35 Ocampo vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016.*

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO,
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI
JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
M.D., SAMAHAN NG EXDETAINEES LABAN SA
DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA), represented by DIONITO
CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL
ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, and DANILO M. DELA
FUENTE,** petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C.
ENRIQUEZ (in his capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of the Philippines), The
Grave Services Unit (Philippine Army), and GENERAL RICARDO
R. VISAYA (in his capacity as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA,
and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented by his
surviving spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE
A.C. SAGUISAG III, intervenors.
G.R. No. 225984. November 8, 2016.*

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, in his personal and official capacities
and as a member of Congress and as the Honorary Chairperson of
the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND);
FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), represented by its Cochairperson,
NILDA L. SEVILLA; REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.;
REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN; REP. EDGAR R. ERICE; and
REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA; AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA; AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ; and HEIRS
OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented by his surviving
spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
_______________
* EN BANC.
** Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. filed a petition for certiorari-in-intervention.

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224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
MARCOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 226097. November 8, 2016.*

LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO,
AIDA F. SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON,
ZENAIDA S. MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P.
BAWAGAN, MILA D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES,
MA. CRISTINA V. RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO,
FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR., LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, and
ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AFP CHIEF
OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, and PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR LT.
GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (RET.), respondents.
G.R. No. 226116. November 8, 2016.*

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X.
MANGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O.
CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA
LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL,
EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F.
TRINIDAD, JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO,
FR. BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA,
AUGUSTO A. LEGASTO, JR., and JULIA KRISTINA P.
LEGASTO, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R.
VISAYA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL
ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, and PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) OF THE DND, respondents.
G.R. No. 226117. November 8, 2016.*

ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA,
JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL
MAGALANG, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF RICARDO R.

VISAYA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, respondents.
G.R. No. 226120. November 8, 2016.*

ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, sued in his capacity as Secretary of National
Defense, LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, in his capacity as Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and LT. GEN.
ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (ret.), in his capacity as Administrator,
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO), respondents.
G.R. No. 226294. November 8, 2016.*

LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC and as TAXPAYER, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR
C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R.
VISAYA, UNDERSECRETARY ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, in his
capacity as Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO)
Administrator and B/GEN. RESTITUTO L. AGUILAR, in his
capacity as Shrine Curator and Chief, Veterans Memorial and
Historical Division and HEIRS OF FERDINAND EDRALIN
MARCOS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; It is well-

settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the
following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.—It is well-settled that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

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opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Same; Same; Same; An “actual case or controversy” is one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.—An “actual case or controversy” is one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; President Duterte’s decision
to have the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.—
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is
not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military
cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question
of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness.
Locus Standi; Locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.—Defined as a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus standi
requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Same; Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights
violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no
legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they
have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—Petitioners,
who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, in their capacities as citizens,

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human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and

taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to
show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the
means of administrative processes available.—Under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court’s judicial power can be sought.
Hierarchy of Courts; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not just a trier
of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original
and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction
when proven necessary.—While direct resort to the Court through petitions
for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners
cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in
the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining
order and injunction when proven necessary.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; While the
Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed
Marcos burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—As the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is
a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely
related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.
Republic Act No. 289; National Pantheon; For the perpetuation of
their memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and
of genera-

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tions still unborn, Republic Act (RA) No. 289 authorized the
construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal
remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and
patriots.—For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and
emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn, R.A. No. 289
authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the
mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and
patriots. It also provided for the creation of a Board on National Pantheon to
implement the law.
Same; Same; The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date,
the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its
construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon.—The
National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has
deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the
creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the
legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; The proposed interment is
not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos’ mortal remains. The act in
itself does not confer upon him the status of a “hero.”—Also, the Court
shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to
the consecration of Marcos’ mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer
upon him the status of a “hero.” Despite its name, which is actually a
misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of
“hero” nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
“hero.”
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 10368; With its victim-oriented
perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
specifically proscribing Marcos’ interment at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) as a “reparation” for the Human Rights Violations Victims
(HRVVs), but they did not.—This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners’
logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it
includes the prohibition on Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. It would be undue
to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-
oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
specifically proscribing Marcos’ interment at the LNMB as a “reparation”
for the HRVVs, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain
to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there.

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Same; Executive Department; Our nation’s history will not be instantly

revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—
Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, our nation’s history will not be instantly
revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or
not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying
degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to
the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our
history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and
collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; The descriptive words “sacred and
hallowed” refer to the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a place and not
to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and
respected ground.—Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the
descriptive words “sacred and hallowed” refer to the LNMB as a place and
not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and
respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or
collective “heroism” of the men and women buried or will be buried therein.
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; President Duterte is not
bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and
the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos
Norte.—The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of
Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by
the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the
Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos
Norte.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; The allotment of a cemetery plot at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a
military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the
public use requirement.—At present, there is no law or executive issuance
specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it
was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery
plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a mili-

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tary personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether

recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the
public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the
expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable
public services rendered.
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; President Duterte’s
determination to have Marcos’ remains interred at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB) was inspired by his desire for national healing and
reconciliation.—President Duterte’s determination to have Marcos’ remains
interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and
reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
prevails over petitioners’ highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise
of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback)
to the Marcoses.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; In the absence of any executive issuance or
law to the contrary, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Regulations
G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled
and disqualified to be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—In
the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP
Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who
are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even
if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the
Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB.
Same; For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we
may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we
cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions
he held or the awards he received.—Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos
was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of
National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor
awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may
disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot
deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held
or the awards he received.
Same; The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final
judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude.—Despite all these
ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not
convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No
less than the 1987 Constitution man-

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dates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
Same; Marcos was honorably discharged from military service.
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) expressly recognized him as a
retired veteran pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6948, as amended.—
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO
expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as
amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged
from military service under AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative
Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles
94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War.
Same; It cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos’ ouster from the
presidency during the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the
military service.—It cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos’ ouster
from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his
dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.
The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the
1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian
authority over the military.
Same; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Notwithstanding the
call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and
just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani (LNMB).—At bar, President Duterte, through the public
respondents, acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold
what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at
the LNMB.

SERENO, CJ., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; View that

the Supreme Court (SC) cannot refuse to review an issue simply because it is
alleged to be a political question.—This Court cannot refuse to review an
issue simply because it is alleged to be a political question. That train has
departed a long time ago. Prevailing jurisprudence is a generation apart
from the former usefulness of the political question doctrine as a bar to
judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; View that the directive of President Duterte to
allow the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB)
contravenes the constitution, laws, policies, and jurisprudence.—The
directive of President

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Duterte to allow the burial of Marcos at the LNMB contravenes the

constitution, laws, policies, and jurisprudence. Moreover, the basis for the
directive was an invalid regulation issued by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) in excess of its statutory authority.
Same; Same; View that there were clear indictments by both the
revolutionary government and the legislature against the massive plunder
and the countless abuses committed by Marcos and his cronies during his
tenure as President.—The statements in the above laws were clear
indictments by both the revolutionary government and the legislature
against the massive plunder and the countless abuses committed by
Marcos and his cronies during his tenure as President. These laws not
only condemn him as a thief; they equally recognize his criminal
liability for the atrocities inflicted on innumerable victims while he was
in power.
Same; Same; View that the claim that judgment has not been rendered
against Marcos for the plunder and the atrocities committed under his
regime is belied by the declarations of this very Court.—The claim that
judgment has not been rendered against Marcos for the plunder and the
atrocities committed under his regime is belied by the declarations of this
very Court.
Same; Same; View that Marcos may have evaded a criminal
proceeding by choosing to go on exile after the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) Revolution, the atrocities committed against the Filipino
people during his regime must be remembered.—The pronouncements of
the Court on this matter must be respected and considered conclusive.
Hence, while Marcos may have evaded a criminal proceeding by choosing
to go on exile after the EDSA Revolution, the atrocities committed against
the Filipino people during his regime must be remembered.
Same; Same; View that statutes and jurisprudence condemning Marcos
and his regime effectively prohibit the incumbent President from granting
him any form of tribute or honor.—In this case, the foregoing statutes and
jurisprudence condemning Marcos and his regime effectively prohibit the
incumbent President from granting him any form of tribute or honor. The
President’s discretion in this matter is not unfettered. Contrary to the
assertions of respondents, the President cannot arbitrarily and
whimsically decide that the acts attributed to Marcos during Martial
Law are irrelevant, solely because “he possessed the title to the
presidency until his eventual ouster from office.”

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Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that whether Marcos is to be buried in

the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a hero, soldier, or former President
is of little difference. The most important fact is that the burial would accord
him honor.—Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity for the
Executive branch to insist on paying tribute to an individual who has
been condemned by the two other branches of government as a dictator,
a plunderer, and a human rights violator. Whether Marcos is to be
buried in the LNMB as a hero, soldier, or former President is of little
difference. The most important fact is that the burial would accord him
honor.
Same; View that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) does not
have the authority to select which persons are qualified to be buried in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—The argument of respondents that the
burial is permitted under AFP Regulations 161-375 is unavailing, as the
AFP does not have the authority to select which persons are qualified to be
buried in the LNMB. For this reason, the enumeration contained in AFP
Regulations 161-375 must be deemed invalid.
Same; View that authority of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(PVAO) to administer, maintain and develop the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) pertains purely to the management and care of the cemetery. Its
power does not extend to the determination of which persons are entitled to
be buried there.—The authority of the PVAO to administer, maintain and
develop the LNMB pertains purely to the management and care of the
cemetery. Its power does not extend to the determination of which persons
are entitled to be buried there. This authority pertains to Congress,
because the power to deal with public property, including the right to
specify the purposes for which the property may be used, is legislative
in character.
Same; View that the purported discretion of the President to determine
the persons who may be interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB)
must be considered limited by statutes and judicial decisions.—The AFP
Regulations cannot be considered in isolation. As part of the legal system,
administrative issuances must be interpreted and implemented in a manner
consistent with statutes, jurisprudence, and other rules. In the same manner,
the purported discretion of the President to determine the persons who may
be interred in the LNMB must be considered limited by statutes and judicial
decisions.
Same; View that the residual power of the President cannot be used to
justify acts that are contrary to the Constitution and the laws.—The residual
power of the President cannot be used to justify acts that are contrary to the
Constitu-

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tion and the laws. To allow him to exercise his powers in disregard of
the law would be to grant him unbridled authority in the guise of inherent
power.
Same; View that allowing the proposed burial of Marcos in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) would be a clear violation of
international law obligations.—Allowing the proposed burial of Marcos in
the LNMB would be a clear violation of the foregoing international law
obligations. Consequently, the planned interment must be enjoined in light
of Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution, the established principle of
pacta sunt servanda, and the fact that the state has already acknowledged
these duties and incorporated them in our domestic laws.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; View that the statutes,
issuances, and rules enacted by the different branches of government to
promote human rights cannot suffice for the purpose of fulfilling the state’s
obligation to the human rights victims of former President Marcos.—
Contrary to the implications of the ponencia, the statutes, issuances, and
rules enacted by the different branches of government to promote human
rights cannot suffice for the purpose of fulfilling the state’s obligation to the
human rights victims of former President Marcos. These enactments cannot
erase the violations committed against these victims, or the failure of the
state to give them justice; more important, these enactments cannot negate
the further violation of their rights through the proposed burial.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the burial of Marcos would be
more than a simple matter of the interment of his remains, because it would
involve his victims’ right to symbolic reparations.—The burial of Marcos
would be more than a simple matter of the interment of his remains, because
it would involve his victims’ right to symbolic reparations. Undoubtedly, to
honor the very perpetrator of human rights atrocities would be the direct
opposite of the duty of the state to respect, promote, and fulfil human rights.
Same; View that for the President to allow the burial would constitute a
clear contravention of international human rights law and would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.—These opinions must be given paramount
consideration by the state in compliance with its duty to provide symbolic
reparations to victims of human rights atrocities. For the President to allow
the burial in disregard of these views would constitute a clear contravention
of international human rights law and would amount to grave abuse of
discretion.

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Same; View that to permit the burial would be to sanction violations of

international obligations and to allow the state to disregard the latter’s duty
to provide effective remedies to victims of human rights violations,
particularly its duty to provide symbolic reparations and to combat
impunity.—In the process of mapping through the vast body of international
human rights law, each turn leads to the conclusion that the burial of Marcos
in the LNMB would be incompatible with the international obligations of
the Philippines. For the Court to permit the burial would be to sanction these
violations and allow the state to disregard the latter’s duty to provide
effective remedies to victims of human rights violations, particularly its duty
to provide symbolic reparations and to combat impunity.
Same; View that the burial would perpetuate a climate of impunity, as
it would effectively disregard the human rights violations perpetrated by
Marcos and permit the state to honor him despite his transgressions.—The
burial would also perpetuate a climate of impunity, as it would effectively
disregard the human rights violations perpetrated by Marcos and permit the
state to honor him despite his transgressions.
Same; View that the burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB)
would result in a contravention of the public purpose of the site as it would
no longer be a sacred symbol of honor and valor.—As earlier discussed,
Marcos was an ousted dictator and disgraced president. Consequently,
he is clearly not worthy of commendation from the state and no public
purpose would be served by his interment therein. In fact, his burial in
the LNMB would result in a contravention of the public purpose of the
site as it would no longer be a sacred symbol of honor and valor.
Same; View that respondents fail to explain how the burial would lead
to national unity and healing.—It is significant to note, however, that
respondents fail to explain how the burial would lead to national unity and
healing. Consequently, their statements remain meaningless assertions. To
emphasize, mere reference to an avowed public purpose cannot
automatically justify the use of public funds and property.
Same; View that the burial would ultimately benefit only the Marcos
family. No general advantage is derived by the public from the interment.—
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the burial would ultimately
benefit only the Marcos family. No general advantage is derived by the
public from the interment; as it stands, divisiveness instead of unity has
resulted from the plan.

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Same; View that the private interest of the Marcos family and the
personal objective of the President to fulfill a pledge to his political allies
will not justify the proposed public expenditure for the burial.—Needless to
state, the private interest of the Marcos family and the personal objective of
the President to fulfill a pledge to his political allies will not justify the
proposed public expenditure for the burial.
Same; View that the order of the President to allow the burial is, at the
very least, a declaration that Marcos is worthy of a grave at a cemetery
reserved for war heroes, despite the objections of countless victims of
human rights violations during the Martial Law regime.—The order of the
President to allow the burial is, at the very least, a declaration that Marcos is
worthy of a grave at a cemetery reserved for war heroes, despite the
objections of countless victims of human rights violations during the Martial
Law regime.
Same; View that for the Court to pretend that the present dispute is a
simple question of the entitlement of a soldier to a military burial is to take
a regrettably myopic view of the controversy.—For the Court to pretend that
the present dispute is a simple question of the entitlement of a soldier to a
military burial is to take a regrettably myopic view of the controversy. It
would be to disregard historical truths and legal principles that persist after
death.

CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that Marcos is not qualified to be

interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), and thus the Memorandum
dated 7 August 2016 of Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Lorenzana was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.—I vote to grant the petitions on the ground that
Marcos is not qualified to be interred at the LNMB, and thus the
Memorandum dated 7 August 2016 of DND Secretary Lorenzana was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Same; View that assuming Marcos was qualified to be interred at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a Medal of Valor Awardee, and as a
former President of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief, he ceased to
be qualified when he was ousted from the Presidency by the nonviolent
People Power Revolution on 25 February 1986.—Assuming that Marcos
was qualified to be interred at the LNMB as a Medal of Valor Awardee, and
as a former President of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief, he ceased
to be qualified when he was

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ousted from the Presidency by the nonviolent People Power Revolution

on 25 February 1986.
Same; Dishonorable Discharge; View that there is nothing more
dishonorable for a President than being forcibly removed from office by the
direct sovereign act of the people.—The removal of Marcos from the
Presidency, therefore, was a direct exercise of the sovereign act of the
Filipino people that is “beyond judicial scrutiny.” It cannot be said that
this removal was an “honorable” one. Truly, there is nothing more
dishonorable for a President than being forcibly removed from office by the
direct sovereign act of the people.
Same; Same; View that Circular No. 17, issued more than one (1) year
after such separation from office, cannot be made to apply retroactively to
Marcos.—Marcos was separated from service with finality, having been
forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986. Circular 17,
issued more than one year after such separation from office, cannot be
made to apply retroactively to Marcos. When Circular 17 was issued,
Marcos had already been finally discharged, terminated, and ousted — as
President and Commander-in-Chief — by the Filipino people.
Same; Same; View that even assuming Circular No. 17 can be given
retroactive effect, Marcos was still dishonorably discharged from service
since Circular No. 17 cannot prevail over the sovereign act of the Filipino
people.—Even assuming that Circular 17 can be given retroactive effect,
Marcos was still dishonorably discharged from service since Circular 17
cannot prevail over the sovereign act of the Filipino people. Marcos was
ousted by the direct act of the Filipino people. The sovereign people is the
ultimate source of all government powers.
Same; View that there is no substantial distinction between the military
and civilian personnel, for purposes of interment at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB), that would warrant applying the disqualifications to
military personnel and not to civilian personnel.—In this case, however,
there is no substantial distinction between the military and civilian
personnel, for purposes of interment at the LNMB, that would warrant
applying the disqualifications to military personnel and not to civilian
personnel.
Same; View that interring Marcos on the hallowed grounds of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), which was established to show “the
nation’s esteem and reverence” for those who fought for freedom and
democracy for our country, extols Marcos and exculpates him from human
rights violations.—Interring Marcos on

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the hallowed grounds of the LNMB, which was established to show

“the nation’s esteem and reverence” for those who fought for freedom and
democracy for our country, extols Marcos and exculpates him from human
rights violations. This starkly negates the “moral and legal obligation” of the
State to recognize the sufferings and deprivations of the human rights
victims under the dictatorship of Marcos.
Same; View that Marcos’ interment at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) will cause undue injury particularly to human rights victims of the
Marcos regime, as well as the sovereign people who ousted Marcos during
the People Power Revolution.—Marcos’ interment at the LNMB will cause
undue injury particularly to human rights victims of the Marcos regime, as
well as the sovereign people who ousted Marcos during the People Power
Revolution. Marcos’ interment at the LNMB is thus contrary to public
policy.
Same; Dishonorable Discharge; View that Marcos’ dishonorable
discharge serves to convert his burial into a private affair of the Marcos
family. Hence, no public purpose is served by interring his remains at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—Government funds or property shall be
spent or used solely for public purposes. Since Marcos was ousted by the
sovereign act of the Filipino people, he was dishonorably discharged from
office. Consequently, Marcos’ dishonorable discharge serves to convert his
burial into a private affair of the Marcos family. Hence, no public purpose is
served by interring his remains at the LNMB.

BRION, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; View that for the Court to

directly exercise its expanded jurisdiction, the petitioners carry the burden
of proving, prima facie, that the President’s decision to inter Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) violates the Constitution.—In the context
of the present case, for the Court to directly exercise its expanded
jurisdiction, the petitioners carry the burden of proving, prima facie, that the
President’s decision to inter Marcos at the LNMB violates the Constitution.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that petitioners’ allegations
equating President Duterte’s alleged statutory violations (when he issued his
burial order) to grave abuse of discretion, are not the proper subject of
judicial review under the Court’s direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction.
—In these lights, I find that the petitioners’ allegations equating President
Duterte’s alleged statutory violations (when he issued his burial order) to
grave abuse of discretion, are not

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the proper subject of judicial review under the Court’s direct exercise
of its expanded jurisdiction.
Same; Judicial Review; View that the faithful execution clause does not
allow litigants to question the manner by which the President implements a
law.—The petitioners’ insistence that the burial order’s violation of various
laws amounts to a constitutional violation involving the faithful execution
clause, rests on a very tenuous interpretation of this clause that stretches it to
its breaking point. The faithful execution clause does not allow litigants to
question — as a constitutional violation — the manner by which the
President implements a law.
Same; Judicial Department; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that
petitioners failed to point to any specific treaty obligation prohibiting
Marcos’ burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) or at any other
public cemetery.—While I agree that these international agreements (except
for the UDHR, which is a nonbinding document with provisions attaining
the status of customary international law) had been ratified by the Philippine
government and hence have the force and effect of law in the Philippines,
the petitioners failed to point to any specific treaty obligation prohibiting
Marcos’ burial at the LNMB or at any other public cemetery.
Same; Republic Act No. 10368; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the
burial order does not have the effect of rewriting jurisprudence and
excusing the ills of the Marcos administration; neither does it amend
Republic Act (RA) No. 10368.—It must be considered that the burial order
does not have the effect of rewriting jurisprudence and excusing the ills of
the Marcos administration; neither does it amend Republic Act No. 10368
(“Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013”), a law
that had been enacted as part of the Philippines’ compliance with its
obligations in the ICCPR and CAT.
Same; Judicial Department; View that Article II, Section 27 and Article
XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution cannot be interpreted to prohibit
former President Marcos’ interment at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB).—Neither can we interpret Article II, Section 27 and Article XI,
Section 1 to prohibit former President Marcos’ interment at the LNMB. To
be sure, these are provisions that cannot be faulted as they enshrine honesty,
integrity, and accountability in the public service, and require government
officials to exercise their functions “with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.”

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Same; Same; View that the 1987 Constitution’s enactment after the
Marcos regime collapsed does not suggest and cannot be translated into an
implied command preventing his burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) or in a shrine of national significance.—The Constitution was
undeniably forged out of the ashes of the Marcos regime. Its enactment after
the Marcos regime collapsed, however, does not suggest and cannot be
translated into an implied command preventing his burial at the LNMB or in
a shrine of national significance. Had such prohibition been the intent, the
Constitution’s transitory provisions would have specifically so provided in
the manner these provisions incorporated terms that the framers wanted to
implement within intended and foreseeable time frames.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that if we do rule in favor of the burial
of former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), we do
not dishonor those who believe they suffered under his regime.—Thus, if we
do rule in favor of the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB, we
do not thereby dishonor those who believe they suffered under his regime.
Nor are we unmindful of the laws crafted in their favor; we considered these
laws but they are simply not the laws primarily relevant and applicable to
the issue before us — the interment of former President Marcos at the
LNMB.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; View that
the wisdom of or need for the interment of former President Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is a policy determination that is outside
the Court’s jurisdiction to pass upon or interfere with as a matter of law.—
The wisdom of or need for the interment of former President Marcos at the
LNMB is a political question that our President decided after an assessment
of the thoughts and sentiments of the people from all the regions in our
country; it is a policy determination that is outside the Court’s jurisdiction to
pass upon or interfere with as a matter of law.
Same; Same; Same; View that the burial of Marcos had been a
campaign promise strengthens the nature of former President Marcos’
burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a political question.—
That the burial of Marcos had been a campaign promise strengthens the
nature of former President Marcos’ burial at the LNMB as a political
question. Voters knew of his plan to bury Marcos at the LNMB at the time
he campaigned, and might have voted for him because or regardless of this
plan.

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BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Judicial Review; View that

the interment of the remains of President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB) is a matter that exclusively pertains to the discretion of
President Duterte as the Chief Executive.—The interment of the remains of
President Marcos in the LNMB is a matter that exclusively pertains to the
discretion of President Duterte as the Chief Executive. The character of the
LNMB as the resting place for the war dead and other military personnel
under the care and control of the AFP has placed the LNMB under the
control of the President.
Same; Same; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that President Marcos —
being a former President of the Philippines, a Medal of Valor awardee, a
veteran of World War II, a former Senator and Senate President, and a
former Congressman — is one of those whose remains are entitled to be
interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) under the terms of Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Regulations G 161-375.—President Marcos
— being a former President of the Philippines, a Medal of Valor awardee, a
veteran of World War II, a former Senator and Senate President, and a
former Congressman — is one of those whose remains are entitled to be
interred in the LNMB under the terms of AFP Regulations G 161-375.
President Duterte was far from whimsical or arbitrary in his exercise of
discretion.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is
not the same as the National Pantheon.—The Republic Memorial Cemetery
was reserved as the final resting place for the war dead of World War II, but
President Magsaysay renamed it to LNMB on October 27, 1954. The history
of the LNMB refutes the petitioners’ reliance on Republic Act No. 289.
Verily, the LNMB is not the same as the National Pantheon.
Same; Same; Same; View that the petitioners have not cited any
specific provision of either the Constitution or other existing laws that
would expressly prohibit the interment in the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) of the remains of President Marcos.—The petitioners have not laid
out any legal foundation for directly testing the issuance of the challenged
executive issuances. They have not cited any specific provision of either the
Constitution or other existing laws that would expressly prohibit the
interment in the LNMB of the remains of one like President Marcos.
Same; Same; Same; View that none of the disqualifications listed in
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Regulations G 161-375 can apply to
the late

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President Marcos.—None of the disqualifications can apply to the late

President Marcos. He had not been dishonorably separated or discharged
from military service, or convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Same; View that the ouster from the Presidency by the
1986 People Power revolution is not the same as being dishonorably
discharged because the discharge must be from the military service.—The
contention that he had been ousted from the Presidency by the 1986 People
Power revolution was not the same as being dishonorably discharged
because the discharge must be from the military service. In contrast, and at
the risk of being redundant, I remind that he had been a two-term President
of the Philippines, a Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a
former Senator and Senate President, and a former Congressman, by any of
which he was qualified to have his remains be interred in the LNMB.

PEREZ, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Judicial Review; View that
President Rodrigo R. Duterte did not gravely abuse his discretion, was
neither whimsical nor capricious when upon assumption of the office to
which he was elected he forthwith proceeded to implement his election
promise to have the remains of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—I join the opinion to
dismiss the consolidated petitions for the issuance in their favor and against
the respondents, of the special writ of certiorari. President Rodrigo R.
Duterte did not gravely abuse his discretion, was neither whimsical nor
capricious when upon assumption of the office to which he was elected he
forthwith proceeded to implement his election promise to have the remains
of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos buried in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.
Same; Same; Same; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the Marcos
burial issue was made public and was resolved through a most political
process, a most appropriate process: the election of the President of the
Republic.—The petitioners objected against the publicly announced Marcos
Libingan burial; they protested the pronouncement. Indeed the issue was
made public and was resolved through a most political process, a most
appropriate process: the election of the President of the Republic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the election result is a showing
that, while there may have once been, there is no longer a national
damnation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos; that the
“constitutionalization” of the sin and its

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personification is no longer of national acceptance.—The election

result is a showing that, while there may have once been, there is no longer
a national damnation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos; that the
“constitutionalization” of the sin and its personification is no longer of
national acceptance. A Marcos vote came out of the elections, substantial
enough to be a legitimate consideration in the executive policy formulation.

MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion:

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the interment of President Marcos

in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) will not erase the atrocities
committed during his authoritarian rule.—Ferdinand Edralin Marcos
(President Marcos) was not, and will never be, a hero. His interment in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) will not erase the atrocities committed
during his authoritarian rule. His place in history will ultimately be judged
by the people.
Same; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Judicial Review;
View that the decision of President Duterte to allow President Marcos to be
interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is beyond the ambit of
judicial review.—Guided by the foregoing, it is my considered view that the
decision of President Duterte to allow President Marcos to be interred in the
LNMB is beyond the ambit of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; View that any act
pursuant to the faithful execution clause should be deemed a political
question as the President is merely executing the law as it is.—The
Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. Thus, any act pursuant to the faithful execution clause should be
deemed a political question as the President is merely executing the law as it
is. There is no question as to the legality of the act but on its wisdom or
propriety.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the authority of President Duterte
to allow the interment of President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) is derived from the residual powers of the executive.—Moreover,
the authority of President Duterte to allow the interment of President
Marcos in the LNMB is derived from the residual powers of the executive.
Same; Same; Same; View that the interment of President Marcos in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) will not bestow upon him the title of a
hero.—It should be stressed, however, that the interment of President
Marcos in the LNMB will not bestow upon him the title of a hero. It will not
erase from the

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memories of the victims what have been etched in their minds — that
President Marcos was a heartless dictator and rapacious plunderer of our
national economy and patrimony.
Same; Same; Same; View that the decision to allow the interment of
President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is not contrary to
Republic Act (RA) No. 289 and RA No. 10368.—Moreover, the decision to
allow the interment of President Marcos in the LNMB is not contrary to
R.A. No. 289 and R.A. No. 10368. As explained by the public respondents,
the National Pantheon mentioned in R.A. No. 289 was quite different from
the LNMB. As such, the standards claimed by the petitioners in R.A. No.
289 are not applicable to the LNMB.
Same; Same; Same; View that the interment of President Marcos in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is not repugnant to the avowed policy of
Republic Act (RA) No. 10368, which seeks to recognize the heroism of
human rights violation victims during martial law.—The interment of
President Marcos in the LNMB is not repugnant to the avowed policy of
R.A. No. 10368, which seeks to recognize the heroism of human rights
violation victims (HRVV) during martial law.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that President Duterte’s verbal orders

to carry out the interment of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB) are invalid because they violate Republic Act (RA) No. 289.
—The President’s verbal orders, which were the basis for the issuance of the
questioned orders of public respondents, are invalid because they violate
Republic Act No. 289. Republic Act No. 289 was never repealed.
Same; View that President Duterte’s verbal orders do not provide for a
definite and complete reason for transferring the remains of Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos from its originally intended site as shown in
the agreement signed by Former Secretary Rafael Alunan III and Imelda
Marcos to the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—The President’s verbal
orders do not provide for a definite and complete reason for transferring the
remains of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos from its originally
intended site as shown in the agreement signed by Former Secretary Rafael
Alunan III (Former Secretary Alunan) and Imelda Marcos to the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. It was whimsical, capricious, and an abuse of discretion,
and could have been done only to accommodate the private interest of the
Heirs of Marcos.

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Same; View that that Republic Act (RA) No. 289 was ignored in the
past does not give legal justification for the present administration to
likewise violate the law.—Presidents who do not follow the law do not
repeal that law. Laws can only be repealed by a subsequent law. Again, that
Republic Act No. 289 was ignored in the past does not give legal
justification for the present administration to likewise violate the law.
Same; View that Ferdinand E. Marcos does not meet the standard in
Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 289 that those buried at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani (LNMB) must have led lives worthy of “inspiration and
emulation.”—Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 289, those buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani must have led lives worthy of “inspiration and
emulation.” Ferdinand E. Marcos does not meet this standard.
Same; View that jurisprudence, Republic Act (RA) No. 10368, the
findings of the National Historical Commission, and the actual testimony of
petitioners clearly show that the life of Ferdinand E. Marcos either as
President or as a soldier is bereft of inspiration.—The Court’s findings in a
catena of cases in its jurisprudence, a legislative determination in Republic
Act No. 10368, the findings of the National Historical Commission, and the
actual testimony of petitioners during the Oral Arguments clearly show that
the life of Ferdinand E. Marcos either as President or as a soldier is bereft of
inspiration.
Same; View that burying the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) violates Republic Act (RA) No. 10368 as
the act may be considered as an effort to conceal abuses during the Marcos
regime or to conceal the effects of Martial Law.—Burying the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violates Republic Act
No. 10368 as the act may be considered as an effort “to conceal abuses
during the Marcos regime” or to “conceal . . . the effects of Martial Law.”
Its symbolism is unmistakable. It undermines the recognition of his
complicity. Clearly, it is illegal.
Same; View that if there was no intention to bestow any recognition
upon Ferdinand E. Marcos as a hero, then he should not be buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—If there was no intention to bestow any
recognition upon Ferdinand E. Marcos as a hero, then he should not be
buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. If the President wanted to allot a
portion of public property to bury Ferdinand E. Marcos without according
him the title of a hero, the President had other options.

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Same; View that the transfer of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains is a

violation of the fundamental statutory policy of recognition of the human
rights violations committed during the Marcos regime.—The transfer of
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains violates the policy of full and public
disclosure of the truth. It produces an inaccurate account of the violations
committed. It will fail to educate all sectors of society and all generations of
the human rights violations committed under his watch. It is a violation of
the fundamental statutory policy of recognition of the human rights
violations committed during the Marcos regime.
Same; View that if the government buries and honors Ferdinand E.
Marcos’ body as the body of a former soldier, it will, at the same time, be
burying and honoring the body of a human rights violator, dictator, and
plunderer.—When a person is buried, the whole person is buried, not just
parts of him or her. Thus, if government buries and honors Ferdinand E.
Marcos’ body as the body of a former soldier, it will, at the same time, be
burying and honoring the body of a human rights violator, dictator, and
plunderer. It is impossible to isolate the President, soldier, and Medal of
Valor awardee from the human rights violator, dictator, and plunderer.
Same; View that allowing Ferdinand E. Marcos’ burial under the
pretense of the President’s policy of promotion of national healing and
forgiveness lowers the victims’ dignity and takes away from them their right
to heal in their own time.—Allowing Ferdinand E. Marcos’ burial under the
pretense of the President’s policy of promotion of national healing and
forgiveness lowers the victims’ dignity and takes away from them their right
to heal in their own time. Allowing the Marcos burial on the premise of
national healing and forgiveness is a compulsion from the State for the
victims and the Filipino People to forgive their transgressor without
requiring anything to be done by the transgressor or his successors, and
without even allowing the victims to be provided first the reparations
granted to them by law.
Same; View that to allow the Marcos burial is diametrically opposed to
Republic Act (RA) No. 10368.—To allow the Marcos burial is diametrically
opposed to Republic Act No. 10368. The stated policies are clear. These
must be applied, and applied in its entirety — in accordance with its spirit
and intent.
Same; View that there is no legitimate public purpose for setting aside
public land at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) for Ferdinand E.
Marcos.—Considering Ferdinand E. Marcos’ disreputable role in Philippine
history, there can be no recognition that serves the public interest for him.
There is no legiti-

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mate public purpose for setting aside public land at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani — definitely a national shrine — for him.
Same; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review;
View that the theory that a campaign promise becomes policy is an
abdication of the judiciary’s duty to uphold the Constitution and its laws.—
In other words, under our constitutional order, we elect a President subject
to the Constitution and the current state of the law. We do not, through the
process of elections, anoint a king. Moreover, the theory that a campaign
promise becomes policy is an abdication of the judiciary’s duty to uphold
the Constitution and its laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that there is an actual case or
controversy in this case as it involves a conflict of legal rights arising from
actual facts, which have been properly established through evidence or
judicial notice, and which provide the natural limitations upon judicial
interpretation of the statute.—There is an actual case or controversy in this
case as it involves a conflict of legal rights arising from actual facts, which
have been properly established through evidence or judicial notice, and
which provide the natural limitations upon judicial interpretation of the
statute.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the rule on locus standi has been
relaxed when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.—In any case, the
rule on standing has been relaxed “when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies are present in
this petition.—These exceptions are present in these consolidated cases.
First, these cases involve reviewing the act of another constitutional organ,
that is, the President’s exercise of discretion in allowing Ferdinand E.
Marcos’ burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Second, these Petitions raise
constitutional questions that would be better decided by this Court, as well
as issues relating to public policy that may be beyond the competence of the
lower courts. These cases are likewise of first impression, and no
jurisprudence yet exists on this matter. Thus, the Petitions cannot be
dismissed by invoking the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Same; Same; Same; View that to suggest that Ferdinand E. Marcos was
just a human who erred like us is an affront to those who suffered under the
Marcos regime.—These were not accidents that humans, like us, commit.
These

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were deliberate and conscious acts by one who abused his power. To
suggest that Ferdinand E. Marcos was “just a human who erred like us” is
an affront to those who suffered under the Marcos regime.
Same; Same; View that with the transfer of the Marcos’ remains to the
sacred grounds of the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) will permanently
cause untold anguish to Martial Law victims.—The reality is that the
retelling of the story of Martial Law is agonizing to many who went through
the ordeal. Reliving it for eternity, with the transfer of the remains of he who
is responsible for the ordeal to the sacred grounds of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB), will permanently cause untold anguish to the victims.
Same; Same; View that the burial of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is not an act of national healing.—The
burial of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is
not an act of national healing. It cannot be an act of healing when
petitioners, and all others who suffered, are not consulted and do not
participate. Rather, it is an effort to forget our collective shame of having
failed to act as a People as many suffered. It is to contribute to the impunity
for human rights abuses and the plunder of our public trust.
Same; Same; View that Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains, by law, cannot
be transferred to the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—Ferdinand E.
Marcos’ remains, by law, cannot be transferred to the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Ferdinand E. Marcos is not a “bayani.”

CAGUIOA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; View that President

Duterte’s decision to have the remains of President Marcos interred at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) does not raise a political question.—The
ponencia holds that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. I disagree.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; Political Questions; View that victims of
human rights violations during martial law have the legal standing to
question the internment and burial of former President Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—Victims of human rights violations
during martial law have the requisite legal standing to file their respective
petitions. Their personal and direct interest to question the interment and
burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB rests on their right to a full
and effective remedy and entitlement
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to monetary and nonmonetary reparations guaranteed by the State

under the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
Same; Taxation; Taxpayer’s Suit; View that the public character of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) and the general appropriations for its
maintenance, preservation and development satisfy the requirements for a
taxpayer’s suit.—Petitioners also have standing as citizens-taxpayers. The
public character of the LNMB and the general appropriations for its
maintenance, preservation and development satisfy the requirements for a
taxpayer’s suit.
Same; Legislative Department; View that Members of Congress have
no personality to maintain the suit because they failed to show how the
President’s directives to have the remains of former President Marcos
interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) usurps or infringes upon
their legislative functions.—Members of Congress in the Lagman petition
and petitioner De Lima have no personality to maintain the suit as
legislators because they failed to allege, much less show, how the
President’s directive to have the remains of former President Marcos
interred at the LNMB usurps or infringes upon their legislative functions.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; Locus Standi;
Supreme Court; View that under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the
validity of the President’s directive to have the remains of former President
Marcos interred and buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) and the
legality of the assailed Memorandum and Directive issued by public
respondents, are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
—Therefore, that the assailed act and/or issuances do not involve the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions is of no moment.
Under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the validity of the President’s
directive to have the remains of former President Marcos interred and buried
at the LNMB and the legality of the assailed Memorandum and Directive
issued by public respondents, are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; View that there are special and
compelling reasons attendant in the case which justify direct resort to this
Court.—Contrary to the ponencia’s holding, there are special and
compelling reasons attendant in the case at bar which justify direct resort to
this Court. Apart from the fact that the issues presented here are of
transcendental importance, as earlier explained, they are being brought
before the Court for the first time. As no jurisprudence yet exists on the
matter, it is best that this case be decided by this Court.

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Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as there
are numerous exceptions laid down by jurisprudence.—The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as there are numerous
exceptions laid down by jurisprudence.
Constitutional Law; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the order to
inter the remains of former President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB) is contrary to the Constitution, the law, and several
executive issuances that have the force of law, as well as the public policy
that the Constitution, the said laws, and executive issuances espouse and
advance.—I believe that the petitions are with merit, and that the order to
inter the remains of former President Marcos in the LNMB is contrary to the
Constitution, the law, and several executive issuances that have the force of
law, as well as the public policy that the Constitution, the said laws, and
executive issuances espouse and advance.
Same; Public Purpose; View that any disbursement of public funds in
connection with the interment will not be for a public purpose, as it is
principally for the advantage of a private party.—This admission by the
Solicitor General indicates to me that the interment is primarily to favor the
Marcos family, and serves no legitimate public purpose. Therefore, the first
requirement for the legitimate exercise of the President’s power to reserve
has not been met. Moreover, any disbursement of public funds in connection
with the interment will not be for a public purpose, as it is principally for the
advantage of a private party — separate from the motivation for the same.
Libingan ng mga Bayani; Public Purpose; View that the interment
cannot be justified by the power to reserve because it is not a legitimate
public purpose, and is not consistent with the national shrine purposes of
Libingan ng mga Bayani’s (LNMB’s) reservation.—Moreover, the interment
cannot be justified by the power to reserve because it is not a legitimate
public purpose, and is not consistent with the national shrine purposes of
LNMB’s reservation. For the same reasons that the interment serves no
legitimate public purpose, no use of public property or public funds can
be made to support it.
Same; Presidency; View that while the order to inter former President
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) may be considered an
exercise of the President’s power of control, this is necessarily subject to the
limitations found in the Constitution, laws and executive issuances.—While
the order to inter former President Marcos in the LNMB may be considered
an exercise of the President’s power of control, this is necessarily subject to
the limitations similarly applica-

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ble to his subordinate, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (“PVAO”)

or the Quartermaster General — found in the Constitution, laws and
executive issuances.
Same; National Pantheon; View that the land on which the National
Pantheon was to be built refers to a discrete parcel of land that is different
from site of the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—I agree that RA 289 is
not applicable. Reading RA 289 together with Proclamation No. 431 leads
to no other conclusion than that the land on which the National Pantheon
was to be built refers to a discrete parcel of land that is different from site of
the LNMB.
Constitutional Law; Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the interment
of former President Marcos constitutes a violation of the physical, historical
and cultural integrity of the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a national
shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve.—Verily, the
interment of former President Marcos constitutes a violation of the
physical, historical and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve.
Same; Dishonorable Discharge; View that when Marcos was forcibly
taken out of office and removed as a President and a Commander-in-Chief
by the sovereign act of the people expressed in the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) Revolution, it can reasonably be said that he was
dishonorably separated as a President and dishonorably discharged as a
Commander-in-Chief.—When Marcos was forcibly taken out of office and
removed as a President and a Commander-in-Chief by the sovereign act of
the people expressed in the EDSA Revolution — which is an act higher than
an act of a military tribunal or of a civilian administrative tribunal — then it
can reasonably be said that he was dishonorably separated as a President
and dishonorably discharged as a Commander-in-Chief.
Same; Libingan ng mga Bayani; Presidency; View that whether as a
soldier or as a President, former President Marcos does not deserve a
resting place together with the heroes at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB).—His soldier persona cannot be separated from his private citizen
cum former President persona, and vice versa, unless by some miracle one
can be excised from the other. Either the entire remains of former President
Marcos are allowed to be buried in the LNMB or none of his parts. Whether
as a soldier or as a President, former President Marcos does not deserve a
resting place together with the heroes at the LNMB.

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Libingan ng mga Bayani; Human Rights Abuses; View that burial of

former President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) would
blur his real role in the country’s history and in the human rights abuses
that the human rights victims suffered under his martial law regime.—The
burial of former President Marcos in the LNMB which, as already
explained, is not a mere cemetery but a memorial for heroes, will certainly
not further or advance the Philippines’ obligation to accord HRVVs their
right to truth and preserve memory. Indeed, such an act would blur the real
role of former President Marcos in the country’s history and in the human
rights abuses that the HRVVs suffered under his martial law regime.
Constitutional Law; Libingan ng mga Bayani; Republic Act No. 10368;
View that there is sufficient basis to rule that the burial of former President
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) will violate certain
international law principles and obligations, which the Philippines has
adopted and must abide by, and Republic Act (RA) No. 10368 which
transformed the principle and State policy expressed in Article II, Section 11
of the Constitution.—There is sufficient basis to rule that the burial of
former President Marcos in the LNMB will violate certain international law
principles and obligations, which the Philippines has adopted and must
abide by, and RA 10368 which transformed the principle and State policy
expressed in Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which states: “The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,

Prohibition, Certiorari-in-Intervention, and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edre U. Olalia and Maria Cristina Yambot, et al. for petitioners
in G.R. No. 225973.
John Michael A. Bernardo, et al. for petitioners in G.R. No.
225984.
Ibarra M. Guttierez III, et al. for petitioners in G.R. No.
226097.
Reody Anthony M. Balisi, et al. for petitioners in G.R. No.
226116.
Hyacinth E. Rafael-Antonio for the heirs of Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III for petitioners in G.R. No. 226117.
Algamar A. Latiph for petitioner in G.R. No. 226120.

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PERALTA, J.:

In law, as much as in life, there is need to find closure. Issues
that have lingered and festered for so long and which
unnecessarily divide the people and slow the path to the future
have to be interred. To move on is not to forget the past. It is to
focus on the present and the future, leaving behind what is
better left for history to ultimately decide. The Court finds
guidance from the Constitution and the applicable laws, and in
the absence of clear prohibition against the exercise of discretion
entrusted to the political branches of the Government, the Court
must not overextend its readings of what may only be seen as
providing tenuous connection to the issue before it.

Facts

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election,
then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that
he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May
9, 2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30,
2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the
Malacañan Palace.
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National
Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public
respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:
Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at

LNMB

Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016.

In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement his
election campaign promise to have the remains of the late former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, kindly
undertake all the necessary planning and preparations to facilitate the
coordination of all agencies concerned

254

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
specially the provisions for ceremonial and security requirements.

Coordinate closely with the Marcos family regarding the date of interment
and the transport of the late former President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to
the LNMB.
The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO since the LNMB is
under its supervision and administration. PVAO shall designate the focal
person for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as possible.1

On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez issued the following directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General:
SUBJECT: Funeral Honors and Service

TO: Commanding General, Philippine Army
Headquarters, Philippine Army
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff for RRA, G9

1. Pursuant to paragraph 2b, SOP Number 8, GHQ, AFP dated 14
July 1992, provide services, honors and other courtesies for
the late Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as
indicated:
[x] Vigil -Provide vigil-;
[x] Bugler/Drummer;
[x] Firing Party;
[x] Military Host/Pallbearers;
[x] Escort and Transportation;
[x] Arrival/Departure Honors;

2. His remains lie in state at Ilocos Norte.
3. Interment will take place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ft.
Bonifacio, Taguig City. Date: TBAL.
4. Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a
President.
_______________
1 See Annex “A” of Petition for Prohibition of Lagman, et al., G.R. No. 225984.

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5. POC: Administrator, PVAO BY COMMAND OF

GENERAL VISAYA.2

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed
by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by Saturnino
Ocampo and several others,4 in their capacities as human rights
advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under
Section 3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights
Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention5 filed by Rene A.V.
Saguisag, Sr. and his son,6 as members of the Bar and human rights
lawyers, and his grandchild.7
3. Petition for Prohibition8 filed by Representative Edcel C.
Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House of
Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims
of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation
and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance,
mostly during the martial law regime of the former President
Marcos, and several others,9 in their official capacities as duly-
elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
_______________
2 See Annex “B,” id. (Emphasis in the original)

3 G.R. No. 225973.
4 TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P.
ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
M.D., SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO
(SELDA) represented by DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M.
FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARlO, FELIX C. DALISAY and DANILO M.
DELA FUENTE.
5 G.R. No. 225973.
6 RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, JR.
7 RENE A. C. SAGUISAG, III.
8 G.R. No. 225984.
9 FIND COCHAIRPERSON, NILDA L. SEVILLA, REP. TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR., REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, REP. EDGAR R. ERICE and
REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
4. Petition for Prohibition10 filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales,

former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and
several others,11 suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights
violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition12 filed by Heherson T.
Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who
fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others,13 as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition14 filed by Zaira Patricia
B. Baniaga and several others,15 as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition16 filed by Algamar A.
Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights
Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself
and on behalf of the Moro17 who are victims of human rights during
the martial law regime of Marcos.
_______________
10 G.R. No. 226097.

11 HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA F. SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q.
MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S. MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P.
BAWAGAN, MILA D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V.
RODRIGUEZ, LOUUE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.,
LIWAYWAY D. ARCE and ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR.
12 G.R. No. 226116.
13 JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X. MAGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE
JESUS, BELINDA O. CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX
DEGRACIA LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL,
EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F. TRINIDAD, JESUS
DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR. BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD,
ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, AUGUSTO A. LEGASTO, JR. and JULIA KRISTINA P.
LEGASTO.
14 G.R. No. 226117.
15 JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA, JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, and JUAN
ANTONIO RAROGAL MAGALANG.
16 G.R. No. 226120.
17 Defined as native peoples who have historically inhabited Mindanao, Palawan
and Sulu, who are largely of the Islamic Faith, under Sec. 4, par. d.[8], RA 9710
otherwise known as THE MAGNA CARTA OF WOMEN.

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8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition18 filed by Leila M. De

Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines,
public official and concerned citizen.

Issues
Procedural

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains
of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant
petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

Substantive

1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and
AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed
memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of
President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB.
2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws, particularly:
(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Section 1 of
Article III, Section 17 of Article VII, Section 1 of Article XI,
Section 3(2) of Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution;
(b) R.A. No. 289;
(c) R.A. No. 10368;
(d) AFP Regulation G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000;
(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
_______________
18 G.R. No. 226294.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
(f) The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law” of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly;
and
(g) The “Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion
of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity” of the U.N.
Economic and Social Council;
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten
wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements
of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB.
4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial
of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his
remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.

Opinion

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural Grounds

Justiciable controversy

It is well-settled that no question involving the constitutionality
or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided
by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are
present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.19
_______________
19 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519; 710 SCRA 1, 89 (2013).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.20
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.21 There must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.22 Related to the requisite of an actual case or
controversy is the requisite of “ripeness,” which means that
something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
itself as a result of the challenged action.23 Moreover, the limitation
on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.24 Those areas
pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.25 As they are concerned with
questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure,26 political questions used to be
beyond the ambit of judicial review. However, the scope of the
political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the
power to determine whether or not there has been grave
_______________
20 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,

646 Phil. 452, 471; 632 SCRA 146, 167 (2010).
21 Supra note 19 at p. 519; p. 90, citing Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP), 589 Phil. 387, 481; 568 SCRA 402, 450 (2008).
22 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), id.
23 Supra note 19 at pp. 519-520; p. 90.
Peace Panel on Acestral Domain (GRP), supra.
25 Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957); Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19
at p. 526; pp. 286-289.
26 Id.; id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision
to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise
of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to
allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the
public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military
shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte’s decision on
that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question,27 locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.28 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such
proper party has no standing.29 Petitioners, who filed their respective
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators,
members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file
such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or
will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB.
_______________
27 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 941, 6th edition, 1991.
28 Supra note 19 at p. 527; p. 99.
29 Id., citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860,
890; 421 SCRA 148, 178 (2004).

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Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that

public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.30 In
this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the
decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al.,31 as members of the Bar, are required
to allege any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the act complained of.32 Suffice it to state that the
averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such
injury, and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by
other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without
more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.33
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to
substantiate that the issues raised are of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.34 In cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity
of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence.35 In Marcos v. Manglapus,36 the majority
opinion observed that the subject controversy was of grave national
importance, and that the Court’s decision would
_______________
30 Supra note 19 at p. 528; pp. 99-100.

31 Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and Rene A.Q. Saguisag, Jr.
32 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 762; 489 SCRA 160, 223 (2006).
33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618; 338 SCRA 81
(2000).
34 Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994,
232 SCRA 110.
35 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 46.
36 258 Phil 479; 177 SCRA 668 (1989).

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have a profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects

of national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class
by itself, unique and could not create precedent because it involved a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years
of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who,
within the short space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to
the Philippines to die.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery
originally established as a national military cemetery and declared a
national shrine would have no profound effect on the political,
economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that
more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30)
years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners
failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their
fundamental constitutional rights.
As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law
regime, some of petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical
revisionism, and disregard of their state recognition as heroes.
Petitioners’ argument is founded on the wrong premise that the
LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by law to perpetuate the
memory of all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history
of the LNMB, as will be discussed further, reveals its nature and
purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine, under
the administration of the AFP.
Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners
Senator De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al.37 come before
the Court as legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to
protect appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In the
absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or the
institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the
Congress cannot be upheld.38 They do not specifically claim that the
official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the
Secretary of National Defense and the
_______________
37 REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT JR., REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,

REP. EDGAR R. ERICE and REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES.
38 BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 648; 342
SCRA 449, 479 (2000).

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directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of

Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.39

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the
means of administrative processes available.40 If resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.41
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case.42 While there are exceptions43 to the
_______________
39 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 439; 637
SCRA 78, 233 (2010).
40 Maglalang v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
723 Phil. 546, 556; 712 SCRA 472, 482-483 (2013).
41 Id.
42 Id., at p. 557; p. 482.
43 Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and
practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions,
such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed

to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing
to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive
before the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National
Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued
upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation
thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion,
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his
office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If
petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the
Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the
President which has control and supervision over the Department of
National Defense (DND).44

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases,45 which are lacking
in this case, peti-
_______________
involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. (See Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87,
97-98; 517 scra 255, 265-266 [2007]).
44 Book IV, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Administrative Code.
45 Direct resort to the Court is allowed as follows (1) when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2)
when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) when cases of first
impression are involved; and (4) when constitutional issues raised are better decided
by the Court; (5) when the time element presented in the case cannot be ignored; (6)
when the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners
rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (8) when the petition includes
questions that are “dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent

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tioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also
resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when
proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural
grounds alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the
petitions should still be denied.

Substantive Grounds

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.46 None is present in this case.

I
The President’s decision to bury Marcos
at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should
not be allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history
as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian
ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial
Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution,
which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights
constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as
a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their
case, petitioners invoke Sections
_______________
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.” (See The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 35 at pp. 45-49.
46 National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario, et al. v. The Executive
Secretary, 714 Phil. 127, 169; 701 SCRA 269, 316 (2013).

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2,47 11,48 13,49 23,50 26,51 2752 and 2853 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art.
VII,54 Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV,55 Sec. 1 of Art. XI,56 and Sec. 26 of
Art. XVIII57 of the Constitution.
_______________
47 SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national

policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
48 SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
49 SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth atriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
50 SECTION 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
51 SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
52 SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
53 SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
54 SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
55 SECTION 3. x x x
(2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen
ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
56 SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
57 SECTION 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after

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There is no merit to the contention.

As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned
out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding
principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara58 already ruled that the provisions in Article II
of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of

principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.”
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to implement them x x x.
_______________
the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by

the President, the Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie
case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be
registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this
Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six
months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action
or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
58 338 Phil. 546; 272 SCRA 18 (1997).

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x x x

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of
broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due
process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean
of social and economic policy making.”59

In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a
self-executing provision considering that a law should be passed by
the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied
therein. As a matter of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 6713 (“Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees”), R.A. No. 6770 (“The Ombudsman Act of
1989”), R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder), and Republic Act No. 9485 (“Anti-Red Tape Act of
2007”). To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has
issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the
norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies
on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client
feedback program.
Petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art.
XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV
refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in
teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for
human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision
on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of
Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions,
there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos’ interment at the
LNMB.
_______________
59 Tañada v. Angara, id., at pp. 580-581; p. 55. (Citations omitted). The case was
cited in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 554 Phil.
609, 625-626; 527 SCRA 746, 764-765 (2007); Bases Conversion and Development
Authority v. Court of Appeals, 599 Phil. 455, 465; 580 SCRA 295, 303 (2009); and
Espina v. Zamora, Jr., 645 Phil. 269, 278-279; 631 SCRA 17, 26 (2010). See also
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, 101-102;
267 SCRA 408, 477 (1997).

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The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty

of the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed,”
which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987,60 is likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his or her department.61 Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary
and proper steps” to carry into execution the law.62 The mandate is
self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature
and is intimately related to the other executive functions.63 It is best
construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.64
The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily,
the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them.65
Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art.
VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international
human rights laws cited by petitioners.

A. On R.A. No. 28966

For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and
emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn, R.A.
No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the
burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the
Philippines,
_______________
60 Executive Order No. 292, S. 1987, Signed on July 25, 1987.

61 Supra note 39 at p. 451; p. 160.
62 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174,
113766, and 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, 552.
63 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, January 12, 2016, 779
SCRA 241, 339.
Secretary, supra note 46 at p. 164; p. 309, as cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., supra.
65 Id.
66 Entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL PANTHEON
FOR PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES AND PATRIOTS OF THE COUNTRY,”
approved on June 16, 1948.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
national heroes and patriots.67 It also provided for the creation of a

Board on National Pantheon to implement the law.68
On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site
of the National Pantheon at East Avenue, Quezon City.69 On
December 23, 1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally
“withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve as a site for the
construction of the National Pantheon a certain parcel of land
located in Quezon City.” However, on July 5, 1954, President
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos.
422 and 431, both Series of 1953, and reserving the parcels of land
embraced therein for national park purposes to be known as Quezon
Memorial Park.
It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal
standard by which a person’s mortal remains may be interred at the
LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G 161-375 merely implements
the law and
_______________
67 Section 1.
68 Sec. 2. There is hereby created a Board on National Pantheon composed of
the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and
the Secretary of Education and two private citizens to be appointed by the President
of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments which shall
have the following duties and functions:
(a) To determine the location of a suitable site for the construction of the said
National Pantheon, and to have such site acquired, surveyed and fenced for this
purpose and to delimit and set aside a portion thereof wherein shall be interred the
remains of all Presidents of the Philippines and another portion wherein the remains
of heroes, patriots and other great men of the country shall likewise be interred;
(b) To order and supervise the construction thereon of uniform monuments,
mausoleums, or tombs as the Board may deem appropriate;
(c) To cause to be interred therein the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, the national heroes and patriots;
(d) To order and supervise the construction of a suitable road leading to the said
National Pantheon from the nearest national or provincial road; and
(e) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
69 Office of the President of the Philippines. (1953). Official Month in Review.
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 49(5), lxv-lxxvi
<http://www.gov.ph/1953/05/01/official-month-in-review-may-1953/>, (last accessed
on October 28, 2016).

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should not violate its spirit and intent. Petitioners claim that it is
known, both here and abroad, that Marcos’ acts and deed — the
gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of
government coffers, and his military record that is fraught with
myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies — are neither worthy of
perpetuation in our memory nor serve as a source of inspiration and
emulation of the present and future generations. They maintain that
public respondents are not members of the Board on National
Pantheon, which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the
LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the Philippines, national
heroes, and patriots.
Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the
oral arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical
bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National
Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because
the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned
in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President
Quirino’s Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by
President Magsaysay’s Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Marcos’ Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon
does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise
not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of
the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative
will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North
Cemetery, the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally
distinguished private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but
without cost to the limited funds of the government.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue,
still, petitioners’ allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the
LNMB is reserved only for the “decent and the brave” or “hero”
would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the
validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting
therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also,
the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is
not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos’ mortal remains. The
act in itself does not confer upon him the status of

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
a “hero.” Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the

purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives,
has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of
“hero” nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a “hero.” Lastly, petitioners’ repeated reference to a
“hero’s burial” and “state honors,” without showing proof as to what
kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of
Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been
finalized by public respondents.

B. On R.A. No. 1036870

For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G
161-375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos’ burial at the LNMB
because the
_______________
70 Approved on February 25, 2013, R.A. No. 10368 is the consolidation of House
Bill (H.B.) No. 5990 and Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 3334. H.B. No. 5990, entitled “An Act
Providing Compensation to Victims of Human Rights Violations During the Marcos
Regime, Documentation of Said Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes,” was cosponsored by Lorenzo R. Tañada III, Edcel C. Lagman, Rene
L. Relampagos, Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Walden F. Bello, Kaka J. Bag-ao, Teodoro
A. Casiño, Neri Javier Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan,
Antonio L. Tinio, Emerenciana A. De Jesus, and Raymond V. Palatino. No member of
the House signified an intention to ask any question during the period of sponsorship
and debate, and no committee or individual amendments were made during the period
of amendments (Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14, 2012, p. 3). The bill
was approved on Second Reading (Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14,
2012, p. 4). On Third Reading, the bill was approved with 235 affirmative votes, no
negative vote, and no abstention (Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 47, March 21,
2012, p. 15). On the other hand, S.B. No. 3334, entitled “An Act Providing for
Reparation and Recognition of the Survivors and Relatives of the Victims of
Violations of Human Rights and Other Related Violations During the Regime of
Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Documentation of Said Violations,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” was coauthored by Sergio R.
Osmeña III, Teofisto D. Guingona III, Francis G. Escudero, and Franklin M. Drilon.
Senators Drilon and Panfilo M. Lacson withdrew their reservation to interpellate on
the measure (Senate Journal No. 41, December 10, 2012, p. 1171). The bill was
approved on Second Reading with no objection (Senate Journal No. 41, December 10,
2012, p. 1172). On Third Reading, the bill was approved with 18 senators voting in
favor, none against, and no abstention (Senate Journal No. 44, December 17, 2012, p.
1281).

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legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has

statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has
recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights
Violations Victims (HRVVs)71 under his regime. They insist that the
intended act of public respondents damages and makes mockery of
the mandatory teaching of Martial Law atrocities and of the lives
and sacrifices of its victims. They contend that “reparation” under
R.A. No. 10368 is nonjudicial in nature but a political action of the
State through the Legislative and Executive branches by providing
administrative relief for the compensation, recognition, and
memorialization of human rights victims.
We beg to disagree.
Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices
of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture,
enforced or involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights
violations committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25,
1986. To restore their honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its
moral and legal obligation72 to provide reparation to said victims
and/or their families for
_______________
71 Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to a person whose human

rights were violated by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State
as defined herein. In order to qualify for reparation under this Act, the human rights
violation must have been committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986: Provided, however, That victims of human rights violations that
were committed one (1) month before September 21, 1972 and one (1) month after
February 25, 1986 shall be entitled to reparation under this Act if they can establish
that the violation was committed:
(1) By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official capacity as defined
hereunder;
(2) For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or promoting the said
regime; or
(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects of Martial
Law. (Sec. 3[c] of R.A. No. 10368).
72 Section 11 Article II and Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution as well
as Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other

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the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they

experienced.
In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs,
which is part of the right to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368
entitles them to monetary and nonmonetary reparation. Any HRVV
qualified under the law73 shall receive a monetary reparation, which
is tax-free and without prejudice to the receipt of any other sum
from any other person or entity in any case involving human rights
violations.74 Anent the nonmonetary reparation, the Department of
Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government
agencies are required to render the necessary services for the
HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Human
Rights Victims’ Claims Board (Board) pursuant to the provisions of
the law.75
Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the
violations committed against the HRVVs, regardless of whether they
opt to seek reparation or not. This is manifested by enshrining their
names in the Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims (Roll)
prepared by the Board.76 The Roll may be displayed in government
agencies designated by the
_______________
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and other international

human rights laws and conventions (See Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 10368).
73 The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights
Litigation Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No. 840, CA No. 86-
0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii wherein a favorable
judgment has been rendered, and the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog ng mga
Bayani Foundation shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they are
HRVVs. However, the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board is not deprived of its
original jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human
rights violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be
granted (See Sec. 17 of R.A. No. 10368).
74 Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 10368.
75 Id., Sec. 5.
76 Id., Sec. 6.

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HRVV Memorial Commission (Commission).77 Also, a

Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established and a compendium
of their sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and
accessed in the internet.78 The Commission is created primarily for
the establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the
Memorial/Museum/ Library/Compendium.79
To memorialize80 the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 10368 further mandates that: (1) the
database prepared by the Board derived from the processing of
claims shall be turned over to the Commission for archival purposes,
and made accessible for the promotion of human rights to all
government agencies and instrumentalities in order to prevent
recurrence of similar abuses, encourage continuing reforms and
contribute to ending impunity;81 (2) the lessons learned from Martial
Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs shall be
included in the basic and higher education curricula, as well as in
continuing adult learning, prioritizing those most prone to commit
human rights violations;82 and (3) the Commission shall publish
only those stories of HRVVs who have given prior informed
consent.83
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners’ logic that the
beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it
includes the prohibition on Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. It would be
undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With
its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily
inserted a provision specifi-
_______________
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id., Sec. 27.
80 “Memorialization” refers to the preservation of the memory of the human
rights violations victims, objects, events and lessons learned during the Marcos
regime. This is part of the inherent obligation of the State to acknowledge the wrongs
committed in the past, to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who
were victims of gross human rights violations during Martial Law, and to prevent the
recurrence of similar abuses (Sec. 1[j], Rule II, IRR of R.A. No. 10368).
81 Sec. 1, Rule VII, IRR of R.A. No. 10368.
82 Id., Sec. 2.
83 Id., Sec. 3.

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cally proscribing Marcos’ interment at the LNMB as a “reparation”

for the HRVVs, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should
remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply
not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume
the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That
would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs’ rights
under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no
causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject
memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot
interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and
the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs’ entitlements to the
benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are
not curtailed. It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not
amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the
Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by

implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the
later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The
clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a
showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language
used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what
had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice. x x x84

C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will
violate the rights of the HRVVs to “full” and “effective” reparation,
which is provided under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
_______________
84 Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate

Service, 726 Phil. 104, 118-119; 715 SCRA 293, 308-309 (2014).

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(ICCPR),85 the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a

Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law86
_______________
85 Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
86 IX. Reparation for harm suffered
15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by
redressing gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of
international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of
the violations and the harm suffered. In accordance with its domestic laws and
international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or
omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to
a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if
the State has already provided reparation to the victim.
16. States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and
other assistance to victims in the event that the parties liable for the harm suffered are
unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.

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_______________
17. States shall, with respect to claims by victims, enforce domestic judgements

for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm suffered and
endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements for reparation in accordance with
domestic law and international legal obligations. To that end, States should provide
under their domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of reparation
judgements.
18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of
individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate
and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be
provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which
include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition.
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original
situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious
violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and
citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return
of property.
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage,
as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances
of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services,
and psychological and social services.
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as
legal and social services.
22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:
(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the
extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and
interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons

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adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 2005, and

the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of
Human
_______________
who have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further
violations;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the
children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the recovery,
identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed
wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the
reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of
responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in
international human rights law and international humanitarian law training and in
educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of
the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international
standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health care professions, the
media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international
humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law enforcement
officials as well as military and security forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular
international standards, by public servants, including law enforcement, correctional,
media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel, as well as by
economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and
their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian
law.

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Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity87 dated February 8, 2005

by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.
We do not think so. The ICCPR,88 as well as the U.N. principles
on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the enactment of
legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and
provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance
with the country’s constitutional processes, that are necessary to give
effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other
international laws. The U.N. principles on reparation expressly
states:
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein
do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of
existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as
to their norms[.] [Emphasis supplied]

The Philippines is more than compliant with its international
obligations. When the Filipinos regained their democratic
institutions after
_______________
87 PRINCIPLE 2. THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH

Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events
concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and
reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those
crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth provides a vital safeguard
against the recurrence of violations.
PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY
A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as
such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the State’s duty to
preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and
humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall
be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at
guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.
88 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23,
1976, in accordance with Article 49
<http.//www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>, (last accessed on
October 28, 2016).

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the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on February

25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair
share to respect, protect and fulfill the country’s human rights
obligations, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and
protect human rights and social justice.
As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus,
amparo,89 and habeas data,90 the Supreme Court promulgated on
March 1, 2007 Administrative Order No. 25-2007,91 which provides
rules on cases involving extrajudicial killings of political ideologists
and members of the media. The provision of the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the prevention of the victim’s re-traumatization
applies in the course of legal and administrative procedures designed
to provide justice and reparation.92
On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of
administrative and executive orders. Notable of which are the
following:
1. A.O. No. 370 dated December 10, 1997 (Creating the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee on Human Rights);
2. E.O. No. 118 dated July 5, 1999 (Providing for the Creation of
a National Committee on the Culture of Peace);
_______________
89 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Effective on October 24, 2007.

90 A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Effective on February 2, 2008.
91 Reiterated in OCA Circular No. 103-07 dated October 16, 2007 and OCA
Circular No. 46-09 dated April 20, 2009.
92 VI. Treatment of victims
10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and
human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety,
physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families.
The State should ensure that its domestic laws, to the extent possible, provide that a
victim who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from special consideration
and care to avoid his or her re-traumatization in the course of legal and administrative
procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.

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3. E.O. No. 134 dated July 31, 1999 (Declaring August 12, 1999
and Every 12th Day of August Thereafter as International
Humanitarian Law Day);
4. E.O. No. 404 dated January 24, 2005 (Creating the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Monitoring
Committee [GRPMC] on Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law);
5. A.O. No. 157 dated August 21, 2006 (Creating an Independent
Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings);
6. A.O. No. 163 dated December 8, 2006 (Strengthening and
Increasing the Membership of the Presidential Human Rights
Committee, and Expanding Further the Functions of Said
Committee);93
7. A.O. No. 181 dated July 3, 2007 (Directing the Cooperation
and Coordination Between the National Prosecution Service
and Other Concerned Agencies of Government for the
Successful Investigation and Prosecution of Political and
Media Killings);
8. A.O. No. 197 dated September 25, 2007 (DND and AFP
Coordination with PHRC Sub-committee on Killings and
Disappearances);
9. A.O. No. 211 dated November 26, 2007 (Creating a Task
Force Against Political Violence);
10. A.O. No. 249 dated December 10, 2008 (Further
Strengthening Government Policies, Plans, and Programs for
the Effective Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on
the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights);
11. E.O. No. 847 dated November 23, 2009 (Creating the
Church-Police-Military-Liaison Committee to Formulate and
Implement a Comprehensive Program to Establish Strong
Partner-
_______________
93 Originated from A.O. No. 101 dated Docember 13, 1988 and A.O. No. 29
dated January 27, 2002.

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ship Between the State and the Church on Matters Concerning

Peace and Order and Human Rights);
12. A.O. No. 35 dated November 22, 2012 (Creating the Inter-
Agency Committee on Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced
Disappearances, Torture and Other Grave Violations of the
Right to Life, Liberty and Security of Persons);
13. A.O. No. 1 dated October 11, 2016 (Creating the Presidential
Task Force on Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and
Security of the Members of the Media).

Finally, the Congress passed the following laws affecting human
rights:
1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of
Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation
as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof);
2. Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of
1997);
3. Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights
Consciousness Week Act of 2002);
4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003);
5. Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004);
6. Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006);
7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007);
8. Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women);
9. Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009);
10. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity);
11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Act of 2010);

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12. Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing

Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012);
13. Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance Act of 2012);
14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking In
Persons Act of 2012);
15. Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation
and Recognition Act of 2013);
16. Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems
Act of 2013).

Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, our nation’s history will not
be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting
through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are
already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds
of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be
said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the
sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of
the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial
Commission in the memorialization of HRVVs, the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known
as the National Historical Institute (NHI),94 is mandated to act as the
primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized
to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine
history.95 Among others, it is tasked to: (a) conduct and support all
kinds of research relating to Philippine national and local history; (b)
develop educational materials in various media, implement historical
educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history,
and disseminate, information regarding Philippine historical events,
dates, places and personages; and (c) actively engage in the
settlement or resolution of controversies or
_______________
94 Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 10086.

95 Id., Sec. 5.

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issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.96

Under R.A. Nos. 10066 (National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009)97
and 10086 (Strengthening Peoples’ Nationalism Through Philippine
History Act),98 the declared State policy is to conserve, develop,
promote, and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage
and resources.99 Towards this end, means shall be provided to
strengthen people’s nationalism, love of country, respect for its
heroes and pride for the people’s accomplishments by reinforcing
the importance of Philippine national and local history in daily life
with the end in view of raising social consciousness.100 Utmost
priority shall be given not only with the research on history but also
its popularization.101

II.
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at
the LNMB is not done whimsically, capri-
ciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias

Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB
will desecrate it as a sacred and hallowed place and a revered
national shrine where the mortal remains of our country’s great men
and women are interred for the inspiration and emulation of the
present generation and generations to come. They erred.

A. National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national
historical shrines (or historical shrines) refer to sites or structures
hallowed and
_______________
96 Id.
97 Approved on March 26, 2010.
98 Approved on May 12, 2010 and took effect on June 13, 2010.
99 Sec. 2 of R.A. 10066 and Sec. 2 of R.A. 10086.
100 Id.
101 Id.

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revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP.102

The national shrines created by law and presidential issuance
include, among others: Fort Santiago (Dambana ng Kalayaan) in
Manila;103 all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan;104 the site
of First Mass in the Philippines in Magallanes, Limasawa, Leyte;105
Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom Shrine in Kawit, Cavite;106 Fort San
Antonio Abad National Shrine in Malate, Manila;107 Tirad Pass
National Shrine in Ilocos Sur;108 Ricarte Shrine109 and Aglipay
Shrine110 in Batac, Ilocos Norte; Liberty Shrine in Lapu-Lapu,
Cebu;111 “Red Beach” or the landing point of General Douglas
MacArthur and the liberating forces in Baras, Palo, Leyte;112
Dapitan City as a National Shrine City in Zamboanga Del Norte;113
General Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine in Hamtic,
Antique;114 and Mabini Shrine in Polytechnic University of the
Philippines-Mabini Campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila.115 As sites of the
birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent
leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold and
keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.116 P.D. No.
105117 strictly prohibits
_______________
102 See Sec. 4(d) of R.A. 10066 in relation to Sec. 3(u) of R.A. No. 10066 and
Sec. 3(n) of R.A. No. 10086. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
10086 specifically defines National Historical Shrine as “a site or structure hallowed
and revered for its association to national heroes or historical events declared by the
Commission.” (Art. 6[q], Rule 5, Title I)
103 R.A. No. 597, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1569 and 1607.
104 E.O. No. 58 issued on August 16, 1954 (See Arula v. Espino, 138 Phil. 570,
589-591; 28 SCRA 540, 555-557 [1969]).
105 R.A. No. 2733.
106 R.A. No. 4039.
107 Proclamation No. 207 dated May 27, 1967.
108 Proclamation No. 433 dated July 23, 1968.
109 R.A. No. 5648.
110 R.A. No. 5649.
111 R.A. No. 5695.
112 Proclamation No. 618 dated October 13, 1969, as amended by Proclamation
No. 1272 dated June 4, 1974.
113 R.A. No. 6468.
114 Batas Pambansa Bilang 309 dated November 14, 1982.
115 Proclamation No. 1992 dated February 8, 2010.
116 P.D. No. 105 dated January 24, 1973.

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and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the desecration of

national shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity through
digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and
committing unbecoming acts within their premises. R.A. No. 10066
also makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or destroy the
original features of, or undertake construction or real estate
development in any national shrine, monument, landmark and other
historic edifices and structures, declared, classified, and marked by
the NHCP as such, without the prior written permission from the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCAA).118
As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA,119 the
NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines,
monuments, historical sites, edifices and landmarks of significant
historico-cultural value.120 In particular, the NHCP Board has the
power to approve the declaration of historic structures and sites,
such as national shrines, monuments, landmarks and heritage houses
and to determine the manner of their identification, maintenance,
restoration, conservation, preservation and protection.121
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the
military memorials and battle monuments declared as national
shrines, which have been under the administration, maintenance and
development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the
DND. Among the military shrines are: Mt. Samat National Shrine in
Pilar, Bataan;122 Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan,
Ifugao;123 Capas National Shrine in Capas, Tarlac;124 Ricarte
National Shrine in
_______________
117 Entitled “DECLARING NATIONAL SHRINES AS SACRED (HALLOWED) PLACES AND
PROHIBITING DESECRATION THEREOF” (Signed on January 24, 1973).

118 Sec. 48(b).
119 Sec. 31(d) of R.A. No. 10066.
120 Sec. 5(d) of R.A. No. 10086.
121 Article 12(e) and (f), Rule 8, Title III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 10086.
122 Proclamation No. 25 dated April 18, 1966.
123 Proclamation No. 1682 dated October 17, 1977.
124 Proclamation No. 842 dated December 7, 1991 and R.A. No. 8221.

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Malasin, Batac, Ilocos Norte;125 Balantang Memorial Cemetery

National Shrine in Jaro, Iloilo;126 Balete Pass National Shrine in Sta.
Fe, Nueva Vizcaya;127 USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park in
Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur;128 and the LNMB in Taguig
City, Metro Manila.129

B. The Libingan ng mga Bayani

At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning
for the death of thousands of Filipinos. Several places served as
grounds for the war dead, such as the Republic Memorial Cemetery,
the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, and other places throughout the
country. The Republic Memorial Cemetery, in particular, was
established in May 1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of
Filipino military personnel who died in World War II.
On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued
E.O. No. 77, which ordered “the remains of the war dead interred at
the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province, and at other
places in the Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the
Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province”
so as to minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and
to make the remains accessible to the widows, parents, children,
relatives, and friends.
On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 86, which changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to
Libingan ng mga Bayani to symbolize “the cause for which our
soldiers have died” and to “truly express the nation’s esteem and
reverence for her war dead.”130
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 423, which reserved for military purposes, under the
administration of
_______________
125 Proclamation No. 228 dated August 12, 1993.

126 Proclamation No. 425 dated July 13, 1994.
127 R.A. No. 10796.
128 <http://server.pvao.mil.ph/PDF/shrines/usafipnl.pdf>, (last accessed on
September 19, 2016).
129 Proclamation No. 208 dated May 28, 1967.
130 See Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 86.

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the AFP Chief of Staff, the land where LNMB is located. The
LNMB was part of a military reservation site then known as Fort
Wm McKinley (now known as Fort Andres Bonifacio).
On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which
excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military reservation
and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the
administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the
DND.
On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as
the AFP Commander-in-Chief, and pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated
September 22, 1972, as amended, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1 which reorganized the Executive Branch of the National
Government through the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan (IRP). Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII thereof
abolished the NSC and its functions together with applicable
appropriations, records, equipment, property and such personnel as
may be necessary were transferred to the NHI under the Department
of Education (DEC). The NHI was responsible for promoting and
preserving the Philippine cultural heritage by undertaking, inter alia,
studies on Philippine history and national heroes and maintaining
national shrines and monuments.131
Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the
administration, maintenance and development of national shrines
tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.
On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076.
Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP was repealed
on the grounds that “the administration, maintenance and
development of national shrines consisting of military memorials or
battle monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they are
removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of
the latter’s greater capabilities and resources” and that “the
functions of the [DND] are more closely related and relevant to the
charter or significance of said national shrines.” Henceforth, the
PVAO — through the Military Shrines Service (MSS), which was
created to perform the functions of the abolished NSC —
_______________
131 Section 1, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP.

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would administer, maintain and develop military memorials and

battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the
Administrative Code. The Code retains PVAO under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of National Defense.132 Among others,
PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military shrines.133
With the approval of PVAO Rationalization Plan on June 29, 2010,
pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was renamed
to Veterans Memorial and Historical Division, under the supervision
and control of PVAO, which is presently tasked with the
management and development of military shrines and the
perpetuation of the heroic deeds of our nation’s veterans.
As a national military shrine, the main features, structures, and
facilities of the LNMB are as follows:
1. Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers – The main structure constructed at the

center of the cemetery where wreath laying ceremonies are held when
Philippine government officials and foreign dignitaries visit the LNMB.
The following inscription is found on the tomb: “Here lies a Filipino
soldier whose name is known only to God.” Behind the tomb are three
marble pillars representing the three main island groups of the
Philippines — Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Buried here were the
remains of 39,000 Filipino soldiers who were originally buried in Camp
O’Donnell Concentration Camp and Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila.
2. Heroes Memorial Gate – A structure shaped in the form of a large
concrete tripod with a stairway leading to an upper view deck and a
metal sculpture at the center. This is the first imposing structure one sees
upon entering the grounds of the cemetery complex.
3. Black Stone Walls – Erected on opposite sides of the main entrance road
leading to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers and just near the Heroes
Memorial are two 12-foot high black
_______________
132 Book IV, Title VIII, Subtitle II, Chapter 1, Sec. 18.
133 Id., Chapter 5, Sec. 32(4).

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stone walls which bear the words, “I do not know the dignity of his birth,
but I do know the glory of his death.” that General Douglas MacArthur
made during his sentimental journey to the Philippines in 1961.
4. Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Pylon – Inaugurated
on April 5, 1977 by Secretary Renato S. De Villa in memory of the
defenders of Bataan and Corregidor during World War II. This
monument is dedicated as an eternal acknowledgment of their valor and
sacrifice in defense of the Philippines.
5. Korean Memorial Pylon – A towering monument honoring the 112
Filipino officers and men who, as members of the Philippine
Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), perished during the Korean
War.
6. Vietnam Veterans Memorial Pylon – Dedicated to the members of the
Philippine Contingents and Philippine Civic Action Groups to Vietnam
(PHILCON-V and PHILCAG-V) who served as medical, dental,
engineering construction, community and psychological workers, and
security complement. They offered tremendous sacrifices as they
alleviated human suffering in war-ravaged Vietnam from 1964-1971.
Inscribed on the memorial pylon are the words: “To build and not to
destroy, to bring the Vietnamese people happiness and not sorrow, to
develop goodwill and not hatred.”
7. Philippine World War II Guerillas Pylon – Erected by the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines as a testimony to the indomitable spirit and
bravery of the Filipino guerillas of World War II who refused to be
cowed into submission and carried on the fight for freedom against an
enemy with vastly superior arms and under almost insurmountable odds.
Their hardship and sufferings, as well as their defeats and victories, are
enshrined in this memorial.134
_______________
134 See Annex to the Manifestation of the AFP Adjutant General and
<http://server.pvao.mil.ph/PDF/shrines/libingan.pdf> (last accessed on October 25,
2016).

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Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105135 does not apply to the
LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105,136
the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines
enumerated in the latter.137 The proposition that the LNMB is
implicitly covered in the catchall phrase “and others which may be
proclaimed in the future as National Shrines” is erroneous because:
(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.
(2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis,138 the LNMB is not a site “of the birth, exile,
imprisonment, de-
_______________
135 P.D. No. 105 is an issuance of Marcos, acting as the AFP Commander-in-
Chief and by virtue of his powers under the Martial Law. It was not a law that was
enacted by the Congress.
136 P.D. No. 208 was signed on May 28, 1967 while P.D. No. 105 was signed on
January 24, 1973.
137 Among those named were the birthplace of Dr. Jose Rizal in Calamba,
Laguna, Talisay, Dapitan City, where the hero was exiled for four years, Fort
Santiago, Manila, where he was imprisoned in 1896 prior to his execution; Talaga,
Tanauan, Batangas where Apolinario Mabini was born, Pandacan, Manila, where
Mabini’s house in which he died, is located; Aguinaldo Mansion in Kawit, Cavite,
where General Emilio Aguinaldo, first President of the Philippines, was born, and
where Philippine Independence was solemnly proclaimed on June 12, 1898; and
Batan, Aklan, where the “Code of Kalantiyaw” was promulgated in 1433.
138 Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where a general word or phrase
follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where
the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include,
or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned.”
The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National
Power Corporation v. Angas as follows:
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and
general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as
including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular
words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to
be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular
subjects but would have used only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory

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tention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation.” What

P.D. No. 105 contemplates are the following national shrines: Fort
Santiago (“Dambana ng Kalayaan”), all battlefield areas in
Corregidor and Bataan, the site of First Mass in the Philippines,
Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom Shrine, Fort San Antonio Abad
National Shrine, Tirad Pass National Shrine, Ricarte Shrine, Aglipay
Shrine, Liberty Shrine, “Red Beach” or the landing point of General
Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces, Dapitan City, General
Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine, and Mabini Shrine.
Excluded are the military memorials and battle monuments declared
as national shrines under the PVAO, such as: Mt. Samat National
Shrine, Kiangan War Memorial Shrine, Capas National Shrine,
Ricarte National Shrine, Balantang Memorial Cemetery National
Shrine, Balete Pass National Shrine; USAFIP, NL Military Shrine
and Park, and the LNMB.
(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine
under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. While P.D. No. 1 dated
September 24, 1972 transferred the administration, maintenance and
development of national shrines to the NHI under the DEC, it never
actually materialized. Pending the organization of the DEC, its
functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into
the PVAO in July 1973. Eventually, on January 26, 1977, Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1076. The PVAO, through the MSS, was tasked to
administer, maintain, and develop military memorials and battle
monuments proclaimed as national shrines. The reasons being that
“the administration, maintenance and development of national
shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be
more effectively accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC]
and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter’s greater
capabilities and resources” and that “the functions of the [DND]
are more closely related and relevant to the charter or significance
of said national shrines.”
_______________
Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400]. (See Pelizloy Realty Corp. v. Province of Benguet, 708
Phil. 466, 480-481; 695 SCRA 491, 505-506 [2013], as cited in Alta Vista Golf and Country
Club v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016, 781 SCRA 335, 357-360)

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The foregoing interpretation is neither narrow and myopic nor

downright error. Instead, it is consistent with the letter and intent of
P.D. No. 105.
Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words
“sacred and hallowed” refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each
and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered
and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed
individual or collective “heroism” of the men and women buried or
will be buried therein. The “nations esteem and reverence for her
war dead,” as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in
issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said,
the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of
the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a
national military shrine.
At this juncture, reference should be made to Arlington National
Cemetery (Arlington), which is identical to the LNMB in terms of its
prominence in the U.S. It is not amiss to point that our armed forces
have been patterned after the U.S. and that its military code
produced a salutary effect in the Philippines’ military justice
system.139 Hence, relevant military rules, regulations, and practices
of the U.S. have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this
jurisdiction.
As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries,140 the
Arlington is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army.141
The Secretary of the U.S. Army has the responsibility to develop,
operate, manage, administer, oversee, and fund the Army national
military cemeteries in a manner and to standards that fully honor the
service and sacrifices of the deceased members of the armed forces
buried or inurned therein, and shall prescribe such regulations and
policies as may be necessary to administer the cemeteries.142 In
addition, the Secretary of the U.S. Army
_______________
139 See Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA),
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, 751 SCRA 469, 542.
140 Also includes the United States Soldiers’ and Airmen’s National Cemetery in
the District of Columbia.
141 See 32 C.F.R. § 553.3 and 10 U.S.C.A. § 4721.
142 Id.

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is empowered to appoint an advisory committee, which shall make

periodic reports and recommendations as well as advise the
Secretary with respect to the administration of the cemetery, the
erection of memorials at the cemetery, and master planning for the
cemetery.143
Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are
established as national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who
have served in the U.S. Armed Forces.144 The areas are protected,
managed and administered as suitable and dignified burial grounds
and as significant cultural resources.145 As such, the authorization of
activities that take place therein is limited to those that are consistent
with applicable legislation and that are compatible with maintaining
their solemn commemorative and historic character.146
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military
memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to administer, develop,
and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of
the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of
Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and
does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be
limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.147 This is why
President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement148
between former President
_______________
143 10 U.S.C.A. § 4723.

144 36 C.F.R. § 12.2.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See National Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit, 427
Phil. 464, 485; 377 SCRA 223, 240 (2002).
148 On August 19, 1992, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary
Rafael M. Alunan III, and the family of the late President Marcos, represented by his
widow, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, agreed on the following conditions and procedures by
which the remains of the former President shall be brought back to and interred in the
Philippines:

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_______________
I
It is hereby agreed that the remains of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos shall be
allowed to be brought back to the Philippines from Hawaii, USA on 1 September 1992.
II
That the remains shall be brought directly from Hawaii, USA to Laoag, Ilocos Norte by
means of an aircraft which shall fly directly to its port of destination at Laoag International
Airport, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. It shall be understood that once the aircraft enters the Philippine
area of responsibility, stopover for whatever reason in any airport other than the airport of
destination shall be allowed only upon prior clearance from the Philippine Government.
III
That the family of the late President Marcos undertakes to fix a wake period of nine (9) days
beginning 1 September 1992 to allow friends, relatives and supporters to pay their courtesy, last
respect and homage to the former President at the Marcos family home at Batac, Ilocos Norte.
It shall undertake further to maintain peaceful and orderly wake and/or help and cooperate with
the local government authorities ensure that the same will not be used to foment and promote
civil disorder.
IV
That the remains shall be buried [temporarily interred] on the 9th of September 1992 at the
family burial grounds at Batac, Ilocos Norte, provided that any transfer of burial grounds shall
be with prior clearance from the Philippine Government taking into account the prevailing
socio-political climate.
V
The government shall provide appropriate military honors during the wake and interment,
the details of which shall be arranged and finalized by and between the parties thereto.
VI
The Government shall ensure that the facilities at Laoag International Airport will allow for
a safe landing as well as processing of incoming passengers, their cargoes and/or existing laws
and regulations.

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Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos
interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is
free to amend,
_______________
On August 26, 1992, DILG Secretary Alunan informed Mrs. Marcos of the
government’s decision that former President Marcos be accorded honors befitting a
war veteran, and a former member of the AFP which, in general terms, includes the
following: Flag Draped Coffin, Vigil Guards during the wake, Honor Guard, Firing
Detail, Taps, and Pallbearers composed of retired generals under his command.
On August 25, 1993, Roque R. Ablan, Jr. wrote DILG Secretary Alunan,
confirming the previous arrangements between him and Mrs. Marcos, and also the
arrangements made by Ablan before President Fidel V. Ramos on the following
matters:
1. Direct flight of the remains of the late Pres. Marcos from Honolulu to
Laoag.
2. That there will be an interim burial of the late Pres. Marcos in Batac,
Ilocos Norte until such time when President Ramos will feel that the healing
period would have been attain[ed] and that he shall be transferred to Manila
for final burial.
3. That the remains will not be paraded to the other provinces.
4. That [Ablan] discussed this with Mrs. Marcos this morning and that she
had given me full authority to assure the government that everything will be
in accordance with the memo of understanding, and the pronouncement made
by President Ramos that the remains can stay at the Don Mariano Marcos
State University provided no government expenditures will be incurred and
that the place will not be disturbed.
Ablan also informed DILG Secretary Alunan of the following details: (1) the
remains of former President Marcos would arrive in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on
September 7, 1993; (2) from the airport, the remains would be brought to the Laoag
City Cathedral, and after the mass, it would be brought to the Capitol for public
viewing; (3) on the next day, the remains would be brought to Batac where it should
be placed side by side with the late Doña Josefa Edralin Marcos; (4) that on
September 9, Doña Josefa Marcos would be buried in the cemetery besides Governor
Elizabeth Marcos Roca; and (5) on September 10, the late President Marcos would be
buried in the mausoleum.
On September 10, 1993, the coffin of former President Marcos was opened inside
the mausoleum and was subsequently placed inside a transparent glass for viewing.

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revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his

predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based
on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective
in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the
power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any
of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall
remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until
otherwise provided by law or proclamation.149 At present, there is no
law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which
the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the
past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for
Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief,150 a
legislator,151 a Secretary of National Defense,152 a military
personnel,153 a veteran,154 and a Medal of Valor awardee,155
_______________
149 Book III, Title I, Chapter 4, Section 14 of the Administrative Code.

150 From December 30, 1965 until February 25, 1986 when he and his immediate
family members were forcibly exiled in the USA because of the EDSA People Power
Revolution.
151 He was an Assemblyman (1949 to 1959) and a Senator (1959-1965), serving
as Senate President during his last three (3) years.
152 From December 31, 1965 to January 20, 1967.
153 On November 15, 1941, Marcos was called and inducted to the United States
Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) as Third Lieutenant. From November 16,
1941 to April 8, 1942, he was assigned as assistant G-2 of the 21st (Lightning)
Division of the USAFFE, where he attained the rank of First Lieutenant. He was then
promoted to the rank of Colonel under Special Orders No. 68 dated September 25,
1962. In Special Orders No. 264 dated June 11, 1963 and General Orders No. 265
dated May 19, 1964, he remained listed as Colonel. (See Annex “13” of the
Consolidated Comment filed by the OSG).
154 The PVAO recognized Marcos as a member of the retired army personnel.
Based on a Certification dated August 18, 2016 issued by PVAO’s Records
Management Division Chief, respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos is receiving
P5,000.00 as Old Age Pension, being the surviving spouse of a retired veteran under
R.A. No. 6948, as amended. (See Annex “12” of the Consolidated Comment filed by
the OSG).
155 During his military career, Marcos was awarded a Medal of Valor through
General Orders No. 167 dated October 16, 1968 “for extraordinary gallantry and
intrepidity at the risk of life, above and beyond the call of duty in a

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whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such,

satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public
funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to
compensate him for valuable public services rendered.156 Likewise,
President Duterte’s determination to have Marcos’ remains interred
at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and
reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty prevails over petitioners’ highly disputed factual
allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative,
the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of
gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the
purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to
establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this
Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a
trier of facts.

C. AFP Regulations on the LNMB

A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as
to who may and may not be interred at the LNMB underscores the
nature and purpose of the LNMB as an active military
cemetery/grave site.
On May 13, 1947, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, by
the direction of the President and by order of the Secretary of
National Defense, issued General Orders No. 111, which constituted
and activated, as of said date, the Graves Registration Platoon as a
unit of the Philippine Army.
On February 2, 1960, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the
Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-371
(Administrative and Special Staff Services, Grave Registration
Service), which provided that the following may be interred in the
LNMB: (a) World War II dead of the AFP and recognized guerillas;
(b) Current dead of the AFP; (c) Retired military personnel of the
AFP; (d) Remains of former members of the AFP
_______________
suicidal action against overwhelming enemy forces at the junction of Salian River and
Abo-Abo River, Bataan, on or about 22 January 1942.” (See Annex “14” of
Consolidated Comment filed by the OSG).
156 See Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174, 188; 619 SCRA 154, 166-167
(2010).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
who died while in the active service and in the Retired List of the
AFP now interred at different cemeteries and other places
throughout the Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense; and
(e) Others upon approval of the Congress of the Philippines, the
President of the Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense.
The regulation also stated that the AFP Quartermaster General will
be responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation of
the Graves Registration Service; the interment, disinterment and
reinterment of the dead mentioned above; and preservation of
military cemeteries, national cemeteries, and memorials.
On July 31, 1973, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the
(Administration and Operation of AFP Graves Registration
Installations), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-371. It
provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a)
Deceased Veterans of the Philippine Revolution of 1896/World War
I; (b) Deceased World War II members of the AFP and recognized
guerillas; (c) Deceased military personnel of the AFP who died
while in the active duty; (d) Deceased retired military personnel of
the AFP; (e) Deceased military personnel of the AFP interred at
different cemeteries and other places outside the LNMB; and (f)
Such remains of persons as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP
may direct. The remains of the following were not allowed to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) The spouse of an active, or retired,
deceased military personnel, recognized guerillas who
himself/herself is not a military personnel; and (b) AFP personnel
who were retireable but separated/reverted/discharged for cause, or
joined and aided the enemy of the Republic of the Philippines, or
were convicted of capital or other criminal offenses, involving moral
turpitude. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster General
shall be responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation
of the AFP graves registration installations; the interment,
disinterment and reinterment of deceased military personnel
mentioned above; and the preservation of military cemeteries,
proper marking and official recording of graves therein.
On April 9, 1986, AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, by order of
National Defense Minister, issued AFP Regulations G 161-373
(Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani),
which superseded

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AFP Regulations G 161-372. It enumerated a list of deceased person

who may be interred at the LNMB, namely: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c)
Ministers of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e)
General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military
personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of
1896, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; and (h) Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artist and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Batasang Pambansa or the Minister of
National Defense. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster
General shall be responsible for the allocation of specific
section/areas for the said deceased persons, while the Commanding
Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Company shall be
charged with the preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials at
LNMB and the registration of graves.
On March 27, 1998, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the
(Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani),
which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-373. It provided that the
following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c)
Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e)
General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military
personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of
1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (h) Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense;
and (i) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, CSAFP,
Generals/Flag Officers, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists,
widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and
Chief of Staff. The remains of the following were not allowed to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized
personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Like AFP Regulations G 161-373, it
stated that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the
allocation of specific section/areas for the deceased persons, whereas
the Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration
Unit shall be

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charged with the preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials,

and the registration of graves.
Finally, on September 11, 2000, the AFP Chief of Staff, by the
order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations
G 161-375 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-374. The
regulation stated that the Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the
issuance of interment directive for all active military personnel for
interment, authorized personnel (such as those former members of
the AFP who laterally entered or joined the Philippine Coast Guard
[PCG] and the Philippine National Police [PNP]), and retirees,
veterans and reservists enumerated therein. The Quartermaster
General is tasked to exercise overall supervision in the
implementation of the regulation and the Commander ASCOM, PA
through the Commanding Officer of Grave Services Unit is charged
with the registration of the deceased/graves, the allocation of
specific section/area at the LNMB for interment of deceased, the
preparation of grave sites, and the supervision of burials.
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for
interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents
or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense;
(d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f)
Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and
CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or
combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the
PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890,
WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose
interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-
Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and (j)
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of
National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP Regulations G
161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged
from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted
by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

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In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary,

the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in
determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise
the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.
The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be
sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting
under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the
alter ego of the President.
x x x In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego

principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this
wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours,
citation omitted)157

It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted
pursuant to law has the force and effect of law and, until set aside, is
binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the
President as the chief executor of laws.158
_______________
157 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes,
G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, April 21, 2015, 756 SCRA 513, 560-561.
Secretary, supra note 46 at p. 166; pp. 312-313.

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1. Qualification under the AFP Regulations

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the
absence of clear and unmistakable showing that it has been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for
purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious
standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.
To compare, We again refer to the U.S. Army regulations on
Arlington. In the U.S., the Secretary of the Army, with the approval
of the Secretary of Defense, determines eligibility for interment or
inurnment in the Army national military cemeteries.159 Effective
October 26, 2016, the rule160 is as follows:
Only those who qualify as a primarily eligible person or a derivatively

eligible person are eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery,
unless otherwise prohibited as provided for in §§ 553.19161-553.20,162
provided that the last period of active duty of the service member or veteran
ended with an honorable discharge.
_______________
159 10 U.S.C.A. § 4722.

160 32 C.F.R. § 553.12.
161 The following persons are not eligible for interment, inurnment, or
memorialization in an Army National Military Cemetery:
(a) A father, mother, brother, sister, or in-law solely on the basis of his or her
relationship to a primarily eligible person, even though the individual is:
(1) Dependent on the primarily eligible person for support; or
(2) A member of the primarily eligible person’s household.
(b) A person whose last period of service was not characterized as an honorable
discharge (e.g., a separation or discharge under general but honorable conditions,
other than honorable conditions, a conduct discharge, a dishonorable discharge, or a
dismissal), regardless of whether the person:
(1) Received any other veterans’ benefits; or
(2) Was treated at a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital or died in such a
hospital.
(c) A person who has volunteered for service with the U.S. Armed Forces, but
has not yet entered on active duty.
(d) A former spouse whose marriage to the primarily eligible person ended in
divorce.

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_______________
(e) A spouse who predeceases the primarily eligible person and is interred or
inurned in a location other than Arlington National Cemetery, and the primarily
eligible person remarries.
(f) A divorced spouse of a primarily eligible person.
(g) Otherwise derivatively eligible persons, such as a spouse or minor child, if
the primarily eligible person was not or will not be interred or inurned at Arlington
National Cemetery.
(h) A service member who dies while on active duty, if the first General Courts
Martial Convening Authority in the service member’s chain of command determines
that there is clear and convincing evidence that the service member engaged in
conduct that would have resulted in a separation or discharge not characterized as an
honorable discharge (e.g., a separation or discharge under general but honorable
conditions, other than honorable conditions, a bad conduct discharge, a dishonorable
discharge, or a dismissal) being imposed, but for the death of the service member.
(i) Animal remains. If animal remains are unintentionally commingled with
human remains due to a natural disaster, unforeseen accident, act of war or terrorism,
violent explosion, or similar incident, and such remains cannot be separated from the
remains of an eligible person, then the remains may be interred or inurned with the
eligible person, but the identity of the animal remains shall not be inscribed or
identified on a niche, marker, headstone, or otherwise. (See 32 C.F.R. § 553.19)
162 (a) Prohibition. Notwithstanding §§ 553.12-553.16, 553.18, and 553.22,
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 985 and 38 U.S.C. 2411, the interment, inurnment, or
memorialization in an Army National Military Cemetery of any of the following
persons is prohibited:
(1) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by the Attorney
General of the United States, prior to his or her interment, inurnment, or
memorialization, as a person who has been convicted of a Federal capital crime and
whose conviction is final (other than a person whose sentence was commuted by the
President).
(2) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by an appropriate
State official, prior to his or her interment, inurnment, or memorialization, as a person
who has been convicted of a State capital crime and whose conviction is final (other
than a person whose sentence was commuted by the Governor of the State).
(3) Any person found under procedures specified in § 553.21 to have committed
a Federal or State capital crime but who has not been convicted of such crime by
reason of such person not being available for trial due to death or flight
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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons

for purposes of interment:
(1) Any service member who dies on active duty in the U.S. Armed
Forces (except those service members serving on active duty for training
only), if the General Courts Martial Convening Authority grants a certificate
of honorable service.
(2) Any veteran retired from a Reserve component who served a period of
active duty (other than for training), is carried on the official retired list, and
is entitled to receive military retired pay.
(3) Any veteran retired from active military service and entitled to receive
military retired pay.
(4) Any veteran who received an honorable discharge from the Armed
Forces prior to October 1, 1949, who was discharged for a permanent
physical disability, who served on active duty (other than
_______________
to avoid prosecution. Notice from officials is not required for this prohibition to apply.
(4) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by the Attorney
General of the United States or by an appropriate State official, prior to his or her
interment, inurnment, or memorialization, as a person who has been convicted of a
Federal or State crime causing the person to be a Tier III sex offender for purposes of
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, who for such crime is sentenced
to a minimum of life imprisonment and whose conviction is final (other than a person
whose sentence was commuted by the President or the Governor of a State, as the
case may be).
(b) Notice. The Executive Director is designated as the Secretary of the Army’s
representative authorized to receive from the appropriate Federal or State officials
notification of conviction of capital crimes referred to in this section.
(c) Confirmation of person’s eligibility.
(1) If notice has not been received, but the Executive Director has reason to
believe that the person may have been convicted of a Federal capital crime or a State
capital crime, the Executive Director shall seek written confirmation from:
(i) The Attorney General of the United States, with respect to a suspected
Federal capital crime; or
(ii) An appropriate State official, with respect to a suspected State capital crime.
(2) The Executive Director will defer the decision on whether to inter, inurn, or
memorialize a decedent until a written response is received. (See 32 C.F.R. § 553.20)

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for training), and who would have been eligible for retirement under the
provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1201 had the statute been in effect on the date of
separation.
(5) Any veteran awarded one of the following decorations:
(i) Medal of Honor;163
(ii) Distinguished Service Cross, Air Force Cross, or Navy Cross;
(iii) Distinguished Service Medal;
(iv) Silver Star; or
(v) Purple Heart.
(6) Any veteran who served on active duty (other than active duty for
training) and who held any of the following positions:
(i) President or Vice President of the United States;
(ii) Elected member of the U.S. Congress;
(iii) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;
(iv) A position listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5 U.S.C.
5312164 or 5313165 (Levels I and II of the Executive Schedule); or

_______________
163 The medal of honor awarded posthumously to a deceased member of the

armed forces who, as an unidentified casualty of a particular war or other armed
conflict, is interred in the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery,
Virginia, is awarded to the member as the representative of the members of the armed
forces who died in such war or other armed conflict and whose remains have not been
identified, and not to the individual personally. (10 U.S.C.A. § 1134)
164 Includes the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, United
States Trade Representative, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary
of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, Commissioner of Social Security, Social Security
Administration, Director of National Drug Control Policy, Chairman and Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Director of National Intelligence.
165 Includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy
Secretary of State for Management and Resources, Administrator of Agency for
International Development, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Management, Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Transpor-

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(v) Chief of Mission of a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post if the Department of

State classified that post as a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post during the person’s
tenure as Chief of Mission.
(7) Any former prisoner of war who, while a prisoner of war, served
honorably in the active military service, and who died on or after November
30, 1993.
(b) Derivatively eligible persons. The following individuals are
derivatively eligible persons for purposes of interment who may be interred
if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible person:
(1) The spouse of a primarily eligible person who is or will be interred in
Arlington National Cemetery. A former spouse of a primarily eligible
person is not eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery under
this paragraph.
(2) The spouse of an active duty service member or an eligible veteran,
who was:
_______________
tation, Chairman of Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Chairman of Council of

Economic Advisers, Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy, Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration, Director of
the National Science Foundation, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of
Energy, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, Administrator of Federal Highway Administration, Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Deputy Secretary of Labor, Deputy Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, Independent Members of Thrift Depositor Protection
Oversight Board, Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services, Deputy Secretary
of the Interior, Deputy Secretary of Education, Deputy Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, Deputy Director for Management of Office of Management and
Budget, Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Deputy Commissioner of
Social Security, Social Security Administration, Administrator of the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund, Deputy Director of National Drug Control
Policy, Members and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Undersecretary of Transportation for Policy, Chief Executive Officer of Millennium
Challenge Corporation, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center, Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and Federal Transit Administrator.

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(i) Lost or buried at sea, temporarily interred overseas due to action by the

Government, or officially determined to be missing in action;
(ii) Buried in a U.S. military cemetery maintained by the American Battle
Monuments Commission; or
(iii) Interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial (the
derivatively eligible spouse may not be buried in the group burial gravesite).
(3) The parents of a minor child or a permanently dependent adult child,
whose remains were interred in Arlington National Cemetery based on the
eligibility of a parent at the time of the child’s death, unless eligibility of the
non-service connected parent is lost through divorce from the primarily
eligible parent.
(4) An honorably discharged veteran who does not qualify as a primarily
eligible person, if the veteran will be buried in the same gravesite as an
already interred primarily eligible person who is a close relative, where the
interment meets the following conditions:
(i) The veteran is without minor or unmarried adult dependent children;
(ii) The veteran will not occupy space reserved for the spouse, a minor
child, or a permanently dependent adult child;
(iii) All other close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur with
the interment of the veteran with the primarily eligible person by signing a
notarized statement;
(iv) The veteran’s spouse waives any entitlement to interment in Arlington
National Cemetery, where such entitlement might be based on the veteran’s
interment in Arlington National Cemetery. The Executive Director may set
aside the spouse’s waiver, provided space is available in the same gravesite,
and all close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur;
(v) Any cost of moving, recasketing, or revaulting the remains will be paid
from private funds.

There is a separate list of eligible with respect to the inurnment of
cremated remains in the Columbarium,166 interment of cremated re-
_______________
166 The following persons are eligible for inurnment in the Arlington National
Cemetery Columbarium, unless otherwise prohibited as provided for in §§ 553.19-
553.20, provided that the last period of active duty of the service member or veteran
ended with an honorable discharge.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
_______________
(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons for
purposes of inurnment:
(1) Any person eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery, as
provided for in § 553.12(a).
(2) Any veteran who served on active duty other than active duty for training.
(3) Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces who dies while:
(i) On active duty for training or performing full-time duty under title 32, United
States Code;
(ii) Performing authorized travel to or from such active duty for training or full-
time duty;
(iii) On authorized inactive-duty training, including training performed as a
member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard
of the United States; or
(iv) Hospitalized or receiving treatment at the expense of the Government for an
injury or disease incurred or contracted while on such active duty for training or full-
time duty, traveling to or from such active duty for training or full-time duty, or on
inactive-duty training.
(4) Any member of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps of the United States,
Army, Navy, or Air Force, whose death occurs while:
(i) Attending an authorized training camp or cruise;
(ii) Performing authorized travel to or from that camp or cruise; or
(iii) Hospitalized or receiving treatment at the expense of the Government for
injury or disease incurred or contracted while attending such camp or cruise or while
traveling to or from such camp or cruise.
(5) Any citizen of the United States who, during any war in which the United
States has been or may hereafter be engaged, served in the armed forces of any
government allied with the United States during that war, whose last service ended
honorably by death or otherwise, and who was a citizen of the United States at the
time of entry into that service and at the time of death.
(6) Commissioned officers, United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (now
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) who die during or subsequent to
the service specified in the following categories and whose last service terminated
honorably:
(i) Assignment to areas of immediate military hazard.
(ii) Served in the Philippine Islands on December 7, 1941.
(iii) Transferred to the Department of the Army or the Department of the Navy
under certain statutes.

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mains in the Unmarked Area,167 and group burial.168 As a national

military cemetery, eligibility standards for interment, inurnment, or
memo-
_______________
(7) Any commissioned officer of the United States Public Health Service who
served on full-time duty on or after July 29, 1945, if the service falls within the
meaning of active duty for training as defined in 38 U.S.C. 101(22) or inactive duty
training as defined in 38 U.S.C. 101(23) and whose death resulted from a disease or
injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty. Also, any commissioned officer of the
Regular or Reserve Corps of the Public Health Service who performed active service
prior to July 29, 1945 in time of war; on detail for duty with the Armed Forces; or
while the service was part of the military forces of the United States pursuant to
Executive order of the President.
(8) Any Active Duty Designee as defined in this part.
(b) Derivatively eligible persons. Those connected to an individual described in
paragraph (a) of this section through a relationship described in
§ 553.12(b). Such individuals may be inurned if space is available in the primarily
eligible person’s niche. (32 C.F.R. § 553.13)
167 (a) The cremated remains of any person eligible for interment in Arlington
National Cemetery as described in § 553.12 may be interred in the designated
Arlington National Cemetery Unmarked Area.
(b) Cremated remains must be interred in a biodegradable container or placed
directly into the ground without a container. Cremated remains are not authorized to
be scattered at this site or at any location within Arlington National Cemetery.
(c) There will be no headstone or marker for any person choosing this method of
interment. A permanent register will be maintained by the Executive Director.
(d) Consistent with the one-gravesite-per-family policy, once a person is interred
in the Unmarked Area, any derivatively eligible persons and spouses must be interred
in this manner. This includes spouses who are also primarily eligible persons. No
additional gravesite, niche, or memorial marker in a memorial area will be authorized.
(32 C.F.R. § 553.14)
168 (a) The Executive Director may authorize a group burial in Arlington
National Cemetery whenever several people, at least one of whom is an active duty
service member, die during a military-related activity and not all remains can be
individually identified.
(b) Before authorizing a group burial that includes both United States and
foreign decedents, the Executive Director will notify the Department of State and
request that the Department of State notify the appropriate foreign embassy. (32
C.F.R. § 553.15)

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
rialization in Arlington are based on honorable military service.169

Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves, which are
rarely granted, are for those persons who have made significant
contributions that directly and substantially benefited the U.S.
military.170
Judging from the foregoing, it is glaring that the U.S. Army
regulations on Arlington and the AFP Regulations G 161-375 on the
LNMB, as a general rule, recognize and reward the military services
or military related activities of the deceased. Compared with the
latter, however, the former is actually less generous in granting the
privilege of interment since only the spouse or parent, under certain
conditions, may be allowed “if space is available in the gravesite of
the primarily eligible person.”
It is not contrary to the “well-established custom,” as the dissent
described it, to argue that the word “bayani” in the LNMB has
become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach
to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same
does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery
and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated,
the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there
the title of “hero” nor to require that only those interred therein
should be treated as a “hero.” In fact, the privilege of internment at
the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list
of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military
service or military-related activities but also non-military personnel
who were recognized for their significant contributions to the
Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen,
national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of
former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of
Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial
privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order
to be consistent with the
_______________
169 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(a).

170 Id.

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original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the

issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered
significant active military service and military-related activities.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National
Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor
awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices,
we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief,
but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the
other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We
agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged
in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not
pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor
awardee and a veteran. R.A. No. 9049171 declares the policy of the
State “to consistently honor its military heroes in order to strengthen
the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military.”172
For the “supreme self-sacrifice and distinctive acts of heroism and
gallantry,”173 a Medal of Valor awardee or his/her
dependents/heirs/beneficiaries are entitled to the following social
services and financial rewards:
1. Tax-exempt lifetime monthly gratuity of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), which is separate and distinct from any
salary or pension that the awardee currently receives or will
receive from the government of the Philippines;174
2. Precedence in employment in government agencies or
government-owned or -controlled corporation, if the job
qualifications or requirements are met;
_______________
171 Approved on March 22, 2001 and published in national newspapers of

general circulation on April 9, 2001 as well as in the Official Gazette on July 9, 2001.
It repealed P.D. No. 1687 dated March 24, 1980.
172 Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 9049.
173 Id.
174 In the event of the awardee’s death, the gratuity shall accrue in equal shares
and with the right of accretion to the surviving spouse until she remarries and to the
children, legitimate, or adopted or illegitimate, until they reach the age of eighteen
(18) or until they marry, whichever comes earlier.

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3. Priority in the approval of the awardee’s housing application

under existing housing programs of the government;
4. Priority in the acquisition of public lands under the Public
Land Act and preferential right in the lease of pasture lands
and exploitation of natural resources;
5. Privilege of obtaining loans in an aggregate amount not
exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) from
government-owned or -controlled financial institutions
without having to put up any collateral or constitute any
pledge or mortgage to secure the payment of the loan;
6. Twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants, recreation and sport
centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country;
7. Twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by
theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement;
8. Free medical and dental services and consultation in hospital
and clinics anywhere in the country;
9. Exemption from the payment of tuition and matriculation fees
in public or private schools, universities, colleges and other
educational institutions in any pre-school, baccalaureate or
post graduate courses such as or including course leading to
the degree of Doctor of Medicine (MD), Bachelor of Laws
(LLB), and Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) or allied and
similar courses; and
10. If interested and qualified, a quota is given to join the cadet
corps of the Philippine Military Academy or otherwise
priority for direct commission, call to active duty (CAD)
and/or enlistment in regular force of the AFP.

On the other hand, in recognizing their patriotic services in times
of war and peace for the cause of freedom and democracy; for the
attainment of national unity, independence, and socioeconomic
advancement; and for the maintenance of peace and order,175 R.A.
No. 6948, as
_______________
175 Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6948.

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amended,176 grants our veterans177 and their dependents or survivors

with pension (old age, disability, total administrative disability, and
death) and non-pension (burial, education, hospitalization, and
medical care and treatment) benefits as well as provisions from the
local governments. Under the law, the benefits may be withheld if
the Commission on Human Rights certifies to the AFP General
Headquarters that the veteran has been found guilty by final
judgment of a gross human rights violation while in the service,
but this factor shall not be considered taken against his next of
kin.178

2. Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos
possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G
161-375. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense
involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the
AFP regulations disregards historical context and the rule on
statutory construction. They urge the Court to construe statutes not
literally but according to their spirit and reason.
It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral
turpitude for his gross human rights violations, massive graft and
corruption,
_______________
176 Amended by R.A. Nos. 7696, 9396, and 9499.

177 A veteran refers to “any person who: (1) rendered military service in the land,
sea or air forces of the Philippines during the revolution against Spain, the Philippine-
American War, and World War II, including Filipino citizens who served with the
Allied Forces in Philippine territory; (2) was a member of the Philippine
Expeditionary Forces sent to the Korean War and the Philippine Civic Action Group
sent to the Vietnam War; (3) rendered military service in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and has been honorably discharged or retired after at least twenty
(20) years total cumulative active service or sooner separated while in the active
service in the AFP due to death or disability arising from a wound or injury received
or sickness or disease incurred in line of duty.” (Sec. 2[a] of R.A. No. 6948, as
amended by R.A. No. 9396).
178 Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 6948.

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and dubious military records, as found by foreign and local courts as

well as administrative agencies. By going into exile, he deliberately
evaded liability for his actions. And by allowing death to overtake
him, he inevitably escaped the prospect of facing accountability for
his crimes. They also contend that his removal in the 1986 popular
uprising is a clear sign of his discharge from the AFP. The People
Power Revolution was the direct exercise of the Filipinos’ power to
overthrow an illegitimate and oppressive regime. As a sovereign act,
it necessarily includes the power to adjudge him as dishonorably
discharged from the AFP.
Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of
the disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375 only to
soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an
additional cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results
(because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged would be
disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by
Marcos). Also, the AFP regulations would place Marcos in the same
class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a class of
his own, sui generis. The other Presidents were never removed by
People Power Revolution and were never subject of laws declaring
them to have committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended
burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are
differently situated.
Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact
remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any
offense involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987
Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law and that, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf.”179 Even the U.N. principles on reparation and to
_______________
179 Section 14, Article III.

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combat impunity cited by petitioners unequivocally guarantee the

rights of the accused, providing that:
XIII. Rights of others

27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from
internationally or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the right
of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due process.

x x x

PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED

Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals
concerned shall be entitled to the following guarantees:
(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating
individuals before they are named publicly;
(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide
a statement setting forth their version of the facts either at a hearing
convened by the commission while conducting its investigation or through
submission of a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the
commission’s file.

To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal
or State capital crime (i.e., a crime which a sentence of
imprisonment for life or death penalty may be imposed) but who has
not been convicted by reason of not being available for trial due to
death or flight to avoid prosecution, may be ineligible for interment,
inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military
cemetery. Nevertheless, such ineligibility must still observe the
procedures specified in § 553.21.180
_______________
180 (a) Preliminary inquiry. If the Executive Director has reason to believe that
a decedent may have committed a Federal capital crime or a State capital crime but
has not been convicted of such crime by reason of such person not being available for
trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution, the Executive Director shall submit
the issue to the Army General Counsel. The Army General Counsel or his or her
designee shall initiate a preliminary inquiry seeking information from Federal, State,
or local law enforcement officials, or other sources of potentially relevant
information.

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_______________
(b) Decision after preliminary inquiry. If, after conducting the preliminary

inquiry described in paragraph (a) of this section, the Army General Counsel or
designee determines that credible evidence exists suggesting the decedent may have
committed a Federal capital crime or State capital crime, then further proceedings
under this section are warranted to determine whether the decedent committed such
crime. Consequently the Army General Counsel or his or her designee shall present
the personal representative with a written notification of such preliminary
determination and a dated, written notice of the personal representative’s procedural
options.
(c) Notice and procedural options. The notice of procedural options shall
indicate that, within fifteen days, the personal representative may:
(1) Request a hearing;
(2) Withdraw the request for interment, inurnment, or memorialization; or
(3) Do nothing, in which case the request for interment, inurnment, or
memorialization will be considered to have been withdrawn.
(d) Time computation. The fifteen-day time period begins on the calendar day
immediately following the earlier of the day the notice of procedural options is
delivered in person to the personal representative or is sent by U.S. registered mail or,
if available, by electronic means to the personal representative. It ends at midnight on
the fifteenth day. The period includes weekends and holidays.
(e) Hearing. The purpose of the hearing is to allow the personal representative to
present additional information regarding whether the decedent committed a Federal
capital crime or a State capital crime. In lieu of making a personal appearance at the
hearing, the personal representative may submit relevant documents for consideration.
(1) If a hearing is requested, the Army General Counsel or his or her designee
shall conduct the hearing.
(2) The hearing shall be conducted in an informal manner.
(3) The rules of evidence shall not apply.
(4) The personal representative and witnesses may appear, at no expense to the
Government, and shall, in the discretion of the Army General Counsel or his or her
designee, testify under oath. Oaths must be administered by a person who possesses
the legal authority to administer oaths.
(5) The Army General Counsel or designee shall consider any and all relevant
information obtained.
(6) The hearing shall be appropriately recorded. Upon request, a copy of the
record shall be provided to the personal representative.

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The various cases cited by petitioners, which were decided with

finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since
they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish
moral turpitude.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there
is no property right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be
buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the
privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable
recommendation from the Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen.
Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and
enforceable.
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites
of equal protection clause are not met.181 In this case, there is a real
and
_______________
(f) Final determination. After considering the opinion of the Army General

Counsel or his or her designee, and any additional information submitted by the
personal representative, the Secretary of the Army or his or her designee shall
determine the decedent’s eligibility for interment, inurnment, or memorialization.
This determination is final and not appealable.
(1) The determination shall be based on evidence that supports or undermines a
conclusion that the decedent’s actions satisfied the elements of the crime as
established by the law of the jurisdiction in which the decedent would have been
prosecuted.
(2) If an affirmative defense is offered by the decedent’s personal representative,
a determination as to whether the defense was met shall be made according to the law
of the jurisdiction in which the decedent would have been prosecuted.
(3) Mitigating evidence shall not be considered.
(4) The opinion of the local, State, or Federal prosecutor as to whether he or she
would have brought charges against the decedent had the decedent been available is
relevant but not binding and shall be given no more weight than other facts presented.
(g) Notice of decision. The Executive Director shall provide written notification
of the Secretary’s decision to the personal representative. (See 32 C.F.R. § 553.21;
Effective: October 26, 2016)
181 The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former

President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the
Articles of War182 attach only to the members of the military. There
is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three
Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino,
Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a
military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes
of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a
national shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military
cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons
interred therein.
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military
service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran
pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown
that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under
AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and
97 of the Articles of War.183 The
_______________
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class. (Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551,
June 30, 2015, 760 SCRA 652, 709-710)
182 Commonwealth Act No. 408 dated September 14, 1938, as amended.
183 ARTICLE 94. Various Crimes.—Any person subjected to military law who
commits any crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance, which is
recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of
the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, on a Philippine Army reservation,
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct; Provided, That in time of peace,
officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-
martial for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances
committed under this Article.
ARTICLE 95. Frauds Against the Government Affecting Matters and
Equipments.—Any person subject to military law who, having charge, possession,
custody, or control of any money or other property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, furnished or intended for the military service thereof, knowingly delivers,
or causes to be delivered, to any person having authority to receive the same, any
amount thereof less than that for which he receives a certificate or receipt; or

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_______________
Who, being authorized to make or deliver any paper certifying the receipt of any
property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines furnished or intended for the
military service thereof, makes or delivers to any person such writing, without having
full knowledge of the truth of the statements therein contained and with intent to
defraud the Philippines; or
Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willfully misappropriates, applies to his
own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance,
arms, equipments, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines furnished or intended for the military service
thereof; or
Who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness
from any soldier, officer, or other person who is a part of or employed in said forces
or service, any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing subsistence stores,
or other property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, such soldier, officer, or
other person not having lawful right to sell or pledge the same;
Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such
other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties.
And if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the military
service of the Philippines, received his discharge or is dismissed from the service, he
shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-
martial in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received such
discharge nor been dismissed. And if any officer, being guilty, while in the military
service of the Philippines of embezzlement of ration savings, post exchange,
company, or other like funds, or of embezzlement of money or other property
entrusted to his charge by an enlisted man or men, receives his discharge, or is
dismissed, or is dropped from the rolls, he shall continue to be liable to be arrested
and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and to the same
extent as if he had not been so discharged, dismissed, or dropped from the rolls.
ARTICLE 97. General Article.—Though not mentioned in these articles, all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be taken
cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
(Commonwealth Act No. 408 dated September 14, 1938, as amended by P.D. 1166
dated June 24, 1977)
Article 94 is under the jurisdiction of civil courts while Articles 95 to 97, as
service-connected crimes or offenses, are under the jurisdiction of the court-martial
(See R.A. No. 7055, approved on June 20, 1991)

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NHCP study184 is incomplete with respect to his entire military

career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.
With respect to the phrase “[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service,” the same should be
viewed in light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G
161-375 to the term “active service” which is “[s]ervice rendered by
a military person as a Commissioned Officer, enlisted man/woman,
probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and service rendered by him/her as a civilian official or
employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date of his/her
separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for which military and/or civilian service he/she shall have received
pay from the Philippine Government, and/or such others as may be
hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638, as
amended).”185 To my mind, the word “service” should be construed
as that rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil
service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation,
training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement
from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and
retirement from the AFP is outside the context of “service” under
AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos’ ouster
from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to
his dishonor-
_______________
184 On July 12, 2016, the NHCP published its study, entitled “Why Ferdinand E.
Marcos Should Not Be Buried at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani,” concluding that
Marcos’ military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies. The
NHCP study demonstrated that: (1) Marcos lied about receiving U.S. Medals
(Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and Order of Purple Heart); (2) his guerilla
unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika, was never officially recognized and neither was his
leadership of it; (3) U.S. officials did not recognize Marcos’ rank promotion from
Major in 1944 to Lt. Col. by 1947; and (4) some of Marcos’ actions as a soldier were
officially called into question by the upper echelons of the U.S. Military, such as his
command of the Alias Intelligence Unit (described as “usurpation”), his
commissioning of officers (without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-NL
presumably to build in airfield for Gen. Roxas, his collection of money for the airfield
(described as “illegal”), and his listing of his name on the roster of different units
(called a “malicious criminal act”).
185 Emphasis supplied.

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able separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The

fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under
the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of
civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who
may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly
be deemed “dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service” as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond
the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative
regulation.
It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of
office by the people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said
political act of the people should not be automatically given a
particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence — that
of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to
the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of
the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine
the exact implications or significance of the number of votes
obtained in elections, or the message from the number of
participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the
pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if
not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its
recognized guiding stars — clear constitutional and legal rules —
not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the
actions of the people.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that
there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority
to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another
branch. Truly, the President’s discretion is not totally unfettered.
“Discretion is not a freespirited stallion that runs and roams
wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its
classic formulation, ‘discretion is not unconfined and vagrant’ but
‘canalized within banks that keep it

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
from overflowing.’”186 At bar, President Duterte, through the public
respondents, acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must
uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his
rightful place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our
Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at
any stage of a person’s development, from the time he or she
becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth.187
There are certain things that are better left for history — not this
Court — to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in
accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond
that, it is ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to
decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the passage
of time provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and
let this issue rest.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are
DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby
LIFTED.
Sereno, CJ., See Dissenting Opinion.

Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Velasco, Jr.,*** J., I concur in the ponencia and also in the
Opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the ponencia and Separate
Opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Brion, J., With Separate Concurring Opinion.
Bersamin, J., See Separate Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., I join the Separate Opinion of J. Mendoza.
_______________
186 National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive Secretary,
supra note 46 at p. 163; p. 309.
187 Records (Vol. IV), September 19, 1986, pp. 829-831; See also Bernas,
Joaquin G., S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995, pp. 116-117.
*** On Official Leave.

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Perez, J., See Separate Opinion.
Mendoza, J., See Separate Opinion.
Reyes, J., Inhibited/No part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Separate Opinion of J. Mendoza.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., I join dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, CJ.:

The whole thesis of respondents on the substantive issues lies in
the absence of an express prohibition against the burial of former
President Marcos; hence, they argue that this Court cannot
characterize the current President’s decision to have him buried at
the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as one made in grave abuse of
discretion.
Nothing can be more wrong, and no view more diminishing of
the Judiciary’s mandated role under the 1987 Constitution.
If the absence of an express prohibition were to be the primary or
sole determinant of the merits of this case, then even the processing
clerk of the administrative office supervising the LNMB could
decide this matter by simply ticking off the appropriate box in a Yes
or No question that asks: “Is there an express statute that prohibits a
President from burying a former bemedalled soldier or president in
the Libingan ng mga Bayani? If yes, bury. If no, do not bury.”
To the contrary, the case can only be decided by deeply and
holistically analyzing the extent and implications of the legal
phenomenon called the power to exercise presidential discretion,
and how it should be measured in this case.
In light of allegations that the decision to bury the late President
will run counter to the Constitution, statutory standards and judicial
pro-

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
nouncements, this Court must take a step back in history to
understand what the Constitution that it is defending stands for;
whether it is in danger of being violated in spirit or in letter; and
whether this danger is of such kind and degree that the exercise of
presidential discretion should be restrained. This Court must also
compare the statutory standards that have been raised and determine
whether the course of action proposed by the President would run
counter to those standards. This Court must also examine the
doctrines and language employed in many of its decisions if it is to
guard against heresy directed at the spirit of the Constitution that
could undermine not just one doctrine, but perhaps the moral
legitimacy of the Court itself.
This is how consequential any statement coming from the Court
on this issue could be.

The Court’s bounden duty is
not only to preserve the
Constitution, but also itself.

It has been posited that the Court should not meddle in a political
maneuver that the President is compelled to make. Whether it is a
maneuver that is animated by the need to maintain credibility in the
eyes of important supporters, or whether it is necessary to advance
unity in this country, is not a motivation that the President should be
accountable for.
Likewise, it has been proposed that this Court should look
beyond the past and shift its focus to today’s political reality — that
the present decision maker is the most powerful and the most
popular politician in the republic; that for him to undertake the
reforms he has promised requires that he be able to deliver on his
promises; that the key to unity in this day and age is to forgive the
past and give former President Marcos the honors due the office that
he held and the bemedalled soldiering he rendered; and that in any
event, the state has enacted many measures not only to compensate
Martial Law victims but also to advance the cause of human rights.
At the initial stage of any discussion in this Court, these kinds of
arguments are usually met with skepticism by its Members under the
express unction of the Constitution as interpreted in the post-Marcos

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decisions.1 For the relevant judicial powers provisions of the 1987

Constitution impels the Court to relegate the political question
argument, and any semblance of such argument — deference,
political wisdom, etc. — to a status of non-importance, especially if
it fails to satisfy the threshold test. Simply put, that test is whether
indeed the question is one addressed to purely political exercises
internal to the workings of the legislature;2 or whether, on the part of
the President, there are no legal standards against which his
particular action can be evaluated.3 Indeed, the Court has, in
questions of grave national importance, generally exercised judicial
review when the allegations of grave abuse of discretion are
sufficiently serious.
For the implications of this case goes to the very fulcrum of the
powers of Government: the Court must do what is right by correctly
balancing the interests that are present before it and thus preserve
the stability of Philippine democracy.
If the Court unduly shies away from addressing the principal
question of whether a decision to bury the former President would
contradict the anti-Martial Law and human rights underpinnings and
direction of the 1987 Constitution, it would, wittingly or unwittingly,
weaken itself by diminishing its role as the protector of the
constitutional liberties of our people. It would dissipate its own
moral strength and progressively be weakened, unable to promptly
speak against actions that mimic the authoritarian past, or issue
judicial writs to protect the people from the excesses of government.
This Court must, perforce, painstakingly go through the process
of examining whether any claim put forth herein by the parties
genuinely
_______________
1 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, 12 January 2016, 779
SCRA 241; Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003); Estrada v.
Desierto, 406 Phil. 1; 353 SCRA 452 (2001); Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No.
101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792; Bondoc v. Pineda, 278 Phil. 784; 201 SCRA
792 (1991); Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479; 177 SCRA 668 (1989).
2 Arroyo v. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42; 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
3 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705; 489 SCRA 160 (2006); Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618; 338 SCRA 81 (2000); Llamas v.
Orbos, 279 Phil. 920; 202 SCRA 844 (1991).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
undermines the intellectual and moral fiber of the Constitution. And,

by instinct, the Court must defend the Constitution and itself.

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment
of the Filipino nations’ enduring values,
which this Court must zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the
1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’ enduring values.4 The
protection of those values has consequently become the duty of the
Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it
has properly comported itself in its constitutional role has been
declared in various fashions by the Court itself.
See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect
the environment,5 women,6 children,7 labor,8 the indigenous people,9
and
_______________
4 1987 CONSTITUTION, Preamble. Also see Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice

Sereno in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 &
221698-700, 8 March 2016, 786 SCRA 1.
5 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015, 756 SCRA 513, 541; West Tower Condominium
Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, 16 June
2015, 758 SCRA 292; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay, 595 Phil. 305; 574 SCRA 661 (2008); Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr., supra note 1.
6 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003,
205043, 205138, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, 207563, 8 April
2014, 721 SCRA 146; Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44; 699 SCRA 352 (2013);
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 1093; 272 SCRA
596 (1997).
7 Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra; Dela Cruz v. Gracia, 612
Phil. 167; 594 SCRA 649 (2009); People v. Abadies, 433 Phil. 814; 384 SCRA 442
(2002).
8 Seagull Maritime Corp. v. Dee, 548 Phil. 660; 520 SCRA 109 (2007); Lopez v.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, 501 Phil. 115; 462 SCRA 428
(2005).
9 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754; 445 SCRA 1
(2004).

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consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived

of their human rights.10
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively
promulgate rules for the protection of human rights, and how the
Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of
kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.11
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on
the part of this Court to protect the cherished values of the
Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is
designed to be passive relative to the “active” nature of the political
departments is a given. But when called upon to discharge its
relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown
zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness
that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year
2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.

Not everything legally required
is written in black and white;
the Judges’ role is to discern
within the penumbra.

As early as 1950, the Civil Code, a creation of the Legislature,
has instructed the Judiciary on how to proceed in situations where
there is no applicable law or where there is ambiguity in the
legislation that seems to apply to the case at hand. The code
provides:
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of

the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
_______________
10 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, 21

January 2015, 747 SCRA 1; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T.
Domingo, G.R. No. 168533, 4 February 2008, 543 SCRA 627; Guazon v. De Villa,
260 Phil. 673; 181 SCRA 623 (1990).
11 See Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, 13
April 2010; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 September
2007; Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 22 January 2008.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it

is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

I do not believe that this Court is bereft of sufficient guides that
can aid in the exercise of its role of protecting and advancing
constitutional rights. It must with a magnifying lens examine
whether clear intent, historical references, and express mandates can
be found in the 1987 Constitution and whether these are relevant to
this case. We must pick them out and examine them. The ill-gotten
wealth statutes, the remedial human rights legislation — all describe
the burden of a nation that must recover from the financial and moral
plunder inflicted upon this nation by Marcos, his family and his
cronies. We must get our bearings from these guideposts and find
out if they instruct us on what must be done with respect to his
proposed burial beyond the express and implied condemnation of
the wrongs he has committed against the country. The
pronouncements of this Court and those of the Sandiganbayan, the
legal pleadings and administrative propositions submitted by the
Philippine government to international and local tribunals from 1987
to the present — a full 29 years — from these we must infer an
indication of the treatment that should be given to the proposed
action of the Government.
That constitutional and statutory interpretation is the bread and
butter of adjudication is beyond cavil. From the oldest cases in the
Philippine Reports to its latest decision,12 this Court has been in the
business of filling in gaps, interpreting difficult texts, so that “right
and justice will prevail.” That this is the entire reason for the
existence of the Judi-
_______________
12 See, among others, Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377 (1943); Republic v. De los
Angeles, 148-B Phil. 902; 41 SCRA 422 (1971); Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation, 220 Phil. 533; 136 SCRA 141 (1985); Salvacion v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, 343 Phil. 539; 278 SCRA 27 (1997); Concurring Opinion of Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno in Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353; 724 SCRA 1
(2014), citing the Report of the Code Commission, p. 78; Social Weather Stations, Inc.
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA 124; Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November
2015, 774 SCRA 431; Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra note 4.

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ciary is self-evident. The end of “judging” is not to do what an

administrative clerk can very well do; it is to ensure that “right and
justice” will prevail.
Indeed, that judges must interpret statutes as well as declare the
existence and protection of individual rights so that “justice and
right” might prevail has been the essence of an independent
Judiciary. This has been so from the time that the necessity for such
independence was first recognized by the 1215 Magna Carta signed
by King John; that no man, not even the highest ruler of the land —
and King John believed in his divine right to rule — can exercise
power in such a way that denies the fundamental liberty of any man.
And the modern Judiciary has progressed considerably from that
time. The Philippine Judiciary will thus be measured by the
universal standard of whether it has discharged its power of review,
so that “right and justice will prevail.”
There was a time when this Court hid under the “political
question” doctrine and evaded constitutional and moral
responsibility for the long period of suppression of the people’s
basic rights. Rightly so, that same Court, after the repudiation by our
people of the Marcos regime in 1986, likewise repudiated the acts of
the majority of the Court during Martial Law.
This Court cannot afford to retrogress and make the same
mistakes as those made by its predecessor courts during Martial
Law. To do so would possibly merit the same kind of condemnation
that former President Marcos reaped in the fullness of time.

Is the preference for the
protection of human rights
encoded in the legal DNA of
the Constitution?

There is no question that the importance given to human rights is
encoded in the very building blocks of the Philippine Constitution.
For the Constitution to make sense, the Supreme Court has to
recognize that it is programmed to reject government actions that are
contrary to the respect for human rights, and to uphold those that do.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The recognition of the hallowed place given to the protection of

human rights has been tirelessly repeated by all the Justices who
ever walked the halls of Padre Faura. Not one has said that it was
unimportant; or that it should be sacrificed at the altar of something
else — not economic progress, not even peace — not even by those
who saw when, why, and how Martial Law began and progressed.
Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno has said:
The sole purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve these

[human] rights. And when government not only defaults in its duty but itself
violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authority
to demand obedience of the governed and could be replaced with one to
which the people consent. The Filipino people exercised this highest of
rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.13

Chief Justice Puno unequivocably repudiated the “ends-justifies-
means” mantra of Martial Law when he catapulted the rights that
Marcos trampled upon to the highest pinnacle of government
priorities, and when as Chief Justice he made as his tenure’s flagship
the promulgation of the extraordinary and novel human rights writs
of amparo and habeas data.
If it is true that when the Government itself violates the very
rights it was established to protect, that violation forfeits its right to
govern, then it becomes necessary for this Court to reject any
governmental attempt that encourages the degradation of those
rights. For this Court guards not only against clear and direct
violations of the Constitution, but also against actions that lead this
country and its rulers to a slippery slope that threatens to hurl its
people to the abyss of helpless unprotectedness.
Contrary to the thesis of my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado
Peralta, the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the protection of
human rights are not inert, coming to life only when there is a
specific law that would make these rights accessible in specific
cases. Each right
_______________
13 Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454

Phil. 504; 407 SCRA 10 (2003).

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that is sought to be protected by the Constitution acts as a

prohibition against the Government’s derogation of those rights. Not
all of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution direct the
commission of positive acts. Yet these rights can, under the right
circumstances, be invoked either singly or collectively to bar public
officers from performing certain acts that denigrate those rights.

Summary of the arguments
on the substantive issues

Credit must be given to the Solicitor General for immediately
agreeing that the Constitution, decisions of this Court, human right
statutes and the ill-gotten wealth laws and proceedings — in their
totality — condemn the Martial Law regime of the late President
Marcos, his family and his cronies.14 Nevertheless, he posits that all
of these are in the past; human rights victims are to be compensated,
anyway; and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth would continue,
including the pursuit of criminal cases against the Marcos family
and their cronies. In other words, while he admits that it would be
most difficult to make former President Marcos out as a hero,
considering the latter’s martial rule and recorded plunder,
nevertheless, Marcos was a bemedalled war soldier, and that, in
addition, his being a former President who was never dishonorably
discharged as a soldier — this fact alone — entitles him to be
interred at the LNMB. To the Solicitor General, it is non sequitur for
human rights victims to claim that the burial of Marcos at a
cemetery called Libingan ng mga Bayani will entomb him as a hero
and negate the plethora of legal pronouncements that he is not.
The candid admission made by the Solicitor General has made
the job of this Court much easier. For the substantive issue now boils
down to whether, in fact and in law, the proposed burial of the late
President Marcos at the LNMB.
_______________
14 Consolidated Comment dated 22 August 2016, p. 62; Oral Arguments

Transcript of Stenographic Notes [hereinafter TSN], 7 September 2016, p. 243;
Memorandum dated 27 September 2016, pp. 134-136.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
(1) will derogate from the state’s duty to protect and promote
human rights under the Constitution, domestic statutes, and
international law;
(2) will violate Presidential Decree No. 105, and Republic Act
Nos. 10066, 10086 and 289;
(3) is an unconstitutional devotion of public property to a private
purpose;
(4) is an illegal use of public funds;
(5) cannot be sourced from the residual powers of the President
or his powers to reserve lands for public purposes;
(6) cannot find legal mooring in AFP Regulation G 161-375;
(7) is in violation of the clause on faithful execution of the laws.

and thus the proposed burial is unconstitutional and illegal, and
the presidential discretion sought to be exercised is being committed
in grave abuse of discretion.
On the procedural points, this Opinion fully agrees with the
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Jr., but
will nevertheless, attempt to augment what has been so ably
discussed by Justice Caguioa on the political question defense.
On the substantive points, I fully agree with Justice Caguioa,
whose Dissenting Opinion had first been proposed as the main
decision. I had prepared this Opinion to elucidate my independent
understanding of some of the issues he has covered.

Discussion

I.

The Court has the Authority to Resolve this Controversy Under the
Expanded Concept of Judicial Review in the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents contend that the issue in this case is a matter within
the discretion of the Executive and must consequently be considered
beyond our power of judicial review.

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As will be further discussed, this Court cannot refuse to review

an issue simply because it is alleged to be a political question. That
train has departed a long time ago. Prevailing jurisprudence is a
generation apart from the former usefulness of the political question
doctrine as a bar to judicial review. The reason for that departure —
Philippine Martial Law experience.

A. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no
longer utilize the
traditional political question doctrine
to impede the power of judicial review.

The 1987 Constitution has expanded the concept of judicial
review15 by expressly providing in Section 1, Article VIII, as
follows:
Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and

in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The above provision delineates judicial power and engraves, for
the first time, the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.16
The first part of the provision represents the traditional concept of
judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part represents the expansion of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory; that is, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.17
_______________
15 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 3.

16 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 1.
17 Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 1.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, particularly

in the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the legislature, as well as to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction, should
they be tainted with grave abuse of discretion.18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide
the nature and rationale of this expansion of judicial power. In his
Sponsorship Speech, former Chief Justice and Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion stated:
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number
of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all,
the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got
away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly
the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the de-
_______________
18 Id.

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fense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: “Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. . . .

x x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.19
(Emphasis supplied)

The expansion of judicial power resulted in constricting the reach
of the political question doctrine.20 Marcos v. Manglapus21 was the
first case that squarely dealt with the issue of the scope of judicial
power vis-à-vis the political question doctrine under the 1987
Constitution. In that case, the Court explained:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine

and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide.

x x x x
_______________
19 I Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, pp. 434-436 (1986).

20 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 1.
21 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 1.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
x x x When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the

determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a
matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.22

The prerogative of the Court to review cases in order to
determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion was further
clarified in Estrada v. Desierto:23
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the “thou shalt not’s” of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power
of doing nothing.24 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Notably, the present Constitution has not only vested the
judiciary with the right to exercise judicial power, but made it a duty
to proceed therewith — a duty that cannot be abandoned “by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.”25
This duty must be exercised “to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 506-507; p. 696.
24 Id., at pp. 42-43; p. 491.
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 1 at p. 910; p. 149.

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ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.”26
Chief Justice Concepcion had emphatically explained to the 1986
Constitutional Commission that the Supreme Court, which he had
been a part of, used the political question theory to avoid reviewing
acts of the President during Martial Law, and thus enabled the
violation of the rights of the people. In his words:
It [referring to the refusal of the Supreme Court to review] did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.27

The question I now pose to my colleagues in the Majority: “Are
we not, by refusing to pass upon the question of the effects of the
Marcos burial at the LNMB, encouraging authoritarianism, plunder,
and the violation of human rights, by signaling that what Marcos and
his Martial Rule represents is not anathema?”

B. In the exercise of its expanded judi-
cial power, the Court has decided is-
sues that were traditionally consid-
ered political questions.

Following the effectivity of the present Constitution, only a select
number of issues continue to be recognized by the Court as truly
political and thus beyond its power of review. These issues include
the executive’s determination by the executive of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity,28 its espousal of the claims of its nationals
against a foreign gov-
_______________
26 Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. Nos. 209287, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209442,
209517, 209569, 1 July 2014, 728 SCRA 1, 74.
27 Supra note 19.
28 Department of Foreign Affairs v. NLRC, 330 Phil. 573; 262 SCRA 39 (1996);
Collado v. International Rice Research Institute, 314 Phil. 46; 244 SCRA 210 (1995);
Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Ex-

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ernment,29 and the electorate’s expression of confidence in an

incumbent official.30
Apart from these matters, all other acts of government have been
the subject of the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court under
Article VIII, Section 17 of the Constitution. As demonstrated in the
following cases, the Court has reviewed the acts of the President, the
Senate, the House of Representatives, and even of independent
bodies such as the electoral tribunals and the Commission on
Elections, even for acts that were traditionally considered political.

Acts of the President

The Court in Marcos v. Manglapus31 ascertained the validity of
the President’s determination that the return of the Marcoses posed a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare, as well as the
validity of the prohibition on their return. As previously stated, the
political question doctrine was first invoked — and then rejected —
by the Court in that case in view of its expanded power of judicial
review under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court then reviewed the constitutionality of a presidential
veto in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.32 It ruled that “the political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.”
The expanded power of judicial review was likewise utilized to
examine the grant by the President of clemency in administrative
cases;33 and the President’s power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress
_______________
ploration, 311 Phil. 795; 241 SCRA 681 (1995); The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr., G.R.
No. 101949, 1 December 1994, 238 SCRA 524; International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 268 Phil. 134; 190 SCRA 130 (1990).
29 Vinuya v. Romulo, 633 Phil. 538; 619 SCRA 533 (2010).
30 Evardone v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 94010, 95063, 2 December
1991, 204 SCRA 464.
32 Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 269 Phil. 472; 191 SCRA 452 (1990).
33 Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920; 202 SCRA 844 (1991).

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lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.34 The Court even tackled the

legitimacy of the Arroyo administration in Estrada v. Desierto.35
Although it resolved the question as a constitutional issue, the Court
clarified that it would not defer its resolution based merely on the
political question doctrine.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,36 it was the validity of then
President Arroyo’s declaration of national emergency that was
assailed before the Court. Significantly, it reviewed the issue even
while it recognized that the matter was solely vested in the wisdom
of the executive:
While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does
not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the
Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of
judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.”37 (Citations omitted)

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,38 even the
President’s creation of a Truth Commission was reviewed by the
Court. As will be further explained, the fact that the commission
was created to implement a campaign promise did not prevent
the Court from examining the issue.
_______________

36 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 3.
37 Id., at p. 766; pp. 227-228.
38 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374; 637 SCRA 78
(2010).

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Acts of the Legislature

The Court has likewise exercised its expanded power of judicial
review in relation to actions of Congress and its related bodies. In
Daza v. Singson,39 it reviewed the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments by the House of
Representatives. While the review was premised on the fact that the
question involved was legal and not political, the Court nevertheless
held that “even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.”
In later cases, the Court rejected the political question doctrine
and proceeded to look into the following political acts of the
legislature: (a) the decision of the House of Representatives to allow
the dominant political party to change its representative in the House
Electoral Tribunal;40 (b) the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to require the petitioners to testify and produce evidence
at its inquiry;41 (c) the propriety of permitting logging in the
country;42 (d) the validity of the filing of a second impeachment
complaint with the House of Representatives;43 (e) the validity of an
investigation conducted in aid of legislation by certain Senate
committees;44 and (f) the decision of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice to take cognizance of two impeachment
complaints.45
_______________
39 Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980; 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
40 Bondoc v. Pineda, supra note 1.
41 Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November
1991, 203 SCRA 767, 769.
42 In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 1, the Court declared that “the political
question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.”
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 1.
44 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, 573 Phil. 554; 564 SCRA 152 (2008).
45 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322;
643 SCRA 198 (2011). We explained therein that “the Court is not asserting

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We also exercised our constitutional duty “to determine whether

or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction”46 on the part of the Senate when it ratified
the WTO Agreement and the three Annexes thereof in Tañada v.
Angara.47 The Court firmly emphasized in that case that “it will not
shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality, or department of the government.”48

Latest Jurisprudence

The most recent jurisprudence in this area remains in line with
the notion of expanded certiorari jurisdiction. The Court has been
consistent in its rejection of the political question doctrine as a bar to
its expanded power of review.
In 2013, the constitutionality of the pork barrel system was
resolved in Belgica v. Ochoa.49 While the Court clarified that the
issue involved legal questions, it nonetheless rejected the invocation
of the political question doctrine and upheld the expanded judicial
powers of the Court.
In 2014, Araullo v. Aquino III50 delved into the constitutionality
of the Disbursement Acceleration Program of the executive
department, again emphasizing the Court’s expanded power of
review.
In 2015, the Court in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections51 rejected the application of the political question doctrine.
It ruled that the right of the noncandidate petitioners to post the
subject tarpaulin in their private property was an exercise of their
right to free expression. In rejecting the COMELEC’s political
question defense, it held that
_______________
its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.”
46 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575; 272 SCRA 18, 49 (1997).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416; 710 SCRA 1 (2013).
50 Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 26.
51 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 10.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
“the concept of a political question. . . . never precludes judicial

review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right.”52
A few months after Diocese of Bacolod, the policy of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) requiring judges of first-level courts to
render five years of service before they could qualify as applicants to
second-level courts was assailed as unconstitutional in Villanueva v.
Judicial and Bar Council.53 The Court resolved the issue by stating
“since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to
the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination
must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.”54
Early this year, the Court in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr.,55 determined
the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America. The Court affirmed therein its expanded
jurisdiction:
The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987
Constitution. The scope of that power has been extended to the
determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the
sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of
discretion has been attended with grave abuse. The expansion of this power
has made the political question doctrine “no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.”56
(Citations omitted)

Notably, while there were instances when the Court deferred
from interfering with an issue involving a political question, it did so
not because political questions were involved but because of a
finding that
_______________
52 Id., at p. 53.

53 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, 755
SCRA 182.
54 Id., at p. 197.
55 779 SCRA 241, supra note 1.
56 Id.

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there was no grave abuse of discretion.57 Otherwise stated, the Court

still exercised its expanded judicial power, but found no reason to
annul the questioned acts. It held in Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,58 “the all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court ‘to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government’ is restricted only by the
definition and confines of the term ‘grave abuse of discretion.’”
It is evident from this long line of cases that the Court can no
longer refuse to adjudicate cases on the basis of the “political
question doctrine.” Whenever issues of a political nature are raised
before it, it is the duty of the Court to meet the questions head-on for
as long as grave abuse of discretion or constitutionality is seriously
involved.

C. The assertion that the burial is
intended to implement an election
campaign promise does not render
the matter non-justiciable.

In view of the above rulings of this Court, it is evident that we
must resolve the present controversy, notwithstanding the allegation
that the decision of the President to allow the burial is purely
political in character. That the order was supposedly founded on an
“election campaign promise” does not transform the matter into a
political issue that is beyond our power to review.
_______________
57 See Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 660 Phil. 202; 644 SCRA
741 (2011); Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 598 Phil. 981; 579
SCRA 521 (2009); Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64; 583 SCRA 119
(2009); Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482; 421 SCRA 656 (2004);
Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation (EASCO) v. Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), 459 Phil. 395; 413 SCRA 75 (2003);
Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555; 380 SCRA 739 (2002); Bagatsing v.
Committee on Privatization, 316 Phil. 404; 246 SCRA 334 (1995); Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 216 Phil. 758; 199 SCRA 692 (1991);
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 281 Phil. 572; 204 SCRA 516 (1991).
58 Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276; 298 SCRA 756 (1998).

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In fact, in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,59 the

Court reviewed the validity of the creation of the Truth Commission,
despite its recognition that the act was meant to implement a
campaign promise made by then President Benigno Aquino III:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
“Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (Truth Commission).60

Even under those circumstances, however, the Court still decided
the controversy and ultimately declared the creation of the Truth
Commission unconstitutional. While I maintain my dissenting view
because unknowable standards were imposed in that case, I believe
that the Court correctly took cognizance of the dispute,
notwithstanding the fact that a campaign promise was involved.
There is no reason for the Court to deviate from that course in the
present case.
Having established the duty of the Court to review the assailed
acts, it is now necessary to examine whether the decision of the
President to allow the burial of former President Marcos at the
LNMB is consistent with the Constitution and the laws.
_______________
59 Supra note 38.

60 Id., at p. 428; pp. 138-139.

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II.

The President Acted with Grave Abuse of
Discretion and in Violation of his Duty to Faithfully Execute the
Laws when he
Ordered the Burial of Marcos in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the president to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.61 This duty of faithful execution
circumscribes all the actions of the President as the Chief Executive.
It also limits every exercise of his discretion. As this Court declared
in Almario v. Executive Secretary:
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it

pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
“discretion is not unconfined and vagrant” but “canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.”

The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of
the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists

should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an
obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It
simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that
“[a]dministrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”62 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
_______________
61 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 17.

62 714 Phil. 127, 163-164; 701 SCRA 269, 309 (2013).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
In fulfilling this duty, the President is not only obligated to

enforce the express terms of the Constitution or the statutes; he is
likewise bound to implement any right, duty, or obligation inferable
from these primary sources.63 This rule finds support in Cunningham
v. Neagle,64 in which the United States Supreme Court suggested
that the duty of the President to faithfully execute the law is not
limited to the enforcement of the express terms of acts of
Congress or of treaties, that duty extends to “all rights, duties
and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution.”65
As a consequence of these principles, any act of the President
that contravenes the law, its policies, or any right or duty inferable
therefrom must be considered grave abuse of discretion.66 By the
same token, a refusal to execute the laws when necessary must be
invalidated in the absence of any statutory justification.67
As will be demonstrated, the directive of President Duterte to
allow the burial of Marcos at the LNMB contravenes the
constitution, laws,
_______________
63 See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo Brion, Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 38.
64 135 U.S. 1, 82-84.
65 Id., at p. 64.
66 In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 12, the
Court defined grave abuse of discretion in this manner:
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. It has also been held that “grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence.” [citations omitted]
67 Supra note 38.

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policies, and jurisprudence. Moreover, the basis for the directive was
an invalid regulation issued by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) in excess of its statutory authority. Considering that the order
was made in contravention of law, it cannot be justified by mere
reference to the President’s residual powers. Such act is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

A. Statutes and jurisprudence estab-
lish a clear policy to condemn the
acts of Marcos and what he repre-
sents, which effectively prohibits
the incumbent President from
honoring him through a burial in
the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

It is the duty of the Court to give effect not only to the letter of
the law, but more importantly to the spirit and the policy that
animate it. In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,68 the Court
explained:
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so.
x x x
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its

construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within the letter thereof; and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a
thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of
the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.69

To carry out this duty, the Court must examine not only the
subject law itself, but the entire body of related laws including the
Constitution,
_______________
68 234 Phil. 267; 150 SCRA 259 (1987).

69 Id., at pp. 272-273; pp. 265-266.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
domestic statutes, administrative issuances and jurisprudence. It is

only by taking a holistic view of the matter that the Court can ensure
that its reading of the law is consistent with the spirit thereof. In
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,70 we explained the
importance of taking a holistic view when interpreting the law:
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A
contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather
than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the
prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular
that describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of
constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation.
Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of
the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the
ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that
should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who
currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.71

In this case, we are being asked to decide whether the President
may validly order the burial of Former President Marcos in the
LNMB. The resolution of this question requires more than an
examination of the text of AFP Regulations 161-375. More than
finding a textual anchor, we are compelled by this issue to scrutinize
the implications of the President’s order and determine if it conflicts
with the text, the policy, and the spirit of the law.
At its core, the present dispute turns on whether the state,
through the President and the AFP, may legally honor Former
_______________
70 G.R. No. 208062, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA 124.

71 Id., at p. 167.

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President Marcos and his family. For that is the essence of the
proposed burial at the LNMB regardless of whether Marcos is to
be buried as a hero, as a soldier or as a former president. A clear
understanding of our Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, and our
international obligations must lead to the conclusion that the
grant of any such honors for the late dictator is prohibited.
Setting aside the validity of AFP Regulations 161-375 for the
moment, their blind application to the present case would be an
egregious mistake. Considering that various laws and jurisprudence
reveal the clear policy of the state to denounce both former President
Marcos and the Martial Law regime, it would be inappropriate, if
not absurd, for the state to honor his memory.

1. Marcos is perpetuated
as a plunderer and a
perpetrator of human
rights violations in our
organic and statutory
laws.

As soon as the EDSA Revolution succeeded in 1986, the
revolutionary government — installed by the direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people72 — declared its objective to
immediately recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by Marcos, his
family, and his cronies. The importance of this endeavor is evident
in the fact that it was specifically identified in the 1986 Provisional
Constitution as part of the mandate of the people. Article II, Section
1 of that Constitution states:
SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New

Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power.
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to:

x x x x
_______________
72 Provisional Constitution, First Whereas Clause; also see In Re: Puno, A.M.
No. 90-11-2697-CA (Resolution), 29 June 1992.

352

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of
accounts.

Pursuant to this mandate, then President Corazon Aquino issued
three executive orders focused entirely on the recovery of the ill-
gotten wealth taken by Marcos and his supporters:
a) Executive Order No. 173 created the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) tasked to, among others, assist
the President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates x x x by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.”74
b) Executive Order No. 275 authorized the freezing and
sequestration of assets pertaining to Marcos, his relatives,
associates, dummies, agents or nominees, which had been
“acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result
of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by
the Government of the Philippines”;76 or “by taking undue
advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.”77
c) Executive Order No. 1478 empowered the PCGG to file and
prosecute all cases it had investigated pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 2.
_______________
73 Executive Order No. 1, CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT (1987).
74 Id., Section 2(a).
75 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2, REGARDING THE FUND, MONEYS, ASSETS, AND PROPERTIES
ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED OR MISAPPROPRIATED BY FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS,

MRS. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, THEIR CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES, AGENTS, OR NOMINEES (1987).

76 Id., First Whereas Clause.
77 Id.
78 Executive Order No. 14, DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING THE
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS, MRS. IMELDA R.

MARCOS, MEMBERS OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES, CLOSE
AND/OR BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES, AGENTS AND NOMINEES.

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All three executive orders affirmed that Marcos, his relatives and
supporters had acquired assets and properties through the improper
or illegal use of government funds or properties by taking undue
advantage of their office, authority, influence, or connections. These
acts were proclaimed to have caused “grave damage and prejudice to
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.”79
The gravity of the offenses committed by former President
Marcos and his supporters even prompted the Court to describe the
mandate of the PCGG as the recovery of “the tremendous wealth
plundered from the people by the past regime in the most execrable
thievery perpetrated in all history.”80 The importance of this mandate
was further underscored by the sovereign Filipino people when they
ratified the 1987 Constitution, including the following provision:

ARTICLE XVIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen
months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national
interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.

Apart from being declared a plunderer, Marcos has likewise been
pronounced by the legislature as a perpetrator of human rights
violations. In Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10368, the state recognized
the following facts:
a) Human rights violations were committed during the Martial
Law period “from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986
by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the
State”;81 and
_______________
79 Executive Order No. 2, First Whereas Clause.
80 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 243 Phil. 93; 159
SCRA 556 (1998).
81 Section 3 of RA No. 10368 defines a “human rights violation” as “any act or
omission committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986
by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State.”

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
b) A number of these human rights violations occurred because

of decrees, declarations or issuances made by Marcos;82 and
by “acts of force, intimidation or deceit”83 done by him, his
spouse, Imelda Marcos, and their immediate relatives by
consanguinity or affinity, associates, cronies and
subordinates.84

Because of the human rights violations perpetrated by Marcos
and his associates, the legislature has decreed that victims are
entitled to both monetary85 and nonmonetary86 reparations to be
principally sourced
_______________
82 The definition of human rights violations in Section 3 of R.A. No. 10348
includes: any search, arrest and/or detention without a valid search warrant or warrant
of arrest issued by a civilian court of law, including any warrantless arrest or
detention carried out pursuant to the declaration of Martial Law by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos as well as any arrest, detention or deprivation of liberty carried
out during the covered period on the basis of an “Arrest, Search and Seizure Order
(ASSO),” a “Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)” or a “Preventive Detention
Action (PDA)” and such other similar executive issuances as defined by decrees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, or in any manner that the arrest, detention or
deprivation of liberty was effected.
83 A human rights violation under Section 3(b)(5) of R.A. No. 10368 includes
“[a]ny act of force, intimidation or deceit causing unjust or illegal takeover of a
business, confiscation of property, detention of owner/s and or their families,
deprivation of livelihood of a person by agents of the State, including those caused by
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by
consanguinity or affinity, as well as those persons considered as among their close
relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates under Executive Order No. 1, issued on
February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution.”
84 Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 10368, human rights violations may be
compensation if they were committed by “Persons Acting in an Official Capacity
and/or Agents of the State.” This includes former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as
well as their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates.
85 R.A. No. 10368, Section 4 states:
SECTION 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation.—Any [Human Rights
Violation Victim] qualified under this Act shall receive reparation from the
State, free of tax, as herein prescribed x x x.
86 Id., Section 5 provides:

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from the funds transferred to the Philippine government by virtue of

the Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.87 Those funds were
earlier declared part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family
and forfeited in favor of the Philippine government.
The statements in the above laws were clear indictments by
both the revolutionary government and the legislature against
the massive plunder and the countless abuses committed by
Marcos and his cronies during his tenure as President. These
laws not only condemn him as a thief; they equally recognize his
criminal liability for the atrocities inflicted on innumerable
victims while he was in power.

2. Decisions of this Court have
denounced the abuses com-
mitted by Marcos during the
Martial Law dictatorship.

Apart from earning the condemnation of the legislature, Marcos
and the Martial Law regime have likewise received harsh criticism
from this Court. In dozens of decisions, it denounced the abuses he
had committed; the pernicious effects of his dictatorship; and the
grave damage
_______________
SECTION 5. Nonmonetary Reparation.—The Department of Health

(DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Education (DepEd), the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the necessary
services as nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may
be determined by the Board pursuant to the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 7. Source of Reparation.—The amount of Ten billion pesos
(P10,000,000,000.00) plus accrued interest which form part of the funds
transferred to the government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of
the December 10, 1997 Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, adjudged
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines as final and executory in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan on July 15, 2003 (G.R. No. 152154) as Marcos ill-gotten
wealth and forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, shall be the
principal source of funds for the implementation of this Act.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
inflicted upon the nation by his corruption, thievery, and contempt

for human rights. Foremost among these denunciations are found in
are four cases ordering the forfeiture of the ill-gotten wealth he
amassed with the assistance of his relatives and cronies.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,88 the Court forfeited a total of
USD658 million in favor of the government. These funds, contained
in Swiss deposit accounts in the name of certain foundations, were
declared ill-gotten, as they were manifestly out of proportion to the
known lawful income of the Marcos family. The Court used the
same reasoning in Marcos, Jr. v. Republic89 to justify the forfeiture
of the assets of Arelma, S.A., valued at USD3,369,975 in 1983.
On the other hand, in Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi90 and in
Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,91 the Court scrutinized the beneficial
ownership of certain shares of Bulletin Publishing Corporation and
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation,
respectively. The Court concluded in the two cases that the shares,
although registered in the names of cronies and nominees of Marcos,
were part of the ill-gotten wealth of the dictator and were subject to
forfeiture.
It must be emphasized that in the preceding cases, the Court
noted the grand schemes employed by Marcos and his supporters to
unlawfully amass wealth and to conceal their transgressions. In
Yuchengco, it declared:
In PCGG v. Peña, this Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a “well-

entrenched plundering regime” of twenty years, noted the “magnitude of the
past regime’s ‘organized pillage’ and the ingenuity of the plunderers and
pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in
the market.” The evidence presented in this case reveals one more instance
of this grand scheme. This Court — guardian of the high standards and
noble traditions of the legal profession — has thus before it an opportunity
to undo[,]
_______________
88 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059; 406 SCRA 190 (2003).
89 686 Phil. 980; 671 SCRA 280 (2012).
90 512 Phil. 425; 476 SCRA 20 (2005).
91 515 Phil. 1; 479 SCRA 1 (2006).

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even if only to a certain extent, the damage that has been done.92 (citations
omitted)

In addition to the plunder of the public coffers, Marcos was
harshly condemned by this Court for the human rights abuses
committed during the Martial Law period.93 In Mijares v. Ranada, et
al.,94 it stated:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have
yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom
and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much
lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not
sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive
conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured,
the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in
the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief
due them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that
characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely
personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to
involve the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule
of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights
violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man
who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle
instead with the earthly representative, his estate.95 (Emphasis supplied)

Marcos himself was severely criticized for abuses he had
personally committed while in power. For instance, he was found to
have unlawfully exercised his authority for personal gain in the
following cases: (a) Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,96 in which he
ordered the general manager of the Manila International Airport
Authority to directly remit to the
_______________
92 Id., at pp. 48-49; pp. 56-57.

93 See Contado v. Tan, 243 Phil. 546; 160 SCRA 404 (1988).
94 495 Phil. 372; 455 SCRA 397 (2005).
95 Id., at p. 372; p. 400.
96 335 Phil. 795; 268 SCRA 332 (1997).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Office of the President the amount owed by the agency to the

Philippine National Construction Corporation; (b) Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,97 in
which Marcos made a marginal note prohibiting the foreclosure of
the mortgaged assets of Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills and waiving
the liabilities of the corporation and its owners to the National
Investment and Development Corporation; and (c) Republic v.
Tuvera,98 in which Marcos himself granted a Timber License
Agreement to a company owned by the son of his longtime aide, in
violation of the Forestry Reform Code and Forestry Administrative
Order No. 11.
Marcos was likewise deemed personally responsible for the
corruption of the judicial process in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.99
Affirming the findings of a commission created to receive evidence
on the case, the Court stated:
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on
the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and
knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code
named Olympus) had stage managed in and from Malacañang Palace
“a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case”; and that “the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist,” and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents
accused of all criminal and civil liability.

x x x x
_______________
97 664 Phil. 16; 635 SCRA 487 (2010).

98 545 Phil. 21; 516 SCRA 113 (2007).
99 228 Phil. 42; 144 SCRA 43 (1986).

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The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then
President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources
of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
x x x

Indeed, the secret Malacañan conference at which the authoritarian
President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy
Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the
trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in
our annals and jurisprudence.100 (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the abuses committed, the Court condemned the
Marcos years as a “dark chapter in our history,”101 a period of
“national trauma”102 dominated by a “well-entrenched plundering
regime,”103 which brought about “colossal damage wrought under
the oppressive conditions of the Martial Law period.”104 The attempt
by the dictator to return to the country after the EDSA Revolution
was even described by the Court as “the case of a dictator forced out
of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political,
economic and social havoc in the country.”105
The foregoing pronouncements are considered part of the legal
system of the Philippines106 and must be considered binding, since
they are integral parts of final and immutable judgments. It may be
presumed that the Court made the above declarations only after a
judicious consideration of the evidence and the applicable law.
Consequently, those declarations cannot be questioned, reversed, or
disregarded without
_______________
100 Id., at pp. 71-83; pp. 70, 82-83.

101 See Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil. 510, 524; 440
SCRA 483, 497-498 (2004).
102 See Republic v. Tuvera, supra note 98 at p. 61; p. 153.
103 See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, supra note 80 at
p. 115; p. 574.
104 Mijares v. Ranada, supra note 94 at p. 372; p. 399.
105 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 1 at p. 492; p. 682.
106 CIVIL CODE, Article 8.

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running afoul of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. This

doctrine of finality of judgments applies even to the highest court of
the land.107
The claim that judgment has not been rendered against Marcos
for the plunder and the atrocities committed under his regime is
belied by the declarations of this very Court. In his Separate Opinion
in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,108 former Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee wrote of our nation’s history during the Martial
Law regime, and it would be well to recall his words:
It was a long and horrible nightmare when our people’s rights, freedoms and
liberties were sacrificed at the altar of “national security” even though it
involved nothing more than the President-dictator’s perpetuation in office
and the security of his relatives and some officials in high positions and their
protection from public accountability of their acts of venality and deception
in government, many of which were of public knowledge.

x x x x

The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the martyred
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., within minutes of his arrival at the Manila
International Airport, although ringed with 2,000 soldiers, shocked and
outraged the conscience of the nation. After three years of exile following
almost eight years of detention since martial law, Aquino, although facing
the military commission’s predetermined death sentence, supra, yet refused
proper travel documents, was returning home “to strive for genuine national
reconciliation founded on justice.” The late Senator Jose W. Diokno who
passed away this year was among the first victims of the martial law coup
d’état to be locked up with Senator Aquino. In March, 1973, all of their
personal effects, including their eyeglasses were ominously returned to their
homes. Their wives’ visitation privileges were suspended and they lost all
contact for over a month. It turned out that Aquino had smuggled out of his
cell a written statement critical of the martial law regime. In swift
retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the army camp at
Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in solitary confinement in dark boarded
cells with hardly any ventila-
_______________
107 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Group Management

Corporation (GMC), 666 Phil. 277; 651 SCRA 279 (2011).
108 234 Phil. 144; 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

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tion. When their persons were produced before the Court on habeas corpus
proceedings, they were a pitiable sight having lost about 30 to 40 lbs. in
weight. Senator Diokno was to be released in September, 1974 after almost
two years of detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed against him.
His only fault was that he was a possible rival for the presidency.
Horacio Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government service and
then executive vice president of the Development Academy of the
Philippines, was among the hardworking government functionaries who had
been radicalized and gave up their government positions. Morales went
underground on the night he was supposed to receive his TOYM award,
declaring that “(F)or almost ten years, I have been an official in the
reactionary government, serviced the Marcos dictatorship and all that it
stands for, serving a ruling system that has brought so much suffering and
misery to the broad masses of the Filipino people. (I) refuse to take any
more part of this. I have had enough of this regime’s tyranny and treachery,
greed and brutality, exploitation and oppression of the people,” and “(I)n
rejecting my position and part in the reactionary government, I am glad to
be finally free of being a servant of foreign and local vested interest. I am
happy to be fighting side by side with the people.” He was apprehended in
1982 and was charged with the capital crime of subversion, until he was
freed in March, 1986 after President Corazon C. Aquino’s assumption of
office, together with other political prisoners and detainees and prisoners of
conscience in fulfillment of her campaign pledge.
Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to the
tyranny and repression of the past regime. Driven by their dreams to free
our motherland from poverty, oppression, iniquity and injustice, many of
our youthful leaders were to make the supreme sacrifice. To mention a few:
U.P. Collegian editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr., worthy son of an illustrious
member of the Court pricked the conscience of many as he asked on the
front page of the college paper: Sino ang kikibo kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino
ang kikilos kung hindi tayo kikilos? Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa? He was
locked up in the military camp and released only when he was near death
from a severe attack of asthma, to which he succumbed. Another TOYM
awardee, Edgar Jopson, an outstanding honor student at the Ateneo
University, instinctively pinpointed the gut issue in 1971 he pressed for a
“non-partisan Constitutional Convention”; and demanded that the then
president-soon-to-turn dictator “put down in

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writing” that he was not going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his
disqualification to run for a third term or perpetuate himself in office and
was called down as “son of a grocer.” When as he feared, martial law was
declared, Jopson went underground to continue the struggle and was to be
waylaid and killed at the age of 34 by 21 military troops as the reported
head of the rebel movement in Mindanao. Another activist honor student
leader, Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent member of the Court, was to
disappear on Valentine’s Day in 1976 at the young age of 24, reportedly
picked up by military agents in front of Channel 7 in Quezon City, and
never to be seen again.
One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio B. Javier, 43, unarmed,
governor of the province of Antique at 28, a Harvard-trained lawyer, was
mercilessly gunned down with impunity in broad daylight at 10 a.m. in front
of the provincial capitol building by six mad-dog killers who riddled his
body with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite rifles (the standard heavy
automatic weapon of our military). He was just taking a breather and
stretching his legs from the tedious but tense proceedings of the canvassing
of the returns of the presidential snap election in the capitol building. This
was to be the last straw and the bloodless EDSA revolt was soon to unfold.
The Court in Javier v. Comelec, through Mr. Justice Cruz, said these meager
words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his
youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. “Where many kept a
meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in
hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid.
Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe
him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to
his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the
sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting
valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race,
unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual
night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to
say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, “swifter than eagles and stronger
than lions.’”109 (Citations omitted)
_______________
109 Id., at pp. 173-177; pp. 175-178.

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The pronouncements of the Court on this matter must be

respected and considered conclusive. Hence, while Marcos may
have evaded a criminal proceeding by choosing to go on exile after
the EDSA Revolution, the atrocities committed against the Filipino
people during his regime must be remembered. Our declarations on
this matter cannot be disregarded or forgotten, as Chief Justice
Teehankee reminded us in Olaguer:
The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human memory. We

must note here the unforgettable and noble sacrifices of the countless
brave and patriotic men and women who feel as martyrs and victims
during the long dark years of the deposed regime. In vacating the death
sentence imposed on the petitioners who survived the holocaust, we render
them simple justice and we redeem and honor the memory of those who
selflessly offered their lives for the restoration of truth, decency, justice and
freedom in our beloved land.110 (Emphasis supplied)

3. The President may not contra-
dict or render ineffective the de-
nunciations, or the policies and
principles enunciated in the
foregoing statutes and jurispru-
dence.

It is the obligation of the President to give effect to the
pronouncements of the Legislature and the Judiciary as part of his
duty to faithfully execute the laws. At the very least, the President
cannot authorize an act that runs counter to the letter and the spirit of
the law.
In this case, the foregoing statutes and jurisprudence condemning
Marcos and his regime effectively prohibit the incumbent President
from granting him any form of tribute or honor. The President’s
discretion in this matter is not unfettered. Contrary to the
assertions of respondents, the President cannot arbitrarily and
whimsically decide that the acts attributed to Marcos during
Martial Law
_______________
110 Id., at p. 177; p. 178.

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are irrelevant, solely because “he possessed the title to the

presidency until his eventual ouster from office.”111
Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity for the Executive
branch to insist on paying tribute to an individual who has been
condemned by the two other branches of government as a
dictator, a plunderer, and a human rights violator. Whether
Marcos is to be buried in the LNMB as a hero, soldier, or former
President is of little difference. The most important fact is that
the burial would accord him honor. For the Court to pretend
otherwise is to sustain a delusion, as this controversy would not
have arisen if not for this reality.
A state of affairs that would allow Marcos to reap any accolade
or tribute from the state using public funds and property would
obviously contradict the laws and judicial findings described above.
Clearly, there is more than sufficient basis to reject the proposed
burial.

B. The AFP does not have the
power to determine which
persons are qualified for
interment in the Libingan.

The argument of respondents that the burial is permitted under
AFP Regulations 161-375 is unavailing, as the AFP does not have
the authority to select which persons are qualified to be buried in the
LNMB. For this reason, the enumeration contained in AFP
Regulations 161-375 must be deemed invalid.
In Proclamation No. 208,112 then President Marcos reserved a
certain parcel of land in Taguig — the proposed site of the LNMB
— for “na-
_______________
111 Public Respondents’ Memorandum with Prayer to Lift Status Quo Ante Order
(hereinafter Public Respondents’ Memorandum), p. 106.
112 Proclamation No. 208, Excluding from the operation of Proclamation No.
423, dated July 12, 1957, which established the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation a
certain portion of the land embraced therein situated in the Municipality of Taguig,
Province of Rizal, and reserving the same for national shrine purposes, 28 May 1967.

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tional shrine purposes.” This parcel of land was placed “under the
administration” of the National Shrines Commission (NSC). The
NSC was later transferred to the Department of National Defense
(from the Department of Education) and then abolished through the
Integrated Reorganization Plan. The functions of the former NSC
were then transferred to the National Historical Institute (NHI).
On 26 January 1977, Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1076113
created the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) under the
Department of National Defense. The PVAO was tasked to, among
others, “administer, maintain and develop military memorials and
battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.” P.D. 1076 also
abolished the NHI and transferred its functions to the PVAO. The
transferred functions pertained to military memorials, including the
authority to “administer” the LNMB.
The authority of the PVAO to administer, maintain and develop
the LNMB pertains purely to the management and care of the
cemetery. Its power does not extend to the determination of which
persons are entitled to be buried there. This authority pertains to
Congress, because the power to deal with public property,
including the right to specify the purposes for which the
property may be used, is legislative in character.114 Accordingly,
the provision in AFP Regulations 161-375 enumerating the persons
qualified to be interred in the LNMB cannot bind this Court.
At any rate, the AFP Regulations cannot be considered in
isolation. As part of the legal system, administrative issuances must
be interpreted and implemented in a manner consistent with statutes,
jurisprudence, and other rules.115 In the same manner, the purported
discretion of the President to determine the persons who may be
interred in the LNMB must be considered limited by statutes and
judicial decisions.116
_______________
113 Presidential Decree No. 1076, AMENDING PART XII (EDUCATION) AND PART XIX
(NATIONAL SECURITY) OF THE INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN, 26 January 1977.
114 Rabuco v. Villegas, 154 Phil. 615; 55 SCRA 656 (1974).
115 CIVIL CODE, Article 7.
116 See National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario, et al. v. The Executive
Secretary, supra note 62.

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Since the proposed interment of Marcos in the LNMB runs

counter to law as explained in the preceding section, AFP
Regulations 161-375 must be interpreted to mean that Marcos is
specifically disqualified from being buried in that cemetery. Only by
adhering to this interpretation can the Court ensure that the issuance
is in harmony with other existing laws. Consequently, we cannot
choose to implement AFP Regulations 161-375 exclusively while
disregarding the statutes and jurisprudence referred to above.

C. The burial cannot be justified by mere
reference to the President’s residual
powers; it is not unfettered, and such
power can only be exercised in confor-
mity with the entire Constitution.

During the oral arguments, respondents attempted to justify the
decision of the President to allow the burial primarily on the basis of
his residual power.117 Citing Marcos v. Manglapus118 and Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary,119 they argued that the President is vested
with powers other than those enumerated in the Constitution and
statutes, and that these powers are implicit in the duty to safeguard
and protect the general welfare.120
It must be emphasized that the statement in Marcos v. Manglapus
acknowledging the “President’s residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people” was not unconditional. The Court,
in fact, explicitly stated that only acts “not forbidden” by the
Constitution or the laws were permitted under this concept:
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on
_______________
117 TSN, 7 September 2016, pp. 11-12.

119 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra note 57.
120 TSN, 7 September 2016, p. 11.

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the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase

Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also
his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand. [See Corwin, supra at p. 153] It is a
power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.
It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President,
where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary
power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the
President].121 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in that case also reiterated the underlying principles
that must guide the exercise of presidential functions and powers,
residual or otherwise:
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of

peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words.
Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from
another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic,
the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.122 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the residual power of the President cannot be used to
justify acts that are contrary to the Constitution and the laws. To
allow him to exercise his powers in disregard of the law would be to
grant him unbridled authority in the guise of inherent power. Clearly,
that could not have been the extent of the residual powers
contemplated by the Court in Marcos v. Manglapus.
To reiterate, the President is not above the laws but is, in fact,
obliged to obey and execute them.123 This obligation is even more
para-
_______________
121 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 1 at p. 504; pp. 694, 723-724.

122 Id., at p. 503; p. 693.

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mount in this case because of historical considerations and the

nature of the norms involved, i.e., peremptory norms of human
rights that are enshrined both in domestic and international law.

III.

To Allow Marcos to be Buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani
would Violate International Human Rights Law as an Independent
Source of State Obligations, and Would Negate the Remedies
Provided by Republic Act No. 10368.

An examination of the vast body of international human rights
law establishes a duty on the part of the state to provide the victims
of human rights violations during the Marcos regime a range of
effective remedies and reparations. This obligation is founded on the
state’s duty to ensure respect for, and to protect and fulfill those
rights.
Allowing the proposed burial of Marcos in the LNMB would be
a clear violation of the foregoing international law obligations.
Consequently, the planned interment must be enjoined in light of
Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution, the established principle of
pacta sunt servanda, and the fact that the state has already
acknowledged these duties and incorporated them in our domestic
laws.

A. Under international law, the Philip-
pines is obligated to provide effective
remedies, including holistic repara-
tions, to human rights victims.

The obligation of the Philippines to respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights has its legal basis in international agreements and
customary international law. As will be discussed, this obligation
includes the duty to provide effective remedies, which, in turn,
incorporates the grant of holistic reparations to victims of human
rights violations.

1. The Philippines is bound to
respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights under its

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treaty obligations and cus-

tomary international law.

As a party to the United Nations (UN) Charter124 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),125 the
Philippines is bound to comply in good faith with our obligations
therein pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.126 These
treaties form the normative foundation of the duty of the state to
provide effective remedies and reparations to victims of human
rights violations.
The promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights norms
are obligations woven throughout the entire UN Charter, beginning
with the Preamble which “reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”127 In line
with this statement, the promotion of “universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”128 was
identified as one of the basic purposes
_______________
124 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS
XVI [hereinafter UN Charter].
125 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
126 In Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No.
148571, 24 September 2002, 389 SCRA 623, the Court explained the principle of
pacta sunt servanda as follows:
Article 2, Section 2, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for an adherence to general
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. One of these principles is the basic
rule of pacta sunt servanda or the performance in good faith of a state’s treaty obligations.
Pacta sunt servanda is the foundation of all conventional international law, for without it, the
superstructure of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, which comprise a great part of
international law, could well be inconsequential.
127 UN Charter, supra, Preamble.

128 Id., Art. 55.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
of the United Nations.129 These principles became part of a concrete

obligation via Article 56 of the Charter, as states were mandated to
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the UN for the
achievement of its purposes.130
On the other hand, the ICCPR obligates states parties to respect
and ensure the human rights of all individuals within its territory.
Article 2(1) of this covenant provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.

Interpreting this provision, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee131 (UNHRC) issued General Comment No. 31132
declaring that the obligation in Article 2(1) is owed not just to
individuals as the rights holders under the ICCPR, but to every state
party therein.133 The duty to respect basic human rights is likewise
considered an erga omnes obligation in view of the importance of
the rights involved.134 In other words, it is an obligation towards the
international community as a whole.135
Further establishing the obligation to respect human rights is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which defines and
_______________
129 Id.
130 Id., Art. 56.
131 Pursuant to Article 40 of the ICCPR, the UNHRC is described as the official
body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR.
132 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 31 [80], The
nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26
May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 [hereinafter UNHRC General Comment No.
31].
133 Id., par. 2.
134 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd.
(Second Phase, Belgium v. Spain), I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32 [hereinafter Barcelona
Traction Case].
135 Id.

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codifies human rights norms provided for in the UN Charter.

Considered the most important human rights document in the
world,136 the UDHR enumerates the human rights that states are
bound to respect, including the right to life, liberty, and security of
persons;137 the prohibition against torture and arbitrary arrest or
detention;138 and the right to freedom from interference with one’s
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.139 While not a legally
binding treaty, the UDHR is generally considered a codification of
the customary international law on human rights.140 Hence, it binds
all nations including the Philippines.
The foregoing instruments clearly create rights that every state is
obliged to recognize and respect. To give effect to these
entitlements, a violation of protected rights brings about the
obligation on the part of the offending state to provide a
corresponding remedy.

2. The duty to respect, protect,
and fulfill human rights
includes the obligation to
provide an effective remedy.

The international guarantee of a remedy for human rights
violations is well established328 as one of the bedrock principles of
contemporary international human rights law.329 Ubi ius ibi
remedium — “where there is a right, there is a remedy.”330 It is
settled that gross human rights violations give rise to a right to
remedy for victims, which in turn im-
_______________
136 Hannum, Hurst, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in The

Essentials of Human Rights, p. 351 (Rhona K.M. Smith and Christian van den Anker
eds., 2005).
137 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10
December 1948, 217 A (III), Art. 3 [hereinafter UDHR].
138 Id., Arts. 4, 5, 9.
139 Id., Art. 12.
140 Hannum, supra.
141 Shelton, Dinah, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, p. 37 (1999
ed.).
142 Starr, Sonja B., Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 698 (2008), p. 693.
143 Id.; Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1120, 6th ed. (1990).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
plies a duty on the part of states to provide the same.144 This

obligation is based on the principle that failure to provide an
adequate remedy for violations renders the duty to respect the rights
involved meaningless and illusory.145

Under Treaties

International human rights law instruments, both global and
regional, impose upon states the duty not merely to offer a remedy,
but also to ensure that the remedy provided is “effective.” This rule
is clearly demonstrated in the provisions discussed below.
It is an accepted principle that “[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.”146 This rule is further developed in Article 2 of the ICCPR,
which provides:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.147
_______________
144 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes, p. 7, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.XIV.3 (2008); Shelton, supra note 141 at p. 15.
145 Shelton, Dinah, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, p. 61 (2015
ed.).
146 UDHR, supra note 137, Art. 8.
147 ICCPR, supra note 125, Art. 2.

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Explaining the nature of the obligations imposed by this

provision, the UNHRC stated that the grant of reparations to
individual victims is a central component of this legal obligation.148
A similar guarantee of effective remedies is included in the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD),149
while the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against
Torture)150 refers to an equivalent right in the form of redress and
compensation.151 This right to redress was
_______________
148 In General Comment No. 31, supra note 132, the UNHRC explains:
Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose
Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights
have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the
efficacy of Article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged.

149 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series,
Vol. 660, p. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. Article 6 of this treaty provides:
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and
remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts
of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to
this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or
satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.

150 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1465, p. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
151 Article 14 of the CAT states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the
means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation
which may exist under national law.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
clarified in General Comment No. 3152 of the UN Committee

Against Torture (UNCAT) as a comprehensive reparative concept,
which embraces both “effective remedy” and “reparation.” Redress
“entails restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition and refers to the full scope of measures
required to redress violations under the Convention.”153 The
committee also emphasized that reparative measures must take into
account the particular needs of the victims and the gravity of the
violations committed against them.154
Even regional instruments such as the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,155 the
Ameri
_______________
152 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 3; Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:
Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties, 13 December 2012 [hereinafter
General Comment No. 3].
153 Id., par. 2.
154 General Comment No. 3, par. 6 states:
Reparation must be adequate, effective and comprehensive. States parties are reminded that in
the determination of redress and reparative measures provided or awarded to a victim of torture
or ill treatment, the specificities and circumstances of each case must be taken into
consideration and redress should be tailored to the particular needs of the victim and be
proportionate in relation to gravity of the violations committed against them. The Committee
emphasi[z]es that the provision of reparation has an inherent preventive and deterrent effect in
relation to future violations.

155 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November
1950, ETS 5 [hereinafter ECPHR]. Article 13 of the Convention provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.

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can Convention on Human Rights,156 and the Protocol to the African

Charter,157 provide for effective remedies for human rights
violations.

Under Customary International Law

At the same time, customary international law, as discerned from
the law of state responsibility and the progressive development of
human rights treaty law, is further solidifying the legal basis of the
right to remedy of victims of human rights violations.158
The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts codified by the International Law Commission (ILC
Articles) provides that state responsibility arising from an
internationally wrongful act159 gives rise to the duty to make
reparations. Under the ILC Articles, a state held liable for the breach
of an obligation may be re-
_______________
156 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human

Rights, “Pact of San Jose,” Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 [hereinafter ACHR].
Article 63 of the treaty talks about remedies and compensation, as follows:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this
Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or
freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that
fair compensation be paid to the injured party.

157 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 11 July 2003. Article 27 of the Protocol
states:
If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall make
appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or
reparation.

158 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 144 at pp. 5-6.
159 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Chp.
IV.E.1, Art. 1 [hereinafter ILC Articles].

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quired to perform the following acts: (1) cessation of the

violation,160 (2) guarantee of non-repetition,161 and (3) full
reparation for the injury caused.162
Because of the emergence of human rights in international law,163
the duty to remedy a breach under the ILC Articles is deemed owed
not only to the injured state as traditionally imagined, but also to
individuals whose human rights have been impaired by the breach
under a state’s jurisdiction.164 The right to effective remedies and
just reparations for individual victims may be culled from the
obligations of the state to cease violations, guarantee non-repetition
and make full reparation.165 This right is further affirmed by Article
33 of the ILC Articles, which declares that the obligation of the state
to provide reparations is “without prejudice to any right, arising
from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue
directly to any person or entity other than a State.”166
_______________
160 ILC Articles, Art. 30(a).

161 Id., Art. 30(b).
162 Id., Art. 31(a).
note 144 at p. 6.
164 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims
of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms: final report/submitted
by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, 2 July 1993, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8,
paragraphs 43-46 [hereinafter Van Boven Report]; see also Buyse, Antoine, Lost and
regained? Restitution as a remedy for human rights violations in the context of
International Law, 68 Heidelberg J. OF I. L. 129, 134-135 (2008), wherein the author
posits as follows: “The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion Reparation for Injuries Suffered
in the Service of the United Nations recognized that a nonstate entity — the
international organization of the United Nations — had the right to claim reparation at
the international level from a state. Extending this, one could argue that if other new
subjects of international law arise, they too can claim. Individuals have been
recognized as being such subjects of international law. To the extent that they are
accorded rights under international law, they should therefore have the possibility to
claim.”
165 Van Boven Report, id., par. 45.
166 ILC Articles, supra note 159, Art. 33(2).

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To further substantiate the existence of a rule of customary

international law on this matter, two declarations approved by the
UNHRC and the UN General Assembly, respectively, may be cited.
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance167 issued by the UNHRC is a body of principles
concerning enforced disappearances, including a provision for the
right of victims of acts of enforced disappearance to adequate
compensation and complete rehabilitation.168
On the other hand, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power169 offers guidelines in
relation to abuse of economic and political power. Through this
declaration, the UN General Assembly recognized that millions of
people suffer harm as a result of crime and abuse of power, and that
these victims are entitled to prompt redress and access to the
mechanisms of justice.170
These instruments and customary norms of international human
rights law clearly provide for the duty to grant effective remedies to
a victim of violations. More than being an essential component of
other substantive norms, they create a distinct obligation; hence, the
failure to
_______________
167 UN Commission on Human Rights, Declaration on the Protection of All

Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 28 February 1992, E/CN.4/RES/1992/29.
168 Article 19 of the Declaration provides:
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall
have the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation
as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced
disappearance, their dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.

169 UN General Assembly, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims
of Crime and Abuse of Power: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 29
November 1985, A/RES/40/34.
170 The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime (par. 4)
states:
Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are entitled to
access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national
legislation, for the harm that they have suffered.

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provide effective remedies is an additional and independent

violation of internationally recognized human rights.171

Defining Effective Remedies

Because an exact definition of an effective remedy is not provided
by the foregoing international instruments, it is necessary to examine
the interpretations of authorized bodies, as well as the theory and
practice of international courts, in order to determine the exact scope
of the obligation.172
As the succeeding discussion will show, the duty to provide an
“effective remedy” does not embrace a singular concept. Rather, that
duty embodies a variety of measures more aptly referred to as
holistic “reparations.”

3. The obligation of the state
to provide an effective rem-
edy incorporates the duty to
offer holistic reparations.

The right to effective remedy is comprised of two dimensions:
procedural and substantive.173 As explained by the UNCAT in
General Comment No. 3:
The obligations of States parties to provide redress under Article 14 are two-
fold: procedural and substantive. To satisfy their procedural obligations,
States parties shall enact legislation and establish complaints
mechanisms, investigation bodies and institutions, including
independent judicial bodies, capable of determining the right to and
awarding redress for a victim of torture and ill treatment, and ensure that
such mechanisms and bodies are effective and accessible to all victims. At
the substantive level, States parties shall ensure that victims of torture or ill
treatment obtain full and effective redress and reparation, including com-
_______________
171 Shelton, supra note 141 at p. 37.

172 Id.
173 Contreras-Garduño, Diana, Defining Beneficiaries of Collective Reparations:
The Experience of the IACtHR, 4 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM, p. 43 (2012).

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pensation and the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.174

(Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the procedural dimension refers to the legal
means by which alleged human rights violations are addressed by an
impartial authority; the substantive dimension involves prompt and
effective reparation for the harm suffered.175
The right to reparations is therefore but one side of an effective
remedy, and is a crucial element in delivering justice to victims.176
As such, the duty to provide reparations is as binding as the duty to
provide effective remedies. This principle is clearly enunciated in
international instruments, to the extent that it has achieved a non-
derogable status.177 As the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga Case)178
ratiocinated:
The Chamber accepts that the right to reparations is a well-established

and basic human right, that is enshrined in universal and regional
human rights treaties, and in other international instruments, including
the UN Basic Principles; the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and
_______________
174 General Comment No. 3, supra note 152, par. 5.
175 Contreras-Garduño, supra note 173.
176 Id.
177 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29:
Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, 31 August 2001,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, par. 14 [hereinafter General Comment No. 29] which
states: “Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant (ICCPR) requires a State party to the
Covenant to provide remedies for any violation of the provisions of the Covenant.
This clause is not mentioned in the list of non-derogable provisions in Article 4,
paragraph 2, but it constitutes a treaty obligation inherent in the Covenant as a whole.
Even if a State party, during a state of emergency, and to the extent that such
measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, may introduce
adjustments to the practical functioning of its procedures governing judicial or other
remedies, the State party must comply with the fundamental obligation, under Article
2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant to provide a remedy that is effective.”
178 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 14
May 2007.

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Abuse of Power; the Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child

Victims and Witnesses of Crime; the Nairobi Declaration; the Cape Town
Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed
Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in
Africa; and the Paris Principles. These international instruments, as well as
certain significant human rights reports, have provided guidance to the
Chamber in establishing the present principles.179 (Emphasis supplied)

Understanding Reparations

The term reparation is derived from the word repair. Thus, it is
often perceived as making of amends by providing recompense to
persons who suffered loss or harm due to gross human rights
violations.180 Within the context of State responsibility, it pertains to
a series of actions expressing the State’s acknowledgment and
acceptance of its responsibility in consequence of the gross
violations. Reparation therefore denotes all types of redress for
victims of human rights violations,181 all seeking to make them
whole again to the fullest extent possible. The Chorzow Factory
case182 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) in 1928 provides the leading definition of the concept:
Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed
if that act had not been committed.183

Reparation, as a means to provide redress for past violations,
goes to the very heart of human protection. It has been recognized as
a “vital process in the acknowledgment of the wrong done to the
victim, and a
_______________
179 Id., par. 185.

180 Sarkin, Jeremy, Providing reparations in Uganda: Substantive
recommendations for implementing reparations in the aftermath of the conflicts that
occurred over the last few decades, 14 AHRLJ 526, 534-535 (2014).
181 Van Boven Report, supra note 164 at p. 7.
182 Factory at Chorzów, Germany v. Poland, Judgment, Claim for Indemnity,
Merits, Judgment No. 13, (1928) PCIJ Series A, No. 17, ICGJ 255 (PCIJ 1928), 13
September 1928.
183 Id., par. 124.

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key component in addressing the complex needs of victims in the

aftermath of violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.”184 As explained by the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACtHR) in its Report on the
Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law:185
The [Inter-American Court of Human Rights] considers that, beyond the

established legal system, the State has a key role and a primary
responsibility to guarantee that victims of crimes against international law
will have effective access under conditions of equality to measures of
reparation, consistent with the standards of international law governing
human rights. Access to reparations for victims of crimes against humanity
must never be subject exclusively to determination of the criminal liability
of the perpetrators, or the prior disposal of their personal goods, licit or
illicit.186

x x x x

The State must play a primary, rather than a secondary, role in guaranteeing
victims’ access to reparations in accordance with the standards of
international law.187

UN Reparations Principles

The most important text dealing with the concept of reparations
is the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law (UN Reparations Principles).188 This text is regarded as the
international standard for the provision of reparations around the
world.189
_______________
184 Sarkin, supra note 180 at p. 528.

185 Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law: Initial
Stages in the Demobilization of the AUC and First Judicial Proceedings,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 3, 2 October 2007 [hereinafter Report on the Implementation
of the Justice and Peace Law].
186 Id., par. 98.
187 Id., par. 110(6).
188 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The UN Reparations Principles was the product of the work of
Theodoor Van Boven, who was appointed in 1989 by the United
Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, to examine the possibility of developing
basic principles and guidelines on remedies for gross violations.190
Van Boven’s work resulted in a landmark final report in 1993, also
known as the Van Boven Principles, which declared that human
rights violations give rise to a right of reparation for victims.191
These principles attribute the State’s duty to make such reparations
to its obligation to afford remedies and ensure respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.192
After 15 years of consideration, the UN General Assembly
adopted the UN Reparations Principles on 16 December 2005193
without a vote. While these principles are argued to be soft law, they
are considered binding on states because they elucidate the basic
standards applicable to reparations internationally and
domestically.194 The number of states in the UN General Assembly
that accepted the resolution by consensus likewise indicates the
authoritative weight of the principles, and signifies the status of
these rules as part of emerging customary international law.195
It must be emphasized that the UN Reparations Principles is not a
source of new commitments but rather a statement of existing
obligations, as it expresses the content of international law on
reparations to ensure that this is respected. This view was explicitly
set out in the prefatory statement of the principles:
_______________
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law:

resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147
[hereinafter UN Reparations Principles].
190 United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1989/13 of 31 August 1989.
191 Van Boven Report, supra note 164 at par. 137, General Principle No. 1.
192 Id., par. 137, General Principle No. 2.
193 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005.
195 Buyse, supra note 164 at p. 140.

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mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of
existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as
to their norms x x x.196

Therefore, the state obligation to provide reparations to victims
of human right violations — as established in this text — takes its
normative character from existing legal obligations under
international human rights law. As declared in the Preamble197 and
Parts I198 and II199 of the
_______________
196 UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188 at p. 3.

197 The Preamble of the UN Reparations Principles states in relevant part:
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of
violations of international human rights law found in numerous international
instruments. x x x
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of
violations of international human rights found in regional conventions. x x x
Recognizing that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and
reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight of victims,
survivors and future human generations and reaffirms the international legal
principles of accountability, justice and the rule of law[.]
198 The UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188, Part I, states:
I. Obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international human

rights law and international humanitarian law.
1. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement
international human rights law and international humanitarian law
as provided for under the respective bodies of law emanates from:
(a) Treaties to which a State is a party;

(b) Customary international law;
(c) The domestic law of each State.
2. If they have not already done so, States shall, as required under
international law, ensure that their domestic law is consistent with
their intemational legal obligations by:

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UN Reparations Principles, the underlying framework of this

document is grounded on the right to effective remedies enshrined in
international human rights law.
“Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered” is,
in fact, a component of the remedies required to be accorded to
victims of gross violations of international human rights law, and
serious viola-
_______________
(a) Incorporating norms of international human rights law and

international humanitarian law into their domestic law, or
otherwise implementing them in their domestic legal
system;
(b) Adopting appropriate and effective legislative and
administrative procedures and other appropriate measures
that provide fair, effective and prompt access to justice;
(c) Making available adequate, effective, prompt and
appropriate remedies, including reparation, as defined
below;
(d) Ensuring that their domestic law provides at least the same
level of protection for victims as that required by their
international obligations.
199 The UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188, Part II, provides:
II. Scope of the obligation

3. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement
as provided for under the respective bodies of law, includes, inter
alia, the duty to:
(a) Take appropriate legislative and administrative and other
appropriate measures to prevent violations;
(b) Investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and
impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those
allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and
international law;
(c) Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or
humanitarian law violation with equal and effective access
to justice, as described below, irrespective of who may
ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation;
and
(d) Provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation,
as described below.

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tions of international humanitarian law.200 Elaborating on the

purpose and scope of reparation, the UN Reparations Principles
provides:
IX. Reparation for harm suffered

15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote
justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law or
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparation should be
proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a
State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be
attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international human
rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. In cases
where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation
to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or
compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the
victim.

x x x x

18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking
account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and
effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the
following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and

Holistic Approach to Reparations

Although the PCIJ in the Chorzów Factory case201 declared that
the ultimate goal of reparation is restitutio in integrum,202 or the
return of the victims to a situation prior to the unlawful conduct, it is
acknowledged that human rights violations are impossible to rectify.
As aptly stated by Special Rapporteur Van Boven in his final report:
_______________
200 UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188, Part VII.

201 Supra note 182.
202 Contreras-Garduño, supra note 173 at p. 43.

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It is obvious that gross violations of human rights and fundamental

freedoms, particularly when they have been committed on a massive scale,
are by their nature irreparable. In such instances any remedy or redress
stands in no proportional relationship to the grave injury inflicted upon
the victims. It is nevertheless an imperative norm of justice that the
responsibility of the perpetrators be clearly established and that the rights of
the victims be sustained to the fullest possible extent.203 (Emphasis
supplied)

This view was seconded by Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade of the
IACtHR in his Separate Opinion in Bulacio v. Argentina.204 He
opined “the harm cannot be erased. Instead, reparations for human
rights violations only provide the victims the means to attenuate
their suffering, making it less unbearable, perhaps bearable.”205
These statements reflect the underlying idea that the reparations
in the UN Reparations Principles are envisioned to extend beyond
the pecuniary or material dimension. Rather, holistic reparation is
the key. This conclusion is supported by Principles 19 to 23 of the
UN Reparations Principles pertaining to the five forms of full and
effective reparation:
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the

original situation before the gross violations of international human rights
law or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred.
Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of
human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of
residence, restoration of employment and return of property.

20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and
the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of
humanitarian law, such as:
_______________
203 Van Boven Report, supra note 164, par. 131.

204 I/A Court H.R., Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment of 18 September 2003, Series C, No. 100.
205 Id., Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade (Separate Opinion), Sec. 25.

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(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social
benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical
services, and psychological and social services.
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well
as legal and social services.

22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the
following:

(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to
the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or
threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives,
witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or
prevent the occurrence of further violations;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities
of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and
assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in
accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or
the cultural practices of the families and communities;
reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely
connected with the victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgment of the facts and
acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the
violations;

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training and in educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or

all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:

(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions,
the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and
training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security
forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in
particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social
service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social
conflicts and their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.

Clearly, aside from addressing the injuries suffered by victims
through financial compensation, reparation also addresses a broader
set of issues, through the prevention of future human rights
violations. It addresses “democracy, good governance, and building
an inclusive po-

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litical community. Reparations include recognition, acknowledgment

of violations and state responsibility. It can contribute to structural
transformation”206 while also seeking to promote peace and
reconciliation.207 This holistic approach to reparation is followed in
other human rights institutions like the UNCAT, the UNHRC, the
ICC, the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR).
General Comment No. 3 of the UNCAT emphasizes that
“monetary compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a
victim of torture and ill treatment. The Committee affirms that the
provision of only monetary compensation is inadequate for a State
party to comply with its obligations under Article 14.”208 General
Comment No. 31 of the UNHRC likewise notes that “where
appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and
measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials,
guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and
practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human
rights violations.”209
The holistic approach was likewise applied by the ICC to the
Lubanga Case,210 in which it held that victims of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide have a fundamental right to receive
reparations. The trial chamber observed that reparations “go beyond
the notion of punitive justice, towards a solution which is more
inclusive, encourages participation and recognizes the need to
provide effective remedies for victims.”211 It then explained that
reparations must be applied in a broad and flexible manner, so as to
allow it to approve the widest possible remedies for violations of the
rights of the victims.212
In Blazek v. Czech Republic, the UNHRC declared that a remedy
is only effective if it results in adequate measures of reparation
granted to victims. It further provided that the approach must be
holistic so as to
_______________

207 Contreras-Garduño, supra note 173 at p. 41.
208 General Comment No. 3, supra note 152, par. 9.
209 UNHRC General Comment No. 31, supra note 132, par. 16.
210 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 178.
211 Id., par. 177.
212 Id., par. 180.

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put the needs and interests of the victim at the center of the process
with the aim of restoring the latter’s dignity.213
For its part, the IACtHR made it clear that as a principle of
international law, every violation of an international obligation that
results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation. In this
respect, the Court ruled that reparation
consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the
reestablishment of the previous situation. If this is not feasible, as in most
cases of human rights violations, the Court will determine measures to
guarantee the rights that have been violated and to redress the consequences
of the violations. Therefore, the Court has found it necessary to award
different measures of reparation in order to redress the damage fully, so that,
in addition to pecuniary compensation, measures of restitution,
rehabilitation and satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, have
special relevance to the harm caused.214

It is noteworthy that the IACtHR has constantly addressed human
rights violations of a widespread nature, which can be attributed to
the authoritarian regimes and violent conflicts in Latin America
during the 1970s and early 1980s.215 Consequently, IACtHR rulings
are particularly relevant to our discussion of the authoritarian
Marcos regime.
Lastly, while the ECHR has awarded “just satisfaction” partaking
of a pecuniary nature in most of its cases,216 the intention to provide
a
_______________
213 UN Human Rights Committee, Blazek, et al. v. The Czech Republic,

Communication No. 847/1999, CCPR/C/72/D/857/1999, 12 July 2001, par. 7.
214 I/A Court H.R., Case of Gonzales Lluy, et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C,
No. 298.; Cf. Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary
objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C,
No. 211, par. 226, and Case of Cruz Sanchez, et al. v. Peru, par. 452.
215 Contreras-Garduño, supra note 173 at p. 45, citing Medina-Quiroga, C. The
Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System,
p. 369 (1988).
216 Van Boven Report, supra note 164, par. 81, citing the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 50.

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holistic approach in providing effective satisfaction can be discerned
in its Vagrancy Cases against the Belgian Government:
[I]f the victim, after exhausting in vain the domestic remedies before
complaining at Strasbourg of a violation of his rights, were obliged to do so
a second time before being able to obtain from the Court just satisfaction,
the total length of the procedure instituted by the Convention would scarcely
be in keeping with the idea of the effective protection of human rights. Such
a requirement would lead to a situation incompatible with the aim and
object of the Convention.217

x x x x

Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 50 which recognise the Court’s
competence to grant to the injured party a just satisfaction also cover the
case where the impossibility of restitutio in integrum follows from the very
nature of the injury; indeed common sense suggests that this must be so a
fortiori.218

B. The burial would contravene
the duty of the Philippines to
provide reparations to victims
of human rights violations
during the Marcos regime.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the Philippines is
obligated to provide holistic reparations to victims of human rights
violations during Martial Law. In fact, as discussed in the previous
section, R.A. 10368 acknowledged the “moral and legal obligation
[of the State] to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims
and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations
and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.”219 As stated
in the Explanatory Note
_______________
217 Id., par. 82, citing European Court of Human Rights, De Wilde, Ooms and
Versijp Cases (“Vagrancy” Cases), Judgment of 10 March 1972 (Article 50), Series
A, Vol. 14, par. 16.
218 Id., par. 20.
219 RA No. 10368, Section 2.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
of House Bill No. 54 — one of the progenitors of R.A. 10368 — this

recognition was one of the main features of the law:
Among the important features of this bill are:

One, Congress recognition that those who have filed a case against the
Marcoses before the US Federal District Court in Hawaii and are given
favorable judgment are considered human rights violations victims. This is
called legislative cognizance.

Two, any person who has secured or can secure a favorable judgment from
any court in the country arising from a human rights violation is given a so-
called conclusive presumption that he or she is a human rights violation
victim.

Three, some ten billion pesos of funds seized from bank accounts and
discovered investments of the Marcos family shall be used to compensate
the victims; and

Four, an independent Human Rights Victims Compensation Board is
created attached to, but not necessarily under the direct supervision of the
CHR to ensure the proper disposition of the funds guided by this Act.

No amount of money can really be enough to compensate our living heroes
and those survived by their kinds for the democracy that our people are now
enjoying. The least we can do though is pass this bill to honor, in our small
way, the sacrifices, that they have made for our country.220

The law also recognized the binding nature of the Decision of the
US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii,221 by creating a
conclusive presumption that the claimants in the case against the
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos were human rights violations victims.222
In that case, compensatory and exemplary damages were awarded to
(a) the class plaintiffs who were declared to have been tortured; or
(b) the heirs and beneficiaries of those who were summarily
executed, or who disappeared
_______________
220 Explanatory Note of House Bill 54, introduced by Rep. Lorenzo R. Tañada,
III, 15th Congress, First Regular Session.
221 MDL No. 840, CA No. 86-0390, Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos.
222 RA No. 10368, Section 17.

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while in the custody of Philippine military or paramilitary groups.223

Several petitioners in the present case were claimants therein and are
_______________
223 The Final Judgment in Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos states in relevant part:
1) The Court incorporates herein its Judgment on Liability entered October 20, 1992
and its Order entered December 17, 1992 denying defendant’s post-trial motions
reliability.
2) Judgment for compensatory damages is entered for the below named randomly
selected class claims as follows:
Torture Subclass
Summary Execution Subclass
Disappearance Subclass
3) Judgment for compensatory damages is entered for the remaining members of the
Plaintiff class as follows:
a) for the remaining Plaintiff subclass of all current citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between September 1972
and February 1986 were tortured while in the custody of the Philippine
military or para-military groups in the aggregate of $251,819,811.00, to be
divided pro rata.
b) for the remaining Plaintiff Subclass of all current citizens of the Republic of
and February 1986 were summarily executed while in the custody of the
Philippine military or para-military groups in the aggregate of
$409,191,760.00 to be divided pro rata.
c) for the remaining Plaintiff Subclass of all current citizens of the Republic of
and February 1986 disappeared (and are presumed dead) while in the
custody of the Philippine military or para-military groups in the aggregate
of $94,910,640.00 to be divided pro rata.
4) Judgment for exemplary damages, to make an example for the public good, is
entered in the aggregate of $1,197,227,417.90 to be divided pro rata among all
members of the Plaintiff class.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
thus conclusively considered victims of human rights during the

Marcos regime.
Both monetary224 and nonmonetary225 forms of reparations were
provided for in R.A. 10368. These measures notwithstanding, the
members of the Bicameral Conference Committee emphasized the
symbolic value of recognition in acknowledgment of the fact that
material forms of reparation are not sufficient to atone for the
suffering of the victims of atrocities:
Sen. Guingona: Page 5, letter (d) “Monetary Compensation refers to

financial consideration equivalent to.” Then, we changed “economically
assessable damage” just to —We just make it “refers to financial
consideration extended to human rights violation victims.”

Ang rationale dito kasi this one implies — The present definition implies
that the damage —When you’re human rights victim, it can be
equivalent to a material damage when actually there is no adequate
compensation when your human rights are violated. So we just make it
just “financial consideration extended to human rights violation victims
as defined in this Act.” Ganoon.
Rep. Lagman: Baka instead of financial consideration, maski iyong
consideration, ano, eh — Ah, financial reparation.

Sen. Guingona: Okay.
Rep. Lagman: Reparation.
_______________
224 R.A. No. 10368, Section 4 states.

SECTION 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation.—Any HRVV qualified
under this Act shall receive reparation from the State, free of tax, as herein
prescribed x x x.
SECTION 5. Nonmonetary Reparation.—The Department of Health
(DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Education (DepEd), the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the necessary
services a nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may
be determined by the Board pursuant to the provisions of this Act.

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Sen. Guingona: Reparation. Instead of “economically assessable” parang

sinasabi mo you[r] right has been violated but that’s eqivalent to this
amount.226

x x x x

Sen. Arroyo: x x x Here, we seemed to be concerned about the physical
aspects of human rights, meaning torture and all that. But take for instance,
those who were economically depressed, harassed. You mean to say the
family of Chino Roces, who lost his entire Manila Times and his family, is
not really living in poverty x x x.

Now they will not ask for compensation but they would want
recognition. This is the purpose of recognition. That is why to us that
roll of honor is very important. Because to others, they just want to be
recognized.227 (Emphasis supplied)

Considering the foregoing, the intent is that not only must
material reparation be provided by the state to human rights victims,
the prohibition against public acts and symbolisms that degrade the
recognition of the injury inflicted — although not expressly
mentioned in the statute — are likewise included in the obligation of
the state. Therefore, while the passage of legislative measures and
the provision of government mechanisms in an effort to comply with
this obligation are lauded, the State’s duty does not end there.
Contrary to the implications of the ponencia, the statutes,
issuances, and rules enacted by the different branches of government
to promote human rights cannot suffice for the purpose of fulfilling
the state’s obligation to the human rights victims of former President
Marcos. These enactments cannot erase the violations committed
against these victims, or the failure of the state to give them justice;
more important, these enactments cannot negate the further violation
of their rights through the proposed burial.
_______________
226 Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate

Bill 3334 and House Bill No. 5990 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Compensation Act), 16 January 2013, I-2, pp. 6-7.
227 Id., at IV-6, p. 7 and I-7, p. 1.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
It must be emphasized that the obligation owed by the Philippine

government to the victims of human rights violations during Martial
Law is distinct from the general obligation to avoid further
violations of human rights. As distinct species of obligations, the
general duty to prevent further human rights violations cannot offset
the right of past victims to full and holistic reparations. Their rights
under international law have already been violated; they have
already disappeared, been tortured or summarily executed.228 The
government cannot choose to disregard their specific claims and
assert that it has fulfilled its obligation to them merely by enacting
laws that apply in general to future violations of human rights.
As will be further discussed, victims of human rights violations
during the Martial Law regime have a distinct right to holistic
reparations, including the grant thereof in symbolic form.

1. Symbolic reparation
is an indispensable
facet of an adequate
reparations regime.

Symbolic forms of reparation are mandated by international law
and are considered hallmarks of any reparations regime.229 Within
the framework of the UN Reparations Principles, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition are described as symbolic, because they
involve a greater intangible element.230 On the other hand,
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation are typically financial
or material in character.
_______________
228 See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation Hilao v.

Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F. 3d 1467.
229 Megret, Frederic, Of Shines, Memorials and Museums: Using the
International Criminal Court’s Victim Reparation and Assistance Regime to Promote
Transitional Justice, p. 13, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1403929> (last accessed 20 September 2016) [Megret]; Megret, Frederic,
The International Criminal Court and the Failure to Mention Symbolic Reparations,
p. 12, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1275087> [last accessed 20 September 2016] [Megret II].
230 Megret II, id., at p. 3.

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As earlier explained, a comprehensive and holistic program of

reparations is expected to contain aspects of both.231

Symbols as sources of meaning

The collective dimension of symbolic reparations is the source of
their value.232 Symbolic reparations extend beyond the victim and
their families, and represent a demand for recognition, respect,
dignity, and hope for a safe future.233 They assist communities as a
whole in dealing with the process of remembering and
commemorating the past.234 In other words, symbolic measures
provide moral reparation,235 which is considered by victims to be of
equal or higher importance than material or physical reparation.
The United Nations, in its guidelines for reparation programs for
post-conflict states, describes the significance of symbolic
reparations in this manner:
As many recent reparations programmes have been proposed by truth

commissions (which have broader mandates and goals than typical judicial
instances), they are becoming less like mere compensation mechanisms and
are increasingly proposing more complex reparations measures, including
symbolic ones. Individualized letters of apology signed by the highest
authority in Government, sending each victim a copy of the truth
commission’s report and supporting families to give a proper burial to their
loved ones are some of the individual symbolic measures that have been
tried with some success in different contexts. Some of the collective
symbolic meas-
_______________

232 Megret II, supra note 229 at p. 6.
233 Doñoso, Gina, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reparation
judgments: Strengths and challenges for a comprehensive approach, 49 Revista IIDH
29, 58 (2009); Megret II, supra note 229 at p. 6.
234 Sarkin, supra note 180 at p. 548, citing the Report of Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.
235 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and
political), 26 June 1997, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, par. 40 [hereinafter Joinet Report];
Contreras-Garduño, supra note 173 at p. 42.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ures that have been tried are renaming public spaces, building museums and
memorials, rededicating places of detention and torture, turning them into
sites of memory, establishing days of commemoration and engaging in
public acts of atonement. Like other reparations measures, symbolic benefits
are, at least in part, geared towards fostering recognition. However, in
contrast to other benefits, symbolic measures derive their great
potential from the fact that they are carriers of meaning, and therefore
can help victims in particular and society in general to make sense of
the painful events of the past. Symbolic measures usually turn out to be
so significant because, by making the memory of the victims a public
matter, they disburden their families from their sense of obligation to
keep the memory alive and allow them to move on. This is essential if
reparations are to provide recognition to victims not only as victims but
also as citizens and as rights holders more generally.236 (Emphasis
supplied)

Restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation under the UN
Reparations Principles, while necessary, are lacking in this symbolic
dimension. Monetary forms of reparation can indeed provide funds
for certain necessities and improve the future of victims, but without
more, it is unlikely that they would lead to the justice sought.
Moreover, it has been observed that human rights victims want
an apology, above all else.237 They also place a premium on
obtaining recognition of the harm done to them.238 In contrast,
financial reparations or damages are considered less important than
emotional or symbolic reparations, because the former fail to
squarely address a person’s need for “dignity, emotional relief,
participation in the social polity, or institutional reordering.”239 If
given in isolation, monetary reparation may even
_______________
note 144 at p. 23.
237 Antkowiak, Thomas, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-
Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 Stan. J. Int’l Law, 279, 284 (2011).
238 Megret, supra note 229 at p. 13.
239 Antkowiak, supra.

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have a trivializing effect on suffering in certain cultural, social, and
political contexts.240

Forms of Symbolic Reparation

Because of its peculiar nature, symbolic reparation takes various
forms. An examination of the UN Reparations Principles, as well as
the decisions of international and regional courts, reveals that
different measures have been utilized to satisfy this requirement.
The following have been identified as examples of measures
intended to offer satisfaction to victims of atrocities: (a) “verification
of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth”;241 (b) “an
official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the
connected with the victim”;242 (c) “public apology”;243 and (d)
“commemorations and tributes to the victims.”244 These methods
deal with the emotional, psychological, and symbolic aspects of the
suffering of the victims,245 and are primarily concerned with the
restoration of their dignity through an acknowledgment by the state
of the harm done.
Guarantees of non-repetition, on the other hand, focus on reform
and restructuring initiatives pursuant to the state’s commitment to
never again engage in the practices that led to human rights
violations.246 The actual steps taken by state institutions represent
the guarantees of non-repetition. These steps include “promoting
mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their
resolution”247 and “reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or
allowing gross violations of international human rights law.”248
_______________
240 Id.
241 UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188, Principle 22(b).
242 Id., Principle 22(d).
243 Id., Principle 22(e).
244 Id., par. 22(g).
245 Megret, supra note 229 at p. 26.
246 Megret II, supra note 229 at p. 5.
247 UN Reparations Principles, supra note 188, Principle 23(g).
248 Id., Principle 23(h).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Meanwhile, the ICC in the Lubanga Case considered the

conviction and the sentence issued by the Court itself as forms of
reparation on account of their significance to the victims and the
communities.249 In turn, the IACtHR — the most progressive court
in terms of granting reparations to victims of human rights violations
— has ordered the following measures as part of “other forms of
reparation”: (a) the construction of monuments to commemorate the
suffering of victims,250 (b) the naming of a school after them,251 (c)
the designation of a day of remembrance for them,252 (d) the conduct
by the state of public ceremonies offering apologies in honor of the
fallen;253 (e) the establishment of memorial scholarships;254 and (f)
human rights courses.255

Memorials as Symbolic Reparation

In a report on memorialization processes utilized by states
transitioning from conflicts or periods of repression, Farida Shaheed,
the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, identified
memorials as “physical representation[s] or commemorative
activities, located in public spaces, that concern specific events
regardless of the period of occurrence (wars and conflicts, mass or
grave human rights violations),
_______________
249 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 178, par. 237.
250 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C, No.
124, par. 218.
251 I/A Court H.R., Case of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia. Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of February 27, 2002. Series C, No. 92, par. 122.
252 I/A Court H.R., Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Monitoring Compliance
with Judgment, Order of the Court, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 3, 2010).
253 Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra, par. 191.
254 I/A Court H.R., Case of Norin Catrimán, et al. (Leaders, members and
activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of May 29, 2014. Series C, No. 279, par. 432.
255 I/A Court H.R., Case of Espinoza Gonzales v. Peru. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C, No. 289,
par. 327.

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or the persons involved (soldiers, combatants, victims, political

leaders or activists for example).”256
In recent times, memorials have become principally focused on
honoring the victims of human rights atrocities. As Special
Rapporteur Shaheed explained, memorials were utilized as a means
of “ensuring recognition for the victims, as reparation for mass or
grave violations of human rights and as a guarantee of
nonrecurrence,”257 as well as a way to combat injustice and promote
reconciliation.258 This trend was followed in post-conflict states,
where memorials commemorating victims of human rights
violations were regularly established. The Report states:
An exhaustive list of all truth and reconciliation commissions that have

advocated the construction of memorials is beyond the scope of this
document. Nevertheless, one should mention the recommendations of the
truth and reconciliation commissions in El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala,
Peru, Morocco and South Africa and the commission of inquiry in Chad,
even though not all their recommendations were implemented.

The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador clearly called in its report for
the construction of a national monument in El Salvador bearing the names
of all victims of the conflict, recognition of their good name and the serious
crimes of which they were the victims and the institution of a national
holiday in memory of the victims of conflict as a symbol of reconciliation.

Similarly, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala
recommended, among other things, that monuments and parks be
constructed and the names of victims assigned to public buildings and
highways in memory of the victims. The Commission stated that “the
historical memory, both individual and collective, forms the basis of
national identity.”259
_______________
256 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of
cultural rights, Memorialization processes, 23 January 2014, par. 5 [hereinafter
Shaheed Report].
257 Id., Summary.
258 Id., par. 12.
259 Id., pars. 39-41.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The reason behind the creation of memorials intended to

commemorate victims of atrocities was explained by Special
Rapporteur Shaheed in relation to the duty to provide symbolic
reparations:
With the passage of time, memorials have shifted from honouring soldiers
dying in the line of duty to a victims’ perspective and new visions of
reconciliation. Starting in the 1980s, the creation of memorials has become
linked to the idea that ensuring public recognition of past crimes is
indispensable to the victims, essential for preventing further violence and
necessary for redefining national unity. Memorialization is often a demand
of victims and society at large and the path to national reconciliation is seen
to pass through not only legal reparations, but also symbolic reparations
such as memorials.260

2. The proposed burial would
be the antithesis of an act
of symbolic reparation.

In the present case, the dispute also involves the creation of a
memorial in the form of a burial plot located at the LNMB. Instead
of commemorating victims, however, the memorial proposes to
honor Marcos, the recognized perpetrator of countless human rights
violations during the Martial Law regime. The establishment of this
memorial would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended
by symbolic reparation, and would consequently violate the
obligations of the Philippines under international human rights law.
For reasons previously discussed, the burial of Marcos would be
more than a simple matter of the interment of his remains, because it
would involve his victims’ right to symbolic reparations.
Undoubtedly, to honor the very perpetrator of human rights
atrocities would be the direct opposite of the duty of the state to
respect, promote, and fulfil human rights.
These conclusions are supported by the opinion of UN Special
Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff in the analogous case of another
dictator, General Francisco Franco of Spain, and his burial place —
the Valle de los
_______________
260 Id., par. 9.

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Caídos (Valley of the Fallen).261 The site, located in Madrid, serves

as a monument and a memorial, as it is also the burial ground of
almost 34,000 other individuals. The structure, however, is still
considered by many as “an exaltation of Francoism”262 and a
reminder of the forced labor of thousands of political prisoners who
were compelled to build the structure.263
In his Report on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of nonrecurrence,264 Special Rapporteur De Greiff
studied the fate of symbols of Francoism in relation to the then
newly enacted 2007 Law of Historical Memory.265 This law dealt
with the recognition of victims of human rights violations during the
Spanish Civil War and the 40-year regime of General Franco.
Special Rapporteur De Greiff reviewed, in particular, the effects
of a provision in the Law of Historical Memory requiring the
removal of all memorials related to Franco and the latter’s
dictatorship. In his report, he welcomed the measures introduced to
combat the exaltation of the coup d’état, the Civil War, and the
repression by the Franco dictatorship, particularly through the
removal of symbols and monuments.266 He further noted “majority
of inventoried symbols and monuments had been removed, and that
the remaining symbols and monuments either required a lengthy
administrative procedure or considerable expense, or were subject to
protection rules for their historic or artistic value.”267
As part of the implementation of the Law of Historical Memory,
the removal of Valle de los Caídos was proposed because of its ties
to General Franco and Francoism. However, because the structure
could not be
_______________
261 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the

promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of nonrecurrence, Mission to
Spain, 22 July 2014, par. 5 [hereinafter de Greiff Report].
262 Id., pars. 29-30
263 Id., par. 32.
264 de Greiff Report, supra.
265 Ley de Memoria Histórica or La Ley por la que se reconocen y amplían
derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecucion o
violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura, Ley 52/2007 de 26 de Diciembre.
266 de Greiff Report, supra, par. 27.
267 Id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
removed without disturbing the burial grounds of other

individuals,268 De Greiff made the following recommendation with
respect to the site:
The site can be put to good use and “reinterpreted,” with suitable techniques
and pedagogy, in favour of the promotion of truth and memory, and given an
educational and preventive purpose. It can hardly be construed as a place
devoted to peace and reconciliation, so long as silence is maintained
about the facts relevant to the context and origin of the site, and
especially while the flower-covered tomb of the dictator remains in the
centre of the monument.269 [Emphasis supplied]

The necessity for the reinterpretation and “recontextualization”
of the Valle de los Caídos highlights the fact that far from being an
ordinary burial plot, the final resting place of a dictator and
perpetrator of human rights violations is a symbol and a source of
meaning. The meaning it conveys, particularly to the victims of
atrocities, cannot be underestimated. Special Rapporteur Shaheed, in
her report on memorialization processes, also expressed concerns
about the monuments and sites intended to honor past oppressive
regimes:
The question is how to manage an architectural legacy with strong symbolic

connotations when oppressive regimes collapse. Should a new democratic
Government destroy, conserve or transform these legacies? Answers vary
from situation to situation, frequently giving rise to intense controversy,
including amongst victims. Striking examples include debates in Spain over
the memorial in Valle de los caídos (the Valley of the Fallen) where Franco
is buried, in Bulgaria over the mausoleum of former communist leader
Georgy Dimitrov, which was finally destroyed, and in Germany over
Hitler’s bunker, now located beneath a parking lot in the centre of Berlin,
marked only by a small sign.270

Shaheed therefore concludes “the choice to conserve,
transform or destroy always carries meaning and so needs to be
discussed,
_______________
268 Id., par. 30.

269 Id., par. 33.
270 Id., par. 62.

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framed and interpreted.”271 In this undertaking, the concerns

and views of victims are given primary consideration and for
good reason — they are, after all, the persons most affected by
any decision on the matter.
In this case, the victims of human rights violations have
expressed their objection to the proposed burial of Marcos in the
LNMB. They assert that the burial would constitute a state-
sanctioned narrative that would confer honor upon him.272 This,
in turn, would subject his human rights victims to the same
indignity, hurt, and damage that they have already experienced
under his regime.273
These opinions must be given paramount consideration by the
state in compliance with its duty to provide symbolic reparations to
victims of human rights atrocities. For the President to allow the
burial in disregard of these views would constitute a clear
contravention of international human rights law and would amount
to grave abuse of discretion.

C. The burial would run
counter to the duty of the
state to combat impunity.

As part of their obligation to protect and ensure human rights
under international law,274 states have the duty to combat impunity
and hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. In
fact, the clear nexus between the impunity of perpetrators of gross
violations of human rights, and the failure to provide adequate
reparation to the victims275 indicate that the two obligations must go
hand in hand.
_______________
271 Id., par. 63.

272 Rosales Petition, p. 61.
273 Id., at p. 17.
274 Seibert-Fohr, Anja, Reconstruction Through Accountability in MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, p. 559 (A. Von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, eds.,
2005), citing U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1365th mtg. at p. 12, para.
54, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1365 (1994); U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess.
at p. 5, para. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65 (1996).
275 Van Boven Report, supra note 164, par. 126.

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In his report, Special Rapporteur Theodoor Van Boven concluded

that “in many situations where impunity has been sanctioned by the
law or where de facto impunity prevails with regard to persons
responsible for gross violations of human rights, the victims are
effectively barred from seeking and receiving redress and
reparation.”276 His conclusion is unsurprising, given the significant
role of reparations in ensuring that the perpetrators are held
responsible for their actions.
Certainly, states cannot claim to look after the interest of the
victims and at the same time endorse a social and political climate
where impunity prevails. This incongruity would be tantamount to a
violation of the victims’ right to effective remedy and reparations. In
Van Boven’s words, “it is hard to perceive that a system of justice
that cares for the rights of victims can remain at the same time
indifferent and inert towards the gross misconduct of
perpetrators.”277

The UN Impunity Principles

The primary instrument providing for the duty to combat
impunity is the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity
(UN Impunity Principles).278 Like the UN Reparations Principles,
this document does not impose new obligations, but only frames and
emphasizes the existing state obligations under international human
rights law. This rule is apparent in the Preamble of the Principles,
which cites the UN Charter and the UDHR as the bases for the
statement that “the duty of every State under international law to
respect and to secure respect for human rights requires that effective
measures should be taken to combat impunity.”279
In these Principles, the UN Human Rights Committee
enumerates the acts from which impunity may arise. Principle 1
states:
_______________
276 Id., par. 127.

277 Id., par. 130.
278 UN Human Rights Committee, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity,
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005 [hereinafter UN Impunity Principles].
279 Id., Preamble.

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Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to

investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished;
to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive
reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know
the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a
recurrence of violations.280

A reading of the UN Principles on Impunity reveals the close
relationship between impunity and the concepts of reparations and
the preservation of memory.

Impunity and the Right to Reparation

The provision of effective remedies and reparations for victims
has been recognized as one of the means to combat impunity.
Principles 31 and 34 provide:
PRINCIPLE 31. RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARISING OUT OF THE

OBLIGATION TO MAKE REPARATION

Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part
of the victim or his or her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the
State to make reparation and the possibility for the victim to seek redress
from the perpetrator.

x x x x

PRINCIPLE 34. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO
REPARATION

The right to reparation shall cover all injuries suffered by victims; it shall
include measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and
satisfaction as provided by international law.
_______________
280 Id., Principle 1.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
In particular, symbolic reparations are considered significant. In

his Report281 on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of
Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political),282 Special Rapporteur
Louis Joinet concluded:
On a collective basis, symbolic measures intended to provide moral

reparation, such as formal public recognition by the State of its
responsibility, or official declarations aimed at restoring victims’ dignity,
commemorative ceremonies, naming of public thoroughfares or the erection
of monuments, help to discharge the duty of remembrance. In France, for
example, it took more than 50 years for the Head of State formally to
acknowledge, in 1996, the responsibility of the French State for the crimes
against human rights committed by the Vichy regime between 1940 and
1944. Mention can be made of similar statements by President Cardoso
concerning violations committed under the military dictatorship in Brazil,
and more especially of the initiative of the Spanish Government, which
recently conferred the status of ex-servicemen on the anti-Fascists and
International Brigade members who fought on the Republican side during
the Spanish civil war.283

The Duty to Preserve Memory

Another facet of the fight against impunity involves the duty of a
state to preserve the memory of its people. In this regard, the UN
Impunity Principles requires states to combat any measure that tends
to encourage people to forget or downplay past human rights
violations. Principle 3 provides:
_______________
281 This report was accomplished pursuant to the request of the UNCHR Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities for Joinet
to undertake a study on the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations.
282 Joinet Report, supra note 235.
283 Id., par. 42.

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PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY

A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its
heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in
fulfillment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other evidence
concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate
knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving
the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against
the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.

While the UN Impunity Principles sees reconciliation and justice
as the primary goals, it is firm in asserting that these goals may not
be achieved by disregarding human rights atrocities that occurred in
the past. In fact, the principles emphasize that before true
reconciliation can be achieved, the human rights violators must be
held accountable. This dictum is reflected in the Preamble of the
instrument:
Aware that there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need
for justice is effectively satisfied,
Equally aware that forgiveness, which may be an important element of
reconciliation, implies, insofar as it is a private act, that the victim or the
victim’s beneficiaries know the perpetrator of the violations and that the
latter has acknowledged his or her deeds,

x x x x

Convinced, therefore, that national and international measures must be
taken for that purpose with a view to securing jointly, in the interests of the
victims of violations, observance of the right to know and, by implication,
the right to the truth, the right to justice and the right to reparation, without
which there can be no effective remedy against the pernicious effects of
impunity.284

Consistent with the foregoing, the UN Impunity Principles
imposes restrictions on certain rules of law like limiting the
entitlement of perpetrators to amnesties and other measures of
clemency. In Principle 24, the restrictions are imposed even when
clemency measures are “in-
_______________
284 UN Impunity Principles, supra note 278, Preamble.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
tended to establish conditions conducive to a peace agreement or to

foster national reconciliation.”285 Joinet, in his report, emphasizes
the importance of accountability in the context of reconciliation:
[T]here can be no just and lasting reconciliation without an effective

response to the need for justice; as a factor of reconciliation, forgiveness,
insofar as it is a private act, implies that the victim must know the
perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been in a position to show
repentance. For forgiveness to be granted, it must first have been sought.286

In this case, the burial of Marcos in the LNMB would be
tantamount to a disregard of the human rights violations
perpetrated by his regime. To allow it to proceed would sanction
an egregious act of impunity and allow the government to
bestow an honor that is clearly not due upon a perpetrator of
human rights violations. To allow it would be a rampant
violation of the rights of victims under international law.
In the process of mapping through the vast body of international
human rights law, each turn leads to the conclusion that the burial of
Marcos in the LNMB would be incompatible with the international
obligations of the Philippines. For the Court to permit the burial
would be to sanction these violations and allow the state to disregard
the latter’s duty to provide effective remedies to victims of human
rights violations, particularly its duty to provide symbolic
reparations and to combat impunity.

Incorporation of international law
principles in Philippine law

The foregoing principles of international law have been
incorporated in Philippine law as part of two domestic statutes
intended for the protection of human rights.
_______________
285 Id., Principle 24.

286 Joinet Report, supra note 235, par. 26.

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As discussed above, R.A. 10368 was enacted pursuant to

generally accepted principles of international law, as well as the
specific obligations of the Philippines under international human
rights laws and conventions.287 In accordance with these principles,
the statute recognized the
_______________
287 SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—Section 11 of Article II of the 1987

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines declares that the State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Pursuant
to this declared policy, Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution prohibits the use
of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will and mandates the compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices and their families.
By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Philippines adheres to
international human rights laws and conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment which imposes on each State party the obligation to enact
domestic legislation to give effect to the rights recognized therein and to ensure that
any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall have an effective
remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in an official capacity. In
fact, the right to a remedy is itself guaranteed under existing human rights treaties
and/or customary international law, being peremptory in character (jus cogens) and as
such has been recognized as non-derogable.
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to
recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary
execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human
rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and
restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and
legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their
families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered
under the Marcos regime.
Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings and damages
inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were forcibly taken over,
sequestered or used, or those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or
those whose freedom of movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the
violations of the Bill of Rights.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
“heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of

summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance
and other gross human rights violations” and vowed to “restore the
victims’ honor and dignity” through the grant of reparations to
victims and/or their families.288
The same principles were likewise incorporated in R.A. 9851,289
a statute penalizing crimes against international humanitarian law,
genocide, and other crimes against humanity. In providing remedies
for offenses under this law, courts were specifically mandated to
follow international principles relating to reparations for victims,
including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.290 The
statute also enu-
_______________
288 Id.
289 PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
GENOCIDE, AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, Republic Act No. 9851, 11
December 2009.
290 Sections 14 and 15 of RA No. 9851 state:
SECTION 14. Reparations to Victims.—In addition to existing provisions in

Philippine law and procedural rules for reparations to victims, the following measures
shall be undertaken:
(a) The court shall follow principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision,
the court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional
circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or
in respect of, victims and state the principles on which it is acting;
(b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation; and
(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall take
account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims or
other interested persons.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under
national or international law.

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merated the sources of international law that may guide the courts in
the application and interpretation of the statute. These sources
include international instruments, decisions of international courts
and tribunals, as well as writings of most highly qualified publicists
and authoritative commentaries.
The obligation of the state to provide holistic reparations for
victims of human rights violations is, therefore, enshrined in both
international and domestic laws. This obligation includes the
responsibility to provide victims with reparations — both financial
and symbolic — in recognition of their suffering and heroism. The
grant of reparations should likewise go hand in hand with the duty of
the state to combat impunity by holding perpetrators of human rights
violations accountable.
As previously discussed, the proposed burial of former President
Marcos in the LNMB contravenes these principles, because it would
_______________
SECTION 15. Applicability of International Law.—In the application and

interpretation of this Act, Philippine courts shall be guided by the following sources:
(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;

(b) The 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and
their 2005 Additional Protocol III;
(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second Protocol;
(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional Protocol on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;
(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals;
(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;
(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the
Republic of the Philippines; and
(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on
the foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
international law.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
honor the identified perpetrator of human rights violations. As such,

it would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended to be
accomplished by international and domestic principles on
reparations, i.e., to recognize and honor the sufferings of victims;
and to make amends for the physical, emotional and psychological
harm they have sustained. The burial would also perpetuate a
climate of impunity, as it would effectively disregard the human
rights violations perpetrated by Marcos and permit the state to honor
him despite his transgressions.
Clearly, the President cannot sanction the burial without going
against domestic and international principles, as well as his solemn
oath to faithfully execute the law.

IV.

Public Funds and Property Cannot be Used for the Burial as it
Serves No Legitimate Public Purpose.

On a final note, I must point out that the discretion of the
President in this case is not unlimited, as argued by respondents.
Because their proposal involves public funds and property, certain
rules must be complied with.
Respondents propose the use of a portion of the LNMB, a
national cemetery owned by the government, for the interment of
Marcos. They likewise intend to use money from the government
coffers for the preparation and maintenance of the gravesite, as well
as for military honors to be accorded to the deceased by the AFP.
Considering that public resources would be used for the
interment, it is necessary for this Court to determine if the planned
expenditures are for a legitimate public purpose. The reason is
simple — public property, including public funds, belongs to the
people.291 Hence, it is the duty of the government to ensure the
prudent use of these resources at all times to prevent dissipation and
waste.292 As a necessary corollary to these
_______________
291 Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, 714 Phil. 171; 701 SCRA 318
(2013).
292 Id.

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principles, it is settled that public property and funds may only be

used for public purposes.293
This Court has explained the nature and the meaning of the term
“public purpose” in the context of public expenditures in several
cases. It has declared that the term includes not only activities that
will benefit the community as a body and are related to the
traditional functions of government,294 but also those designed to
promote social justice, general welfare and the common good.295
This broad understanding of the public purpose requirement,
however, does not authorize the use of public funds and property for
unmistakably personal and political motives.296
Ultimately, the validity of a public expenditure depends on the
essential character of its direct object. In Albon v. Fernando,297 the
Court explained:
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of
validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the
magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may
be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by
the use of public money.298 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
_______________
293 Presidential Decree 1445 (1978), Section 4(2); Republic Act No. 7160
(1991), Section 305(b); see Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock
Securities Limited, 622 Phil. 431; 607 SCRA 413 (2009).
294 Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174; 619 SCRA 154 (2010).
295 Binay v. Domingo, 278 Phil. 515; 201 SCRA 508 (1991).
296 See Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa
sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) v. Executive Secretary, 685 Phil. 295; 669 SCRA 49 (2012).
297 526 Phil. 630; 494 SCRA 141 (2006).
298 Id., at p. 638; p. 150.

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Based on the foregoing standard, the validity of public

expenditures must be determined based on the nature of the
particular expense involved, and the public purpose sought to be
accomplished.
As will be explained in further detail, the proposed burial
would promote only the private interest of the Marcos family.
Significantly, respondents have failed to prove that any sort of public
purpose would be served by the planned interment; in fact, the event
would contravene the public purposes of the LNMB. Consequently,
the intended public expenditure cannot be allowed.

A. The burial would contravene
the public purpose of the

The government in this case proposes to shoulder the expenses
for the burial of Marcos in the LNMB, a military cemetery
maintained on public property and a declared national shrine. The
expenses contemplated are comprised of the cost of a plot inside a
military cemetery, the maintenance expenses for the gravesite, and
the cost of military honors and ceremonies.299
Generally, burial expenses are not borne by the government
because interments are customarily private affairs. However, as
exceptions to the foregoing rule, public expenditure is allowed in the
case of cemeteries that serve certain public purposes, for instance:
(a) burial grounds set aside for the indigent in the name of social
justice;300 and (b) cemeteries reserved for individuals deemed
worthy of honor and reverence, i.e., the nation’s war dead, soldiers
or dignitaries, of the government.301 The LNMB belongs to this
second exception.
Formerly known as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the LNMB
was designated by former President Ramon M. Magsaysay as the
national cemetery for the nation’s war dead in 1954. Through
Executive Order
_______________
299 TSN, 7 September 2016, pp. 220-226.

300 See Republic Act No. 7160, Section 17.
301 See Proclamation No. 425, Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine in
Jaro, Iloilo City, 13 July 1994.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
No. 77,302 he ordered that the remains of the war dead interred at the
Bataan Memorial Cemetery and other places be transferred to the
LNMB to accord honor to dead war heroes; improve the
accessibility of the burial grounds to relatives of the deceased; and
consolidate the expenses of maintenance and upkeep of military
cemeteries. He thereafter issued Proclamation No. 86,303 which
renamed the cemetery to “Libingan ng mga Bayani,” because the
former name was “not symbolic of the cause for which our soldiers
have died, and does not truly express the nation’s esteem and
reverence for her war dead.”
It is therefore evident that the LNMB is no ordinary cemetery,
but a burial ground established on public property to honor the
nation’s war dead and fallen soldiers. Further, the designation of the
cemetery as a national shrine confirms its sacred character and main
purpose, that is, to serve as a symbol for the community and to
encourage remembrance of the honor and valor of great Filipinos.304
Respondents themselves acknowledged this fact when they argued
that the LNMB implements a public purpose because it is a military
shrine and a military memorial.305
To allow the LNMB to fulfill the foregoing purposes, it has been
and continues to be the recipient of public funds and property. Not
only was the cemetery established on land owned by the
government, public funds are also being utilized for the cost of
maintenance and other expenses. The use of these resources is
justified because of the public purpose of the site. As a necessary
consequence of this principle, an expenditure that does not further
this public purpose is invalid.
Applying the foregoing standards, the proposed expenditures for
the burial of Marcos in the LNMB must be considered invalid. As
earlier
_______________
302 Executive Order No. 77, Transferring the remains of war dead interred at
Bataan Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province and at other places in the Philippines
to the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort WM Mckinley, Rizal Province, 23 October
1954.
303 Proclamation No. 86, Changing the “Republic Memorial Cemetery” at Fort WM
McKinley, Rizal Province, to “Libingan ng mga Bayani,” 27 October 1954.
304 Presidential Decree No. 105, Declaring National Shrines as Sacred
(Hallowed) Places and Prohibiting Desecration Thereof (1973).
305 Consolidated Comment dated 22 August 2016, pp. 43-44.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
discussed, Marcos was an ousted dictator and disgraced

president. Consequently, he is clearly not worthy of
commendation from the state and no public purpose would be
served by his interment therein. In fact, his burial in the LNMB
would result in a contravention of the public purpose of the site
as it would no longer be a sacred symbol of honor and valor.

B. Respondents have not explained how
the burial would serve the avowed
policy of national unity and healing.

Considering that the public purpose of the LNMB would not be
served by the interment, we must now examine the other public
purpose supposedly fulfilled by the proposal. According to
respondents, that purpose pertains to national unity and healing. In
their Comment, they contend:
Undeniably, no cadaver has polarized this nation for the longest time other
than that of the former President Marcos. Thus, President Duterte deems
that it is but high time to put an end to this issue by burying the mortal
remains of a former President, Commander-in-Chief, and soldier.
President Duterte’s decision to accord respect to the remains of former
President Marcos is not simply a matter of political accommodation, or even
whims. Viewed from a wider perspective, this decision should be dovetailed
to his war against corruption and dangerous drugs, and his recent dealings
with the CPP/NPA/NDF. All these are geared towards changing the national
psyche and beginning the painful healing of this country.306

x x x x

It should likewise be emphasized that President Duterte’s order to allow
former President Marcos’ interment at the Libingan is based on his
determination that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness, and
redound to the benefit of the Filipino people. Surely, this is an exercise of
his executive prerogative beyond the ambit of judicial review.307
_______________
306 Id., at p. 5.
307 Id., at p. 26.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
It is significant to note, however, that respondents fail to explain

how the burial would lead to national unity and healing.
Consequently, their statements remain meaningless assertions. To
emphasize, mere reference to an avowed public purpose cannot
automatically justify the use of public funds and property. This
Court must still review the validity of the declared purpose of public
expenditure, as well as the reasonable connection between the
objective and the proposed means for its attainment. Our duty to
safeguard public funds and property demands no less. To reiterate,
“[p]ublic funds are the property of the people and must be used
prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and
waste.”308
Furthermore, as previously discussed, it is the essential character
of the direct object of public expenditure that determines its
validity,309 and not the incidental advantage derived from it by the
community. Hence, assuming for the sake of argument that the
burial would bear an incidental benefit of promoting unity and
healing, this supposed benefit would not erase the reality that the
interment would principally be for the promotion of the personal
interest of former President Marcos and his family.
.
C. The burial would promote
only the private interest of
the Marcos family.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the burial would
ultimately benefit only the Marcos family. No general advantage is
derived by the public from the interment; as it stands, divisiveness
instead of unity has resulted from the plan.
The circumstances surrounding the order of the President to
allow the burial likewise reveal the political color behind the
decision. In their Comment, respondents admit that the President
ordered the burial to fulfill a promise made during his presidential
campaign.310 It must be pointed out, however, that the President
made that pledge not at any
_______________
308 Yap v. Commission on Audit, supra note 294 at p. 188; pp. 166-167.
309 See Albon v. Fernando, supra note 297.
310 Consolidated Comment dated 22 August 2016, p. 16.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
random location, but while campaigning in Ilocos Norte,311 a known

stronghold of the Marcos family. During the oral arguments held in
this case, it was also revealed that the preparations for the burial
were prompted by a letter sent by the Marcos heirs to Secretary
Lorenzana, urging him to issue the orders required for the interment
at the earliest opportunity. 312
Needless to state, the private interest of the Marcos family and
the personal objective of the President to fulfill a pledge to his
political allies will not justify the proposed public expenditure for
the burial.
Indeed, it is completely unseemly for the Marcos family to
expect the Filipino people to bear the financial and emotional
cost of burying the condemned former President even while this
country has yet to recover all the ill-gotten wealth that he, his
family, and unrepentant cronies continue to deny them.313 It is
wrong for this Government and the Marcos family to refer
human rights victims to the financial reparation provided by
Republic Act 10386 as recompense, which moneys will come, not
from the private wealth of the Marcos family, but from the
money they illegally acquired while in office, and on which the
Philippine state spent fortunes to recover. Every Filipino
continues to suffer because of the billions of unwarranted public
debt incurred by the country under the Marcos leadership;314
______________
311 Id., supra note 51.
312 TSN, 7 September 2016, pp. 165, 234.
313 See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 360 Phil. 133;
299 SCRA 744 (1998).
314 In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, supra note 80 at p.
107; p. 566, the Court stated:
The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the magnitude
of the past regime’s “organized pillage” and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with
the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer
necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made
impossible the Commission’s gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation,
whom the past regime in the process had

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and every Filipino will incur more expenses, no matter how

modest, for the proposed burial. No situation can be more ironic
indeed.

Epilogue

Stripped to its core, this case involves an order by the President
to bury a dictator — one declared to have perpetrated human rights
violations and plundered the wealth of the nation — with all the
trappings of a hero’s burial. It may not be an express declaration, as
respondents themselves concede that the President does not have the
power to declare any individual a hero, but it is a pronouncement of
heroism nevertheless. It is far from being an empty statement bereft
of significance. As respondents themselves recognize, the nature of
the office held by the President provides him the opportunity to
“profoundly influence the public discourse x x x by the mere
expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the day.”315 Clearly, the
order of the President to allow the burial is, at the very least, a
declaration that Marcos is worthy of a grave at a cemetery reserved
for war heroes, despite the objections of countless victims of human
rights violations during the Martial Law regime. It is an executive
pronouncement that his memory may be preserved and maintained
using public funds.
Justice Isagani Cruz once stated: “liberty is not a gift of the
government but the rights of the governed.”316 Throughout his
regime, Marcos trampled upon this statement by his own acts and
those of his subordinates, in a stampede wrought by the fervor to
supposedly protect the nation from lawless elements. It pitted
Filipino against Filipino, masking each face in shades of black or
white and sowing fear and terror whilst reaping a harvest of public
treasure. The nation was silenced. But people like petitioners
persevered, keeping in their hearts the essence of Justice Cruz’s
words. They fought, and the people ultimately
_______________
saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5
billion.
315 Public Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 60.

316 Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 115576, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA
152.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
rose and won back the freedom we all now enjoy. The statement
continues:
Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not
bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare.
Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its
magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but
does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a
member of the human family.317

To forget that Marcos took this right away from the citizens of
the Philippines would be the peak of intellectual and moral
complacency. As a nation of laws, we cannot tolerate anything less
than the full remembrance of a dark past from which we derive
lessons that we imbue into the legal firmament. We cannot tolerate
another instance in which our rights would be run to the ground, in
which we would lose sight of the values held in our own
Constitution, the symbols we hold dear, the aspirations we cherish.
The LNMB is revered because of the symbolism it carries. One
treatise on geography and public memory explains:
Cemeteries, as one type of memorial space, create a symbolic encounter

between the living and the dead in the form of individual gravesites and the
ritual activities taking place in the burial space. In contrast to communal
cemeteries, national cemeteries are state shrines that belong to the national
narrative of the people. The heroes buried there — most prominently
national leaders and fallen soldiers — are privileged members of the
national pantheon.318

A grave in the LNMB is a testament to the honor and valor of the
person buried therein. The Marcos family has long sought a burial
for the dictator at this site for this exact reason.
The Court cannot order that a particular event be remembered in
a particular way, but it can negate an act that whimsically ignores
legal
_______________
317 Id.
318 Foote, Kenneth E. and Maoz Azaryahu, Toward a Geography of Memory:
Geographical Dimensions of Public Memory, Journal of Political and Military
Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer), pp. 125-144 (2007).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
truths. It can invalidate the arbitrary distillation of the nation’s

collective memory into politically convenient snippets and moments
of alleged glory. The Court is empowered to do justice, and justice
in this case means preventing a whitewash of the sins of Marcos
against the Filipino people.
The burial of Marcos in the earth from whence he came is his
right, despite all that he did. However, his burial in the grave of
heroes on the impulse of one man would continue the desecration of
other citizens’ rights, a chilling legacy of the Marcos regime that
curiously survives to this very day, long after the death of the
dictator.
Respondents may deny the implications of their actions today,319
but the symbolism of the burial will outlive even their most
emphatic refutations. Long after the clarifications made by this
administration have been forgotten, the gravesite at the LNMB will
remain. That is the peculiar power of symbols in the public
landscape — they are not only carriers of meaning, but are
repositories of public memory and ultimately, history.
For the Court to pretend that the present dispute is a simple
question of the entitlement of a soldier to a military burial is to take
a regrettably myopic view of the controversy. It would be to
disregard historical truths and legal principles that persist after
death. As important, it would be to degrade the state’s duty to
recognize the pain of countless
_______________
319 In Public Respondents’ Memorandum (p. 99), it was declared:
Besides, the chapter of Philippine history on Martial Law is not written in ordinary ink. Rather,
its every word is written in the blood and tears of recognized and unsung heroes; its every page
is a Shroud that has their bloodied but valiant faces on it; and each turn of these pages echoes
their cried for freedom.
The point here is simple: the interment of the remains of former President Marcos at the
Libingan is not tantamount to a consecretion of his mortal remains or his image for that matter.
No amount of heartfelt eulogy, gun salutes, holy anointment, and elaborate procession and
rituals can transmogrify the dark pages of history during Martial Law. As it is written now,
Philippine history is on the side of petitioners and everybody who fought and died for
democracy.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
victims of Marcos and Martial Law. Regardless of the promised
national unity that the proposed burial will bring, I cannot, in good
conscience, support such an expedient and shortsighted view of
Philippine history.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Petitions.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

The petitions seek to prevent the interment of the remains of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB).
The LNMB was formerly known as the Republic Memorial
Cemetery. On 27 October 1954, then President Ramon Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 86, “changing the Republic Memorial
Cemetery at Fort WM McKinley, Rizal Province, to Libingan ng
mga Bayani.” More than a decade later, then President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 208 on 28 May 1967, excluding
approximately 1,428,800 square meters from the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation for the site of the LNMB, and reserving the
same for national shrine purposes under the administration of the
National Shrines Commission. The National Shrines Commission
was subsequently abolished and its functions transferred to the
Military Shrines Service of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office of
the Department of National Defense under Presidential Decree No.
1076, issued by then President Marcos on 26 January 1977.
On 11 September 2000, Acting Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff Jose M. Calimlim, by order of the Secretary of
National Defense, issued AFP Regulation 161-375 (AFPR G 161-
375),1 on the allocation of cemetery plots at the LNMB.
Under AFPR G 161-375, the deceased persons who are qualified
to be interred at the LNMB are:
_______________
1 AFPR G 161-375 superseded AFPR G 161-374 dated 27 March 1998, which in

turn superseded AFPR G 161-373 issued on 9 April 1986.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
a. Medal of Valor Awardees;

b. Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP;
c. Secretaries of National Defense;
d. Chiefs of Staff, AFP;
e. Generals/Flag Officers of the AFP;
f. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU
Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related
activities;
g. Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Philippine National Police (PNP);
h. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and
recognized guerillas;
i. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and
j. Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National
Defense and Chief[s] of Staff.

AFPR G 161-375 also enumerates those not qualified to be
interred at the LNMB, namely:
a. Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/

discharged from the service; and
b. Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis supplied)

In a Memorandum dated 7 August 2016, the Department of
National Defense (DND) Secretary Delfin Lorenzana ordered the
AFP Chief of Staff Ricardo Visaya to undertake the necessary
preparations to facilitate the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, in
compliance with the verbal order of President Rodrigo Duterte on 11
July 2016.
The DND Memorandum resulted in the filing of these petitions,
which oppose the implementation of the DND Memorandum for the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
I vote to grant the petitions on the ground that Marcos is not

qualified to be interred at the LNMB, and thus the Memorandum
dated 7 August 2016 of DND Secretary Lorenzana was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Marcos is disqualified from
being interred at the LNMB

Assuming that Marcos was qualified to be interred at the LNMB
as a Medal of Valor Awardee, and as a former President of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief, he ceased to be qualified
when he was ousted from the Presidency by the nonviolent People
Power Revolution on 25 February 1986.
AFPR G 161-375, which respondents rely on to justify the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, specifically provides that
“personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service” are not qualified
to be interred at the LNMB. Marcos, who was forcibly ousted from
the Presidency by the sovereign act of the Filipino people, falls
under this disqualification.

Dishonorable discharge from office

In Marcos v. Manglapus,2 the Court described Marcos as “a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country.”3 In
short, he was ousted by the Filipino people. Marcos was forcibly
removed from the Presidency by what is now referred to as the
People Power Revolution. This is the strongest form of
dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted out by the
direct act of the sovereign people.
The fact of Marcos’ ouster is beyond judicial review. This Court
has no power to review the legitimacy of the People Power
Revolution as it was successfully carried out by the sovereign people
who installed the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino.
The people have spo-
_______________
2 258 Phil. 479; 177 SCRA 668 (1989).
3 Id., at p. 492; p. 682.

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ken by ratifying the 1987 Constitution, which was drafted under the
Aquino government installed by the People Power Revolution. The
Court has been steadfast in dismissing challenges to the legitimacy
of the Aquino government, and has declared that its legitimacy is not
a justiciable matter that can be acted upon by the Court.4
As the removal of Marcos from the Presidency is no longer
within the purview of judicial review, we must accept this as an
incontrovertible fact which has become part of the history of the
Philippines. This ouster, which was directly carried out by by the
sovereign act of the Filipino people, constitutes dishonorable
removal from service. Marcos was forcibly removed from the
position as President and Commander-in-Chief by the Filipino
people. In Estrada v. Desierto,5 the Court reiterated the legitimacy
of the removal of Marcos and the establishment of the Aquino
government:
No less than the Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino

government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by
a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for
that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop.6
(Emphasis supplied)

The removal of Marcos from the Presidency, therefore, was a direct
exercise of the sovereign act of the Filipino people that is “beyond
judicial scrutiny.” It cannot be said that this removal was an
“honorable” one. Truly, there is nothing more dishonorable for a
President than being forcibly removed from office by the direct
sovereign act of the people.
_______________
4 Joint Resolution, Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines v. President Aquino,
G.R. No. 73748; People’s Crusade for the Supremacy of the Constitution v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 73972; Ganay v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73990, 22 May 1986 (unsigned
Resolution).
5 406 Phil. 1; 353 SCRA 452 (2001).
6 Id., at pp. 43-44; pp. 490-492.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Respondents argue that because Marcos was not dishonorably

discharged in accordance with the procedures and guidelines
prescribed in Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term
of Enlistment (Circular 17, dated 2 October 1987, Series of 1987, of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines), Marcos was honorably
separated from service.
I disagree.
First, Marcos was separated from service with finality, having
been forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986.
Circular 17, issued more than one year after such separation from
office, cannot be made to apply retroactively to Marcos. When
Circular 17 was issued, Marcos had already been finally discharged,
terminated, and ousted — as President and Commander-in-Chief —
by the Filipino people. Circular 17 requires certain administrative
procedures and guidelines in the discharge of incumbent or serving
military personnel. There is a physical and legal impossibility to
apply to Marcos Circular 17 since it was issued long after Marcos
had been separated from office.
Second, even assuming that Circular 17 can be given retroactive
effect, Marcos was still dishonorably discharged from service since
Circular 17 cannot prevail over the sovereign act of the Filipino
people. Marcos was ousted by the direct act of the Filipino people.
The sovereign people is the ultimate source of all government
powers.7 The Constitution specifically declares that “sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.”8 Thus, the act of the sovereign people in removing Marcos
from the Presidency, which is now beyond judicial review, and thus
necessarily beyond administrative review, cannot be overturned by a
mere administrative circular issued by a department secretary. The
reality is, more than one year before Circular 17 was issued, Marcos
had already been removed with finality from office by the sovereign
people for reasons that are far from honorable.
Circular 17, a mere administrative issuance of a department
secretary, cannot be applied retroactively to undo a final act by the
sovereign people. The power of all government officials, this Court
included, ema-
_______________
7 See Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Dumaguete, 239 Phil. 403; 155 SCRA 421 (1987).
8 Article II, Section 1, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
nates from the people. Thus, any act that runs afoul with the direct
exercise of sovereignty by the people, such as the removable of a
dictator, plunderer and human rights violator, cannot be
countenanced. The sovereign act of the Filipino people obviously
prevails over a mere administrative circular issued by a department
secretary.

Equal Protection Clause

The respondents assert that the disqualifications under AFPR G
161-375 are inapplicable to former presidents as the disqualifications
under AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military personnel and not to
nonmilitary personnel.
I disagree.
The disqualifications prescribed under AFPR G 161-375 are
reasonable per se considering that the LNMB is a national shrine.9
Proclamation No. 86 renamed the Republic Memorial Cemetery to
LNMB to make it more “symbolic of the cause for which Filipino
soldiers have died” and “to truly express the nation’s esteem and
reverence for her war dead.” The disqualifications are safeguards to
ensure that those interred at the LNMB indeed deserve such honor
and reverence.
However, to submit to respondents’ view that the
disqualifications under AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military
personnel, and that the President, even as Commander-in-Chief, is
not a military personnel subject to such disqualifications,10 negates
the purpose for which the LNMB was originally established, which
is to honor Filipino soldiers who fought for freedom and democracy
for our country. Indeed, Marcos is the very antithesis of freedom and
democracy because he was a dictator as declared by this Court.
Respondents’ view will discriminate against military personnel
who are subject to the disqualifications. Applying only to military
personnel the disqualifications will unduly favor nonmilitary
personnel who will always be eligible, regardless of crimes
committed against the State or
_______________
9 Proclamation No. 208, issued on 28 May 1967.

10 Consolidated Comment (of public respondents) in G.R. No. 225973, G.R. No.
225984, and G.R. No. 226097, pp. 54-55.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
humanity, to be interred at the LNMB as long as they are included in

the list of those qualified. This will lead to the absurd situation
where a military officer who was dishonorably discharged would be
disqualified, while a deposed President who was dishonorably
discharged through an act of the sovereign people for committing
plunder, human rights violations, and other atrocious acts would still
be qualified to be interred at the LNMB.
The term “personnel” is not defined anywhere in Circular 17 and
thus, we must refer to its common usage. Personnel is defined as
“the people who work for a particular company or organization.”11
The enumeration of the people qualified to be interred at the LNMB
includes both military (such as the Generals, Flag Officers and
Active and Retired Military personnel of the AFP) and civilian (such
as Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense, Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and widows of former
Presidents) personnel. Thus, the term “personnel” as used in the
provision for disqualifications should refer to both military and
civilian personnel. Significantly, paragraph 4 of AFPR G 161-375,
the provision which enumerates those not qualified to be interred at
the LNMB, does not use the word “military” to define personnel,
while for other provisions in the regulation, the term “military” is
specifically used to classify “personnel.”
If as respondents argue, the disqualifications should apply only to
military personnel, then AFPR G 161-375 would be a patent
violation of the Equal Protection Clause as it would indiscriminately
create unreasonable classifications between civilian and military
personnel for purposes of interment at the LNMB. Such
classification serves no purpose and is not germane to the purpose of
interment at the LNMB. The Equal Protection Clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that: “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
The Equal Protection Clause applies not
_______________
11 <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personnel?
utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld> (last accessed 14
September 2016).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
only to statutes or legislative acts but to all official state actions.12

As explained in Bureau of Customs Employees Associations
(BOCEA) v. Hon. Teves:13
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.14

To be valid, a classification must be reasonable and based on real
and substantial distinctions. The Court, in the landmark case of
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,15 held:
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which

means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.16

Thus, for a classification to be valid and compliant with the
Equal Protection Clause, it must (1) be based on substantial
distinctions, (2) be
_______________
12 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

206020, 14 April 2015, 755 SCRA 441; Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, 651 Phil. 374; 637 SCRA 78 (2010).
13 677 Phil. 636; 661 SCRA 589 (2011).
14 Id., at p. 660; pp. 609-610.
15 158 Phil. 60; 59 SCRA 54 (1974).
16 Id., at p. 87; pp. 77-78.

432

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing

conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class.17
In this case, however, there is no substantial distinction between
the military and civilian personnel, for purposes of interment at the
LNMB, that would warrant applying the disqualifications to military
personnel and not to civilian personnel.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas,18 the Court found that the rank-and-file employees of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) were unduly discriminated
against when all the rank-and-file employees of other Government
Financial Institutions (GFIs) were exempted from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) while the SSL continued to be applied to
the rank-and-file employees of the BSP. The Court held that while
the exemption from the applicability of the SSL is a privilege that is
within the prerogative of the legislature to grant, the validity or
legality of the exercise is still subject to judicial review, such that if
it is exercised capriciously and arbitrarily, the Court is duty bound to
correct it. The Court held:
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a “privilege” fully
within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent
grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the
BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy
exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or
legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. So
when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded,
it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the
power to correct. As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, once the State has chosen to
confer benefits, “discrimination” contrary to law may occur where favorable
treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though
the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment.
_______________
17 Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 229; 301 SCRA 278 (1999).
18 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-
file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination — no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of
the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP.
Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.19
(Italicization in the original)

Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are in
like circumstances and conditions must be treated alike both as to
the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case, as those
enumerated in the AFPR G 161-375 are all granted the privilege of
being interred at the LNMB, consequently, the disqualifications must
also be made applicable to all of them. There is no substantial or
reasonable basis for the disqualifications to be made applicable to
military personnel only when civilians alike may be dishonorably
dismissed from service for the same offenses.
To sustain respondents’ view would give rise to an absurd
situation where civilians, eligible to be interred at the LNMB would
have the absolute and irrevocable right to be interred there,
notwithstanding that military personnel, likewise eligible to be
interred at the LNMB, may be disqualified. There is no real or
substantial basis for this distinction. The conditions for
disqualification should likewise be applied to civilian personnel as
the privileges conferred on them — interment at the LNMB — is the
same privilege conferred on military personnel.
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 582-583; pp. 369-370. Citations omitted.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Marcos’ interment at the LNMB

is contrary to public policy

Jurisprudence defines public policy as “that principle of the law
which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.”20
The Constitution grants the Legislative branch the power to enact
laws and establish the public policy behind the law. The public
policy is prescribed by the Legislature and is implemented by the
Executive. The Executive must implement the law by observing the
highest standards of promoting the public policy. These standards
are embedded in the Constitution, international law and municipal
statutes. By these standards, the DND Memorandum ordering the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB is contrary to public policy.
Section 11, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. This public policy is further established in
Section 12 of Article III which prohibits the use of torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate free
will and mandates the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices. Also, following the doctrine of incorporation,21 the
Philippines adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Convention Against Torture. Through the provisions of the
Constitution and international law, the State binds itself to enact
legislation recognizing and upholding the rights of human rights
victims.
Congress, by enacting Republic Act No. 10368 or “The Human
Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013,”
established as a “policy of the State” to recognize the heroism and
sacrifices of victims of (a) summary execution; (b) torture; (c)
enforced or involuntary disap-
_______________
20 Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., 724 Phil. 198, 207; 713 SCRA 224, 233 (2014), citing
Avon Cosmetics, Incorporated v. Luna, 540 Phil. 389, 404; 511 SCRA 376, 393-394
(2006).
21 Article II, Section 2 states: “The Philippines x x x adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land x x x.”

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
pearance; and (d) other gross human rights violations during the
Marcos regime. Section 2 of R.A. No. 10368 states:
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State
to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of
summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance
and other gross human rights violations committed during the regime
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and
dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to
recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their
families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they
suffered under the Marcos regime. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 10368 mandates that it is the “moral and legal
obligation” of the State to recognize the sufferings and deprivations
of the human rights victims of Marcos’ martial law regime. Interring
Marcos on the hallowed grounds of the LNMB, which was
established to show “the nation’s esteem and reverence” for those
who fought for freedom and democracy for our country, extols
Marcos and exculpates him from human rights violations. This
starkly negates the “moral and legal obligation” of the State to
recognize the sufferings and deprivations of the human rights
victims under the dictatorship of Marcos.
The legislative declarations must be implemented by the
Executive who is sworn under the Constitution to “faithfully execute
the law.” The Executive, in implementing the law, must observe the
standard of recognizing the rights of human rights victims. Marcos’
interment at the LNMB will cause undue injury particularly to
human rights victims of the Marcos regime, as well as the sovereign
people who ousted Marcos during the People Power Revolution.
Marcos’ interment at the LNMB is thus contrary to public policy.
The sufferings and deprivations of the human rights victims
during the martial law era are well documented. The United States
District Court of Hawaii in In Re Estate of Marcos22 held Marcos
guilty of wide-
_______________
22 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw., 1995).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
spread human rights violations and awarded one billion two hundred
million U.S. Dollars ($1,200,000,000) in exemplary damages and
seven hundred sixty-six million U.S. Dollars ($766,000,000) in
compensatory damages to human rights victims. The judgment of
the district court was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos.23
Finally, government funds or property shall be spent or used
solely for public purposes.24 Since Marcos was ousted by the
sovereign act of the Filipino people, he was dishonorably discharged
from office. Consequently, Marcos’ dishonorable discharge serves to
convert his burial into a private affair of the Marcos family. Hence,
no public purpose is served by interring his remains at the LNMB.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos.
225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294 and
to DECLARE the DND Memorandum dated 7 August 2016 VOID
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I write this Separate Concurring Opinion to express the reasons
for my vote to dismiss the petitions assailing President Rodrigo
Duterte’s order to inter the remains of former President Ferdinand
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).
I opine that the Court cannot grant the petitions as the petitioners
presented issues that are outside our judicial authority — as defined
by law and jurisprudence — to resolve.
I am not insensitive to the plight of victims of human rights
violations, nor am I unaware of the allegations they raised against
the Marcos administration. But their emotions and beliefs cannot
and should
_______________
23 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir., 1996).

24 Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 694
Phil. 7; 679 SCRA 566 (2012).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
not influence the faithful discharge of my duties as a Member of this

Court.
The judicial power that the Court wields is symbolized by a
blindfolded lady carrying a set of scales for a reason: it bases its
decision, not on who the litigants are, nor on the clout — political,
emotional, or financial — they may carry; judicial adjudication is
based on law and evidence alone. Under this standard, I cannot grant
the petitions without knowingly crossing the line separating judicial
power from judicial overreach.
To my mind, the present petitions, however emotionally charged
they might be, do not present an actual case or controversy that
calls for the exercise of the power of judicial review.
Without an actual case or controversy, we cannot and should not
exercise this exceptional power; even our expanded jurisdiction
under the Constitution does not allow exceptions to this deficiency.
For us to indulge in this exercise would not only amount to a judicial
overreach, but could possibly thrust this Court into a political
minefield that could not be traversed without weakening the public’s
trust and confidence in our institution.
Ours is a power that emanates from the authority, granted to us
under the Constitution, to interpret and apply the law in actual and
live disputes. We exercise this power through the decisions we
render in cases presented before us; without the public’s respect and
trust in the legal soundness of our decisions, our pronouncements
would be no different from meaningless doodles that children write
on throw away papers.
Even if we were to exercise our power of judicial review in these
petitions, the exercise of our judgment should be limited by the
following considerations:
First, judicial review, even under our Court’s expanded
jurisdiction, does not empower the Court to directly pass upon
allegations involving violations of statutes;
Second, the Constitution’s “faithful execution” clause cannot be
made the basis to question the Executive’s manner of implementing
our laws;

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Third, the petitioners failed to specify any treaty obligation

prohibiting Marcos’ burial at the LNMB;
Fourth, the Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos
regime, should not be interpreted in a way that would prevent
reconciliation and the country’s move towards national unity; and
Finally, the necessity of Marcos’ burial at the LNMB is a
political question that the President has decided, and is not without
support from the Filipino electorate.
I shall discuss these points in the order posed above.

Judicial review, even under our
Court’s expanded jurisdiction,
does not empower the Court to
directly pass upon allegations
involving violations of statutes.

The petitions directly assail before this Court the President’s
decision allowing the interment of the remains of former President
Marcos at the LNMB; they impute grave abuse of discretion on
President Duterte for this decision and seek, under this Court’s
expanded jurisdiction, the nullification of his actions. By doing so,
the petitioners directly seek the exercise of our power of judicial
review.
After due consideration, I find that these petitions failed to
establish the necessity of the Court’s direct exercise of its power of
judicial review, as their cited legal bases and arguments largely
involve violations of the law or its misapplication. The remedy
available to them, given their objective, is not judicial review under
the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, but the ordinary remedies
available for errors of law under the Rules of Court.
Thus, we cannot grant to the petitioners the remedy they seek, as
their desired remedy lies outside this Court’s power to directly
provide.
The petitions collectively assert that the burial order violates
several statutes and implementing rules and regulations, among
them: AFP

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Regulations G 161-373,1 Republic Act (RA) No. 289,2 and RA

10368.3 The petitions further assert that the President’s failure to
interpret these laws, together or in relation with one another, to bar
Marcos’ burial at the LNMB, violates the faithful execution clause
and the spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Indeed, our Court now possesses the duty to determine and to act
when “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of . . . the government” exists. This is a grant
of power under the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution.
Under the expanded jurisdiction that the Constitution granted this
Court, our duty to exercise judicial review runs broad and deep; it
exists even when an aspect of the case involves a political question.
We have in fact cited this duty to justify the relaxation of the
“standing” requirement for judicial review when the case presents a
matter of transcendental importance, a standard that the Court has
formulated and self-defined to allow for the exceptional application
of our jurisdiction.
Separately from all these, I have also been pushing for an
alternative approach in invoking our expanded jurisdiction, by
recognizing that a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the government in cases involving constitutional
violations, should be sufficient to give a Filipino citizen the standing
to seek judicial remedy.
The Court’s expanded jurisdiction, however, affects only the
means of invoking judicial review, and does not change the nature of
this power at all. The power of judicial review pertains to the power
of the courts to
_______________
1 AFP Regulations G 161-373 Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the LNMB, issued

on 9 April 1986 by then AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos and then
President Corazon Aquino.
2 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL PANTHEON FOR
PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES, AND PANTHEON FOR PRESIDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES, AND PATRIOTS OF THE COUNTRY, 16 June 1948. “Section
1. To perpetuate the memory of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes
and patriots for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations
still unborn. x x x” (Emphasis by petitioner)
3 HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS REPARATION AND RECOGNITION ACT OF 2013.

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test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity
with the Constitution.4 As a requirement for its direct exercise by
this Court, the “grave abuse of discretion” that triggers the Court’s
expanded jurisdiction must necessarily involve a violation of the
Constitution.
In other words, the Court’s direct authority to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction is limited to the determination of the
constitutionality of a governmental act. Grave abuse of discretion
arising from mere violations of statutes cannot, as a rule, be the
subject of the Court’s direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction.
The petitioners’ recourse in this situation lies with other judicial
remedies or proceedings, allowed under the Rules of Court, that may
arrive in due course at the Court’s portals for review.
In the context of the present case, for the Court to directly
exercise its expanded jurisdiction, the petitioners carry the burden of
proving, prima facie, that the President’s decision to inter Marcos at
the LNMB violates the Constitution.
This view is not only in accord with existing pronouncements on
judicial review and the exercise of judicial power; it is also the more
prudent and practicable option for the Court.
Opening the Court’s direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
to acts that violate statutes, however grave the abuse of the statute
might be,
_______________
4 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 119,
128-129. Note, at this point, that judicial review is an aspect of judicial power, which
the Constitution defines as the power to “settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable”; thus the Court necessarily exercises
judicial power when engaging in judicial review, but not all exercises of judicial
power includes, or needs, the exercise of the judicial review power. Judicial review,
when approached through the traditional route, requires the existence of four
requirements, viz.: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

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significantly dilutes the doctrines of hierarchy of courts,5 primary

jurisdiction,6 and exhaustion of administrative remedies.7 In short,
the necessity for the application of these doctrines diminishes when
recourse to the Court is immediately and directly made available.
_______________
5 Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is

improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so
in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it
to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385,
February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 306.
6 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice. Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of
Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 301.
7 The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he
should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2,
2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265.

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The practice of directly accessing this Court could also possibly

add petitions that are jointly cognizable with the lower courts, to the
Court’s already clogged dockets, and deluge this Court with matters
that are highly technical in nature or are premature for adjudication.
Let it be remembered that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts;
this adjudicatory role belongs, as a rule, to the lower courts.
In these lights, I find that the petitioners’ allegations equating
President Duterte’s alleged statutory violations (when he issued his
burial order) to grave abuse of discretion, are not the proper subject
of judicial review under the Court’s direct exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction.
Assuming, hypothetically, that several statutes have indeed been
erroneously applied by the President, the remedy for the petitioners
is not the direct and immediate recourse to this Court for the
nullification of the illegal acts committed. Violations of statutes by
the Executive may be assailed through administrative bodies that
possess the expertise on the applicable laws and that possess as well
the technical expertise on the information subject of, or relevant to,
the dispute.
For these statutory violations, recourse may be made before the
courts through an appeal of the administrative body’s ruling, or by
filing for a petition for declaratory relief before the lower court with
jurisdiction over the matter. Only when these lower courts have
rendered their decisions should these matters be elevated to this
Court by appeal or certiorari; even then, the issues the petitioners
may present are limited to questions of law, not to questions of fact.

The faithful execution clause does not
allow the constitutionalization of issues
that, if proven to be true, would amount
to the violation of statutes.

Neither can I agree that the “faithful execution” clause found in
the Constitution may be used to constitutionalize issues that
primarily involve the manner by which laws are implemented.
The Constitution vests in the President the power to execute laws
under Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides:

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SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of

the Philippines.

The Constitution has apparently left out from this provision a
definition of what “executive power” exactly is, in order to give the
President sufficient flexibility and leeway in the implementation of
laws. We thus have jurisprudence recognizing the vast and plenary
nature of executive power,8 and the President’s vast discretion in
implementing laws.
_______________
8 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421

SCRA 656, for instance, the Court noted:
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice
Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual
power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this
distinction to the “unitary and highly centralized” nature of the Philippine
government. She noted that, “There is no counterpart of the several states of the
American union which have reserved powers under the United States constitution.”
Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:
. . . . The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the
government in this manner: “The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” “The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” The judicial
powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual
division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the
Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, “a grant of
legislative power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial
power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government.” If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more
appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in one official — the
president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive
branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the
chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch
can be more immediate and direct than the United States president because he is
given

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This immense executive power, however, is not without
limitations. The Constitution provides clear and categorical limits
and any violation of these limits could amount to a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the President.
The Constitution has as well defined how the President is to
relate to other officials within his own department. Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive

executed.

Through jurisprudence, we have recognized that this provision vests
in the President the power of control and supervision over all the
executive
_______________
by express provision of the constitution control over all executive departments,

bureaus and offices.
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935
Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a
strong Executive in the Philippines. Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial
law, our most recent Charter has restricted the President’s powers as Commander-in-
Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the President’s powers as Chief
Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President’s power to
forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority’s ruling
rested on the President’s . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power. [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original]

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departments, bureaus, and offices.9 The first sentence pertains to the

President’s power of control, while the latter, to his power of
supervision. His duty to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed”
pertains to his power (and duty) of supervision over the executive
branch, and when read with Section 4, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, over local government units.10 Notably, the provision
on the President’s supervision over autonomous regions follows a
similar language, thus:
SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over

autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

How laws are to be “faithfully executed” provides a broad
standard generally describing the expectations on how the President
is to execute the law. The nature and extent of the constitutionally-
granted presidential powers, however, negate the concept that this
standard can be used as basis to constitutionally question the
manner by which the President exercises executive power.
To hold otherwise is inconsistent with the plenary nature of
executive power that the Constitution envisions. The Constitution
intends as well a tripartite system of government where each branch
is coequal and supreme in its own sphere.
These intents could be defeated if the standard of “faithfulness”
in executing our laws would be a constitutional standard measuring
the manner of the President’s implementation of the laws. In the first
place, it places the Court in the position to pass upon the scope and
parameters of the vague and not-easily determinable “faithfulness”
standard. Putting the Court in this position (especially when
considered with the Court’s expanded jurisdiction) amounts to
placing it in a higher plane from where it can dictate how laws
should be implemented. In fact, it is hard to discern how the Court
can apply a standard for the faithful
_______________
9 See De Leon v. Carpio, G.R. No. 85243, October 12, 1989, 178 SCRA 457,
Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998, 295 SCRA 366.
10 See Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 201,
Taule v. Santos, G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 512.

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execution of the laws, without determining how the law should be

implemented in the first place.
Additionally, characterizing the failure to ensure faithful
execution of the laws as a constitutional violation can prove to be an
unreasonably restricting interpretation. It could possibly paralyze
executive discretion, and expose the Executive to constant lawsuits
based on acts of grave abuse of discretion he or she allegedly
committed.
Thus, the duty to “ensure that laws are faithfully executed”
should not be read as the constitutional standard to test the legality
of the President’s acts so that a legal error in the implementation of
a law becomes a constitutional violation of his faithful execution
duty.
Incidentally, the interpretation that the faithful execution clause
refers to the President’s power of control and supervision is in line
with US jurisprudence interpreting the “take care” clause of the
United States Constitution, which — as everyone knows — served
as the 1935 Philippine Constitution’s model from which our later
constitutions have not departed. Article II, Section 3 of the United
States Constitution provides:
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information

of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such
Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on
extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper;
he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the
Officers of the United States.

In the United States, the take care clause has generally been
accepted as imposing a constitutional duty on the President not to
suspend or refuse the enforcement of laws, particularly of statutes.11
_______________
11 See Garvey, Todd, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the
Enforcement of Law, September 4, 2014, available at
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43708.pdf>.

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In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,12 for instance, the US

Supreme Court characterized a provision requiring the Postmaster
General to provide backpay to mail courier providers as a ministerial
duty that the President had no authority to prevent. The US Court
arrived at this ruling in Kendall using the take care clause as basis to
prevent the President from stopping the implementation of a
ministerial duty that Congress imposed.
On the flipside, the take care clause has likewise been used to
invalidate laws that rob the President of his powers of control and
supervision over the Executive. In Buckley v. Valeo,13 for instance,
the US Court held that the Congress cannot arrogate unto itself the
power to appoint officials to an independent commission that
exercises executive powers. The reason for this ruling is the
President’s duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
While the two functions of the take care clause in US
jurisprudence could at times seem to conflict with each other (one
imposes a duty on the President, the other recognizes his authority)14
it has never been used to question the manner by which the
President’s executive power is exercised.
Notably, the President’s duty to implement laws under the take
care clause is judicially enforceable only where the statute in
question provides a clear and categorical directive to the President.
Where a statute leaves to the executive the details of its
implementation, the latter should be given sufficient leeway in
exercising its duty.
In sum, the petitioners’ insistence that the burial order’s violation
of various laws amounts to a constitutional violation involving the
faithful execution clause, rests on a very tenuous interpretation of
this clause that stretches it to its breaking point. The faithful
execution clause does not allow litigants to question — as a
constitutional violation — the manner by which the President
implements a law. The Court, for its part, has no authority to directly
resolve the alleged statutory violations that, in this case, allegedly
attended the burial order.
_______________
12 37 U.S. 524 (1838).

13 424 U.S. 1 (1970).
14 Supra note 6.

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The burial order does not violate

international law obligations.

The petitioners’ international law arguments, in my view,
likewise fail to establish the unconstitutionality of the President’s
burial order.
The petitioners argue that the burial order violates several
international law obligations, based on the Philippines’ status as a
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the Rome Statute, and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
While I agree that these international agreements (except for the
UDHR, which is a nonbinding document with provisions attaining
the status of customary international law) had been ratified by the
Philippine government and hence have the force and effect of law in
the Philippines, the petitioners failed to point to any specific treaty
obligation prohibiting Marcos’ burial at the LNMB or at any other
public cemetery.
These treaties prohibit torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,15 and recognize these acts as crimes
against humanity16 falling within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court.17 State parties to CAT are likewise obliged to
criminalize torture and take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial, and other measures to prevent torture.18 Parties also have
the obligation to investigate claims of torture19 and ensure that
torture victims have an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation.20
_______________
15 Article 7 of the ICCPR provides:

Article 7. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
16 Article 7, Section 1(g) of the Rome Statute.
17 Article 5, Section 1(b) of the Rome Statute.
18 Article 2, CAT.
19 Articles 12 and 13, CAT.
20 Article 14, CAT.

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Article 14 of the CAT, in particular, requires state parties to

“ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act
of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”
The petitioners assert that the burial order amounts to a state-
sanctioned narrative that violates the Philippines’ duty to provide a
“full and effective reparation” for human rights violations victims.
The petitioners cite as legal bases Principle 22 and Principle 23 of
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy;
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law (IHRL); Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL); and Principle 2 and Principle 3 of the
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity.
These principles, however, do not create legally binding
obligations. They are not international agreements that states accede
to and ratify, as states have not agreed to formally be bound by them.
Declarations, principles, plans of action and guidelines are
considered “soft law” because they do not bind states, although they
may carry considerable political and legal weight. They are
considered statements of moral and political intent that, at most, may
subsequently ripen into international norms.21
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of The Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for
instance, does not create new international or domestic legal
obligations, viz.:

mechanisms, modalities, procedures and
_______________
21 See The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Human Rights

Standards: Learning from Experience, pp. 11, 14-18 (2006), available at
<http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/31/120b_report_en.pdf>

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methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under

international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are
complementary though different as to their norms.

That these principles do not create obligation legally binding on
the State means that they cannot be interpreted as constraints on the
discretion of the President who acts, not only as the government’s
chief executive, but as its chief architect in foreign affairs.
Without any specific and legally binding prohibition limiting the
President’s actions, no basis exists to nullify his order and to
disregard the presumption of regularity that exists in the
performance of his duties.
Lastly, it must be considered that the burial order does not have
the effect of rewriting jurisprudence and excusing the ills of the
Marcos administration; neither does it amend Republic Act No.
10368 (“Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013”), a law that had been enacted as part of the Philippines’
compliance with its obligations in the ICCPR and CAT.
RA 10368, among others, creates a Human Rights Victims
Claims Board tasked to recognize victims of human rights violations
and to recommend their claims for reparation. RA 10368 even
recognizes the “heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were
victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary
disappearance, and other gross human rights violations committed
during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering
the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986.” The law
makes it a policy to “restore the victims’ honor and dignity” and
acknowledge the State’s moral and legal obligation to recognize
and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the
deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations, and damages they suffered
These terms and provisions, however, while critical of the
Marcos regime hardly amount to a prohibition barring the interment
of his remains in a resting place duly reserved by law for soldiers;
former President Marcos indisputably was a soldier during his
lifetime and was one long before the human rights violations
attributed to him took place. To deny him now, despite the law
entitling him to a LNMB resting place, may only lay the petitioners
to the charge that they are now doing to

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another what they have accused former President Marcos of doing

— denying another of the rule of law.

Divining the spirit of the Constitution
is acceptable only to clarify ambigui-
ties in its provisions, and not to create
entirely new provisions.

a. The Spirit of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners further argue that Marcos’ interment at the
LNMB violates the spirit of the 1987 Constitution which was crafted
as a reaction to the abuses during the Marcos regime. Limitations
and restrictions to the President’s power, in particular, had been
introduced because of former President Marcos’ abuses during his
regime. Thus, to inter him at the LNMB would amount to a violation
of the reasons underlying the Constitution.
In particular, the petitioners assert that former President Marcos’
burial at the LNMB violates two other principles enshrined in the
1987 Constitution: first, it violates Section 27, Article II of the
Constitution as the burial of a dishonest and disgraced public official
will not promote honesty and integrity in public service; second, it
violates Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution22 because it goes
against the precept that corruption is never forgotten.
Constitutional provisions, read by themselves for the principles
and precepts they embody, hardly reveal the clear intents that drove
the constitutional framers to incorporate these provisions in the
Constitution. These intents, however, are neither lost nor hidden as
they can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission which drafted the Constitution.
In this Court, we use and have used these deliberations as guides
to interpret the Constitution when there exist ambiguous or
seemingly conflicting provisions crucial to the resolution of a case.
We look to these
_______________
22 “Public office is a public trust. x x x”

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
deliberations to find the intent behind the constitutional provisions to

clarify how they should be applied.
While constitutional intent serves as a valuable guide in
undertaking our adjudicatory duties, it does not embody a right and,
by itself, is not a basis for the enforcement of a right. Neither does it
provide a standard on how the President should act and enforce the
laws, without prior reference to specific provisions or legislations
applying the intent of the Constitution.
In the context of the present petitions, without any specific
provision alleged to have been violated by the burial order, the
constitutional intents that the petitioners brought to light cannot be
used as a measure to resolve the issues that bedevil us in these cases.
Specifically, they cannot be used as basis to determine the existence
of grave abuse of discretion under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction.
As we have done by long established practice, we rely on intent only
to settle ambiguities that cross our paths in the course of reading and
considering constitutional provisions.
To go to the concrete and the specific demands of the issues at
hand, we cannot use the faithful execution clause as basis to
question the manner by which the Executive implements a law.
Neither can we interpret Article II, Section 27 and Article XI,
Section 1 to prohibit former President Marcos’ interment at the
LNMB. To be sure, these are provisions that cannot be faulted as
they enshrine honesty, integrity, and accountability in the public
service, and require government officials to exercise their functions
“with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
Despite their high minded terms, however, these provisions can
hardly be claimed as basis, in the absence of clear and concrete
legislation embodying actionable standards, for the petitioners’
claims; these provisions can only describe our aspirations for our
government and government officials, and could not have been
meant to dilute the President’s prerogatives in making his political
moves, among them, his decision on the interment of a previously
deposed president.

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It should be noted, too, that Article II, Section 27 does not appear
to be a self-executing provision. Its location, i.e., under Article II,
Declaration of State Principles, strongly hints of its non-self-
executing23 nature. The language itself of the provision obligates the
State to “take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.” Under these terms and circumstances, this provision
merely reflects a statement of an ideal that cannot be realized
independently of a concrete congressional enactment. Its goal of
maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service cannot
likewise be implemented without laws defining and promoting these
values.

b. No Express Constitutional
Bar to Interment

The Constitution was undeniably forged out of the ashes of the
Marcos regime. Its enactment after the Marcos regime collapsed,
however, does not suggest and cannot be translated into an implied
command preventing his burial at the LNMB or in a shrine of
national significance. Had such prohibition been the intent, the
Constitution’s transi-
_______________
23 In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.

122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408, 431, the Court has distinguished between
self-executing and non-self-executing provisions of the Constitution, viz.:
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.
Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of
the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
tory provisions would have specifically so provided in the manner

these provisions incorporated terms that the framers wanted to
implement within intended and foreseeable time frames.24

c. Historical Perspectives

Unfortunately, both in the pleadings and in the media, the Court
majority has been accused of being quick to forget the lessons of the
Martial Law Era. I see no point in directly answering this charge as
this Opinion has not been written to consider historical perspectives
except to the extent that they bear on the immediate business an
concern of the Court — the interpretation and application of the
Constitution.
The Court, of course, is not blind to history but is not a judge of
history; it is a judge of the interpretation and application of the terms
of the Constitution.25 When the time comes therefore when we are
tested by push and pull of history and those of the Constitution, an
answer is not difficult to make even if we are dealing with an
exceptional historical figure.
The clear and simple response is that concerns raised by the
Constitution must first be addressed; historical considerations follow
unless the constitutional concern is so affected or intertwined with
history that we cannot consider one without the other. Fortunately
for us in the present case, no such consideration requires to be taken
as the way is clear: we rule based on the standards of our
Constitution.
Based on these considerations, I believe we should not be
charged with being blind to the lessons of the past, in particular of
what transpired during the martial law era. Rather than being blind,
we simply do not look first to history in resolving disputes before us;
we look to the law as our primary guide and consideration.
_______________
24 The transitory provisions, for example, specifically laid down the rule that
after the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement, military bases, troops and
facilities shall not be introduced into the Philippines except through a treaty
concurred in by the Senate.
25 Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 671.

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Thus, if we do rule in favor of the burial of former President
Marcos at the LNMB, we do not thereby dishonor those who believe
they suffered under his regime. Nor are we unmindful of the laws
crafted in their favor; we considered these laws but they are simply
not the laws primarily relevant and applicable to the issue before us
— the interment of former President Marcos at the LNMB.

d. Considerations of Policy

I do know as a matter of law and history that the framers of our
Constitution crafted it with the intent of preventing another tyrant
from rising to power and from consolidating the State’s might for
himself. A stronger tripartite government with a system of checks
and balances became the cornerstone of our new democracy. Under
this system, each of the three branches of government performs
specific, distinct, and clearly delineated functions. The intent is to
prevent one branch from encroaching on the prerogatives of another
and to characterize any usurpation as an act of tyranny. These
constitutional principles are the policies that receive primary
consideration from us as a Court.
The Constitution vested the Supreme Court with judicial power
the power and duty to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Considering that Justices of this
Court are not elected by the sovereign people, the framers did not
see it fit to give us dominion over matters of policy.
From these perspectives, this Court is clearly not a court of
public opinion; we are court of law. With respect to matters of
policy, we have no right to substitute our wisdom over that of duly
elected political branches. They carry the mandate of the popular
will — we do not.
Under the impetus of these constitutional realities, the wisdom
of or need for the interment of former President Marcos at the
LNMB is

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
a political question26 that our President decided after an assessment
of the thoughts and sentiments of the people from all the regions in
our country; it is a policy determination that is outside the Court’s
jurisdiction to pass upon or interfere with as a matter of law.
Separately from our consideration of the Executive and its policy,
we are also aware that strong sentiments exist against the burial of
former President Marcos at the LNMB. We hear the loud and
strident voices that proclaim these sentiments. But we are likewise
aware that against the pull by those who voice these sentiments are
counterforces pulling into other directions, specifically, the pull of
the law and those of policy.
As I have already indicated, I again say that the law must prevail
under the unwavering standard we observe. But we recognize at the
same time that policy has its own demands. Ultimately, we
recognize that vowing to the raucous crowd may temporarily signify
harmony, but we do so at the expense of disregarding Executive
policy and weakening the political branches, and indeed, the very
institution of government itself.
Thus, we have no choice if we are to truly serve as guardians of
the Constitution. In the absence of any countervailing legal
considerations, we give primacy to the Executive’s policy as this is
the law — the constitutional separation of power — that we have to
fully respect.
As my last point, that the burial of Marcos had been a campaign
promise strengthens the nature of former President Marcos’ burial at
the LNMB as a political question. Voters knew of his plan to bury
Marcos at the LNMB at the time he campaigned, and might have
voted for him because or regardless of this plan. President Duterte’s
victory in the polls signifies, at the very least, the electorate’s
tolerance of his decision and, at most, the electorate’s support.
_______________
26 A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution,

are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.” Tañada v. Cuenco, No. L-10520, February 28, 1957, 103
Phil. 1051.

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In sum and without hesitation, we must now recognize that the

petitioners have failed to establish any clear constitutional breach
attendant to the President’s burial order. We must therefore respect
and abide by the Executive’s decision to allow the interment of
former President Marcos at the LNMB.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petitions, and to lift the
status quo ante order this Court issued to avoid rendering the
petitions moot and academic prior to our decision.

CONCURRING OPINION

BERSAMIN, J.:

These consolidated special civil actions (variously seeking the
writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition)1 concern the
question of whether or not the Chief Executive, in verbally
authorizing the interment of the remains of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB),
gravely abused his discretion.
I CONCUR with the MAIN OPINION so eruditely penned for
the Majority by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta. I hereby only express
my reasons for voting to dismiss the petitions, and thus to allow the
interment to proceed.
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte was sworn to office and assumed
the Presidency at noontime of June 30, 2016. In his campaign for the
Presidency, he had promised, among others, that if elected he would
authorize the interment of the remains of the late President Marcos
in the LNMB. To deliver on this promise, he verbally directed
Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana of the Department of National
Defense (DND) on July 11, 2016 to prepare the groundwork for the
interment. Secretary Lorenzana thus issued on August 7, 2016 the
assailed Memorandum directing General Ricardo R. Visaya, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philip-
_______________
1 G.R. No. 225973, G.R. No. 226117, and G.R. No. 226120 are petitions for
certiorari and prohibition; G.R. No. 225984 and G.R. No. 226097 are petitions for
prohibition; and G.R. No. 226116 prays for the issuance of the writs of mandamus
and prohibition.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
pines (AFP), to “kindly undertake the necessary planning and

preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies concerned
specially the provisions for ceremonial and security requirements”
for the interment, and to “[c]oordinate closely with the Marcos
family regarding the date of interment and the transport of the late
former President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.” In
turn, General Visaya commanded Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFP
Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez to implement the Memorandum,
and this Rear Admiral Enriquez did by transmitting on August 9,
2016 his own directive to the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army to proceed with the interment and to provide “all
necessary military honors accorded for a President.”
These events expectedly invited protests from various sectors.
The petitioners herein then initiated these consolidated special civil
actions in this Court to advance a common cause — to prevent the
interment of the remains of President Marcos in LNMB because of
the many human rights violations committed during his long regime
that included the period when he placed the whole country under
Martial Law. They mainly insisted that interring the remains of
President Marcos in the LNMB would desecrate the shrine that was
intended only for heroes.
The following should explain my vote.
First of all, the foregoing antecedents render it quite evident to
me that the interment of the remains of President Marcos in the
LNMB is a matter that exclusively pertains to the discretion of
President Duterte as the Chief Executive. The character of the
LNMB as the resting place for the war dead and other military
personnel under the care and control of the AFP has placed the
LNMB under the control of the President. Plainly enough, the
President thereby exercised such control through the AFP Chief of
Staff.
In the context of the LNMB being a military facility, the AFP has
issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 to prescribe guidelines that
enumerate the persons whose remains may be interred therein, to
wit:

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draftees and trainees who died in the line of duty, active reservists
and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations
or combat related activities;
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP);
h. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII, and
recognized guerillas;
i. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinternment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense;
National Defense and Chief of Staff are authorized to be interred at
the LNMB.

Based on the foregoing, the exercise by President Duterte of his
discretion upon a matter under his control like the interment of the
remains of President Marcos in the LNMB is beyond review by the
Court. He has not thereby transgressed any legal boundaries.
President Marcos — being a former President of the Philippines, a
Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former Senator
and Senate President, and a former Congressman — is one of those
whose remains are entitled to be interred in the LNMB under the
terms of AFP Regulations G 161-375. President Duterte was far
from whimsical or arbitrary in his exercise of discretion. I believe
that interment of any remains in the LNMB is a political question
within the exclusive domain of the Chief Executive. The Court must
defer to his wisdom and must respect his exercise of discretion. In
other words, his directive to Secretary Lorenzana is unassailable.
I must observe that the factual milieu in these cases is different
from that in the case in which the Court addressed and decided the
question of whether or not the President of the Philippines had
validly acted in

460

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
prohibiting the return of the family of President Marcos to the

country. In the latter case, the Court ruled that when political
questions were involved, the Constitution limited the determination
to whether or not grave abuse of respondent public official.2 The
foremost consideration then was that the return of the Marcoses
could dangerously impact on the nation’s peace and security. That
impact is not imminent today.
Secondly, the several laws the petitioner have invoked to prevent
the interment are not relevant to the LNMB. The main opinion fully
explains why this is so. I agree.
For instance, Republic Act No. 289, which all the petitioners
except the petitioners in G.R. No. 226120 rely upon, stipulated the
establishment of the National Pantheon as the final resting place for
former Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots to
perpetuate their memory as sources of inspiration and emulation for
the future generations. On the basis of this law, the petitioners
concerned quickly assert that the remains of the late President
Marcos do not deserve to be interred in the LNMB because his gross
human rights violations, massive corruption and plunder of the
government coffers, and other abuses during his regime rendered his
memory unworthy of perpetuation and because he could not be a
source of inspiration and emulation for future generations. Yet, the
Solicitor General has clarified that the LNMB is not the National
Pantheon referred to by Republic Act No. 289. Indeed, Proclamation
No. 431 (Reserving as Site for the Construction of the National
Pantheon a Certain Parcel of Land Situated in Quezon City) would
locate the National Pantheon in East Avenue, Quezon City, but the
establishment of the National Pantheon was later on discontinued. In
contrast, the LNMB is the former Republic Memorial Cemetery as
expressly provided in Executive Order No. 77 (Transferring the
Remains of War Dead Interred at Bataan Memorial Cemetery,
Bataan Province and at the Other Places in the Philippines to the
Republic Memorial Cemetery at Port WM McKinley, Rizal
Province). The Republic Memorial Cemetery was reserved as the
final resting place for the war dead of World War II, but President
Magsaysay renamed it to LNMB on Octo-
_______________
2 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668,
696.

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ber 27, 1954. The history of the LNMB refutes the petitioners’
reliance on Republic Act No. 289. Verily, the LNMB is not the same
as the National Pantheon.
Republic Act No. 10368 has also been cited by the petitioners.
This law recognizes the victims of Martial Law and makes
reparations for their sufferings by appropriating P10,000,000,000.00
as compensation for them. How such law impacts on the interment
of the remains of President Marcos has not been persuasively
shown.
The petitioners have not laid out any legal foundation for directly
testing the issuance of the challenged executive issuances. They
have not cited any specific provision of either the Constitution or
other existing laws that would expressly prohibit the interment in the
LNMB of the remains of one like President Marcos.
And, thirdly, AFP Regulations G 161-375 lists those who are
disqualified to have their remains interred in the LNMB, to wit:
a. Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from

the service.

b. Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude.

None of the disqualifications can apply to the late President
Marcos. He had not been dishonorably separated or discharged from
military service, or convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude. The contention that he had been ousted
from the Presidency by the 1986 People Power revolution was not
the same as being dishonorably discharged because the discharge
must be from the military service. In contrast, and at the risk of
being redundant, I remind that he had been a two-term President of
the Philippines, a Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War
II, a former Senator and Senate President, and a former
Congressman, by any of which he was qualified to have his remains
be interred in the LNMB.

462

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
SEPARATE OPINION

PEREZ, J.:

The factual and procedural antecedents are not in dispute.
On 25 February 1986, during the snap election term of Ferdinand
Marcos, Sr., the EDSA People Power Revolution transpired. With
US aid, the Former President, together with his family, was forced
into exile. On 28 September 1989, he died in Honolulu, Hawaii. Two
weeks before his death, the Supreme Court upheld then sitting
President Corazon Aquino’s firm decision to bar the return of the
Marcos family.1 In a statement, President Aquino said:
“In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr.
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility
of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will
not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the
government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall
otherwise decide.”2

Pursuant to a written agreement executed between the Philippine
Government, then represented by Former President Fidel V. Ramos,
and the Marcos family, the remains of the late strongman was
returned to the Philippines on 5 September 1993. The mortal
remains of Former President Marcos was allowed to be returned to
the Philippines, under the following conditions:
1. The body of President Marcos would be flown straight from Hawaii to

Ilocos Norte province without any fanfare;3
2. President Marcos would be given honors befitting a major, his last
rank in the AFP;4 and
3. The body of President Marcos will be buried in Ilocos.5
_______________
1 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 27 October 1989, 178 SCRA 760.
2 Id.
3 Alvarez Petition, p. 10.
4 Id.

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The Former President was eventually interred in a Mausoleum, with

his remains currently kept in a refrigerated crypt in Batac, Ilocos
Norte.
During his campaign for president in the 2016 national elections,
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly declared that he will cause
the burial of the former President in the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB). After his election as president, President Rodrigo R.
Duterte ordered the implementation of his campaign declaration. On
11 July 2016, President Duterte verbally directed Marcos’ burial in
the LNMB. In compliance with the verbal order, Secretary of
National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum dated
7 August 2016, addressed to General Ricardo R. Visaya, Chief of
Staff of the AFP, directing him to “undertake the necessary planning
and preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and security
requirements”6 and to “coordinate closely with the Marcos family
regarding the date of interment and the transport of the late former
President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.”7 Conforming
to the 7 August 2016 Memorandum, AFP Chief of Staff General
Visaya instructed Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree
Affairs Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez to issue a directive
addressed to the Philippine Army.8 According to the 9 August 2016
Directive, the Army is required to provide vigil, bugler/drummer,
firing party, military host/
pallbearers, escort and transportation, and arrival and departure
honors.9
Five different petitions, praying for a Temporary Restraining
Order to restrain respondents from proceeding with the burial were
filed and consolidated. Petitioners likewise sought the nullification
of the 7 August 2016 Memorandum and the 9 August 2016
Directive, and a permanent prohibition from allowing the interment
of the remains of Former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.
_______________
5 Ocampo Petition, p. 6.
6 Memorandum issued by Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana
dated 7 August 2016.
7 Id.
9 Id.

464

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The first petition (Ocampo petition) was filed on 15 August 2016

by Saturnino C. Ocampo, Trinidad G. Repuno, Bienvenido
Lumbera, Bonifacio P. Ilagan, Neri Javier Colmenares, Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, all of whom alleged that they were human rights
violations victims and members of the class suit in the human rights
litigation against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos in MDL No. 840,
CA No. 88-0390 in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu,
Hawaii. The Samahan ng Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at
Aresto (SELDA), an organization of political prisoners and former
political detainees in the country, also took part in the petition.
The second petition (Lagman petition) was also filed on 15
August 2016 by Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Teddy Brawner
Baguilat, Jr., Rep. Tomasito S. Villarin, Rep. Edgar R. Erice, Rep.
Emmanuel A. Billones, and the Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND). The incumbent members of the House of
Representatives sued as legislators with duties including the
protection of appropriated funds from being misused for void, illegal
and improvident activities.
The third petition (Rosales petition) was filed on 19 August 2016
by the former chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights,
Loretta Ann Paragas-Rosales; Hilda B. Narciso; Aida F. Santos-
Maranan; Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon; Zenaida S. Mique; Fe B. Mangahas;
Ma. Cristina P. Bawagan; Mila D. Aguilar; Minerva G. Gonzales;
Ma. Cristina V. Rodriguez; Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr.; Louie G.
Crismo; Abdulmari De Leon Imao, Jr.; and Liwayway D. Arce. All
the petitioners sued as victims of allegedly State-sanctioned human
rights violations during Martial Law.
The fourth petition (Alvarez petition) was filed on 22 August
2016 by Former Senator Heherson T. Alvarez; Joel C. Lamangan, a
martial law victim; Francis X. Manglapus; Edilberto C. De Jesus;
Belinda O. Cunanan; Cecilia G. Alvarez; Rex De Garcia Lores;
Arnold Marie Noel Sr.; Carlos Manuel; Edmund S. Tayao; Danilo P.
Olivares; Noel F. Trinidad; Jesus Dela Fuente; Rebecca M. Quijano;
Fr. Benigno Beltran, SVD; Roberto S. Verzola; Augusto A. Legasto,
Jr.; Julia Kristina P. Legasto, all of whom came to court Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.

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The fifth petition (Baniaga petition) was filed on 22 August 2016

by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga, John Arvin Buenaagua, Joanne Rose
Sace Lim, and Juan Antonio, also as Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
The Respondents are Honorable Salvador C. Medialdea, in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary of the Republic of the
Philippines; Honorable Delfin N. Lorenzana, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense; General Ricardo
R. Visaya, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, in his capacity
as Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Lt. Gen. Ernesto G. Carolina
(Ret.), in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO); and the heirs of Marcos.
All the contentions espoused by the five petitions pivot around
the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondents when they allowed the burial of the remains of the
Former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
All the petitioners argue that the Memorandum and Directive for
the burial mock and are in contravention of Republic Act No. 289
(An Act Providing for the Construction of a National Pantheon for
Presidents of the Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the
Country), which petitioners argue created the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. They cite Section 1 of the statute that the purpose of the
construction of the National Pantheon is “to perpetuate the memory
of all presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots for
the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations
still unborn.”10 The petitioners contend that the Former President’s
transgressions against the Filipino people hardly make him an
inspiration and do not make him worthy of emulation by this
generation and the next.11 The petitioners further aver that the public
respondents had no authority to allow the burial, considering that
only members of the Board of the National Pantheon may cause to
be interred therein the mortal remains of all presidents, na-
_______________
10 Section 1 of R.A. No. 289 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
NATIONAL PANTHEON FOR PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES AND PATRIOTS
OF THE COUNTRY).
11 Lagman Petition, p. 12; Alvarez Petition, p. 31.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
tional heroes, and patriots.12 The Board is composed of the Secretary

of Interior, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and the
Secretary of Education, and two private citizens to be appointed by
the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.13
Petitioners who took part in the Ocampo, Lagman and Rosales
petitions maintain that the Memorandum and the Directive are
inconsistent with Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013), a law which serves as an
indubitable validation by the Legislative and Executive departments
of the widespread human rights violations attributable to the late
President Marcos under his martial law regime.14 In their petitions,
great weight is attributed to Section 2 of the law, which reads:
“x x x [I]t is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize the heroism
and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution,
torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights
violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986
and restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges
its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said
victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations
and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.”15

Thus, for petitioners, allowing the burial is inconsistent with the
declared policy of the State. The Lagman Petition in particular,
espouses the view that R.A. No. 10368 amended the burial
requirements and entitlements issued by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines respecting the Libingan ng mga Bayani by excluding the
Former President from being interred therein.16 Similarly, those who
took part in the Ocampo and the Lagman petitions assert that a
hero’s burial at the Libingan ng
_______________
12 Baniaga Petition, p. 10.

13 Sec. 2, R.A. No. 289.
14 Lagman Petition, p. 15.
15 Sec. 2 R.A. No. 10368.
16 Lagman Petition, p. 16.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
mga Bayani for the Former President is contrary to public policy,

premised on the fact that he committed crimes involving moral
turpitude against the Filipino People.17
The Ocampo, Rosales, and Alvarez petitions attack the
constitutionality of the Memorandum and Directive. Petitioners
therein contend that a burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani will
amount to a denial of the history of authoritarian rule and a
condonation of the abuses committed by the Marcos Regime.18 For
those who took part in the Rosales petition, burying the Former
President at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, a place supposedly for
heroes and patriots, is to desecrate the raison d’être of the 1987
Constitution.19 That the burial of the Former President at the
Libingan ng Bayan runs counter to judicial pronouncements is
another argument raised in the Rosales and the Lagman petitions. In
support of such argument, judicial decisions of the Philippine
Supreme Court, as well as foreign courts, which established the
culpability of Former President Marcos for human rights atrocities
and plunder were cited.20
The Baniaga and the Alvarez petitions advance a related
argument, with petitioners therein maintaining that the
Memorandum and Directive are violative of the Faithful Execution
Clause of the 1987 Constitution.21 Citing Article VII, Section 17 of
the Constitution, petitioners argue that President Duterte, acting
through his alter ego, respondent Sec. Lorenzana, would not be
faithfully executing R.A. No. 10368 and R.A. No. 289 by burying
Former President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.22 The
Baniaga petition likewise argues that the Memorandum and
Directive violate the equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution,23 given that the Former President is in a different class
from the other Presidents already buried in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.
_______________
17 Ocampo Petition, p. 21, Lagman Petition, p. 12.

19 Id., at p. 29.
20 Lagman Petition, p. 17; Rosales Petition, pp. 37-44.
21 Baniaga Petition, p. 14.
22 Id., at p. 14; Alvarez Petition, p. 11.
23 Id., at p. 13.

468

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Tackling the issue from a broader perspective, the parties who

took part in the Rosales petition maintain that a burial at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani violates the international duties of the
Philippines to combat impunity and to guarantee non-repetition of
violations of international human rights law.24 Petitioners insist that
allowing the burial could potentially hinder and violate human rights
victims’ remedies and could lead to a distortion of the findings of
previous authorities thus, creating an injustice to the victims rightly
afforded a remedy from the Former President’s actions.25 For the
petitioners, such injustice would put the Philippines in violation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, specifically
Section 2 thereof, viz.:

recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been omitted by persons acting
in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
when granted.

At the core of all the controversy is AFP Regulation G 161-373:
Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the LNMB, as amended by AFP
Regulation G 161-375. The regulation was issued on 9 April 1986
by then AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos and then President
Corazon Aquino. The said Regulation provides that the following
deceased persons are qualified to be interred in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani:
1. Medal of Valor awardees;

2. Presidents or commanders-in-chief AFP;
3. Secretaries of National Defense;
_______________

25 Id., at p. 62.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
4. Chiefs of staff, AFP;

5. Generals/flag officers of the AFP;
6. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP;
7. Former AFP members who laterally entered/joined the Philippine
National Police and the Philippine Coast Guard;
8. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1896, World War I, World War II
and recognized guerillas;
9. Government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or re-interment has been approved by the
Commander-in-chief, Congress, or the Secretary of National
Defense;
10. Former Presidents, secretaries of defense, CSAFP, generals/flag
officers, dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, widows of former
presidents, secretaries of national defense and chief of staff.

In the same vein, the regulation disallows the interment in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani of the following:
1. Personnel who were dishonorably separated, reverted, and/or

discharged from the service;
2. Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude.

Petitioners who took part in the Ocampo, Rosales, and Baniaga
petitions submit that notwithstanding the fact that Ferdinand E.
Marcos was a Former President, he is disqualified from being buried
in the Libingan ng mga Bayani because he falls under the category
of “personnel who were dishonorably separated or discharged from
the service.”26 Therein petitioners emphasize that the Former
President was deposed and removed from the presidency because of
the atrocities he committed during his tenure. Insisting that such
facts are matters of judicial notice, petitioners maintain that such
removal through revolution is tantamount to being dishonorably
separated or discharged from the service,
_______________
26 Baniaga Petition, p. 11; Rosales Petition, p. 37; Ocampo Petition, p. 15.

470

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
thereby effectively disqualifying him from being buried at the

Libingan ng mga Bayani. Alternatively, the Ocampo petition attacks
the legality and constitutionality of the AFP Regulation. Petitioners
therein submit that the AFP Regulation unduly expands the
parameters of R.A. No. 289 by allowing one unworthy to be
considered an inspiration and unworthy of emulation by generations
to be buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.27
Finally, for those who took part in the Ocampo, Lagman, and
Rosales petitions, even if it be conceded that Former President
Marcos is qualified under the law and the AFP Regulation, whatever
benefits and courtesies due him have already been waived and
contracted away by the Marcos family when they agreed to bury him
in Batac, Ilocos Norte pursuant to their agreement with then
President Fidel V. Ramos. It was likewise submitted that the 1993
Agreement should be treated as a compromise agreement that was
voluntarily entered into by the Philippine Government and the
Marcos family, making it the law between the parties.28 Stated
otherwise, petitioners contend that respondents are bound to observe
the terms of the Agreement as it is a binding contract between the
parties. Petitioners insist that the High Court should take judicial
notice of such Agreement as it was an official act of the Executive
Department.29 Moreover, it is averred that an abandonment of the
Agreement, a reboot of the entire process, by allowing the burial at
the Libingan ng mga Bayani is tantamount to reliving the terror and
horrors of the victims.30
I join the opinion to dismiss the consolidated petitions for the
issuance in their favor and against the respondents, of the special
writ of certiorari. President Rodrigo R. Duterte did not gravely
abuse his discretion, was neither whimsical nor capricious when
upon assumption of the office to which he was elected he forthwith
proceeded to implement his election promise to have the remains of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos buried in the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
_______________

29 Id., at p. 67.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
This position is fixed and firmed by the origins of the petitions so

impressively presented in the petition itself in G.R. No. 225973:
“10. During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Elections

then candidate Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced that he will allow the
burial of former President Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. He reiterated this public pronouncement when he became president
without giving details on how this will be implemented, leaving the
Marcoses to process the same with the proper authorities.
11. These pronouncements were met with opposition by various sectors
including victims or relatives of human rights violations of torture, illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, disappearances and summary executions during
martial law. Family members of the thousands who died during martial law
also protested these public pronouncements with the hope that the plan will
not push through.”

As judicial admissions,31 petitioners state as fact that the burial of
former President Marcos as the Libingan ng mga Bayani is a matter
about which the Filipino public was consulted as a campaign
promise of candidate Duterte who, when he became president
redeemed the pledge.
Significantly, petitioners further admitted that they, as “the
various sectors” participated in the election of options and met with
opposition the pronouncements favoring the Libingan as burial of
Marcos’ remains and protested the public pronouncements of the
promisor.
Thus did the petitioners admit that the determination of the issue
can be, if not ought to be, left to the will of the people. True to the
ad-
_______________
31 Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Section 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may take judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the
trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other
stages of the judicial proceeding. (Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No.
154430, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 49)

472

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
mission, petitioners sought to forge that will into the shape they
hoped for. The petitioners objected against the publicly announced
Marcos Libingan burial; they protested the pronouncement. Indeed
the issue was made public and was resolved through a most political
process, a most appropriate process: the election of the President of
the Republic.32 A juxtaposition of two concepts, people and
suffrage, show this. In his treatise, as old as it is respected, Dean
Vicente Sinco expounds:
The same meaning, that of all the Citizens considered as a collective unit
acting under a majority rule, is given to the term people in an Illinois
decision which states that “in a representative government all powers of
government belong ultimately to the people in their sovereign corporate
capacity.” Obviously it is in this sense that the term people is used in the
Constitution of the Philippines when it declares in its Article II thus: The
Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
governmental authority from them.33

xxxx

Suffrage, or the right to vote, is a political right. Different views have
been expressed about its nature. One is that it is merely a privilege to be
given or withheld by the law-making power in the absence of constitutional
limitations. Another view considers it as a natural right included among the
liberties guaranteed to every citizen in a republican form of government,
and may not therefore be taken away from him except by due process of
law. A third view maintains that the right of suffrage is one reserved by the
people to a definite portion of the population possessing the qualifications
prescribed in the constitution. This view is based on the theory that the
_______________
32 Rodrigo R. Duterte garnered a total of 16,601,997 votes; 6,623,822 votes more
than his closest rival Mar Roxas who got 9,978,175 votes. The rest of the candidates
got the following votes:
Jojo Binay – 5,416,140 votes;
Miriam Defensor-Santiago – 1,455,532 votes;
Grace Poe – 9,100,991 votes;
Roy Señeres – 25,779 votes;
33 Sinco, Philippine Political Law: Principles and Concepts, pp. 8-9; 10th
edition; Article II in the 1935 Constitution is now Sec. 1 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
sovereign political power in a democratic state remains with the people and
is to be exercised only in the manner indicated by the constitution.
Consequently, a person who belongs to the class to whom the constitution
grants this right may not be deprived of it by any legislative act except by
due process of law. It is in this sense that suffrage may be understood in the
Philippines at present.34 (Underscoring supplied)

The people or the qualified voters elected as president of the
Philippines the candidate who made the election pronouncement,
objected to by the persons who are now the petitioners, that he will
allow the burial of former President Ferdinand Marcos at the
As things are, it is hardly debatable that, by word and deed,
petitioners have accepted that the issue they now, after losing the
vote, present before the Court is a political issue, defined over and
over again, by variations of phrases that have one meaning:
“. . . What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political,

and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people
in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated
to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. See State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R.
A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green
v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher v. Tuttle,
151 Ill. 41, 37N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the
Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have
no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve
political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the
Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the
powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes
the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary
acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular
matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional
government must
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 402-403.

474
Ocampo vs. Enriquez
act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling
power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the
executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the
other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special
duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain
and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of
laws and not men’-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in
any written constitutional document.” (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied)
In short, the term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.35

There were ripostes. They were feeble though; and notably they
concern not the political nature of the issue but rather the indications
of the electoral response.
There was reference to the nitpicked significance of “majority” in
the definition of “people” the argument being that the 16,601,997
votes in favor of the promising candidate is not the majority of the
total number of those who voted for the position. What makes the
observation specious is the fact that it was only candidate Duterte
who made the serious and specific promise of a Libingan burial for
Marcos. The other four candidates for president were unclear about
their preference. The votes for the four cannot be definitely counted
as against the burial.
Referring to the variety of the electoral issues, there were those
who submit that not all those who voted for Duterte did so because
they favored the burial of Marcos at the Libingan. It is contended
that the votes for Duterte were determined by items in his platform
other than
_______________
35 Tañada v. Cuenco, No. L-10520, 28 February 1957, 103 Phil. 1051.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
the burial issue. That may be plausible; but what cannot be

questioned is that Duterte did not lose because of his burial
pronouncement.
It was urged that the Libingan allowance was not a commitment
to the nation, not a principled promise, a mere propaganda pitch.
Thus, was the issue sought to be reduced as a promise made to be
broken, treacherous trap for undiscerning electors. That the
allegations are unfounded is clearly shown by the prefatory phrase in
the memorandum36 of respondent Secretary of National Defense
Delfin N. Lorenzana to respondent Gen. Ricardo R. Visaya, AFP:
In compliance to the verbal order of the President to implement his

election campaign promise to have the remains of the late former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, kindly
undertake the necessary planning and preparations to facilitate the
coordination of all agencies concerned specially the provisions for
ceremonial and security requirements. Coordinate closely with the Marcos
family regarding the date of interment and the transport of the late former
President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.
The overall OPR for this activity will the PVAO since the LNMB is
under its supervision and administration. PVAO shall designate the focal
person for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as possible.

The Marcos internment at Libingan, borrowing the petitioners’
words, was a principled commitment which President Duterte firmly
believed was so when he offered it to the Filipino voters whom he
considered capable of intelligent choice such that upon election he
had to “implement his election promise.” That, precisely, resulted in
the filing of the consolidated petitions before the Court.
Quite obviously, the petitions were submitted because the
petitioners did not prevail in the political exercise that was the
National Elections of 2016. Right away, we have the reason why the
petitions should be dismissed. The petitions with premises and
prayer no different from
_______________
36 Annex “A” (Petition in G.R. No. 225984).

476

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
those that were publicly debated, for or against, between and among
the people including petitioners themselves proceeding to a
conclusion unacceptable to them, cannot be pursued in lieu of the
failed public submission.
Adamant in their position, petitioners nonetheless went to Court
with their cause now in legal clothing. Still, petitioners cannot
thereby bring the matter within the adjudication of the Court.
There was heavy reference to R.A. No. 10368, titled “An Act
Providing for Reparation and Recognition of Victims of Human
Rights Violations during the Marcos Regime, Documentations of
Said Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes.” Notably, the petitioners, as they described themselves,
are the same persons for whose favor the statute was enacted; the
reasons they mention in their petition consisting of the provisions of
the Constitution and of the international agreement are the same
reasons mentioned in Section 2 of the statute in the “Declaration
Policy.” Quite specifically the statute defines “Human Rights
Violation” as any act or omission committed during the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 carried out pursuant to the
declaration of Martial Law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
including warrantless arrest, ASSO, PCO, PDA, torture, killing,
involuntary disappearances, illegal takeover of business,
confiscation of property, sexual offenses and “analogous” abuses.
And, it is provided that Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV)
refers to a person whose human rights were violated by persons
acting in an official capacity and to qualify for reparations “the
human rights violation must have been committed during the period
from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986.”
Clearly, as proclaimed human rights victims, they squarely fall
under the definition of R.A. No. 10368. For the same reasons and
basis that they are now before this Court, petitioners have already,
by the proper political body, been given the recognition and
reparation due them, in specific, direct and detailed provisions that
even include the creation of a Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board
to implement the recognition and reparation granted to them by
statute.
R.A. No. 10368 is a complete law. It has defined their rights, not
just for reparation for damages suffered as HRV’s but also they will

477
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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
have by the law their names enshrined in a Roll of Human Rights

Victims. A Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established in their
Honor. A compendium of their sacrifice shall be prepared and be
readily viewed in the internet. There will even be a Human Rights
Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission. The definition of what
their rights are limits any further inclusions except, perhaps, through
the same legislative action. There too is significance in the “sunset
clause” of the law which states that the Human Rights Victims’
Claims Board shall complete its work within two years from the
effectivity of the IRR promulgated by it, after which it shall become
functus officio. By its concrete and definite terms, R.A. No. 10368 is
a completed exercise of legislative wisdom. The Court cannot allow
the collected petitions at bar to interfere with that wisdom.
The urgings for judicial action inspite of the limits of R.A. No.
10368 can be gleaned from the presentation by petitioners during the
oral arguments. They testified on the details of their suffering during
the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and pleaded that the
burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani would
“retraumatize” them. They supported the claim and prayer with the
submission that their suffering accompanied by the other
commission of Marcos, was a national experience that became
sovereign contempt culminating in a revolt against Marcos and
eventually the “constitutionalization” of both sin and sinner. Hence,
the prayer that the allowance of the burial at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani of the constitutionalized offender is in grave abuse of
discretion.
Relative to the petitioners’ prayer, an explanation was made by
the Solicitor General:
Justice Caguioa:
Was this a unilateral act on the part of the President or was this a request from
the Marcos family?
Solicitor General Calida:
I do not know the circumstances in which this promise was made, Your
Honor, but if I know President Duterte, he already had a plan for the
Philippines, a plan to unite all the Filipinos of different persuasions,
ideologist, in fact, this policy of recon-

478

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ciliation is now manifested in the recent Oslo, Norway talks, Your Honor. He
wants an inclusive government, Your Honor.
Justice Caguioa:
So, what are we saying here that the testimonials made by human rights
victims and other people like them which the Claims Board has numbered at
around seventy-five thousand (75), those pain, the pain that they feel they do
not reflect the national phyche today, is that what you’re saying?
Your Honor, I’m human being I feel their pain, but we are in a Court of law,
Your Honor. And there are venues where that pain will be expressed by the
victims, and as far as I know, making them recount their horrible experience
is a form of retraumatization.
Justice Caguioa:
I understand from their testimonies and the summation made by the human
rights, what is retraumatizing them is the act of burying President Marcos, do
you dispute that?
I do not agree with that, Your Honor.
Justice Caguioa:
When the President made this decision to allow the interment of President
Marcos in the Libingan, did they also considered the injury that the Marcos
family would suffer if the burial did not take place?
x x x x
Well, the urgency, Your Honor, is that President Duterte has already stated
that among his policies, Your Honor, is the policy of reconciliation, national
healing, and any day that is, shall I rephrase if Your Honor. This is the policy
that he has adopted: the remains of Marcos should now be interred at the
Libingan even the 218 Congressmen, Your Honor, of the 15th Congress
agreed that this place is the most fitting place where former President Marcos
will be buried, Your Honor.

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Justice Caguioa:
And this wisdom, this decision is over and above the pain and sufferings of
the human rights victims do I understand that correctly as a political decision
that he made?
Well, the President will take every matter into consideration, Your Honor, and
I assume he considered that too.
Justice Caguioa:
Alright, thank you.37

Whether the policy of healing and reconciliation “over and above
the pain and suffering of the human rights victims” is in grave abuse
of executive discretion or not is answered by the evidently
substantial Marcos vote during the fresh and immediately preceding
national elections of 2016. The election result is a showing that,
while there may have once been, there is no longer a national
damnation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos; that the
“constitutionalization” of the sin and its personification is no longer
of national acceptance. A Marcos vote came out of the elections,
substantial enough to be a legitimate consideration in the executive
policy formulation. To go back, a Libingan Burial for Marcos was a
promise made by President Duterte, which promise was opposed by
petitioners, inspite of which opposition, candidate Duterte was
elected President.
All in all, the redemption of an election pledge and the policy
which has basis in the result of the election, cannot be tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. As things are the issue presented by the
petitioners should not even be touched by the Court since it is a
political question already resolved politically.
I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions before this Court.
_______________
37 TSN of Oral Arguments, Wednesday, 7 September 2016, 10:00 a.m.

480

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

The Court should not take sides in this political controversy.
The questions being truly political, there is simply no justiciable
controversy. Hence, the petitions should be dismissed.
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (President Marcos) was not, and will
never be, a hero. His interment in the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB) will not erase the atrocities committed during his
authoritarian rule. His place in history will ultimately be judged by
the people.
His worthiness as a hero, however, is not the issue at hand. The
current controversy revolves around the decision of the
administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte)
to allow the burial of the remains of President Marcos in the LNMB
in the exercise of his discretion as Chief Executive.
In the course of his campaign for the May 2016 national
elections, President Duterte promised to have the remains of the late
president buried in the LNMB as a step towards national conciliation
or healing. After winning the elections, he followed through on his
campaign promise. Pursuant thereto, the public respondents began to
take steps to implement his verbal order.
Herein petitioners, majority of whom are either victims or kin of
victims of human rights violations committed during the regime of
the deposed dictator, assert that the interment is contrary to the
Constitution, laws and regulations, and international law. The
petitioners claim that a recognized dictator, plunderer and human
rights violator has no place in the LNMB, which is reserved for
persons who are worthy of emulation or a source of inspiration.

Issues involved are truly
political questions which
are nonjusticiable

The Court has refused to take cognizance of cases which do not
present any justiciable controversy, such as when the issue presented
is a

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truly political question. In the landmark case of Tañada v. Cuenco,1

the Court expounded on the concept of political question, viz.:
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the

question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this connection,
Willoughby lucidly states:
“Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established

principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts
to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action.
Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.

x x x

In short, the term “political question” connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum
(supra), it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. [Emphases supplied]

It is true that under the present constitutional milieu, the scope of
judicial power has been expanded. Under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.”
_______________
1 No. L-10520, February 28, 1957, 103 Phil. 1051.

482

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The expanded judicial power bestowed by the Constitution is an

offshoot of the prevalence, during the Marcos regime, of invoking
the political question doctrine every time government acts were
questioned before the courts. The present Constitution, thus,
empowered the courts to settle controversies if there would be grave
abuse of discretion.
Notwithstanding the expanded power of the courts, the political
question doctrine remains operative. The present provision on
judicial power does not mean to do away with the political question
doctrine itself, and so “truly political questions” are still
recognized.2 In Francisco, Jr. v. HRET,3 the Court explicitly
recognized the political question doctrine and explained how the
same was determined:
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with truly political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) truly political questions
and (2) those which “are not truly political questions.”
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

x x x

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker
v. Carr attempts to provide some:
_______________
2 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary (2003).
3 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
. . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question
from a nonjusticiable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts
are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.4 x x x. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]

Thus, a political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 910-912; pp. 149-151.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
upon the political bodies.5 Nonetheless, even in cases where matters
of policy may be brought before the courts, there must be a showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government before the questioned act may be
struck down. “If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter
alone to decide.”6 “We cannot, for example, question the President’s
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a
presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution
under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.”7
Guided by the foregoing, it is my considered view that the
decision of President Duterte to allow President Marcos to be
interred in the LNMB is beyond the ambit of judicial review.

Interment of President Marcos
in the LNMB is a discretionary
act of President Duterte

Executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.8
Inherent in the executive power is the duty to faithfully execute the
laws of the land and is intimately related to the other executive
functions.9 Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution10 embodies
the faithful execution clause. The Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our
_______________
5 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January
21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 57.
6 Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 506-507; 177 SCRA 668, 696 (1989).
7 Id., at p. 506; pp. 695-696.
8 Section 1, Article VII of the CONSTITUTION.
9 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241,
339.
10 The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

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laws are faithfully executed.11 Thus, any act pursuant to the faithful
execution clause should be deemed a political question as the
President is merely executing the law as it is. There is no question as
to the legality of the act but on its wisdom or propriety.
Indeed, the duty to execute the laws of the land is not
discretionary on the part of the President, in the same manner that it
is not discretionary on the part of the citizens to obey the laws. In
Spouses Marquez v. Spouses Alindog,12 the Court drew a fine line
between a discretionary act and a ministerial one.
A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. Thus:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well-
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The President may also exercise his judgment in the manner of
implementing the laws. For as long as he faithfully executes the law,
any issue on the wisdom or propriety of his acts is deemed a
political question.
Moreover, the authority of President Duterte to allow the
interment of President Marcos in the LNMB is derived from the
residual powers of the executive. In the landmark case of Marcos v.
Manglapus,13 the Court had expounded on the residual powers of the
President, to wit:
_______________
SCRA 78, 159 (2010).
12 G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 460, 472.
13 Supra note 6 at pp. 504-505; pp. 694, 723-724.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as
steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the
power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by
the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. [See
Corwin, supra, at p. 153] It is a power borne by the President’s duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances
the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any
government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency] The
power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising
the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the
State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is
not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-
chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of
the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order
and security. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

To reiterate, President Duterte’s rationale in allowing the
interment of President Marcos in the LNMB was for national
healing, reconciliation and forgiveness amidst our fragmented
society, so that the country could move forward in unity far from the
spectre of the martial law regime.

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To this, however, the petitioners vehemently disagree. Thus, in

their petitions, they challenge the wisdom of the decision of the
President. They bewail, and understandably so, that Marcos was not
a hero who deserved to be buried in the hallowed grounds of the
LNMB. They view him as not worthy of being buried alongside
those who were true heroes, as they hold him responsible for the
illegal detention, arrest, torture, disappearances, and summary
executions of those who opposed his regime.
The Court should not comment on those points for now. It is not
unaware of the sufferings of the victims of human rights during
martial law. The Court, however, should defer exercising jurisdiction
when the acts of the State are challenged based on their wisdom or
propriety. It should be stressed, however, that the interment of
President Marcos in the LNMB will not bestow upon him the title of
a hero. It will not erase from the memories of the victims what have
been etched in their minds — that President Marcos was a heartless
dictator and rapacious plunderer of our national economy and
patrimony.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion

Granting that the discretionary act of President Duterte was
covered by the expanded scope of judicial power, the petitions
would still lack merit. There is absolutely no showing that the acts
of the public respondents are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.14
In the situation at hand, no grave abuse of discretion is manifest
as there is no violation of any constitutional provision or law. In fact,
the public respondents were guided by, and complied with, the law.
Under
_______________
14 Intec Cebu, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189851, June 22, 2016, 794
SCRA 266.

488

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
AFP Regulation G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment

in the LNMB:
1. Medal of Valor Awardees;

2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief;
3. Secretaries of National Defense;
4. Chiefs of Staff;
5. General/Flag Officers of the AFP;
6. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
7. Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and
the PNP;
8. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and
recognized guerrillas;
9. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress, or the Secretary of National Defense;
and
10. Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National
defense and Chief of Staff.

In the absence of any law to the contrary, AFP Regulation G 161-
375 remains to be the sole legal basis in determining who are
qualified to be buried in the LNMB.
When the public respondents based their decision on the
applicable laws and regulations, they cannot be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion. Besides, it is not for the Court
to determine who is worthy of inspiration or emulation.
It is true that the present Constitution was crafted to prevent the
occurrence of abuse prevalent during the Marcos Regime. This is
evident in numerous provisions of the Constitution such as the Bill
of Rights and the provisions under the Executive Department
limiting the power

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
to declare Martial Law. Nevertheless, the Constitution neither

expressly nor impliedly prohibits the interment of President Marcos
in the LNMB.
Moreover, the decision to allow the interment of President
Marcos in the LNMB is not contrary to R.A. No. 289 and R.A. No.
10368. As explained by the public respondents, the National
Pantheon mentioned in R.A. No. 289 was quite different from the
LNMB. As such, the standards claimed by the petitioners in R.A.
No. 289 are not applicable to the LNMB.
Likewise, the interment of President Marcos in the LNMB is not
repugnant to the avowed policy of R.A. No. 10368, which seeks to
recognize the heroism of human rights violation victims (HRVV)
during martial law. First, R.A. No. 10368 neither expressly nor
impliedly prohibits his burial in the LNMB. Second, his interment is
not incongruous with honoring HRVVs considering that the burial is
not intended to confer upon him the title of a hero. Third, the State
can continue to comply with its obligation under R.A. No. 10368 to
provide recognition and reparation, monetary or nonmonetary, to the
HRVVs, notwithstanding his burial in the LNMB.

A Final Note

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not passing judgment on
whether President Marcos truly deserves to be buried in the LNMB.
It is merely exercising judicial restraint as the issues at hand are
truly political in nature and, therefore, are best left to the discretion
of the President.
The Court sympathizes with the HRVVs and acknowledges the
harrowing ordeals they suffered in the hands of government forces
during martial law. The stigma left by the martial law regime will
never be forgotten by the Filipino people and the burial of President
Marcos in the LNMB will not rewrite history.
On the matter, however, the Supreme Court should not have a
hand. It should not resolve the issues in this truly political
controversy.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss these petitions and move on.

490

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
DISSENTING OPINION

“. . . They tore my dress and then even-
tually they let me lay down to sleep but
then early in the morning the two soldiers
who stayed near me started torturing me
again and by today’s definition, it is rape
because they fondled my breast and they
inserted a long object into my vagina and
although I screamed and screamed with
all my might, no one seemed to hear ex-
cept that I heard the train pass by . . .”
– Ma. Cristina Pargas Bawagan,
Petitioner and Human Rights
Victim of the Marcos Regime

“My mother is still alive but she was
also . . . she also undergone . . . she
underwent torture and sexual abuse and
I hope my sister is not listening right
now because she does not know this.”
– Liwayway Arce,
Petitioner and Human Rights
Victim of the Marcos Regime

LEONEN, J.:

I dissent.
Under our constitutional order, Presidents, unlike kings, earn
their honors. As Presidents are public servants, their position in itself
should not be the basis to glorify them. Neither should their place in
history be determined by a succeeding President. Only the sovereign
Filipino People deserve to determine a President’s place in history.
Given the present state of our Constitution, our laws, and our
jurisprudence, it is illegal for the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos to
be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. The Filipino People do
not deserve such a symbolism.

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Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos presided over a regime

that caused untold sufferings for millions of Filipinos. Gross
violations of human rights were suffered by thousands. The public
coffers contributed to by impoverished Filipinos were raided.
Ferdinand E. Marcos stood by as his family, associates, and cronies
engaged in systematic plunder. The national debt ballooned during
his regime.
He was eventually ousted by a public uprising. His regime and
the abuses he committed during that time led to a complete
rethinking of our constitutional order. The 1987 Constitution embeds
most of our experiences during Martial Law. It was a reaction to the
failures of governance of Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cohorts.
Ferdinand E. Marcos is no hero. He was not even an exemplary
public officer. He is not worthy of emulation and inspiration by
those who suffer poverty as a result of the opportunity lost during
his administration, by those who continue to suffer the trauma of the
violations to the human dignity of their persons and of their families.
He is certainly not worthy of emulation and inspiration by those in
public service, including the lawyers, judges, and justices who
simply want to do what is right, protect others, and conscientiously
and diligently protect public funds entrusted to them.
If we are true to the text and spirit of our Constitution and our
laws as well as our history, Ferdinand E. Marcos cannot be buried at
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. The proposal that he be accorded
public honor is contrary to law. It is a betrayal of the Filipino spirit.
Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s discretion as President is “not unconfined
and vagrant” but always “canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.”1 His alleged verbal orders to cause the interment of
the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
were whimsical, capricious, a grave abuse of discretion, and issued
only to please a single family. Ferdinand E. Marcos invented most of
his medals as a soldier. He was one of our worst Presidents.
_______________
1 National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario, et al. v. The Executive Secretary,
714 Phil. 127, 163; 701 SCRA 269, 309 (2013), citing the dissent of J. Cardozo in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En
Banc].

492

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
National healing cannot simply come when the President

pronounces it. It can only come through a process that leads to social
justice. Justice requires accountability. Justice does not come with
just forgetting. Accountability involves the recognition of the place
of the perpetrator and the victim.
The victims of Martial Law, who stood by their principles and
spoke to power, who were detained, made to disappear, tortured,
killed, molested, and raped, were the heroes. They are the “bayani.”
By law, they are our heroes.
Ferdinand E. Marcos was the perpetrator. He is not the “bayani.”
The perpetrator cannot be a hero at the same time that his victims
are heroes. This is cruel and illogical. This is impunity. This is an
assurance that our People will suffer the same gross violations of
human rights and plunder.
Our laws are not illogical. If they are, then they will be the cause
of injustice. If our laws are unreasonable, then they will violate the
“due process of law.” Certainly, this Court cannot be party to an
illogical and unreasonable interpretation of the law.
Our laws do not allow the burial of the remains of the perpetrator
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani for any or all of the following
reasons:
First, the President’s verbal orders, which were the basis for the
issuance of the questioned orders of public respondents, are invalid
because they violate Republic Act No. 289. Republic Act No. 289
was never repealed. The law covers the subject of AFP Regulations
No. 161-373 (1986),2 AFP Regulations No. 161-374 (1998),3 and
AFP Regulations No. 161-375 (2000) (collectively, AFP
Regulations).4 Yet, these AFP Regulations ignore the requirements
of Republic Act No. 289. Therefore, the basis of the Memorandum5
of Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana (Lorenzana
Memorandum) and the Directive6 of Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez
(Enriquez Orders) are ultra vires and, therefore, are null, void, and
inexistent.
_______________
2 OSG Comment, Annex 5.

3 Id., Annex 6.
4 Id., Annex 7.
5 OSG Memorandum, p. 20.
6 Id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Second, assuming without accepting that AFP Regulations were

valid when issued, still President’s verbal orders, the Lorenzana
Memorandum, and the Enriquez Orders all violate the requirement
in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 289 that those buried must have led
lives worthy of “inspiration and emulation.”
Third, assuming without accepting that the AFP Regulations
were valid when issued, public respondents gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to show that there was an examination of
the sufficiency of the facts that would reasonably lead them to
believe that the burial of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani would be in accordance with Republic Act
No. 289 or the various Proclamations that identified the location of
the Libingan, considering the findings of the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (National Historical Commission),
the provisions of our laws including Republic Act No. 10368, and
this Court’s jurisprudence.
The President’s verbal orders do not provide for a definite and
complete reason for transferring the remains of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos from its originally intended site as shown in
the agreement signed by Former Secretary Rafael Alunan III
(Former Secretary Alunan) and Imelda Marcos to the Libingan ng
mga Bayani. It was whimsical, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion, and could have been done only to accommodate the
private interest of the Heirs of Marcos.
Fourth, the President’s verbal orders, the Lorenzana
Memorandum, and the Enriquez Orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion because they violate Republic Act No. 10368,
otherwise known as the Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013.
Fifth, the President’s verbal orders, the Lorenzana Memorandum,
and the Enriquez Orders cannot be justified even under the
provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. Given the
established circumstances of the Marcos regime and the
participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos, there remains no public
purpose to the interment of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at
Sixth, the actions of public respondents are contrary to the
President’s oath of office because they encourage impunity.
Impunity is the

494

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
result of rewarding the person who presided over human rights

violations and who personally participated in the plunder of the
public treasury.

I

This case resolves Petitions for certiorari,7 prohibition,8 and
mandamus:9 (i) questioning the validity of the verbal orders of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) to bury
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani; (ii) seeking to
nullify the Memorandum dated August 7, 2016 issued by Secretary
of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana) and the
Directive dated August 9, 2016 of Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez
(Rear Admiral Enriquez) implementing President Duterte’s verbal
orders; and (iii) praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction.
The facts that frame these consolidated cases are as follows:
After World War II, the Republic Memorial Cemetery was
established in Fort William McKinley10 as a burial place for Filipino
soldiers who died during the war.11 On October 23, 1954, Executive
Order No. 7712 was issued by Former President Ramon Magsaysay
(Former President Magsaysay). The Executive Order directed the
remains of all Filipino soldiers who died in the war be removed from
their places of burial and transferred to the Republic Memorial
Cemetery, since “in the national observance of the occasion
honoring the memory of those war dead, it is
_______________
7 Petition (G.R. No. 225973), Petition (G.R. No. 226117) and Petition (G.R. No.
226120).
8 Petition (G.R. No. 225973), Petition (G.R. No. 225984), Petition (G.R. No.
226097), Petition (G.R. No. 226116), Petition (G.R. No. 226117) and Petition (G.R.
No. 226120).
9 Petition (G.R. No. 226116).
11 Memorandum (G.R. No. 226097), p. 8.
12 TRANSFERRING THE REMAINS OF WAR DEAD INTERRED AT BATAAN MEMORIAL
CEMETERY, BATAAN PROVINCE AND AT OTHER PLACES IN THE PHILIPPINES TO THE REPUBLIC
MEMORIAL CEMETERY AT FORT WM MCKINLEY, RIZAL PROVINCE (1954).

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fitting and proper that their remains be interred in one national
cemetery.”13
On October 27, 1954, through Proclamation No. 86, Former
President Magsaysay renamed the Republic Memorial Cemetery to
Libingan ng mga Bayani as the name “Republic Memorial Cemetery
. . . is not symbolic of the cause for which our soldiers have died,
and does not truly express the nation’s esteem and reverence for her
war dead.”14
On May 28, 1967, Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 208, reserving a portion of land in the Fort
Bonifacio Military Reservation for national shrine purposes.15
On January 24, 1973, Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 105, declaring national shrines to be hallowed places
and punishing their desecration, which included the acts of
“disturbing their peace and serenity by digging, excavating,
defacing, causing unnecessary noise and committing unbecoming
acts within the premises of said National Shrines[.]”16
On April 9, 1986, the Armed Forces of the Philippines issued
AFP Regulations No. 161-373,17 which prescribed the allocation of
cemetery plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. This was amended
on March 27, 1998 by AFP Regulations No. 161-374,18 and then
again on September 11, 2000 by AFP Regulations No. 161-375.19
Both amendments were issued by the Former Secretaries of National
Defense.20
In 1989, Ferdinand E. Marcos passed away in Hawaii while in
exile.21 Thereafter, in 1992, Former President Fidel V. Ramos
(Former President Ramos), on behalf of government, signed an
agreement with the Marcos Family pertaining to the return of
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ re-
_______________
13 Exec. Order No. 77 (1954), 4th whereas clause.

14 Proc. No. 86 (1954).
15 Proc. No. 208 (1967).
16 Pres. Decree No. 105 (1973).
18 Id., Annex 6.
19 Id., Annex 7.
21 Id., at p. 11.

496

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
mains.22 Under this agreement, the Marcos Family was allowed to

fly Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains to the Philippines from Hawaii,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that Ferdinand E. Marcos’
remains would be flown straight from Hawaii to Ilocos Norte; (2)
that Ferdinand E. Marcos would only be given honors befitting a
major of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; (3) that his remains
would not be permitted to be paraded around Metro Manila; and (4)
that the burial would be done in Ilocos Norte, and not at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani.23
However, before signing the agreement, and without informing
any representative of government, Imelda R. Marcos crossed out the
word “buried” and replaced it with the words “temporarily
interred.”24 Former Secretary Alunan, during the Oral Arguments on
August 31, 2016, stated that this was viewed by Former President
Ramos as a sign of bad faith:
SECRETARY ALUNAN:

The official agreement is what I personally, I officially submitted to the
President of the Philippines on August 19 which was altered by Imelda
Marcos. The following day, she sent her version of the Memorandum of
Agreement that she signed without my signature but which was disregarded
by the President. In fact, if I may share, the comment of the President when
he saw the words temporarily interred was that, this was a sign of bad
faith.25

During a press conference in May 2016, then President-elect
Duterte stated he would allow the burial of Marcos at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani:
“Look, there is the courts. Pumunta kayo ng korte kasi yung taong
hinahabol niyo, cadaver na (Go to the courts because the person you’re after
is already a cadaver). What do you want more from the guy? Patay nga
(He’s already dead) . . . . Sabi niyo si Marcos, hindi dapat diyan (ilibing)
(You said that Marcos should not be buried there). That is (on) the question
of his abuses. It is something
_______________
22 Id.
23 Id., at pp. 11-12.
24 Id., at p. 12.
25 Id., at p. 13.

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that is attached to his persona forever. Marcos might not really be a hero, I
accept that proposition, maybe. But certainly he was a soldier,” Duterte said.

. . . .

“In addition to being a president, he was a soldier. So yung sinabi mo
noong dinakip ng martial law, nandiyan ang korte (So those who were
arrested during the martial law, the courts are there for you). It’s just a
matter of distributing the award. So anong problema? Patay na yung tao.
Anong gusto niyo? (So what is the problem? The guy is already dead. What
do you want?) You want the cadaver to be burned? Will that satisfy your
hate?” he added.

. . . .

“Alam mo kapag nagbitaw ako ng salita, yun na yun. Magpakamatay na
ako diyan (If I have already uttered the words, that’s it already. I am willing
to stake my life on it). I will do things that I promised to do. I will not die if
I do not become President. I will stake my honor, my life, and the
presidency itself. Bantayan niyo ang salita ko (Pay attention to my words),”
Duterte said.26

President Duterte reiterated his position on Ferdinand E. Marcos’
burial sometime in August 2016, stating that “[a]s a former soldier
and former [P]resident of the Philippines, [he] [saw] nothing wrong
in having Marcos buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.”27
On July 11, 2016, President Duterte gave verbal orders to
respondent Secretary Lorenzana to carry out the interment of
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.28
In response to President Duterte’s pronouncements, the National
Historical Commission published a study entitled “Why Ferdinand
Marcos Should Not Be Buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani”29 on
July 12,
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 13-14.

27 Id., at p. 14.
29 National Historical Commission of the Philippines, Why Ferdinand Marcos
Should Not Be Buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, July 12, 2016
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9c6mrxI4zoYS2I0UWFENEp6TkU/view>
(visited November 7, 2016).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
2016.30 The National Historical Commission reported that Ferdinand

E. Marcos’ military records were not deserving of the honors that
would be bestowed upon him should he be buried at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani as they were “fraught with myths, factual
inconsistencies, and lies.” In particular, the National Historical
Commission found that:
1. Mr. Marcos lied about receiving U.S. medals: Distinguished Service

Cross, Silver Star, and Order of the Purple Heart, which he claimed as early
as about 1945.
2. His guerilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika, was never officially
recognized and neither was his leadership of it.
3. U.S. officials did not recognize Mr. Marcos’s rank promotion from
Major in 1944 to Lt. Col. by 1947.
4. Some of Mr. Marcos’s actions as a soldier were officially called into
question by upper echelons of the U.S. military, such as his command over
the Alias Intelligence Unit (described as usurpation), his commissioning of
officers (without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-NL presumably to
build an airfield for Gen. Roxas, his collection of money for the airfield
(described as “illegal”), and his listing of his name on the roster of different
units (called a “malicious criminal act”).31

Despite the National Historical Commission’s report, on August
7, 2016, Secretary Lorenzana issued the Lorenzana Memorandum
directing respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff
General Ricardo R. Visaya (General Visaya) “to undertake the
necessary planning and preparations to facilitate the coordination of
all agencies concerned” and to “coordinate closely with the Marcos
family” as to the transfer of Marcos’ remains to the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.32 Secretary Lorenzana designated the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office as the office of primary responsibility for the Marcos
burial.33 Reportedly, under this directive, General Visaya gave
instructions to Rear Admiral
_______________

31 Id., at p. 15.
32 Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 7; OSG Memorandum, p. 20.

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Enriquez, Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs,

pertaining to the Marcos burial.34
Thus, on August 12, 2016, the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
through its Army Chief of Public Affairs, issued a press release
entitled “Army receives interment directive for former Pres.
Marcos.” The press release stated that the Philippine Army had
received a directive from Rear Admiral Enriquez under the
command of General Visaya for the Marcos burial at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.35 It stated that under this directive, the Army was
required to provide vigil, bugler/drummer, firing party, military
host/pallbearers, escort and transportation, as well as arrival and
departure honors.36 It also stated that the Army had designated a
protocol officer to coordinate laterally with the Marcos Family
regarding the details of the Marcos burial.37
President Duterte confirmed in various interviews that he had
allowed Ferdinand E. Marcos’ interment at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani, as this was a promise he had made during his campaign for
the presidency.38
Thus, petitioners separately filed the present Petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, mainly seeking that the
execution of the Executive Department’s decision to allow the burial
of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani be reversed,
set aside, and enjoined.39 After respondents filed their respective
Comments, oral arguments were held on August 31 and September
7, 2016. The parties then filed their respective Memoranda.

II

The AFP Regulations are ultra vires. They violate Republic Act
No. 289, which is still an existing law. Therefore, the verbal orders
of the
_______________

35 Id., at p. 7.
36 Id., at p. 8.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
President, the Lorenzana Memorandum, and the Enriquez Orders

based on the AFP Regulations are null and void.
Republic Act No. 28940 creates a National Pantheon “to
perpetuate the memory of all the Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes and patriots for the inspiration and emulation of this
generation and of generations still unborn[.]”41 The National
Pantheon is, by law, intended to be the “burial place of their mortal
remains.”42 Thus:
SECTION 1. To perpetuate the memory of all the Presidents of the

Philippines, national heroes and patriots for the inspiration and emulation of
this generation and of generations still unborn, there shall be constructed a
National Pantheon which shall be the burial place of their mortal remains.

The clear intention of the legislature in enacting Republic Act
No. 289 was to create a burial place to perpetuate the memory of the
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots, for the
inspiration and emulation of generations of the Filipino People.43 An
examination of the evolution of what is now known as the Libingan
ng mga Bayani shows that it is precisely the burial ground covered
by Republic Act No. 289.
The Libingan ng mga Bayani, similar to the National Pantheon,
is there to hold the remains and “perpetuate the memory of all the
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots for the
inspiration and emulation of this generation and generations still
unborn.”
Republic Act No. 289 does not specify what the name of the
National Pantheon shall be. The Libingan ng mga Bayani may not
be called the “National Pantheon,” but nothing in Republic Act No.
289 prohibits naming the National Pantheon as the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.
Republic Act No. 289 does not specify where the National
Pantheon is to be located. Under Republic Act No. 289, the suitable
site is yet to be determined by a Board, who has the duty:
_______________
40 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL PANTHEON FOR
PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HEROES AND PATRIOTS OF THE COUNTRY.

41 Id., Sec. 1.
42 Id.
43 Id.

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(a) To determine the location of a suitable site for the construction of the
said National Pantheon, and to have such site acquired, surveyed and
fenced for this purpose and to delimit and set aside a portion thereof
wherein shall be interred the remains of all Presidents of the Philippines
and another portion wherein the remains of heroes, patriots and other
great men of the country shall likewise be interred[.]44 (Emphasis
supplied)

Wherever the mortal remains of Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots are buried is, thus, the burial place
envisioned by the legislature, subject to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 289.
The space where the Libingan ng mga Bayani is now located was
once the Republic Memorial Cemetery, which initially served as
burial grounds for the war dead.45
Prior to the law’s enactment, in 1947, the Republic Memorial
Cemetery was established as a burial ground for soldiers who died
during World War II.
While Republic Act No. 289 was effective and apparently
without the action of the Board of National Pantheon, Former
President Magsaysay issued Executive Order No. 77, transferring
the remains of the war dead to the Republic Memorial Cemetery:
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is maintaining the Bataan

Memorial Cemetery in the province of Bataan and the Republic Memorial
Cemetery in Fort Wm McKinley, Rizal Province, thereby splitting the
expenses of maintenance and upkeep therefor;

WHEREAS, there are other remains of our war dead interred at other places
throughout the Philippines which are not classified as cemeteries;

WHEREAS, the said cemetery in Bataan province and the other places in
the Philippines where our dead war heroes are interred are
_______________
44 Id., Sec. 2(a).


502

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
not easily accessible to their widows, parents, children, relatives and friends;
and

WHEREAS, in the national observance of the occasion honoring the
memory of those war dead, it is fitting and proper that their remains be
interred in one national cemetery;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order
that the remains of the war dead interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery,
Bataan province, and at other places in the Philippines, be transferred to,
and reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm McKinley,
Rizal Province.

This change — relocating the nation’s war dead to one national
cemetery — created a burial ground that, by its express purpose,
necessarily glorifies and honors those buried as war heroes. This
reinterment of all of the dead war heroes to the Republic Memorial
Cemetery transformed it the National Pantheon, covered by
Republic Act No. 289.
On October 27, 1954, Former President Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 86, changing the name of the Republic Memorial
Cemetery to express the nation’s esteem and reverence for those
buried in the cemetery, the war dead:
WHEREAS, the name “Republic Memorial Cemetery” at Fort Wm

McKinley, Rizal province, is not symbolic of the cause for which our
soldiers have died, and does not truly express the nation’s esteem and
reverence for her war dead;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare that the
“Republic Memorial Cemetery” shall henceforth be called “LIBINGAN NG
MGA BAYANI.”

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Proclamation No. 86 purposefully and expressly altered the
nature of the Republic Memorial Cemetery. The name was changed
specifically to honor those who died in the war, as “bayani,” the
heroes of war.

503
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On July 12, 1957, Former President Carlos P. Garcia issued

Proclamation No. 423, which reserved for military purposes, under
the administration of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, certain parcels of land in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque,
Province of Rizal, and Pasay City.46 Under this Proclamation, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines issued various regulations
expanding the scope of the types of individuals who could be buried
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, the nature of what once was
the Republic Memorial Cemetery changed further. The most recent
AFP Regulations, AFP Regulations No. 161-375 (2000), invoked by
public respondents, reads:
1. General: This regulation prescribes the allocation of cemetery plots and

construction of grave markers at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).

. . . .

3. Who are qualified to be interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani: The
remains of the following deceased persons are qualified and, therefore,
authorized to be interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani:
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP);
h. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and
recognized guerrillas;
_______________
46 Proc. No. 423 (1957).

504

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
i. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other

deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved
by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National
Defense;
National Defense and Chief of Staff are authorized to be interred at
the LNMB.47

Again, the Republic Memorial Cemetery was created specifically
as a burial place for the war dead,48 and then renamed to Libingan
ng mga Bayani with the express purpose of revering the nation’s war
dead.49 Now, progressing from the renaming, and under AFP
Regulations, the cemetery is no longer primarily a cemetery for the
nation’s war dead. Remains of individuals who have nothing to do
with the military — much less any war — have been interred there.
This includes, among others, three (3) former Chief Justices of this
Court,50 as well as Former Presidents Elpidio R. Quirino and
Diosdado P. Macapagal.51
As admitted by the Solicitor General, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines has determined that those who have contributed to
society, despite not having served as soldiers, may be buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
If the Libingan ng mga Bayani is a military cemetery, why is it that there is
“national artist” also included in the order?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:
Because they fall under the classification of probably dignitaries, Your

Honors.
_______________

48 Exec. Order No. 77 (1954).
49 Proc. No. 86 (1954).
50 TSN, Oral Arguments, September 7, 2016, p. 142.
51 Id., at p. 57.

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JUSTICE LEONEN:
Why single out national artists?
Because they have contributed something to society, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Maybe I will tell you because there is a law that actually allows national
artists to be interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, is that not correct?52

Unlike for national artists, the expansion of the coverage of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani is without cover of law and, in some cases,
contrary to Republic Act No. 289. For instance, the inclusion of
widows of Former Presidents or widows of Former Secretaries of
National Defense at the Libingan ng mga Bayani has no purpose and
is contrary to the nature of the Libingan.
The change of its name from Republic Memorial Cemetery to
Libingan ng mga Bayani and the scope of individuals that could be
buried through subsequent AFP Regulations are operative facts that
put the cemetery under the coverage of Republic Act No. 289. What
once may have been a military cemetery has been converted, over
time, into what is the National Pantheon envisioned by the
legislature when it passed Republic Act No. 289.
It is true that in 1953, Proclamation No. 431, entitled Reserving
as Site for the National Pantheon a Certain Parcel of Land Situated
in Quezon City, reserved a parcel of land in Quezon City for the
construction of the National Pantheon. However, this was
subsequently revoked by Proclamation No. 42, entitled Revoking
Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both Series of 1953, and Reserving
the Parcels of Land Embraced Therein Situated in Quezon City for
National Park Purposes to be Known as Quezon Memorial Park.
There is no National Pantheon in Quezon City.
The revoked attempt to locate the National Pantheon in Quezon
City does not amend Republic Act No. 289. Quezon City is not a
definitive
_______________
52 Id., at p. 152.

506

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
part of the National Pantheon, and Proclamation No. 431 is wholly

irrelevant to the validity of Republic Act No. 289.
The ponencia suggests that the lack of appropriation from
Congress for the creation of a National Pantheon shows a
“legislative will not to pursue” the establishment of a National
Pantheon. It further suggests that “[p]erhaps, the Manila North
Cemetery, the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally
distinguished private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but
without cost to the limited funds of the government.”53
The failure to provide appropriation for a law does not repeal the
law. Moreover, the failure to provide the appropriate budget for the
execution of a law is a violation of the President’s duty to faithfully
execute all laws. Certainly, the lack of appropriation does not
suspend standards laid down by the legislature in a valid and
subsisting law.
The legislative policy in Republic Act No. 289 includes
delegating the powers related to the National Pantheon to a specially
constituted board composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Secretary of
Education, and two (2) private citizens appointed by the President,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Board).54
Under Republic Act No. 289, it is the Board — not the President
directly nor the Secretary of National Defense — that has the power
to perform all the functions necessary to carry out the purposes of
the law.55
The Board is statutorily empowered to, among others:
(a) To determine the location of a suitable site. . . .

(b) To order and supervise the construction thereon of uniform monuments,
mausoleums, or tombs. . . . [and]
(c) To cause to be interred therein the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, the national heroes and patriots[.]
_______________
53 Ponencia, p. 271.

54 Rep. Act No. 289, Sec. 2.
55 Id.

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However, the Lorenzana Memorandum and the Enriquez Orders

to have the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos transferred to the
Libingan ng mga Bayani, today’s National Pantheon, were made
without the authority of the Board. Consequently, the Lorenzana
Memorandum and the Enriquez Orders are void for being ultra
vires. There is no showing that the Board recommended to the
President the burial of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan. The issuances of public respondents are ultra vires and
have no effect whatsoever. The continued implementation of these
issuances would be an act beyond their jurisdiction, or grave abuse
of discretion, because they violate existing law.
In public respondents’ opening statement, the Solicitor General
argues that the provisions of Republic Act No. 289 do not apply to
the Libingan ng mga Bayani because Republic Act No. 289 is a
“defunct law,” established by the clear expressions of the legislative
and executive will to abandon Republic Act No. 289 altogether,
namely: (1) the inaction on the part of Congress, (2) the withdrawal
of the reservation of land for the Pantheon by President
Magsaysay.56
This is not a valid legal argument.
A law cannot be repealed by inaction or tradition. Neither can a
law be repealed by a President. A President who does not follow a
law is a President that violates his or her duties under the
Constitution.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not
be excused by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary. This Court
has repeatedly held that only a law can repeal another law,57 and a
law subsists when it has not been repealed nor expressly amended
by any other law.58 Likewise, “repeals by implication are not favored
and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended.”59
_______________
56 TSN, Oral Arguments, September 7, 2016, p. 14.

57 Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994, 238 SCRA
593, 601 [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
58 See United States v. Chan Tiao, 37 Phil. 78, 84 (1917) [Per J. Torres, En
Banc].
59 National Power Corporation v. Province of Lanao del Sur, 332 Phil. 303, 323;
264 SCRA 271, 290 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

508

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
No law has been passed amending or repealing Republic Act No.

289, and no manifest intention on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 289 has been shown. It cannot be disputed;
therefore, Republic Act No. 289 is a valid and binding law.
Further, the effectivity of a law cannot be made to depend on a
future event or act. Otherwise, it would “rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed
relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know.” In Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Interport Resources Corporation:60
It is well-settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of
validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid
and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and
purposes. The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively
invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will
support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal, this Court ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that

“legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if
susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give
it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on
the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose
for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise
and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its
execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.”
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the Court underlined the importance of

the presumption of validity of laws and the careful consideration with which
the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions

and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in
the absence of a clear and
_______________
60 588 Phil. 651; 567 SCRA 354 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

509
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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This

presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the
other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make
rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers
providing general regulations for various and varying details of
management. To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would
empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying
the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating
to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know. It is well-established that administrative authorities have the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and
to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry
into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules
and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or
deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation.61 (Emphasis supplied)

The effectivity of Republic Act No. 289 does not depend on a
Board being constituted or on the naming of a plot of land as the
‘‘National Pantheon.” If a government agency creates a burial place
that clearly and factually comprises the burial place contemplated in
Republic Act No. 289, the legislative policy must still govern.
_______________
61 Id., at pp. 673-675; pp. 379-380, citing 25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811.

510

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The majority’s position is that Republic Act No. 289 can be

simply ignored by the President. The President, however, will
gravely abuse his discretion when he does.
The Solicitor General insists that the disparate histories of the
site of the Libingan ng mga Bayani and Republic Act No. 289 reveal
that the two are unrelated. Hence, the provisions of Republic Act
No. 289 do not apply to the Libingan ng mga Bayani.62
The Solicitor General starts with a narration of the history of the
land where the Libingan ng mga Bayani, as nothing but a renamed
Republic Memorial Cemetery,63 intended only to be a national
military cemetery for the interment of those who died during the
war.64 He then proceeds to insist that the Libingan ng mga Bayani
has been operating as a military shrine and cemetery.65 In his view,
the National Pantheon, on the other hand, was never constructed.66
Its intended site was in Quezon City under Proclamation No. 431.67
However, in 1954, this site was later withdrawn under Proclamation
No. 42.68
The Solicitor General implies that simply because Proclamation
No. 431 was later withdrawn by another presidential proclamation,
the law has ceased to become effective.
The Solicitor General then argues that the standards laid down in
Republic Act No. 289 do not apply to the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Public respondents point out that the standards under Republic Act
No. 289 are not stated in any of the issuances pertinent to the
Libingan ng mga Bayani, namely: Proclamation No. 208,
Presidential Decree No. 1076, or Executive Order No. 292.69 Thus,
as the National Pantheon was never constructed, public respondents
claim that “the clear inference is that former President Marcos and
President Corazon Aquino did not intend
_______________

63 Id.
64 Id., at p. 55.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id., at p. 54.
68 Id.
69 Id., at p. 56.

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to adopt said standards for those to be interred at the Libingan ng

mga Bayani.”70
The position of the Solicitor General is legally untenable and
logically unsound. Presidents who do not follow the law do not
repeal that law. Laws can only be repealed by a subsequent law.
Again, that Republic Act No. 289 was ignored in the past does not
give legal justification for the present administration to likewise
violate the law.
Republic Act No. 289 does not specify the location of the
National Pantheon. It could be anywhere. The defining characteristic
of the National Pantheon is that it shall be the burial place of the
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.71
The AFP Regulations, on the other hand, provide that the
remains of the following may be buried at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani: (1) Medal of Valor Awardees; (2) Presidents or
Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; (3)
Secretaries of National Defense; (4) Chiefs of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; (5) General flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; (6) Active and retired military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; (7) Veterans of the
Philippine Revolution of 1896, World War I, World War II, and
recognized guerrillas; (8) government dignitaries, statesmen,
national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress, or the Secretary of National Defense; and (9) Former
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, CSAFP, generals/flag officers,
dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, widows of former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense, and Chiefs of Staff.72
A plain reading of the AFP Regulations reveals that although it
does not refer to Republic Act No. 289, it nonetheless provides for
the burial of individuals who would properly be covered by
Republic Act No. 289. The AFP Regulations define a burial place,
which is the burial place provided for under Republic Act No. 289.
_______________
70 Id.
71 Rep. Act No. 289, Sec. 1.

512

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The executive cannot avoid carrying out a valid and subsisting

law by passing regulations substantially covering a matter that is
already a law and excuse itself from complying with the law on the
premise that it — a law that the executive never implemented — is
now defunct.
Under Republic Act No. 289, only the Board is authorized to set
aside portions of the National Pantheon where the remains of the
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots shall be
interred,73 to cause to be interred in the National Pantheon the
mortal remains of Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and
patriots,74 and to perform such other functions as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this law.75
Having been issued by Secretary Lorenzana, General Visaya, and
Rear Admiral Enriquez without the authority of the Board, the
General Lorenzana Memorandum and the Enriquez Orders are void
for being ultra vires.

III

Assuming without accepting that respondents Secretary
Lorenzana, General Visaya, and Rear Admiral Enriquez had the
authority to determine who may be interred at Libingan ng mga
Bayani, the Lorenzana Memorandum and the Enriquez Orders are
nonetheless invalid.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 289, those buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani must have led lives worthy of “inspiration
and emulation.”
Ferdinand E. Marcos does not meet this standard.
Our jurisprudence clearly shows that Ferdinand E. Marcos does
not even come close to being one who will inspire. His example
should not be emulated by this generation, or by generations yet to
come.
_______________
73 Rep. Act No. 289, Sec. 2(a).

74 Id., Sec. 2(c).
75 Id., Sec. 2(e).

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Ferdinand E. Marcos has been characterized as an authoritarian

by this Court in nine (9) Decisions76 and 9 Separate Opinions.77 He
was called a dictator in 19 Decisions78 and 16 Separate Opinions.79
That he
_______________
76 Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479; 177 SCRA 668 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En
Banc]; Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42; 144 SCRA 43 (1986) [Per CJ.
Teehankee, En Banc]; Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526; 668 SCRA 504
(2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]; People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774; 354 SCRA 310
(2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division]; Buscayno v. Enrile, 190 Phil. 7; 102
SCRA 7 (1981) [Per CJ. Fernando, En Banc]; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil.
1059; 406 SCRA 190 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]; Republic v. Villarama, Jr., 344
Phil. 288; 278 SCRA 736 (1997) [Per J. Davide Jr., Third Division]; Salazar v.
Achacoso, 262 Phil. 160; 183 SCRA 145 (1990) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc];
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374; 637 SCRA 78 (2010)
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
77 J. Gutierrez, Jr., Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Manglapus, id., at pp. 513-
526; pp. 702-714; J. Francisco, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Dans, Jr. v.
People, 349 Phil. 434, 477-513; 285 SCRA 504, 571-579 (1998) [Per J. Romero,
Third Division]; J. Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 375 Phil. 697, 748-754; 317
SCRA 272, 323-327 (1999) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; J. Vitug, Dissenting
Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412
Phil. 308, 347-356; 359 SCRA 698, 733-741 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; J.
Sarmiento, Dissenting Opinion in Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266, 332-344; 202 SCRA
251, 297-309 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; J. Davide, Separate Opinion in People’s
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 129754, September 23, 1997 [Unsigned Resolution, En Banc]; J. Puno, Separate
Opinion in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 551-630; 407 SCRA 10, 61-
134 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; J. Sarmiento, Dissenting Opinion in Baylosis v.
Chavez, Jr., 279 Phil. 448, 470-483; 202 SCRA 405, 421-433 (1991) [J. Narvasa, En
Banc]; J. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Tan v. Commission on Elections, 226
Phil. 624, 648-651; 142 SCRA 727, 752-754 (1986) [Per J. Alampay, En Banc].
78 Marcos v. Manglapus, id.; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 565 Phil. 172; 540
SCRA 431 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Republic v. Estate of Hans
Menzi, 512 Phil. 425; 476 SCRA 20 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Fortun v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, supra; Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 255 Phil. 934; 174
SCRA 245 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]; First Philippine Holdings Corp. v. Trans
Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc., 622 Phil. 623; 607 SCRA 605 (2009) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; Associated Bank v. Montano, Sr., 619 Phil. 128;

514

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
_______________
604 SCRA 134 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; National Development
Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 270 Phil. 349; 192 SCRA 257 (1990) [Per J.
Cruz, En Banc]; Dizon v. Eduardo, 242 Phil. 200; 158 SCRA 470 (1988) [Per CJ.
Teehankee, En Banc]; People v. Pacificador, supra note 76; Philippine National
Construction Corporation v. Pabion, 377 Phil. 101; 320 SCRA 188 (1999) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521;
257 SCRA 727 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. No. 217126, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil.
510; 440 SCRA 483 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Philippine Free
Press, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 510 Phil. 411; 473 SCRA 639 (2005) [Per J. Garcia,
Third Division]; Taruc v. Ericta, 250 Phil. 65; 168 SCRA 63 (1989) [Per J. Paras, En
Banc]; Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 357 Phil. 762; 297 SCRA 95
(1998) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc]; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 76;
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 76.
79 J. Cruz, Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Manglapus, 258-A Phil. 547, 555;
178 SCRA 760, 765-766 (1989) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; J. Padilla, Dissenting
Opinion in Marcos v. Manglapus, id., at pp. 556-558; pp. 767-768; J. Sarmiento,
Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Manglapus, id., at pp. 559-560; pp. 722-729; CJ.
Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 234 Phil.
144, 164-179; 150 SCRA 144, 166-180 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]; J.
Davide, Dissenting Opinion in Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 335 Phil. 795, 878-886;
268 SCRA 332, 404-414 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc]; J. Panganiban,
Dissenting Opinion in Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, id., at pp. 911-913; pp. 438-441; J.
Kapunan, Dissenting Opinion in Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 95-107; 357 SCRA
756, 767-779 (2001) [Per J. Melo, En Banc]; J. Cruz, Separate Opinion in Umil v.
Ramos, supra note 77 at pp. 306-311; pp. 280-284; J. Sarmiento, Dissenting Opinion
in Umil v. Ramos, supra note 77 at pp. 332-344; pp. 297-309; J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Dissenting Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482, 534-548; 421
SCRA 656, 690-702 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Concurring Opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 536 Phil. 1, 154-186;
505 SCRA 160, 384-415 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; J. Puno, Separate Opinion
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 77; J. Cruz, Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion in Umil v. Ramos, 265 Phil. 325, 355; 187 SCRA 311, 334-335 (1990) [Per
Curiam, En Banc]; J. Sarmiento, Dissenting Opinion in Umil v. Ramos, id., at pp.
355-365; pp. 337-346; CJ. Panganiban, Concurring Opinion in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 812-813; 489 SCRA 160, 276-277 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-

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was unceremoniously deposed as President or dictator by a direct act

of the People was stressed in 16 Decisions80 and six (6) Separate
Opinions.81
_______________
Gutierrez, En Banc]; J. Cruz, Dissenting Opinion in Sarmiento, III v. Mison, 240 Phil.
505, 541-546; 156 SCRA 549, 577-581 (1987) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
80 Marcos v. Manglapus, id.; Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 681 Phil. 380; 665
SCRA 367 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division]; E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports
Authority, 235 Phil. 223; 151 SCRA 233 (1987) [Per J. Fernan, En Banc];
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 243 Phil. 93; 159 SCRA 556
(1988) [Per CJ. Teehankee, En Banc]; Liwayway Publishing, Inc. v. PCGG, 243 Phil.
864; 160 SCRA 716 (1988) [Per CJ. Teehankee, En Banc]; Quisumbing v.
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 591 Phil. 633; 571 SCRA 7 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-
Morales, Second Division]; Samahang Manggagawa ng Rizal Park v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 94372, June 21, 1991, 198 SCRA 480 [Per J. Cruz, First Division]; Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 138; 460 SCRA 146 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Third Division]; Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, 258-A Phil. 1; 178 SCRA 236 (1989)
[Per J. Narvasa, En Banc]; Cuenca v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
561 Phil. 235; 535 SCRA 102 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division];
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226
SCRA 408 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; Sison v. People, 320 Phil. 112; 250 SCRA 58
(1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC) v. Africa, G.R. No. 184622, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 453 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division]; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, 278 Phil. 544; 201 SCRA 536
(1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc]; Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 310 Phil.
402; 240 SCRA 379 (1995) [Per CJ. Narvasa, En Banc]; Secretary of Finance v.
Ilarde, 497 Phil. 544; 458 SCRA 218 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
81 CJ. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co.,
Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 234 Phil. 180, 238-249; 150
SCRA 181, 241-252 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc]; J. Bersamin, Concurring
Opinion in Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr., 689 Phil. 149, 173-179; 674 SCRA 492, 509-
516 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]; CJ. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Tuason v.
Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, 241 Phil. 650, 663-665; 157 SCRA 613, 623-625
(1988) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc]; J. Kapunan, Dissenting Opinion in Lacson v. Perez,
supra note 79 at pp. 95-107; pp. 767-779; J. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in
Agcaoili v. Enrile, 226 Phil. 611, 622-624; 142 SCRA 714, 724-727 (1986) [Per J.
Narvasa, En Banc]; J. Cruz, Dissenting Opinion in Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118 [Per J.
Romero, En Banc].

516

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
This Court has also declared that the amount of US$658,175,373.60,

in Swiss deposits under the name of the Marcoses, was ill-gotten
wealth that should be forfeited in favor of the State.82
For instance, a powerful portrait of the despotic power exercised
by Marcos during Martial Law was presented in Dizon v. Eduardo:83
Senator Diokno passed away a year ago last February 27th. He, together
with the martyred Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. were the first
victims of martial law imposed in September 1972 by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, destroying in one fell swoop the Philippines’ 75 years
of stable democratic traditions and established reputation as the showcase of
democracy in Asia. They were the first to be arrested in the dark of the night
of September 22, 1972, as the military authorities spread out through the
metropolis upon orders of the President-turned-dictator to lock up the
opposition together with newspaper editors, journalists and columnists and
detain them at various army camps. What was the martial law government’s
justification for the arrest and detention of Diokno and Aquino? The
government’s return to their petitions for habeas corpus claimed that they
were “regarded as participants or as having given aid and comfort ‘in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take over the
government by force.’” The fact is that they just happened to be the
foremost contenders for the Presidency of the Republic in the scheduled
November 1973 presidential elections, at which time Mr. Marcos would
have finished his second 4-year term and barred under the prevailing 1935
Constitution from running for a third term. . . .

. . . .

Senator Ninoy Aquino underwent an even more tortuous ordeal. He was
charged on August 11, 1973 with murder, subversion and illegal possession
of firearms and found guilty and sentenced to death by a military
commission, notwithstanding his being a civilian and the fact that said
general offenses were allegedly committed before the imposition of martial
law, and could not fall within the jurisdiction of military commissions,
which are not courts but mere ad-
_______________
82 Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 98, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan,

supra note 77.
83 242 Phil. 200; 158 SCRA 470 (1988) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].

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juncts of the Commander-in-Chief to enforce military discipline. Mr.

Marcos had publicly pronounced the evidence against Ninoy as “not only
strong but overwhelming” in a nationwide press conference on August 24,
1971 following the Plaza Miranda bombing three days earlier of the LP
proclamation meeting, yet had not charged him before the civil courts.
Ninoy had contended correctly but in vain that he had been publicly indicted
and his guilt prejudged by Mr. Marcos, and he could not possibly get due
process and a fair trial before a group of Mr. Marcos’ military
subordinates[.]84

In Mijares v. Ranada,85 despite the passing of years, this Court
acknowledged the continuing difficulties caused by the dark years of
the Marcos regime:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have
yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom
and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much
lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not
sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive
conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the
murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts
of the fairminded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them
cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the
ill wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely personal but
institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the
award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights
violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man
who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle
instead with the earthly representative, his estate[.]86
_______________
84 Id., at pp. 202-204; pp. 475-477.

85 495 Phil. 372; 455 SCRA 397 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
86 Id., at p. 375; pp. 399-400.

518

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,87 this

Court recognized the gargantuan task of the Philippine Commission
on Good Governance in recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and the “organized pillage” of his regime:
Having been charged with the herculean task of bailing the country out
of the financial bankruptcy and morass of the previous regime and returning
to the people what is rightfully theirs, the Commission could ill afford to be
impeded or restrained in the performance of its functions by writs or
injunctions emanating from tribunals coequal to it and inferior to this Court.
Public policy dictates that the Commission be not embroiled in and
swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land, since the loss
of time and energy required to defend against such suits would defeat the
very purpose of its creation.

. . . .

The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood.
Given the magnitude of the past regime’s ‘organized pillage’ and the
ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts
and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer necessity
to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and
made impossible the Commission’s gigantic task of recovering the
plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process had
saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since
ballooned to $28.5 billion.88

The many martyrs produced by Martial Law were recognized in
Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission:89
Hence, on June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to
strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
For nearly two (2) decades, labor enjoyed the
_______________
87 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, supra note 80.

88 Id., at pp. 106-107; pp. 565-566, 585.
89 G.R. No. 105090, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 499 [Per J. Puno, Second
Division].

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right to strike until it was prohibited on September 12, 1972 upon the
declaration of martial law in the country. The 14-year battle to end martial
rule produced many martyrs and foremost among them were the radicals of
the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance, therefore, that after the
final battle against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the new
government treated labor with a favored eye. Among those chosen by then
President Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987 Constitution were recognized
labor leaders like Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople and Jaime
S. L. Tadeo. These delegates helped craft into the 1987 Constitution its
Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. For the first time in
our constitutional history, the fundamental law of our land mandated the
State to “. . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.” This Constitutional
imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor.
Our Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 did not accord constitutional status to
the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution did not elevate
the right to strike to a constitutional level[.]90

Widespread “acts of torture, summary execution, disappearance,
arbitrary detention, and numerous other atrocities” were also
recognized in other jurisdictions. In a class action suit that served as
a serious precedent for other jurisdictions, the United States District
Court of Hawaii in In Re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation91 pronounced:
“Proclamation 1081 not only declared martial law, but also set the stage for
what plaintiffs alleged, and the jury found, to be acts of torture, summary
execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and numerous other atrocities
for which the jury found MARCOS personally responsible.

MARCOS gradually increased his own power to such an extent that there
were no limits to his orders of the human rights violations suffered by
plaintiffs in this action. MARCOS promulgated General Order No. 1 which
stated he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
_______________
90 Id., at pp. 511-512.

91 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995).

520
Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Forces of the Philippines. The order also stated that MARCOS was to
govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire Government,
including all its agencies and instrumentalities. By General Orders 2 and 2-
A, signed by MARCOS immediately after proclaiming martial law,
MARCOS authorized the arrest, by the military, of a long list of dissidents.
By General Order 3, MARCOS maintained, as captive, the executive and
judicial branches of all political entities in the Philippines until otherwise
ordered by himself personally.

. . . .

Immediately after the declaration of martial law the issuance of General
Orders 1, 2, 2A, 3 and 3A caused arrests of persons accused of subversion,
apparently because of their real or apparent opposition to the MARCOS
government. These arrests were made pursuant to orders issued by the
Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile (‘ENRILE’) or MARCOS himself.

The arrest orders were means for detention of each of the representatives of
the plaintiff class as well as each of the individual plaintiffs. During those
detentions the plaintiffs experienced human rights violations including, but
not limited to the following:
1. Beatings while blindfolded by punching, kicking and hitting with

the butts of rifles;

2. The ‘telephone’ where a detainee’s ears were clapped
simultaneously, producing a ringing sound in the head;

3. Insertion of bullets between the fingers of a detainee and
squeezing the hand;

4. The ‘wet submarine,’ where a detainee’s head was submerged in
a toilet bowl full of excrement;

5. The ‘water cure’ where a cloth was placed over the detainee’s
mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a drowning
sensation;

6. The ‘dry submarine,’ where a plastic bag was placed over the
detainee’s head producing suffocation;

7. Use of a detainee’s hands for putting out lighted cigarettes;

8. Use of flat-irons on the soles of a detainee’s feet;

9. Forcing a detainee while wet and naked to sit before an air
conditioner often while sitting on a block of ice;

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10. Injection of a clear substance into the body of a detainee

believed to be truth serum;

11. Stripping, sexually molesting and raping female detainees; one
male plaintiff testified he was threatened with rape;

12. Electric shock where one electrode is attached to the genitals of
males or the breast of females and another electrode to some other
part of the body, usually a finger, and electrical energy produced from
a military field telephone is sent through the body;

13. Russian roulette; and

14. Solitary confinement while handcuffed or tied to a bed.
All these forms of torture were used during ‘tactical interrogation,’

attempting to elicit information from detainees concerning opposition to the
MARCOS government. The more the detainees resisted, whether
purposefully or out of lack of knowledge, the more serious the torture
used.92

US$1.2 billion in exemplary damages, as well as US$770 million
in compensatory damages, was awarded to the victims of the Marcos
regime.93 The federal appeals court upheld the Decision of the
Honolulu court and held the estate of Marcos liable for the gross and
massie human rights abuses committed. In Hilao v. Marcos,94 the
United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals used the principle of
“command responsibility” for the violations committed by the
agents of a political leader, thus:
“The district court had jurisdiction over Hilao’s cause of action. Hilao’s
claims were neither barred by the statute of limitations nor abated by
Marcos’ death. The district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying
the class. The challenged evidentiary rulings of the district court were not in
error. The district court properly held Marcos liable for human rights abuses
which occurred and which he knew about and failed to use his power to
prevent. The jury instruc-
_______________
92 Id., at pp. 4-5.

93 Rosales Memorandum, p. 104.
94 103 F. 3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996).

522

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
tions on the Torture Victim Protection Act and on proximate cause were not
erroneous. The award of exemplary damages against the Estate was allowed
under Philippine law and the Estate’s due process rights were not violated in
either the determination of those damages or of compensatory damages.”95

The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, through the Decision
dated December 10, 1997,96 affirmed the ruling of the District
Attorney of Zurich granting the Philippine government’s request for
transfer of funds held in multiple accounts by various foreign
foundations in Swiss banks. This was transferred to an escrow
account.
Then, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,97 this Court declared that
the funds were proven to belong to the Marcos Family and were
consequently ill-gotten wealth:
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial

admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their
answer, the General Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos’ Manifestation
and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10,
1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that respondents had made
judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,
respondent likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of
respondents’ answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it

alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in
Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations
and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that
respondents’ aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
_______________
95 Id. as cited in Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 105.

96 Federal Office for Police Matters v. Aguamina Corp., 1A.87/1994/err (Swiss
Federal Court, 10 December 1997), cited in Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 106.
97 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 76.

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By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful,

respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.

. . . .

Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful
income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence
that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks
under the names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was
able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties
acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to
their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner
presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar
deposits amounting to US$356 million representing the balance of the Swiss
accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their
aggregate legitimate income of only $304,372.43 during their incumbency
as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was
considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses,
the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly
established.98 (Emphasis supplied)

This cursory review of our jurisprudence relating to the
consequences of the Marcos regime establishes a climate of gross
human rights violations and unabated pillage of the public coffers. It
also reveals his direct participation, leadership, and complicity.

IV

In Republic Act No. 10368, a legislative determination was made
regarding the gross human rights violations committed during the
Marcos regime:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—. . . .

Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the
State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were
victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or invol-
_______________
98 Id., at pp. 1131-1143; pp. 258-268.

524

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
untary disappearance and other gross human rights violations committed

during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the
period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the
victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and
legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims
and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and
damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.
Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings
and damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were
forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions were
damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was
restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.

Section 17 even declares a conclusive presumption as to
particular victims and, at the same time, recognizes the complicity of
Ferdinand E. Marcos:
Sec. 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV Under This

Act.—The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the
Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL
No. 840, CA No. 88-0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu,
Hawaii wherein a favorable judgment has been rendered, shall be extended
the conclusive presumption that they are [victims of human rights
violations]: Provided, That the [victims of human rights violations]
recognized by the Bantayog Ng Mga Bayani Foundation shall also be
accorded the same conclusive presumption[.]

Conclusive presumptions are “inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any
contrary proof however strong.”99 Thus, the existence of human
rights violations committed during the Marcos regime and the
recognition of victims explicitly stated in the provision cannot be
denied.
_______________
99 Mercado v. Santos and Daza, 66 Phil. 215, 222 (1938) [Per J. Laurel, En
Banc].

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The human rights victims and the violations under the Marcos
regime are so numerous that the legislature created a Human Rights
Victims’ Claims Board, dedicated to effectively attain the objectives
of Republic Act No. 10368. The Board is now adjudicating 75,730
claims of human rights victims for reparation and/or recognition
under Republic Act No. 10368.100

V

Petitioner Algamar A. Latiph points out that among the many
gross human rights violations perpetrated under the Marcos regime
were those inflicted on the Moro civilian population. These atrocities
were committed by government forces, as well as by state-affiliated
armed groups. The more infamous of these are: (1) the Jabidah
Massacre, where government forces allegedly executed at least 23
Muslim recruits;101 (2) the Burning of Jolo, where the massive aerial
and naval bombardments and a ground offensive against the MNLF
forces resulted in the destruction of two-thirds of Jolo and, thus,
thousands of refugees;102 (3) the Malisbong Massacre, where
paramilitary forces were responsible for killing about 1,500 Moro
men and boys who were held in a local mosque and killed, an
unknown number of women and girls were raped offshore on a naval
vessel, and around 300 houses were burned.103
Lesser known but equally deplorable atrocities alleged to have
been committed by government forces during the Marcos regime
included the Tran Incident and the Tong Umapuy Massacre. These
were reported by the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation
Commission:104
_______________
100 TSN, Oral Arguments, August 31, 2016, p. 206, Statement of Chairperson
Lina Castillo Sarmiento of the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board.
101 Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, p. 31
<http://www.tjrc.ph/skin/vii_tjrc/pdfs/report.pdf> (visited November 7, 2016).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. The Transitional Justice and Reconciliaton Commission was created
through the GPH-MILF negotiation process. It was mandated to undertake a study
and, among others, propose appropriate mechanism to address legitimate grievances
of the Bangsamoro People, as well as address human rights violations.

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The “Tran Incident” refers to a large-scale military campaign against the

MNLF in central Mindanao in June-August 1973. In the Listening Process
session, participants spoke of the massacre of Moro civilians from the
Barangay Populacion in the town of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat province
by military forces during that campaign. The soldiers separated the men and
women; the men were confined in a military camp, interrogated, and
tortured, while the women with their children were taken aboard naval
vessels and raped. In the end, the men as well as the women and children
were killed. At a Listening Process session in Tawi-Tawi, participants
shared their memory of what they called the “Tong Umapuy massacre.” In
1983, a Philippine Navy ship allegedly opened fire on a passenger boat and
killed 57 persons onboard. The passengers were reportedly on their way to
an athletic event in Bongao.105

As regards the atrocities committed by groups that maintained
ties with the government under Marcos, the Transitional Justice and
Reconciliation Commission reports:
The campaign of the Ilaga in Mindanao in 1970-1971 involved

indiscriminate killings and burning of houses with the intention of
terrorizing and expelling the Moro and indigenous population from their
homes and ancestral territories. Violent incidents took place chronologically
in a progressive fashion over a widespread area, occurring among other
places in Upi, Maguindanao (March and September 1970); Polomok, South
Cotabato (August 1970); Alamada, Midsayap, and Datu Piang, Cotabato
(December 1970); Bagumbayan and Alamada, Cotabato (January 1971);
Wao, Lanao del Sur (July and August 1971); Ampatuan, Cotabato (August
1971); Kisolan, Bukidnon (October 1971); Siay, Zamboanga del Sur
(November 1971); Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur (December 1971); and
Palembang, South Cotabato (January 1972).
The armed bands of Christian paramilitaries, primarily Ilongga settlers,
that comprised the Ilaga, maintained ties with state authorities, including
local and national politicians, the Philippine Constabulary, and the military.
In most cases, the paramilitaries acted on their own initiative; on other
occasions, however, it is believed that their attacks were conducted in close
coordination with
_______________
105 Id., at p. 32.

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government authorities. This was allegedly the circumstance in the case of

the mass killings of Moro villagers that took place in a mosque and outlying
houses in a rural Barangay of Carmen, (North) Cotabato on June 19, 1971.
Known as the “Manili massacre,” this event spurred the Moro armed
resistance and was one of the few incidents that received attention in
international media.

. . . .

. . . During the height of Ilaga atrocities, women’s bodies were mutilated
by cutting off their nipples and breasts, ripping babies out of pregnant
women’s wombs, and disfiguring their reproductive organs. . . .
. . . [D]uring the TJRC Listening Process, there were accounts of women
being raped by Ilaga and soldiers in front of their families or of women
forced to have sex with their husbands in front of and for the amusement of
soldiers. Many Moro women and young girls who were abducted and raped
were never seen again; others were allowed to return home. According to
the TJRC Listening Process report, incidents of sexual violence took place
during the period of Martial Law that amount to military sexual slavery.
. . . [B]etween 1972 and 1974, Ilaga and soldiers alike made Bangsamoro
women in Labangan and Ipil, Sibugay become “sex slaves” of navy men,
whose boat was docked at Labangan and Ipil ports. For more than a week,
soldiers rounded up a group of at least ten women from Labangan and
forced them to the naval boats to serve the “sexual needs” of the navy men.
The following day, they were released; only to be replaced with another
group of women, and so on. . . . More than 200 women were [believed to
be] enslaved in this way.106

Petitioners also gave this Court their firsthand accounts of the
human rights violations they suffered under the Marcos regime.
Petitioner Loretta Ann P. Rosales recounted that she was raped and
tortured with the Russian roulette and a modified water cure, among
others:
_______________
106 Id., at pp. 31-37.

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MRS. ROSALES:
My name is Loretta Ann P. Rosales. I am a torture victim under the

Marcos regime. I was sexually molested and according to the latest Rape Act,
I was actually raped, that is the definition. I had electric shock; I suffered
from Russian roulette, modified water cure and several other ways of
harassing me. So I’m a torture victim and so I applied before the Claims
Board compensation for the violations committed by the Marcos regime
during my time.
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
By Russian roulette, what is it, Ms. Rosales?
MRS. ROSALES:
They had a gun and they threatened me to answer the questions otherwise
they would shoot. So that was a psywar. So I said if I would give in to them,
they’ll shoot me then they won’t . . . then they won’t be able to get confession
from me cause I’ll be dead by then. So that was all psywar so I just kept on
with my position and they finally gave up. So they went into other methods of
torture in order to try to draw confession, exact confession from me. And the
worst part, of course, was that sexual molestation and electric shock and the
modified water cure.
How long did these incidents transpire, the entire duration? You don’t have
to count the number of days . . . (interrupted)
MRS. ROSALES:
No, no, in fact, I don’t know. I mean it was just a continuing thing like
twenty-four (24) hours continuing torture. There was no sleeping, there was
no eating. It just went on and on because until . . . such time, it was after the
electric shock I suffered . . . I was traumatized, physically traumatized so I
couldn’t control the tremor in my body and they finally stop[ped]. I pretended
I was dying but they knew I wasn’t dying. So that’s all psywar throughout.
Anyway, after the electric part, which was the worst part, that was the last
part, they finally pushed me and put me somewhere and I don’t know how
long that took.107

Her sister, petitioner Ma. Cristina Pargas Bawagan, testified that
she was beaten, raped, and sexually abused:
_______________
107 TSN, Oral Arguments, August 31, 2016, pp. 200-201.

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MS. BAWAGAN:
I am Ma. Cristina Pargas Bawagan. I am the sister of Etta. I was arrested
May 27, 1981 in Munoz, Nueva Ecija on charges of possession of subversive
documents. There was no arrest order; I was simply arrested, handcuffed and
blindfolded, my mouth gagged then they brought me to a safe house. And in
the safe house they started interrogating and torturing me and they hit on my
thighs until my thighs turned black and blue; and they also threatened me
with so many things, pinompyang ako, that’s what they call sa ears and then
they put a sharp object over my breast, etcetera. They tore my dress and then
eventually they let me lay down to sleep but then early in the morning the two
soldiers who stayed near me started torturing me again and by today’s
definition, it is rape because they fondled my breast and they inserted a long
object into my vagina and although I screamed and screamed with all my
might, no one seemed to hear except that I heard the train pass by . . .108

Petitioner Hilda Narciso testified that she was raped and sexually
abused:
MS. NARCISO:
I am Hilda Narciso. I was incarcerated in Davao City in 1983. It was a
rape, multiple rape that I have undergone through my captures. I was placed
in a safe house where the militaries are safe and I was actually being sexually
abused for about two days. It’s quite difficult to me in the hands of the
militaries because I was handcuffed, blindfolded and actually they have
mashed all my body. And . . . (At this juncture, Ms. Narciso is already in
tears) they handcuffed me and then a lot of hands were all over my body and
they also put their penises one at a time on my mouth, finger your vagina and
all that for several hours without . . . you have been even taken your food.
Actually it was quite a long period of time under the safe house for about two
days with all those kinds of process that I have gone through . . .109

Petitioner Liwayway Arce testified that during the Marcos
regime, her father was killed, and her mother was tortured and
sexually abused:
_______________
108 Id., at pp. 203-204.

109 Id., at p. 203.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
MS. ARCE:
I’m Liwayway Arce, Your Honors. I’m the daughter of Merardo Tuazon-
Arce; he was a UP student and he founded Panday Sining, which was a
cultural group. Later on he fought for his beliefs and on February 5, 1985, he
was gunned down in Mabolo Street in Cebu City. In 2005, he was heralded as
one of the martyrs at the Bantayog ng mga Bayani Foundation and his name
is inscribed also together with two hundred sixty plus martyrs and heroes in
Bantayog ng mga Bayani. I am a claimant-beneficiary under the Republic Act
10368. And my mother is also a claimant; she was incarcerated also in a camp
in Fort Bonifacio. I don’t really know much details about my parents because
I was not raised by them and there are many other beneficiaries like me who
were orphaned. My mother is still alive but she was also . . . she also
undergone . . . she underwent torture and sexual abuse and I hope my sister is
not listening right now because she does not know this. Thank you.110

Petitioner Atty. Neri Colmenares recounted having lost four (4)
years of his life as a young student leader to imprisonment, during
which various forms of torture were used on him:
ATTY. COLMENARES:
And for the record, Your Honor, I’m also conclusively presumed under the
law as a human rights victim being in the Hawaii case for my torture of seven
days and four years of imprisonment when I was eighteen years old, Your
Honor. Thank You.
You were eighteen years old. You were a student leader at that time,
Congressman . . . ?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, I was the chairman of the student catholic action and we were
demanding the return of student council and student papers when I was
arrested. And I was tortured, Your Honor, the usual, they . . . cigarette butts,
the electric shocks, the M16 bullets in between your fingers, the Russian
roulette and so on, Your Honor. So under the law, human rights victims who
are in Hawaii, the Hawaii
_______________
110 Id.

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case are conclusively presumed to be human rights violation victims Your

Honor.111

Petitioner Trinidad Herrera Repuno testified that she was a
member of the informal settlers’ sector and was also a victim of
torture:
Magandang hapon po sa inyong lahat mga Justices. Ako po si Trinidad

Herrera Repuno. Ako ay isang biktima ng kapanahunan ng martial law. Ako
po ay isang leader ng organisasyon ng mga mahirap sa Tondo. Ang
pinaglalaban po namin ay merong batas para doon sa magkaroon kami ng
lupa at yung iba pang mga karapatan namin. Subalit noong nagdeklara si
Marcos ng martial law, nawala ho lahat ng saysay iyon. . . . Ako po’y isa sa
mga judges na pupunta sana sa international competition para architectural
competition sa Vancouver para doon sa pabahayan na gagawin dito sa
Pilipinas. Subalit hindi po ako binigyan nang pagkakataon na makaalis. Sa
halip na ako’y makaalis, ako po ay hinuli noong April 27, 1977 at ako’y
dinala dooon sa . . . ang humuli ho sa akin intelligence ng Manila Police. At
ako’y kinahapunan tinurn-over sa Crame sa pangunguna po ni Eduardo
Matillano. Nang ako’y napasok doon sa maliit na kuwarto, ako’y tinanong
kung ano ang pangalan ko, sinabi ko ang pangalan ko at ako’y . . . pinaalis
ang aking sapatos, pinaalis lahat iyong aking bag at sinabi sa akin na
tumayo ako. Merong parang telepono doon sa may lamesa na meroong
kuryente. Iyon po ang inilagay dito sa aking dalawang daliri at
inumpisahan ho nila akong tinatanong kung sinu-sino ang nalalaman ko.
Ang alam ko lang ho ang pinaglalaban namin, na karapatan namin para sa
aming mga maralita. Subalit hindi naniniwala si Matillano at sinasabi nya
na meron akong kinalaman sa mga kumunista na wala naman akong
kinalaman. Iyon ang pinipilit po nila hanggang dumudugo na po ang
dalawang daliri ko dito sa . . . iyong mga malalaking daliri ko, tumutulo na
po ang dugo, hindi pa ho nila tinatantanan. Mamaya-maya nang hindi na
po nila naanuhan, pinaalis ho ang aking blusa at iyong wire po inilagay po
dito sa aking dalawang suso at muli inulit-ulit pagtuturn po nang parang
telepono pumapasok po ang kuryente sa katawan ko na hindi ko na ho
nakakayanan hanggang sa ako y sumigaw nang sumigaw subalit wala
naman hong nakakarinig sapagkat maliit na kwarto, nilagyan pa ho ng
tubig iyong sahig para
_______________
111 Id., at pp. 208-209.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
iyong kuryente lalong pumasok sa aking katawan. . . Nairelease po ako

subalit nanghina po ako hanggang sa ngayon. Nang ako’y medyo may edad
na nararamdaman ko na ho iyong mga pampahirap, iyong pukpok dito sa
likod ko habang ako’y inaano, lagi po nilang. . . pagkatapos nang pagpaikot
ng kuryente, pukpukin ho ako dito sa likod. Sabi nya pampalakas daw iyon.
Pero masakit na masakit po talaga hanggang sa ngayon nararamdaman po
namin ngayon ang ano. Kaya ako, sumama ako sa U.S. para ako’y
tumestigo laban kay Marcos[.]112

Petitioner Carmencita Florentino, also from the informal settlers’
sector, testified as to her forcible abduction, torture, and detention:
Magandang hapon po sa inyo. Ako po si Carmencita Florentino. Isa po

akong leader ng urban poor. Ipinaglalaban namin iyong karapatan namin sa
paninirahan doon na expropriation law. April 1977 po dumating po iyong
mga Metrocom may mga kasamang pulis ng Quezon City may mga armalite
po sila, sapilitan po nila . . . marami po sila, siguro hindi lang isang daan.
Pinasok po nang sapilitan iyong bahay namin, kasalukuyan po alas syete ng
gabi. . . . Niransack po iyong bahay namin pagkatapos kinaladkad po iyong
asawa ko. Iyong anak ko po na siyam na taong babae na nag-iisa. Aka po,
halos nahubaran na ako dahil pinipilit po akong arestuhin, kaming mag-
asawa . . . At sinasabing ako’y leader ng komunista na hindi ko naman po
naiintindihan iyon. Ang alam ko po pinaglalaban lang namin karapatan
namin sa paninirahan sa Barangay Tatalon. Sapilitan po halos napunit na
po iyong damit ko. Ibinalibag ako doon sa . . . palabas po ng pinto dahil
hinahabol ko iyong asawa ko na hinampas po ng armalite nung mga
Metrocom na iyon. Tumama po ang likod ko sa pintuan namin, iyong kanto
namin na halos mapilay na po ako. Pagkatapos po dinala kami sa Camp
Crame, iyong asawa ko hindi ko na po nakita. Iyong anak ko nasa custody
daw ng mga sundalo. Ako pinaglipat-lipat kung saan saan doon ‘di ko na
matandaan e, may ESV, JAGO, na iniinterrogate ako, tinatanong sino iyong
pinuno, sino iyong pinuno namin. Hindi ko po alam, wala akong maisagot.
Kaya po sa pagkakataon na iyon, tumutulo na po iyong, akala ko po sipon
lang, dugo na pala ang lumalabas sa bibig ko saka sa ilong ko po dahil,
hindi ko alam kung anong nangyari do-
_______________
112 Id., at pp. 209-211.

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on sa siyam na taong anak ko na babae, nahiwalay sa akin. Masyado po

ang pahirap na ginawa nila doon, na kulang na lang na ma-rape ako.
Inaasa ko na lang po ang aking sarili sa Panginoong Diyos kung anuman
ang mangyari sa akin, tatanggapin ko na. Pero iyong anak ko, iyong babae,
hindi ko siya makita, dahil ako nakabukod, bukod-bukod kami. Natawanan
ko iyong aking mga officer, buntis ho, ikinulong din pala. Kaya sobra ho
ang hirap na inabot namin noong panahon ng martial law, na masyado na
kaming . . . hanggang ngayon taglay ko pa rin po . . . sa baga ko may pilat,
hindi nawawala, sinusumpong po paminsan minsan lalo pa nga pag naalala
ko ang ganito na iniinterview kami kung maaari ayaw ko nang
magpainterview dahil ano po e mahirap, napakasakit pong tanggapin.
Pinalaya po kami pansamantala ng anak ko, nagkita kami ng anak ko. Isang
buwan po kami sa Camp Crame, pansamantala pinalaya kaming mag-ina
dahil sa humanitarian daw po pero binabantayan pa rin kami sa bahay
namin, hindi kami makalayong mag-ina. At tuwing Sabado nagrereport po
kami dyan sa Camp Crame. Ang asawa ko po nakakulong sa Bicutan
kasama po nila Ka Trining. Hanggang ngayon po trauma na rin po iyong
anak ko kahit nga po may pamilya na ayaw nang tumira dito sa Pilipinas
dahil baka po makulong uli kami. Iyon lang po.113

Petitioner Felix Dalisay testified as to the lifelong trauma of the
Martial Law years:
Magandang hapon po sa ating lahat. Felix Dalisay po, 64 years old.

Sapilitan po akong hinuli, kinulong ng mga panahon ng Martial Law
sometime ‘73, ‘74. Almost, kung tututalin po lahat nang pagkakakulong ko
hindi naman tuloy-tuloy, almost three years po. ... Sa Kampo Crame po sa
panahon ng interrogation, nakaranas po ako nang ibat-ibang klase nang
pagmaltrato. Nandyan po iyong pagka hindi maganda ang sagot mo sa mga
tanong nila, nakakatanggap po ako ng karate chop, mga suntok po sa
tagiliran na alam nyo naman ang katawan ko maliit lang noong araw, ang
pakiramdam ko e bale na ata iyong tadyang ko rito e. Andyan rin po iyong
ipitan nang bala ng 45 ang kamay mo, didiinan ng ganyan po. Meron din
pong mga suntok sa iba’t ibang parte ng katawan. May pagkakataon po na
minsan natadyakan po ako, tinadyakan po ako, bumagsak sa isang
_______________
113 Id., at pp. 208-212.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
parting mabato kaya hanggang ngayon po may pilat po ako dito. Ang
pinakamabigat po kasi na nangyari sa akin sa panahon nang interrogation,
kung minsan kasi kami pag ka iniinterrogate hindi na ho namin matiis ang
mga sakit so nakakapagsalita kami nang mga taong nakasama namin. So,
noong panahon po na iyon, gabi noon, so may mga nabanggit ako during
interrogation ng mga tao na mga nakasama ko so niraid po namin iyon,
sinamahan ko sila. E marahil siguro iyong mga dati kong kasama e
nabalitaang nahuli na ako, nagtakbuhan na po siguro so wala kaming
inabot. Ang mabigat na parte po noon galit na galit ang mga sundalo ng
FIFSEC po iyon. Ang FIFSEC po Fifth Constabulary Security iyon e pinaka
notorious na torturer noong panahon ng Martial Law, marami po iyan. So
ang pinakamabigat po roon kasi sa totoo po ngayon mabuti pa iyong LALU
victim may mga counseling pero kami po ang mga biktima (crying)
hanggang ngayon po wala pa ho kaming natatanggap (sniffiing) maski
hustisya, mga counseling na yan. At ang masakit sa akin ako po nagiging
emotional po ako hindi lang po sa sarili ko. . . . Marami pa pong mga
biktima dyan ma’am na talagang maaawa ka. Grabe po. Iyong sa akin po
ang pinaka matindi po akala ko isasalvage na po ako. Dinala po ako sa
isang madilim na lugar dyan sa Libis, Quezon City sa Eastwood, noong
panahon pong iyun medyo gubatan po iyun pinaihi kami sabi naiihi ako
nakarinig na lang po ako ng putok sa kaliwang bahagi ng tenga ko. Akala
ko patay na ako. Tapos mga pompyang, pompyang po na iyan pag sinabi
pong pompyang na mga ganyan. Hanggang ngayon po sa totoo po humina
po ang aking pandinig. Hindi naman ako tuluyang nabingi, mahina po kaya
pagka may tumatawag sa akin sa cellphone sabi ko pakitext mo na lang,
naulinigan ko ang boses nyo pero ahhh hindi ko maintindihan. So pakiusap
lang sana sa totoo lang po Ma’am dito maaring nagsasabi ang iba forget
about the past ilibing na natin yan dyan. Sa amin pong mga naging biktima.
Hindi po ganun kadali iyon. Ang trauma po hanggang ngayon dala-dala
namin. Tuwing maaalala namin ang sinapit namin, naiiyak kami, naaawa
kami sa sarili namin. Tapos ngayon sasabihin nila forget about the past.
Paano kaming mga naging biktima. Hanggang ngayon nga wala pa kaming
katarungan e. Andyan nga may Ten Billion, ang human rights . . . mga
nauna naman yan e. Hindi ba nirecover natin yan. Tapos ngayon ang
sasabihin nila Marcos is a hero. No, hindi po. Hindi po matatapos yan. So
hanggang doon na lang po, sana. Sana po pagbigyan nyo kami. Dahil kami
sa parte ng mga biktima payagan man ng Supreme Court na ilibing yan di-

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yan, di po kami titigil sa pakikipaglaban namin sapagkat kami nagkaranas

nang lupit ng Martial Law hanggang, habang buhay po naming dala yan.
Salamat po.114

All these accounts occurred during the Marcos regime. By no
stretch of the imagination, then, can Ferdinand E. Marcos’ memory
serve as an inspiration, to be emulated by generations of Filipinos.

VI

Contemporarily, even the National Historical Commission took a
clear position against the interment of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
The National Historical Commission was established by law as
“the primary government agency responsible for history”115 given
the mandate “to determine all factual matters relating to official
Philippine history.”116
Among others, it is given the task to:
(a) conduct and support all kinds of research relating to Philippine

national and local history;

(b) develop educational materials in various media, implement historical
educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history, and
disseminate information regarding Philippine historical events, dates, places
and personages;

(c) undertake and prescribe the manner of restoration, conservation and
protection of the country’s historical movable and immovable objects;

(d) manage, maintain and administer national shrines, monuments,
historical sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural
value; and
_______________
114 Id., at pp. 214-215.

115 Rep. Act No. 10386, Sec. 5.
116 Id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
(e) actively engage in the settlement or resolution of controversies or

issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.117

The National Historical Commission’s Board is given the power
to “discuss and resolve, with finality, issues or conflicts on
Philippine History.”118 The Chair of the National Historical
Commission is mandated to “advise the President and Congress on
matters relating to Philippine history.”119
In these statutory capacities, the National Historical Commission
published its study entitled “Why Ferdinand Marcos Should not be
Buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani” on July 12, 2016.120
The study was based on the declassified documents in the
Philippine Archives Collection of the United States National
Archives/National Archives and Records Administration and the
websites of pertinent United States government agencies and some
officially sanctioned biographies of Ferdinand E. Marcos. It
concluded that:
“With regard to Mr. Marcos’ war medals, we have established that Mr.
Marcos did not receive, as the wartime history of the Ang Mga Maharlika
and Marcos’ authorized biography claim, the Distinguished Service Cross,
the Silver Medal, and the Order of the Purple Heart. In the hierarchy of
primary sources, official biographies and memoirs do not rank at the top and
are never taken at face value because of their self-serving orientation, as it is
abundantly palpable in Mr. Marcos’ sanctioned biographies. In a leader’s
earnestness to project himself to present and succeeding generations as
strong and heroic, personally authorized accounts tend to suffer from a
shortage of facts and a bounty of embellishment.”

“With respect to Mr. Marcos’ guerilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika was
never recognized during the war and neither was Mr. Marcos’ leadership of
it. Note that other guerilla units in northern Luzon were recognized, such as:
_______________
117 Id.
118 Id., Sec. 7(h).
119 Id., Sec. 13.
120 Supra note 29.

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103rd Regiment, East Central Luzon

Pangasinan Anti-Crime Service, Pangasinan Military Area, LGAF

100th Bn/100th Inf. Regiment LGAFA

Southern Pangasinan Guerilla Forces (Gonzalo C. Mendoza
Commander).
“Furthermore, grave doubts expressed in the military records about Mr.

Marcos’ actions and character as a soldier do not provide sound,
unassailable basis for the recognition of a soldier who deserves to be buried
at the LNMB.

“On these grounds, coupled with Mr. Marcos’ lies about his medals, the
NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES
opposes the plan to bury Mr. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.”121

The Court’s findings in a catena of cases in its jurisprudence, a
legislative determination in Republic Act No. 10368, the findings of
the National Historical Commission, and the actual testimony of
petitioners during the Oral Arguments clearly show that the life of
Ferdinand E. Marcos either as President or as a soldier is bereft of
inspiration. Ferdinand E. Marcos should not be the subject of
emulation of this generation, or of generations yet to come.

VII

Assuming without accepting that Republic Act No. 289
authorized public respondents to determine who has led a life
worthy of “inspiration and emulation,” and assuming further that it
was under this authority that they directed Ferdinand E. Marcos’
interment, the President’s verbal orders, the Lorenzana
Memorandum, and the Enriquez Orders were still issued with grave
abuse of discretion because they were whimsical and capricious.
Considering the state of existing law and jurisprudence as well as
the findings of the National Historical Commission, there was no
showing
_______________
121 Id., at p. 24.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
that respondents conducted any evaluation process to determine

whether Ferdinand E. Marcos deserved to be buried at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.
Respondents’ actions were based upon the President’s verbal
orders, devoid of any assessment of fact that would overcome what
had already been established by law and jurisprudence.
The Solicitor General can only state that:
41. During the campaign period leading to the May 2016 elections,

President Duterte, then only a candidate to the highest executive post in the
land, openly expressed his desire to have the remains of former President
Marcos interred at the Libingan.
42. On 9 May 2016, more than 16 million voters elected President
Duterte to the position.
43. True to his campaign promise of unifying the nation, President
Duterte gave verbal orders on 11 July 2016 to Defense Secretary Lorenzana
to effect the interment of the remains of former President Marcos at the
Libingan.
44. On 7 August 2016, and pursuant to the verbal orders of the
President, Defense Secretary Lorenzana issued a Memorandum addressed to
AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya informing him of the verbal
orders of the President, and for this purpose, to “undertake the necessary
planning and preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and security
requirements.”
45. In the same Memorandum, Defense Secretary Lorenzana tasked the
PVAO as the “OPR” (Office of Primary Responsibility) for the interment of
the remains of former President Marcos, as the Libingan is under the
PVAO’s supervision and administration. Defense Secretary Lorenzana
likewise directed the Administrator of the PVAO to designate the focal
person for and overseer of the event.
46. On 9 August 2016, Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez, by command
of General Visaya, issued a Directive to the Commanding

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General of the Philippine Army to prepare a grave for former President

Marcos at the Libingan.122

President Duterte himself publicly admitted that Ferdinand E.
Marcos was no hero.123 This much was also admitted by the
Solicitor General:124
Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices: At this moment in our

history, I recall a scene from Julius Caesar where Marc Anthony spoke to his
countrymen: “I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him, The evil that men do
lives after them, the good is oft interred in their bones.” Inspired by these
lines, I now come to your honors to allow the State to bury the remains of
former President Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, not to
honor him as a hero even if by military standards he is. But to accord him the
simple mortuary rites befitting a former president, commander-in-chief, war
veteran and soldier.125

The capriciousness of the decision to have him buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani is obvious, considering how abhorrent the
atrocities during Martial Law had been. Likewise, the effects of the
Marcos regime on modern Philippine history are likewise too
pervasive to be overlooked.
The Filipino People themselves deemed Marcos an unfit
President and discharged him from office through a direct exercise
of their sovereign power. This has been repeatedly recognized by
this Court.
_______________
122 OSG Memorandum, pp. 19-20.

123 Hegina, Aries Joseph, Duterte won’t change mind on hero’s burial for
Marcos, Inquirer.Net, May 26, 2016 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/787590/duterte-
wont-change-mind-on-heros-burialfor-marcos#ixzz4IQcNtc8X> (visited November 7,
2016).
Nicolas, Fiona, Duterte defends hero’s burial for Marcos: A matter of enforcing
the law, CNN Philippines, August 18, 2016
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/08/18/duterte-defends-marcos-heros-burial-
libingan-ng-mga-bayani-enforcing-law.html> (visited November 7, 2016).
124 TSN, Oral Arguments, September 7, 2016, pp. 8 and 93.
125 Id., at p. 8.

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In Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino:126
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners
have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For
the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

Moreover, the sentiment of the sovereign People, reacting to the
blight that was the Marcos dictatorship, was enunciated in
Proclamation No. 3:
WHEREAS, the new government was installed through a direct exercise

of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended;
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their
extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the
government, restoration of democracy, protection of basic rights, rebuilding
of confidence in the entire governmental system, eradication of graft and
corruption, restoration of peace and order, maintenance of the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military, and the transition to a government under
a New Constitution in the shortest time possible.

Further, in articulating the mandate of the People, Article 2,
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 3 enumerated the many evils
perpetuated during
_______________
126 G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986, as cited in In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, 229
Phil. 185, 188; 145 SCRA 160, 163 (1986) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

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the Marcos regime, which the new government would be charged to
dismantle:

Article II
The President, the Vice President, and the Cabinet

SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power.
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to:
a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and
oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime;
b) Make effective the guarantees of civil, political, human, social,
economic and cultural rights and freedoms of the Filipino people, and
provide remedies against violations thereof;
c) Rehabilitate the economy and promote the nationalist aspirations of
the people;
d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of
the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts;
e) Eradicate graft and corruption in government and punish those guilty
thereof; and
f) Restore peace and order, settle the problem of insurgency, and pursue
national reconciliation based on justice.

Public respondents neglect to examine the entirety of Ferdinand
E. Marcos’ life, despite the notoriety of his latter years. The willful
ignorance of the pronouncements from all three branches of
government and of the judgment of the People themselves can only
be characterized as so arbitrary and whimsical as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.

VIII

Republic Act No. 10368, otherwise known as the Human Rights
Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013, contains a
legislative

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finding that gross human rights violations were committed during

the Marcos regime. It provides for both the recognition of the
sufferings of human rights victims as well as the provision for
effective remedies.
Recognition of human rights and of the goal of achieving social
justice is a primordial shift in our constitutional order. This shift was
occasioned by the experiences of our society during Martial Law.
This is evident in some discussions in the Constitutional
Convention.
Commissioner Edmundo Garcia, speaking on the necessity of a
Commission on Human Rights, emphasized:
Precisely, one of the reasons why it is important for this body to be

constitutionalized is the fact that regardless of who is the President or who
holds the executive power, the human rights issue is of such importance that
it should be safeguarded and it should be independent of political parties or
power that are actually holding the reins of government. Our experience
during the martial law period made us realize how precious those rights are
and, therefore, these must be safeguarded at all times.
Hence, Section 11, Article II of the 1987 Constitution thus reads, “(t)he
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” To breathe life into this State policy, the Commission on
Human Rights was created and was envisioned as an independent office,
free from political interference.127

Commissioner Jose Nolledo, sponsoring the provision that
declares an independent foreign policy for the Philippines, also
stated:
The Marcos regime has wrought great havoc to our country. It has
intensified insurgency and is guilty of rampant violations of human rights
and injustices it has committed. It has brought about economic turmoil. It
has institutionalized widespread graft and corruption in all levels of
government and it has bled the National treasury, resulting in great financial
hemorrhage of our country.128
_______________
127 Rosales, et al., Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 109.

128 Id.

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Former Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the 1986

Constitutional Commission President, in her closing speech, alluded
to the experience during Martial Law as a motivating force operating
in the background of the crafting of the new Constitution:
A beautiful irony which cannot be overlooked is the fact that this new
Constitution was discussed, debated, and finally written within the walls of
this hall which saw the emergence of what was called by its author a
“constitutional authoritarianism,” but which, in effect, was a dictatorship,
pure and simple. This hall was the seat of a combined executive and
legislative power skillfully placed in the hands of one man for more than a
decade. However, the miracle of prayer and of a people’s faith and
determined struggle to break the shackles of dictatorship toppled down the
structure of despotism and converted this hall into hallowed grounds where
the seeds of a newly found freedom have been sown and have borne fruit.
My countrymen, we open the new Charter with a Preamble which is the
beacon light that shines and brightens the path in building a new structure of
government for our people. In that Preamble is expounded in positive terms
our goals and aspirations. Thus, imploring the aid of Almighty God, we
shall establish a just and humane society, a social order that upholds the
dignity of man, for as a Christian nation, we adhere to the principle that, and
I quote: “the dignity of man and the common good of society demand that
society must be based on justice.” We uphold our independence and a
democratic way of life and, abhorring despotism and tyranny, we bind
ourselves to live under the rule of law where no man is above the law, and
where truth, justice, freedom, equality, love and peace will prevail.
For the first time in the history of constitution making in this country, the
word “love” is enshrined in the fundamental law. This is most significant at
this period in our national life when the nation is bleeding under the forces
of hatred and violence. Love which begets understanding is necessary if
reconciliation is to be achieved among the warring factions and conflicting
ideologies now gripping the country. Love is imperative if peace is to be
restored in our nativeland, for without love there can be no peace.
We have established a republican democratic form of government where
sovereignty resides in the people and civilian supremacy over the military is
upheld.

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For the first time, the Charter contains an all-embracing expanded Bill of
Rights which constitutes the cornerstone of the structure of government.
Traditional rights and freedoms which are hallmarks of our democratic way
of life are reaffirmed. The right to life, liberty and property, due process,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of religion, speech, the press, peaceful
assembly, among others, are reasserted and guaranteed. The Marcos
provision that search warrants or warrants of arrest may [be] issued not only
by a judge but by any responsible officer authorized by law is discarded.
Never again will the Filipino people be victims of the much-condemned
presidential detention action or PDA or presidential commitment orders, the
PCOs, which desecrate the rights to life and liberty, for under the new
provision a search warrant or warrant of arrest may be issued only by a
judge. Mention must be made of some new features in the Bill of Rights,
such as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended only in
cases of invasion or rebellion, and the right to bail is not impaired during
such suspension, thereby discarding jurisprudence laid down by the
Supreme Court under the Marcos dispensation that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ carried with it the suspension of the right to bail. The
death penalty is abolished, and physical, psychological or degrading
punishment against prisoners or detainees, substandard and subhuman
conditions in penitentiaries are condemned.
For the first time, the Constitution provides for the creation of a
Commission on Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of
investigating violations of civil and political rights by any party or groups
and recommending remedies therefor.
From the Bill of Rights we proceed to the structure of government
established in the new Charter.
We have established the presidential system of government with three
branches — the legislative, executive, and judicial — each separate and
independent of each other, but affording an effective check and balance of
one over the other.
All legislative power is returned and exclusively vested in a bicameral
legislature where the Members are elected by the people for a definite term,
subject to limitations for reelection, disqualification to hold any other office
or employment in the government including government-owned or -
controlled corporations and, among others, they may not even appear as
counsel before any court of justice.

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For the first time in our Constitution, 20 percent of Members the Lower
House are to be elected through a party-list system and, for three
consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, 25 of the seats
shall be allocated to sectoral representatives from labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and other sectors as may be
provided by law. This innovation is a product of the signs of the times when
there is an intensive clamor for expanding the horizons of participatory
democracy among the people.
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected
by the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of
his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President
are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions
which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the
Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
proclaim martial law.
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr.
Marcos caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial
law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be
exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety
demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to
Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial
law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More
importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review
thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render the executive action a
political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or
legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over
civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this
point, I state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting
opinions I have written during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the
martial law cases.129
_______________
129 Id., citing Closing remarks of the President of the Constitutional Commission
at the final session, Official Gazette, October 15, 1986
<http://www.gov.ph/1986/10/15/closing-remarks-of-the-president-of-the-
constitutional-commission-at-the-final-session-october-15-1986> (visited November
7, 2016).

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IX

In part, to implement these safeguards for human rights, Republic
Act No. 10368 was passed. Its statement of policy is found in
Section 2:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—Section 11 of Article II of the 1987

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines declares that the State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights. Pursuant to this declared policy, Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution prohibits the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation
or any other means which vitiate the free will and mandates the
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices
and their families.
By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the
Philippines adheres to international human rights laws and conventions, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention
Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment which imposes on each State party the obligation to enact
domestic legislation to give effect to the rights recognized therein and to
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall
have an effective remedy, and even if the violation is committed by persons
acting in an official capacity. In fact, the right to a remedy is itself
guaranteed under existing human rights treaties and/or customary
international law, being peremptory in character (jus cogens) and as such
has been recognized as non-derogable.
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the
State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were
victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary
disappearance and other gross human rights violations committed during the
regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and
dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to
recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for
the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered

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Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings

and damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were
forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions were
damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was
restricted and/or impaired, and/or such other victims of the violations of the
Bill of Rights.

Thus, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 10368 states (2) two state
policies: (i) “to acknowledge the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced
or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights
violations” committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25,
1986 during the Marcos regime; and (ii) to restore their honor and
dignity.130
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 10368 likewise acknowledges the
State’s moral and legal obligation to recognize and provide
reparation to the victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries,
sufferings, deprivations, and damages they suffered under the
Marcos regime. The State also expressly acknowledged the
sufferings and damages inflicted upon: (i) persons whose properties
or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used; (ii)
those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired; (iii) those
whose freedom of movement was restricted; and/or (iv) such other
victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.131
_______________
130 See also Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 10368, Sec.
3(a):
SECTION 3. Declaration of Policy.—Consistent with Sections 2 and 11 of
Article II, and Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, and adhering to international human rights law and conventions, it is the
declared policy of the State to:
a) Recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of
summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and
other gross human rights violations committed during the regime of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21,
1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and dignity[.]
131 See also Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 10368, Sec.
3(b) and (c):
SECTION 3. Declaration of Policy.—Consistent with Sections 2 and 11 of
Article II, and Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Repub-

548

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The bases of these policies132 are found in the Constitution.

Section 11 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE II

. . . .

State Policies

....

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.

Related to Article II, Section 11 is Section 9, which provides:
SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.

Article II, Section 10 goes further:
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of

national development.
_______________
lic of the Philippines, and adhering to international human rights law and
conventions, it is the declared policy of the State to:
. . . .
b) Acknowledge its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide

reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries,
sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime;
c) Acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon persons whose
properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those
whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of
movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill
of Rights.
132 Rep. Act No. 10368, Sec. 2.

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These enhance the rights that are already enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.133

Under the Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 12(2) and (4) of the
Constitution provides:134

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

....

SECTION 12. . . .
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

....

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.

Republic Act No. 10368 provides for both government policy in
relation to the treatment of Martial Law victims as well as these
victims’ reparation and recognition. It creates a Human Rights
Victims’ Claims Board135 and provides for its powers.136 Among the
powers of the Board is to “approve with finality all eligible
claims”137 under the law.
_______________
133 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides for the Bill of Rights. The Bill of
Rights was also found in Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution, Article III of the 1935
Constitution; also the Title IV, Political Constitution of the Malolos Constitution and
the President McKinley’s Instructions of April 7, 1900.
134 Rep. Act No. 10386, Sec. 2.
135 Id., Secs. 8 to 14 provide:
SECTION 8. Creation and Composition of the Human Rights Victims’ Claims
Board.—There is hereby created an independent and quasi-judicial body to be known
as the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. It
shall be composed of nine (9) members, who shall possess the following
qualifications:
(a) Must be of known probity, competence and integrity;

550
Ocampo vs. Enriquez
_______________
(b) Must have a deep and thorough understanding and knowledge of human rights
and involvement in efforts against human rights violations committed during the
regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
(c) At least three (3) of them must be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years; and
(d) Must have a clear and adequate understanding and commitment to human rights
protection, promotion and advocacy.
The Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board shall be attached to but shall not be
under the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
The Board shall organize itself within thirty (30) days from the completion of
appointment of all nine (9) members and shall thereafter organize its Secretariat.
SECTION 9. Appointment to the Board.—The President shall appoint the
Chairperson and the other eight (8) members of the Board: Provided, That human
rights organizations such as, but not limited to, the Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI), the Families of
Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND) and the Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees
Laban sa Detensyon at Aresto (SELDA) may submit nominations to the President.
....
SECTION 11. Resolution of Claims.—The Board shall be composed of three (3)
divisions which shall function simultaneously and independently of each other in the
resolution of claims for reparation. Each division shall be composed of one (1)
Chairperson, who shall be a member of the Philippine Bar and two (2) members to be
appointed by the Board En Banc.
SECTION 12. Emoluments.—The Chairperson and members of the Board shall
have the rank, salary, emoluments and allowances equivalent to a Presiding Justice
and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, respectively.
SECTION 13. Secretariat of the Board.—The Board shall be assisted by a
Secretariat which may come from the existing personnel of the CHR, without
prejudice to the hiring of additional personnel as determined by the Board to
accommodate the volume of required work. The following shall be the functions of
the Secretariat:
(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this
Act;
(b) Recommend to the Board the approval of applications for claims;
(c) Assist the Board in technical functions;
(d) Perform other duties that may be assigned by the Board.

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_______________
The Chairperson of the Board shall appoint a Board Secretary who shall head the
Secretariat for the duration of the existence of the Board. There shall be a Technical
Staff Head assisted by five (5) Legal Officers and three (3) Paralegal Officers; and an
Administrative Staff Head assisted by three (3) Administrative Support Staff.
When necessary, the Board may hire additional contractual employees or contract
a service provider to provide services of counselors, psychologists, social workers and
public education specialists, among others, to augment the services of the Secretariat:
Provided, That the maximum contract amount per year shall not exceed more than
fifteen percent (15%) of the total annual operating budget of the Board.
SECTION 14. Operating Budget of the Board.—The operating budget of the
Board shall be funded from the Ten billion peso (P10,000,000,000.00) fund, with Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) as its initial operating budget: Provided, That it shall
not exceed Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) a year.
136 Id., Sec. 10 provides:
SECTION 10. Powers and Functions of the Board.—The Board shall have the
following powers and functions:
(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this
Act;
(b) Issue subpoena/s ad testificandum and subpoena/s duces tecum;
(c) Conduct independent administrative proceedings and resolve disputes over
claims;
(d) Approve with finality all eligible claims under this Act;
(e) Deputize appropriate government agencies to assist it in order to effectively
perform its functions;
(f) Promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act,
including rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings, with the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines having suppletory application;
(g) Exercise administrative control and supervision over its Secretariat;
(h) The Board, at its discretion, may consult the human rights organizations
mentioned in Section 9 herein; and
(i) Perform such other duties, functions and responsibilities as may be necessary to
effectively attain the objectives of this Act.
137 Id., Sec. 10(d) provides:

SECTION 10. Powers and Functions of the Board.—The Board shall have the
following powers and functions:
....
(d) Approve with finality all eligible claims under this Act[.]

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This law provides for the process of recognition of Martial Law

victims.138 There are victims who are allowed to initiate their
petitions,139
_______________
138 Id., Secs. 16, 17, 18. A point system is provided in Section 19. Section 21
provides for the filing of sworn statements “narrating the circumstances of the
pertinent human rights violations committed.” Section 23 provides for a period to file
claims. Section 24 provides for a system of appeal. Section 25 provides penalties for
fraudulent claims, and various misuse of the funds dedicated for the implementation
of the law.
SECTION 16. Claimants.—Any person who is an HRVV may file a claim with
the Board for reparation and/or recognition in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
SECTION 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV Under This Act.
—The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights
judgment has been rendered, shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they
are HRVVs: Provided, That the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog ng mga Bayani
Foundation shall also be accorded the same conclusive presumption: Provided,
further, That nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its original
jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights
violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.
SECTION 18. Motu Proprio Recognition.—The Board may take judicial notice
motu proprio of individual persons who suffered human rights violations as defined
herein and grant such persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the Roll of
Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof.
....
SECTION 19. Determination of Award.—(a) The Board shall follow the point
system in the determination of the award. The range shall be one (1) to ten (10)
points, as follows:
(1) Victims who died or who disappeared and are still missing shall be given ten
(10) points;
(2) Victims who were tortured and/or raped or sexually abused shall be given six
(6) to nine (9) points;
(3) Victims who were detained shall be given three (3) to five (5) points; and
(4) Victims whose rights were violated under Section 3, paragraph (b), nos. (4), (5)
and (6) under this Act shall be given one (1) to two (2) points.
....

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_______________
SECTION 21. Documentation of Human Rights Violations Committed by the

Marcos Regime.—In the implementation of this Act and without prejudice to any
other documentary or other evidence that may be required for the award of any
reparation, any HRVV seeking reparation shall execute a detailed sworn statement
narrating the circumstances of the pertinent human rights violation/s committed.
....
SECTION 23. Period for Filing of Claims; Waiver.—An HRVV shall file an
application for reparation with the Board within six (6) months from the effectivity of
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act: Provided, That failure to
file an application within said period is deemed a waiver of the right to file the same:
Provided, further, That for HRVVs who are deceased, incapacitated, or missing due
to enforced disappearance, their legal heir/s or representatives, shall be entitled to file
an application for reparation on their behalf.
Any opposition to the new application/s pursuant to Section 16 hereof shall only
be entertained if such is filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the last
publication of the official list of eligible claimants as may be determined by the
Board. The Board shall cause the publication of the official list of eligible claimants
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
SECTION 24. Appeal.—Any aggrieved claimant or oppositor may file an
appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of the Resolution of the
Division, to the Board En Banc, whose decision shall then become final and
executory.
SECTION 25. Penalties; Applicability of the Revised Penal Code.—Any
claimant who is found by the Board, after due hearing, to have filed a fraudulent
claim, shall be referred to the appropriate office for prosecution. If convicted, he shall
suffer the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10) years, shall be disqualified from
public office and employment and shall be deprived of the right to vote and be voted
for in any national or local election, even after the service of sentence unless granted
absolute pardon.
Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an
agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who shall misuse,
embezzle or misappropriate the funds for the reparation of HRVVs or who shall
commit fraud in the processing of documents and claims of HRVVs, or shall conspire
with any individual to commit the same, shall also be prosecuted.
Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an
agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who may

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those who are conclusively presumed,140 and those who may be

motu proprio be recognized by the Board141 even without an
initiatory petition.
Republic Act No. 10368 codifies four (4) obligations of the State
in relation to the Martial Law regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos:
First, to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of victims of
summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance,
and other gross violations of human rights;
Second, to restore the honor and dignity of human rights victims;
Third, to provide reparation to human rights victims and their
families; and
Fourth, to ensure that there are effective remedies to these human
rights violations.
_______________
have been found guilty of committing any or all of the prohibited acts stated in the
preceding paragraph, or those acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code, shall be
penalized under the pertinent provisions in the Code and relevant special penal laws.
139 Id., Sec. 16, in relation to the definition of victim in Sec. 3(b), provides:
SECTION 16. Claimants.—Any person who is an HRVV may file a claim with
the Board for reparation and/or recognition in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
SECTION 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV Under This Act.
—The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights
judgment has been rendered, shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they
are HRVVs: Provided, That the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog ng mga Bayani
Foundation shall also be accorded the same conclusive presumption: Provided,
further, That nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its original
jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights
violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.
SECTION 18. Motu Proprio Recognition.—The Board may take judicial notice
motu proprio of individual persons who suffered human rights violations as defined
herein and grant such persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the Roll of
Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof.

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Based on the text of this law, human rights violations during the
“regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the
period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986” are
recognized. Despite his claim of having won the snap elections for
President in 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos was unceremoniously
spirited away from Malacañan to Hawaii as a result of the People’s
uprising now known as “People Power.” The legitimacy of his
ouster from power was subsequently acknowledged by this Court in
Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines and in In re Saturnino
Bermudez, which were both decided in 1986.
This recognition of human rights violations is even clearer in the
law’s definition of terms in Republic Act No. 10368, Section 3(b):
(b) Human rights violation refers to any act or omission committed during

the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons acting
in an official capacity and/or agents of the State, but shall not be limited to
the following:
(1) Any search, arrest and/or detention without a valid search

warrant or warrant of arrest issued by a civilian court of law,
including any warrantless arrest or detention carried out pursuant to
the declaration of Martial Law by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos as well as any arrest, detention or deprivation of liberty
carried out during the covered period on the basis of an Arrest,
Search and Seizure Order (ASSO), a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO), or a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) and such other
similar executive issuances as defined by decrees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, or in ay manner that the arrest, detention or
deprivation of liberty was effected;

(2) The infliction by a person acting in an official capacity and or
an agent of the State of physical injury, torture, killing, or violation of
other human rights, of any person exercising civil or political rights,
including but not limited to the freedom of speech, assembly or
organization; and/or the right to petition the government for redress
of grievances, even if such violation took place during or in the
course of what the authorities at the time deemed an illegal assembly
or demon-

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stration: Provided, That torture in any form or under any

circumstance shall be considered a human rights violation;

(3) Any enforced or involuntary disappearance caused upon a
person who was arrested, detained or abducted against one’s will or
otherwise deprived of one’s liberty, as defined in Republic Act No.
10350, otherwise known as the ‘Anti-Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance Act of 2012’;

(4) Any force or intimidation causing the involuntary exile of a
person from the Philippines;

(5) Any act of force, intimidation or deceit causing unjust or illegal
takeover of a business, confiscation of property, detention of owner/s
and or their families, deprivation of livelihood of a person by agents
of the State, including those caused by Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity
or affinity, as well as those persons considered as among their close
relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates under Executive Order
No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon C.
Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution’;

(6) Any act or series of acts causing, committing and/or conducting
the following:

“(i) Kidnapping or otherwise exploiting children of persons
suspected of committing acts against the Marcos regime;

“(ii) Committing sexual offenses against human rights
victims who are detained and/or in the course of conducting
military and/or police operations; and

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“(iii) Other violations and/or abuses similar or analogous to

the above, including those recognized by international law.”142

Human rights violations during Martial Law were state-
sponsored. Thus, Republic Act No. 10368, Section 3(c) defines
Human Rights Victims as:
(c) Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to a person whose
human rights were violated by persons acting in an official capacity and/or
agents of the State as defined herein. In order to qualify for reparation under
this Act, the human rights violation must have been committed during the
period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986: Provided, however,
That victims of human rights violations that were committed one (1) month
before September 21, 1972 and one (1) month after February 25, 1986 shall
be entitled to reparation under this Act if they can establish that the violation
was committed:

(1) By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official
capacity as defined hereunder;

(2) For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or
promoting the said regime; or

(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects
of Martial Law.143

Section 3(d) of this law defines the violators to include persons
acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State:
(d) Persons Acting in an Official Capacity and/or Agents of the State.—

The following persons shall be deemed persons acting in an official capacity
and/or agents of the State under this Act:
(1) Any member of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC), the

former Integrated National Policy (INP), the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Civilian
_______________
142 Id., Sec. 3(b).

143 Id., Sec. 3(c).

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Home Defense Force (CHDF) from September 21, 1972 to February
25, 1986 as well as any civilian agent attached thereto: and any
member of a paramilitary group even if one is not organically part of
the PC, the INP, the AFP or the CHDF so long as it is shown that the
group was organized, funded, supplied with equipment, facilities
and/or resources, and/or indoctrinated, controlled and/or supervised
by any person acting in an official capacity and/or agent of the State
as herein defined;

(2) Any member of the civil service, including persons who held
elective or appointive public office at any time from September 21,
1972 to February 25, 1986;

(3) Persons referred to in Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1,
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
issued on February 28, 1986 and related laws by then President
Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution, including former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by
consanguinity or affinity, as well as their close relatives, associates,
cronies and subordinates; and

(4) Any person or group/s of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State during the Marcos regime.144

In clear and unmistakable terms, the law recognizes the
culpability of Ferdinand E. Marcos for acts of summary execution,
torture, enforced or involuntary disappearances, and other gross
violations of human rights. The law likewise implies that not only
was he the President that presided over those violations, but that he
and his spouse, relatives, associates, cronies, and subordinates were
active participants.
Burying the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani violates Republic Act No. 10368 as the act may be
considered as an effort “to conceal abuses during the Marcos
regime” or to “conceal . . .
_______________
144 Id., Sec. 3(d).

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the effects of Martial Law.”145 Its symbolism is unmistakable. It

undermines the recognition of his complicity. Clearly, it is illegal.

X

“Libingan ng mga Bayani” is a label created by a presidential
proclamation. The Libingan ng mga Bayani was formerly known as
the Republic Memorial Cemetery. In 1954, under Proclamation No.
86, the Republic Memorial Cemetery was renamed to Libingan ng
mga Bayani for symbolic purposes, to express esteem and reverence
for those buried there:
WHEREAS, the name “Republic Memorial Cemetery” at Fort Wm

McKinley, Rizal province, is not symbolic of the cause for which our
soldiers have died, and does not truly express the nation’s esteem and
reverence for her war dead;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare that the
“Republic Memorial Cemetery” shall henceforth be called “LIBINGAN NG
MGA BAYANI.”

Thus, Proclamation No. 86 is a recognition of the nation’s intent
to honor, esteem, and revere its war dead. To further this intention, it
changed the name of the cemetery to the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
From this act alone, it is clear that the name of the cemetery conveys
meaning. The Libingan ng mga Bayani was named as such to honor
and esteem those who are and will be buried there.
If there was no intention to bestow any recognition upon
Ferdinand E. Marcos as a hero, then he should not be buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. If the President wanted to allot a portion
of public property to bury Ferdinand E. Marcos without according
him the title of a hero, the President had other options. The President
had the power to select a different cemetery where Marcos was to be
buried.
_______________
145 Id., Sec. 3(c).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Likewise, before ordering the interment, the President did not

amend the name through his own presidential proclamation.
Therefore, the intent to bury him with honors is clearly legible,
totally unequivocal, and dangerously palpable.
Having the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos in a national shrine
called the Libingan ng mga Bayani undeniably elevates his status. It
produces an indelible remark on our history. It commingles his name
and his notorious legacy with the distinctively heroic and exemplary
actions of all those privileged to be buried there.
The transfer of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains violates the policy
of full and public disclosure of the truth. It produces an inaccurate
account of the violations committed. It will fail to educate all sectors
of society and all generations of the human rights violations
committed under his watch. It is a violation of the fundamental
statutory policy of recognition of the human rights violations
committed during the Marcos regime.
As pointed out by the Commission on Human Rights:
17. Crucial to the Satisfaction component of effective reparation is the

official acknowledgment of the truth of the abuses and violations that the
victim suffered, including an acknowledgment of the responsibility of the
perpetrator as well as a public apology.
18. Burying the remains of Ferdinand Marcos at the LNMB with the
pomp and pageantry accorded to a hero is the complete antithesis of any
such apology, and would constitute a denial or reversal of any previous
acknowledgment of his many sins against the victims of human rights
violations under his government. It is an act that, for all of the discussion as
to what “bayani” means, will inevitably extol him and his actions in
government for all future generations. . . .
19. Moreover, the burial of Mr. Marcos’ remains at the LNMB sends a
very dangerous message to Philippine society and even to the world by
treating him as a hero, and violates the Guarantee of Non-Repetition
component of effective reparations. . . .
20. To bury a legally confirmed human rights violator as hero would fly
in the face of any effort to educate the Filipino people on the importance of
human rights, and would, rather than promote reform in favor of respect for
human rights, tend to promote impunity

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by honoring a man known all over the world for having perpetrated human
rights violations for nearly two decades in order to perpetuate his hold on
power;
21. Worse still, this would even send a message to other leaders that
adopting a similar path of abuse and violations that characterized the
Marcos dictatorship would ultimately result not in condemnation but instead
acknowledgment and accolades of heroism, constituting thereby a set of
circumstance not contemplated by the holistic notion of reparation, in
particular violating both the standard of Satisfaction and the Guarantee of
Non-Repetition. Therefore, this will not only deprive the victims of human
rights violations of their right to effective reparations but will place future
generations in genuine peril of the real prospect of coming face-to-face once
more with authoritarian rule characterized by rampant human rights
violations.146

The interment of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani necessarily implies two (2) things: the
honoring of Ferdinand E. Marcos; and the allotting of a portion of
public property for this act.
The act of burying in itself has always been more than an act of
disposing of dead bodies. A burial is a manner of memorializing and
paying respects to a deceased person. Implicit in these ceremonies is
the preservation of the memory of the person for his good or valiant
deeds.
This cultural practice is not limited to private persons. The same
practice applies when it is the State burying the deceased person.
The act of burying a body under the sanction of the State means that
it is the State itself paying its respects to the dead person and
memorializing him or her for his or her good and valiant deeds. It is
never done to remember past transgressions. Thus, burials are acts of
honoring. And when the burial is state-sanctioned, it is the State that
honors the deceased person.
This is more emphasized when the place of interment is the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Again, whether or not one subscribes to
the idea that the Libingan ng mga Bayani is a cemetery for the
country’s heroes, from
_______________
146 Commission on Human Rights Memorandum, pp. 9-16.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
the public’s perspective, those buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani

are respected, revered, admired, and seen with high regard. To say
otherwise is ridiculous. Although not all who are buried at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani are recognized by the public, the public
recognizes the distinction of being buried there. Those who are and
will be buried there are accorded honors not only by their own
families, but by the State itself.
It is impossible for the State to bury Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani without according him, or his memory, any
honor.
Given these considerations, the transfer of the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violates
Republic Act No. 10368. It is inconsistent with the State’s public
policies as stated in Republic Act No. 10368.
In Avon Cosmetics, Inc. v. Luna,147 this Court discussed the
meaning and relevance of public policy:
And what is public policy? In the words of the eminent Spanish jurist,
Don Jose Maria Manresa, in his commentaries of the Codigo Civil, public
policy (orden público):
[R]epresents in the law of persons the public, social and legal

interest, that which is permanent and essential of the institutions, that
which, even if favoring an individual in whom the right lies, cannot
be left to his own will. It is an idea which, in cases of the waiver of
any right, is manifested with clearness and force.
As applied to agreements, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, another

distinguished civilist gives the term “public policy” a more defined
meaning:
Agreements in violation of orden públic must be considered as those

which conflict with law, whether properly, strictly and wholly a
public law (derecho) or whether a law of the person, but law which in
certain respects affects the interest of society.
_______________
147 540 Phil. 389; 511 SCRA 376 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].

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Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no
subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public or against the public good. As applied to contracts, in the
absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, must find that the contract
as to the consideration or thing to be done, has a tendency to injure the
public, is against the public good, or contravenes some established interests
of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends
clearly to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of personal
liability or of private property.148 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The State’s fundamental policies are laid out in the Constitution.
The rest are embodied in statutes enacted by the legislature. The
determination of policies is a legislative function, consistent with the
Congress’ power to make, alter, and repeal laws.149
It is not the President alone who determines the State’s policies.
The President is always bound by the Constitution and the State’s
statutes and is constitutionally mandated to “ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.”150 To execute laws, the President must
faithfully comply with all of them. He cannot ignore the laws for a
particular group of people or for private interests. The President
cannot ignore the laws to execute a policy that he determined on his
own. He cannot ignore the laws to fulfill a campaign promise that
may or may not have been the reason why he won the People’s
votes. Thus, the President is bound to comply with and execute
Republic Act No. 10368’s state policies are again as follows:
First, to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who
had been victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations
committed dur-
_______________
148 Id., at pp. 404-405; pp. 393-394.

149 Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 276 (1927)
[Per J. Malcolm, Second Division], citing Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., pp. 126, 131, 157-162.
150 CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 17.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ing the regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from

September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986; and
Second, to restore the victims’ honor and dignity.
The nature of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ burial at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani contravenes these public policies. The State’s act of
according any honor to Ferdinand E. Marcos grossly contradicts,
and is highly irreconcilable with, its own public policies to
recognize the heroism and sacrifices of the Martial Law victims and
restore these victims’ honor and dignity.
To allow Ferdinand E. Marcos’ burial is inconsistent with
honoring the memory of the Martial Law victims. It conflicts with
their recognized heroism and sacrifice, and as most of them testified,
it opens an avenue for their re-traumatization. These victims’ honor,
which the State avowed to restore, is suddenly questionable because
the State is also according honor and allotting public property to the
person responsible for their victimization. The victims’ state
recognition is put into doubt when the President decided to act
favorably towards the person who victimized them.

XI

Public respondents’ contention that Ferdinand E. Marcos will not
be buried as a hero, but only as a President, soldier, and Medal of
Valor Awardee, fails to convince:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I am not challenging whether the action of the President was regular or
not, that’s not the point. The point is, you know for a fact that it was a
proclamation creating the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and now without
changing the name, they are now, the President, according to you, verbally
ordered the interment of the remains of the former President. Yet now, you
take the position that the intention of government is not to honor the body of
Ferdinand Marcos as the body of a hero. Although the Libingan’s name is
Libingan ng mga Bayani. So, can you explain that?

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But, as I said, Your Honor, in my opening statement, that is not the purpose
to bury him as a hero. But, by military standards, Your Honor, former
President Marcos fits in to the definition of a hero. As defined by the
Lagman’s Petition, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Excuse me, Counsel, a while ago, this morning, before we took lunch, you
said that there was no intention to honor. In fact, you read from your
Comment, that there was no intention to bury the President as a hero.
Yes, we stand by that, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay.
However, based on the military standards given to a Medal of Valor

awardee, he fits in to the definition which was proposed by Petitioner
Lagman, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A Medal of Valor awardee, is he or she a hero?
May I read into the records, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A Medal of Valor, please do not ignore my question.
Yes.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A Medal of Valor awardee, is he a hero or not a hero? Is he or she a hero or

not a hero?
Based on the wordings of Presidential Decree 1687, Your Honor, it says
here, “The Medal of Valor is the highest award that may be given to a Filipino
soldier in recognition of conspicuous acts of gallantry above and beyond a
call of duty and in total disregard of personal safety; Whereas, an awardee of
the Medal of Valor for his supreme self-sacrifice and distinctive act of
gallantry, performed more than ordinarily hazardous service and deserved due
recognition from a grateful government and people.” . . .

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Is this a Presidential Decree, Counsel?
. . . the definition, Your Honor, in the Lagman Petition . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Is this a Presidential Decree?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Who issued the Presidential Decree?
. . . .
Well, a judicial notice can be taken that it was during the term of President
Marcos, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Ferdinand Marcos, who is a Medal of Valor awardee, issued this

Presidential Decree.
However, Your Honor, the Medal of Valor . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, no, no, however, he had the power to issue the Presidential Decree, I’m
not questioning that. Okay, my question here, which you ignored, is, is a
Medal of Valor awardee a hero?
By the definition, Your Honor, he is a hero.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, therefore, you are going back against what you said in the Comment . . .
But we will set aside that, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
How can you set that aside?
We will set it aside because . . .

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JUSTICE LEONEN:
Which part of Marcos will you not bury as a Medal of Valor awardee and
which part will you bury?
Because, Your Honor . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
It’s the same person.
. . . President Duterte’s announcement is that he will allow the burial not as
a hero, but as a former president, a former veteran and a soldier, that’s all,
Your Honor.161

The claim that he is being buried only as a President, soldier, and
Medal of Valor awardee is a fallacy. When a person is buried, the
whole person is buried, not just parts of him or her. Thus, if
government buries and honors Ferdinand E. Marcos’ body as the
body of a former soldier, it will, at the same time, be burying and
honoring the body of a human rights violator, dictator, and
plunderer. It is impossible to isolate the President, soldier, and
Medal of Valor awardee from the human rights violator, dictator, and
plunderer.

XII

Apart from recognizing the normative framework and the
acknowledgment of human rights violations during the Marcos
regime, the law likewise acknowledges the State’s obligation that
“any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall have
an effective remedy.”162 This right to an “effective remedy” is
available even if “the violation is committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.”163
With the recognition of human rights victims of Martial Law, the
Board created by Republic Act No. 10368 may provide “awards.”164
_______________
161 TSN, Oral Arguments, September 7, 2016, pp. 156-159.

162 Rep. Act No. 10368, par. 2.
163 Id.
164 Id., Sec. 19.

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Although this award has a monetary value,165 other duties for

government are likewise provided by law. There can be
nonmonetary reparation:
Section 5. Nonmonetary Reparation.—The Department of Social

Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education (DepEd),
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government
agencies shall render the necessary services as nonmonetary reparation for
HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Board pursuant
to the provisions of this Act[.]166

The phrase “other government agencies” includes public
respondents in these consolidated cases.
The law also requires the documentation of the human rights
violations committed during the Marcos regime:
Section 21. Documentation of Human Rights Violations Committed by

the Marcos Regime.—In the implementation of this Act and without
prejudice to any other documentary or other evidence that may be required
for the award of any reparation, any HRVV seeking reparation shall execute
a detailed sworn statement narrating the circumstances of the pertinent
human rights violation/s committed.167

Further, memorialization is required under the law:
Section 26. Roll of Victims.—Persons who are HRVVs, regardless of

whether they opt to seek reparation or not, shall be given recognition by
enshrining their names in a Roll of Human Rights Victims to be prepared by
the Board.
A Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established in honor and in
memory of the victims of human rights violations whose names
_______________
165 Id., Sec. 19(c). The monetary value shall be dependent on a point system.
166 Id., Sec. 5.
167 Id., Sec. 21.

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shall be inscribed in the Roll. A compendium of their sacrifices shall be

prepared and may be readily viewed and accessed in the internet. The
Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium shall have an appropriation of at
least Five hundred million pesos (P500,000,000.00) from the accrued
interest of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) fund.
The Roll may also be displayed in government agencies as may be
designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission as created hereunder.

The Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission is
given the task of making such memory permanent. It is tasked to
ensure that the atrocities that happened during the Marcos regime
are included in the educational curricula of schools:
Section 27. Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission.

—There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Human Rights
Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission, primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and
conservation of the Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium in honor of
the HRVVs during the Marcos regime.

....

The Commission shall be attached to the CHR solely for budgetary and
administrative purposes. The operating budget of the Commission shall be
appropriated from the General Appropriations Act.
The Commission shall also coordinate and collaborate with the DepEd
and the CHED to ensure that the teaching of Martial Law atrocities, the
lives and sacrifices of HRVVs in our history are included in the basic,
secondary and tertiary education curricula.

The concept of an effective remedy can be read from the law.

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The requirements of effective remedies beyond monetary

compensation are also supported by jurisprudence. In Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants,
Inc.:158
[E]very statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all

incidental power, right or privilege. In Atienza v. Villarosa, the doctrine was
explained, thus:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in
its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be
an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as
the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power,
right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed
in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.159

Persuasive, as it dovetails with the requirements of our
Constitution and our statutes, are international laws and treaties
providing for the right to a remedy for victims of international
human rights law. This has been recognized in Article 8160 of the
Universal Declaration of Hu-
_______________
158 G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015, 751 SCRA 389 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
First Division].
159 Id., at pp. 404-405, citing Atienza v. Villarosa, 497 Phil. 689; 458 SCRA 385
(2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
160 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 8 provides:

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man Rights; Article 2161 of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights; Article 6162 of the International Convention on the
Elimi-
_______________
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent

national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.
161 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2 provides:
Article 2.
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
162 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination, Art. 6 provides:
Article 6. States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction
effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other
State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human
rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to
seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage
suffered as a result of such discrimination.

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nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 14163 of the

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; and Article 39164 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The right to a remedy is also an obligation in
Article 3165 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Convention IV);
Article 91166 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977; and
Article 68167 and Article 75168 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Additionally, the Rome Statute of the
International
_______________
163 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, Art. 14 provides:
Article 14.
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants
shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to
compensation which may exist under national law.
164 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 39 provides:

Article 39. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical
and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of any form of
neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect
and dignity of the child.
165 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 3
provides:
Article 3. A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
166 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 91 provides:
Article 91. Responsibility.—A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions
of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part
of its armed forces.
167 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 68 provides:
Article 68. Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the
proceedings.—

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_______________
1. The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so
doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender
as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in
particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender
violence or violence against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These
measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused and a fair and impartial trial.
2. As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in Article 67, the
Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused,
conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of
evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall
be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a
victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to all
the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness.
3. Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4. The Victims and Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on
appropriate protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and
assistance as referred to in Article 43, paragraph 6.
5. Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may
lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family,
the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the
commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead
submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial.
6. State may make an application for necessary measures to be taken in respect of
the protection of its servants or agents and the protection of confidential or
sensitive information.
168 Id., Art. 75 provides:

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Criminal Court requires that the “principles relating to reparations

to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation”169 be established by state parties.
Except for the Hague Convention of 1907, the Philippines has
ratified all of these international conventions.170 The contents of the
Hague Con-
_______________
Article 75. Reparations to victims.—
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect

of victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this
basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion
in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage,
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on
which it is acting.
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court
may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund
provided for in Article 79.
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall
take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person,
victims, other interested persons or interested States.
4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is
convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether,
in order to give effect to an order which it may make under this article, it is
necessary to seek measures under Article 93, paragraph 1.

A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the provisions of
Article 109 were applicable to this article.
169 Id.
170 The Philippines signed and approved the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights on December 10, 1948 as part of the United Nations General Assembly that
adopted it; ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights on
October 23, 1986; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination on September 15, 1967; the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on June 26, 1987;
Convention on the Rights of the Child on Augnst 21, 1990; the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of June 8, 1977 on March 30, 2012; the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on August 30, 2011.

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vention of 1907 already form part of customary international law

embodying much of the foundation of international humanitarian
law. All the obligations in these treaties are already part of our laws.
We take a closer look at the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Part II, Article 2, Section 3 provides:
PART II
Article 2

....


the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;


when granted. (Emphasis supplied)

The United Nations General Assembly later adopted Resolution
No. 60/147, which embodied the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles).171
The Basic Principles was adopted to affirm and expound on the right
of victims to a remedy as provided for in the ICCPR and other
international laws and treaties. It is persuasive in the ICCPR’s
interpretation and contributes to achieving
_______________
171 UN G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (16 December 2005). The
Basic Principles and Guidelines were recommended by the UN Commission on
Human Rights in its resolution 2005/35 dated April 19, 2005 and by the Economic
and Social Council also in its resolution dated 2005/30 dated July 25, 2005.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
the full guarantee for respect of human rights required by the

Constitution.
The Basic Principles does not entail new international
obligations. The document only identifies “mechanisms, modalities,
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal
obligations under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law which are complementary through different as to
their norms.”172
Under the Basic Principles, the dignity of victims must be
respected, and their well-being ensured. The State must take
measures to safeguard that its laws protect the victims from re-
traumatization:
VI. Treatment of victims

10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their
dignity and human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to
ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as
well as those of their families. The State should ensure that its domestic
laws, to the extent possible, provide that a victim who has suffered violence
or trauma should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid his or
her re-traumatization in the course of legal and administrative procedures
designed to provide justice and reparation.

The victims’ right to a remedy under the Basic Principles
includes adequate, effective, and prompt reparation for harm
suffered:
VII. Victims’ right to remedies

11. Remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law include the victim’s
right to the following as provided for under international law:
_______________
172 Basic Principles, 7th whereas clause provides:

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not
entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms,
modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal
obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law
which are complementary though different as to their norms[.]

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(a) Equal and effective access to justice;

(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered;
(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and
reparation mechanisms.

The Basic Principles further elucidates the reparation to which
the victims are entitled. It provides that the reparation must be
proportional to the harm suffered. The general concept of reparation
and effective remedies is found in Principles 15 and 18 of the Basic
Principles:
15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote
justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law or
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparations should be
proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a
State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be
attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international human
rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. In cases
where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation
to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or
compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the
victim.

. . . .

18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking
account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of
humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and
effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the
following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Full and effective reparation includes Restitution, Compensation,

Rehabilitation, Satisfaction, and Guarantees of Non-repetition.
These are provided for under Principles 19 to 23:
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the

original situation before the gross violations of international human rights
Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of
human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, and return to one’s place
of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.

20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and
the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of
humanitarian law such as:

(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social
benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical
services, and psychological and social services.
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well

as legal and social services.

22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the
following:

(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to
the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or
threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives,
witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist

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the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations;

(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities
of the children abducted, and of the bodies of those killed, and
assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in
accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or
the cultural practices of the families and communities;
connected with the victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgment of the facts and
acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the
violations;
training and in educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or

all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:

(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and healthcare professions,
the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and
training for

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law enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;

(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in
particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service
and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts
and their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.

The Basic Principles requires separate obligations that are
complete in themselves, and all these components are necessary for
achieving an “effective remedy”173 against human rights violations.
Thus, Compensation for violations committed is not enough
without the victim’s satisfaction. Satisfying and compensating the
victim is not enough unless there is a guarantee against non-
repetition. This requires a legal order that can address these
violations, as well as a cultural and educational system that allows
remembrance of its occurrences.174 It also requires a state that does
what it can to guarantee non-repetition of these offenses.
These are essential to “guarantee full respect for human
rights.”175 Article 2, Section 11 of the Constitution provides that
“[t]he State values the dignity of every human person. It guarantees
full respect of human rights.”176
This provision is not a mere guide or suggestion. It requires the
positive act of the State to guarantee full respect of human rights.
Moreover,
_______________
173 Rep. Act No. 10368, Sec. 2.

174 See Memoradum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 47; Memorandum Commission on
Human Rights Memorandum, p. 7.
175 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 11.
176 Id.

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the State, with all its branches and instrumentalities including this
Court, must provide this guarantee. When this state policy is
invoked, the State cannot shy away from recognizing it as a source
of right that may be affected by government actions.
The reparation due to the victims should not be solely monetary.
In addition to the compensation provided under Republic Act No.
10368, the State must restitute, rehabilitate, satisfy, and guarantee
non-repetition to victims.
Pertinent to issues raised by the victims of the Marcos regime is
the reparation in the form of Satisfaction and Guarantee of Non-
Repetition. The Basic Principles is clear that Satisfaction must
include a “public apology, including acknowledgment of the facts
and acceptance of responsibility,” “judicial and administrative
sanctions against persons liable for the violations,” and an “inclusion
of an accurate account of the violations that occurred . . . in
educational material at all levels.”
The Guarantee of Non-Repetition requires the State to “provide,
on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international
humanitarian law education to all sectors of society,” and “review
and reform laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of
humanitarian law.”
The transfer of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos negates all
these aspects of Satisfaction and Guarantee of Non-Repetition.
There has been no sufficient public apology, full acknowledgment of
facts, or any clear acceptance of responsibility on the part of
Ferdinand E. Marcos or his Heirs. Neither was Ferdinand E. Marcos
sanctioned specifically for human rights violations. Now that he is
dead, the victims can no longer avail themselves of this recourse. To
add insult to this injury, the President decided to acknowledge the
heroic acts and other favorable aspects of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
person primarily responsible for these human rights violations. This
affects the accuracy of the accounts of the violations committed on
the victims. It reneges on the State’s obligation to provide human
rights education and humanitarian law education to the Filipino
People. It contributes to allowing violations of international human
rights law and encourages impunity. If the State chooses to revere
the person responsible for human rights violations, the percep-

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
tion of its People and the rest of the world on the gravity and weight
of the violations is necessarily compromised.
Allowing Ferdinand E. Marcos’ burial under the pretense of the
President’s policy of promotion of national healing and forgiveness
lowers the victims’ dignity and takes away from them their right to
heal in their own time. Allowing the Marcos burial on the premise of
national healing and forgiveness is a compulsion from the State for
the victims and the Filipino People to forgive their transgressor
without requiring anything to be done by the transgressor or his
successors, and without even allowing the victims to be provided
first the reparations granted to them by law.
Despite the conclusive presumption accorded to some of these
human rights victims, they have still been unable to claim the
reparations explicitly granted to them by Republic Act No. 10368.
Meanwhile, Ferdinand E. Marcos is awarded forgiveness and
accorded state funds and public property to honor him as a Former
President and a military man. This is not the effective remedy
contemplated by law.

XIII

To allow the Marcos burial is diametrically opposed to Republic
Act No. 10368. The stated policies are clear. These must be applied,
and applied in its entirety — in accordance with its spirit and intent:
Thus, the literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless; and

lead to absurdity, injustice, or contradiction. When this happens, and
following the rule that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls its
letter. Not to the letter that killeth, but to the spirit that vivifieth. Hindi ang
letra na pumapatay, kung hindi ang diwa na nagbibigay buhay.177
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
177 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections, 592

Phil. 1, 62; 571 SCRA 263, 319-320 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

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Likewise, a law is always superior to an administrative

regulation, including those issued by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.178 The latter cannot prevail over the former. In Conte, et
al. v. Commission on Audit:179
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an

administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a
public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may
not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules
and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect
to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or
a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.180 (Emphasis
supplied)

This is especially true when the regulation does not stem from
any enabling statute. Administrative regulations stem from the
President’s administrative power. In Ople v. Torres:181
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace
and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.182
_______________
178 China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 158, 173; 265
SCRA 327, 343 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
179 332 Phil. 20; 264 SCRA 19 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
180 Id., at p. 36; pp. 30-31.
181 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
182 Id., at pp. 967-968; pp. 150-151.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies

and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Because regulations are issued under the administrative powers
of the President, its function is mostly to properly apply policies and
enforce orders. Thus, regulations must be in harmony with the law.
The AFP Regulations cannot be given priority by the President over
Nonetheless, assuming the AFP Regulations are valid, Republic
Act No. 10368 has amended them such that they disallow any
governmental act that conflicts with the victims’ right to recognition
and reparation. Section 31 of Republic Act No. 10368 provides:
Section 31. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, executive orders,

rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with any of the provisions
of this Act, including Section 63(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and
Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, are hereby repealed, amended or modified
accordingly.

Since Republic Act No. 10368 should be read into or deemed to
have amended the AFP Regulations, the transfer of the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos is illegal.

XIV

Assuming the AFP Regulations remain the governing regulation
over the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ferdinand E. Marcos is still
disqualified from being interred there. It can be inferred from the list
of disqualifications that those who have committed serious crimes,
something inherently immoral, despite having served the country in
some way, are not “bayani” deserving to be interred at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.

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Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta contends that Ferdinand
E. Marcos is not disqualified from being interred at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani under the AFP Regulations as he was neither convicted
of an offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably discharged
from active military service. This argument is hinged on the
constitutional provision that a person shall not be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law and the presumption
of innocence in all criminal prosecutions.183
It is true that the presumption of innocence applies in criminal
prosecutions. Nonetheless, relying on the presumption of innocence
to allow Ferdinand E. Marcos to escape the consequence of his
crimes is flimsy.
First, this is not a criminal prosecution, and the rights of the
accused do not apply. Second, Ferdinand E. Marcos’ innocence is
not in issue here. Even public respondents do not insult petitioners
by arguing that Ferdinand E. Marcos is not complicit and
responsible for the atrocities committed during his dictatorship.
Third, an invocation of the presumption of Ferdinand E. Marcos’
innocence is a rejection of the legislative findings of Republic Act
No. 10368 and of this Court’s own pronouncements in numerous
cases.
The issue at hand is whether Ferdinand E. Marcos is someone
who should be honored and emulated.
There is no presumption of innocence when it comes to
determining one’s fitness to be buried at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Moreover, as Ferdinand E. Marcos is a public officer, the
standards are high. Article XI of the Constitution provides the basic
rules that must be followed by all public officers:

ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
_______________

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Not only is Ferdinand E. Marcos responsible for gross human

rights violations and, thus, crimes of moral turpitude; he also failed
to meet any of the standards imposed on a public officer under the
Constitution. On this alone, he is not worthy of being emulated and
does not belong at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

XV

The Solicitor General claims that the provision in the
Administrative Code of 1987 is the government’s legal basis for the
instructions to bury the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani:
Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of

the Government.—(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for
settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of
the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The
reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. (Emphasis
supplied)

This provision requires two (2) substantive requirements. First,
the segregation of land is “for public use and a specific public
purpose.” Second, the use of public land “is not otherwise directed
by law.”
The Solicitor General cites Manosca v. Court of Appeals184 and
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila.185 These cases
provide little assistance to their case.
The Solicitor General claims that “recognizing a person’s
contribution to Philippine history and culture is consistent with the
requirement of public use.”186 Yet, he acknowledges on behalf of
government that Martial Law was part of the “dark pages” of our
history. Thus, in his Consolidated Comment:
_______________
184 G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 412 [Per J. Vitug, First
Division].
185 40 Phil. 349 (1919) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
186 Solicitor General Consolidated Comment, p. 43.

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No amount of heartfelt eulogy, gun salutes, holy anointment, and elaborate

procession and rituals can transmogrify the dark pages of history during
Martial Law. As it is written now, Philippine history is on the side of
Petitioners and everybody who fought and died for democracy.187

Ferdinand E. Marcos was ousted from the highest office by the
direct sovereign act of the People. His regime was marked by
brutality and by the “organized pillaging” that came to pass.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,188 which was decided in 1989, this
Court acknowledged that Ferdinand E. Marcos was “a dictator”189
who was “forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country.”190 This
Court recognized the immediate effects of the Marcos regime:
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the
economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives,
many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize
the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to
speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, we cannot ignore the continually
increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates
development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its
attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.191

In 2006, in Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan:192
In PCGG v. Peña, this Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a “well-

entrenched plundering regime of twenty years” noted the
_______________
187 Id., at pp. 60-61.

189 Id., at p. 492; pp. 682-683.
190 Id.
191 Id., at p. 509; p. 698.
192 515 Phil. 1; 479 SCRA 1 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
“magnitude of the past regime’s ‘organized pillage’ and the ingenuity of the
plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal
minds available in the market.” The evidence presented in this case reveals
one more instance of this grand scheme. This Court — guardian of the high
standards and noble traditions of the legal profession — has thus before it an
opportunity to undo, even if only to a certain extent, the damage that has
been done.193 (Citations omitted)

In the 2001 case of Estrada v. Desierto,194 this Court
characterized once again the 1986 EDSA Revolution and, in so
doing, described the rejection of the Marcos regime:
[T]he government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful

revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino People in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended.195

The other possible purpose stated by the Solicitor General is to
achieve the ambiguous goal of “national healing.”196 During the
Oral Arguments, the Solicitor General argues that the aim of the
burial is to achieve “changing the national psyche and beginning the
painful healing of this country.” In doing so, however, respondents
rewrite our history to erase the remembrance of Ferdinand E.
Marcos as a symbol of the atrocities committed to many of our
People. It is an attempt to forget that he was a human rights violator,
a dictator, and a plunderer, in the name of “national healing” and at
the cost of repetition of the same acts in this or future generations.
_______________
193 Id., at pp. 48-49; pp. 56-57.

194 406 Phil. 1; 353 SCRA 452 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
195 Id., at pp. 43-44; p. 492. See also Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines v.
Aquino, supra note 126, as cited in In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, supra note 126.
196 Solicitor General, Consolidated Comment, p. 5.

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Considering Ferdinand E. Marcos’ disreputable role in Philippine

history, there can be no recognition that serves the public interest for
him. There is no legitimate public purpose for setting aside public
land at the Libingan ng mga Bayani — definitely a national shrine
— for him.
Manosca states the standard that governmental action to favor an
individual or his or her memory will only be allowed if it is to
recognize the person’s laudable and distinctive contribution to
Philippine history or culture. Ferdinand E. Marcos’ leadership has
been discredited both by statutory provisions and jurisprudence. He
has contribution that stands out and that should be validly
recognized.
It is disturbing that what appears to be the underlying cause for
the interment of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani is the fulfillment of a campaign promise by President
Duterte to the Heirs of Marcos. This dovetails with petitioners’
manifestation that campaign contributions were made by the Heirs
of Marcos. Promised acts of a political candidate to a family to
further personal political ambition at the cost of the public’s welfare
cannot be considered as the public purpose required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.

XVI

The exercise of the President’s powers may not be justified by
invoking the executive’s residual powers.
An exercise of the President’s residual powers is appropriate only
if there is no law delegating the power to another body, and if there
is an exigency that should be addressed immediately or that
threatens the existence of government. These involve contingencies
that cannot await consideration by the appropriate branches of
government.
In Gonzales v. Marcos,197 this Court recognized the residual
power of the President to administer donations specifically in the
absence of legislative guidelines. This Court stressed that it was
necessary that the executive act promptly, as time was of the
essence:
_______________
197 160 Phil. 637; 65 SCRA 624 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
There is impressive juridical support for the stand taken by the lower
court. Justice Malcolm in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer
took pains to emphasize: “Just as surely as the duty of caring for
governmental property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it as
surely executive.” It would be an unduly narrow or restrictive view of such
a principle if the public funds that accrued by way of donation from the
United States and financial contributions for the Cultural Center project
could not be legally considered as “governmental property.” They may be
acquired under the concept of dominium, the state as a persona in law not
being deprived of such an attribute, thereafter to be administered by virtue
of its prerogative of imperium. What is a more appropriate agency for
assuring that they be not wasted or frittered away than the Executive, the
department precisely entrusted with management functions? It would thus
appear that for the President to refrain from taking positive steps and await
the action of the then Congress could be tantamount to dereliction of duty.
He had to act; time was of the essence. Delay was far from conducive to
public interest. It was as simple as that. Certainly then, it could be only
under the most strained construction of executive power to conclude that in
taking the step he took, he transgressed on terrain constitutionally reserved
for Congress.198 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Marcos v. Manglapus,199 the government was unstable and
was threatened by various forces, such as elements within the
military, who were among the rabid followers of Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Thus, the residual power of the President to bar the return
of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ body was recognized by this Court as borne
by the duty to preserve and defend the Constitution and ensure the
faithful execution of laws:
The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward
of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of
the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power
borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a
_______________
198 Id., at p. 644; p. 631.


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power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed.200

Further, this Court recognized the President’s residual powers for
the purpose of, and necessary for, maintaining peace:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the
peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times
of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of
the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.201

In Sanlakas v. Reyes202 where several hundred members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City and demanded Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s resignation, the use of the President’s residual
power to declare a state of rebellion was allowed. This Court held
that although the declaration is a superfluity, her power to declare a
state of rebellion arises from her pow-
_______________
200 Id., at p. 504; p. 694, citing Hyman, The American President, where the
author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in
any government and is best lodged in the President.
201 Id., at pp. 504-505; p. 694, citing Rossiter, The American Presidency.
202 Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra note 78.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.203 This Court

examined the history of such powers:
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so
when taken together with the provision on executive power and the
presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the
presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or
threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity
of the State.204

In these cases, the residual powers recognized by this Court were
directly related to the President’s duty to attend to a present
contingency or an urgent need to act in order to preserve domestic
tranquility. In all cases of the exercise of residual power, there must
be a clear lack of legislative policy to guide executive power.
This is not the situation in these consolidated cases. As
discussed, there are laws violated. At the very least, there was no
urgency. There was no disturbance to the public peace.

XVII

I disagree with Associate Justice Jose P. Perez’s view that the
issue relating to the transfer of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos
was already resolved through the political process of the election of
the President of the Philippines.205 In his view, the issue had already
been presented to the public during the campaign season, and
President Duterte was elected despite petitioners’ opposition. Thus,
he concludes that the sovereign has subscribed to the policy
promised by President Duterte.206 In other words, he is of the
opinion that the People decided that Ferdinand E. Marcos should be
buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani because President Duterte did
not lose.207
_______________
203 Id., at p. 522; p. 677.

204 Id., at p. 518; pp. 675-699.
205 J. Perez, Concurring Opinion, p. 472.
206 Id., at p. 473.
207 Id., at pp. 474-475.

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Associate Justice Perez suggests that the President-elect’s acts to
effectuate his campaign promises may no longer be questioned by
any party, regardless of whether it is contrary to the Constitution,
laws, and public policy, regardless of whether he obtained the votes
of the majority, and regardless of whether he acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.208 He takes
the position that any act of the President to fulfill his electoral
promise will be deemed legitimate because the People have
supposedly chosen him as their President.209
I cannot agree to this dangerous proposition. We are a
constitutional democracy: a State under the rule of law.
The number of votes obtained by the President does not
determine whether the Constitution or the laws will or will not
apply. The Constitution is not suspended on account of the election
of a President who promised a particular policy. We elect a President
whom we expect to implement political platforms given the existing
state of the law. The process of election is not a means to create new
law. The process of creating law is provided in Article VIII of the
Constitution. Neither should the elections for President be the
process for amending the Constitution. The process for amending
the Constitution is provided in Article XVII of the same
Constitution.
Furthermore, the President is tasked to execute the law — not
create it. It is the legislative branch that determines state policies
through its power to enact, amend, and repeal laws. Thus, it is
dangerous to assume that the sovereign voted for the President to
“ratify” policies he promised during his campaign.
In other words, under our constitutional order, we elect a
President subject to the Constitution and the current state of the law.
We do not, through the process of elections, anoint a king.
Moreover, the theory that a campaign promise becomes policy is
an abdication of the judiciary’s duty to uphold the Constitution and
its laws.
_______________
208 Id.
209 Id.

594
Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision defines this Court’s duty to ensure that all
branches or instrumentalities of Government act only within the
scope of their powers as defined by the Constitution and by law.
Nothing in the provision allows campaign promises to trump the rule
of law.
Associate Justice Perez’s Concurring Opinion is founded upon
the premise that the transfer of the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos
is a question of policy to be determined by the People, outside the
scope of this Court’s power of judicial review. He claims that the
matter is a political question. Unfortunately, the allegations of an
infringement upon a fundamental individual or collective right and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of another branch of
government, which were properly pleaded by petitioners, were not
addressed.
Recently, in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections:210
The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks
this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of
their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In
such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will
decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious
and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
_______________
210 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

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The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial

review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. . . .
Marcos v. Manglapus limited the use of the political question doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the

determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law
is for the latter alone to decide.
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has
undergone an evolution since the time that it had been first invoked in
Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and
social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully
and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. . . .
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such
crises may use the resolution of constitutional issues as leverage. But the
expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to exercise its
power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe
or resolve social conflict.
This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or
unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in

which the President’s discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue
involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or
whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial
review. And such review does not constitute a modification or
correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute
interference with the functions of the President.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political

question was discussed most extensively in Francisco v. HRET. In this case,
the House of Representatives argued that the question of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. . . .
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of
the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.211 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

XVIII

Similarly, I cannot agree with the conclusions of Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion with respect to the interpretation of Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Associate Justice Brion opines that this Court’s expanded
jurisdiction under the Constitution does not empower this Court to
review allegations involving violations and misapplication of
statutes.212 He claims that the remedies available to petitioners are
those found in the Rules of Court, which address errors of law.213 He
claims that this Court can only check whether there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of another branch or instrumentality of
government when there is a violation of the Constitution.214
Necessarily, petitioners must have shown that there is prima facie
evidence that the President violated the Constitution in allowing the
Marcos burial.215 He insists that the Court’s authority, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is limited to determining the constitutionality
of a governmental act. Grave abuse of discretion from violations of
statutes cannot be made a matter of judicial review under this
Court’s expanded jurisdiction.
_______________
211 Id., at pp. 20-23.
212 J. Brion, Concurring Opinion, p. 437.
213 Id.
214 Id., at p. 438.
215 Id.

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Associate Justice Brion’s interpretation proceeds from the theory

that there is a hierarchy of breach of the normative legal order and
that only a breach of the Constitution will be considered grave abuse
of discretion.
In my view, this reading is not supported by the text of the
provision or by its history.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution is clear. This Court is
possessed of the duty to exercise its judicial power to determine
whether there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
expess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
government. This provision does not state that this Court may
exercise its power of judicial review exclusively in cases of
violations of the Constitution.
An illegal act is an illegal act, no matter whether it is illegal as a
result of the violation of a constitutional provision or a violation of
valid and existing law. It is the exercise of discretion that must be
subjected to review, and it is the discretion of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Nothing in the Constitution can lead
to the conclusion that a violation of a statute by the President is not a
grave abuse of discretion.
This jurisdiction to determine whether there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction of any branch of
government is a new provision under the 1987 Constitution. It was
added as a safeguard from abuses of other branches of government,
which were justified under the doctrine of political question. In
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives:216
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant
in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
_______________
216 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

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Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

. . . .
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino

Feliciano, “. . . judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them.” To
him, “[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation
— or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.”
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by “any branch or instrumentalities of government,” the
aforequoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the
first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called “expanded
certiorari jurisdiction” of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which
are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:

. . . .

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitution.
It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.

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Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in
a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: “Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it,
in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. . . .

....

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters

constitute a political question.217 (Emphasis supplied)

It is not about violations that may or may not be constitutional or
statutory in character. It is about discretion gravely abused.
Regretfully, Associate Justice Brion’s position ignores the legal
issues presented by petitioners, which involve a question of the
proper exercise of constitutional powers: whether the President may
use his executive power to order the transfer of the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ to the Libingan ng mga Bayani burial despite
the rights invoked by petitioners and other particular provisions in
the Constitution, statutes, and public policy.
Definitely, there is an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial
review. Recalling a position in Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.:218
The requirement for a “case” or “controversy” locates the judiciary in the

scheme of our constitutional order. It defines our role and distinguishes this
institution from the other constitutional organs.

....

An actual case or controversy is “one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.” To be
justiciable, the issues presented must be “‘definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest’; a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.” The term justiciability
refers to the dual limitation of only considering in an adversarial context the
questions presented before courts, and in the process, the courts’ duty to
respect its coequal branches of government’s powers and prerogatives under
the doctrine of separation of powers.
_______________
217 Id., at pp. 881-884; pp. 123-126.

218 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 731-847 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

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There is a case or controversy when there is a real conflict of rights or

duties arising from actual facts. These facts, properly established in court
through evidence or judicial notice, provide the natural limitations upon
judicial interpretation of the statute. When it is claimed that a statute is
inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution, the meaning of a
constitutional provision will be narrowly drawn.
Without the necessary findings of facts, this court is left to speculate
leaving justices to grapple within the limitations of their own life
experiences. This provides too much leeway for the imposition of political
standpoints or personal predilections of the majority of this court. This is not
what the Constitution contemplates. Rigor in determining whether
controversies brought before us are justiciable avoids the counter
majoritarian difficulties attributed to the judiciary.
Without the existence and proper proof of actual facts, any review of the
statute or its implementing rules will be theoretical and abstract. Courts are
not structured to predict facts, acts or events that will still happen. Unlike
the legislature, we do not determine policy. We read law only when we are
convinced that there is enough proof of the real acts or events that raise
conflicts of legal rights or duties. Unlike the executive, our participation
comes in after the law has been implemented. Verily, we also do not
determine how laws are to be implemented.219

There is an actual case or controversy in this case as it involves a
conflict of legal rights arising from actual facts, which have been
properly established through evidence or judicial notice, and which
provide the natural limitations upon judicial interpretation of the
statute.
Petitioners invoke a violation of their existing legal rights, among
which is their right as victims of human rights violations committed
during the Marcos regime. They invoke an act from the executive
branch, which allegedly violates their rights and was allegedly
committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondents insist on the
President’s right to exercise his executive discretion on who may or
may not be buried at the
_______________
219 Id., at pp. 738-739.

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Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, a conflict of rights must be

determined by this Court in accordance with the Constitution and
statutes. This Court’s ruling on the matter will not be merely
advisory; on the contrary, it shall be binding among the parties and
shall be implemented with force and effect. Thus, there is an actual
case or controversy.

XIX

Associate Justice Peralta contends that petitioners have no locus
standi because they failed to show any direct suffering or personal
injury that they have incurred or will incur as a result of Ferdinand
E. Marcos’ burial.220
I cannot agree.
The requirement of locus standi requires that the party raising the
issue must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”221
In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas:222
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, this Court defined legal

standing as follows:
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing
is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.”
_______________
220 Ponencia, pp. 260-261.

221 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 87 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
222 542 Phil. 443; 513 SCRA 457 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second
Division].

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In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a

“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and
could be suing as a “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” To invest him
with locus standi, the plaintiff has to adequately show that he is entitled to
judicial protection and has a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
asserted public right.223 (Citations omitted)

Several petitioners allege that they are human rights victims
during the Marcos regime who had filed claims under Republic Act
No. 10368. In their Petitions, they claim that respondents’
questioned acts affect their right to reparation and recognition under
Republic Act No. 10368 and international laws. As petitioners have
an interest against Ferdinand E. Marcos and have claims against the
State in connection with the violation of their human rights,
petitioners are vested with material interest in the President’s act in
allowing the Marcos burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In any case, the rule on standing has been relaxed “when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.”224 In In Re Supreme
Court Judicial Independence v. Judiciary Development Fund:225
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in

Francisco v. House of Representatives:
_______________
223 Id., at pp. 455-456; pp. 469-470.

224 In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and
Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 352 [Per J.
Leonen, En Banc], citing Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note
76 at p. 441; p. 151, in turn citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, 591 Phil. 393, 404; 570 SCRA 410, 421 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc],
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359; 281 SCRA 330,
348 (1997) [Per J. Puno, En Banc], and De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
225 Id.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,

the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.226 (Citations omitted)

Given that public property and funds are involved and there are
allegations of disregard of constitutional and statutory limitations by
the executive department, this Court may properly act on the
Petitions.
The ponencia states that petitioners violated the doctrines of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts,227
which essentially espouse the principle that no direct resort to this
Court is allowed when there are other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies.

However, there are exceptions to this rule, as restated in Diocese
of Bacolod:
(a) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time;
(b) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In
these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis
of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantial protection;
(c) In cases of first impression, and no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on this matter;
(d) When the constitutional issues raised are better decided by
this court;
_______________
226 Id., at pp. 367-368.


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(e) When the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ;
(f) When there is a time element presented in this case cannot be
ignored;
(g) When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could free them from the
injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their
rights; and
(h) When the petition includes questions that are “dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.”228

These exceptions are present in these consolidated cases. First,
these cases involve reviewing the act of another constitutional organ,
that is, the President’s exercise of discretion in allowing Ferdinand
E. Marcos’ burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Second, these
Petitions raise constitutional questions that would be better decided
by this Court, as well as issues relating to public policy that may be
beyond the competence of the lower courts. These cases are likewise
of first impression, and no jurisprudence yet exists on this matter.
Thus, the Petitions cannot be dismissed by invoking the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies.

XX

Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the President
violates his or her own oath of office. Thus, in Article VII, Section 5
of the 1987 Constitution:

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

....
_______________
228 Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 210 at pp. 15-18.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
SECTION 5. . . .

“I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously
fulfill my duties as President . . . of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate
myself to the service of the nation. So help me God.”

The President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is
enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, in Article VII, Section 17:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all executive

departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

In Almario v. Executive Secretary,229 we have clarified that the
faithful execution clause is not a separate grant of power but an
obligation imposed on the President. The President is, therefore, not
above the law or above judicial interpretation. He is duty-bound to
obey and execute them. Thus, administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution.230
In Almario, the President’s proclamation of several national
artists was nullified because several rules, guidelines, and processes
of the National Commission on Culture and the Arts and the
Cultural Center of the Philippines were disregarded. This Court
declared that the actions of the President, contrary to the spirit of
these rules, constituted grave abuse of discretion:
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists,

the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and
the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
_______________
230 CIVIL CODE, Art. 7.

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Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it

pleases but is reigned in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
‘discretion is not unconfined and vagrant’ but ‘canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.’
The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing
laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists

should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an
obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
This is precisely why the law provides that “[a]dministrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws of the Constitution.”231

XXI

The ponencia’s characterization of Ferdinand E. Marcos as “just
a human who erred like us”232 trivializes the magnitude of the
suffering that he inflicted on scores of Filipinos.
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ “errors” were not errors that a President is
entitled to commit. They were exceptional in both severity and scale.
They were inhuman acts.
Ferdinand E. Marcos provided the atmosphere of impunity that
allowed the molestations, rape, torture, death, and disappearance of
thousands of Filipinos. Ferdinand E. Marcos was the President who,
rather than preserve and protect the public trust, caused untold
anguish upon
_______________
Secretary, supra note 1 at pp. 163-164; pp. 308-310.

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thousands of Filipino families. Their trauma, after all these years,

still exists.
Ferdinand E. Marcos plundered the nation’s coffers. The
systematic plunder was so exceptional and outrageous that even
after being ousted, he and his family brought more than
P27,000,000.00 in freshly printed notes, 23 wooden crates, 12
suitcases and bags, and various boxes of jewelry, gold bricks, and
enough clothes to fill 57 racks233 with them to their exile in Hawaii.
These were not accidents that humans, like us, commit. These
were deliberate and conscious acts by one who abused his power. To
suggest that Ferdinand E. Marcos was “just a human who erred like
us” is an affront to those who suffered under the Marcos regime.
To suggest that these were mere errors is an attempt to erase
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ accountability for the atrocities during Martial
Law. It is an attempt to usher in and guarantee impunity for them as
well as for those who will commit the same in the future.
It is within the power of this Court to prevent impunity for gross
violations of human rights, systematic plunder by those whom we
elect to public office, and abuse of power at the expense of our
toiling masses. We should do justice rather than characterize these
acts as the “mere human error” of one whom We have characterized
as a dictator and an authoritarian.

XXII

Interpreting the law is not mere power. It is not simply our
personal privilege.
Judicial review is an awesome social responsibility that should
always be discharged with the desire to learn from history and to do
justice. Social justice will not come as a gift. It is a product of the
constant,
_______________
233 Ocampo Memorandum (G.R. No. 225973), p. 5, citing Davies, Nick, The
$10bn question: what happened to the Marcos millions?, The Guardian, May 7, 2016
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/07/10bn-dollar-question-marcos-
millions-nick-davies> (visited November 7, 2016).

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conscious, and determined effort to understand our society and do

what is right. Justice will not come when we insist that we should
decide behind a veil of ignorance. Precisely, our expanded
jurisdiction in the present Constitution contains our People’s
command for this Court not to forget that never again should this
Court be blind to reality.
The reality is that the retelling of the story of Martial Law is
agonizing to many who went through the ordeal. Reliving it for
eternity, with the transfer of the remains of he who is responsible for
the ordeal to the sacred grounds of the Libingan ng mga Bayani, will
permanently cause untold anguish to the victims.
The mother who stood by her principles but was tortured,
molested, or raped during Martial Law will now have to explain to
her daughter why he who allowed that indignity to happen is now at
The family of the father or the mother or the son or the daughter
or the nephew or niece or cousin who disappeared will have extreme
difficulty accepting that the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos — the
President who was Commander-in-Chief and who had control over
all those who wielded state coercion during Martial Law — is buried
in a place that implies that he is a hero. They will have to explain to
themselves, with the pain and anguish that they still suffer, why the
most powerful man who was unable to help them find their kin is
granted honors by this State.
Those who will celebrate this country’s pride every year with the
commemoration of People Power or the EDSA Revolution will also
live with the contradiction that the remains of the President they
ousted for his abuses is now interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
National healing cannot happen without the victims’ participation
and consent.
The decision of the majority to deny the Petitions robs this
generation and future generations of the ability to learn from our
past mistakes. It will tell them that there are rewards for the abuse of
power and that there is impunity for human rights violations. The
decision of the majority implies that, learning from the past, our
People should be silent and

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
cower in fear of an oppressor. After all, as time passes, the

authoritarian and the dictator will be rewarded.
Sooner rather than later, we will experience the same fear of a
strongman who will dictate his view on the solutions of his favored
social ills. Women will again be disrespected, molested, and then
raped. People will die needlessly — perhaps summarily killed by the
same law enforcers who are supposed to protect them and guarantee
the rule of law. Perhaps, there will be people who will be tortured
after they are shamed and stereotyped.
We forget the lessons of the past when we allow abuse to hold
sway over the lives of those who seem to be unrelated to us. Silence,
in the face of abuse, is complicity.
The burial of Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani is not an act of national healing. It cannot be an act of
healing when petitioners, and all others who suffered, are not
consulted and do not participate. Rather, it is an effort to forget our
collective shame of having failed to act as a People as many
suffered. It is to contribute to the impunity for human rights abuses
and the plunder of our public trust.
The full guarantee of human rights is a fundamental primordial
principle enshrined in the Constitution. It is not the antithesis of
government.
To deny these Petitions is to participate in the effort to create
myth at the expense of history.
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains, by law, cannot be transferred to
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Ferdinand E. Marcos is not a “bayani.”
Ferdinand E. Marcos is not a hero.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions.

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DISSENTING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I vehemently dissent.
Ultimately, the ponencia’s reason to dismiss the petitions is that
there is “no clear constitutional or legal basis” to hold that there was
a grave abuse of discretion attending President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s
order to inter former President Marcos’s remains in the Libingan ng
mga Bayani (“LNMB”). And the premise of the statement is that the
sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be
interred at the LNMB is the AFP Regulations.
I cannot, as a magistrate and a citizen, in good conscience, agree.
My reasons are set forth below.

The burial of former President Mar-
cos does not raise a political question
beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The ponencia holds that President Duterte’s decision to have the
remains interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is
not a justiciable controversy.
I disagree.
The issues of justiciability and political question are inextricably
intertwined. They are in reality two sides of the same coin. Their
resolution usually involves mutually exclusive choices. A
determination favoring one necessarily negates the other. It is an
“either/or” scenario.
Invariably, any discussion of the political question doctrine will
draw in the concept of judicial power and review. In turn, the
presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is the stimulus for the exercise of judicial review.
As the doctrine of political question evolved in this jurisdiction,
so did the concept of judicial power. At present, judicial power, as
defined in

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paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,1

includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This expanded
concept of judicial power has consequently bounded, if not
marginalized, the political question doctrine.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The petitioners argue that their petitions raise justiciable issues
over which the Court has the power of judicial review under its
expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution.2 They cite,
among others, The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,3 Marcos v.
Manglapus,4 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,5 Estrada
v. Desierto,6 and Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives7 in
support of their argument. These cases have resolved the political
question issue as well.
On the other hand, public respondents argue that President
Duterte’s determination to have the remains of former President
Marcos interred at the LNMB does not pose a justiciable
controversy.8 The Solicitor General claims that the decision involves
“wisdom”9 and thus beyond judicial review. In fine, public
respondents pose “policy or wisdom” considerations to thwart the
Court from taking cognizance of the petitions.10 In support of his
position, the Solicitor General relies on the cases of
_______________
1 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law.
2 Lagman Petition, p. 3, par. 5.
3 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1.
4 258 Phil. 479; 177 SCRA 668 (1989).
5 392 Phil. 618; 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
6 406 Phil. 1; 353 SCRA 452 (2001).
7 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).
8 OSG Consolidated Comment, I.A., p. 24.
9 Id., par. 55, p. 24.
10 Id., par. 51, p. 24; Public Respondent’s Memorandum, par. 55, p. 27.

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Mamba v. Lara,11 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,12 and Tañada v. Cuenco13 as

jurisprudential anchors.
In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,14 the Court,
after recalling the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in relation to Section 1, Article VIII15 of the 1987
Constitution, espoused that there are two species of political
questions: (1) “truly political questions” or “nonjusticiable political
questions” and (2) “justiciable political questions” or those which
are “not truly political questions.” Thus, truly political questions are
beyond judicial review while courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.16 The Court explained in Francisco:
However, Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define

what are “truly political questions” and those which are not truly political.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic.
There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr
attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. (Italics supplied)
_______________
11 623 Phil. 63; 608 SCRA 149 (2009).

12 721 Phil. 416; 710 SCRA 1 (2013).
13 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
15 Supra note 1.
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 7 at pp. 911-912; pp. 150-151.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political question and a nonjusticiable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now
apply this standard to the present controversy.17 (Citations omitted)

As early as the landmark case of Tañada v. Cuenco,18 the Court
has already recognized that, while the action of the executive or
legislative department may be dictated by public or political policy,
or may involve a question of policy or its wisdom, the judiciary is
nonetheless charged with the special duty of determining the
limitations which the law places on all official action, viz.:
“It is not easy, however, to define the phrase ‘political question,’ nor to
determine what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions,
which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
_______________
17 Id.
18 Tañada v. Cuenco, supra note 13.

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full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government.” x x x

xxxx

“x x x What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act. x x x Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control
over such matters, not merely because they involve [a] political question,
but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers
delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the
laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary
acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular
matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional
government must act according to law and subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the
courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One
department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of determining the
limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of
this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary,
‘to the end that the government may be one of laws and not [of] men’ —
words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written
constitutional document.” x x x19

The Solicitor General argues that the wisdom of the President
cannot be questioned when, in the exercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, he deemed it appropriate
to inter the remains of former President Marcos in a parcel of land of
the public domain devoted for the purpose of being a military shrine,
and recognize
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 1066-1067. (emphasis supplied)

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
his having been a former President, a Medal of Valor Awardee, a

member of the retired military personnel, and a war veteran.20
A mere invocation of the wisdom of the President’s actions and
orders does not make them untrammeled, as indeed, the exercise of
Presidential powers and prerogatives is not without limitations —
the exercise of the Presidential power and prerogative under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, which the public
respondents invoke, is circumscribed within defined constitutional,
legal, and public policy standards.
In fact, the reliance by the Solicitor General on the powers of the
President under the Constitution and the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code (“RAC”) to justify his decision to inter the
remains of former President Marcos in the LNMB necessarily calls
into play any and all underlying constitutional and legal limitations
to such powers. Within this paradigm, judicial review by the Court is
justifiable, if not called for. There is, thus, no truly political question
in relation to the assailed action of the President if this is justified to
have been made allegedly pursuant to his purported powers under
the Constitution and the RAC.
Apart from his powers under the Constitution and the RAC, the
Solicitor General also argues that the President’s order to allow
former President Marcos’ interment at the LNMB is based on his
determination that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness,
and redound to the benefit of the Filipino people.21 He further argues
that the President’s decision is not simply a matter of political
accommodation, or even whim, but, viewed from a wider
perspective, it is geared towards changing the national psyche and
thus begin the painful healing of this country.22 Lastly, he argues that
the said order is in keeping with the President’s campaign promise,
his quest for genuine change and his desire to efface Marcos’
remains as the symbol of polarity.23
In fine, the Solicitor General asks the Court to take the foregoing
arguments at face value and admit them as truisms without any
question,
_______________
20 OSG Consolidated Comment, par. 60, p. 25; Public Respondents’

Memorandum, par. 62, p. 29.
21 Id., par. 61, p. 26; id., par. 63, p. 29.
22 Id., par. 3, p. 5.
23 Id., Prefatory Statement, pp. 3-5.

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on the proposition that if the Court were to scrutinize them, then the
President’s wisdom is being doubted. This request, however, the
Court cannot grant without abnegating its constitutional duty24 of
judicial review.

Requisites of Judicial Review

The flipside to the political question doctrine would be the
requisites of judicial review. Before the Court may hear and decide a
petition assailing the constitutionality of a law or any governmental
act, the following must first be satisfied: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.25 Of these four, the most important are the first
two requisites,26 and thus will be the focus of the following
discussion.

The case presents an
actual controversy ripe
for adjudication.

In Belgica v. Ochoa,27 the Court expounded anew on the
requirement of actual case or controversy in this wise:
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an

actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which pertinently states that ‘judi-
_______________

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 7 at pp. 889-890; p. 223.
25 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 12 at pp. 518-519; p. 89.
26 Id., at p. 519; p. 819, citing Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 296-A Phil. 595, 602; 225 SCRA 568, 575 (1993).
27 Id., at pp. 519-520; pp. 89-90.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
cial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
enforceable x x x.’ Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy
is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, ‘[t]here
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.’ Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
‘ripeness,’ meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. ‘A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.’ ‘Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions.’ (Emphasis supplied)

With these standards, this case presents an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The antagonistic claims on
the legality of the interment of former President Marcos at the
LNMB as shown in petitioners’ assertion of legally enforceable
rights that may be infringed upon by the subject interment, on the
one hand, and the Solicitor General’s insistence on the President’s
prerogative to promote national healing, on the other, clearly satisfy
the requirement for contrariety of legal rights. Furthermore, the
issues in this case are also ripe for adjudication because it has not
been denied that initial preparations and planning for the subject
interment have already been undertaken by public respondents.28
_______________
28 Gov’t now preparing for Marcos burial at Libingan, available at

<http://www.rappler.com/nation/142266-philippines-malacanang-preparations-
ferdinand-marcos-burial-libingan-ng-mga-bayani>, last accessed on October 17,
2016.

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Petitioners have locus standi.

I do not agree with the ponencia’s holding that none of the
petitioners had standing to file the petitions for failure to show direct
and personal injury.
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.29 It refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.30 To
satisfy the requirement of legal standing, one must allege such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.31
In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,32
the Court recognized that in public actions, suits are not usually
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Thus, in a long line of cases, nontraditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators, who have not been
personally injured by the assailed governmental act, have been given
standing by this Court provided specific requirements have been
met.33
For legislators, they have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office
_______________
29 Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 535; 728 SCRA 1, 79 (2014), citing
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 941 (6th ed., 1991).
30 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 283,
citing Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. The Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338,
350; 531 SCRA 583, 591 (2007).
31 Galicto v. Aquino III, 683 Phil. 141, 170; 667 SCRA 150, 170 (2012).
32 450 Phil. 744, 803; 402 SCRA 612, 645-646 (2003).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action,
which infringe upon their legislative prerogatives.34
In the case of taxpayers, they are allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.35
When suing as a concerned citizen, the person complaining must
allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, however, it
has been held that being a citizen and having an interest in the
execution of the laws is already sufficient.36
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case:
(1) Victims of human rights violations during martial law have
the requisite legal standing to file their respective petitions. Their
personal and direct interest to question the interment and burial of
former President Marcos at the LNMB rests on their right to a full
and effective remedy and entitlement to monetary and nonmonetary
reparations guaranteed by the State under the Constitution, domestic
and international laws.
(2) Petitioners also have standing as citizens-taxpayers. The
public character of the LNMB and the general appropriations for its
maintenance, preservation and development satisfy the requirements
for a taxpayer’s suit. To be sure, petitioners’ assertion of every
citizen’s right to enforce the performance of a public duty and to
ensure faithful execution of laws suffices to clothe them with the
requisite legal standing as concerned citizens.
_______________
34 Osmeña III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation,
G.R. No. 212686, September 28, 2015, 771 SCRA 559, 576.
35 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 196; 676 SCRA 579, 594-
595 (2012).
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), 589 Phil. 387, 486; 568 SCRA 402, 456
(2008).

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(3) However, Members of Congress in the Lagman petition and

petitioner De Lima have no personality to maintain the suit as
legislators because they failed to allege, much less show, how the
President’s directive to have the remains of former President Marcos
interred at the LNMB usurps or infringes upon their legislative
functions.
(4) Similarly, petitioners Saguisag, et al., as intervenors in the
case, have no legal standing to maintain the suit in regard to their
claim as human rights lawyers as this is too general to clothe them
the legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either
of the parties required under the Rules of Court.37
Be that as it may, the question of locus standi is but corollary to
the bigger question of the proper exercise of judicial power.38 The
Court may brush aside technical rules when the matter is of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.39
The ponencia concludes by saying that “[the interment] would
have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects
of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven years
since his death and thirty years after his ouster have already passed.”
Prescinding from this statement’s sheer and utter disregard of
Philippine history, the implications that the assailed act bear on the
State’s policy to guarantee full respect for human rights embodied in
the Constitution, on the body of jurisprudence acknowledging the
atrocities committed during martial law, and on the legislative
enactments and treaty obligations granting full protection and
reparation to the victims of human rights violations, undoubtedly
elevate this case to the level of transcendental importance. A
relaxation of the rules of legal standing is thus properly called for.
_______________
37 Id., at p. 487; pp. 456, 459.

38 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 763; 489 SCRA 160, 224 (2006).
SCRA 78, 151-152 (2010).

622

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Certiorari and prohibition

are proper remedies.

The Solicitor General assails the propriety of the remedies sought
by petitioners. He argues that a petition for certiorari and
prohibition does not lie against public respondents inasmuch as the
President, in directing the interment of former President Marcos at
the LNMB, did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
The petitioners’ resort to certiorari and prohibition was proper. A
petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 is an appropriate
remedy to question, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the
act of any branch or instrumentality of government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.40
To reiterate, the expanded definition of judicial power, under
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, imposes upon the Court
and all other courts of justice, the power and the duty not only to
“settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.”
In the case of Araullo v. Aquino,41 the Court clarified that the
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court are remedies by which the courts discharge this
constitutional mandate. Thus, it was ruled that:
[T]he remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in

scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Govern-
_______________
40 Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279, 328,
citing Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 29 at p. 531; p. 76; Villanueva v. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 182.
41 Araullo v. Aquino III, id.

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ment, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or

ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right
and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court
is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been
thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any
assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with
the republican system of checks and balances.42

Therefore, that the assailed act and/or issuances do not involve
the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions is of
no moment. Under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the validity of
the President’s directive to have the remains of former President
Marcos interred and buried at the LNMB and the legality of the
assailed Memorandum and Directive issued by public respondents,
are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioners did not violate the rule
on hierarchy of courts.

The ponencia holds that petitioners failed to observe the rule on
hierarchy of courts as they should have filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over public respondents, and that there
exist no special, compelling and important reasons to justify direct
resort to this Court.
I disagree.
_______________
42 Id., at p. 531; pp. 74-75.

624

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,43 citing Bañez, Jr. v.

Concepcion,44 the Court held:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of
the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious
and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

xxxx

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to
be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe. x x x45

In the same case, however, the Court recognized that hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule. Direct invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction may be allowed for special, important and compelling
reasons clearly spelled out in the petition, such as: (a) when there are
genuine
_______________
43 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 3.

44 693 Phil. 399, 412; 679 SCRA 237, 250-251 (2012).
45 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 3 at pp. 42-43.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most

immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (c) in cases of first impression; (d) when the
constitutional issues raised are best decided by this Court; (e) when
the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored; (f) when
the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; (h) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy so dictates, or when demanded by the broader interest
of justice; (i) when the orders complained of are patent nullities; and
(j) when appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.46
Contrary to the ponencia’s holding, there are special and
compelling reasons attendant in the case at bar which justify direct
resort to this Court. Apart from the fact that the issues presented
here are of transcendental importance, as earlier explained, they are
being brought before the Court for the first time. As no
jurisprudence yet exists on the matter, it is best that this case be
decided by this Court.
Moreover, while the petitions may have been directed against the
Memorandum and Directive issued by public respondents, the
ultimate act assailed is an executive action. In Drilon v. Lim,47 the
Court ruled:
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on
the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the
handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be
prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is
better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and
with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.48
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 45-50.

47 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135.
48 Id., at p. 140.

626

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Furthermore, time was of the essence in this case. The public

pronouncement of Presidential Spokesman Ernesto Abella that the
burial for former President Marcos would push through “unless the
Supreme Court will issue a TRO”;49 news reports that the burial
would be scheduled on September 18, 2016,50 and the President’s
statement that he was willing to allow the Marcos family to decide
on the date of the burial and adding that they could even set the date
of the burial on September 11, 2016,51 cannot be ignored.

Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in
this case.

The ponencia upholds the Solicitor General’s claim that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies because they
should have first sought with the Office of the President the
reconsideration of the subject directives.
This is untenable.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
absolute as there are numerous exceptions laid down by
jurisprudence, namely: (a) when there is a violation of due process;
(b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable
injury; (f) when the respondent is a department sec-
_______________
49 Palace: Hero’s burial for Marcos to proceed unless there’s a TRO, available at
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/577948/news/nation/palace-hero-s-burial-
for-marcos-to-proceed-unless-there-s-a-tro>, last accessed on October 17, 2016.
50 Palace clueless on who will pay for Marcos funeral, available at
<http://manilastandardtoday.com/news/-main-stories/top-stories/213621/palace-
clueless-on-who-will-pay-for-marcos-funeral.html>, last accessed on October 17,
2016.
51 Duterte confirms Marcos burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, available at
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/08/07/marcos-libingan-ng-mga-bayani-
burial.html>, last accessed on October 17, 2016.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
retary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.52
In the petitions before the Court, circumstances (b), (f), (g) and
(k) are present.
First, as already mentioned, the case involves a matter of extreme
urgency. The urgency of judicial intervention is self-evident in the
Court’s decision to issue a Status Quo Ante Order on August 23,
2016, which was extended until November 8, 2016.
Second, the principal issue in this case of whether the President,
in ordering the interment and burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB, committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or violated the Constitution and other statutes is purely of law
and will ultimately be decided by the courts of justice. In this regard,
Vigilar v. Aquino53 explains the reason for the exception, viz.:
Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative

authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with
the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience
but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
(Emphasis supplied)

Third, it was upon the verbal order of the President that the
assailed Memorandum and Directive were issued by public
respondents. This, in fact, is extant in the very language of the
Memorandum itself. Moreover, the President, on numerous
occasions, had insisted that, notwithstand-
_______________
52 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 3 at pp. 59-60,
citing Chua v. Ang, 614 Phil. 416, 425-426; 598 SCRA 229, 238 (2009).
53 654 Phil. 755, 761-762; 639 SCRA 772, 778 (2011), citing Republic v. Lacap,
G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 266-267.

628

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ing oppositions, including the filing of the consolidated petitions, he

would make good his promise to allow the burial of the former
President Marcos at the LNMB54 and even allow the Marcos family
to decide on the date of the burial. With these pronouncements,
seeking relief with the Office of the President would have been an
exercise in futility.

Substantive Issues

Having established the jurisdiction of this Court to rule upon
these consolidated petitions under Rule 65, pursuant to its power of
judicial review under the expanded definition of judicial power in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, I now proceed to the
substantive issues.

Grave abuse of discretion

The office of the writs of certiorari and prohibition is to correct
errors of jurisdiction arising from grave abuse of discretion. Very
simply, then, the most important question that needs to be answered
in this case is fairly straightforward: whether or not public
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB.
Restated, in ordering the interment of former President Marcos in
the LNMB, did public respondents contravene or violate the
Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence?55 If they did, then
they committed grave abuse of discretion,56 the ponencia concedes
as much. Whimsical-
_______________
54 Duterte asked to reconsider Marcos burial at Libingan ng mga Bayani,

available at <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/568973/news/nation/duterte-
asked-to-reconsider-marcos-burial-at-libingan-ng-mga-bayani>, last accessed on
October 17, 2016; Duterte: Follow the law on hero’s burial for Marcos, available at
<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/11/16/duterte-follow-the-lawon-heros-burial-for-
marcos>, last accessed on October 17, 2016.
55 See Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 209; 494 SCRA 66, 85
(2006); Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 610 Phil. 730,
760; 593 SCRA 316, 345-346 (2009).
56 See Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, 584 Phil.
183; 562 SCRA 184 (2008); Banal III v. Panganiban, 511 Phil. 605; 475 SCRA 164
(2005); Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735; 372 SCRA 462 (2001).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ity, caprice and arbitrariness are also considered in determining the

existence of grave abuse. I fully concur with Justice Leonen’s
discussion on the subject, and will confine my discussion to whether
the interment violates the Constitution, law or jurisprudence.
Directly answering the question, I believe that the petitions are
with merit, and that the order to inter the remains of former
President Marcos in the LNMB is contrary to the Constitution, the
law, and several executive issuances that have the force of law, as
well as the public policy that the Constitution, the said laws, and
executive issuances espouse and advance. The argument that
burying former President Marcos in the LNMB does not make him a
hero disregards the status of the LNMB as a national shrine, the
public policy in treating national shrines, the standards set forth in
these laws and executive issuances as well as in the AFP LNMB
burial regulations (“AFP Regulations”).
Before explaining how the intended interment of former
President Marcos violates the Constitution, law, executive issuances,
public policy, and custom, it would be apropos to examine the legal
bases offered by the Solicitor General and private respondents Heirs
of Marcos in defending the legality of the President’s act of allowing
the interment and burial of former President Marcos in the LNMB,
as upheld by the ponencia.

The President’s power to reserve
tracts of land of the public domain
for a specific public purpose.

The ponencia considers the President’s power to reserve land for
public purpose, under Section 14, Chapter IV of Book III, Title I of
the RAC, as basis for the decision to inter former President Marcos
in the LNMB.57 Section 14 provides:
SECTION 14. Power to reserve Lands of the Public and Private

Domain of the Government.—(1) The President shall have the power to
reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of
the lands of the public domain, the use of which is
_______________
57 OSG Comment, pars. 131-138, pp. 42-44.

630

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by
law or proclamation.
(2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other
disposition and for specific public uses or purposes, any land belonging to
the private domain of the Government, or any of the Friar lands, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall be
used for the purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise
provided by law.

This power is, in turn, traced by the Solicitor General to the
President’s power to reserve lands under Commonwealth Act No.
141, or the Public Land Act.58 The provision that empowers the
President to reserve tracts of land of the public domain for a specific
purpose, in turn, reads:

CHAPTER XI
Reservations for Public and Semi-Public Purposes

SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation
any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this
purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for highways, rights-of-way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas
comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen’s
village and other improvements for the public benefit.

First of all, it bears noting that under the provisions of both the
RAC and the Public Land Act, this power to reserve government
lands of the public and private domain is exercised through a
Presidential Proclamation59 or, under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, by executive
_______________
58 Id.
59 Under Section 4, Chapter II of Book III, Title I of the REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE, a proclamation is an act of the President fixing a date or declar-

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
order.60 Elsewhere in the Public Land Act, the proclamation where

the reservation is made is forwarded to the Director of Lands, and
may require further action from the Solicitor General.61
An illustration is found in the factual milieu of Republic v.
Octobre,62 wherein a particular tract of land of the public domain
was reserved for a public purpose by proclamation, and thereafter
released through a subsequent proclamation by President
Magsaysay. The Court cited therein the authority of the President
under Section 9 of the Public Land Act to reclassify lands of the
public domain “at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands
from one class to another,” to validate the release of the reservation
through the subsequent proclamation. This supports the conclusion
that the positive act that “perfects” the reservation for public purpose
(or release) is the issuance of a proclamation. In fact, in Republic v.
Estonilo,63 this mode was considered necessary for a reservation to
be effective or valid:
To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of

the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that
effect.

In this case, however, there is no dispute that this power, argued
by the Solicitor General as belonging exclusively to the President,
was exercised through a verbal order. Based on the foregoing, this
falls short of the manner prescribed by law for its exercise.
Accordingly, absent a Presidential Proclamation, I fail to fathom
how these laws (the RAC and the Public Land Act) can be used to
justify the decision to inter former President Marcos in the LNMB.
Moreover, without any showing that the interment is consistent with
LNMB’s purpose as a national shrine, it cannot be undertaken as no
change in the said specific purpose has been validly made.
_______________
ing a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend.
60 CA No. 141, Sec. 64(d) and (e).
61 Id., Secs. 86 to 88.
62 123 Phil. 698; 16 SCRA 845 (1966).
63 512 Phil. 644, 646; 476 SCRA 265, 268 (2005).

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But even assuming arguendo that the President can exercise the
power to reserve lands of the public domain through a verbal order,
the exercise of this power as basis for the decision to inter former
President Marcos in the LNMB must still be scrutinized in two
ways: first, does the interment constitute public use or public
purpose; and second, is there any law that directs the use of the land
the President seeks to reserve.64
Based on the language of Section 14, Chapter IV of Book III,
Title I of the RAC itself, the power to reserve land is qualified by the
standards stated therein:
(1) That the reservation be for settlement or public use, and for
specific public purposes;
(2) That the use of the land sought to be reserved is not otherwise
directed by law.

First requirement: reserve
tracts of land of the public
domain for a specific pub-
lic purpose.

On the first standard, petitioners argued during the oral
arguments that the fulfillment of the President’s campaign promise,
made in favor of a private party, or to inter a dictator or plunderer
does not constitute a legitimate public purpose as it does not serve
public good. During the interpellation by Justice Carpio, this was
discussed:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
If you bury somebody in the Libingan, you have to spend money, correct?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
_______________
64 “The matter to be considered then is whether there is any law that directs or
authorizes the President to release a disposable public land from a reservation
previously made.” (Republic v. Octobre, supra note 62 at p. 701; pp. 847-848)

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JUSTICE CARPIO:
Funds will be spent?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And you will be using public property, correct?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, the rule is public funds and public property can be used only for a
public purpose, not a private purpose, correct?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, when you bury somebody in the Libingan who has been dishonorably
discharged or separated from service, are you using public funds and property
for a public purpose or for a private purpose?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
That is not transformed, Your Honor. The shrine is intended for, the public
purpose or the shrine is for enshrinement or the recognition of those who are
revered and esteemed and now you are going to put someone who is not
revered and esteemed. That will be a violation of that, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Public purpose means is that (sic), means the use of the funds or the
property is for the general welfare for the public good?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if a person has been dishonorably discharged from service and you
bury him there in a government property that is for a private purpose to extol
or honor the family or the person?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
That is not for the public, there is no public good there, correct?

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So if the President now amends the regulations because the regulations

state, that if you are dishonorably discharged, you cannot be buried in the
Libingan and former President Marcos was dishonorably separated by the
people in 1986, he cannot be buried but if the President now, the incumbent
President amends the regulation to say that he can still be buried upon my
instruction that cannot be done because that’s against the Constitution because
you’re using public funds or property for a private purpose, correct?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, Your Honor, in that sense and also in addition, if you agree with the
petitioner’s contention that R.A. 289 has a standard, the President’s directive
cannot amend R.A. 289 and now must therefore also be struck down, Your
Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, thank you counsel, that’s all.65

For his part, the Solicitor General stood firm and insisted that the
subject interment serves a public purpose, when interpellated by
Justice Leonen:
I have here an excerpt, Your Honor, Section 14. “The Power to Reserve
Lands of the Public and Private Domain of the Government.—(1) The
President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for
specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law.”
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So there are two things there, public use and public purpose.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Is the creation of a Libingan ng mga Bayani falling under that power
of the president, that statutory power, for public use?
_______________
65 TSN, August 31, 2016, pp. 55-63.

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Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Can any member of the public use the Libingan?
Not any member, Your Honor. It should be within the guidelines of the
AFP Regulations.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So is it still public use?

It will be public use, Your Honor, depending on the observance of the

classifications which allow certain persons to be interred at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But if it’s not public, if only a few individuals, select individuals, can use
the Libingan, therefore, it is not public use.
Maybe it can be public use but for a limited and classified persons (sic)
only, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Is that the concept of public use? Is it your submission that that is the
concept of public use?
Because the cemetery can only accommodate so much, it cannot

accommodate the entire public of the Philippines, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we’ll go to that later. In fact, you cited the case in your consolidated
comment. Chinese Cemetery, I think, vs. the City of Manila where you said,
that it does not need to have a character of everybody using it to be public
use, correct? And therefore, the key there. . .
If there is a public purpose for it, yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes. So the key there is public purpose.66
_______________
66 TSN, September 7, 2016, pp. 139-141.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
There appears to be some confusion on the part of the Solicitor

General as to the difference between the terms “public use” and
“public purpose.” “Public use” connotes the traditional concept of
use by the public while “public purpose” is understood more to
mean in furtherance of the public good, or in the public interest.67
The requirement of public purpose is necessary because public funds
and properties cannot be used to serve primarily private benefit.
This Court, in rejecting the validity of appropriating public funds
for a private purpose, explained in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Communications:68
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private

purpose, the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
“It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to

appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. x x x It
is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude
of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private inter-
_______________
67 There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public
purpose” or “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the
general public (e.g., roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could
satisfy the constitutional requirement of “public use.” Under the more current
concept, “public use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a
resort complex for tourists or housing project. (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes,
Nos. L-60549, 60553-60555, October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, No. L-48685, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 461; Province of Camarines
Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 173)
68 110 Phil. 331 (1960).

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ests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does

not justify their aid by the use of public money.” (25 R. L. C. pp.
398-400; italics supplied)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following

language:
“In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, discussed, supra, Sec. 14, money
raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not
for the advantage of private individuals.” (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646;
italics supplied)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum

states:
“Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the

constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The
right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its
right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for
one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. x x x

xxxx

“The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of
public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public
interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public. x x x” (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics
supplied)69

While the Solicitor General argues that expenditures for the
interment are supported by AFP appropriations, the President’s
discretion in
_______________
69 Id., at p. 340. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
spending AFP appropriations to support the interment of former

President Marcos in the LNMB, by virtue of his power of budget
implementation and his power to reserve the tract of land, remains,
as stated, subject to the public purpose requirement. In this case, the
legitimateness of the purpose will depend on what this Court
determines to be the nature of the interment — public or private.
Does it serve the public at large, or merely the partisan interests of
certain individuals?
The ponencia holds that the recognition of the former President
Marcos’s status or contributions as a President, veteran or Medal of
Valor awardee satisfies the public use requirement, and the interment
as compensation for valuable services rendered is public purpose
that justifies use of public funds. Apart from lacking legal basis, this
holding conveniently overlooks the primary purpose of the interment
extant in the records — the Solicitor General has admitted that the
burial of former President Marcos was a campaign promise of the
President to the Marcos family:
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
Before the President gave his verbal order to have the remains of President
Marcos interred in the Libingan, did the heirs of President Marcos make a
personal request to that effect?
In fact, Your Honor, that was a campaign promised (sic) even before he
was a President.
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
And that was a promised (sic) given to, whom?

To the heirs of President Marcos, Your Honor.70

This admission by the Solicitor General indicates to me that the
interment is primarily to favor the Marcos family, and serves no
legitimate public purpose. Therefore, the first requirement for the
legitimate exercise of the President’s power to reserve has not been
met. Moreover, any disbursement of public funds in connection with
the interment will
70 TSN, September 7, 2016, pp. 39-40.

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not be for a public purpose, as it is principally for the advantage of a

private party — separate from the motivation for the same.
The holding of the ponencia, shown in this light, is illogical:
Marcos is not a hero, and burying him in the LNMB will not convert
him into a hero. But somehow, his interment primarily serves a
public purpose or otherwise serves the interest of the public at large,
and this Court will allow the expenditure of public funds to inter him
as a President, veteran, and/or a Medal of Valor awardee as
compensation for valuable public services rendered — turning a
blind eye to the disservice, damage and havoc that former
President Marcos caused to this country.

Second requirement: the
use of the land sought to
be reserved not otherwise
directed by law.

The second requirement for the validity of a reservation requires
the determination of the existence of a law that requires a different
use for the land to be reserved. This was the standard in Republic v.
Octobre,71 when the Court interpreted Section 64(e) of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, the applicable provision then in force,
viz.:
SEC. 64. Particular powers and duties of President of the Philippines.
—In addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the
Philippines shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly
conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and
duties set forth in this chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be:

xxxx

[(d) To reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public
uses any of the public domain of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines the use
of which is not otherwise directed by law, the same thereafter remaining
subject to the specific public uses indicated in
_______________
71 Republic v. Octobre, supra note 62 at pp. 700-701; pp. 847-848.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
the executive order by which such reservation is made, until otherwise

provided by law or executive order.]
(e) To reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public use
or service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of
the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law; and
thereafter such land shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such
executive order until otherwise provided by law.72
and held that “[t]he matter to be considered then is whether there is

any law that directs or authorizes the President to release a
disposable public land from a reservation previously made.” Plainly,
the powers in Section 64(d) and (e) are restated in Section 14 of the
RAC cited by the Solicitor General. The Court’s interpretation of
Section 64(e), and by necessary extension now to Section 14 of the
RAC, has two implications: first, the existence of a law directing the
use of the land sought to be reserved affects the validity of the
reservation — and the provisions of the said law will form part of
the standards by which the court can determine the existence of
grave abuse in case of violation, and second, the original specific
public use or purpose continues until a subsequent law or executive
issuance releases or changes the said specific public use or purpose
for which the land was originally reserved.
In other words, the Solicitor General’s invocation of Section 14
of the RAC, as intimated earlier, confirms that the decision to inter
former President Marcos in the LNMB is not a truly political
question as said decision is, in law, subject to the Court’s power of
judicial review — to determine whether the standards of Section 14
of the RAC have been met, and alongside all other laws, issuances,
judicial decisions and state of facts subject to judicial notice that
relate to former President Marcos as the intended beneficiary of the
directive to be interred in the LNMB. Moreover, since the land that
is the present site of the LNMB is already reserved by Presidential
Proclamation for a specified public use or purpose — for national
shrine purposes — then such specified use or purpose continues
until the land is released by another Presidential Proclamation. Since
in this case, there is no such Presidential Proclamation,
_______________
72 Italics supplied.

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the interment and concomitant expenditure of public funds must, if

justified by Section 14 of the RAC, constitute public purpose and be
consistent with the specified purpose of its reservation, i.e.,
Proclamation No. 208 (S. 1967).
In fine, the verbal order to inter falls short of the required manner
of exercising the power to reserve. Moreover, the interment cannot
be justified by the power to reserve because it is not a legitimate
public purpose, and is not consistent with the national shrine
purposes of LNMB’s reservation. For the same reasons that the
interment serves no legitimate public purpose, no use of public
property or public funds can be made to support it.

Faithful execution and
power of control

As another basis for the power to order the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB, the Solicitor General cites the
President’s power of control over the executive department. On the
other hand, Heirs of Marcos insist that the President’s order merely
implements the express provisions of RA 289 and the pertinent AFP
Regulations and, as such, cannot be considered as capricious or
whimsical, nor arbitrary and despotic.
Petitioners, however, aver the opposite — that the Memorandum
and Directive to bury former President Marcos at the LNMB violate
the faithful execution clause because it disregards the clear and
unequivocal declaration made by Congress in RA 10368 that former
President Marcos is a recognized human rights violator.
There is no argument as to the existence of the power of control
and duty of faithful execution. However, as applied to the case at
bar, it bears to revisit the extent of the power of control and duty to
faithfully execute laws.
The President’s power of control and duty to faithfully execute
laws are found in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:

642

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive

executed.

In Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(a) of the RAC, control is
defined to include “authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.”
It has also been jurisprudentially defined as the “power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.”73
In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corp. v. The Board of
Investments,74 the Court held that the power of control is not
absolute, and may be effectively limited:
Such “executive control” is not absolute. The definition of the structure

of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of
administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, while the order to inter former President Marcos in the
LNMB may be considered an exercise of the President’s power of
control, this is necessarily subject to the limitations similarly
applicable to his subordinate, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(“PVAO”) or the Quartermaster General — found in the
Constitution, laws and executive Issuances.
This is consistent with the duty imposed upon the President by
the faithful execution clause, which this Court explained, thus:
_______________
73 Ham v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 109 Phil. 949, 957 (1960).
74 597 Phil. 649, 661; 578 SCRA 69, 81-82 (2009).

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That the President cannot, in the absence of any statutory justification,

refuse to execute the laws when called for is a principle fully recognized by
jurisprudence. In In re Neagle, the US Supreme Court held that the faithful
execution clause is “not limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress
according to their express terms.” According to Father Bernas, Neagle “saw
as law that had to be faithfully executed not just formal acts of the
legislature but any duty or obligation inferable from the Constitution or
from statutes.”75 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the claim that the President is merely faithfully executing
law (i.e., the AFP Regulations) when he ordered the interment must
be examined in the context of the other duties or obligations
inferable from the Constitution and from statutes that relate to the
facts of this case. And the order to inter cannot be considered a valid
exercise of his power of control, or his duty to faithfully execute the
laws because the interment violates the Constitution, laws and
executive issuances — how it violates these provisions are discussed
subsequently in this dissent.

Residual powers of the President

In default of, or in addition to, the President’s power to reserve
lands, power of control, and faithful execution of the laws, the
Solicitor General claims that the decision to inter former President
Marcos is an exercise of the residual powers of the President. And,
in this connection, the Solicitor General harps on the inherent and
exclusive prerogative of the President to determine the country’s
policy of national healing.76
Residual powers are provided in Book III, Title I, Chapter 7,
Section 20 of the RAC, thus:
SECTION 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides

otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under the laws
_______________
75 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 39 at pp. 538-
539; p. 346.
76 OSG Memorandum or Consolidated Comment.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated
by the President in accordance with law.

In Larin v. Executive Secretary,77 the claim of exercise of
residual power to validate the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue was examined in light of whether or not a law exists that
gives the President the power to reorganize.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No.
292 which states:
“Sec. 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides

otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are
not delegated by the President in accordance with law.” (italics ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416.
These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
are unquestionable. x x x78

On the other hand, in Sanlakas v. Reyes,79 this Court made the
following observation on “residual powers”:
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so
when taken together with the provision on executive
_______________
77 345 Phil. 961; 280 SCRA 713 (1997).

78 Id., at p. 979; p. 730.
79 466 Phil. 482; 421 SCRA 656 (2004).

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power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers
of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies
or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the
integrity of the State.80

Inasmuch as the Solicitor General has failed to provide the
persuasive constitutional or statutory basis for the exercise of
residual power, or even the exigencies which “undermine the very
existence of the government or the integrity of the State” that the
order to inter former President Marcos in the LNMB seeks to
address, the Court should have been left with no recourse except to
examine the factual bases, if any, of the invocation of the residual
powers of the President, as this is the duty given to the Court
pursuant to its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence mandates that
there is no grave abuse of discretion provided there is sufficient
factual basis for the exercise of residual powers.81 Conversely, when
there is absence of factual basis for the exercise of residual power,
this will result in a finding of arbitrariness, whimsicality and
capriciousness that is the essence of grave abuse of discretion.
As early as Marcos v. Manglapus,82 the Court, after conceding to
then President Corazon Aquino the discretion to prohibit the
Marcoses83 from returning to the Philippines under the “residual
unstated powers of the President x x x to safeguard and protect
general welfare,” proceeded to still ascertain if her decision had
factual basis, viz.:
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
_______________
80 Id., at p. 518; p. 675.

81 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 4; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra
note 79; and Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 5.
82 Id.
83 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M.
Araneta, and Imee Manotoc.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine

and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
We cannot, for example, question the President’s recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us
that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend
the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us
because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts
of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter
which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it
would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution, defining “judicial power,” which specifically empowers the
courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [No. L-
33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in
hand with the system of checks and balances,

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under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of

the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted
to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is
merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. x x x [at pp. 479-480]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or

not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has
acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion
in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President’s decision.84 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,85 the Court, while
conceding that the President has the power to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
again inquired into the factual determination by then President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada as to the necessity to call out the armed
forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols
around the metropolis before it ruled that he did not gravely abuse
his discretion. The Court observed:
_______________
84 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 4 at pp. 506-508; pp. 696-697.


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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by

providing that “[T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Under this definition, the Court cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political
question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of
power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or
the limitations respected, is justiciable — the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned.

xxxx

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused,
the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from
this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis
for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically
asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila x x x. We
do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial
notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the
shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are
among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering
all these facts, we hold that the Presi-

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dent has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.86 (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied)

In both Marcos v. Manglapus and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, the Court, pursuant to the expanded concept
of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution, took the “pragmatist”
approach that a political question87 should be subject to judicial
review to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
the official whose action was being questioned. In turn, a
determination of the existence or nonexistence of grave abuse of
discretion is greatly dependent upon a finding by the Court that the
concerned official had adequate factual basis for his questioned
action.
Thus, conceding to the President the power to order the interment
of the former President in the LNMB, did he, however, have
competent factual basis to conclude that his decision would promote
national healing, genuine change and forgiveness, redound to the
benefit of Filipino people, change the national psyche, begin the
painful healing of this country, and efface the Marcos’ remains as a
symbol of polarity?
National healing, genuine change, forgiveness, change in national
psyche, and effacing the Marcos’s remains as the symbol of polarity
are not matters which the Court can or may take judicial notice of.88
They are not self-evident or self-authenticating. The public
respondents and the private respondents, Heirs of Marcos, have,
therefore, the burden to
_______________
86 Id., at pp. 638-645; pp. 105-112.

87 Not to be confused with a “truly political question” pursuant to the Francisco
v. HRET formulation.
88 Rule 129, Section 1 provides that judicial notice is mandatory with respect to
“the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments
of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions,” while Section 2 provides that judicial notice is discretionary with respect
to matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

650

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
factually substantiate them. The Court cannot be left, on its own, to

divine their significance in practical terms and flesh them out.
Regarding national healing, does the Solicitor General expect the
Court to commiserate with and feel for whatever “pain and
suffering” the Marcos family may stand to endure if former
President Marcos is not interred in the LNMB? The Court has not
even been apprised of the nature of such “pain and suffering.” In
fact, counsel for the heirs of Marcos refused to provide an answer
when asked on this issue during the oral arguments, thus:
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
Can you tell me what injuries the Marcos family is suffering because
President Marcos is (has) not been interred in the Libingan? Is there any
injury?
ATTY. RAFAEL-ANTONIO:
Your Honor, with all due respect the issue here is the propriety of the
decision of President Duterte to inter him. The injury which the Marcos
family may be suffering would be, to discuss this, would be amounting to an
academic discussion, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
Not necessarily, we are a court of law and a court of equity and as judges
we are mandated to find a solution to any legal controversy prescinding from
the emotions. . .
Your Honor. . .
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
That is the basis of my question.
Yes, Your Honor. I agree, Your Honor, but equity must follow the law and
in this case, the laws applicable do not consider the injuries on the family of
the deceased.
JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
So do I take it that you will not answer my question?
Yes, Your Honor.89
_______________
89 TSN, September 7, 2016, pp. 50-51.

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“[T]he painful healing of this country,” borrowing the words of

the Solicitor General, of the wounds brought about by the Marcos
martial rule actually started with his ouster in 1986 and has
progressed significantly throughout the ensuing three decades.
Indeed, as far as Heirs of Marcos are concerned, they have almost
regained their former political stature. At present, there is a Marcos
senator,90 who almost made it to the Vice Presidency, a Marcos
representative91 to the Congress of the Philippines, and a Marcos
governor.92 On the other hand, the victims of the Marcos martial rule
have partly won their day in court and have been so far awarded
sizeable judgments.93 Several laws (e.g., RA 10368) have been
enacted that recognize the deaths, sufferings, injuries, deprivations
that they endured, and accord them reparation. In simple terms, there
appears to be no perceptible empirical correlation between the
intended burial of former President Marcos and the supposed
national healing the President seeks to promote. To be sure, no
reason has been offered that would clothe the President’s decision as
essential to this supposed national healing.
“Genuine change,” without more, may have been an excellent
slogan during the campaign period, but as a reason for the decision
to inter former President Marcos in the LNMB, is too amorphous
and nebulous. What is it in the present Filipino life that requires
“genuine change,” the Solicitor General has not even attempted to
explain. How does the interment of former President Marcos in the
LNMB effect this “genuine change?” Again, the Solicitor General
has not proffered any kind of explanation.
As defined, forgiveness is a “conscious, deliberate decision to
release feelings of resentment or vengeance” toward a person or
group who has caused harm, regardless of whether such persons are
deserving of the same.94 Conversely, forgiveness does not mean
glossing over or denying
_______________
90 Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr.

91 Representative Imelda R. Marcos.
92 Ilocos Norte Governor Imee Marcos.
93 In Re: Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw.
1995), upheld in Hilao v. Marcos, 103. F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996).
94 What Is Forgiveness?, available at
<http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/toic/forgiveness/definition>, last accessed on
October 17, 2016.

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the seriousness of an offense committed against one’s person, nor
does it mean condoning or excusing offenses or legal
accountability.95 Instead, forgiveness entails the recognition of the
pain that one has suffered, without letting such pain prevent one
from attaining healing or moving on with their life.96
On the part of the Marcos heirs, the Solicitor General quotes in
their Memorandum Ilocos Norte Governor Imee Marcos’ message97
of “simple sorry”98 during the recent commemoration of her father’s
birthday, wherein she purportedly “humbly sought forgiveness.”99 Is
this the forgiveness that the President is after? But, forgiveness
cannot be exacted from the victims of the Marcos martial rule
because the State has no right to impose the same upon them. The
Court is helpless in the absence of a reasonable and acceptable
explanation how the President’s objective of “forgiveness” is
achieved by the intended interment.
Unlike in Marcos v. Manglapus where “from the pleadings filed
by the parties [therein], from their oral arguments, and the facts
revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser,
wherein petitioners and respondents [therein] were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President’s decision” to bar the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines in the national interest,100
the Solicitor General has not identified any tangible and material
benefit that the nation will reap with the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB. Thus, the Court is left with no
alternative but to conclude that it will only be Heirs of Marcos, who
are private citizens, who will stand to benefit from the interment.
The Solicitor General’s postulate that the burial of the former
President’s remains in the LNMB is “geared towards changing the
national
_______________
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Public Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 4.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 4 at pp. 507-508; pp. 682, 697.

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psyche” is, again, as vague as the other motherhood statements that

have been bandied about.
“Psyche” is simply defined as the soul, mind or personality of a
person or group101 and the mental or psychological structure of a
person, especially as a motive force.102 Conversely, “national
psychology” may refer to the soul, mind, or personality of a nation,
or the mental psychological structure of a nation.
The Solicitor General cannot just presume that the Court is
knowledgeable of the “national psyche” that the President desires to
engender or change. The President’s intentions may be noble, but the
Court cannot be expected to speculate as to what he understands
“national psyche” to be or how the interment will engender or
change the “national psyche.”
As to the burial of former President Marcos being in keeping
with the President’s campaign promise, the Solicitor General
effectively takes the position that with the President’s proclamation
as such, he must now keep his campaign promise because the
electorate “has spoken.”103
But again, this is equivocal to say the least. To some, the
campaign promise is but a political concession to the Heirs of
Marcos and to attract the votes of the Marcos loyalists. To others,
who are perennially political cynics, campaign promises are made to
be broken, not cast in stone, and are like debts listed on water. As to
the reasons why the voters’ preference in the last national elections
tilted in favor of the President over the other presidential candidates,
political analysts can have their field day. The Court should not try
to second guess.
Regarding the Solicitor General’s premise that former President
Marcos’ remains have become the symbol of polarity, again, the
necessary foundation for this was not laid.
_______________
101 “Psyche,” available at <http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/psyche>, last accessed on October 17, 2016.
102 <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/psyche>, last accessed on October 17,
2016.
103 TSN, September 7, 2016, pp. 83-87.

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What the Court can take judicial notice of is that, at present,

former President Marcos lies in repose at the Ferdinand E. Marcos
Presidential Center,104 which is situated in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The
Center has a museum which showcases memorabilia of the former
President, and a mausoleum where his remains lie inside a glass-
encased coffin which has been on public display since 1993. Many
flock to the mausoleum to view the remains of former President
Marcos and he continues to be admired by his loyalists. Those who
are presently vehemently opposing the burial of former President
Marcos in the LNMB have not, for more than 20 years, questioned
the right and decision of the Heirs of Marcos to have his remains lie
in repose at his mausoleum. The so-called “polarity” symbolized by
the remains of the former President is, again, not apparent.
Thus, the mere incantation of buzzwords such as “national
psyche,” “national healing,” “genuine change,” “campaign promise”
and “effacing symbol of polarity” as the wisdom underlying the
challenged order of the President appears — in the absence of
anything other than such incantation — is nothing more than a
legerdemain resorted to prevent the Court from taking judicial
cognition thereof and to make the President’s action inscrutable.
Without sufficient factual bases, these magic words are ephemeral
and ambiguous. The Solicitor General has failed to provide even the
minimum specifics as to how such objectives, as lofty as they are or
pretended to be, will be achieved if the President’s order is
implemented. Consequently, this failure to substantiate the factual
bases of the President’s assailed action should have left the Court
with no option but to rule that the President’s intended action is
bereft of any factual basis — and, for that reason, following Marcos
v. Manglapus, already constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Summation

To recapitulate: (1) there was no valid exercise of the power to
reserve under Section 14 of the RAC; (2) the President may validly
order the
_______________
104 Despite tourism loss, Batac mayor backs hero’s burial for Marcos, available
at <http://www.rappler.com/nation/145804-batac-mayor-her-burial-marcos>, last
accessed on October 17, 2016.

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interment of former President Marcos in the LNMB pursuant to his

power of control and his duty to faithfully execute laws, provided
that no contravention of the Constitution, laws, executive issuances,
public policy, customs and international obligations arises therefrom
or is committed; (3) the Solicitor General failed to show any
contingency for the valid exercise of the President’s residual powers,
and likewise failed to demonstrate sufficient factual basis to justify
the interment of former President Marcos in the LNMB.
Turning now to the relevant provisions of the Constitution, laws,
executive issuances, public policy, customs and international
obligations, I will explain in turn how the interment violates them,
and thus, constitutes grave abuse.

The laws, executive issuances,
public policy and customs that
were violated.

Republic Act No. 289

Petitioners’ reliance on RA 289 as anchor for their argument that
the intended burial of former President Marcos is prohibited by this
law is misplaced.
RA 289 directed the construction of a National Pantheon
intended to be the burial place for all the Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes and patriots,105 and established the
Board of National Pantheon that is mandated to cause the interment
in the National Pantheon of the mortal remains of all Presidents of
the Philippines, national heroes and patriots.106 Subsequently, in
Proclamation No. 431 issued by President Quirino in 1953, a parcel
of land in Quezon City was reserved. Thereafter, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 42 (S. 1954), this reservation was withdrawn. No
other property has been thus earmarked or reserved for the
construction of a National Pantheon.
I agree that RA 289 is not applicable. Reading RA 289 together
with Proclamation No. 431 leads to no other conclusion than that the
land on
_______________
105 Sec. 1, R.A. No. 289.

106 Sec. 2, id.

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which the National Pantheon was to be built refers to a discrete

parcel of land that is different from site of the LNMB. To be sure,
the history of the LNMB, is that of a parcel of land identified by
Proclamation No. 208, Series of 1967, dated May 28, 1967, which is
parcel 3, Psu-2031, consisting of 1,428,800 square meters and
whose technical description is reflected in said Proclamation No.
208. Accordingly, it is non sequitur to argue the applicability of RA
289, or the standards indicated therein, to the LNMB, which is a
parcel of land that is totally different and distinct.
That said, I fully concur with Justice Leonen that RA 289
remains an effective law consistent with Article 7 of the Civil Code.

PD 105, RA 10066 and
10086, and the specific
policy in the treatment
of national shrines

It has to be acknowledged that there is no dispute that the present
LNMB is rightfully a military memorial declared as a national
shrine. The history of the LNMB, as it is expressed in the different
PDs and executive issuances, shows that it is not an ordinary
cemetery; it is not an ordinary gravesite. Truthfully, and legally, its
status as a national shrine is beyond cavil.
In this regard, PD 105 squarely directs how national shrines
should be regarded. And while the decree specifically mentions
several places as national shrines, it also unequivocally provides that
all national shrines “and others which may be proclaimed in the
future as national shrines” are to be regarded and treated as
“hallowed places.”
Thus, the third Whereas clause of PD 105 mandates that “it is
the policy of the Government to hold and keep said National
Shrines as sacred and hallowed place.”107
PD 105 is not a mere executive issuance. It is law. And this law
establishes a specific State policy in the treatment of all national
shrines declared before and after its issuance. Accordingly, since the
LNMB has
_______________
107 P.D. No. 105, 3rd Whereas Clause.

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been declared as a national shrine, the specific State policy to hold

and keep national shrines as a “sacred and hallowed place”
necessarily covers the LNMB. To be sure, this policy extends to the
LNMB despite the fact that its declaration as a national shrine
predated PD 105 as there is no rational basis why the LNMB,
already declared a national shrine by Proclamation No. 208 in 1967,
should be treated differently from those sites that have been declared
as national shrines after PD 105.
The argument that PD 105 applies only to places of birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the
nation is too narrow and myopic a reading that it deserves scant
consideration. Indeed, this interpretation is contradicted and belied
by the very language of PD 105 itself which recognizes all other
national shrines that “may be declared in the future” as also being
sacred and hallowed places. The Court can take judicial notice of a
number of places declared as national shrines after PD 105 — and
therefore to be treated as sacred and hallowed places — that are not
places of birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and
eminent leaders, such as the Kiangan War Memorial Shrine which
was established to perpetuate the surrender site for the Japanese
Imperial Forces and to serve as a reminder of the “uselessness of
war as a means of solving international differences,”108 the Quezon
Memorial Circle which was established in memory of the late
President Manuel L. Quezon even as President Quezon died in New
York, and the Balete Pass109 which was a battlefield where the
Americans and the Filipinos fought against the Japanese Imperial
Forces. To insist that the provisions of PD 105, and the proscription
against the prohibited acts listed therein, will apply to a national
shrine only if said national shrine is the place of birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of a great and eminent leader is
plainly ridiculous and downright error.
I find that PD 105 is applicable. No proposition is being made to
expand the import of the decree beyond its express terms; no penalty
is sought against any act involved in this case. What is inescapable,
however, is the explicit statement of government policy to hold
national
_______________
108 Presidential Decree No. 1682.

109 R.A. No. 10796 (2016).

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shrines sacred. As well, the same policy is reiterated in RA 10066

and RA 10086 — order the preservation or conservation of the
cultural significance of national shrines.
In this connection, the policy of PD 105 to hold and keep the
LNMB as a “sacred and hallowed place” is in keeping with, and
completely aligned with, the esteem and reverence that
Proclamation No. 89 accords to the fallen soldiers, war dead and
military personnel who were meant to be buried in the LNMB.
As admitted by the Solicitor General during oral arguments, the
words “esteem and reverence” in Proclamation No. 89 and “sacred
and hallowed” in PD 105 are not empty and meaningless. The words
“esteem and reverence” set and mandate how the LNMB, in
particular, should be regarded, whereas the words “sacred and
hallowed” direct how national shrines, in general, should be treated.
Truly, it is precisely because of the country’s collective regard of
the LNMB as the memorial in honor of the heroism, patriotism and
nationalism of its war dead as well as its fallen soldiers and military
personnel that President Duterte held the rites honoring the country’s
national heroes at the LNMB in the morning of August 29, 2016.110
There is no question that LNMB has traditionally been the site
where National Heroes Day is commemorated.
The main premise of the ponencia appears to be that the LNMB
is still primarily and essentially a military memorial, or a military
shrine, notwithstanding the fact that it was purposely excluded from
the military reservation for national shrine purposes by
Proclamation No. 208. The military nature of the LNMB is
seemingly relied upon to argue that standards relating to national
shrines in general, and to the LNMB in particular, outside of the
standards expressly embodied in the AFP Regulations, cannot apply.
To me this is egregious error. The dual nature of the LNMB as a
military memorial and a national shrine cannot be denied.
_______________
110 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/579292/news/nation/duterte-leads-
national-heroes-day-rites>; <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/29/16/look-duterte-
leads-national-heroes-day-rites>, last accessed on October 17, 2016.

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Former President Marcos himself appeared to have recognized

the distinction in the discerning manner that he declared sites as
military memorials or shrines and national shrines — some he
declared solely as military shrines or memorial shrines, while others
sites with military significance were declared as national shrines. To
illustrate, he declared the Tirad Pass National Park,111 Fort San
Antonio Abad,112 “Red Beach” (the landing point of General
Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces),113 and an area of Mt.
Samat,114 as national shrines, while a parcel of land in Cavinti was
declared as a memorial shrine.115
The best exemplar, perhaps, is the Bantayog ng Kiangan, the site
in Ifugao where General Yamashita surrendered to the Allied Forces.
On July 9, 1975, former President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1460, declaring the same as a military shrine under the
administration and control of the Military Memorial Division,
Department of National Defense.116 Two years later, on October 17,
1977, he issued Proclamation No. 1682, declaring the previously
declared military shrine as a national shrine.117
Even PD 1076,118 issued by former President Marcos on January
26, 1977, that transferred the functions of administration,
maintenance and
_______________
111 July 23, 1968 (Declaring the Tirad Pass National Park as Tirad Pass
National Shrine, Proclamation No. 433 [1968]).
112 May 27, 1967 (Reserving for National Shrine Purposes a Certain Parcel of
Land of the Private Domain Situated in the District of Malate, City of Manila,
Proclamation No. 207 [1967]).
113 Reserving Certain Parcel of Land of the Private Domain in Baras, Palo,
Leyte for the Province of Leyte, Proclamation No. 1272 [1974].
114 April 18, 1966 (Excluding from the Operation of Proclamation No. 24,
S. 1945, Proclamation No. 25 [1966]).
115 March 27, 1973 (Reserving for Memorial Shrine for the War Dead a Certain
Parcel of Land of the Public Domain in Cavinti, Laguna, Proclamation No. 1123
[1973]).
116 Declaring the “Bantayog sa Kiangan” as a Military Shrine, Proclamation
No. 1460 [1975].
117 Declaring the Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan, Ifugao as a
National Shrine, Proclamation No. 1682 [1977].
118 Amending Part XII (Education) and Part XIX (National Security) of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan, Presidential Decree No. 1076 [1977].

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development of national shrines to the PVAO, found its impetus, not

on the ground that PVAO should have exclusive jurisdiction over
these national shrines, but on the fact that the (then) Department of
Defense had greater capabilities and resources to more effectively
administer, maintain and develop the national shrines, and exercised
functions more closely related to the significance of the national
shrines.119
Verily, the argument that the LNMB was initially, primarily, or
truly a military memorial to maintain that only the express
disqualifications in the AFP Regulations should control in the
determination of who may be interred therein, to the exclusion of the
provisions of the Constitution, laws and executive issuances,
disregards the fact that its status as a national shrine has legal
consequences.
The policy of PD 105 with respect to national shrines is
reiterated, or more accurately, expanded in the statement of policy in
RA 10066120 that has the objective of protect[ing], preserv[ing],
conserv[ing] and promot[ing] the nation’s cultural heritage, its
property and histories;121 and RA 10086122 that states the policy of
the State to conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s historical
and cultural heritage and resources.123 Even assuming that PD 105
does not apply to the LNMB, there can be no argument that the later
expression of legislative will in RA 10066 and RA 10086 accords
even fuller protection to national shrines, which includes the LNMB.
The term “national shrine” escapes express legal definition.
However, sufficient guidance is found in RA 10066124 that uses
different permutations of the term: “national historical shrines” is a
category of cultural property125 while the term “historical shrines” is
defined to refer to historical sites or structures hallowed and revered
for their history or asso-
_______________
119 Second and Third Whereas Clauses of PD No. 1076.

120 NATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE ACT OF 2009, Republic Act No. 10066, March
24, 2010.
121 Article 2(a), id.
122 STRENGTHENING PEOPLES’ NATIONALISM THROUGH PHILIPPINE HISTORY ACT,
Republic Act No. 10086, May 12, 2010.
123 Section 2, id.
124 Republic Act No. 10066, supra.
125 Section 4, id., uses the term “national historical shrine.”

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ciation as declared by the National Historical Institute.126 Thereafter,

RA 10066 uses the term “national shrines” in its penal provision127
which could only mean national historical shrine previously defined.
Under this law, the National Historical Institute (“NHI”), the body
once given powers of administration over the LNMB, was
responsible for significant movable and immovable cultural property
that pertains to Philippine history, heroes and the conservation of
historical artifacts.128
In RA 10086, “national historical shrines” refers to “sites or
structures hallowed and revered for their history or association
declared as such by the NHCP,”129 which is the successor of the NHI
mentioned in RA 10066. RA 10086 interchangeably uses shrines130
and national shrines.131 In both laws, the word “conservation” is
defined as “processes and measures of maintaining the cultural
significance of a cultural property including, but not limited to,
physical, social or legal preservation, restoration, reconstruction,
protection, adaptation or any combination thereof,” respectively,132
which is consistent with, and in fact expanded the protection
beyond, what may be argued as merely prohibiting physical
desecration in PD 105. The clear legislative mandate in RA 10066
and 10086 require conservation, not only of the physical integrity of
national shrines as cultural and historical resources, but also of the
cultural significance thereof.
These laws operate to accord legal protection to the LNMB so
that the standard applicable to it, in particular, esteem and reverence
in Proclamation No. 86, and to national shrines, in general, as sacred
and hallowed under PD 105, will be upheld and maintained. In other
words, if a person who is not worthy of or held in esteem and
reverence is sought to be interred in the LNMB, then this would be
contrary to the policy to hold LNMB as a sacred and hallowed place
— and the Court must step in to preserve and protect LNMB’s
cultural significance. Relevantly, the
_______________
126 Section 3, id.

127 Section 48, id.
128 Section 31, id.
129 Section 3(n), RA No. 10086.
130 Sections 7(d) and (n), id.
131 Sections 3(b), 7(e) and 20, id.
132 Section 3(i) in RA No. 10066 and Section 3(c), id.

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NHCP, which has the mandate to discuss and resolve, with finality,
issues or conflicts on Philippine history under Section 7 of RA
10086, opposes the interment — another fact completely
disregarded by the ponencia.
Verily, the interment of former President Marcos constitutes a
violation of the physical, historical and cultural integrity of the
LNMB as a national shrine, which the State has the obligation to
conserve.

AFP Regulations

Concededly, the LNMB is also a military grave site. The
Quartermaster General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(“AFP”) exercises overall supervision in the implementation of the
AFP Regulations concerning burials at the LNMB, specifically, AFP
Regulations 161-373 dated April 9, 1986 and the subsequent
regulations (AFP Regulations G 161-374 dated March 27, 1998,133
and AFP Regulations G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000134 [the
AFP Regulations] while the Graves Services Unit (“GSU”) is
charged with the registration of deceased/graves, allocation of
specific section/area, preparation of grave sites, and supervision of
burials at the LNMB.135
The fact that the LNMB is an active military grave site or
cemetery, however, does not diminish, and cannot be used as an
excuse to denigrate, its status as a national shrine. The PDs
discussed above are laws while the presidential issuances have the
force of law. They must be observed in the use of the LNMB.
National Heroes Day is a regular holiday under Act No. 3827
intended for the Filipinos to reflect on the heroism of our
countrymen. This Court can take judicial notice of the custom136 or
tradition of the sitting President to celebrate this national holiday by
visiting the
_______________
133 Annex 6, Consolidated Comment.
134 Annex 7, id.
135 AFP Regulations G 161-375.
136 The Requisites of Custom are (1) a number of acts; (2) uniformity; (3)
juridical intent; (4) lapse of time; and not contrary to law. 1 Manresa p. 76.

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LNMB, which, if accorded a most reasonable interpretation, can be

taken to mean that LNMB does symbolize heroism, or that it is the
place where the nation’s heroes lie. To argue, therefore, that the
word “bayani” in the LNMB is a misnomer, and that no symbolism
of heroism should be attached thereto or to those that lie therein as
heroes, is, at the very least, contrary to well-established custom.
And this is precisely how the provisions in the AFP Regulations
regarding those who are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB
should be construed — as an acknowledgment that it is a national
shrine, and must be treated as a “sacred and hallowed” resting place.
Surely, if “personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from service” are to be interred in the
LNMB, then LNMB, being a “sacred and hallowed place,”137 would
be desecrated. In the same vein, if “authorized personnel who were
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude”138 are to be interred in the LNMB, then the status of
LNMB as a national shrine would be tarnished. Without these
disqualifications, the sacredness and hallowedness of the LNMB
would be hollow and meaningless.
In other words, it would be, as it is, error, to view or understand
the AFP Regulations in a vacuum, independent of or apart from, the
policy expressed in Proclamation No. 86 which renamed the
Republic Memorial Cemetery as “Libingan ng mga Bayani”
(Cemetery of the Heroes)139 and established therein the standards
of “ESTEEM and REVERENCE,” Proclamation No. 208 which
constituted LNMB as a national shrine, PD 105 which specifically
provides the specific policy that all national shrines shall be sacred
and hallowed places, RA 10086 that characterizes LNMB as a
“national historic shrine” or a historical site or structure hallowed
and revered for its history or association.
These laws and presidential proclamations that have the force of
law should be read into, and considered part of, the AFP
Regulations.
_______________
137 AFP Regulations G 161-374; AFP Regulations G 161-375. Emphasis

supplied.
138 Id.; id. Emphasis supplied.
139 <http://corregidorisland.com/bayani/libingan.html.>

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Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting

and harmonizing laws is the best method of interpretation in order to
form a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system of
jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal maxim interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.140
Thus, the disqualifications contemplated under the AFP
Regulations should be construed under the aegis of the foregoing
laws and executive issuances and their interpretation should not be
narrowed by the language used therein. Accordingly, I fully agree
with Justice Carpio’s position that when Marcos was forcibly taken
out of office and removed as a President and a Commander-in-Chief
by the sovereign act of the people expressed in the EDSA
Revolution — which is an act higher than an act of a military
tribunal or of a civilian administrative tribunal — then it can
reasonably be said that he was dishonorably separated as a President
and dishonorably discharged as a Commander-in-Chief. During the
oral arguments, Justice Carpio further clarified that a military
personnel, who is a Medal of Valor awardee, retires from the
military, joins the government, and while in government, he is
dishonorably separated for an offense, then upon his death, he
should not be qualified to be interred in the LNMB pursuant to the
AFP Regulations themselves because LNMB, being a sacred and
hallowed ground, would be besmirched.141
In the same manner, the disqualification of those who have been
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude
should be understood in its normal and ordinary acceptation. In his
concurring opinion in Teves v. COMELEC,142 Justice Brion cites the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as an “act of
baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties
which man owes to his fellowman, or to society in general,” and
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary as including “everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Citing In re
Basa143 and Zari v. Flores,144 Justice
_______________
140 Pabillo v. Commission on Elections En Banc, G.R. Nos. 216098 & 216562,
April 21, 2015, 756 SCRA 606, 672.
141 TSN, August 31, 2016, p. 55.
142 604 Phil. 717, 735-742; 587 SCRA 1, 10 (2009).
143 41 Phil. 275 (1920).

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Brion lists, among others, estafa, theft, murder, whether frustrated or

attempted, attempted bribery, robbery, direct bribery, embezzlement,
extortion, frustrated homicide, falsification of document, fabrication
of evidence, evasion of income tax, and rape as crimes involving
moral turpitude. The commission by a person of any such crimes
when proven should surely disqualify him from being buried in the
LNMB as it would blacken the sacredness and hallowedness of the
LNMB.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,145 a certiorari petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) against the Sandiganbayan,
former President Marcos, represented by his heirs: Imelda R.
Marcos, Maria Imelda [Imee] Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr. and Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, which sought to reinstate the Sandiganbayan’s earlier
decision dated September 19, 2000 that forfeited in favor of the
Republic Swiss bank accounts in the aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, claimed by the
Marcoses as theirs and held in escrow in the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), this Court made this factual finding and ruling:
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of
documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to
justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence,
the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in
favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379[.]146 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In Marcos, Jr. v. Republic,147 this Court ruled that all the assets,
properties and funds of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by former
President Marcos, with an estimated aggregate amount of
US$3,369,975.00 as of 1983, which the Marcos claimed as theirs,
were declared ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the
Republic.
This Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Marcos, Jr. v.
Republic, noted with approval the Solicitor General’s evidence,
culled from the
_______________
144 Adm. No. (2170-MC) P-1356, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 317.
145 453 Phil. 1059; 406 SCRA 190 (2003).
146 Id., at p. 1149; pp. 273-274.
147 686 Phil. 980; 671 SCRA 280 (2012).

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Balance Sheets filed by the

Marcoses, that showed their total income from 1965 to 1984 in the
amount of P16,408,442.00, with 67.71% thereof or P11,109,836.00
allegedly coming from the legal practice of the former President as
compared to the official salaries of former President Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos of P2,627,581.00 or 16.01% of the total, and the
Solicitor General’s findings that:
x x x FM [Ferdinand Marcos] made it appear that he had an extremely

profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by
law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and
that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The
only problem is that in his Balance sheet attached to his 1965 ITR
immediately preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not
show any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10.65M that he
decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing
any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record
that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office.
As previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December,
1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore,
conceal the skeletons of their KLEPTOCRACY.148 (All caps and its
emphasis supplied)

This Court also observed the very thorough presentation of the
Solicitor General’s evidence, viz.:
The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in

detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth
to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and
other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or
corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. x x
x149
_______________
148 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 145 at p. 1091; p. 223; Marcos, Jr. v.
Republic, id., at pp. 1003-1004; pp. 300-301.
149 Id., at p. 1093; p. 224.

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Marcos v. Manglapus150 recognized the plunder of the economy

attributed to the Marcoses and their cronies and relied thereon as
basis to bar the return of the remains of former President Marcos to
the country, viz.:
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by tbe plunder of
the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and
relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the
surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth
stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot
ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and
stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty
and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In PCCG v. Peña,151 this Court recalled the economic havoc
engendered by the Marcos regime through the plunder of the
country’s wealth, viz.:
x x x Given the magnitude of the [Marcos] regime’s “organized pillage”

and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the
experts and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer
necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into
knots and made impossible the Commission’s gigantic task of recovering
the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process had
saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since
ballooned to $28.5 billion.

Indeed, as correctly pointed out by petitioner Latiph, this Court
has referred to former President Marcos as a dictator in 20 cases and
his rule was characterized as authoritarian in 18 cases.
_______________
150 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 4 at p. 509; p. 698.

151 243 Phil. 93, 107; 159 SCRA 556, 566 (1988).

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That is not all. Section 2 of RA 10368 is a recognition by
legislative fiat that “summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights violations
[were] committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos covering from September 21, 1972 to February 25,
1986.”
In two United States cases, the United States District Court of
Hawaii152 awarded US$1.2 Billion in exemplary damages and over
US$770 Million in compensatory damages to 10,059 plaintiffs for
acts of torture, summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary
detention and numerous other atrocities, which the jury found
former President Marcos personally liable for, and the US 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals,153 applying the “command responsibility”
principle, ruled that the district court properly held former President
Marcos liable for human rights abuses which occurred and which he
knew about and failed to use his power to prevent.
The NHCP, in its study, “Why Ferdinand Marcos should not be
buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,” which it undertook as part
of its mandate to conduct and disseminate historical research and
resolve historical controversies, has concluded, among others, that
former President Marcos had lied about receiving U.S. medals and
that certain actions committed by him as a soldier amounted to
“usurpation” and could be characterized as “illegal” and “malicious
criminal act.” Significantly, the NHCP opposes the proposed burial
of former President Marcos.154
In the Memorandum filed by petitioners Rosales, et al., they
question the basis of the Solicitor General’s claim that former
President Marcos was a Medal of Valor Awardee. Based on a copy
of General Order No. 167 dated October 16, 1958 (“GO 167”),
which is Annex “A” to the Rosales Memorandum, former President
Marcos obtained not a Medal of Valor but a Medal for Valor. A
reading of the contents of GO 167 re-
_______________
152 In Re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw.
1995).
153 Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3rd 762 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 The NHCP is the independent government entity that has the mandate to
resolve, with finality, issues or conflicts on Philippine history.

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veals that the account of the purported Marcos’ bravery therein had
been debunked in the aforementioned study of the NHCP. There is
thus reliable basis to seriously doubt the authenticity of the Medal of
Valor award of former President Marcos. As the NHCP concluded:
Mr. Marcos’s military record is fraught with myths, factual

inconsistencies, and lies. The rule in history is that when a claim is
disproven — such as Mr. Marcos’s claims about his medals, rank, and
guerilla unit — it is simply dismissed. When, moreover, a historical matter
is under question or grave doubt, as expressed in the military records about
Marcos’s actions and character as a soldier, the matter may not be
established or taken as fact. A doubtful record also does not serve as sound,
unassailable basis of historical recognition of any sort, let alone burial in a
site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes.

This Court’s and the United States courts’ pronouncements, the
provisions of RA 10368, coupled with the observations of the
NHCP, on the perniciousness, gravity and depravity of the acts (e.g.,
plunder, falsification, human rights abuse, dictatorship,
authoritarianism) that former President Marcos perpetrated and
allowed to be perpetrated are sufficient to qualify them as acts
involving moral turpitude, justifying the application of the provision
on disqualification in the AFP Regulations. The overwhelming
import of all these simply cannot be cast aside as irrelevant just
because former President Marcos was not convicted of such crimes
by a criminal court. Certainly, this Court cannot close its eyes to
these established facts from which it can be legitimately concluded
that former President Marcos was guilty of crimes involving moral
turpitude, and would have been convicted thereof were it not for his
flight and his subsequent death. Unfortunately, the ponencia is
content to brush aside these determinations on the ground that
without a conviction these do not amount to a disqualification
provided in the AFP Regulations.
Just as the LNMB should be looked at as one integral whole, as
one and indivisible national shrine, despite the presence of a military
grave site within its confines, former President Marcos should be
viewed and judged in his totality. His soldier persona cannot be
separated from his private citizen cum former President persona, and
vice versa, unless by

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some miracle one can be excised from the other. Either the entire
remains of former President Marcos are allowed to be buried in the
LNMB or none of his parts. Whether as a soldier or as a President,
former President Marcos does not deserve a resting place together
with the heroes at the LNMB.
In the end, the argument that burying former President Marcos in
the LNMB does not make him a hero disregards the status of the
LNMB as a national shrine. And, even if the standards set forth in
the AFP Regulations were to be followed, former President Marcos
would still be disqualified to be interred in the LNMB.
Thus, recalling the earlier discussion on the second requirement
of the President’s power to reserve, it is now clear that the interment
violates the specific public purpose, i.e., national shrine
purposes/policies, for which the LNMB was reserved.
To recapitulate, the order to inter former President Marcos in the
LNMB is clearly contrary to law (PD 105, RA 10066, RA 10086,
and the presidential issuances above mentioned), the AFP
Regulations, and the public policy that the said laws, executive
issuances, and regulations espouse and advance. In light of the
foregoing violations, it is also clear that the interment cannot be
justified by the exercise of the President’s power of control and duty
to faithfully execute laws.

The 1987 Constitution

The ponencia disposes of petitioners’ invocation of the
provisions of Article II of the Constitution by holding that these are
not self-executing, citing Tañada v. Angara. However, it fails to
recognize at the same time that, since then, several laws have been
passed that “enabled” Article II, Section 11, among which are RA
10353155 and RA 10368. In this respect, the applicability of these
laws, especially RA 10368, as basis to oppose the proposed
interment will be addressed below.
_______________
155 “ANTI-ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE ACT OF 2012.”

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The applicable treaties and

international law principles
stand to be violated with the
burial of former President
Marcos in the LNMB.

Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”
One of these principles — as recognized by this Court in a long line
of decisions156 — is the rule of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26157
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties158 (“VCLT”),
or the performance in good faith of a State’s treaty obligations.
Borrowing the words of this Court in Agustin v. Edu,159 “[i]t is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged
its word. The concept of pacta sunt
_______________
156 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Muñoz, G.R. No.
207342, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 467; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, 727 Phil. 506; 736 SCRA 623 (2014); Bayan
(Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623; 342 SCRA 449 (2000);
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476; Bayan
Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246; 641 SCRA 244 (2011); CBK Power Company
Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 193383-84 & 193407-08,
January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 93; Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr., 544 Phil. 645; 515 SCRA 720
(2007); Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service v. Kolonwel
Trading, 551 Phil. 1030; 524 SCRA 591 (2007); Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 716 Phil. 676; 704 SCRA 216 (2013); Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165; 322 SCRA 160 (2000); La Chemise Lacoste, S.A.
v. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332; 129 SCRA 373 (1984); Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546,
592; 272 SCRA 18, 66 (1997); Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386; 535 SCRA 265 (2007).
157 “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith.”
158 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, opened for signature May 23, 1969, entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980.
159 No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195.

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servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover,

at war with the principle of international morality.”160
The Philippines became signatory to the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights (“UDHR”),161 and State-party, without
reservations, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”)162 on October 23, 1966, the Rome Statute163 on
August 30, 2011, and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) on
June 18, 1986.164
The UDHR is an international document recognizing inalienable
human rights, which eventually led to the creation of several legally-
binding treaties, such as the ICCPR and International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).165 The
Philippines signed the UDHR because of its recognition of the rights
and values enumerated in the UDHR, and it is that same recognition
that led the Philippines to sign and ratify both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.166
_______________
160 Id.
161 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948;
see Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700,
March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1. (Dissenting Opinion)
162 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / (1980) ATS 23 / 6 ILM 368 (1967); the
Philippines signed the ICCPR on December 19, 1966 and ratified the same on
October 23, 1986.
163 A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998.
164 The Philippines ratified the CAT on June 26, 1987.
165 The Philippines signed the ICESCR on December 19, 1966 and ratified the
same on June 7, 1974; see: J. von Bernstorff, “The Changing Fortunes of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the
Turn to Rights in International Law” 19 (5) European Journal of International Law
903, 913-914 (2008), cited in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra.
166 See: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 50-51; 568 SCRA
1, 54 (2008) and Separate Opinion of CJ. Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, in Poe-
Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, id.

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Article VII, Section 21167 and Article II, Section 2 of the

Constitution168 adopt the doctrine of transformation. Treaties, which
have been duly entered and ratified pursuant to the Constitution,
must be transformed into municipal law so that they can be applied
to domestic conflicts.169 Once so transformed, treaty obligations
enjoy the same legal force and effect as domestic statutes.170
The CAT was transformed by virtue of Republic Act 9745 or the
“Anti-Torture Act of 2009.”171 Subsequently, echoing its
commitment to the UDHR, the Philippines transformed its
obligations under the ICCPR and the CAT, on July 23, 2012, with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 10368. The enactment of RA
10368 is, in truth, in fulfillment of the country’s duty under Article
2(2) of the ICCPR to “take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”
Section 2 of RA 10368, echoing the State’s policy enshrined in
Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution on the value of the dignity
of every human person and the guarantee of full respect for human
rights, is an acknowledgment of the Philippines’ obligations as
State-party to the UDHR, ICCPR, and the CAT.
_______________
167 Art. VII, Sec. 21. “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
168 Art. II, Sec. 2. “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.”
169 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
supra note 156; Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, No. L-14279,
October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 351, 356, cited in Intellectual Property Association of the
Philippines v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016, 797 SCRA 134.
170 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra note 156.
171 AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, November 10, 2009.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Particularly, in enacting RA 10368, the Philippines categorically

recognized its obligation to: (1) “give effect to the rights recognized
[in the UDHR, ICCPR and the CAT]”172 (2) ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall have an effective
remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in an
official capacity; (3) “recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced
or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights
violations committed during the regime of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972
to February 25, 1986”; and (4) “restore the victims’ honor and
dignity.”
More importantly, the Philippines acknowledged, through RA
10368, its “moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide
reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths,
injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under
the Marcos regime” and to “acknowledge the sufferings and
damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were
forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions
were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of
movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations
of the Bill of Rights.”173
The obligations listed in Section 2 of RA 10368 are not to be
read in a vacuum. Neither should they be read as bounded by the
four corners of that law.
_______________
172 R.A. No. 10368, Sec. 2. “x x x By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the

Constitution adopting generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, the Philippines adheres to international human rights laws and
conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which
imposes on each State party the obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect
to the rights recognized therein and to ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms have been violated shall have an effective remedy, even if the violation is
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. x x x”
173 Id.

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Considering that the enactment of RA 10368 was precisely to

“give effect”174 to the rights of human rights victims recognized in
the ICCPR and the CAT, which the Philippines ratified without
reservations,175
_______________
174 Id. “x x x By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the
Philippines adheres to international human rights laws and conventions, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which imposes on each State party
the obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the rights recognized
therein and to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated
shall have an effective remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in
an official capacity. In fact, the right to a remedy is itself guaranteed under existing
human rights treaties and/or customary international law, being peremptory in
character (jus cogens) and as such has been recognized as non-derogable.
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to
recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary
execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human
rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and
restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and
legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their
families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered
under the Marcos regime. x x x”
175 On May 23, 1969 — the very same day the Convention was opened for
signature — the Philippines signed the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”) (1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M 679, opened for signature May 23,
1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) and ratified the same on November 15, 1972.
Enshrined in Article 26 of the VCLT is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which
requires that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” (1969 VCLT 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M 679, Art.
26)
Further, pursuant to the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (1969
VCLT, Art. 34. “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent”; see in Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 598,
6th ed., 2003) under Article 34 of the VCLT, treaties bind only States parties to it.
(id.) Consequently, in cases where a State does not want certain provisions of a treaty
to apply to it, such exception must be expressed by

676

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
then RA 10368 must be understood and interpreted within the

broader context of the treaties which it effectuates. Consistent with
this, I concur with the Chief Justice’s discussion on the proper
interpretation of the rights of HRVVs and the corollary state
obligations under RA 10368.
It is very significant to note that RA 10368, Section 2 which
provides: “x x x the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which
imposes on each State party the obligation to enact domestic
legislation to give effect to the rights recognized therein and to
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated
shall have an effective remedy, even if the violation is committed by
persons acting in an official capacity” is an almost verbatim
reproduction of Article 2(3) of the ICCPR,176 which provides:

the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity x
x x.
_______________
the State by means of a reservation, done at the time the State ratifies the treaty. (Art.
2[1][d], 1969 VCLT)
A reservation is a unilateral statement made by a State whereby the State “purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State.” (Art. 2[1][d], 1969 VCLT) In addition, the reservation must
be made “when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty.” (Id.)
In effect, a reservation removes the obligation referred to by the State from its legal
obligations arising from that treaty. (Rhona K.M. Smith, Texts and Materials on
International Human Rights, p. 67 [2013]) No such reservations have been made by
the Philippines when it to the ICCPR, the Rome Statute, and the CAT.
176 Sec. 2.

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In addition, in interpreting the State’s obligations relative to

human rights violations, Article 38(1)(d)177 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”)178 specifically
recognizes “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists (“MHQPs”) of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.” In this regard, it is
significant to note that as original member of the United Nations
(“UN”), the Philippines is ipso facto State-party to the ICJ Statute in
accordance with Article 93, Chapter XIV of the UN Charter.179 In
other words, the Court can rely on what are called subsidiary sources
of international law such as judicial decisions and teachings of
MHQPs.
Finally, decisions of various tribunals180 authorize the use of the
text of the relevant convention as an aid to interpretation even if the
statute does not incorporate the convention or even refer to it.
Given the foregoing, which are the parameters that are
considered in understanding and interpreting RA 10368, the
question before the Court is how to determine whether petitioners,
who claim to be victims of human rights violations under the
Marcos martial law regime,181 can rightfully be considered HRVVs.
In an attempt to strip MLHRV petitioners of their
characterization as HRVVs and to dilute their rights as such, the
Solicitor General argues that the lack of specific mention of “state
agents” in Sec. 3 of RA 10368 means that former President Marcos
could not be held liable as Com-
_______________
177 Art. 38(1)(d). “[S]ubject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions

and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”
178 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945).
179 Article 93(1). All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
180 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, p. 45 (6th ed., 2003),
citing Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967], 2 QB 116, CA, at
141 (per Lord Denning, MR), 143 (per Diplock, LJ); ILR 41; Post Office v. Estuary
Radio [1967] 1 WLR 1396, CA at 1404; [1968] 2 QB 740 at 757; Cococraft Ltd. v.
Pan American Airways Inc. [1969] 1 QB 616; [1968] 3 WLR 1273, CA at 1281.
181 Hereinafter referred to as “MLHRV.”

678

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
mander-in-Chief for human rights abuses suffered by them.182 This

argument, however, fails to consider the 2001 Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts or the
Articles on State Responsibility (“ASR”).183
Contrary to the Solicitor General’s claims, the absence of the
words “state agents” in RA 10368 does not, by itself, remove the
basis for holding former President Marcos liable as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces for the crimes committed during his
martial law regime. To begin with, the principle of “state agents”
would only be relevant for purposes of attributing responsibility to a
State, as reflected in Article 4 of the ASR, viz.:
Article 4. Conduct of organs of a State.—

1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization
of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
Government or of a territorial unit of the State.

2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.

In these petitions, responsibility for the human rights violations
committed during the martial law regime is anchored not on the
attribution to the State through state agents, but on attribution to
former President Marcos, as an individual and Commander-in-Chief.
It is also incorrect to argue that the application of “command
responsibility” to former President Marcos would violate the
constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.184
_______________
182 OSG Memorandum, par. 245, p. 93.

183 53 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001).

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In Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,185 the “command
responsibility” principle was applied to hold former President
Marcos liable for human rights abuses during his martial law
regime, which occurred and which he knew about and failed to use
his power to prevent. In In Re: Estate of Marcos,186 it was ruled that
the estate of former President Marcos was not immune even if the
acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts
outside of his authority as President and were not taken within any
official mandate.
While the foregoing cases were decided by United States of
America courts, the rulings therein are binding in this jurisdiction by
virtue of the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine is the
“recognition by a country of the legal and physical consequences of
all acts of state in other countries,”187 and “a recognition of the
effects of sovereignty, the attributes and prerogatives of sovereign
power.”188 In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan and Officeco Holdings N.V.,189 this Court had
occasion to rule that the act of state doctrine prohibits States from
sitting in judgment on the acts of the government of another State
done within its territory.190 It requires the forum court to exercise
restraint in the adjudication of disputes by foreign courts performed
within its jurisdiction.191
_______________
185 Maximo HILAO, Class Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Estate of Ferdinand

Marcos, Defendant-Appellant, No. 95-15779, December 17, 1996.
186 In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at p. 1472 (9th Cir. 1994).
187 Berstein v. Van Heyden Fieres Societe’ Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2nd Cir.
1947) (L. Hand, J.), in Achebe, Ifeanyi, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Can They Coexist?, 13 Md. J. Int’l L. 247 (1989).
188 Achebe, id.
189 556 Phil. 664; 530 SCRA 13 (2007).
190 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923 (1964),
citing Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng.Rep. 992; PCGG v. Sandiganbayan and
Officeco Holdings N.V., id., at p. 678; p. 26, citing Evans, M.d. (Ed.), International
Law (First Edition), Oxford University Press, p. 357; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897).
191 PCGG v. Sandiganbayan and Officeco Holdings N.V., id., citing Evans, id.

680
Ocampo vs. Enriquez
Simply put, convicting former President Marcos for whatever

past crimes he might have committed would not only be legally
untenable but also absurd; however, the Court must recognize what
has already been previously and legally determined and settled.
In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that MLHRV
petitioners, who by their personal accounts (narrated during the Oral
Arguments held on August 31, 2016)192 and as alleged under oath in
their respective petitions, have suffered human rights violations
during martial law, there is no legal obstacle in recognizing them as
HRVVs as this is defined under RA 10368. As HRVVs, they have
several rights under international law, which the State has the duty to
protect.
As culled from the primary sources of international law (the
ICCPR and the CAT), and the subsidiary sources of international
law — namely, the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (“UN Guidelines”) —
as well as RA 10368, HRVVs are entitled to the following rights: (1)
the non-derogable right to an effective remedy; (2) the right against
re-traumatization; (3) the right to truth and the State’s corollary duty
to preserve memory; and (4) the right to reparation.

1. The right to an effective remedy

Prescinding from the various laws that have been enacted by the
Philippine legislature to promote and protect human rights193 and the
availability of judicial remedies,194 it must be clarified that the
Philippines’ obligations do not cease by the mere enactment of laws
or the availability of judicial remedies. Article 2 of the ICCPR
provides:
Article 2(3). Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwith-
_______________
192 TSN, August 31, 2016, pp. 199-215.

194 Id.

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standing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an

official capacity.

In turn, General Comment No. 31 to the ICCPR states that the
purpose of Article 2 will be defeated if there is no concurrent
obligation on the part of the State-party to take measures to
prevent a recurrence of a violation of the ICCPR.195 In other
words, when RA 10368 recognized the obligation of the Philippines
to provide an effective remedy to HRVVs, this can only be
understood as the Philippines also having the concurrent obligation
to prevent a recurrence of the violation of the ICCPR.
This is not the first time this Court has been asked to recognize
the obligatory nature of the ICCPR and the General Comments
interpreting their provisions. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,196
the Court recognized the binding nature of the ICCPR and relied on
General Comment 6 (to Article 6 of the ICCPR) to resolve the issues
raised by petitioner Echegaray with respect to the death penalty
allegedly violating the Philippines’ international obligations. In
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis197 the Court relied upon the U.N. Human Rights
Committee’s (“UNHRC”) interpretation of Article 2 of the ICCPR
on the right to an effective domestic remedy. According to the
UNHRC, the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right
to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the
person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime
against humanity.198
_______________
195 General Comment No. 31, par. 17, The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326
May 2004. See par. 17, which states:
17. In general, the purposes of the Covenant would be defeated without an
obligation integral to Article 2 to take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation
of the Covenant.
196 358 Phil. 410; 297 SCRA 754 (1998).
197 621 Phil. 536; 606 SCRA 598 (2009).
198 Id., at pp. 603-604; p. 676.

682

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The obligation to provide effective remedy, and concurrently, to

prevent a recurrence, by its nature, is not discharged by the mere
passage of laws. This obligation, by necessity, is a continuing one.

2. The right to be protected
from re-traumatization

Petitioner Latiph claims that the burial of former President
Marcos in “a state funeral as a hero and extending to him full
military honors”199 violates the Philippines’ obligations under the
UN Guidelines.200 In response, the Solicitor General merely stated
that the premise of these alleged violations is “flawed,”201 in that
there is no causal relation between the Philippines’ compliance with
its international law obligations and former President Marcos burial
at the LNMB.
First of all, the claim that the Philippines is not bound by the UN
Guidelines because they are merely “guidelines” and “not
treaties”202 or “sources of international law”203 is inaccurate. While
it is true that a treaty only binds States parties to it and generally
does not create obligations for States not parties to it pursuant to the
principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt,204 the rule does not
operate to preclude the application of the UN Guidelines to the
Philippines. This is because the UN Guidelines do not create new
international or domestic legal obligations, but merely identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international
human rights law.205
Quite the contrary, and as earlier adverted to,206 the UN
Guidelines constitute subsidiary sources of International Law under
Article 38(1)(d)
_______________
199 Latiph Petition, p. 22.

200 See also OSG Memorandum, par. 310, p. 110.
202 Id., par. 344, p. 119.
203 Id.
204 ICJ Statute, Art. 34.
205 Preamble to the Principles and Guidelines, par. 7.
206 ICJ Statute, supra.

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of the ICJ Statute. Principle 10 of the UN Guidelines, pertaining to

the treatment of victims, provides:
10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity
and human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their
safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those
of their families. The State should ensure that its domestic laws, to the
extent possible, provide that a victim who has suffered violence or trauma
should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid his or her re-
traumatization in the course of legal and administrative procedures
designed to provide justice and reparation.
Significantly, Principle 10 is mirrored by Article II, Section 11 of

the Constitution and Section 2 of RA 10368, stating that the “State
values the dignity of every human, person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.”
Based on the narrations of the HRVV petitioners, it is the
intended interment that would reopen wounds and re-traumatize
them. In this regard, international law has recognized that impunity
must be considered as a continued and ongoing form oftorture.207 To
bury the architect of martial law in the LNMB would be an act of
impunity.

3. The right to truth and the States’
duty to preserve memory208

Under Principle 2 of the UN Principles on Impunity,209 the right
to truth pertains to the right to know about past events concerning
the violations and about the circumstances and reasons that led to
the perpetration of those crimes.
_______________
207 Sveass, Nora, Gross human rights violations and reparation under
international law: Approaching rehabilitation as a form of reparation, European
Journal of Psychotraumatology, Eur J Psychotraumatol, p. 4, May 8, 2013.
208 Rosales Petition.
209 Subsidiary source of international law under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ
Statute, supra note 204.

684

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
The duty to preserve memory, in Principle 3 of the UN Principles

on Impunity, requires that people’s knowledge of the history of its
oppression be part of its heritage and as such, must be ensured by
appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s duty to preserve
archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights
and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those
violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective
memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the
development of revisionist and negationist arguments.
The burial of former President Marcos in the LNMB which, as
already explained, is not a mere cemetery but a memorial for heroes,
will certainly not further or advance the Philippines’ obligation to
accord HRVVs their right to truth and preserve memory. Indeed,
such an act would blur the real role of former President Marcos in
the country’s history and in the human rights abuses that the HRVVs
suffered under his martial law regime. This is the causal connection
between the proposed interment and the violation of the HRVV’s
right to truth, and the Philippines’ duty to preserve memory.

4. The right to specific forms of
reparation for harm suffered
under Principles 19, 21, 22,
23 of the UN Guidelines

The Solicitor General claims that the “Philippines had already
taken legislative and other measures to give effect to human rights,
and provided not only adequate remedies against human rights
violations and procedures for the investigation of these violations
and for the prosecution of the perpetrators thereof and the penalties
therefor, but also reparation to victims.”210 He further claims that
RA 10368 has no bearing on the powers of the President and his
subordinates under the Constitution and E.O. 292 and that HRVVs
can be very assured that the interment of the remains of the former
President Marcos at the Libingan will neither prevent them from
claiming any entitlements to repa-
_______________

685
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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
rations under RA 10368 nor dilute their claims, moral or legal,

monetary or nonmonetary, thereunder.211
In other words, the Solicitor General is saying that the existence
of several laws212 and the judicial decisions describing former
President Marcos as a plunderer and human rights violator already
“restored the dignities and reputation of the victims of the
regime”213 and constitute sufficient reparation to the HRVVs.
I cannot agree. The UN Guidelines, as cited in the CHR’s
Memorandum, and as explained by CHR Chairman Chito Gascon
during the Oral Arguments, provide five general forms of reparation:
(1) restitution, (2) compensation, (3) rehabilitation, (4) satisfaction,
and (5) guarantees of non-repetition.
Restitution requires that the victim be restored to the original
situation before the gross violations of international human rights
Compensation is provided for any economically assessable
damage resulting from gross violations of human rights. In this
regard, Article 14 of the CAT requires State-parties to ensure in its
legal system that “the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and
has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation,
including the means for as full [a] rehabilitation as possible. In the
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his
dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”
Rehabilitation includes medical and psychological care as well
as legal and social services. There are a number of definitions of
rehabilitation.214 General Comment 3 to Article 14 of the CAT
suggests that reha-
_______________
211 Id., par. 238, p. 91.

212 R.A. No. 9851 or the “PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY”; R.A. NO.
10353 OR THE “ANTI-ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE ACT OF 2012”; R.A.
NO. 9201 OR THE “NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS WEEK ACT OF 2002” and
R.A. No. 10368; id., par. 332, p. 116.
213 Rosales Petition, par. 8.7, pp. 63-64; id., par. 400, p. 136.
214 Redress, Rehabilitation as a form of reparation under international law,
2009. Dec, retrieved April 5, 2011, from
<http://www.redress.org/smartweb/reports/reports>, in Sveass, supra note 207.

686

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
bilitation “should be holistic and include medical and psychological

care as well as legal and social services.” Rehabilitation for victims
should aim to restore, as far as possible, their independence,
physical, mental, social and vocational ability; and full inclusion and
participation in society.215
Satisfaction includes, among others: (i) the “verification of the
facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to assist the victim or
prevent the occurrence of further violations,” (ii) an official
declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with
the victim, (iii) a public apology, (iv) commemorations and tributes
to victims, and (v) the inclusion of an accurate account of the
violations that occurred in international human rights law and
international humanitarian law training and in educational material
at all levels.
Guarantees of non-repetition pertain to measures that may be
taken which will contribute to the prevention of the reoccurrence of
the human rights violations. This includes “strengthening the
independence of the judiciary.”
Notably, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No.
2 (1992) and General Comment No. 31 (2004)216 defined
rehabilitation as a form of reparation. In particular, General
Comment No. 20 states that amnesties are unacceptable, among
other reasons, because they would “deprive individuals of the right
to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full
rehabilitation as may be possible.”
The arguments of the Solicitor General are thus belied, and
shown to be erroneous, by the breadth and extensiveness of the
above described forms of reparation.
To summarize, there is sufficient basis to rule that the burial of
former President Marcos in the LNMB will violate certain
international law principles and obligations, which the Philippines
has adopted and must abide by, and RA 10368 which transformed
the principle and State policy expressed in Article II, Section 11 of
the Constitution which states: “The
_______________
215 General Comment No. 3, Art. 14, CAT.

216 Human Rights Committee, General comments to the international covenant
on civil and political rights (ICCPR) 1992/2004.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.” In this sense, therefore, a violation of RA
10368 is tantamount to a violation of Article II, Section 11 of the
Constitution.

Summation

For all the reasons stated, the directive to inter former President
Marcos in the LNMB constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in violation of:
(1) Presidential Proclamations 86 and 208, (2) PD 105, (3) RA
10066, (4) RA 10086, (5) AFP Regulations G 161-375, and (6) RA
10368, which is tantamount to a violation of Article II, Section 11 of
the Constitution.
When all is said and done, when the cortege led by pallbearers
has reached the plot in the LNMB dedicated to the newest “hero” of
the land and the coffin containing what is claimed to be the remains
of former President Marcos has been finally buried in the ground or
entombed above ground, this DISSENT, along with the dissents of
the Chief Justice and Justices Carpio and Leonen, will be a fitting
eulogy to the slaying of the might of judicial power envisioned in
the 1987 Freedom Constitution by the unbridled exercise of
presidential prerogative using vox populi as the convenient excuse.
Above all, this is a tribute to the fallen, desaparecidos, tortured,
abused, incarcerated and victimized so that the dictator could
perpetuate his martial rule, and to those who fought to attain the
freedom which led to the very Constitution from which this Court
derives the power to make the decision that it reached today — that
their sacrifices, sufferings and struggles in the name of democracy
would be duly acknowledged and immortalized.

688

Ocampo vs. Enriquez
“For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear
witness for the dead and for the living. He has no right to deprive future
generations of a past that belongs to our collective memory. To forget would
be not only dangerous but offensive; to forget the dead would be akin to
killing them a second time.”
- Elie Wiesel, Night217

For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions.
Petitions dismissed, status quo ante order lifted.
Note.—Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of

constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA
293 [2014])

——o0o——
_______________
217 Wiesel, E., Night, xv (2006 translation with preface to the new translation);
Eliezer “Elie” Wiesel (September 30, 1928-July 2, 2016) was born in the town of
Sighet, Transylvania. He was a teenager when he and his family were taken from their
home in 1944 to the Auschwitz concentration camp, and then to Buchenwald. Night is
the terrifying record of his memories of the death of his family, the death of his own
innocence, and his despair as a deeply observant Jew confronting the absolute evil of
man.
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G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016.*

G.R. No. 225984. November 8, 2016.*

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 226097. November 8, 2016.*

G.R. No. 226116. November 8, 2016.*

G.R. No. 226117. November 8, 2016.*

VOL. 807, NOVEMBER 8, 2016 225

DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF RICARDO R.

G.R. No. 226120. November 8, 2016.*

G.R. No. 226294. November 8, 2016.*

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; It is well-

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Same; Executive Department; Our nation’s history will not be instantly

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tary personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether

VOL. 807, NOVEMBER 8, 2016 231

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Review; View that

Duterte to allow the burial of Marcos at the LNMB contravenes the

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Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that whether Marcos is to be buried in

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Same; View that to permit the burial would be to sanction violations of

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that Marcos is not qualiﬁed to be

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ousted from the Presidency by the nonviolent People Power Revolution

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the hallowed grounds of the LNMB, which was established to show

Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; View that for the Court to

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BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Judicial Review; View that

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

President Marcos.—None of the disqualiﬁcations can apply to the late

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personiﬁcation is no longer of national acceptance.—The election

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that the interment of President Marcos

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libingan ng mga Bayani; View that President Duterte’s verbal orders

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Same; View that the transfer of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ remains is a

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Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; View that President

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to monetary and nonmonetary reparations guaranteed by the State

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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ble to his subordinate, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Ofﬁce (“PVAO”)

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libingan ng mga Bayani; Human Rights Abuses; View that burial of

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,