ARTICLES 147-148: PROPERTY REGIME OF psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be

UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE read consistently with Article 129.

1. VALDEZ VS. RTC Issues:
Case Doctrine: Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar.
● In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of Held:
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
the property relations of the parties during the period of
Code.
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
Facts: or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
null and void. It also directed the parties to start this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
proceedings on the liquidation of their common through their work and industry shall be governed by the
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
52 of the same code. obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
common property in "unions without marriage.
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
In an Order, the trial court made the following not included in the co-ownership.
clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
impediment to marry or when they do not live
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
the property acquired by both of them through their
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
respective contributions. Such contributions and
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions
married to another shall accrue to the absolute
on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who
was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles heretofore expressed.
50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of
which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3)
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit
declared void ab initio on the ground of the
a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common Who owns the riceland?
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
Who owns the house and lot?
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of
Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should the separation of property between Miguel and Carlina
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation and the termination of their conjugal partnership?
of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of recovery of ownership and possession?
the co-ownership that exists between common-law Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-
spouses. defendant in the case?
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, Held:
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,
13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable 1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
declared void. exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While
2. AGAPAY VS. PALANG Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15,
Facts: 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and
Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their
only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
Carlina. money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by household, are regarded as contributions to the
Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s acquisition of common property by one who has no
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a
case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
of land to their only child, Herminia. sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
years of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later,
of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness,
Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for
it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
recovery of ownership and possession with damages
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the
property, there being no proof of the same.
house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the
complaint but CA reversed the decision. riceland was bought 2 months before she and Miguel
actually cohabited to exclude their case from the
Issues:
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in
precise date when they commenced their adulterous the case at bar.
cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state
definitively that the riceland was purchased even before
they started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of
actual contribution would still be essential. 3. TUMLOS VS. FERNANDEZ
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money FACTS:
to the purchase price of the riceland, there is no basis to
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and
partnership property of Miguel and Carlina. Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly building that through their tolerance they allowed the
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the without payment of any rent. It was agreed that
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel provided the not complied with. Demand was made several times for
money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need
name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was of the property for the construction of a new building.
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma
the Civil Code because it was made between persons had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
between spouses now applies to donations between Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals
persons living together as husband and wife without a from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said
legal union.
apartment under Article 148.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses during
HELD:
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order
or without judicial conferment when there is an express SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment owners of the subject property. The claim was not
which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no
specifically and expressly for separation of property and other evidence presented to validate it except for the said
should not be so inferred. affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited
with Mario and that she bore him two children were true,
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent,
the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted.
proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma
determination of the estate of the latter and claims
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The
thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court
property relation governing their supposed cohabitation
or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
contribution is required by the said provision in contrast
which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be contributions to the acquisitions of common property by
one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such
is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
proven then there can be no co-ownership and no and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
presumption of equal shares. alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00
for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials.

4. SAGUID VS. CA
While there is no question that both parties contributed
FACTS: in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
separated de facto from her husband, when she met and shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for be equal.
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with 5. ACRE VS. YUTTIKKI
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties FACTS:
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his
contribution to the construction of their house, be
prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting.
reimbursed to her.
Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline
parties Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of
land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki,
HELD: married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not to Jose del Mar. Sofronio died after more than 24 years
capacitated to marry each other because the former was of union with Evangeline.
validly married to another man at the time of her The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime recovery of properties and/or partition with damages.
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous properties with his fund.
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married affirmed the decision of the trial court.
man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired
ISSUE:
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested
owned by them in common in proportion to their properties.
respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution
RULING:
is required.
Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code,
properties.
article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls
Code. under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering
that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148,
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.
The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of
Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel
contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least
exist here. P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the
The certificate of title on its face show that the one
amicable settlement of the case" before filing his
property was exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be
other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is
dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
well-settled that the words "married to" preceding
damages.
Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Evangeline.
ARTICLES 150-151: FAMILY RELATIONS
1. GAYON VS. GAYON ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an
earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro
the suit is tenable.
Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially HELD:
that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a
— copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case,
Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for
Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein
described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, “No suit shall be filed or maintained between members
municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
five(5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said thesame have failed, subject to the limitations in article
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre 2035.”
Gayon, Genoveva d eGayon, or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; It is noteworthy that the impediment arising
that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained
by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was between members of the same family." This phrase,
attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March "members of the same family," should, however, be
21, 1961, sold theafore mentioned land to plaintiff Pedro construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
Gayon for the sum of P614.00;that plaintiff had, since pursuant to which:
1961, introduced thereon improvements worthP1,000; Family relations shall include those:
that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said
property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of (1) Between husband and wife;
our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the
(2) Between parent and child;
consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired
through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the
consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned (4) Among brothers and sisters.
property. Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on none of them is included in the enumeration contained in
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it
that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the by representing that the document was a sale of her land
same. in favor of all her children.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. However, the Court of
set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the dismissed the case on the basis of its finding that there
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of
Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence Art. 222 of the New Civil Code; hence, the instant
of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the petition.
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings,
Issue: W/N the complaint was rightfully dismissed
not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
2. ESQUIVIAS VS. CA
Ruling:
Facts:
Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-
Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of in-law of Jose and Elena Domalaon. Atty. Esquivias is
land with an area of 1,260 square meters and the two- not a member of the family of his wife and is outside the
storey house standing thereon. In 1950 she scope and coverage of the law requiring that the same
extrajudicially constituted this property into a family members of a family should exert efforts to bring about a
home. Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon compromise before the commencement of a litigation.
and Jose G. Domalaon, among other children, were
named beneficiaries thereof. We agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code
provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained
On March 11, 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was between members of the same family unless it should
executed by Julia Galpo de Domalaon in favor of her appear that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
son-in-law, Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia been made but the same have failed. The reason for the
Domalaon. law is that a lawsuit between family members generates
deeper bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it is
On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by
necessary that every effort should be made towards a
Julia Galpo de Domalaon with the conformity of all her
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
children. Afterwards, another deed of sale was executed
and passion in the family.
by her dated 12 April 1977 transferring to Jose G.
Domalaon the house and lot which once constituted the But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code
family home. applies only to suits between or among members of the
same family. The phrase "between members of the same
Prior to the sale of the property to him, or on 21 October
family" should be construed in the light of Art. 217 of
1976, Jose already filed two (2) applications for Free
the Civil Code under which "family relations" include
Patent in his name covering the entire property. When
only those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between
his first application was approved, a certificate of
parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their
title was issued on 11 February 1981. His rights over the
descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.
other application covering the rest of the property were
relinquished by him in favor of his sister Elena. It turned As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S.
out later that Elena G. Domalaon also succeeded in her Esquivias is not included in the enumeration of who are
application for Free Patent and a certificate of title was members of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-
issued in her name on 18 March 1985. law of respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his
marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with
Alleging that it was only in 1981 that she came to know
respondents is based on affinity and not on
that the document she signed in favor of Atty. Salvador
consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is concerned,
S. Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed of sale, Julia
he is a stranger with respect to the family of his wife
Galpo de Domalaon filed a disbarment case against Atty.
and, as such, the mandatory requirement of "earnest
Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law and
effort toward a compromise" does not apply to him. In
lawyer of the Domalaons, Atty. Esquivias took
Magbaleta v. Gonong we ruled that "efforts to
advantage of her trust and confidence and poor eyesight
compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the SBTC, together with Gray and Ortiz-Luis, filed their
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the respective petitions for review before this Court.
family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or
Issue:
indispensable one. An alien to the family may not be
willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, 1.Whether or not Alice and Rosita are justified in
the delay and the complications that wranglings between encashing the subject check given the factual
and among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, circumstances established in the present case.
it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family
be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to 2.Whether or not the petitioners can hold respondent
have innocently acquired some interest in a property by liable for moral damages as effect of his complaint.
virtue of his affinity to the parties. Contrary to the ruling Ruling:
of the Court of Appeals, we find no reason to give Art.
222 a broader scope than its literal import. Petitioners' posture is not sanctioned by law. If they truly
believe that Arturo took advantage of and violated the
3. SANDEJAS VS. IGNACIO, JR. rights of Rosita, petitioners should have sought redress
Facts: from the courts and should not have simply taken the
law into their own hands. Our laws are replete with
Arturo drew up a check, UCPB Check No. GRH-560239 specific remedies designed to provide relief for the
and wrote on it the name of the payee, Dr. Manuel Borja, violation of one's rights. It is true that Article 151 of the
but left blank the date and amount. He signed the check. Family Code requires that earnest efforts towards a
The check was left with Arturo's sister-in-law, who was compromise be made before family members can
instructed to deliver or give it to Benjamin. The check institute suits against each other.
later came to the possession of Alice who felt that Arturo
cheated their sister Rosita in the amount of three million However, nothing in the law sanctions or allows the
pesos (P3,000,000.00). She believed that Arturo and commission of or resort to any extra-legal or illegal
Rosita had a joint and/or money market placement in the measure or remedy in order for family members to avoid
amount of P3 million with the UCPB branch at Ortigas the filing of suits against another family member for the
Ave., San Juan and that Ignacio preterminated the enforcement or protection of their respective rights. As
placement and ran away with it, which rightfully to Patricia's entitlement to damages, this Court has held
belonged to Rosita. She together with Rosita drew up a that while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
scheme to recover the P3 million from Arturo. Alice got order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
her driver, Kudera, to stand as the payee of the check, of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
Dr. Borja. nevertheless essential that the claimant should
satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
Alice and Rosita came to SBC Greenhills damages and its causal connection to defendants acts.
Branch together with a man (Kudera) who[m] they
introduced as Dr. Borja to the then Assistant Cashier In the present case, both the RTC and the CA were not
Luis. They opened a Joint Savings Account. As initial convinced that Patricia is entitled to damages. In
deposit for the Joint Savings Account, Alice, Rosita and addition, and with respect to Benjamin, the Court agrees
Kudera deposited the check. Thereafter, they with the CA that in the absence of a wrongful act or
successfully widraw the amount. Arturo Ignacio, Jr. and omission, or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot
Evelyn Ignacio (respondents) filed a verified complaint be awarded.
for recovery of a sum of money and damages. Judgment 4. LEE VS. CA
is rendered in favor of plaintiffs as against defendants
Security Bank and Trust Co., Rene Colin Gray, Sonia
Ortiz Luis, Alice A.I. Sandejas and Rosita A.I. Cusi. ARTICLES 153-154: FAMILY HOME

The counterclaims of Patricia A.I. Sandejas are 1. MANACOP VS. CA

dismissed. Both parties appealed the RTC Decision to
FACTS:
the CA. The defendants-appellants Security Bank and
Trust Company, Rene Colin D. Gray, Sonia Ortiz-Luis, Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost
Alice A.I. Sandejas, and Rosita A.I. Cusi, are ordered to pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs. Petitioners and petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein,
the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against (1988 being a leap year).
the former. As a consequence of the order on July 28,
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered
1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy
a family home from the time it was occupied by
was issued on August11, 1989 which triggered the
petitioner and his family in1969 is not well-taken. Under
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by
Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop,
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
herein petitioner. The petitioner insists that the attached
family residences insofar as said provisions are
property is a family home, having been occupied by him
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
attachment.
existing family residences are deemed to have been
ISSUE: constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
That the parcel of land is a Family Home and cannot be
and are exempt from execution for the payment of
subject for attachment.
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
HELD: Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Petitioner belief that his abode at Quezon City since Code, are considered family homes and are
1972 is a family home within the purview of the Family prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
Code and therefore should not have been subjected to family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
respondent court properly applied the discussion retroactive effect.
conveyed by Justice Gancayco in this regard when he
spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution
vs. Breva (185 SCRA 766[1990]) that: of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or
liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
execution, forced sale or attachment except: therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988.Both preceded the effectivity of the
(1) For non-payment of taxes; Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).
family home;
Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
before or after such constitution; and
Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, fact alone will militate heavily against the so-called
builders, material men and others who have rendered exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under
service for the construction of the building. paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in
Modequillo.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from
the time of the constitution of the family home as such, 2. CABANG VS. BASAY
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
Facts:
resides therein.
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga del
petitioner was constituted as a family home whether
Sur. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
nor took possession of the lot.
became a family home by operation of law under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on property from the heirs of Felix Odong for
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
P8,000.00. The latter also did not occupy the said constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
property. occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.
Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the There can be no question that a family home is generally
same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted
were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must
No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the be constituted on property owned by the persons
said cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed constituting it. Indeed, as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v.
Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were Planters Products, Inc. [T]he family home must be part
actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, of the properties of the absolute community or the
however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property
No. 7778 was used by the government as a public road of the unmarried head of the family. In other words:
and as there were many discrepancies in the areas
The family home must be established on the properties
occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-
of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal
appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either
On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
for Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees. established on property held in co-ownership with third
RTC ruled in favor of the defendants. CA reversed the persons. However, it can be established partly on
said decision. Petitioners insist that the property subject community property, or conjugal property and partly on
of the controversy is a duly constituted family home the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent
which is not subject to execution, thus, they argue that of the latter.
the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where
the trial court.
there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it
Issue: W/N the improvements introduced by petitioners can be constituted only on his or her own property.
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of
them from their predicament.
petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the
Ruling: stark and immutable fact is that the property on which
their alleged family home stands
The petition lacks merit.
is owned by respondents and the question of ownership
As defined, [T]he family home is a sacred symbol of had been long laid to rest with the finality of the
family love and is the repository of cherished memories appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.
that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject
where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
family reside, including the land on which it is
3. SPS. DE MESA VS. ACERO
situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family. Article 153 of FACTS:
the Family Code provides that
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its property. When Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan,
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses Acero
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or of sale was issued to them. Thereafter, they leased the
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then defaulted
extent of the value allowed by law. in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals
due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment
The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
against Spouses De Mesa. In their defense, Spouses De
the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in
Mesa claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the
urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the
subject property. They deny that they are mere lessors,
afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
alleging that they are the lawful owners of the subject ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 &171: LEGITIMATE
property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom. The CHILDREN; GROUNDS TO IMPUGN
MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. Spouses De Mesa LEGITIMACY
appealed the Decision.
1. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint
FACTS:
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify
the title of Spouses Acero on the basis that the subject Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria
property is a family home which is exempt from Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by
not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig,
their unpaid loan. The RTC dismissed their complaint. herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision. propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was
suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His
ISSUE:
brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house
Whether the subject property is exempt from execution and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly
move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September
1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house
of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1,
1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein
HELD: petitioner.

It is without dispute that the family home, from the time

of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from deceased
execution, forced sale or attachment. However, this right
can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set HELD:
up and prove the status of the property as a family home
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943
at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
himself before the sale of the property at public auction. legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
Sheriff. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
absence during the initial period of conception,
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence impotence which is patent, and incurable; and
or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, took place through corrupt violation of prison
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, than the husband during the initial period does not
it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son
property as a family home. of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel
land.
2. BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA
FACTS: an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had
contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by
various properties. They both died intestate. The special
Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born
proceedings for administration of the properties were
to Vicente and Isabel.
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio
filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses.
the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the
she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
capable of administering his estate. She submitted the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-
pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the law are the sole heirs of the estate.
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives
3. DE JESUS VS. ESTATE OF DIZON
of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence,
that the spouses failed to beget a child during their FACTS:
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa
was not the biological child of the spouses who were Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
unable to physically procreate. married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage
that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA
reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
spouses. being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992.
ISSUE:
Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a complaint on 01 July 1993
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the
child and the sole heir of the late spouses. Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court.
RULING: Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above complaint, even while denominated as being one for
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status
is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
couple. spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
deceased Juan Dizon.
legitimacy of the child by:
The trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as
child;
petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the right.
child could not have been his child;
ISSUE: WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial children of the late Juan Dizon
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
HELD:
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners
were born during the marriage of their parents. The
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period
certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file
being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to
morality and more convincing reason than the the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not
presumption that children born in wedlock are to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
legitimate.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, other information obtained from DNA testing and is
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's
Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
findings, there is a99.9999% probability of paternity that
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
admitted that if the value of the Probability of
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged presumption of paternity.
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This
[BBB].
issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly RULING:
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted
to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990,
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that nine months after the day she said she was raped by
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
considered legitimate although the mother may have uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome
declared against its legitimacy or may have been by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3). The disputable
sentenced as having been an adulteress. presumption that was established as a result of the DNA
testing was not contradicted and overcome by other
4. PEOPLE VS. UMANITO evidence considering that the accused did not object to
the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits
FACTS:
"A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused evidence to rebut the same.
Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime
had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private
well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.
deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
of BBB.
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child.
deny Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The instant 1. That Francisco was her father and she was
case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED conceived at the time when her mother was employed by
the former;
ARTICLES 172 &175: PROOF OF FILIATION
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child
1. FERNANDEZ VS. CA
through his overt acts and conduct.
2. JISON VS. CA
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
FACTS:
identifying the putative father is not competence
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of
against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates
illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 and school records render the documents showed as
years after her mother’s death and when she was already incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
39 years of age. affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of
age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s
and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to
Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his “high standard of proof required for the success of an
acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying
petitioner supported her and spent for her education such upon the provision on “open and continuous
that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 more than mere preponderance of evidence.
witnesses.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation,
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within
child of Francisco Jison. the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the 3. TIJING VS. CA
same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 Facts:
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established. Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife,
they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched
of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and
must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the despite her and her husband‘s efforts, they could not
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to locate Angelita and their child‘s whereabouts.
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”. Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of
Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita,
The following facts was established based on the whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and
testimonial evidences offered by Monina: allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John
Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita
as her own son, sired by her common-law husband
Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita Maasin, Southern Leytebranch.
and Tomas for it was the latter‘s own brother who
Charles courted Divina in the third week of December
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an
1992 and they became sweethearts in thelast week of
accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal
January 1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting
marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita.
cards on special occasions, (Valentine’s Day and her
Tomas‘ brother even testified that Tomas himself
birthday); she reciprocated his love and took care of him
admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
when he was ill.
Issue:
In September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the relations with the respondent in the former’s rented room
subject child. in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo (Divina’s
uncle). Rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August
Ruling:
30, 1994.
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and
the competent evidences to establish the child‘s filiation
became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on
with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim
August 8, 1994, she got pregnant. Charles was happy
with sufficient
and made plans to marryDivina. BUT, Charles backed
clinical records, presenting the proper and credible out of the wedding plan. (Divina filed for damages for
witnesses who assisted her in her child‘s birth. breach of promise to marry but was amicably settled).

Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. (When
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in Charles did not show up and failed toprovide support to
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Gliffze, Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24,
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is 1995 for recognition andsupport of their son)
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in
Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone
Court.
ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and
the admission of Tomas‘ own brother that Tomas was Charles denied being Gliffze’s father in Court.
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could
RTC
have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private – approved monthly child support. RTC (appeal)
respondent were legally married which is false because – reversed former decision
even private respondent had admitted she is a common-
law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in CA
said birth certificate. – ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and give
4. GOTARDO VS. BULING monthly child support

FACTS: ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child

support and to be recognized as Charles’ son.
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
complaint with the RTC of Maasin,Southern Leyte, for HELD: YES.
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
claiming that the CharlesGotardo is the father of her through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
child Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied the paternity. or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
Parties’ failed to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC document or a private hand written instrument and
terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trialon the merits signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
ensued. continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed that she Rules of Court and special laws.
met Charles (accounting supervisor) onDecember 1,
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation
may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial 5. SALAS VS. MATUSALEM
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his]pedigree,
ARTICLE 176: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
PARENTAL AUTHORITY; RA NO. 9255 (2004)
other kinds of proof [admissible]under Rule
1. TONOG VS. CA
130 of the Rules of Court.”
Facts:
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman
declares - Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
—supported by corroborative proof
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and
—that she had sexual relations with the putative father; sister.
at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as
father. We explained further that the two affirmative
a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
father and grandparents.
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to
either physical absence or impotency, or(2) that the - Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and
conception. In this case, the respondent established a appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually - Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah
her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a
the petitioner and the respondent had intimate motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the
relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for
deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, custody over Gardin.
only that it occurred on a much later date than the - Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who
respondent asserted, such that it was physically modified their previous decision and granted Edgar
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) custody over Gardin.
months pregnant already in September 1994 when he
was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the - Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
Issue:
overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Ruling:
Support consists of everything indispensable for No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
education and transportation, in keeping with the away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means who is below seven years of age for “compelling
of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
be reduced or increased proportionately according to the abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
and the resources or means of the person obliged to insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If
support. older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state
his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.
The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of
child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered
be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the as a recognition of paternity
other parent, or even to a third person.
RULING: YES.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the
controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did
private handwritten instrument must be signed by
not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art.
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
175 and 172. It is therefore implied.
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people Special circumstances to the case:
and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.  Died 2 months prior to child’s birth

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child  Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the  Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment
special proceedings before the trial court. by father and brother who stand to be affected
2. DELA CRUZ VS. GRACIA by their hereditary rights

FACTS: The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

 Dominique and Jenie were living together 1. Where the private handwritten instrument is
without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 filiation, there should be strict compliance with
months before Jenie gave birth. the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent
 Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s
birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino. 2. Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and
 When Jenie applied for registration of child’s competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
birth, Jenie attached the ff.: filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as
 Certificate of Live Birth
it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
 AUSF, together with Dominique’s
3. GRANDE VS. ANTONIO
handwritten autobiography
 Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by
Dominique’s father and brother
 Respondent denied the registration because the
child was born out of wedlock.
 Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition
because the document (autobiography) was
unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father) which states that:
 “Private handwritten instrument must be
duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity”
 Furthermore, petition was denied because the
document did not contain any express
recognition of paternity.