace and wielded a certain amount of power behind
the scenes; and Ferdinand, the crown prince and future heir, was habit-
ually conspiring against his family while trying to eliminate Godoy's
authority If that were not enough, Napoleon found the Spanish to be
poor allies. They had done little to support his wars, failed to fulfill their
monetary promises, provided a poor complement to his navy, and nearly
joined the Fourth Coalition against France. While the royal family con-
spired against each other, Napoleon made secret promises to Godoy for
his support. After the arrangement was sealed, it was only a matter of
time until Napoleon planned to topple the regime, reorganize the Span-
ish state, administer it efficiently, and have access to its troops and
resources for the French Empire. Napoleon's intentions, however, were
unknown to Godoy.
In a series of initially disconnected incidents, Napoleon precipitated
the events that brought his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain and
prompted the Peninsular disaster. In March 1808, Napoleon decided to
make the French presence in Spain permanent. He sent Murat and 40,000
soldiers, accompanied by the Imperial Guard and a military band,
through the countryside into Madrid where they were to be stationed.
The French troops were splendidly attired, and they marched in parade
formation. Their reception was festive and promising—but only because
the Spanish had misread Napoleon's signals. In the interim, Crown Prince
Ferdinand had overthrown his father and requested Napoleon's assistance
to shore up his kingdom. At the same time, the overthrown Charles IV
and a very angry former Queen Maria Luisa petitioned the French
emperor for assistance in restoring them. It would have been a comedy if
the results had not been so serious for the Spanish kingdom. Napoleon
demanded that both sides meet with him at Bayonne on the French bor-
der to sort things out. Then by force, he required them to abdicate per-
manently, and he named his brother Joseph Bonaparte to the throne. The
appointment of Joseph was not just a surprise to the Spanish; it was
astonishing, because most of the Spanish populace had expected Napo-
leon to support Ferdinand's usurpation and to legitimize it.
So, on May 2, 1808, when French cavalry placed the last of the
Spanish royal children under custody, the city broke out in rebellion.
Residents of Madrid (Madrilenos) attacked Murat's troops with every-
thing that they could find: chamber pots, cooking utensils, furnishings,
roof tiles, paving stones, and anything else available. Napoleon had
known that such a revolt was possible, and he had counseled Murat to
do everything to keep order. A whiff of grapeshot was not out of the
question. The cannons were fired at point-blank range, and cavalry
swept the streets. According to stories, the Mamelukes (Napoleon's
Moslem troops who had been with him since Egypt) responded even
more brutally, although there were fewer than 100 of them in action that
day. They dismounted, charged dwellings, pulled Spanish men, women,
and children from their homes, beheaded them, and rolled their heads
down the stairs and through the streets. To the Spanish, Dos de Mayo
(the second of May) became the "day the demon emperor of the French
set Moslems on the Christians of Madrid.^ 3/ The following day, Murat
rounded up the most visible leaders of the uprising and executed them
by firing squad.
In July, this same city—Madrid—was to be the place of Joseph
Bonaparte's coronation as King of Spain. Napoleon, who had not been
present during any of the previous events, was still unaware of the extent
of the troubles. "No one has told your majesty the truth," Joseph
reported to Napoleon, but the Emperor was not listening. 38 As events
took place, only 11 days separated Joseph's arrival in Madrid from his
departure. Rebels (to the Spanish, they were freedom fighters) had orga-
nized the countryside, forced French troops to capitulate at Bailen, and
then threatened Madrid. King Joseph I had no choice but to flee from his
new capital. In Portugal, a similar situation occurred. The future Duke
of Wellington forced Junot to capitulate after his defeat at Vimiero (Con-
vention of Cintra). French troops in Spain were imprisoned; French
troops in Portugal were repatriated by the British to France. For all
intents and purposes, the entire Peninsula had been lost, and Napoleon
needed to respond quickly and decisively
Napoleon knew that he needed to take personal command of the
situation in the Peninsula. But, in order to be absent from France, he first
had to make sure that his alliance with Russia was firm and that he
would have sufficient troops east of the Rhine to oversee his central
European holdings. He also knew that Austria was rearming with the
assistance of Great Britain, so he met with Tsar Alexander at Erfurt to
confirm the promises that had been made at Tilsit. In a somewhat
strained meeting, the two emperors agreed to maintain their alliance. By
November 1808, Napoleon was crossing the Ebro River into central
Spain with 300,000 troops. He had brought with him veteran troops and
the elite of his commanders. He intended to leave nothing to hazard, and
a month later, with significant casualties, he was in Madrid placing
Joseph back on the throne. Then, learning of new British incursions into
Spain from Portugal, he rushed to Vallodolid with French troops to
defeat the British and force them out of the Peninsula. 39 Before he could
conduct another victory, however, he had new difficulties to address. He
learned that his own sister and the very unlikely duo of Talleyrand and
Fouche were plotting against him. Should he die in Spain, they intended
to ignore the constitution and put his brother-in-law Murat on the impe-
rial throne. Yet, in two and a half months in the Peninsula, Napoleon's
presence in Spain had restored Joseph to the throne and had eliminated
the opposition of Spanish troops. The British were on the run, and he
felt confident enough to return to Paris to deal with the succession plot
and his critics. Furthermore, he needed to prepare against a new Aus-
trian threat. In Spain, however, the guerrilla war was just beginning in
earnest. Napoleon, however, never returned in person to the Peninsula.
In fact, it is quite likely that, until the end, he always underestimated its
importance to the Empire.
When Napoleon arrived in Paris, morale appeared lower than he
had ever seen before because of the scarcities occasioned by the Conti-
nental System and continuing conscription. The stock market was
falling, and desertion was reported to be high. Young men allegedly
mutilated themselves to avoid service in Spain and Portugal. 40 In his
own court, he also had to deal with Fouche and Talleyrand, engineers
of the succession plot. It was Talleyrand who bore the Emperor's wrath.
Whether he was dismissed or forced to resign, the Foreign Minister's
days were over as a French diplomat. In a heralded and widely reported
meeting, Napoleon leveled on him a litany of charges and abuses. Tal-
leyrand really did not care, because he had lost faith in Napoleon's judg-
ment from the time of the Treaties of Tilsit. He had already been feeding
information to the Russian tsar, and he was currently collaborating with
the Austrians, unknown to the Emperor. Regardless of the confronta-
tion, Talleyrand stayed in Paris, living off the rewards he had earned ear-
lier from Napoleon. When Napoleon later reflected on Talleyrand's
career and his duplicity, the Emperor chastened himself. He should have
had him shot, he reported, because Talleyrand was nothing more than
"dung in silk stockings." 41
Napoleon did not know precisely when the Austrians would be
prepared for their new contest against him, but he took no chances.
Leaving troops in Spain and Naples, he assembled an army of 260,000
troops with 29,000 cavalrymen, supported by 311 cannon, for the new
campaign. Archduke Charles of Austria, however, had not waited for
Napoleon's first move, and he had declared war in March. A coalition
between Britain and Austria was finalized early in April. Pressures for
war had been unrelenting, and Archduke Charles had mobilized an army
of 340,000 men. Within the previous few years, the scale of war had
changed dramatically. The Austrian commander reported that he would
have preferred to have 700,000 men when the hostilities opened. 42
Once the campaign was launched, the battles moved quickly. On
April 9 the Austrians crossed into Bavaria. Within two weeks, Napoleon
took command of the French army and defeated a portion of the Aus-
trian army at Eckmuhl, with Austrian casualties at 50 percent of their
forces. Napoleon then advanced toward Vienna. At Ratisbon, however,
the impossible occurred. A ricocheting and spent cannon ball wounded
the Emperor. His foot injury was painful but far from life threatening,
so Napoleon made sure that his troops saw him still riding among
them. 4 3 Just as the men of the Grand Army had shown that they were
no longer invincible at Eylau, Napoleon's cloak of invincibility had been
removed. In May, Napoleon met the Austrians at Aspern and Essling on
the Danube. For the first time in his campaigns, he seriously rushed his
preparation for the river crossing, and the toll was devastating. Pontoon
bridges failed, coordination was incomplete, and the full army was never
reassembled. An Austrian eyewitness reported, "In every street the fight
raged; in every house, in every ditch. Carriages and carts were obliter-
ated by musket fire."44 In the melee, Napoleon also lost two of his most
prized commanders, among them the first of his marshals to die in com-
bat. 45 After two days of slaughter between the armies, Napoleon with-
drew. It was a draw, and surprisingly Archduke Charles did nothing to
follow up. The mistake ultimately cost the Austrians the war.
In six weeks, Napoleon was in control again. No preparation would
be rushed, and he had gone back to his insistence on detail. He had
assembled nearly 200,0000 men and more artillery than at any other time
of the campaign. In the meanwhile, Archduke Charles had regrouped on
an unassuming plain near a small town called Wagram across the
Danube. Sorely lacking in vigilance, the Austrians did not know that
Napoleon was constructing everything possible to cross the river and to
force the Austrian field marshal into battle—but on Napoleon's terms.
By 6:00 P.M. on July 5, 1809, Napoleon had used everything his engineers
had constructed—20 pontoon bridges, rafts, landing craft, and gunboats
to protect them—and he had assembled 188,900 men and 488 guns on
the north bank to face Archduke Charles. The Austrians could count
140,000 men and 450 guns, and they awaited Archduke John with an
additional 12,000 troops. 46
On July 6, in sweltering summer heat with raw recruits mixed with

his veterans in a multinational army, Napoleon fought the battle of
Wagram. Tactically he took advantage of his sheer numbers and the
speed with which he could take advantage of any opportunity on the bat-
tlefield. Toward 4:00 P.M., Archduke Charles realized that he could no
longer hold back the onslaught of French forces, and he began to with-
draw his men corps by corps. "The enemy is flying in disorder," Na-
poleon reported the next day. "My losses are high; but the victory is
decisive and complete." 47 But, Napoleon was incorrect. Archduke
Charles still had 80,000 men whom he could have deployed, but he did
not turn to engage them as Napoleon probably would have done. On
July 12, the Austrian field marshal requested a truce, to which Napoleon
hastily agreed. The French Emperor did not want to continue the con-
test either. At Wagram, Napoleon had learned that his armies were not
made of the mettle and skill of Austerlitz and that he could not always
rely on his multinational troops who did not have the same personal loy-
alty to him as the French. Looting and desertions had increased, and he
had lost too many men for his own comfort. Napoleon finally dictated
the peace on October 14, after he had given an ultimatum to Francis I
of Austria. By the Treaty of Schonbrunn, the Austrians were assessed
85,000,000 francs in indemnities, the army was restricted to 150,000
men, and Austria's boundaries were altered radically. In total, because of
the territorial adjustments, Austria had lost 3.5 million of its inhabi-
tants. 48
Besides the Fifth Coalition that Napoleon had just concluded, the
Emperor had also been forced to deal with other challenges to his Euro-
pean dominance. A British expeditionary force had landed in the Low
Countries, although it had been beaten back into the marshes where the
invading soldiers fell victim to swamp fevers and disease. Wellington
had invaded Spain again, but the British troops had been forced to retreat
to Lisbon. In Italy, mountaineers in the Tyrol had rebelled, but the
Emperor's stepson Eugene had subdued them. When Pope Pius VII con-
tinued to challenge Napoleon's authority and even excommunicated
him, Napoleon placed the Papal States under further French authority
and, in a fit of pique, sent troops to "arrest that monk." "I am aware that
one should render unto God the things that are God's," wrote Napoleon,
"But the Pope is not God." 49 Pius VII was initially placed under house
arrest in Savona, and later he was moved to Fontainebleau because
Napoleon feared that the British might try to rescue him. 50 Surprisingly,
there was little immediate fallout from Napoleon's actions toward the
supreme pontiff. Only the economic blockade of Europe had not fulfilled
its aim. Nonetheless, Napoleon was pleased with himself, and he pro-
ceeded with his plans to create a dynasty that would truly be his. On
December 15, 1809, by a Senatus consultum, Napoleon dissolved his mar-
riage to Josephine. It remained only for Napoleon to complete negotia-
tions for a new bride who could provide him with the son that he
desperately wanted. See Figure 6.2 for a map showing the extent of the
Napoleonic Empire, 1810-1812.
The Russian Campaign and the Sixth Coalition

(1810-1813)
Although momentarily Europe appeared to be at peace, such was
not the case. The Peninsula remained in ferment as the guerrilla war
became increasingly unmanageable and as British threats from Portugal
grew more intense. Napoleon, however, was preoccupied—perhaps for
one of the very few times of his life. Instead of returning to the Penin-
sula, he sent Massena, whose military successes were legion. But, even
Massena did not want to go into the Peninsular hellhole, where rebels
and other enemies of the French were known to dismember the bodies
of fallen troops and hang them in trees as reminders. One never knew
when a Spanish beauty or her dowager aunt might be hiding a lethal
weapon in her skirts. It was even dangerous to take communion in a
Spanish cathedral because the priest might have poisoned the host
(bread or wafer), and children often lured French soldiers into
ambushes. The contest in the Peninsula was fought only partially on the
principles of European warfare. For the rest of the time, guerrilla war
(meaning "little war" to distinguish it from the traditional, pitched bat-
tles of armies) became a daily occurrence, and the phrase entered
the European vocabulary Among the more interesting memoirs of the
Peninsular War are Laure Junot's descriptions. See the biographies at
the end of this volume for more information on Mme Junot, who saw
firsthand the horrors of guerrilla warfare.
Napoleon's preoccupation was Marie Louise, his new bride, who
was destined to bear a son less than a year later. The Emperor was
pleased with his choice. "Let me thank you for the fine present you have
Map 6.2 The Extent of the Napoleonic Empire, 1810-1812
given me," Napoleon wrote to her father, Francis I of Austria.51 While

remaining in Paris with Marie Louise during 1810-1812, he kept his fin-
ger on the pulse of Europe, manipulating his allies, toying with Britain
and the United States over freedom of the seas, and laying plans to deal
with his erstwhile ally Russia. Furthermore, he was forced to deal
with anti-French hostilities within the Empire. They were caused by
increased taxes to support the incessant wars, additional levies of food
and equipment, and accelerated draft quotas. The Continental System
had not yet brought the "nation of shopkeepers" to its knees, but Napo-
leon's economic warfare had caused a serious recession and labor unrest
in Britain. On the other hand, Napoleon's allies also felt the squeeze.
Only the wealth from smuggling had made the hardship any less dam-
aging. Goods were scarce, and French industry had not yet taken up the
slack as Napoleon had promised. Among the most notorious of Napo-
leon's smuggler allies was the Emperor's own brother, King Louis of Hol-
land, who refused to have his adopted country sacrificed on the altar of
economic warfare. Just as Napoleon knew the details of any campaign,
he also grasped the economic realities of allowing Britain access to the
continent and of allowing Louis to fashion his own diplomacy in oppo-
sition to the Empire. In May 1810, Napoleon clamped down on Holland.
"I am tired of protestations and fine phrases," he wrote to his brother,
who had refused to support French levies and to close Dutch ports.
Napoleon simply dethroned Louis, annexed the territory, and with the
flourish of his pen, concluded his last memorandum with a postscript,
"I will never write to you as long as I live."52
While Napoleon wrote fewer letters and seemed less interested in
international affairs, he was, nonetheless, watchful. Only a month after
he had removed his brother from the throne of Holland, he fired Fouche,
his longtime Minister of Police. He had grown tired of having Fouche
conduct his own personal diplomacy. His old co-conspirator from the
days of the coup of Brumaire had been caught negotiating with Britain
over the potential British annexation of Holland. Enough was enough!
Two months later in August, Napoleon began seriously to play the United
States against Britain over international shipping, the rights of neutrals,
and the meaning of freedom of the seas. Great Britain had created the
Atlantic confrontation, Napoleon argued, with its Orders-in-Council that
placed all neutral shipping in harm's way. As always, Britain was to blame;
he said that he had only responded in kind with his Berlin and Milan
Decrees that blockaded European ports. Napoleon offered a solution: if

the United States would refuse Britain's overtures and avoid British ports,
it would be welcomed on the continent as a neutral and its shipping
would prosper without seaborne danger. Slowly but surely, Napoleon
began to construct the scenario that created the War of 1812 between the
United States and Great Britain. In the end, the war was too small and
too inconsequential to serve as the second front that Napoleon needed
to take Britain's eyes, troops, and commitment away from Europe. For
Napoleon's strategy, see Document 8: The Continental Blockade.
As of 1810, Napoleon's major problem was Alexander I of Russia.
The tsar's commitment to the settlement at Tilsit had become marginal;
and in some cases, the tsar flagrantly ignored the provisions. While
Napoleon pleaded innocence, he also had moved well beyond the pro-
visions of Tilsit. Napoleon continued to foment war against Russia in the
Middle East, and in 1810, Napoleon annexed Oldenburg because the
duchy refused to abide by the Continental System. The annexation was
a personal affront to Alexander I, whose brother-in-law ruled it. Fur-
thermore, Napoleon continued to posture about Polish independence,
and Napoleon's marriage to Marie Louise of Austria appeared to be the
forerunner of an Austrian alliance to replace Napoleon's bond with Rus-
sia. If any single event brought about the Russian campaign, however, it
was Alexander's decree of December 3 1 , 1810 allowing unimpeded colo-
nial shipping into Russian ports. Except in name, Alexander had with-
drawn from Napoleon's blockade. "If we are prepared to close the
continent against the English," Napoleon wrote to his Foreign Minister,
"there will be peace." 53 If not, the pathway was also clear. As with Hol-
land, enough was enough!
By December 1811, Napoleon was convinced that Alexander would
not comply with French demands, and he put in place the final details
of a Russian campaign. 54 As he gathered his troops for a field army that
ultimately numbered 610,000 men, he also gathered the data that he
needed for success. Even his imperial librarian played a role. "Please
send me a few good books," he wrote, "those that are best worth con-
sulting—on the topography of Russia, especially of Lithuania—marshes,
rivers, forests, roads, etc." 55 Napoleon had no reason to doubt his
prospects for victory, because the French Empire thoroughly dominated
the European continent. From 83 departments in 1791, France had
grown to 130 departments by 1812, and France's land area had doubled.
Napoleon's satellite kingdoms included Italy Naples, Spain, and West-

phalia. His allies also included the Confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss
Confederation, Denmark/Norway, Prussia, and Austria. 56 Supremely
self-confident, Napoleon continued to correspond with Alexander I,
needling him over the failures of the Treaties of Tilsit and blaming him
for the impending crisis. "Your majesty has shown a lack of trustfulness,
and (if I may say so) of sincerity," he wrote to the tsar, "You have spoilt
all your prospects [for peace] ,"57
At the time Napoleon wrote to Alexander, French troops had
already crossed into Russia, but Napoleon had scarcely seen the enemy.
His plan, however, was predicated on superior force, a quick entry into
Russia, and a decisive battle that would force Alexander's hand. Week
after week, the French troops penetrated Russian territory, skirmishing
from time to time, but finding the Russians gone by the next dawn.
Behind his armies, Napoleon was forced to garrison each Russian city
as a protection for his supply line. Summer heat, disease, and the gruel-
ing march thinned his ranks, and his men became demoralized. At
Smolensk, the French armies finally met the Russians, but before any-
thing decisive could occur, they withdrew. It seemed that nothing could
force the Russians to take a stand. Finally at Borodino, General Kutuzov
made the choice to hold his ground along a four-mile, partially fortified
line of hills on the way to Moscow. There, Napoleon enlisted his men
and 600 artillery pieces to bring down the Russian army. All he could do,
however, was to force the enemy troops back from their original posi-
tion, but the Russians stood firm again. Flanking maneuvers failed, and
Napoleon resorted to assault after assault. It was a battle of attrition.
When evening fell and hostilities ceased, over four square miles were
strewn with the dead. Even though enemy troops had not been sent flee-
ing from the encounter, Napoleon announced a major victory. In the
meanwhile, the Russians quietly retired, leaving the way open to
Moscow without opposition. "The trophies of this incomplete victory,"
reported one of Napoleons generals, were "seven to eight hundred pris-
oners and twenty broken cannon." 5 8 The French were approximately
525 miles into Russia, three months had already passed, and, in reality,
no decisive battle had yet been fought.
On September 14, 1812, Napoleon entered Moscow and almost
immediately fires broke out. For nearly a week blazes lighted the sky,
although the French troops tried valiantly to extinguish them. Supplies

were woefully scarce, and even roofs over their heads were in short sup-
ply. As the French troops established themselves, Napoleon wrote to the
tsar, "The beautiful and superb city of Moscow exists no more. Three
quarters of the houses have been burned. I have made war on Your
Majesty without animosity" 5 9 Napoleon had worked hard to make the
letter sound reasonable, so he expected a reply from Alexander or, at the
least, from General Kutuzov; but the Russians had agreed upon silence.
They had drawn the French 600 miles into Russia, not through a plan,
but simply because they had found no other option. Unwilling to fight
Napoleon on his terms, they had chosen to retreat, taking their supplies,
their people, and their Russian pride with them.
In October, Napoleon realized that the Russians did not intend to
sue for peace. The weather had begun to change, and it was clear that
Moscow would not be an appropriate garrison for the winter. When the
Russians attacked Murat's cavalry on October 18, Napoleon laid out his
new plans. The French troops would move back toward Smolensk across
territory that had not been ravaged by war. They would pass the winter
there and await a new season to destroy the opposition. With Napoleon's
withdrawal from Moscow, opportunity fell into the hands of the Rus-
sians, and Kutuzov took the offensive to drive the French forces back
on the route that the Russian commander chose. He pressed them back
along the scorched earth of their initial invasion. Ruthlessly, painfully,
and without pity, the Russians went after them. By the time Napoleon's
armies stood their ground to cross the Berezina River, fewer than
100,000 men remained (one-sixth of the invasion force). Stragglers were
left where they fell, frostbite and gangrene claimed their victims, and the
icy waters of the Berezina took hundreds more. When the French army
finally reached the Duchy of Warsaw, leaving Russia permanently
behind, the number had been cut in half again. See Document 9: Diary
of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier.
In December before the retreat was complete, Napoleon left his
men to return quickly to Paris. According to rumors, the French
Emperor had died in Russia. The rumors had taken on such veracity that
a crazed, former inmate had nearly overthrown the government and
Napoleon realized that he needed to be in Paris in person to prove that
he was alive. He could take no chances on losing his seat of power even
though "Generals Mud and Winter" had cost him so dearly in Russia.
In one of his most famous Army Bulletins, Napoleon admitted that the
Russian campaign had ended badly. True to form, he reported that his
"health had never been better." 50 Although the Grand Army had
retreated from Russia, Napoleon refused to acknowledge any role played
by the Russian armies in the retreat. He wrote, "the enemy was consis-
tently defeated, and never captured a single flag or a single gun. My
losses are real, but the enemy can take no credit for them." 61 Statistics
for both sides included the corpses of 430,707 men and 230,677 animals
that were buried or burned where they fell.62 The wounded, deserters,
and prisoners more than doubled the number of casualties.
As 1813 dawned, Napoleon's two-front war came home to haunt
him. Although reversals had taken place during the previous year solid-
ifying French control of Spain, King Joseph I, Napoleons brother, found
himself foundering again. He evacuated Madrid and Valladolid, and
finally he took a stand at Vitoria. Wellingtons force was an Anglo-
Portuguese and Spanish army numbering 95,000 men. Flanking Joseph's
scattered and ill-directed soldiers, Wellington's men had little opposi-
tion. The French seemed incapable of doing anything right, and French
troops simply fled. At the same time, Napoleon's reconstituted Grand
Army of 170,000 men held its own in central Europe. In fact, at the bat-
tles of Liitzen and Bautzen in May 1813, Napoleon achieved separate
victories over the Russian and Prussian forces. The allies, however,
wanted the contest to end. They turned to Napoleon's father-in-law,
Francis I of Austria, who was not part of the Sixth Coalition yet. In his
role as mediator, he proposed an armistice and laid out ground rules for
peace. Regardless of the fact that French armies were undergoing
reverses in Spain and that they were outnumbered in Europe, Napoleon
refused to relinquish any of his conquests.
War or peace, Napoleon said, "did not depend on the cession of any
part of [French] territory." War had been fueled by "the jealousy of the
powers and the passions fomented by English cunning." 63 Again, the
British were at fault, according to Napoleon, so there was no way he would
engage in peace talks. As a result, the armies of Europe assembled. The
main allied field army was composed of 240,000 Russian, Austrian, and
Prussian troops. The allies of the Sixth Coalition could also count on the
King of Sweden's 120,000 men, Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard von
141
Bliicher's 95,000 men, and Benningson's Russo-Polish army of 60,000

men. They vowed to maintain a unified command under Prince Karl
Philip von Schwarzenberg, and, regardless of circumstances, never to be
drawn into battle alone against Napoleon. Napoleon could almost match
their numbers with the Grand Army that he had increased to 250,000 men
(although many were very young recruits), along with General Nicholas-
Charles Oudinot's 70,000 soldiers, and 70,000 troops committed from the
Rheinhund. In August, Napoleon defeated Schwarzenberg at Dresden, but
the Austrians withdrew without giving the Grand Army an opportunity
to inflict further casualties. At Leipzig, on October 16-18, 1813, the "Bat-
tle of the Nations" pitted 370,000 allied troops against Napoleon's
220,000. Napoleon could assemble no more men as the battle raged. The
Bavarians changed sides, and Napoleon feared encirclement. Carefully,
Napoleon began a phased and orderly withdrawal.
With his army still intact, Napoleon crossed the Rhine in November
1813, and the allied powers attempted anew to approach the French
Emperor by offering him peace based on the natural frontiers of France.
Napoleon again refused, although he knew the severity of his situation.
"The point can be put in a nut-shell," he wrote to his brother Joseph,
"France is invaded. All Europe is in arms against her, but more particularly
against me." 64 But, Napoleon continued to fight, and according to histo-
rian Owen Connelly, he "fought the most brilliant campaigns of his life in
early 1814." 65 He was, however, fighting exclusively a defensive war, and
he had no grand strategy. Again, the allies attempted to negotiate. Even
though the allied armies had entered French territories, they were pre-
pared to allow French boundaries to be redrawn to the map of 1792.
Napoleon again declined the offer by countering with one of his own.
Although Napoleon had been able to hold off each of the allied armies on
its own, by March 1814, they had joined to try to defeat him. He mobilized
Paris, called up as many troops as he could, and intended to move forward
to defend the capital from his position near Fontainebleau. He knew that
the allies had 200,000 troops for the assault on Paris. He also knew that
they were likely to reach the French capital before he could send support.
At 2:00 A.M. on March 3 1 , 1814, the war of the Sixth Coalition
finally ended. Citizens, national guardsmen, cadets from military acad-
emies, and a demoralized, leftover French army had been pressed back
to the heights of Montmartre overlooking Paris. It was useless to hold
out, and Marshal A.-E Marmont, who was defending the city, defected
with his troops. Without waiting for imperial orders, the commander of
the remaining French troops surrendered. At Fontainebleau, Napoleon's
other marshals and generals also refused to cooperate with the Emperor,
and Napoleon was forced to abdicate.
Even then, Napoleon did not recognize the severity of what had
occurred. On April 4, he abdicated in favor of his son, assuming that the
French Empire would be spared. The allies, however, held all of the
cards. Outside of Paris, nearly all of the French armies had given up their
positions or were in such desperate situations that it was only a matter
of time until they would capitulate. The allies demanded unconditional
surrender, and two days later, Napoleon complied: "The Allied powers
having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the
re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to
his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the
thrones of France and Italy" 66 On April 11, 1814, the provisions of the
Treaty of Fontainebleau were set. Napoleon was granted sovereignty
over the 86-square-mile island of Elba where he was also to hold the title
of Emperor. He was also provided a substantial, annual stipend and
allowed a military retinue of 600 men to accompany him into exile. As
had been offered earlier, the boundaries of France were defined as of
1792. Savoy, Avignon along with other former papal territories in the
south of France, and parts of Belgium and the Rhineland remained
French. It is extraordinary that the treaties were so generous after more
than a decade of war had consumed European powers on the continent
and in their sometimes far-reaching territories. The settlement for Napo-
leon and France could have been far worse.
On the evening of April 12, a few days before Napoleon was to
depart for Elba, he took the vial of poison that he had worn around his
neck since the retreat from Russia and he drank its contents. The two-
year-old mixture of opium, belladonna, and white hellebore made him
violently ill, but he did not die. "What a task it is to die in bed," Napo-
leon said to the men who surrounded him. 6/ Neither a sabre nor a can-
non ball could kill him on the battlefield, and fate spared him one more
time. The French and Napoleon had entered their twilight years—or had
they? A legend was in the making.
Notes
The title of this chapter: "War Makes Rattling Good History" comes from
Thomas Hardy's The Dynasts, quoted in Alistair Home, How Far from Austerlitz?
Napoleon, 1805-1815 5 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), xx.
1. Historically, France considered its natural frontiers to be the Channel
(La Manche), the Bay of Biscay (Atlantic Ocean), the Pyrenees, the Mediter-
ranean Sea, the Alps, and the Rhine River. Those natural frontiers framed
France, creating what the French chauvinistically called their God-given hexa-
gon. Natural frontiers had been a preoccupation of French wars since at least
the time of Louis XIV, a century and a quarter before Napoleon.
2. The two field armies were the Army of Italy under General Andre
Massena and the Army of the Rhine under General Jean-Victor Moreau. Both
men were seasoned veterans and two of the finest French commanders. During
the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period, French armies were
typically named for the region of their objective or where they served. For
example, the Army of the Orient had been engaged in the Egyptian Campaign,
and the Army of England was created at Boulogne to attack Britain. Beginning
in 1805, when Napoleon was in command of a particular army, it was also called
the Grand Army (see Chapter 5).
3. Napoleon to Cambaceres and Lebrun, Correspondance (1801), quoted
in J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publish-
ing Ltd., 2001), 161.
4. Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns
(Wilmington, Del.: A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1987), 64; and David Chan-
dler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Sol-
dier (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company Inc., 1966), 285.
5. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 286-98.
6. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 164-65.
7. For a standard recipe for Chicken Marengo, see Irma S. Rombauer
and Marion Rombauer Becker, The Joy of Cooking (New York: The Bobbs-Mer-
rill Company, Inc., 1975), 427.
8. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 71; "Luneville, Treaty of," Historical
Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799-1815, ed. Owen Connelly (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 316; and "Luneville," in David Chandler, Dic-
tionary of the Napoleonic Wars: The Soldiers, Strategies, Armaments, Movements
and Battles That Shaped Fvents During Napoleons Reign (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company 1979), 256-57.
9. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 301.
10. "Amiens, Treaty of," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 16;
and "Amiens," in Chandler, Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars, 10-11.
11. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 71-72.
12. See Chapter 2 of this book, note 24.

13. Owen Connelly, The Fpoch of Napoleon (Malabar, Fla.: Robert E.
Krieger, 1972), 67.
14. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte, 227'. Thompson's discussion of the
Continental System contains one of the best datelines of this system of eco-
nomic warfare between Great Britain and France. Officially dated from 1806,
the Continental System did not officially end until Napoleon's abdication and
repeal of the various laws that created it.
15. Ibid., 230.
16. J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Miff-
lin Company, 1987), 254.
17. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 390-92.
18. Correspondance XI: 342, quoted in ibid., 402.
19. For a short account of the Battle of Trafalgar, see Herold, Age of Napo-
leon, 239-44. See also "Trafalgar," in Chandler, Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars,
448-50, which includes a map of the position of each ship of each fleet.
20. General de Segur, Histoire et Memoires (Paris, 1837), 279, quoted in
Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 412.
21. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 88.
22. "Pressburg, Treaty of," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France,
403-04; and "Pressburg," in Chandler, Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars, 348.
23. Napoleon to Joseph, December 3, 1805, quoted in Napoleons Letters:
Selected, Translated, and Fdited byj. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 115.
24. Roger Dufraisse, Napoleon (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 95.
25. Napoleon to Talleyrand, September 12, 1806, quoted in Napoleon's
Letters, 138.
26. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 502.
27. Napoleon to Josephine, October 13, 1806, quoted in Napoleon's Let-
ters, 141.
28. Home, How Far from Austerlitz?, 224-25.
29. Connelly, The Fpoch of Napoleon, 68.
30. General Savary (as quoted by Bourienne), in Chandler, Campaigns of
Napoleon, 586.
32. "Tilsit, Treaties of," Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 473;
and "Tilsit," in Chandler, Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, 441-42.
33. After their first meeting at a ball in Warsaw, it was clear that Napo-
leon was smitten with Maria Walewska, who was married to an elderly Polish
nobleman. He continually wrote to her, pledged his faithfulness, and pleaded
with her to join him. Maria Walewska, who was equally enamored by the man
who had tamed Europe, met Napoleon in Paris in 1808, then in Vienna in 1809,
and in Paris again in 1810. Their child was born on May 11, 1810. Napoleon
never forgot her, and their son Alexandre was provided for in the Emperor's Last
Will and Testament.
34. For reasons of space, it is not possible to chronicle the problems of

Pope Pius VII. French troops initially occupied the Papal States in February
1808 to shut out British goods. The situation grew increasingly difficult there-
after.
35. Emmanuel Dieudonne, comte de Las Cases, Memoirs of the Life, Fxile,
and Conversations of the Fmperor Napoleon (New York: Worthington Company
1890) 2: 134.
36. Owen Connelly, The French Revolution and Napoleonic Fra (Chicago:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1991), 246.
37. Ibid., 248.
38. Ibid., 249.
39. Sir John Moore, who commanded the British forces, found himself
opposite Soult rather than Napoleon. In January of 1809, he reached Corunna,
having been hounded across the mountains by French troops. Although Moore
was killed in the Peninsula, most of his troops were safely removed by the
British Navy.
40. See Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Soci-
ety during the Revolution and Fmpire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)
for further information.
41. Connelly, French Revolution and Napoleonic Fra, 253.
42. Home, How Far from Austerlitz?, 260-61.
43. Ibid., 350.
44. Austrian eyewitness quoted in ibid., 267.
45. Jean Lannes (1769-1809) had joined the French military in 1792. He
was among the first 14 marshals named by the Emperor in 1804, and he was
rewarded with the title Duke of Montebello in 1808. At Aspern-Essling, a can-
non ball massively fractured his leg, which had to be amputated. A few days
later, he died of gangrene. Lannes had seemed as invincible as the Emperor, hav-
ing been wounded more times than any other marshal. As rarely as Napoleon
showed serious emotion, he genuinely mourned the death of one of his earliest
friends.
46. Home, How Far from Austerlitz?, 273; and Connelly, Blundering to
Glory, 142.
47. Napoleon to Josephine, July 7, 1809, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
210.
48. "Schonbrunn," in Chandler, Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars, 404; and
Home, How Far from Austerlitz?, 283.
49. Napoleon to the Ecclesiastical Committee and to Prince Borghese,
March 16, 1811 and May 21, 1812, quoted in Napoleon's Letters, 247 and 267.
51. Napoleon to Francis, Emperor of Austria, March 29, 1810, quoted in
Napoleon's Letters, 232.
52. Napoleon to Louis Napoleon, December 21, 1809 and May 23, 1810,
quoted in ibid., 227, 235.
53. Napoleon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs November 4,

1810, quoted in ibid., 242.
54. Napoleon called the Russian Campaign the Second Polish War of
Independence. The first, he said, had been fought at Friedland and concluded
at Tilsit with the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw.
55. Napoleon to Barbier, December 19, 1811, quoted in Napoleons Let-
ters, 263.
57. Napoleon to Alexander, July 1, 1812, quoted in Napoleon's Letters,
270.
58. Home, How Far from Austerlitz?, 316.
59. Connelly French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 323.
60. Ibid., 326.
61. Napoleon to Frederick VI, King of Denmark and Norway, January 5,
1813, quoted in Napoleons Letters, 278.
62. Ibid., note, 279.
63. Napoleon to the Minister of War, September 27, 1813, quoted in
ibid., 291.
64. Napoleon to Joseph, January 7, 1814, quoted in ibid., 296.
65. Connelly French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 335.
66. Napoleon to the Allied Powers, Correspondance, XXVII: 355-56,
quoted in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 1002.
67. General Armand de Caulaincourt quoted in ibid., 1002.
CHAPTER 7
THE LEGEND OF THE EAGLE
Vive PEmpereur!
On April 20, 1813, Napoleon left Fontainebleau for Elba. He embraced
members of his Old Guard, kissed the eagle-topped French regimental
standard that was presented to him, and prepared for the exile that had
been meted out by the powers of Europe. For 10 months—from early
May 1813 until March 1, 1814—he was Emperor of Elba. He could do
what he pleased. He reorganized nearly everything about the island, con-
ducted his own coronation, designed a flag and livery for his kingdom,
restructured the economy, built a system of education and social welfare,
and reinvigorated industry. His mother and his sister Pauline visited him
occasionally; his Polish mistress Maria Walewska and their three-year-
old son joined him briefly. His Empire was comprised of 12,000 resi-
dents of Elba, and he had an army of 1,600 men and a navy of five ships.
But, it was a far cry from Fontainebleau and the battlefields that had con-
sumed nearly two decades of his life.1
The English Commissioner on Elba, Neil Campbell, was fascinated
with what had become of Napoleon. "I have never seen a man in any situ-
ation in life with so much personal activity and restless perseverance," he
wrote in his recollections. 2 Yet, few others in Europe noted Napoleon's
impatience, his boredom, his annoyance, and his lack of resignation to his
fate. Marie Louise and his son had not joined him in his exile. LAiglon or
"The Young Eagle," as the King of Rome was called, was being reared in an
enemy court because the former French empress had returned to her Aus-
trian roots. Furthermore, Napoleon's 2 million-franc stipend that was guar-
anteed by the Treaty of Fontainebleau had not arrived. Louis XVIII, so
recently restored to the French throne, appeared to be both hopeless and

hapless when it came to understanding the postrevolutionary French. He
was obese and gout-ridden. He had even been dubbed "Louis, the Unavoid-
able" by the allies, because there had been no one else to place on the
throne of France. He had restored the Catholic Church and increased taxes.
The rolls of the unemployed lengthened, the revolutionary tricolor ceased
to fly over France, and he had imposed censorship to silence his critics. As
Napoleon looked across the Mediterranean Sea that separated Elba from
France, he chose his new path.
While the Congress of Vienna met to redraw the boundaries of
Europe by eliminating the vestiges of the French Revolution and by wip-
ing away the excesses of the Napoleonic period, Napoleon simply
slipped away from Elba. He boarded the Inconstant, disguised as a British
warship, and sailed for France, followed by seven smaller vessels carry-
ing his troops. It was a legend in the making, and Napoleon was not dis-
appointed by what occurred. Landing near Cannes, Napoleon and his
men headed north to restore the First French Empire. Near Grenoble,
royal troops met the Emperor; there, they refused to fire on him. After a
momentary silence, "Vive l'Empereur! Vive l'Empereur!" greeted Napo-
leon's ears, and municipal officials opened wide the doors to the city. As
Napoleon traversed the French countryside, troops fell in behind him.
At Auxerre, Michel Ney who had promised to bring him back to Paris
"in an iron cage," gave up his oath. He was a Napoleonic marshal, after
all, who had fought unfailingly with the Emperor. He would take his
chances on a restoration of Napoleon I. Three weeks later, Napoleon was
back in Paris, issuing a new constitution. He was heartened by the sup-
port of the French people: "In spite of all that is past, you see the peo-
ple return to me," he reported to a close associate, "there is sympathy
between us." 3 But, war clouds were immediately on the horizon.
The powers of Europe, meeting in Vienna, agreed not to allow
Napoleon to retake his throne. Britain pledged troops and resources to
defeat him, and the allies reestablished themselves as a military coalition.
They planned a concerted assault on Napoleon and France, and even
before he entered Paris, they outlawed Napoleon as "an Enemy and Dis-
turber of the Tranquility of the World." 4 Napoleon's response was a let-
ter to the sovereigns of Europe in which he pledged "an unqualified
respect for the independence of other peoples." 5 Whether Napoleon's
words were sincere or another example of propaganda did not matter
Fhe Legend of the Eagle 149
because allied troops were already assembling near Brussels: Wellington

with a multinational army of 107,000 men and Blucher with 123,000
Prussians. Austrian and Russian troops from across the continent were
scheduled to join them later. The allied plan was to take Paris and crush
French resolve one more time. Potentially the allies could field more
than three-quarters of a million men if they could work together again.
On the other side, Napoleon's quickly constructed Army of the North
was composed of 128,000 men, some from the Restoration Army of
Louis XVIII, some new recruits, and the majority seasoned veterans and
men who had always followed Napoleon. In total, counting his field
army, 300,000 troops were at Napoleon's disposal, and he had begun to
mobilize the National Guard. The scale of the contest was immense, and
the challenge was real. For further information about the Duke of
Wellington, see the biographies at the end of this volume.
As it came to be, there was no grand strategy to the Waterloo Cam-
paign. It was, in fact, painfully simple, and it hinged on well-proven
principles of warfare. Napoleon had to be victorious over each of the
armies that faced him, and he had to do so before they united and before
additional allied forces joined them. As he had done before, he planned
to use time and space to his advantage. 6 Quickly and quietly, he amassed
his men almost under the noses of the allies. He hoped to count on their
lack of attention and their errors, and Wellington immediately proved
him correct. Just as Napoleon had contrived, the British and Prussian
commanders did not concentrate their troops. They were on their own,
and opportunity belonged to Napoleon. On June 16, the French met the
Prussian advance at Ligny. There, the 72-year-old Prussian commander
stood firm and refused to let the French get the best of him. His efforts,
however, were unavailing. In desperation late in the day, Field Marshal
Blucher personally led the charge against Napoleon's Imperial Guard. In
the melee, his horse was killed beneath him; he was knocked uncon-
scious and nearly trampled. 7 The Prussians had lost 34,000 men (casu-
alties and deserters), and there was nothing they could do except retreat.
Although Blucher was still missing on the battlefield, the Prussians
began to retreat due north instead of to the east toward their line of com-
munications as Napoleon had expected. The direction of the retreat was
one of the most fortuitous decisions of the entire campaign, because
rather than widening the gap between the allied armies, the retreat nar-
rowed their distance.
Twenty miles away at Quatre Bras, also on June 16, Marshal Ney
had attacked Wellington's army. Ney's orders were to control the cross-
roads and block Wellington's movement toward Blucher. Initially every-
thing was set for victory; Ney was positioned well and had numeric
superiority. But, he did not press his troops to start the battle. By the end
of the day after furious fighting, the tardy assault and miscommuni-
cation about an entire corps left Ney with a draw. Casualties were nearly
equal. Although Ney recovered the advantage, he did not resume fight-
ing until a day later on the afternoon of June 17, when he believed that
he would finish off Wellington's army. Unknown to the French, Welling-
ton had already moved his troops, except for some cavalry and rear
guard, toward the ridge at Mont-St.-Jean, just south of Waterloo. It was
a rude surprise to both Ney and Napoleon when they discovered the
British commander's feint. Wellington's forces were now a much more
organized and established foe, and the Prussians were within ample dis-
tance to support them.
Ney's lethargy and misjudgment had, for all intents and purposes,
allowed Wellington to choose the battlefield for the next encounter on
June 18. Yet, there was still nothing to suggest to Napoleon that victory
would not be his. Napoleon had artillery and troop superiority—72,000
men to Wellington's 68,000 men—and he had sent Marshal Emmanuel
Grouchy to pursue the Prussians after Ligny. Overlooking the field at
Waterloo, he confidently told his men that they would sleep in Brussels
that night.
Across a three-mile stretch of slightly undulating hills and along a
line of fortified farms, Wellington had established his defensive position.
Wellington chose to be patient; he would await Napoleon's assault rather
than opening the battle. Not until nearly the middle of the day did Napo-
leon send his troops forward. He had chosen to let the water-soaked
ground dry and harden to maintain his artillery superiority, including
the deadly ricocheting capacity of his solid shot. In the final analysis,
however, the choice was "a moment lost," and the time could never be
recovered.
The battle of Waterloo began with a diversionary bombardment
and attack on the left (at the Chateau of Hougoumont). The diversion
had been designed to draw Wellington's troops to reinforce the chateau
and weaken the center of the Anglo-Dutch line. Then, Napoleon
planned for French troops to make their major assault on Wellington's
The Legend of the Eagle
151
Map 7.1 The Waterloo Campaign and the Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815
center, press through, and take Brussels. From the beginning, however,
the battle of Waterloo did not proceed as planned, and military histori-
ans, who have studied the contest in minute detail, can find innumer-
able causes. It appeared that French commanders, including Napoleon,
were bent on forgetting the Emperor's principles of warfare—one by one.
Besides the late timing of the assault, Napoleon did not know the lay of
the land. Almost immediately at Hougoumont, the French were forced
to strengthen their position besieging the fortified farm, rather than con-
centrating on breaking the enemy line as was their objective. Further-
more, the French line of operations was not maintained as it should have
been; it wavered and curved across the battlefield. Later Ney mistimed
his assault on the center, squandered men in assault after assault, and
sent cavalry without infantry support against British squares. Grouchy,
on whom Napoleon counted, failed to keep the main Prussian forces
from aiding Wellington, and when Napoleon needed Grouchy's men
most, the marshal never marched toward the sound of the drums. Prin-
ciple after principle of warfare was lost.
Then the worst occurred late in the afternoon of June 18 when
three Prussian corps arrived. Napoleon responded by strengthening his
right against the Prussians. He furiously sought Grouchy, and then he
hastened to support Ney's final assault. The French troops were now
numerically inferior, they could not be concentrated any further, and
Napoleon committed the remainder of his Reserve. Toward 8:00 P.M., the
last of the Imperial Guard met the British. Surprised and massively out-
numbered, they retreated, and with them the French army broke and
fled. It was a harrowing scene; the battle was over. At Genappe, south of
the battlefield, French troops continued to flee before the Prussians. It
was ghastly.
Between the houses of the village, the road ran downhill to a bridge
across the river Dyle. The bridge was only eight feet wide, just
enough for a single wagon. The army poured into the top of the
street and was carried down the hill by its own momentum: but it
could only filter slowly out across the bridge at the bottom. First the
bridge and then the whole of the street was blocked, and thousands
upon thousands of men were crushed among the forage and bag-
gage wagons which had halted there. In terror of what they imag-
ined was coming behind them, men tried to cut their way through,
horsemen slashed with their swords, infantry used their bayonets,
shots were fired. They killed and maimed each other without mak-
ing any progress: the living were only hampered by the dead.8
For the wounded on the battlefield, during the night, the looting and
killing continued. The next morning, peasants collected clothing that
had not been taken during the night; and sightseers, sometimes with
perfumed handkerchiefs over their noses, gathered to look at the car-
nage. Finally, nearly 24 hours after the battle had ended, the wounded
were cared for as the field of battle was cleared. 9
The French army was in disarray and the battlefield provided grisly
reality, yet Napoleon called Waterloo only a "disastrous skirmish." In
denial about the extent of the defeat, Napoleon planned to raise a new
army, even if he had to "drag the guns [with] carriage-horses," com-
mandeer weapons from former Royalists, and continue the campaign to
save and restore France. "There is still time to retrieve the situation," he
wrote to his brother Joseph on June 19. 10
This time Napoleon was wrong. Although his Minister of War was
rallying troops to defend Paris and some 117,000 men were available,
the French legislative body refused to support Napoleon. They had
decided to save France themselves, rather than to put their trust in the
once legendary Emperor. By June 2 1 , Napoleon was in Paris pleading
with his former marshals and ministers; but Fouche controlled the day,
and Napoleon was forced to abdicate. He dallied at Malmaison
The Legend of the Eagle 153
(Josephine's former home), gathered some possessions and a new trav-

eling library, and contemplated fleeing to America, which was his
brother Joseph's destination. Instead, fearful that Blucher and the Prus-
sians would capture him, Napoleon surrendered to the British on the
Bellerophon. A day earlier, he had written to the Prince Regent of
England, whom he regarded "as the strongest, the stubbornest, and the
most generous of my foes." He had "put [himself] under the protection
of British law" to avoid his less charitable enemies. He wrote, "Your
Royal Highness: victimized by the factions which divide my country, and
by the hostility of the European powers, I have ended my political career;
and I come, as Themistocles did, to claim a seat by the hearth of the
British people." 11
Again, Napoleon was wrong. No gentleman's hearth awaited him.
While he paraded on the deck of the British ship and engaged the ship's
staff and crew in conversation, his fate was sealed even more surely He
was declared a prisoner of war to be transported to St. Helena where he
would remain until his death. He was simply General Bonaparte, who
had been defeated by the allies of Europe.
I Glimpsed an Eagle
Stendhal's novel, The Charterhouse of Parma (1839), arrived on the
European scene one year before Napoleon's body was returned to Paris
and nearly two decades after the Emperor's death. In the book, the reader
meets Stendhal's young romantic character Fabrizio del Dongo at the
time he heard the news of Napoleon's return from Elba in 1815. Europe
was at war again. As Fabrizio contemplated his changing life, he looked
up: "Suddenly, high in the sky to my right, I glimpsed an eagle—Napo-
leon's bird; it was soaring majestically toward Paris. I then resolved to
offer that great man little enough but all I have." 12 Stendhal's fictional
character then joined the Emperor's troops at Waterloo where he dis-
covered war amid musket balls, cannonballs, smoke, and the fury of the
battlefield. He had joined a man of destiny
On May 5, 1821, the man of destiny died. Having been ill for
months, Napoleon succumbed to what appeared at the time to be stom-
ach cancer, the disease of his father. 13 He had grown pudgy, his stomach
was distended, and he was in pain most of the time. He had given up
most of his diversions—his walks, gardening, and card games of Piquet
1 54 THE AGE OF NAPOLEON
and Twenty-one. He had known that his life was drawing to an end; and
only a few weeks before his death, he had dictated most of the signifi-
cant passages of his last will and testament. The will was, for all those
who read it, a statement of his life, his politics, and his legend. He
wanted to be remembered as a good Catholic, a good father to his son
and to the French people, a man whose largesse was unlimited, and a
man who died "prematurely assassinated by the English oligarchy."14 In
the lengthy will and its codicils, he remembered each of his loyal retain-
ers, specified rewards and pensions to the anonymous French soldiers
who had given their lives and limbs for him, and chastised those who
had deserted him. The will was, in fact, as much a personal memoir as
many of his other writings. See Document 10: Napoleon's Last Will and
Testament.
As news spread of Napoleon's death, responses were mixed. "What
an event!" an admirer in Paris remarked. On the other hand, Talleyrand
noted, "it is no longer an event, it is only a piece of news."15 Talleyrand,
however, was quite mistaken. As the years passed after Napoleon's death
on St. Helena in 1821, the event was firmly imprinted on the collective
memory of Europe and the sides lined up. There were writers, like
Stendhal, who praised Napoleon; and there were those who saw him as
an anti-Christ, a demon Emperor, an ogre, a bloody villain, a megalo-
maniac, and a tyrant who would not allow Europe to find peace. Others
saw him as the son of the Revolution, a man who had unfortunately been
corrupted by power before he could fully achieve his aim, and a modern
Prometheus. Both a black legend and a more generous, sometimes hagio-
graphic, legend defined the former Emperor.16 In some cases, the legend
came directly from the Emperor's exile. Always attempting to be in con-
trol, he had dictated voluminous memoirs to a handful of retainers who
had gone to St. Helena with him. In total, only 27 people had been
allowed to accompany Napoleon in his exile; yet, of those, 11 left mem-
oirs or records that were published during their lifetimes or later. The
first was published in 1822 immediately after his death.17 See the biog-
raphies at the end of this volume for information on Las Cases who
joined Napoleon during his exile and who published one of the best-
known sets of memoirs of the Emperor.
Napoleon had also aroused the interest of a wealth of nineteenth-
century writers: Leo Tolstoy, Lord Byron, Sir Walter Scott, William
Makepeace Thackery, Thomas Hardy, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William
Wordsworth, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Alexandre Dumas, Heinrich Heine,

Frangois Rene Chateaubriand, Honore de Balzac, and Victor Hugo. Later
Rudyard Kipling, George Bernard Shaw, and Anatole France joined the
list. 18 Even musicians were not immune. During his lifetime Ludwig van
Beethoven had dedicated a symphony to Napoleon and then withdrawn
the dedication, and in 1880 Petr Tchaikovsky had composed the 1812
Overture chronicling Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 19
In Napoleon's expansion across Europe, he had also inspired
nationalism—not so much because he wanted it, but because it was
waiting to be born. The Poles cited him as their liberator, although he
had never fulfilled his promises to them. Nonetheless, the Duchy of War-
saw existed to be the basis of the rebirth of Poland after World War I.
Germans, like Johann von Goethe, found inspiration in his genius, and
the Confederation of the Rhine became the foundation of modern Ger-
many. By the mid-nineteenth century, Napoleon had been reborn as
another persona. He had become a leader of the masses, the man who not
only brought order out of the chaos of the Revolution, but who had
brought the benefits of the Revolution to the descendants of his imperium.
Representatives at the Congress of Vienna, who had attempted to expunge
the Revolution and Napoleonic period from the map and memory of
Europe, had done no such thing. 20
Even existing political regimes were not exempt from Napoleonic
influence. King Louis-Philippe (1830-1848), whose problems in France
had increased in the 1830s although he had come to the throne of the
French through revolution, attempted to capitalize on the resurgence of
Bonapartism that he could not stem. In 1840, he authorized a meticu-
lously planned exhumation of Napoleon's remains from the unmarked
grave on St. Helena and then staged an elaborate funeral for Napoleon
in Paris. He was responding to Napoleon's will that had left a simple mes-
sage: "I wish my ashes to rest beside the Seine, in the midst of the French
nation I have loved so dearly" 2 1 The ceremony was extravagant as six
horses pulled the hearse carrying Napoleon's remains under the Arc de
Triomphe and down the Champs-Elysees. To the sound of cannon and
bells, the hearse crossed the Seine and delivered Napoleon to the site of
his final resting place. Briefly in Louis-Philippe's Paris, the declining
economy and labor disputes were forgotten. Old soldiers pinned on their
medals of the Legion of Honor and shared war stories. A resurgence of
nostalgia greeted the popular imagination. The theatrics, however, were
not enough to save Louis-Philippe's throne, and France returned to rev-

olution in 1848.
Historical memory was not lost on Hitler who tried a similar,
although less grandiose, maneuver in 1941. While Napoleon's remains
rested on the banks of the Seine, Napoleons son had never been reunited
with him. In an effort to bring the French into his fold, Hitler sent back
to Paris the ashes of Napoleon's son, who had been interred in Austria
over a century earlier. LAiglon, who was also called the Duke of Reich-
stadt in his mother's homeland, was soon buried near Napoleon's mas-
sive sarcophagus at Les Invalides. 22 Interestingly, Hitler's very politically
charged action did not have its desired outcome. No imperial aura
miraculously surrounded the Fi'ihrer for returning what the French
believed was theirs anyway. Writers, however, began to compare Napo-
leon and Hitler, particularly for the extent of their empires. "The resem-
blances are too striking," wrote Pieter Geyl, whose Napoleon: For and
Against was published in 1949. By 1942, German tanks and troops were
extending themselves from North Africa to the gates of Moscow, and
Hitler had created the Third Reich through centralization, censorship,
and the powerful manipulation of public opinion. For all of the superfi-
cial comparisons and parallels, Geyl did not push the comparison. "His-
tory does not repeat itself," he reported. 23 Similarly, in Henry Kissinger's
less than flattering portrayal of Napoleon in A World Restored, he firmly
asserted that Napoleon was no Hitler. 24 Although Europe could not live
at peace with Napoleon, he had not built his empire on the exclusion
and annihilation of designated peoples.
In conclusion, it may be fitting to turn one more time to Napoleon's
own words. "I have closed the gaping abyss of anarchy, and I have
unscrambled chaos," he told Las Cases in 1816. "I have cleansed the
Revolution, ennobled the common people, and restored the authority of
kings. I have stirred all men to competition, I have rewarded merit wher-
ever I found it, I have pushed back the boundaries of greatness." 23 Leav-
ing aside Napoleons penchant for hyperbole, his reconstruction of
France and the French codes had been immense; he had endorsed the
revolutionary principle of civil equality, and no one refused to accept the
Legion of Honor during his lifetime. He had also planned to create a fed-
eration of Europe: "a European code; a court of European appeal, with
full powers to redress all wrong decisions, as ours redresses at home
those of our tribunals. Money of the same value but with different coins;
the same weights, the same measure, the same laws, etc." 26 He had, in
fact, made impressive strides to that end—adding 28 departments to
France in a period of 10 years from territory annexed from the Dutch,
Germans, Piedmontese, Italians, and Swiss. It is not surprising that
nearly every article published recently on the European Union refer-
ences Napoleon's plan. Yet, the Treaty of Maastricht had something quite
different in mind. Napoleon's federation of Europe would have been
dominated by the French; while the European Union is based on com-
mon citizenship, a common economic and foreign policy, a monetary
union, and equality of states within the union, no country is to have
hegemony over the others. 27 Napoleon would have been incapable of
accepting that model.
In the final analysis, Napoleon was both ahead of his time and
behind in recognizing the extent of the changes that had swept across
France because of the French Revolution and across Europe because of
his armies, occupations, and annexations. He stood with one foot firmly
planted in the past and one solidly placed in the future. He was both the
model of an eighteenth-century enlightened despot and the creator of
the modern powerful, centralized state. In fact, his reign was filled with
contradictions that he might not have escaped if peace had been assured.
Napoleon's gigantic undertaking had failed, and with it his personal
ambition remained unfulfilled. 28 But, the French never erased his pres-
ence. Although there is only one street named for him in Paris (rue
Bonaparte), the city itself is a monument to the Emperor: Les Invalides,
the Venddme column, the Arc de Triomphe, the home of the Legion of
Honor, monuments to his loyal marshals in Pere Lachaise Cemetery, the
names of the splendid boulevards, the avenues that radiate from l'Etoile
(the location of the Arc de Triomphe), and a score of other reminders.
Even his detractors could not ignore his accomplishments. "The
Emperor took a hand in everything; his mind never rested," wrote
Chateaubriand in his Memoirs. "Bonaparte is not great by virtue of his
words, speeches, his writings, or by virtue of a love of liberty; he is great
in that he created a solid and powerful government, a code of laws
adopted in various countries, courts of law, schools, and a strong, active
and intelligent administration on which we are still living." 29 While
Chateaubriand had been scandalized by the casualties that France had
incurred during the wars, he also lived in a world that had changed dra-
matically, in many ways for the better. Graveyards had indeed grown, but
Napoleon's soldiers had remained loyal, even choosing to fight with him
for a second chance.
In 1813, even before the legend had been firmly established, one
of Napoleon's own men had indicated to the Emperor who he was. He
said: "Ah! Sire, some say you are a god, others, that you are a devil, but
everyone allows you are more than a man." 3 0 The statement still rings
true.
Notes
1. See Norman MacKenzie, The Escape from Elba: The Fall and Flight of
Napoleon, 1814-1815 (New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).
2. Alistair Home, How Far from Austerlitz?: Napoleon, 1805-1815 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 357.
3. "Conversation of Napoleon at the Tuileries with Benjamin Constant,
during the Hundred Days," in David L. Dowd, Napoleon: Was He the Heir of the
Revolution? (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1957), 12.
4. Owen Connelly, The French Revolution and Napoleonic Fra (Fort
Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1991), 342.
5. Napoleon to the Sovereigns of Europe, April 4,1815, quoted in Napo-
leon's Letters: Selected, Translated, and Fdited by]. M. Thompson (London: Prion,
1988), 313.
6. Among his famous quotes is the following: "Space we can recover,
time never." See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), 149.
8. David Howarth, Waterloo: Day of Battle (New York: Galahad Books,
1968), 198-99.
9. Ibid., 208-16.
10. Napoleon to Joseph, June 19, 1815, quoted in Napoleon's Letters, 314.
11. Napoleon to the Prince Regent of England, July 14, 1815, quoted in
ibid., 315.
12. Stendhal, The Charterhouse of Parma (New York: Random House,
1999), 27.
13. J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton,
2001), 402. Sten Forshufvud and Ben Weider, however, have conducted exten-
sive research in an effort to prove that Napoleon was poisoned. According to
The Murder of Napoleon (1982) and later research based on samples of Napo-
leon's hair, the most likely assassin was the Count of Montholon who also
resided at Longwood on St. Helena and who had ample opportunity Historians,
including David Chandler and Alan Schom, now view poisoning as the cause
of his death. Other historians, including most French historians, remain con-
vinced that stomach cancer was the cause of death. A recent French response
The Legend of the Eagle
159
can be found in Le Monde hebdomadaire (November 5, 2002) citing a study con-

ducted by Pierre Chevalier at the Laboratoire pour 1'utilisation du rayonnement
electronique (LURE) at Orsay France.
14. Jean-Pierre Babelon and Suzanne d'Huart, Napoleon's Last Will and
Testament (New York and London: Paddington Press, Ltd., 1977), 36-90.
16. Geoffrey Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 (London
and New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), 250; and Jean Tulard,
Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1984).
See also Sir Walter Scott, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French
(New York: Leavitt and Allen, 1858). The original biography was published in
nine volumes in 1827.
17. Susan Conner, "St. Helena and the Napoleonic Legend," in
Napoleonic Military History: A Bibliography, ed. Donald D. Horward (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986), 539-79. See also Chapter XXIV, "St. Helena"
in Volume IX of The Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1969).
18. This list is drawn from Connelly, The French Revolution and
Napoleonic Era, 350, note 16; and Frank McLynn, "Bliss was that dawn: Another
year, another batch of books about Napoleon," abstract of an article in The New
Statesman (December 17, 2001).
19. Beethoven's symphony Eroica was first dedicated to Napoleon until
the composer learned that the First Consul had crowned himself Emperor.
Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture lays out the Russian Campaign through the
national anthems of Russia and France. During his Empire, however, Napoleon
never used "La Marseillaise."
20. As much as possible, the provisions of the Congress of Vienna laid
out status quo ante. See Norman Hampson, The First European Revolution,
1776-1815 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 175 ff. By the Second Treaty of
Paris, France returned to prerevolutionary boundaries (losing even more terri-
tory than Napoleon had gained for the French state). France was required to
pay an indemnity, and an occupation army remained on French soil. Elsewhere,
as the boundaries of Europe were redrawn, restoration and legitimacy were key
words, but the Congress of Vienna also sought to build a strong buffer against
France. Territorial exchanges benefited the victors of the Napoleonic wars.
21. Babelon and d'Huart, Napoleon's Last Will and Testament, 36.
22. Roger Dufraisse, Napoleon (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 155.
23. See Pieter Geyl, Napoleon: For and Against (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1949), 8; and Desmond Seward, Napoleon and Hitler: A
Comparative Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc. Touchstone Book,
1988), 9-16. Geyl concluded that comparisons between Napoleon and Hitler
made Napoleon appear far less "evil" than the black legend had painted him.
Seward argues that their parallels are very strong: "What united them at their
zenith was the demonic process of corruption by power."
24. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith,

1973), 331.
25. Conversation (1816) quoted in The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from
His Written and Spoken Words, Edited and Translated by J. Christopher Herold
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 332.
26. "Dictation of Napoleon to Las Cases at St. Helena, August 24 1816,"
quoted in Geyl, Napoleon: For and Against, 16.
27. Treaty of Maastricht, printed by the European Documentation Cen-
ter, http://www.uni_mannheim.de.
28. Geyl, Napoleon: Eor and Against, 446.
29. Frangois-Auguste-Rene, vicomte de Chateaubriand, The Memoirs of
Chateaubriand, ed. Robert Baldick (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 296, 301.
30. Narbonne to Napoleon (1813) quoted in George Gordon Andrews,
Napoleon in Review (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 280.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES:
SIGNIFICANT PERSONS IN
THE AGE OF NAPOLEON
Fouche, Joseph (1760-1820)

Joseph Fouche was among the best known of Napoleon's ministers,
having served as Minister of General Police from the time of Napoleon's
coup d'etat on 18 Brumaire until September 1802 and again from June
1804 until July 1810. Quintessentially a policeman, Fouche was known
for having his eye on everything. He oversaw governmental censorship,
controlled the press, and created a secret police. He was widely feared
for the information he collected and the way he used it to ferret out
spies, conspirators, opposition leaders, other ministers, and even gener-
als.
Born the son of a merchant sailor, Fouche studied for the ministry,
although he was never ordained. He entered politics, voted for the death
of the king, and served in the provinces during the Jacobin period, rout-
ing out counterrevolutionaries and overseeing mass executions. In July
1794, he was among the Thermidorians who overthrew Robespierre, and
he continued to survive during the Directory period as a military agent,
plenipotentiary, and ambassador.
At the time of Napoleon's coup, Fouche had recently returned to
Paris as Minister of General Police, a position he continued under the
First Consul. The position was broadly defined: the surveillance of pub-
lic opinion; the suppression of crimes and misdemeanors; provisioning
(internal commerce); overseeing traffic, streets, and health; and moni-
toring foreigners and emigres. When Fouche described what he did, he
said simply that he had been designated "to observe everyone and every-
thing." Within a year he was known for the speed with which he brought
to justice the authors of the Infernal Machine plot, who had attempted
162 Biographical Sketches
to kill Napoleon. Using the press, posters, and agents on the street, his
police machinery was ubiquitous; and he soon became known for his
legion of police informants {mouehards or snitches) who were paid out
of a special fund that he managed allegedly from gambling and prosti-
tution. By the fall of 1802, he had files on nearly everyone in politics,
including two of Napoleon's brothers. Napoleon determined to bring
him into check; and with peace assured by the Peace of Amiens, Fouche's
position was eliminated.
Less than two years later, Fouche's expertise was needed to deal
with the Cadoudal Plot that threatened Napoleon and his government.
Clandestinely, efficiently, and meticulously, his agents infiltrated the
plot. The result was a massive purge of royalist opposition and one
potential military rival to Napoleon, along with the death of the due
d'Enghien. Even though Fouche did not support the death of the due
d'Enghien, Napoleon rewarded Fouche for his work. His position as
Minister of General Police was re-created, and he quickly moved again
to establish his network of police, secret police, agents, and spies
throughout the Empire. By 1809 he was a power to be reckoned with;
and while Napoleon was on campaign in Austria, he called up the
National Guard and assigned its command to one of Napoleon's mar-
shals to repel the British troops that had landed at Walcheren. Napoleon
awarded him the title of due d'Otrante, but Napoleon knew that he could
not allow one of his ministers to raise an army that might ultimately be
used against him. In July 1810, using his own agents, Napoleon had
proof that Fouche was dealing with the Bourbons. Fouche fled, remain-
ing for the most part out of politics until Napoleon's Hundred Days when
interestingly he returned to his position with the Emperor. As soon as
the defeat at Waterloo was known, Fouche went to work choreograph-
ing Napoleon's second abdication, a role that provided him with a posi-
tion under the restored Louis XVIII. He remained there only briefly until
he was sent in an official capacity to Dresden and finally to Trieste where
he died.
Josephine [Marie"Joseph-Rose de Tascher de La

Pagerie de Beauharnais] (1763-1814)
Reigning empress of France from 1804 until her divorce from the
Emperor in December 1809, Josephine married Napoleon in 1796 when
he was General Bonaparte, commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy.
Biographical Sketches
163
Although she had been called Rose throughout her life, at Napoleon's
request she became Josephine. The early years of their marriage were
stormy, but by 1799, Josephine had settled into a comfortable role as
doyenne of the court and confidante to her husband.
Described as a stunning Creole from the West Indies (Martinique),
Josephine first married a viscount and bore him two children by the time
of the Revolution. The viscount, who was a political liberal, served in the
revolutionary government until term limits returned him to military ser-
vice. Although he initially gained rapid promotions, his victories were
short-lived, and he was drummed out of the army, arrested, and executed
in 1794. Very quickly, Josephine had also been imprisoned and then
widowed. When the Jacobins fell from power, the widow Beauharnais
remained in Paris with her two children, frequenting salon society and
being linked amorously with several of the members of the Directory. It
was in that society that Napoleon met her. Unaware of her alleged sex-
ual liaisons, Napoleon found her to be one of the most fascinating beau-
ties of the day Furthermore, he believed her to be rich and politically
savvy when he asked her to marry him in March of 1796, just prior to
his departure for northern Italy
During the first months of their marriage, Napoleon wrote lovesick
letters to Josephine, sometimes twice daily She was "the flame that
burned incessantly" at his heart, his "tormentor," and his love. He wore
his infatuation on his sleeve and all but drove his commanders crazy
with his incessant references to Josephine. As far as she was concerned,
while Napoleon was on campaign, she preferred to be among her friends
and companions in Paris, including her young amour Hippolyte Charles.
She only joined Napoleon in Italy when forced to do so. During Napo-
leon's Egyptian campaign, her indiscretions and infidelity finally came
to haunt her. He took a mistress in Egypt and returned to France in 1799
planning to divorce Josephine. Her children's pleas and her tears drove
him to reconciliation.
By 1804 she had become empress of France, a role that she fulfilled
impeccably, although Napoleon's family never approved of their mar-
riage. With her Old Regime manners and style, she oversaw the systeme
that merged Napoleon's new nobility with the emigres who had returned
after amnesty was granted to them. When Napoleon was on campaign,
Josephine was now tucked away at her estate at Malmaison, outside of
Paris. Never again was there any suspicion of infidelity, but Josephine
also did not bear Napoleon the heir that he desired and he was always
piqued at her overspending. After a number of his own affairs, the last
being Napoleon's relationship with Maria Walewska in 1809, and several
illegitimate children, Napoleon made plans to divorce Josephine. As
1810 dawned, Napoleon was free to remarry According to witnesses to
the events, Napoleon's separation from his empress was filled with tears.
Napoleon, after all, had grown to rely on her constancy, her tasteful
manners, and the quiet role that she played behind the throne. She
retained her title and received a grant of 3 million francs per year, along
with several properties including Malmaison. She retained a staff of 36
persons and all of the art and furnishings that she and Napoleon had pre-
viously collected for the estate.
In the end, Josephine finished her days at Malmaison where she
died on May 29, 1814, while Napoleon was in exile on Elba. According
to witnesses at St. Helena, her name was still on Napoleons lips in the
days just prior to his death in 1821.
Junot, Laure~Adelaide~Constance Permon, duchesse

d'Abrantes (1784-1838)
Laure Junot, who married one of Napoleons companions and
friends, was a participant in revolutionary salon society in her youth and
one of the best-known members of Napoleonic court society during the
First Empire. In the 1830s, she received renewed recognition as a nov-
elist and memoirist. Her chatty, gossipy, and sometimes acerbic descrip-
tions of the Napoleonic period were incredibly popular upon their
publication, and they continue to be a staple for historians and writers
even today
Born into Byzantine nobility (although many generations removed),
Laure Permon was raised in revolutionary salon society by her mother, a
Corsican expatriate. Her mothers Parisian salon became a frequent
respite for men like Saliceti, Bonaparte, and her future husband Jean-
Andoche Junot. There, still in her teens, she met Napoleon who appeared
somewhat short to her, almost buried in his knee-high military boots. He
was forever Puss in Boots to her, and she was Loulou or Laurette to him.
Later she recalled Bonaparte s alleged proposal of marriage to her mother,
who was almost twice his age, as he attempted to solidify his position in
Directory society. Mme Permon turned him down, and he moved on to
Josephine.
Biographical Sketches 165
In 1800, Laure Permon married Junot, who was then Napoleon's
aide-de-camp and commandant of Paris. The ceremony was lavish for
the 16-year-old, who took on new pretensions as part of that circle of
society After participating in the opening of the imperial court, Mme
Junot followed her husband to Portugal where he had been appointed
ambassador. Her recollections of Portuguese society were less than gen-
erous, perhaps even mean-spirited. She found fashion ridiculous, eti-
quette lacking, and no one particularly handsome. Returning to Paris
after the French defeat at Trafalgar, Junot began his tenure as governor
of Paris (1806) where he continued to be extravagant, hot-headed, and
not particularly distinguished. Mme Junot, however, became one of the
most sought-after hostesses. In the meanwhile Junot returned to Portu-
gal to expel its ruling family, and in the process earned his title as due
d'Abrantes, joining Napoleon's new nobility. When Junot failed to keep
control of Portugal and was forced to capitulate at Cintra, he rejoined his
wife in Paris.
Their marriage was strained, their debts were increasing, and both
of them courted disaster in their personal relationships. Junot was linked
to Caroline, Napoleon's sister, and Mme Junot became embroiled in
intrigue and scandal with the Austrian foreign minister Clemens von
Metternich. Enough was enough, and Napoleon demanded that Mme
Junot accompany her husband to the Peninsula in 1810. Entering Spain,
she commented on the despoliation of the guerrilla contest, and she
experienced firsthand the horrors of war as she traveled with the French
army to the borders of Portugal. In the ruins of Ciudad Rodrigo she even
gave birth to her son. The Peninsula was far from her privileged life in
Paris.
When Junot died in 1813 after a bout of insanity and a suicide
attempt, the duchess became a recluse. When Napoleon returned to
power in 1815, she refused to see him; and he made no efforts to recon-
cile with the woman whom he had dubbed the "Little Pest." During the
Restoration (Louis XVIII), she overspent on everything, selling most of
her belongings just to have flowers on her table. In 1830, with the assis-
tance of Honore de Balzac, she began her memoirs. Between the publi-
cation of her writings in 1831 and her death, she wrote over three dozen
volumes. Although she frequently erred about particular facts because
she had not kept careful notes, her works were immediately popular. No
one seemed to be able to match her flamboyant use of language, inter-
esting turns of phrases, candor, familiarity with imperial society—both

military and civilian—and sometimes shocking analyses of people and
events during the Empire. Nonetheless, she continued to overspend; and
she died in poverty in Paris in 1838. Although the reader must always
check her facts, Les Memoires de la Duchesse d'Abrantes remain one of the
most colorful portraits of the Napoleonic period. Among the early
English translations are Memoirs of Napoleon, His Court and Family by
the Duchesse d'Abrantes (1855) and Secret Memoirs and Chronicles of the
Courts of Europe: The Memoirs of Emperor Napoleon (1901).
Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin Dieudonne, comte

de (1766-1842)
Sharing Napoleon's exile on St. Helena from 1815 until his expul-
sion from the island in 1816, the Comte de Las Cases was in the envi-
able position of having daily access to Napoleon as the former Emperor
considered how he wished posterity to remember him. In 1823, less than
two years after Napoleon's death, Las Cases published the Memorial de
Sainte-Helene, based on Napoleon's dictations to him. The Memorial was
immediately well received and widely quoted by admirers of Napoleon,
and it remains one of the most important contributions to the
Napoleonic Legend even today
According to contemporaries of Las Cases, his choice of exile on St.
Helena with the former Emperor was unexpected. Almost everything in
Las Cases' past would have placed him with the royalist cause. When the
French Revolution began in 1789, Las Cases was far from a revolution-
ary. In fact, he was a marquis who owned significant land and had served
in the Royal Navy He was among the first of the emigres to leave France,
and he served the counterrevolution until his return to France after 18
Brumaire and Napoleon's amnesty His life was undistinguished, and he
went unnoticed publicly until the publication of an important work on
geography that also restored his fortune. It was not until 1809, however,
that he gained notice in the French military when he volunteered in the
defense of Holland against the British (Walcheren). After receiving
rewards for his service, Napoleon invited Las Cases to serve as cham-
berlain in the court of Marie Louise in 1810. He then went with the
Emperor to Russia and retired to England during Napoleon's first exile.
He returned shortly later and entered Napoleon's service during the
Hundred Days.
167
When Napoleon announced his second abdication, Las Cases was
in the first ranks to pledge his loyalty. He then volunteered with his 15-
year-old son to "have the honor of experiencing the trials of exile" with
the Emperor. Other members of Napoleon's companions in exile, how-
ever, found Las Cases less sincere than he purported. They described
him stereotypically as a small man who had attached himself to a great
man ultimately to profit from the relationship. Regardless of Las Cases'
motives, his multivolume work became a best seller. Published first in
1831, the Memorial went through a second printing that same year. The
following year another edition came out, followed by a 28-volume ver-
sion beginning in 1830. Other editions appeared in 1835 (2 volumes),
1840 (5 volumes), and 1842 (2 volumes). Following Las Cases' death,
reissued versions were printed in 1862, 1894, 1935, and 1951.
The Memorial de Sainte-Helene follows Napoleon on his walks
around Longwood estate on St. Helena, takes him back to his youthful
inspiration by Rousseau, engages him in reminiscences about court life
and the reorganization of France, and lays out some of the former
Emperor's most famous maxims and quotations. According to the Memo-
rial, Napoleon brought order out of chaos; he was a military genius, a
champion of peace, a victim of the British, and a tireless supporter of the
French people. In the introduction, Las Cases set forward his position:
"Circumstances extraordinary have long kept me near the most remark-
able man that ever lived. Admiration made me follow. . . . The world is
full of his glory, his deeds, and his monuments; but few know the true
shades of his character, his private qualities, or the natural disposition
of his soul." Las Cases intended to fill that void.
In 1831 Las Cases was elected to the Senate of France under the
reign of Louis-Philippe. Much to his pleasure, in 1840 he took part in
the massive ceremony placing Napoleon's ashes under the dome of Les
Invalides in Paris. Less than two years later, he died.
Wlassena, Andre, due de Rivoli, prince d'Essling

(1758-1817)
Andre Massena was one of Napoleon's most celebrated command-
ers, whom he nicknamed "1'enfant cheri de la victoire" at the time of the
First Italian Campaign. Massena's name remains indelibly linked with
the Revolution and Napoleonic period; it was etched on the Arc de Tri-
omphe, and one of the major boulevards of Paris bears it as well. Until
1810 and during very difficult circumstances, Napoleon considered him

his finest marshal.
Born in Nice (in the kingdom of Sardinia) and orphaned early in
life, Massena was reared by an uncle until he joined the French Royal-
Italian regiment where he served for 14 years. Having achieved the high-
est noncommissioned rank because he was not a noble, he resigned at
the time of the French Revolution to take his chances in the volunteer
battalions of the French revolutionary army that promised more oppor-
tunities for advancement. In 1792 when French armies annexed Nice,
he became a French citizen, and by 1793 he had been named brigadier
general. He served with Napoleon in the First Italian Campaign, and
then received command of the Army of Helvetia (Switzerland) where he
defeated the Austro-Russian army and the Russian relief army at Zurich,
protecting France from invasion by the forces of the Second Coalition.
This battle was among the most significant battles of the revolutionary
years because France's entire eastern front had been exposed. Massena
served again with Napoleon in the Second Italian Campaign, holding
Genoa long enough for Napoleon to cross the Alps and to gain an advan-
tage over the divided Austrian armies. His health being poor, he retired
from military service for five years.
Throughout Massena's distinguished military career, he was also
known for his love of money and his interest in women. Occasionally
Napoleon disciplined him; but for the most part, Napoleon tended to
excuse him because his military skills were remarkable. As it turned out,
Napoleon could count on him almost without fail. Although Massena
voted against the constitution of the Life Consulate in 1802 when he was
serving in the Legislative Corps of the French Government, Napoleon
made him one of his first marshals of the Empire in 1804. He returned
to the military in 1805 and continued in Napoleon's campaigns in Naples
(1806), Poland (1807), and Austria (1809). In the latter, he served at
Aspern-Essling in one of the bloodiest contests of the campaign on the
banks of the Danube. For his efforts, he was named prince d'Essling, to
be placed alongside the title due de Rivoli that he had been granted ear-
lier. Injured, arthritic, over 50 years of age, and having lost the sight in
his left eye in a hunting accident, Massena looked forward to retirement
by 1810.
Much to his protestations, however, Massena was named com-
mander of the Army of Portugal when Napoleon chose not to return to
169
the Peninsula to take on the English under Wellington. Badly supplied,

with corps commanders who could not work in concert, Massena pen-
etrated into Portugal only to find his army facing formidable redoubts
and fortifications around Lisbon that made it impossible for him to expel
the British from the Peninsula. Under the worst conditions, sniped at by
the enemy, he turned to face the Anglo-Portuguese army on the border
of Spain in 1811. In the throes of defeat, Napoleon replaced him but sent
him to be governor of the military district and port at Toulon. Napoleon,
however, was soon engaged in the Russian campaign, while his French
troops in Spain were slowly pushed back into France.
After his disgrace in the Peninsula and the recurring blame that
Napoleon placed on Massena, he never commanded a field army again.
As governments changed during Napoleons first exile, the first restora-
tion under Louis XVIII, and the Hundred Days, Massena simply
acknowledged the new government and served the ruling power. With
the final restoration, Massena retired to Nice where he died in 1817.
Later, when Wellington was asked about Massena's quality as a com-
mander, his backhanded comment was, in fact, substantial praise; he
answered, "We were pretty even."
StaeLHolstein, Anne-Louise-Qermaine Necker,

haronne de (1766-1817)
Mme de Stael was the daughter of Jacques Necker, the Swiss comp-
troller-general for Louis XVI, and a leading literary and political critic,
novelist, and celebrated hostess in Paris and at her family estate of Cop-
pet during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Although she ini-
tially supported Napoleon, she also became one of his most intractable
critics.
Born in Paris to Swiss parents, she was reared in France at the court
of Louis XVI where her father had been recruited to deal with the near
financial insolvency of the French kingdom prior to the Revolution.
When her family returned to Switzerland in 1793 as the Revolution
became more radical, she followed the events from afar and became an
advocate of constitutional monarchy or a parliamentary system on the
English model. Only after the Jacobins were removed from power did
she return to Paris to side with the more moderate republican govern-
ment that had replaced it in 1795. There in Paris she established a liter-
ary salon of renown where leading writers and thinkers gathered,
including Swiss countryman Benjamin Constant, who served in the Tri-

bunate under Napoleon's Constitution of VIII (1799) and with whom
she had a long-term relationship.
Although Mme de Stael was already well known because of her
family, her writing, and her ties to Constant, in 1800 she gained further
notice with the publication of her book De la litterature consideree dans
ses rapports avec les institutions sociales. Like the Ideologues, although she
was not one of them, she believed in the doctrine of human perfectibil-
ity, but felt that it could be achieved only if liberty nourished it. Napo-
leon grew concerned as her political position became more republican
and oppositional and her salon became more popular, even with mem-
bers of his family, his generals, and his government officials. In 1802, her
novel Delphine appeared to mixed reviews and further ire from the First
Consul. Reflecting the roles of women in society, her female characters
were diverse: some accepted the prescribed roles of the period, others
attempted to manipulate their roles as women in order to find some hap-
piness in being female, and Delphine perfected ruse and deception in
order to participate among the educated and powerful members of soci-
ety. Furthermore, the book contained recommendations on other social
issues: in favor of divorce, against monastic vows and Catholicism, and
always critical of the continuing centralization of power.
According to contemporaries, she was physically a large woman,
witty, flamboyant, well read, and comfortable in male society; and Napo-
leon was always ill at ease in her company. By 1803, he found her criti-
cisms too strident to ignore. He ordered her to leave Paris and not to
reside any closer than 40 leagues from the capital. During the years when
she could not reside in Paris, she traveled throughout Germany, spent
time in Vienna, and retired to Coppet during her father's last illness.
When her father's critical memoirs of France (1804) and her popular
novel Corinne (1807) appeared, Napoleon was angry but took no action;
but De VAllemagne (On Germany, 1810) was unacceptable. Although he
had initially approved its publication in France, he withdrew his sup-
port, condemned it, confiscated the manuscript, and destroyed ten thou-
sand copies that were ready to be sold. The book, later published in 1813
from a salvaged draft, used Germany as an example to inspire France to
greater creativity and intellectual growth. Napoleon viewed it as thor-
oughly anti-French, just as he viewed her entire circle of international
philosophers, writers, and companions.
171
Although she had once attempted reconciliation with Napoleon,
during the later years of the Empire reconciliation was an impossibility.
Mme de Stael publicly supported Napoleon's French opponents and then
the Bourbons after the Restoration of Louis XVIII. She also continued
to write, and her later publications included Dix annees en exil (Ten Years
in Exile) and Considerations sur la RevolutionfranQaise (Considerations on
the Erench Revolution). Always a romantic, her works, however, did not
engage in nostalgia for a past age. Instead, she became a model for writ-
ers who supported progress and who attempted to forge a pathway
between Enlightenment ideology and romanticism.
Talleyrand*Perigord, Charles Maurice de, prince

and due de Benevent (1754-1838)
One of the great survivors of the revolutionary and Napoleonic
periods, Talleyrand was a consummate diplomat who served six differ-
ent regimes and betrayed four, spied on his own country, and even con-
ducted diplomatic maneuverings in spite of government orders to the
contrary As historian Harold Parker described him, "he was adept at
abandoning sinking ships after slyly opening the scuttles."
Talleyrand, who was born into one of the oldest noble families of
France, would have entered the military had a childhood accident not left
him club-footed. Because his injury was so severe, his family chose the
church as his vocation. From the age of eight, he began instruction in the
Catholic Church, becoming the deputy deacon of St. Denis at Rheims in
1775, followed by additional appointments until he became bishop of
Autun in 1789. Among the liberals of the early Revolution, Talleyrand
resigned his religious posts in 1791 and was instrumental in nationaliz-
ing church lands and abolishing the vestiges of feudalism throughout
France. Joining the diplomatic service, he attempted to keep Great Britain
from joining the allies against France in 1792 and 1793. He was, however,
denounced by the radicals in France after the Republic was declared and
expelled from England. With almost nowhere to go, Talleyrand emigrated
to the United States where he remained for two years as a kind of gentle-
man-merchant, traveling among French emigres and newly made Amer-
ican friends. He returned to France in 1796 where he immediately began
again to insinuate himself into circles of political power.
In 1797, Talleyrand became Minister of Foreign Affairs under the
government of the Directory Having resigned from that post in 1799
because he found the government terminally unstable, he assisted Napo-

leon in the coup d'etat of 18 Brumaire and was rewarded with his reap-
pointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Napoleon initially found him
charming and capable, characterizing him as his ablest diplomat. As
Napoleon's Foreign Minister, Talleyrand took very seriously his objec-
tive to negotiate peace throughout Europe, and he was instrumental in
a number of Napoleonic achievements: the return of the emigres, the
Concordat of 1801 with the pope, the reorganization of northern Italy
into the Italian Republic, the creation of the Life Consulate, and the
severity with which Napoleon dealt with the Cadoudal plot (including
the execution of the Due d'Enghien). Napoleon used Talleyrand to nego-
tiate the Treaty of Pressburg (with Austria) ending the Third Coalition,
the Continental System, and portions of the Treaties of Tilsit that ended
the Fourth Coalition (with Prussia and Russia). For his efforts, Tal-
leyrand accumulated additional wealth and titles, including Grand
Chamberlain of the Empire and due de Benevent (Benevento in south-
ern Italy), Grand Chancellor of the Empire, and Grand Elector. He had
also received the coveted Legion of Honor and had become one of the
wealthiest men in France.
By 1807, however, Talleyrand grew weary of Napoleon's expan-
sionist plans, and he left the ministry of Foreign Affairs although Napo-
leon still frequently consulted him. In 1808 as a representative at Erfurt
with Napoleon, he began clandestine dealings with Alexander I of Rus-
sia whom he counseled to oppose the Emperor. He was soon added to
Austria's payroll as an agent. In spite of his growing estrangement from
the Emperor, Talleyrand continued to have a political presence in
France. Although Napoleon must have known of Talleyrand's duplicity,
perhaps not the extent of it, the Emperor interestingly did nothing about
it. Talleyrand was, according to Mme de Stael: "so double-faced that if
you kick him behind, he will smile in front." The public quarrels
between Napoleon and Talleyrand became legendary and the Emperor's
sniping became more intense; but the fabled former diplomat seemed
immune.
As the disastrous Russian campaign drew to a close, Talleyrand
opened more serious negotiations with the allies. He publicly supported
Napoleon's abdication that he had, in fact, choreographed by assuring
that the French Senate would depose Napoleon. He briefly became pres-
ident of the Provisional Government of France and then went to Vienna
173
as France's representative to the Congress of Vienna, serving the Bour-
bon king Louis XVIII. During the Hundred Days in 1815, Talleyrand
remained in Vienna. He then retired to his estates, only to be recalled to
serve as ambassador to Great Britain under King Louis-Philippe in 1830.
In that capacity, he assisted in the creation of modern Belgium.
Wellington, Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of

(1769-1852)
The man who came to be known as the First Duke of Wellington
was first a British soldier, then the commander who most brought about
Napoleon's military defeat leading to the end of the Napoleonic era in
France, and finally a leading British politician and diplomat during the
first half of the nineteenth century.
Irish born and educated at Eton and a French military academy in
Angers, Wellington initially seemed little fit for the military. Because of
his wealth, however, he was able to move up in the army where he saw
his first combat in 1794 when he served in the Netherlands. His service
continued in 1797 in India where he seriously began to study military
strategy and tactics while learning to be a good administrator. In India,
in fact, his successes on the battlefield first brought him notice. He
remained in India until 1805 when he returned to England, where he
served in politics for the next three years.
The French began to notice Wellington only when he first led
troops in the Peninsula. In 1808 he decisively defeated General Junot
bringing about the expulsion of the French from Portugal. In 1809, he
replaced Sir John Moore who had been killed at Corunna and defeated
the French under Marshal Soult, in an attempt to topple the government
of Joseph Bonaparte. In the brutal contest at Talavera, he held his own
against French assault and received the title Viscount of Wellington.
Shortly thereafter, however, the English were forced to withdraw from
Spain into Portugal again.
Wellington's challenge to the French armies and to the Napoleonic
Empire began in earnest in 1810, when Andre Massena was sent to the
Peninsula with Junot and Ney as his corps commanders to expel the
"English leopard." As the French penetrated into Portugal, their advance
was first checked at Bussaco and then at the Lines of Torres Vedras that
French reconnaissance had not discovered. The fortifications to the
north and east of Lisbon proved to be impenetrable, as Wellington had
intended them to be. Ultimately the French had no recourse except to

withdraw, followed closely by the Anglo-Portuguese Army that sniped
and engaged them in battle all the way into Spain. If Wellington had
appeared to be an English gentleman whose wealth had gotten him
where he was (as his men had earlier thought), the Peninsula War
changed their perceptions. He had become "that Bugger who beats the
French." The war, however, was far from over, and another year elapsed
as Wellington's army pressed into Spain, defeated French Marshal Mar-
mont (who had replaced Massena) at Salamanca, and moved to the bor-
der of France. In 1813, after receiving additional reinforcements,
Wellington took Vitoria where his massive victory earned him the title
Duke of Wellington and his baton as a field marshal of Britain. In 1814,
as Napoleon abdicated for the first time, Wellington was still slogging
his way north through France against continuing French opposition.
Most of Wellington's Peninsular Army was then hurriedly shipped
to the United States in 1814, in the final throes of the American War of
1812, and Wellington returned to England. From there he went to Paris
as ambassador and then to Vienna for the peace talks that were to settle
the Napoleonic era, until Napoleon returned from Elba much to the sur-
prise of the powers of Europe. Wellington was then charged with com-
manding a multinational army against Napoleon's troops. There on the
field at Waterloo, Wellington defeated the French for the final time.
Although Wellington remained British Commander in Chief until 1852
when he died at the age of 83, the remaining years of his life were spent
in politics as prime minister, home secretary, foreign secretary, and advi-
sor to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.
As a military commander, Wellington was without question one of
the best. He was a realist when on campaign and organized his troops to
be self-sufficient in the Peninsula. Knowing that he could not always
count on the Portuguese to be as resolute as his British soldiers, he
incorporated them into a divisional structure alongside his men. From
1810 on, he also took few chances, planning strategies deliberately in
advance with contingencies. He consistently strengthened fortifications
where he had them; he preferred to draw the enemy into his snare rather
than taking audacious offensives; and at Waterloo, he even picked the
battlefield.
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS OF
THE NAPOLEONIC ERA,
1799-1815
Document 1
Napoleon Bonaparte's Letter to His Brother Joseph,
Paris, June 22, 1792
Between Napoleon's sojourns in Corsica and his military commit-
ment to France, he happened to be in Paris during the summer and
fall of 1792. On June 20, a mob of Parisians stormed the Tuileries
where the King and royal family were in residence. They wanted
the King to withdraw his veto on several actions that they believed
to be counter to the Revolution. Nearby Napoleon watched the
confrontation. Realizing the seriousness of the contest between the
King (supported by Lafayette and the National Guard) and the mob
(supported by the Jacobins and the radicals), Napoleon described
the events to his older brother. The King had done well to keep the
mob from taking more power, but a dangerous precedent might
have been set. Source: Napoleon's Letters: Selected, Translated and
EditedhyJ. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 11-12. Reprinted
by permission of Prion Books, Ltd.
M. de Lafayette has written to the Assembly, attacking the Jacobins.

It is a strong letter, and many people think it a forgery M. de Lafayette,
most of the officers in the army, all sound people, the ministers, and the
Paris Department are on one side: the majority in the Assembly, the
Jacobins, and the populace are on the other. The Jacobin attacks on
Lafayette have passed all bounds: they describe him as a rascal, an assas-
sin, and an object of pity. The Jacobins are lunatics, and have no com-
mon sense. The day before yesterday seven or eight thousand men armed
with pikes, hatchets, swords, muskets, spits and pointed stakes, marched
to the Assembly to present a petition. From there they went on to the
176 Primary Documents of the Napoleonic Era, 1799-1815
King's palace. The Tuileries Garden was closed, and protected by 15,000
National Guards. The mob battered down the doors, forced an entrance
into the palace, mounted cannon against the King's apartments, razed
four gates to the ground, and presented the King with two cockades—
one white and the other red, white and blue. They gave him a choice.
'Make up your m i n d ; they said, whether you will reign here, or at
Coblenz.' The King showed up well.
He put on the bonnet rouge [red cap of liberty]: so did the Queen
and the Prince Royal. They gave the King a drink. They stayed in the
palace four hours. This event has provided plenty of material for aristo-
cratic harangues at the Fueillants Club. Nonetheless, it is unconstitu-
tional, and sets a very dangerous precedent. It is certainly hard to guess
what will become of the country under the present stress of affairs.
Document 2
Supper in Beaucaire
Or
A Discussion between a Soldier of Carteaux's army, a Marseillais, a
Man from Nimes, and a Manufacturer from Montpellier, on the Events
which have Occurred in the Former County, on the Arrival of the Men
from Marseilles.
When Napoleon published Supper in Beaucaire in July 1793, he had
already spent nine years of commissioned service in the military, but
he had not been particularly noticed. His pamphlet, however,
arrived on the French political scene at precisely the right moment.
As history unfolded, Supper in Beaucaire along with Napoleon's
noteworthy service at Toulon, brought him governmental attention
and changed his life.
According to the story of Napoleons fictionalized supper, a sol-
dier [Napoleon] had arrived in the small town of Beaucaire on the
last day of the regional fair. In a polemical and heated discussion,
the soldier and his companions analyzed the causes of the counter-
revolutionary revolt that was taking place in the south of France.
Regardless of what the soldier said, one of his dinner companions
[a man from Marseilles] persisted in his conviction that the cen-
tralized Jacobin government was the opponent of true revolution-
ary principles. In the end, the soldier won the debate, by convincing
the man from Marseilles that his counterrevolutionary actions and
those of his comrades were tantamount to a coalition with the
enemy. As he finished, Napoleons message was simple; regardless
of other conditions, might would triumph.
Primary Documents of the Napoleonic Era, 1799-1815
\77
In no way was Supper in Beaucaire an elegant statement of
Jacobin positions, but it did catch the eye of Napoleon's Corsican
compatriot Christophe Saliceti, who was serving the Jacobins in the
south of France. Saliceti forwarded the pamphlet to Maximilien
Robespierre's brother Augustin who had the pamphlet published
and w7ho made sure that the government was aware of Napoleon's
military recommendations. Napoleon's first serious foray into polit-
ical pamphleteering had netted an important result. Although
Jacobin ascendance was short-lived (ending in July 1794), Napo-
leon's military reputation was assured.
The following is an edited version of the original focusing mainly
on the soldier's [Napoleon's] words to the counterrevolutionary
Marseillais. Because the original essay contained ellipses ( . . . ) as
a literary device, I have chosen to avoid confusion by not using
ellipses to point out sections that have been edited. Source: Supper
in Beaucaire in Napoleon Wrote Fiction, Edited, Introduced and
Translated by Christopher Frayling (Salisbury, England: The Comp-
ton Press, 1972), 119-35. Reprinted by permission of PFD on behalf
of Christopher Frayling.
I found myself in Beaucaire on the last day of the fair. As luck

would have it, I had as table companions for supper two Marseilles mer-
chants, a man from Nimes and a manufacturer from Montpellier. After
a few moments spent in getting acquainted, they had found out that I
had come from Avignon and that I was a soldier. The minds of my table
companions, which all week had been fixed on the progress of trade as
a means of making money, were at this moment fixed on the outcome of
current events, on which the future of their livelihood depended. They
wanted to find out my opinion, so that in comparing it with their own,
they might adjust their views and assess prospects for a future, which
would affect us all differently.
The Marseillais seemed to be particularly depressed. The evacua-
tion of Avignon had taught them to have doubts about everything—all
they had left was a considerable anxiety about their fate. Mutual confi-
dence soon made us talkative and we embarked on a conversation more
or less on these lines.
The Soldier [Napoleon] describes Carteaux's army as it forced the

counterrevolutionaries out of Avignon:
The army was four thousand strong when it attacked Avignon.
Today there are six thousand men, and before four days are out there will
be ten thousand.
The army skirmished around the town, tried to force the gates by
planting explosives and fired a few cannon to test the garrison's resis-
tance. The Marseillais [counterrevolutionaries] numbered three thou-
sand six hundred men. They had more artillery and [it was] of superior
caliber; in spite of this they were forced to retreat. That astonishes you,
but the reason is that only veteran troops can stand up to the uncer-
tainties of a siege. They had to evacuate the town. The cavalry pursued
them as they retreated. Many of their men were captured and they lost
two cannon.
Then the Soldier turned directly to the men from Marseilles to make his
point about their counterrevolutionary activities:
Your leaders are incompetent; beware of their predictions. You are
naturally impetuous, you are being led to the slaughter by the same
means that have destroyed so many people—by exciting your vanity
You tell me that your army is at Aix with a great artillery train and
good generals; well, whatever your army does, I assure you it will be
defeated.
You had three thousand six hundred men—at least half of them
have scattered. You have good generals, [but] I have yet to see them so
I cannot comment on their talents. They will be bogged down in details
and will not be supported by subalterns; [and] it will take them two
months to organize their army even tolerably well.
You have some eighteen and twenty-four pounders [cannons] and
you think yourselves undefeatable—you are following vulgar opinion,
but the professionals will tell you, and inevitable experience will make
it quite clear, that good four and eight pounders have as much effect in
open warfare and are superior in many ways.
Your gunners are raw recruits; your opposite numbers are artillery-
men of the line, whose skill makes them masters of Europe. What will
become of your army if it concentrates on Aix? The army will be lost—
it is a precept of military science that he who entrenches his position is
sure to be defeated. Theory and practice agree on this point. You can be
quite certain, then, that the choice which, seems the best to you, is in
fact the worst.
What kind of dizziness can suddenly have possessed your people?
What fatal blindness leads you to the slaughter? How can you possibly
179
aspire to resist the entire Republic? Even if you force the Republic's army
to fall back on Avignon, can you doubt that in a very few days fresh
forces will come to replace it? Will the Republic, which makes the law
for the whole of Europe, take it from Marseilles?
In collaboration with Bordeaux, Lyon, Montpellier, Nimes, Greno-
ble, the Jura, the Eure and the Calvados, you embarked on a revolution.
You had some chance of success—your ringleaders may have had dubi-
ous motives but you had an imposing show of force; on the other hand,
now that Lyon, Nimes, Montpellier, Bordeaux, the Jura and Eure, Greno-
ble and Caen have accepted the Constitution, now that Avignon, Taras-
con and Aries have yielded, you must admit that your stubbornness is
rather foolish. You are influenced by people who, having nothing to lose,
involve you in their downfall.
The Marseillais then challenged the Soldier about the Jacobin

government, its ublood-thirsty excesses," and soldiers in the Republican
military, whom he called brigands*
The Soldier replied:
That is civil war; people cut each other to pieces, detest each other
and kill other people they know nothing about. These soldiers whom
you call brigands are our best troops and our most disciplined battal-
ions—their reputation is above scandal.
You seem to think they go to extremes with you; on the contrary,
they are treating you like misguided children. Do you think that Mar-
seilles could have withdrawn the merchandise she had in Beaucaire
without their consent? They could have sequestered the merchandise
right from the start of the war. They did not wish to do that and thanks
to them, you can go home in peace.
Your army, on the other hand, has killed, assassinated more than
thirty people, invaded family privacy and filled the prisons with good
citizens under the vague pretext that they were brigands.
You say that you fly the tricolor flag.
Paoli also hoisted that flag, in Corsica, to give himself time to
deceive the people, to crush the true friends of liberty, in order to lure
his fellow-countrymen into his ambitious and criminal schemes. He
hoisted the tricolor flag, and he opened fire on ships belonging to the
Republic. He drove our troops from their fortresses; he disarmed those
who guarded them, and he organized riots in order to harass those

Republicans who remained on the Island. He pillaged the storehouses,
selling everything in them at giveaway prices in order to have money to
sustain his revolt. He plundered and confiscated the belongings of the
most well-to-do families because they supported the unity of the Repub-
lic, and he declared "enemies of the fatherland" all those who stayed in
our armies. Before that, he had caused the failure of the expedition
against Sardinia. And still he was shameless enough to call himself friend
of France, and a good Republican, and still he deceived the Convention
which repealed the order for his discharge.
We should no longer put our trust in words. We must analyze
deeds, and you must admit that looking at yours, it is easy to show you
to be counterrevolutionaries.
What effect has your movement produced on the Republic? You
have led it almost to ruin; you have hampered our army operations. I do
not know if you have been in the pay of the Spaniard and the Austrian,
but they certainly could not have wished for a happier diversion. What
more could you do if you were in their pay?
As the Soldier continued, other table companions joined in the

challenge to the Marseillais*
The Man from Nimes spoke first:
We abandoned the Marseillais the moment we saw that they sought
counter-revolution, and that they were fighting over personal griev-
ances. The mask fell as soon as they refused to promulgate the Consti-
tution. That is why we forgave the Mountain [Jacobins] a few
irregularities. We were acting in good faith—you [the Marseillais] were
the ones who had a fox under your coat; we wanted a Republic and
therefore had to accept a Republican Constitution.
The Merchant from Montpellier then joined in:

You have overthrown all the laws, all the conventions. By what
right do you break up your Department? Was it Marseilles who estab-
lished it? By what right has your city's battalion been trampling over the
rest of the province? What makes you think now that this Department
does not have the right to call upon public force to defend it? You have
thus confounded every conceivable right, you have established anarchy
and since you dare to justify your actions by the right of the strongest,
you are nothing but brigands and anarchists.
You have set up a popular tribunal, and only Marseilles has
elected it; it is contrary to every law It can only be a bloody tribunal
since it represents one faction. You have forcibly subjugated the whole
of your department to this tribunal. By what right? Aren't you usurp-
ing the very authority you take such unjust exception to, where Paris
is concerned? In Avignon, you have committed people to prison with-
out authority, without a warrant, without an order from any adminis-
trative body. You have abused family privacy, ignored the liberty of the
individual; you have cold-bloodedly ordered assassinations in public
streets. You have revived those very scenes (whose horror you exag-
gerate in any case) which afflicted the early days of the Revolution:
without inquiries, without trials, without knowing who the victims
were, on the word of their enemies alone, you have arrested them, torn
them from their children, dragged them through the streets and put
them to the sword. You have sacrificed as many as thirty in this way
You have dragged the Statue of Liberty through the mud; you have
publicly desecrated her. She has been the object of all manner of
insults from lawless youths. You have hacked at the Statue with your
swords, you cannot possibly deny it, since it was mid-day and more
than two-hundred of your people were seen to be present at this crim-
inal profanation.
The Soldier then summarized the positions of his table companions and
questioned whether the counterrevolutionary activities would still
continue:
Yes, it has been conclusively proved that the Marseillais have
ruined several of our army operations, and wished to suppress liberty
The point is to find out what they can hope for and what course is still
open to them.
The Man from Marseilles, still resistant to what the Soldier and his
table companions have pointed out, pledges to continue to resist the
Republican troops:
I must say we have fewer choices open to us than I thought, but
one's strength is greatest when one has resolved to die and we have so
resolved rather than bow again under the yoke of those men of blood
who govern the state. You know that a drowning man clutches at every
straw; so will we, rather than allow ourselves to be butchered. Yes, we
have all taken part in this new revolution, so we would all be sacrificed
to vengeance. We will always remember that monster who was nonethe-
less one of the principal members of the Club: he had a citizen lynched,
pillaged his house, and raped his wife after making her drink a cup of
her husband's blood.
The Soldier challenges his facts:

How disgusting! But is that a fact? I doubt it very much, for you
know that no one believes in rape nowadays.
The Marseillais continues:

It is true! Rather than submitting to such people, we will fight to
the last ditch. We will give ourselves over to the enemy.
The Soldier notes that the Marseillais cannot win against the stronger
armies of the Republic and they must return to the Republic:
Believe me, Marseillais, shake off the yoke of the small number of
scoundrels who lead you to counter-revolution, re-establish your con-
stituted authorities, accept the Constitution, and give the representatives
their liberty, so that they can go to Paris to intercede for you. You have
been led astray; it is nothing new for the people to be deceived by a few
conspirators and intriguers. In every age, the impetuosity and ignorance
of the multitude has been the cause of most civil wars.
After further discussion, the Men from Marseilles begin to under-
stand the magnitude of their errors—that they were led astray by a few
counter-revolutionary leaders; that they were indoctrinated into believ-
ing that republican soldiers will treat them violently and maliciously;
and that they have failed to understand the meaning of the Jacobin
regime in Paris.
The Soldier concludes the discussion:

At last you are seeing reason. Why should not a similar change of
attitude affect a large number of your fellow-citizens who have been mis-
led and who are acting in good faith? Then [we] who wish to spare
French blood, will send you some loyal and well-qualified man; we will
come to an agreement, and, without a moment's delay, the army will go
183
and make the [enemy] dance the Carmagnole beneath the walls of Per-
pignan, and Marseilles will still remain the center of gravity for liberty
You will just have to tear a few pages out of your history
This happy prophecy put us back in good humor, the Marseillais
gladly bought us several bottles of champagne, which completely dissi-
pated all worries and cares. We went to bed at two o'clock in the morn-
ing, arranging to meet at breakfast the next day—when the Marseillais
had plenty more doubts to express, and I many interesting truths to
teach them.
Document 3
Napoleon's Letter to Josephine, in Absence, April 3, 1796
When Napoleon left for his command of the Army of Italy, he had
only been married to Josephine for three days. During the weeks
and months of the First Italian Campaign, he wore Josephine's por-
trait on a ribbon around his neck and frequently showed it to his
commanders. Outside of his military affairs, he seemed incapable of
speaking of anything else. At the time when he met the attractive
widow in Paris in 1795, he believed her to be wealthy and well
placed in society to assist him in his career; furthermore, he was fas-
cinated by Josephine and by her physical charms. This letter, writ-
ten in April, was followed by increasing pleadings to join him in
Italy, most of which went unanswered. Later, he demanded her pres-
ence and sent two of his aides to Paris to bring her to Italy. She
obsessed him; but at the same time, her thoughts were on Parisian
society and additional extravagances. When Napoleon later learned
of her infidelities, his ardor and passion cooled. Although Napoleon
later said that she was the only woman he truly loved, he also noted,
"Love is the occupation of the idle man, the distraction of the war-
rior, the stumbling block of the sovereign." (See Fisher, Napoleon,
147.) Source: Napoleon's Letters: Selected, Translated and Edited by
J. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 8-20. Reprinted by permis-
sion of Prion Books, Ltd.
I have all your letters, but none has affected me like the last. Dar-
ling, do you think what you are doing, when you write to me in such
terms? Do you suppose my position is not so painful already, that you
must pile regret upon regret, and reduce my soul to distraction? The way
you write! The feelings you describe! They are flames that scorch my
poor heart. Away from you, my one and only Josephine, there is no plea-
sure in life: away from you, the world is a desert in which I am all alone,
without even the solace of expressing my feelings. You have robbed me

of more than my heart: all my thoughts are about you alone. Whenever
I am bored or worried with business, whenever I am troubled as to how
things will turn out, whenever I am disappointed with mankind, and feel
inclined to curse the day I was born, I put my hand to my heart: there
throbs your likeness; I have but to look at it, and my love is perfect hap-
piness, and there is pleasure in every prospect but that of long absence
from my beloved.
What art did you learn to captivate all my faculties, to absorb all my
character into yourself? It is a devotion, dearest, which will end only with
my life. 'He lived for Josephine': there is my epitaph. I strive to be near
you: I am nearly dead with desire for your presence. It is madness! I can-
not realize that I am getting further and further away from you. So many
regions and countries part us asunder! How long it will be before you
read these characters, these imperfect utterances of a troubled heart of
which you are queen! Ah! Wife that I adore. I cannot tell what lot awaits
me; only, that, if it keeps me any longer away from you, it will be insup-
portable, beyond what bravery can bear. There was a time when I prided
myself on my courage; and sometimes, at the sight of misfortunes that
fate might have in store for me, I would face in imagination unheard-of
ills, without a frown, without a feeling of surprise. But nowadays, the
mere thought that my Josephine may be unwell, or that she might be
taken ill—above all the cruel possibility that she may not love me as she
did, wounds my heart, arrests my blood, and makes me so sad and
despondent that I am robbed even of the courage of anger and despair.
Once I would tell myself that to die without regret is to be safe from
any harm the world can inflict; but now the thought of dying without
the certainty of your love is like the torments of Hell, the very image of
utter annihilation. I experience all the feelings of a drowning man.
My perfect comrade, whom fate has allotted to make life's painful
journey at my side! The day when I lose your heart, Nature will lose for
me all her warmth and vegetation. . . . I cannot go on, dearest: my soul
is so sad, my mind over-burdened, my body tired out. Men bore me. I
could hate them all; for they separate me from my love.
I am at Port-Maurice, near Oneille [northern Italy]. I shall be at
Albenga tomorrow. Both armies are on the move: we are trying to out-
wit one another. May the cleverer man win. I like Beaulieu; he manoeu-
vres well: he is a better soldier than his predecessor. I shall beat him, I
185
hope, and in the grand manner. Don't be worried about me. Love me as
you love your eyes. No, that is not enough: love me as you love your-
self—and not yourself only, but your thoughts, your mind, your life,
your all. Darling, I'm raving, forgive me. Nature is a poor recompense for
such feelings as mine, or for the man you love.
Document 4
Napoleon's Legacy as Viewed from St. Helena
Among Napoleon's companions on St. Helena from 1815 through
1816 was the Comte de Las Cases. Although he was expelled from
St. Helena in 1816 for smuggling letters to and from the island dur-
ing his months with Napoleon, he kept careful notebooks of his
conversations with the Emperor and dictations from Napoleon to
him. Published in 1822, Las Cases' memoirs of Napoleon in four
volumes became an instant success. The following selection sum-
marizes Napoleon's legacy, as viewed in Napoleon's own words and
Las Cases' comments. As will become immediately apparent, Las
Cases was an admirer of Napoleon. Source: Emmanuel Dieudonne,
comte de Las Cases, Memoirs of the Life, Exile, and Conversations
with the Emperor Napoleon, 4 vols. (New York: Worthington, 1890),
1: 118-19.
The course by which Napoleon advanced to supreme power is per-

fectly simple and natural; it is single in history; the very circumstances
of his elevation render it unparalleled. "I did not usurp the crown," said
he one day to the Council of State, "I took it up out of the mire; the peo-
ple placed it on my head: let their acts be respected!"
And, by thus taking up the crown, Napoleon restored France to her
rank in European society, terminated her horrors, and revived her char-
acter. He freed us of all the evils of our fatal crisis, and reserved to us all
the advantages arising out of it. "I ascended the throne unsullied by any
of the crimes of my situation," said he, on one occasion. "How few
founders of dynasties can say as much!"
Never during any period of our history, were favors distributed
with so much impartiality; never was merit so indiscriminately sought
out and rewarded; public money so usefully employed; the arts and sci-
ences better encouraged, or the glory and lustre of the country raised to
so high a pitch. "It is my wish," said he one day to the Council of State,
"that the title of Frenchman should be the best and most desirable on
earth; that a Frenchman traveling through any part of Europe may think
and find himself at home."
If liberty seemed occasionally to suffer encroachments, if author-
ity seemed sometimes to overstep its limits, circumstances rendered
those measures necessary and inevitable. Our present misfortunes have,
though too late, made us sensible of this truth; we now render justice,
though also too late, to the courage, judgment, and foresight which then
dictated those steps. It is certain that in this respect the political fall of
Napoleon has considerably increased his influence. Who can now doubt
that his glory and the lustre of his character have been infinitely aug-
mented by his misfortunes?
Document 5
Napoleon Bonaparte's Letter to Talleyrand on Constitution Making,
September 17, 1797
From Napoleon's headquarters in the First Italian Campaign, he
sent this letter to Talleyrand, who was France's Minister of Foreign
Affairs. In the letter, he considered what type of government should
be formed once the Austrians were expelled from Italy. He first ana-
lyzed the English model that Montesquieu had described in The
Spirit of the Law (De VEsprit des Lois, 1748); then he made his own
recommendations. Two years later, with Sieyes and others, he took
the opportunity to create a constitution for France. The Constitu-
tion of the Year VIII, as Napoleon's first constitution was called, had
neither the tidy division of powers that Montesquieu had recom-
mended, nor did it place significant power in the hands of the leg-
islative branch. Source: Napoleons Letters: Selected, Translated and
Edited by J. M. Thompson (London: Prion, 1998), 39-40. Reprinted
by permission of Prion Books, Ltd.
For all our pride, our thousand-and-one pamphlets, and our blus-
tering airy orations, we are extremely ignorant of the science of political
conduct. We have never yet defined what is meant by the executive, leg-
islative, and judicial powers. Montesquieu defined them wrongly: not
because that famous man was incompetent to do otherwise, but
because—as he admitted—his work was only a kind of description of
conditions which had once existed, or still existed in his day—a sum-
mary of notes made during his travels or his reading. His gaze was fixed
on the government of England: he defined, in general terms, the execu-
tive, legislative, and judiciary of that country
But why, in point of fact, should it be thought a function of the leg-

islative power to declare war and peace, or to regulate the amount and
character of the taxes? The English constitution has reasonably enough
entrusted the second of these functions in the House of Commons; and
it is a good arrangement because the English constitution is nothing but
a charter of privilege—a black picture, framed in gold. Since the House
of Commons is the only body which, for better or worse, represents the
nation, it is proper that it should have sole power to impose taxation: it
is the only defense they have been able to devise against the insolent
tyranny of the court party. But why, in a government whose whole
authority emanates from the nation; why, where the sovereign is the peo-
ple, should one include among the functions of the legislative power
things which are foreign to it? There is only one thing, so far as I can see,
that we have really defined during the last fifty years, and that is the sov-
ereignty of the people. We have been no happier in settling what is or is
not constitutional, than in allocating the different powers in the state.
The French people [are] organized only in outline.
The governmental power, taken in the wide sense that I would give
it, ought to be regarded as the real representative of the nation, govern-
ing in virtue of the constitutional charges and the organic laws. It falls
naturally, it seems to me, into two quite distinct authorities. One of these
is supervisory, but not executive: to this body what we nowadays call the
Executive Power would be obliged to submit every important measure:
it would be, if I may call it so, the legislative side of the executive. This
great body would be in a real sense the National Council: it would con-
trol all that part of the administration and of the executive which our
present constitution entrusts to the Legislative Power.
Thus the governmental power would consist of two authorities,
both nominated by the people; and one would be a very large body, con-
taining only such persons as had already occupied some of the posts that
give men experience in the business of government. The legislative power
would enact all the organic laws in the first instance, and would have
power to alter them, but not at a few day's notice, as can be done now; for,
once an organic law is placed upon the statute book, I think there should
be no power to change it without four or five month's debate.
This Legislative Power, carrying no rank in the Republic, closed to
outside influence, hearing and seeing nothing of what goes on around it,
would have no ambitions, and would not inundate us with thousands
of ephemeral measures, whose very absurdity defeats their own ends,

and which have turned us into a nation with 300 law books in folio, and
not a single law.
There you have, I think, a complete system of government, and one
that finds its excuse in the present situation. It would really be disastrous
if a nation of 30 million people, in this 18 lh Century, were unable to save
the country except by recourse to arms. Violent remedies discredit the
legislator. He who gives men a constitution ought to consider before-
hand how it will affect them.
Document 6
Description of Napoleon by His Private Secretary Meneval
Meneval was only 24 years old when he began his service to Napo-
leon. During the years from 1802 through 1813, he chronicled
Napoleons activities, sometimes interjecting his own observations
as is the case with this excerpt. Prior to serving as Napoleon's pri-
vate secretary, he worked with Napoleons brother Joseph. Later,
when he became too ill to keep up with Napoleon, he was reas-
signed to Marie Louise. His memoirs are analytical but generally
favorable to Napoleon. Source: Claude Frangois Meneval, Memoirs
Illustrating the History of Napoleon I from 1802 to 1815,3 vols. (New
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894), 1: 108-11 and 414.
The First Consul came back late, and spent almost the whole day
receiving people in his drawing-room. . . .
[The First Consul] was then in the enjoyment of vigorous health.
He had recently been cured of an internal disease, from which he had
begun to suffer greatly during the second year of the Consulate. This suf-
fering was caused by an inveterate cutaneous infection, which had been
driven into the system by the remedies he had taken, and of which the
skilful doctor, Corvisart, had just relieved him. I have heard it said that
during the siege of Toulon one of the gunners of a battery where Napo-
leon was, was killed. It was important that the firing should not slacken.
Napoleon took the rammer and loaded the cannon several times. Some
days later he was covered with a very malignant itching skin disease. He
tried to remember when and where he could have caught this disease. It
was then discovered that the artilleryman, from whose burning hand
Napoleon had taken the rammer, was infected. In the carelessness of
youth, and being entirely absorbed in his work, he had neglected to
undergo any treatment. He contented himself with some remedies which
189
only caused the outward signs of the disease to disappear, and the poi-
son had been driven into his system, and caused great damage. This was
the reason, it was added, of the extreme thinness and poor, weak look
of Napoleon during the campaigns in Italy and Egypt.
[During the second year of the Consulate] Napoleon was moder-
ately stout. His stoutness was increased later on by the frequent use of
baths, which he took to refresh himself after his fatigues. It may be men-
tioned that he had taken the habit of bathing himself every day at irreg-
ular hours, a practice which he considerably modified when it was
pointed out by his doctor that the frequent use of hot baths, and the time
he spent in them, were weakening, and would predispose to obesity.
Napoleon was of mediocre stature (about five feet two inches), and
well built, though the bust was rather long. His head was big and the
skull largely developed. His neck was short and his shoulders broad. The
size of his chest bespoke a robust constitution, less robust, however,
than his mind. His legs were well shaped, his foot was small and well
formed. His hand, and he was rather proud of it, was delicate, and
plump, with tapering fingers. His forehead was high and broad, his eyes
grey, penetrating and wonderfully mobile; his nose was straight and well
shaped. His teeth were fairly good, the mouth perfectly modeled, the
upper lip slightly drawn down toward the corner of the mouth, and the
chin slightly prominent. His skin was smooth and his complexion pale,
but of a pallor which denoted a good circulation of the blood. His very
fine chestnut hair, which, until the time of the expedition to Egypt, he
had worn long, cut square and covering his ears, was slipped short. The
hair was thin on the upper part of the head, and left bare his forehead,
the seat of such lofty thoughts. The shape of his face and ensemble of his
features were remarkably regular. In one word, his head and his bust
were in no way inferior in nobility or dignity to the most beautiful bust
which antiquity has bequeathed to us.
Of this portrait, which in its principal features underwent little
alteration in the last years of his reign, I will add some particulars fur-
nished by my long intimacy with him. When excited by any violent pas-
sion his face assumed an even terrible expression. A sort of rotary
movement very visibly produced itself on his forehead and between his
eyebrows; his eyes flashed fire; his nostrils dilated, swollen with the
inner storm. But these transient movements, whatever their case may
have been, in no way brought disorder to his mind. He seemed to be able
to control at will these explosions, which, by the way, as time went on,
became less and less frequent. His head remained cool. The blood never
went to it, flowing back to the heart. In ordinary life his expression was
calm, meditative, and gently grave. When in a good humour, or when
anxious to please, his expression was sweet and caressing, and his face
was lighted up by a most beautiful smile. Amongst familiars his laugh
was loud and mocking.
My portrait of Napoleon would be incomplete did I not mention
the hat, without trimming or lace, which was ornamented by a little tri-
colour cockade, fastened with a black silk cord, and the grey surtout
[overcoat] which covered the simple uniform of colonel of his guard.
This hat and this surtout, which became historical with him, shone in
the midst of the coats covered with gold and silver embroidery which
were worn by his generals, and the civil and military officers of his
household.
Nevertheless he liked to be surrounded with splendor and a kind
of pomp. He often used to say to those on whom he lavished his money:
"Be economical and even parsimonious at home; be magnificent in pub-
lic." He followed this maxim himself.
Document 7
Napoleon's Observations on War
The following selection from Las Cases' Memoirs of the Life, Exile,
and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon written in 1816 provides
a summary of Napoleon's observations on war, campaign plans, the
element of accident, the army train, and the use of artillery and cav-
alry. Source: Emmanuel Dieudonne, comte de Las Cases, Memoirs of
the Life, Exile, and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon, 4 vols.
(New York: Worthington Company, 1890), 4: 140-44.
The Emperor sent for me about six o'clock. He informed me that

he had just been dictating a chapter on maritime rights. He spoke to me
of some other works he had in view. I ventured to remind him of the
fourteen paragraphs which he had already planned, and to which I
alluded on a former occasion.
He read and corrected the valuable notes which he had dictated to the
Grand Marshal on ancient and modern warfare, the different plans of com-
posing and regulating armies &c. He afterwards entered into conversation,
and, among other things, said: 'No series of great actions is the mere work
of chance and fortune; it is always the result of reflection and genius. Great
men rarely fail in the most perilous undertakings. Look at Alexander, Cae-
sar, Hannibal, the great Gustavus, and others; they always succeeded. Were
they great men merely because they were fortunate? No, but because, being
great men, they possessed the art of commanding fortune.
Should the Emperor leave behind him his thoughts on these points,
they will be truly invaluable. In the course of the evening, he pronounced
his opinion on several military subjects; sometimes embracing the high-
est questions, and sometimes descending into the minutest details.
He remarked that war frequently depended on accident, and that,
though a commander ought to be guided by general principles, yet he
should never lose sight of anything that may enable him to profit by acci-
dental circumstances. The vulgar call good-fortune that which, on the
contrary, is produced by the calculations of genius.
He was of the opinion that infantry charged by cavalry should fire
from a distance, instead of firing closely according to the present prac-
tice. He proved the advantage of this method.
He observed that infantry and cavalry left to themselves, without
artillery, could procure no decisive result; but that, with the aid of
artillery, all things else being equal, cavalry might destroy the infantry.
He added that artillery really decided the fate of armies and nations;
that men now fought with blows of cannon balls, as they fought with
blows of fists; for in battle, as in a siege, the art consisted in making
numerous discharges converge on one and the same point; that, amidst
the conflict, he who had sufficient address to direct a mass of artillery
suddenly and unexpectedly on any particular point of the enemy's force
was sure of the victory. This, he said, had been his grand secret and his
grand plan of tactics.
The Emperor conceived that it would be impossible to form a per-
fect army without a revolution in the manners and education of a sol-
dier, and perhaps even the officer. This could not be accomplished
without ovens, magazines, commissaries, and carriages. There could be
no perfect army, until, in imitation of the Romans, the soldier should
receive his supply of corn, grind it in his hand-mill, and bake his bread
himself. We could not hope to possess an army, until we should abolish
all our monstrous train of civil attendants.
Document 8
The Continental Blockade
In 1810, Napoleon wrote the following letter to his Minister for For-
eign Affairs to lay out the history of the continental blockade, to place
full responsibility on Britain for the ongoing economic warfare, and
to set forward some principles for dealing with American shipping.
Napoleon's letter was a response to the American Non-Intercourse Act
of 1809 and the British Orders-in-Council that precipitated his Milan
Decrees. In January 1810, according to both the British and the
French, no shipping would be considered neutral. In this letter, Napo-
leon laid out the responsibilities that Americans would have to take
to guarantee freedom of the seas. As American shipping became more
vulnerable to confiscation, the result was the War of 1812 between
the United States and Great Britain. Source: Napoleons Letters:
Selected, Translated and Edited by ]. M. Thompson (London: Prion,
1998), 228-29. Reprinted by permission of Prion Books, Ltd.
I enclose a report from the Minister of Finance, and another from

the Minister for Home Affairs, upon the important subject of our pres-
ent relations with America. I want you to make me a report on the his-
tory of our relations with the United States since the treaty of
Mortefontaine, and to annex to it French translations of all the original
documents mentioned by the two ministers.
All the steps I have taken, as I have often remarked before, are mere
acts of reprisal. I don't recognize any of the English claims with regard to
the neutrals—what they call their maritime code. The English themselves
have never pretended that I recognize it. Such a claim would have been
pointless, since the code is entirely directed against France. At the same
time the English claims have been no more admitted, or admitted only in
part, by America and the northern powers. The maritime laws of England,
previous to the last few years, were tyrannical, but not quite intolerable.
But recently the English have completely altered the situation by arrogat-
ing to themselves the right to declare that all the ports of a country, and
the whole coastline of an empire, are in a state of blockade. This means
that, with respect to the blockaded country, England prohibits all com-
merce, and refuses to recognize any neutrals. I have said nothing of the
influence England claimed to exercise over the neutrals: my Berlin decree
was only a reply to the new extension she gave to the right of blockade;
and even the Berlin decree cannot be considered as more than a maritime,
certainly not as a continental blockade; witness the way in which it was
193
carried out. I regard it simply as a kind of protest—as one act of violence

answering another. It was really applied only to Hamburg, the Weser, and
the continental coastline, and declarations were made to the neutrals to
the effect that its operation would not be extended to the high seas. So far,
little harm had been done; neutral ships still entered our ports. But the
British Orders in Council necessitated my Milan decree, and thencefor-
ward there were no neutrals. That decree had only one object, namely to
protect myself and the neutrals against the intolerable right that England
claimed to levy navigation dues upon the commerce and shipping of all
nations—a claim which treated the high seas as I might treat the Seine, the
Scheldt, or the Rhine. This meant an embargo on all commerce; and in
opposing it, all thought of consequences had to be thrown to the winds. I
was told today that the English are relaxing their regulations, and no
longer impose a tax on shipping: let me know whether there is really an
Order to this effect: even if there is not, let me know whether it is true in
fact. Once I were sure that England is not going to levy navigation dues, I
could relax my regulations in many respects.
I should not be unwilling to sign a treaty with America, by which
she undertook (1) never, under any pretext, to allow England to levy
dues on her commerce or shipping; (2) never to allow England to pre-
vent her trading with France on the ground of a right of blockade, or any
other pretext, it being understood that certain points might be block-
aded, but not a whole empire; and (3) never to admit that, in order to
reach France, her vessels must first call at some port in British territory
Granted these three conditions, I should be willing to declare, on my
side, (1) that my warships and privateers will not exercise the right of
search with respect to American ships, except so far as is necessary to
make sure that they are really American, and do not belong to an enemy
nation, (2) that American ships will be received in my ports, and will not
be expected to pay more than the ordinary dues, always provided they
come direct from the United States, from another French port, from a
country allied to France, or from a neutral; for I refuse to admit Ameri-
can ships coming from English ports.
Document 9
The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier
The following selection is taken from Jakob Walter's diary, which was
never intended for publication. In it, he jotted down his memories
and observations of the retreat from Russia in 1813. The passages rep-
resent the hardships, pleasantries (finding an old friend), and chal-
lenges of the retreat, as seen by a German (Westphalian) conscript in
Napoleon's army. It is interesting to note Walter's observations about
the Emperor whom he saw as they passed by. As the days wore on,
Walter became more and more detached from the suffering of every-
one except his closest friends. As he saw the carnage of the retreat,
he then turned inward and concentrated solely on his survival. Wal-
ter, according to historical records, survived the campaign and lived
until 1864. He fathered 10 children, several of whom migrated to the
United States. Source: Jakob Walter, The Diary of a Napoleonic Toot
Soldier, edited by Marc Raeff (New York: Penguin, 1993), 80-89.
It was November 25, 1812, when we reached Borissov. Now the

march went toward the Beresina River, where the indescribable horror of
all possible plagues awaited us. On the way I met one of my countrymen,
by the name of Brenner, who had served with the Light Horse Regiment.
He came toward me completely wet and half frozen, and we greeted each
other. Brenner said that the night before he and his horse had been
caught and plundered but that he had taken to flight again and had come
through a river which was not frozen. Now, he said, he was near death
from freezing and starvation. This good, noble solider had run into me
not far from Smolensk with a little loaf of bread weighing about two
pounds and had asked me whether I wanted a piece of bread, saying that
this was his last supply 'However, because you have nothing at all, I will
share it with you.' He had dismounted, laid the bread on the ground, and
cut it in two with his saber. 'Dear, good friend,' I had replied, 'you treat
me like a brother. I will not forget as long as I live this good deed of yours
but will rather repay you many times if we live.'
When we came nearer the Beresina River, there was a place where
Napoleon ordered his pack horses to be unharnessed and where he ate.
He watched his army pass by in the most wretched condition. What he
may have felt in his heart is impossible to surmise. His outward appear-
ance seemed indifferent and unconcerned over the wretchedness of his
soldiers; only ambition and lost honor may have made themselves felt in
his heart; and, although the French and Allies shouted into his ears
many oaths and curses about his own guilty person, he was still able to
listen to them unmoved.
When I had gone somewhat farther from that place, I met a man
who had a sack of raw bran in which there was hardly a dust of flour. I
195
begged him ceaselessly to sell me a little of the bran, pressing a silver

ruble into his hand; so he put a few handfuls in my little cloth, although
very unwillingly, whereupon I happily continued on my journey.
After a time, from about two till four o'clock in the afternoon, the
Russians pressed nearer and nearer from every side and the murdering
and torturing seemed about to annihilate everyone. Although our army
used a hill, on which what was left of our artillery was placed, and fired
at the enemy as much as possible, the question was: what chance was
there of rescue? That day we expected that everyone must be captured,
killed, or thrown into the water. Everyone thought that his last hour had
come, and everyone was expecting it; but since the ridge was held by the
French artillery, only cannon and howitzer balls could snatch away a
part of the men. There was no hospital for the wounded; they died also
of hunger, thirst, cold and despair, uttering complaints and curses with
their last breath.
When it became day again, we stood near the stream approximately
a thousand paces from the two bridges, which were built of wood near
each other. These bridges had the structure of sloping saw-horses sus-
pended like trestles on shallow-sunk piles; on these lay long stringers
and across them only bridge ties, which were not fastened down. Every-
one crowded together into a solid mass, and nowhere could one see a
way out or a means of rescue. From morning till night we stood unpro-
tected from cannonballs and grenades which the Russians hurled at us
from two sides. At each blow from three to five men were struck to the
ground, and yet no one was able to move a step to get out of the path of
the cannonballs.
I could look with indifference at the people falling by the hundreds,
although the impact upon the ice bashed their heads. I could look at
their rising and falling again, their dull moaning and whining, and the
wringing and clenching of hands. The ice and snow sticking in their
mouths was frightful. Nevertheless, I had no feeling of pity Only my
friends were in my thoughts.
During this month the cold became worse daily
D o c u m e n t 10
The Last Will and Testament of Napoleon
Napoleon's Last Will and Testament is as much a part of his memoirs
and legend as his Army Bulletins, published correspondence, and
1 96 Primary Documents of the Napoleonic Era, 1799-1815
other types of imperial propaganda. In the enumerated list con-

tained in his will, Napoleon left his own response to what others
might say about him after his death. First, he stated that he
remained a Catholic, although his behavior had been more as an
agnostic and the pope had excommunicated him. Second, he pub-
licly stated his wish to be buried in France, although he knew that
he would be buried at St. Helena with no recognition or fanfare. In
the third and fourth statements, he spun an image of his wife and
son. Although Marie Louise had returned to Austria after his defeat
at Leipzig and had never visited him at Elba, he characterized her
as his special companion. Separated from his son, whom he scarcely
knew, he established the image of a French prince. In summary, he
had done everything for France—nothing for himself.
In later provisions, he listed by name the men whom he blamed
for the unseemly capitulation of France after Waterloo. Generals
Augereau and Marmont had refused to field their troops one more
time in support of the Emperor; Talleyrand and Lafayette, among
others, had led the provisional government against him. If historians
failed to note these men, he would make sure that posterity knew
who they were. As for his death, he blamed Britain for the selection
of St. Helena, its insalubrious climate, and his less-than-acceptable
treatment by Sir Hudson Lowe, whom he viewed as his jailor, and
whom he did not need to name. In the seventh paragraph, he named
his family members, some of whom he had disavowed earlier for
their misbehaviors and failures. In his death, they were equal, except
for Louis, whose behavior as King of Holland was inexcusable. And,
finally, Napoleon stated, one more time, that his execution of the
innocent Due d'Enghien wras just. The event had obsessed him
throughout most of his life, and in what would seem an unlikely doc-
ument, he took the opportunity to have his last word.
While the w7ill contains bequests of 5.600.000 francs to named
generals and supporters, Napoleon also authorized gifts to those men
who had been wounded at Waterloo and to the loyal troops who had
joined him on Elba. To men w7ho had been severely w 7 ounded,
including amputations, he doubled his bequests. Detail by detail, he
accounted for his private property including such items as his fur-
nishings, his library (particularly the four hundred volumes he used
the most), and specifics like the three saddles, bridles, and spurs he
had used at St. Helena, and even his two watches and a chain made
of the Empresss hair. Underlying it all was his admonition that
"None of the articles which have been used by me shall be sold."
In his instructions to his executors, he laid out additional sug-
gestions and demands, among them, that his illegitimate son by
Maria Walewski should be dissuaded from entering the judiciary,
197
that his executors should continually remind the British king that
his ashes should be transported to France, and that his nephews and
nieces should never marry into Swedish families. People whom he
believed had stolen from him were named, and his executors were
charged with retrieving items and wealth from them. Even as he
grew ill—detail after detail, codicil after codicil (eight have been
identified), Napoleon missed nothing. Following are extracts of
Napoleon's Last Will and Testament. Source: Emmanuel Dieudonne,
comte de Las Cases, Memoirs of the Life, Exile, and Conversations of
the Emperor Napoleon, 4 vols. (New York: Worthington Company,
1890), 4: 400-12.
This 15 th April, 1821, at Longwood, Island of St. Helena. This is my Tes-

tament, or act of my last will.
1. I die in the Apostolical Roman religion [Catholic Church], in the
bosom of which I was born, more than fifty years since.
2. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in
the midst of the French people, whom I have loved so well.
3. I have always had reason to be pleased with my dearest wife Mane
Louisa. I retain for her, to my last moment, the most tender senti-
ments—I beseech her to watch, in order to preserve my son from the
snares which yet environ his infancy
4. I recommend to my son never to forget that he was born a French
prince, and never to allow himself to become an instrument in the
hands of the triumvirs who oppress the nations of Europe: he ought
never to fight against France, or to injure her in any manner; he ought
to adopt my motto: "Every thing [sic] for the French people."
5. I die prematurely assassinated by the English oligarchy and its
* * * [hired assassin]. The English nation will not be slow in aveng-
ing me.
6. The two unfortunate results of the invasions of France, when she
had still so many resources, are to be attributed to the treason of Mar-
mont, Augereau, Talleyrand, and La Fayette. I forgive them—May the
posterity of France forgive them as I do!
7. I thank my good and most excellent mother, the Cardinal [my mater-
nal uncle], my brothers Joseph, Lucien, Jerome, [my sisters] Pauline,
Caroline, [my extended family] Julie, Hortense, Catarine, Eugene, for
the interest they have continued to feel for me. I pardon Louis for the
libel he published in 1820; it is replete with false assertions and falsi-
fied documents.
8. I disavow the "Manuscript of St. Helena," and other works, under the
title of Maxims, Sayings, & c , which persons have been pleased to pub-
lish for the last six years. Such are not the rules which have guided my
life. I caused the Due d'Enghien to be arrested and tried, because that
step was essential to the safety, interest, and honour of the French peo-
ple, when the Comte d'Artois was maintaining, by his own confession,
sixty assassins at Paris. Under similar circumstances, I should act in the
same way.
n.
1. I bequeath to my son the boxes, orders, and other articles such as my
plate, field-bed, saddles, spurs, chapel-plate, books, linen which I have
been accustomed to wear and use, according to the list annexed (A). It
is my wish that this slight bequest may be dear to him, as coming from
a father of whom the whole world will remind him.
LIST (A).
Annexed to my Will
Longwood, Island of St. Helena,
this 15 lh April, 1821
II.
1. My arms; that is to say, my sword, that which I wore at Austerlitz, the
sabre of Sobiesky, my dagger, my broad sword, my hanger, my two pair
of Versailles pistols.
2. My gold dressing-case, that which I made use of on the morning of
Ulm and of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Eylau, of Friedland, of the Island of
Lobau, of the Moskwa, of Montmirail. In this point of view it is my
wish that it may be precious in the eyes of my son. (It has been
deposited with Count Bertrand since 1814.)
199
3. I charge Count Bertrand with the care of preserving these objects, and
of conveying them to my son when he shall attain the age of sixteen
years.
m.
1. Three small mahogany boxes, containing, the first, thirty-three snuff-
boxes or comfit-boxes; the second, twelve boxes with the Imperial
arms, two small eye-glasses, and four boxes found on the table of Louis
XVIII in the Tuileries, on the 20th of March, 1815; the third, three snuff
boxes, ornamented with silver medals habitually used by the Emperor;
and sundry articles for his use of the toilet [the act of dressing or
grooming], according to the lists numbered I. II. III.
2. My field-beds, which I used in all my campaigns.
3. My field-telescope.
4. My dressing-case, one of each of my uniforms, a dozen of shirts, and a
complete set of each of my dresses [garments], and generally of every-
thing used in my toilet.
5. My wash-hand stand.
6. A small clock which is in my bed-chamber at Longwood.
7. My two watches, and the chain of the Empress's hair.
8. I entrust the care of these articles to Marchand, my principal valet-de-
chambre, and direct him to convey them to my son when he shall
attain the age of sixteen years.
LIST (A).
1. None of the articles which have been used by me shall be sold; the
residue shall be divided amongst the executors of my will and my
brothers.
2. Marchand shall preserve my hair, and cause a bracelet to be made of
it, with a little gold clasp, to be sent to the Empress Marie Louisa, to
my mother, and to each of my brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, the
Cardinal; and one of the larger size for my son.
ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Napoleon's Correspondence, Writings, and Memoirs

Letters and Documents of Napoleon. Selected and Translated by John Eldred
Howard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Selection of letters
and documents from Napoleon's early years through the Peace of Amiens,
including family correspondence, Army Bulletins, notes, maps, and gov-
ernment documents.
The Military Maxims of Napoleon. Edited by William E. Cairnes. Introduction
and Commentary by David Chandler. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995.
Seventy-eight tenets on the art of war, tactics, strategy, supply, command,
and common soldiering.
The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from his Written and Spoken Words, Edited and
Translated by f. Christopher Herold. New York: Columbia University Press,
1955. A collection of utterances by Napoleon organized topically about
politics, history, war, the social order, the arts and sciences, destiny, and
the human heart.
Napoleon on the Art of War Selected, Edited and Translated by Jay Luvaas. New
York: The Free Press, 1999. Essays, correspondence, and Napoleon's Army
Bulletins organized by theme, for example, preparations for war, the oper-
ational art, and the composition of the army.
Napoleon on Napoleon: An Autobiography of the Emperor Edited by Somerset de
Chair. London: Cassell, 1992. Topically organized writings and dictations
of Napoleon, gleaned from the memoirs of his companions on St. Helena,
including Las Cases, Gourgaud, Montholon, and Bertrand.
Napoleon Wrote Fiction. Edited and Translated by Christopher Frayling. Salis-
bury, U.K.: The Compton Press, Ltd., 1972. Collection of essays includ-
ing the one novel that Napoleon wrote, preceded by thorough analytical
introductions to each of Napoleon's works.
202 Annotated Bibliography
Napoleon's Autobiography: The Personal Memoirs of Bonaparte Compiled from his

own Letters and Diaries by Professor E M. Kircheison. New York: Duffield
and Company, 1931. The words of Napoleon and his memoirists, skill-
fully woven together by one of the preeminent authorities on Napoleon,
forming what appears to be an autobiography.
Napoleon's Letters: Selected, Translated, and Edited by J. M. Thompson. London:
Prion, 1998. Excellent selection of 292 letters and notes written by Napo-
leon spanning the period from June 25, 1784 until July 14, 1815.
Napoleon's Letters to Marie Louise. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935. Collec-
tion of Napoleon's letters to Marie Louise from 1810 through 1814,
reflecting on his family, his affection for her, and his instructions to her
about how to be an empress for France and an emissary for the Emperor.
Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon 1, Preserved in the War Archives, 3 vols.
Translated by Louise Seymour Houghton. New York: Duffield & Com-
pany, 1913. Three-volume addendum to the multivolume original Corre-
spondance de Napoleon I, organized chronologically. The collection is
composed predominantly of military letters and decisions.
Other Primary Sources

Abrantes, Laure Junot, duchesse d'. Memoirs of Napoleon, his Court, andEamily.
2 vols. New York: D. Appleton and Company 1866. Chatty, acerbic, and
frequently quoted memoirs of a member of Napoleonic court society who
married one of Napoleons friends and military companions.
Arnold, Eric. A Documentary Survey of Napoleonic Erance. Lanham: University
Press of America, 1994. Important collection of primary source docu-
ments including Napoleonic constitutions and codes.
Austin, Paul Britten, ed. 1812: The Great Retreat Told by Survivors. London:
Greenhill Books, 1996. A collection of personal narratives of men who
returned from the ill-fated Russian campaign that began in 1812.
Bertrand, Henri Gratien. Napoleon at St. Helena: Memoirs of General Bertrand,
Grand Marshal of the Palace, January to May 1821. London: Cassell and
Company, Ltd., 1953. Frank but somewhat impersonal memoirs about
Napoleon during his last illness and confinement, interspersed with com-
ments about France, the Revolution, Josephine, military affairs, and his
own health, interests, and friends.
Bourienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de. Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte. 4 vols.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891. Entertaining, unreliable, and
unflattering memoirs by Napoleon's schoolmate at Brienne, private sec-
retary from 1797 to 1802, and plenipotentiary to Hamburg in 1805.
Caulaincourt, Armand Augustin Louis de. With Napoleon in Russia. New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1935. A very personal and informative
Annotated Bibliography
203
memoir from Napoleon's loyal friend and aide-de-camp on the retreat

from Russia.
Clauswitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Peter Paret. London: Penguin Books,
1968. First published in 1832 after Clauswitz's death, this treatise on war
has become a classic. Clauswitz, who viewed the Napoleonic wars from
the Prussian side, saw war as an extension of politics (in a somewhat
Machiavellian way).
Denon, Vivant. Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt. New York: Arno Press, 1973.
Description of Egypt published in 1803 by one of Napoleon's surveyor-
artists who traveled with the French armies during the Egyptian cam-
paign.
Gorrequer, Gideon. St. Helena during Napoleon's Exile: Gorrequefs Diary. Edited
by James Kemble. London: Heinemann, 1969. Disjointed notes from Sir
Hudson Lowe's aide-de-camp and acting military secretary at St. Helena
from 1817 until 1823. The diary nonetheless sheds light on Napoleon's
relations with the governor of St. Helena during Napoleon's captivity.
Jomini, Antoine Henri, baron de. The Art of War. London: Greenhill, 1996. An
analysis of the art of warfare by one of Napoleon's staff officers. Jomini's
analysis of Napoleonic tactics and strategy became a classic that was used
by Civil War commanders in the mid-nineteenth century.
Landsdowne, Henry. The First Napoleon: Some Unpublished Documents from the
Bowood Papers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929. Correspon-
dence from the later Empire, including 1812, the first abdication, Elba,
and the Hundred Days, as well as papers from Napoleon's voyage on
H.M.S. Bellerophonn and his exile on St. Helena.
Las Cases, Emmanuel Dieudonne, comte de. Memoirs of the Life, Exile, and Con-
versations of the Emperor Napoleon. 4 vols. New York: Worthington Com-
pany, 1890. Memoirs of Napoleon's life, campaigns, and politics that were
dictated to Las Cases, who remained with Napoleon on St. Helena from
1815 to 1816.
Lewis, Jon E. Soldiers at War. New York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 2001. A
selection of memoirs and documents including the Napoleonic campaigns
in Italy, Egypt, Spain, and Russia and the battles of Wagram, Leipzig, and
Waterloo.
Meneval, Claude Frangois. Memoirs Illustrating the History of Napoleon I from
1802 to 1815. 3 vols. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894. Valu-
able memoirs of the man who served as secretary to Joseph Bonaparte,
Napoleon, and Marie Louise.
Restif de la Bretonne, Nicholas. Les nuits de Paris or the Nocturnal Spectator. New
York: Random House, 1964. A witty, interesting, anecdotal glimpse of
Paris during the revolutionary years.
Stewart, John Hall., ed. Documentary Survey of the French Revolution. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1951. Collection of proclamations and consti-
204 Annotated Bibliograph
tutions of the period of the Revolution and Directory, including Napo-

leon's Italian Campaign, Egyptian Campaign, coup, and Constitution of
1799.
Secondary Sources
Alexander, R. S. Napoleon. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001. His-
toriographic study of the Napoleonic era asking questions such as: Hero
or villain? Charlatan or true prophet? Sinner or saint? Conqueror or uni-
fier of Europe?
Asprey, Robert. The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
Masterful telling of the bloody battles of Napoleon's reign and his exile
and death.
. The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: Basic Books, 2000. Even-
handed, though somewhat anecdotal narrative of Napoleon's life until the
time of Austerlitz, written in the style of a novel but based extensively on
period correspondence.
Blanning, T. C. W , ed. The Eighteenth Century: Europe, 1688-1815. London and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. A series of essays placing the
revolutionary and Napoleonic era in the context of the war-ridden eigh-
teenth century.
Blond, Georges, La Grande Armee. Translated by Marshall May. London: Arms
and Armour Press, 1995. Extensive story of the Grand Army from its cre-
ation at Boulogne to the retreat of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, includ-
ing information on supply, composition, tactics, and strategy.
Britt III, Albert Sidney. The Wars of Napoleon. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing
Group, 1985. Well-organized analysis of Napoleon as a commander,
stressing the principles of generalship and strategy and the problems that
Napoleon encountered with logistics and his staff. The book was written
originally for cadets at West Point in 1972.
Bruun, Geoffrey. Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814. London and New
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938. Classic work on the impact of
Napoleon outside of France, including sections on French colonial aspi-
rations, the Oriental mirage, and the International Empire.
Caldwell, Ronald. The Era of Napoleon: A Bibliography of the History of Western
Civilization, 1799-1815. 2 vols. New York: Garland, 1991. Helpful
research tool organized topically.
Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's
Greatest Soldier : New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1966.
One of the most exhaustive analyses of the Napoleonic wars, concluding
that Napoleons success lay in his application of ideas rather than on any
new or original plans.
205
. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars: The Soldiers, Strategies, Arma-

ments, Movements and Battles that Shaped Events during Napoleons Reign.
New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1979. Comprehensive col-
lection of short entries on Napoleon's battles, commanders, and military
contests as well as the opposition and allied commanders, important civil-
ian personages, and terminology of the day.
. Napoleons Marshals. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1987. Engagingly written, comprehensive volume on Napoleon's 26 mar-
shals, detailing their lives, careers, strengths, weaknesses, achievements,
and failures.
Connelly, Owen. Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns. Wilming-
ton, Del.: A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1987. History of Napoleon's
campaigns, highlighting his genius and success more as the result of
scrambling than planning.
. The Epoch of Napoleon. Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger, 1972. Short
overview of the Napoleonic period, written as a textbook.
. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 3rd ed. New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. Thoroughly updated, popular,
and well-written textbook on the era of the French Revolution and Napo-
leon.
. Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms. New York: The Free Press, 1965. Study
of the Kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and Spain as first
governed by members of Napoleons family and then as Napoleon drew
them into greater France. Were they part of a master plan or grand design?
, ed., along with Harold Parker, Peter Becker, and June K. Burton,
Associate Editors. Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799-1815.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. Excellent alphabetical
overview of Napoleonic personalities, campaigns, significant events, and
terms.
Delorme, Eleanor. Josephine: Napoleon's Incomparable Empress. London: Harry
N. Abrams, 2002. Sensitive, romantic, and favorable portrayal of Empress
Josephine, highlighting her sense of style, intellect, and role as Napoleon's
confidante.
Dowd, David Lloyd. Napoleon: Was He the Heir of the Revolution? Hinsdale, 111.:
Dryden Press, 1957. Interpretive, short excursion into the debates on
Napoleon using period documents and correspondence.
Dufraisse, Roger. Napoleon. Translated by Steven Englund. New York: McGraw-
Hill, Inc., 1992. Short history of the Napoleonic era, seen through the eyes
of a French author (in translation) and through recent scholarship on the
period.
Ellis, Geoffrey James. Napoleon. London: Longman, 1997. Chronological exam-
ination of how perceptions of Napoleon, including both the heroic and
206 Annotated Bibliography
the black legend, survived into the nineteenth century. Part of the series
"Profiles in Power."
Elting, John. Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee. New York:
The Free Press, 1988. Thorough history of the Grand Army including sec-
tions as wide-ranging as rations, pay, mobile hospitals, uniforms, medals,
and camp followers.
Esdaille, Charles. The Wars of Napoleon. London and New York: Longman,
1995. Very critical study of Napoleon, placing the blame almost exclu-
sively on Napoleon for continuing the continental contest between Great
Britain and France.
Esposito, Vincent, and John Elting. A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic
Wars. London: Greenhill, 1999. One of the most comprehensive and
detailed campaign-by-campaign histories of the Napoleonic wars, con-
taining superb maps.
Fisher, H. A. L. Napoleon. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1967. Well-
known, favorable biography of Napoleon, written to focus on his energy
and achievements.
Forrest, Alan. Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the
Revolution and Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Schol-
arly examination of French militarization, including issues of conscrip-
tion, desertion, and policing.
Fregosi, Paul. Dreams of Empire: Napoleon and the First World War, 1792-1815.
London: Hutchinson, 1989. Narrative of the struggles, wars, and contests
that were fought outside of France as part of the global contest of the
Napoleonic era, for example, those that took place in the Caribbean,
South America, the Philippines, India, the Arab states, South Africa, and
Ireland.
Gates, David. The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815. London: Arnold, 1997. Impor-
tant, recent work on Napoleon, comparing his military prowess in 1803
against his later years and setting the conflict in the broader context of
modern warfare.
Geyl, Pieter. Napoleon: For or Against. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1963. Classic work interpreting Napoleon, first published in 1949. Based
on writings from contemporaries such as Chateaubriand and Mme de
Stael, memorists who created the Napoleonic Legend, and French histo-
rians from the nineteenth century through Georges Lefebvre, it ends with
the poignant, but pointed, truth: "the argument goes on."
Glover, Michael. The Peninsular War, 1807-1814: A Concise Military History.
Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1974. Good, solid history of the Penin-
sular War in Spain and Portugal based on Wellington's Dispatches, Napo-
leon's Correspondance, and period memoirs. Focuses on the limitations of
the armies, conditions of the soldiers, and problems of requisitions.
207
Godechot, Jacques, Beatrice Hyslop, and David Dowd. The Napoleonic Era in
Europe. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Even-handed text
on the Napoleonic era, incorporating scholarship from the bicentennial
of Napoleon's birth (1969).
Guerrini, Maurice. Napoleon andParis: Thirty Years of History. London: Cassell,
1970. Excellent study of the city of Paris, highlighting the realities and
promises of Napoleonic reconstruction.
Heckscher, Eli F The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1922. Classic work on the economic blockade, includ-
ing reproductions of French decrees and British Orders-in-Council.
Herold, J. Christopher. The Age of Napoleon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1987. Unsympathetic but extensive biography of Napoleon that
blends social, political, and military history across the panorama of
Europe.
Hibbert, Christopher. Napoleon: His Wives and Women. London: HarperCollins,
2002. Chatty but well documented history of Napoleon seen through the
Emperor's eyes and the eyes of the women who knew him, including his
two empresses and the mothers of the four illegitimate children he
acknowledged.
Holtman, Robert. The Napoleonic Revolution. New York and Philadelphia: J. B.
Lipincott Company, 1967. Study of the gains of the Revolution, rise of the
middle class, improvement in the legal status of peasants, and how Napo-
leon forced France into the modern age.
Home, Alistair. How Far from Austerlitz? Napoleon, 1805-1815. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1996. Well-written, almost conversational coverage of the
Napoleonic wars, occasionally comparing Napoleon's successes and fail-
ures to contemporary events.
Horward, Donald D., ed. Napoleonic Military History, a Bibliography. New York
and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986. Extensive bibliography of
the Napoleonic era, preceded by an introduction to Napoleonic research
and a series of bibliographic essays on each of the campaigns and areas of
Napoleonic influence.
Howarth, David. Waterloo: Day of Battle. New York: Galahad Books, 1968. Nar-
rative of the battle of Waterloo based on 18 eyewitness accounts, from
dawn through the night of June 18, 1815.
Johnson, Paul. Napoleon. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 2002. Biography
of Napoleon, suggesting that the totalitarian states of Russia, Germany, and
Italy learned their authoritarianism from Napoleon's myth and reality.
Kafker, Frank A., and James M. Laux. Napoleon and his Times: Selected Interpre-
tations. Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Publishing Company, 1989. Series of essays
by leading experts on the major events, accomplishments, and challenges
of the Napoleonic period.
208 Annotated d B
Bibliography
Lachouque, Henry The Anatomy of Glory: Napoleon and his Guard: A Study in
Leadership, 4th ed. London: Greenhill, 1997. Illustrated study of Napo-
leon's creation and use of the Imperial Guard. Illustrations are drawn from
the Anne Brown Collection at Brown University
Lefebvre, Georges. Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969. Written by one of the leading histori-
ans of the French Revolution, traces the legacy of the Revolution through
the height of the Napoleonic Empire.
Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Well-written social history of the
Napoleonic period through the lens of the Revolution, questioning when
the Revolution actually ended.
MacKenzie, Norman. The Escape from Elba: the Fall & Flight of Napoleon,
1814-1815. New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982. His-
tory of Napoleon during his reign as Emperor of Elba (1814-1815), view-
ing his first exile as a miniature of his earlier reorganization of Europe.
Markham, Felix. The Bonapartes. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company,
1975. Heavily illustrated story of the Bonaparte family from their Corsi-
can origins throughout the Napoleonic period.
. Napoleon. New York and Toronto: The New American Library, 1963.
Thorough, balanced biography of Napoleon based on published sources,
memoirs, and correspondence.
. Napoleon and the Awakening oj Europe. New York: Collier Books, 1972.
Well-written, short narrative of Napoleon from Corsica through the cre-
ation of the Napoleonic legend, focusing on the emergence of nationalism.
Markov, Walter. Grand Empire: Virtue and Vice in the Napoleonic Era. New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1990. Heavily illustrated social history of the
Napoleonic period.
Martineau, Gilbert. Napoleons Last Journey. London: John Murray, 1976. Nar-
rative of Napoleons death, burial at St. Helena, exhumation, and trans-
mission to Paris for burial at Les Invalides, interspersed with elements of
the Napoleonic legend.
Nicholls, David. Napoleon: A Biographical Companion. Santa Barbara, Calif.:
ABC-Clio, 1999. Well-organized and helpful biographical dictionary of
the Napoleonic era, including a general introduction, chronology, bibli-
ography, and document section.
Parker, Harold. Three Napoleonic Battles. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1983. Study of the battles of Friedland, Aspern-Essling, and Waterloo,
analyzing them for the movement of the armies, amalgamation of troops,
leadership, medical care, requisitions and supply, and evidence of Napo-
leon's imaginative execution. Concludes with an excellent essay on writ-
ing military history
Annotated dBBibliography
209
Pinckney David H. Napoleon: Historical Enigma. St. Louis, Mo.: Forum Press,
1969. Historiographic essays questioning whether Napoleon was the
defender or destroyer of the Revolution, a military genius or revolution-
ary general, an enlightened despot or modern dictator.
Roberts, Andrew. Napoleon and Wellington. London: Weidenfield and Nichol-
son, 2001. Dual biography of the two great military rivals of the
Napoleonic wars, highlighting their off-the-battlefield rivalry more than
their military prowess.
Robiquet, Jean. Daily Life in France under Napoleon. Translated by Violet Mac-
Donald. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. One of the best por-
traits of domestic France, dealing with topics as far ranging as everyday
consumption, gaming, theatre, fashion, highways, and houses in Paris and
the provinces.
Rose, John Holland. The Personality of Napoleon. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd.,
1912. Classic study of Napoleon as "the man, the Jacobin, the warrior, the
lawgiver, the emperor, the thinker, the world-ruler, and the exile," noting
that Napoleon did not understand the age of nationalism in which he
found himself.
Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1980. Detailed study of military history,
strategy, weaponry, and medicine in the Napoleonic and allied armies.
Schneid, Frederic C. Napoleon's Italian Campaigns. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002. Recent, soundly researched study of the early campaigns of Napo-
leon.
Schom, Alan. Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Extensive,
anecdotal, and critical revival of the black legend of Napoleon, concen-
trating on his opportunism.
Schwartz, Berhard. The Code Napoleon and the Common-law World. New York:
New York University Press, 1956. Collection of essays on the Napoleonic
Code, including a good analysis of the major provisions of the Code and
the philosophical underpinnings of Napoleonic law.
Thompson, J. M. Napoleon Bonaparte. Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton Publishing
Ltd., 2001. Reissue of Thompson's excellent, well-documented and cor-
respondence-based 1952 biography of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Tulard, Jean. Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour. London: Weidenfield and Nicol-
son, 1984. The best study of the Napoleonic legend, tracing it from its
birth in the First Italian Campaign, through newspapers, the Napoleonic
catechism, and other forms of propaganda, into the period after 1815
when the Emperor became the "Napoleon of the people."
Ward, A. W , G. W Prothero, and Stanley Leathes. The Cambridge Modern His-
tory: Napoleon. Vol. 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Scholarly, extensively documented study of the Napoleonic period, orig-
210 Annotated d BBibliography
inally published in 1906 and written by some of the leading European his-
torians at that time.
Weider, Ben, and David Hapgood. The Murder of Napoleon. New York: Congdon
and Lattes, Inc., 1982. Intriguingly written story and study of Napoleon's
death on St. Helena, positing that Napoleon did not die of stomach can-
cer but was poisoned by his compatriot Montholon. Based on forensic
research first conducted by Swedish dentist Sten Forshuvfud.
Woloch, Isser. Napoleon and his Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2001. Carefully researched study of Napoleon's coup,
his collaborators, his relationship with the revolutionary legacy, and the
balance between creativity and tyranny during the Napoleonic era.
Films
Austerlitz (1959), directed by Abel Gance. Film version of the decisive conflict
between the forces of Austria and France in 1805.
The Campaigns of Napoleon (1992-1993) including the Battle of Waterloo
(1992), and the Battle of Trafalgar (1993), Battle of Borodino (1993), and
Battle of Austerlitz (1993) produced by Cromwell Productions. This series
of educational videos explores the military genius of Napoleon, his tri-
umphs, and his defeats. Cromwell Productions also produced a short, not
well-received The Campaigns of Napoleon.
The Duellists (1978), directed by Ridley Scott. A film version of Joseph Con-
rad's novel of two Napoleonic officers who carry on a duel for two
decades. The Duellists describes honor as it was known during the
Napoleonic period and the condition of the officer corps and common
soldiers in the early nineteenth century.
The Emperors New Clothes (2001), directed by Alan Taylor. A wildly fictional
comic tragedy based on Simon Leys' novel of a Napoleonic impostor who
returns to France from St. Helena to be mostly ignored (Simon Leys,
Death of Napoleon, reissued in 2002 by Picador). It is worthwhile viewing,
however, for the costumes, locations, and representations of period
lifestyles.
Napoleon (1927), directed by Abel Gance. Gance filmed this cinematic marvel,
a biography of Napoleon Bonaparte that lasts over three hours and ends
only at the First Italian Campaign. Lavishly produced with a huge and
well-selected cast, this film can be classed among the epic black and white
silent films of the era of the 1920s. Music was composed and conducted
by Carmine Coppola. The film has been reissued several times, most
recently by MCA Home Video (Universal City, California, 1989).
Napoleon (1955), directed by Sacha Guitry. Biography of Napoleon from his rise
to power during the Revolution through his days in exile. The film raises
Annotated d BBibliography
211
the question of whether or not Napoleon was a hero, tyrant, or madman.
Among the stars are Orson Wells and Yves Montand.
Napoleon (1997), video produced by Kultur Films as part of their Museum Tour
series. Reproduces the world-touring Napoleonic exhibit (Napoleonic
furnishings, paintings, nostalgia, and military paraphernalia from 50
museums) that was featured in Memphis, Tennessee in 1993.
Napoleon (2000), produced as part of the Arts and Entertainment Biography
series for television. Covers Napoleon's entire life, using contemporary
prints, maps, and paintings along with interviews with leading military
historians to create the portrait of Napoleon and his period.
The Napoleon Murder Mystery (n.d.), produced by Noah Morowitz for Discovery •
Communications. Made for television historical thriller of two interwoven
tales: Napoleon on St. Helena in 1821 and Swedish dentist Sten For-
shufvud's search for evidence that Napoleon was murdered by poisoning.
War and Peace (1967), directed by Sergei Bondarchuk. The well-filmed but
painfully long Russian-language version of Tolstoy's lengthy, classic novel
of the Russian campaign.
Electronic Resources (Web sites)

www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/Napoleonpages/NaptoC.htm.
Excellent collection of military maps compiled and posted by the History
Department at the United States Military Academy (West Point) showing
the European military situation at any time between 1796 and 1815.
www.invalides.org. Site of the Musee de F Armee in Paris, including a brief his-
tory of Napoleon's tomb (and the politics of the return of the ashes) along
with photographs of selected collections and personal objects identified
with Napoleon.
www.napoleon.org. Omnibus site of the Fondation Napoleon including a free
weekly information bulletin, detailed imperial genealogy, pictures, a list-
ing of recent books in the field, screen-savers, glossary, and even
Napoleonic recipes.
www.napoleonbonaparte.nl. One of the most comprehensive and best Napoleonic
Web sites, maintained by Paul Hilferink of Deventer, the Netherlands. The
site includes links to primary documents, essays, and pictures.
www.napoleonic-alliance.com. Web site of the Napoleonic Alliance, a member-
ship organization sponsoring annual meetings for scholars and amateurs
interested in Napoleon. The site includes on-line articles and information
on discount books and annual activities.
www.napoleonic-literature.com. Impressive Web site providing digital texts, an
extensive bibliography of the period including fiction, drama and poetry,
and one of the best lists of films on the Napoleonic period.
212 Annotatedd BBibliography
www.napoleonguide.com. Popular mixture of Napoleonic articles, pictures,

wargames, movies, and miniseries (e.g., the fictional Richard Sharpe series
written by Bernard Cornwell and the Hornblower series), with an exten-
sive set of links to other locations, including museums and scholarly col-
lections. The site is maintained by Richard Moore, editor.
www.napoleonseries.org. All-volunteer educational project created and main-
tained by amateurs and scholars interested in the Napoleonic period. The
site contains articles (usually with some bibliography), translations
(including a complete copy of the Code Napoleon in English), reviews,
and an extensive list of links to sites throughout the world. Frequently
asked questions include how tall Napoleon was, who shot the Sphinx, and
what horses Napoleon rode at each battle. Virtual postcards are available.
www.pbs.org/empires/napoleon. Flash-enhanced, easily navigable Web site for
the extensive documentary biography of Napoleon produced by Public
Broadcasting. Aired first on television in November 2000, the Web site
includes lesson plans, an extensive bibliography, and synopses of each of
the sections of the production. "Napoleon" is narrated by several dozen
leading historians and writers on Napoleon and contains period paintings
and engravings and footage of places identified with Napoleon.
wtj.com. Site of the War Times Journal, an Internet site of primary source doc-
uments related to events in military history (in French and English). It
includes an extensive collection of Wellington's Dispatches and a limited
selection of Napoleonic Army Bulletins.
INDEX
Administration, Napoleonic: elec- Interior under Napoleon, 74; pres-

toral lists 75; municipal affairs, ident of the Council of Five Hun-
74-75; prefects, 76; senators, 76. dred under the government of the
See also Citizenship; Constitutions Directory, 26; republican writings
of France and displeasure of Napoleon, 33
Agriculture: importation of animals, Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Naples,
78; sugar beet production, 79 122; King of Spain, 129-30, 140;
Alexander I of Russia, 120, 121, 125, negotiations for the Concordat of
126,130,137-40 1801, 19; negotiations with Great
Amalgame, 11, 103 Britain for the Peace of Amiens,
Amiens, Peace of, 115-16, 117 115; residence in America, 153;
Appert, Nicolas Frangois, 105 youthful relationship with Napo-
Army See Grand Army; Military leon, 5
Aristocracy, Napoleonic, 51-53 Borodino, battle of, 138
Artillery, 92-93
Austerlitz, battle of, 120-21; map, 122 Cadoudal Plot, 34, 45 n. 24, 117
Calendar, 73
Banque de France, 80-82 Cambaceres, Jean Jacques, 32, 41
Barras, Paul-Frangois-Jean, Nicholas, Campo Formio, Treaty of, 115
vicomte de, 12, 17 Catholic Church, 8, 12, 19, 35-38.
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 155, 159 n. See also Concordat of 1801; Pius
19 VII
Berthier, Alexandre, 112 Cavalry, 98-99. See also Grand Army;
Blucher, Gebhard von, 131, 149 Military
Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland, Censorship, 33-34, 62-63, 76-77.
122, 136 See also Fouche
Bonaparte, Lucien, Coup of Bru- Charlemagne, use of imagery of, 35,
maire, 17, 26, 28; Minister of the 48
214 Index
Charles IV of Spain, 128 Consulate, 17, 28-32, 72. See also

Charles (Karl) von Hapsburg, Arch- Constitution of 1799 (Year VIII)
duke of Austria, 131, 132, 133 Continental System, 82, 117, 136,
Chasseurs, 98. See Infantry 144 n. 14, 192-93. See also War of
Chateaubriand, Frangois Rene, 155, 1812
157 Coronation, 34, 48-49, 65 n. 8
Children: King of Rome (child of Corsica, 3-5, 7
Napoleon and Marie Louise), 55, Coup of 18 Brumaire, 17, 25-28
57, 142, 147, 156, 197; Cuirassiers, 99. See Cavalry
Napoleonic Code on, 43-44; Currency. See Franc
Walewska, Alexandre (child of
Napoleon and Maria Walewska), David, Jacques-Louis, 48, 5 1 ,
127, 144 n. 33, 196 65 n. 8.
Cisalpine Republic, 14, 113, 115 Davout, Louis-Nicholas, 120, 124
Citizenship, 7, 22 n. 13, 30, 40, 75 Desaix, Louis-Charles, 114
Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 35, Directory, government of, 13, 17, 25,
38 29
Coalitions: Second, 111-16; Third, DosdeMayo, 129-30
116-21; Fourth, 122-27; Fifth, Ducos, Roger, 26, 28
131-33; Sixth, 140-42; map of
Europe prior to the Sixth Coali- Ecouen, 6 0 - 6 1 . See also Education
tion, 1810-1812, 135; Seventh, Education: Imperial University,
148-49 59-60; medical, 62; men's, 5 8 - 5 9 ;
Code Napoleon, see Napoleonic Code midwifery, 6 1 ; women's, 58,
Concordat of 1801, 37-38. See also 60-61
Catholic Church Egyptian Campaign, 15-17,
Confederation of the Rhine, 123, 155 54-55
Congress of Vienna, 148, 159 n. 20, Elba, 142, 147
173 Emigres, 36-38
Constant, Benjamin, 63-64, 170. See Empire, 34-35. See also Constitu-
also Ideologues tions of France
Constitutions of France: Constitu- Enghien, Louis-Antoine de Bourbon
tion of 1791, 9, 22 n. 13; Consti- Conde, due d\ 45 n. 24; 63, 117,
tution of 1793, 30; Constitution of 162,198
1795, 12; Constitution of 1799 European Union (Treaty of Maas-
(Year VIII), 1 7 , 2 5 , 2 8 - 3 2 , 7 1 ; tricht), 2, 156-57
Constitution of 1802 (Year X), Eylau, battle of, 125
3 2 - 3 3 ; Constitution of 1804 (Year
XII), 3 4 - 3 5 ; Napoleon on writing Fashion: men's, 54; women's,
constitutions, 186-88 53-54
Index 215
Ferdinand VII of Spain. See Ferdi- Ideologues, 63

nand de Bourbon Imperial Guard, creation and struc-
Ferdinand de Bourbon, Crown ture of, 100-101, 109 n. 44; at
Prince of Spain, 128, 129 Waterloo, 152
Fiscal policy, 80-82 Imperial style, 53, 55
Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 142 Industry, 82
Food: army rations, 104; canning, Infantry, 98. See also Grand Army;
invention of, 105; Chicken Military
Marengo, 114; feast for the mar- Infernal Machine Plot, also called the
riage to Marie Louise, 57; peas- Plot on the Rue Nicaise, 33, 45 n.
ant nutrition, 79-80; Rumford 17
soup,87 Italian Campaign, First, 14, 104; Sec-
Fouche, Joseph, biography, 1 6 1 - ond, 111-14, 143 n. 2
62; Coup of Brumaire, 26; fired
by Napoleon, 136; Minister of Jacobins, 10-11, 177
Police and censorship, 33-34; Jacquard, Joseph Marie, textile pro-
plot against Napoleon, 131; provi- duction, 82
sional government after the Napo- Jews: consistories, 40; debate on
leon's second abdication, 152; spy Napoleon's treatment of, 40; Great
network, 76-77 Sanhedrin, 39
Franc, 8 1 . See also Fiscal policy Joseph I. See Bonaparte, Joseph
Francis I of Austria, 123, 140 Josephine [Marie-Joseph-Rose
Frederick William III of Prussia, 123, Tascher de La Pagerie de Beauhar-
124, 126 nais]: biography, 162-64; corona-
French Revolution, 7-10, 41 tion, 48; fashion, 54; marriage to
Napoleon, 13, 163-64; Napoleon's
Godoy, Manuel, 128, 129 courtship of, 13; Napoleon's
Grand Army, 96-100, 119 divorce from, 56-57
Great Sanhedrin, 39. See also Jews Junot, Jean-Andoche, due d'Abrantes,
Grenadiers, 98. See also Infantry 51, 128, 130, 165
Grouchy, Emmanuel, 150, 151 Junot, Laure-Adelaide-Constance
Guerilla war, 134. See also Peninsular Permon, duchesse d'Abrantes,
War 134; biography, 164-65
Henry IV of France, as a model ruler, King of Rome, Napoleon Frangois

75 Charles Joseph (also called Napo-
Hitler, Adolph, 156, 159 n. 23 leon II and the duke von Reich-
Holland, Kingdom of, 122, 136 stadt): birth, 57; exhumation and
Holy Roman Empire, dissolution of, reburial, 156; Last Will and Testa-
123 ment, 197, 198-99; Napoleon's
216 Index
first abdication in favor of, 142; 105-6, 107 n. 5; conscription

palace in honor of, 55; reared in (draft), 102-3, 110 n. 48; equip-
Austrian court, 147 ment, 98, 105; maxims and guid-
ing principles, 90, 100-102,
Labor: elimination of guilds, 82; 190-91; rations and supplies,
identity cards, 83; working condi- 104-5; tactics, 93, 100-102, 108
tions, 83 n. 20. See also Grand Army
LAiglon. See King of Rome Moreau, Jean-Victor, 112, 115
Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin Murat, Joachim, 123, 129, 131
Dieudonne, comte de, 166-67;
description of Napoleon, 185-86 Naples, Kingdom of, 117, 122, 123,
Lebrun, Charles Frangois, 32 127
Le Chapelier Law, 83. See also Labor Napoleon (Napoleon I): abdication,
Lefebvre, Frangois-Joseph, 52 first, 142; abdication, second, 153;
Legion of Honor, 19, 49-51 birth, 4; birth of son (King of
Leipzig, battle of, 141 Rome), 57; campaigns (see Coali-
Life Consulate, government of, tions; Egyptian Campaign; Italian
32-33. See also Constitutions of Campaign; Russian Campaign);
France coronation, 48-49; Coup of 18
Louis XVI of France, 8-10, 34, 176 Brumaire, 25-28; death, 153, 158
Louis XVIII of France, 147-48 n. 13; descriptions of, 3, 90, 154,
Louis-Philippe, King of the French, 185-86; divorce from Josephine,
155 56; early years, 5-14, 22 n.7;
Louvre, 54, 66 n. 28 Emperor, 34; exhumation and
Luneville, Peace of, 115 reburial (1840), 155; family, 20;
First Consul, 30-31, 71-72;
Mamelukes, 129 Grand Army, creation of, 96;
Marengo, battle of, 113-14 Imperial style, 53, 55-56; influ-
Maria Luisa of Spain, 128, 129 ences on, 6, 58, 90, 93; injuries to,
Marie Louise von Hapsburg, Empress 11, 132; Last Will and Testament,
of France, 57, 134-35, 196, 197 154, 195-99; legend, 154-55,
Marriage and divorce, 43-44. See also 157-58; Legion of Honor and
Josephine; Napoleonic Code other awards, 49-51, 77; Life
Massena, Andre, 14, 51, 112-13, Consul, 32; marriage to Josephine,
134; biography, 167-69 13, 163-64, 183-84; marriage to
Medicine, 62. See also Education Marie Louise, 57; military legacy,
Military: artillery, 92-93; army, orga- 91-96; Notes on the Art of War, 96;
nization of, 96-100; campaign sta- parents of, 4-5; peace, observa-
tistics, 89; campaigns (see tions on, 94-96; physical appear-
Coalitions); casualties, 90, 94, ance, 189-90; suicide attempt,
Index
217
142; Supper in Beaucaire, 10-11; Saliceti, Christophe, 10-12, 177

war, principles of, 191; Whiff of Satellite Kingdoms, 138
Grapeshot, 12-13. See names of Schonbrunn, Treaty of, 133
specific battles. Schools. See Education
Napoleon II. See King of Rome Senatus Consulta, 3 1 , 33, 34
Napoleonic Code, 19, 41-43 Sieyes, Emmanuel-Joseph, 8, 17, 26,
Nelson, Horatio, 120 28,63
Ney, Michel, 5 1 , 125, 148, 150-51 Soldiers. See Military
Spain. See Peninsular War
Old Guard. See Imperial Guard St. Helena, 1, 2; exile on, 153-54
StaeT-Holstein, Anne-Louise-Ger-
Paoli, Pasquale, 4, 7. See also Corsica maine Necker, baronne de, 63,
Paris: architecture, 55, 157; cemeter- 169-71. See also Ideologues
ies, charnel houses, and cata- Stendhal [Marie Henri Beyle],
combs, 84; descriptions of, 70, 74; admirer of Napoleon, 154, Char-
gambling and prostitution, 84 terhouse of Parma, 153
Peasants, 69, 74; agricultural produc- Supper in Beaucaire, 10-11; excerpts
tion, 78; daily life, 79; expansion from, 176-83
of property holding, 77; popular- Symbolism: coinage, 56; eagle, 51;
ity of Napoleon, 80, 85 imperial bee, 51
Peninsular War, 127-31, 134, 165,
169,174 Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Mau-
Pitt, William, 115 rice, prince de, biography, 171-72;
Pius VII, Pope, 37, 48, 133 Coup of 18 Brumaire, 26; Egyp-
Poland: Duchy of Warsaw, 126, 155; tian Campaign, 15; liberal revolu-
Polish people, 125; Polish War of tionary, 8; plot against Napoleon,
Independence, 146 n. 54 130; removal from service to
Portugal. See Peninsular War Napoleon, 131
Pressburg, Treaty of, 122 Taxation. See Fiscal policy
Property rights, 41-42, 77. See also Tchaikovsky, Petr, 155, 159 n. 19
Napoleonic Code Tilsit, Treaties of, 126-27
Trafalgar, 120
Religious toleration, 35-38, 40 Tuilleries: assault on June 20, 9,
Republic, First French, 10 175-76; assault on August
Richard, Frangois, textile production, 10,9
82
Rumford soup, 83. See Unemploy- Unemployment, 70, 83-84. See also
ment Labor
Russian Campaign, 137-40, 155, Vendee, war in, 12, 18, 36, 37
193-95 Villeneuve, Pierre, 118-20
218 Index
Voltigeurs, 98. See also Grand Army; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, duke
Military of, 130, 133, 140, 149; biography,
173-75
Wagram, battle of, 132-33 Whiff of Grapeshot, 12-13
Walewska, Maria, 127, 144 n. 33, Women: Napoleon on, 43, 53;
147 Napoleonic Code on, 42-43; writ-
War of 1812, 136-37, 174, 192 ings by Germaine de Stael on, 170
Waterloo, 149, 150-52, 174; map of,
151
About the Author
SUSAN P. CONNER is Professor of History and Vice President for Academic

Affairs at Florida Southern College, Lakeland. She has published widely in jour-
nals such as Eighteenth Century Studies, the Journal of Social History, the Jour-
nal of Women's History, and Eighteenth Century Life, and on topics of gender,
marginality, crime, and social history in collections, guides, and a historical
encyclopedia.

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What was Napoleon's early life like?

What was Napoleon's early life like?

How did Napoleon restructure French society?

How did Napoleon restructure French society?

he AgeOf Napoleon2

The Dreyfus Affair

Greenwood Guides to Historic Events 1500-1900

Conner, Susan P. (Susan Punzel), 1947-

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 2004 by Susan P. Conner

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003060132

First published in 2004

Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

Excerpts from ''Supper in Beaucaire" by Napoleon Bonaparte. Reprinted by permission

Chapter 1 Napoleon Bonaparte: An Overview 1

Biographical Sketches: Significant Persons in the Age of Napoleon 161

and Counter Reformation and the French Revolution. Still others

These works will lead to a more sophisticated understanding of

period memoirs in the original language or in translation, intriguingly

I owe a debt of gratitude to those individuals who allowed me the

May 28 Napoleon arrives in Paris and is present for the

March 9 Napoleon marries Josephine de Beauharnais

June 14 Battle of Marengo

August 9 Third Coalition formed against France

December 13 Napoleon enters Madrid victoriously

The Fire of Heaven

Napoleon Bonaparte Internet Guide. The site of the French Napoleonic

Very Little Time to Be a Child

bold, with a certain roughness of manner."^ The island contained a vari-

while learning to manage family affairs in the absence of her husband,

patriotism, Napoleon concentrated on his work. Five and a half years

They Have Seen Nothing Yet

defenders of Marseilles' decision to resist the Jacobins, a manufacturer

Regardless, Napoleon declared that he had come with the blessings of

Family of Napoleon Bonaparte

Jerome, m. CD Elizabeth Patterson

Pescen4ants of Jerome an4

5. Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),

The Merchant of Hope

They planned to place themselves in power, stabilize the government of

deliberation. Not surprisingly, they demanded to know what was really

ened to run his brother through if Napoleons republican motives were

ument 5: Napoleon Bonaparte's Letter to Talleyrand on Constitution Mak-

The Short and Obscure Constitutions of France

elections, partisan groups, and personalities than former constitutions

tenth of the names of qualified citizens of the particular voting district.

As far as the Second and Third Consuls were concerned, Napoleon

inate political offices. Shortly, direct election became purely fictional. By

fere with private correspondence. One of Napoleons more annoying crit-

The Mystery of the Social Order

French citizens were caught in the middle of a dispute that

Like a Hawk to Food

flora, permanently affixed glass, and even statuary if placed in a perma-

or a felon. In a marriage, a husband had an obligation to provide for his

15. Ibid., 773.

Impossible Is Not a French Word

By 1804, Napoleon had survived two serious plots, overseen three

a genealogy," he remarked. "I don't want to descend from anyone or