ST DG

Topic: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Definition
Caltex v. Palomar 18 SCRA 247

Citation: G.R. No. L-19650 (18 SCRA 247) 29 September 1966
Short Title: Caltex v. Palomar
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
On 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex Station will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to participate, no
fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.
For seeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made
by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The
acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954,
1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the requested
clearance.
Issues:
Whether or not construction should be employed in this case.
Whether or not the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law.
Held:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present
case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or
interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance,
in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.
Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential
elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by
way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of
property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of
consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a merchandise was required for the
privilege to participate.
CALTEX VS. PALOMAR
FACTS
Caltex Philippines Inc., appellee, conceived and laid groundwork for a promotional scheme
called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing the
contest and transmission of communications relative thereto, a letter to the Post-master General.
Appellant was sent justifying the position of non-violation of the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law. Unimpressed, the appellant opined the scheme falls within the purview of the said
law and declined grant of requested clearance with a threat of fraud orders the appellee if the
contest was conducted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the proposed scheme by Caltex requires Statutory Construction to inquire into the
intended meaning of the provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD
Yes, Statutory Construction is required because the specific statutory provisions relied upon by
both parties are not identical. Statutory construction is the art or process of discovering or
expounding the meaning and intension of the authors of the law with respect to its application to
a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar
Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications,
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise”
which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance,
and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind”
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of
the law is preserved.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 28
Topic: CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION: Power to construe
Banawa v. Mirano 97 SCRA 517
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
BANAWA VS. MIRANO

FACTS
Maria Mirano, niece of Julia Mendoza, was taken in by spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza, treated and reared her up like their own child. A few years later, the spouses opened
up a store from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire
several parcels of land that were bought in the name of Maria Mirano. After a lingering illness,
Maria Mirano died and left as her only nearest relatives the herein respondents who are claiming
ownership over the lands in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the construction of Section5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court can be applied
to the present case.
HELD
No. Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court specifically provides for the case of a
judicially adopted child. It is not applicable to Mario Mirano, an extrajudicial adoption. It is an
elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the
law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Guevara v. Inocentes 16 SCRA 379
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
GUEVARA VS. INOCENTES

FACTS
The petioner, Onofre Guevara, was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of
Labor by the former Executive. The as interim appointment for the same position was also
extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive, seeking the former appointment invalid by
virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 8 declaring all ad interim appointments made by the former
Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress. The
petitioner brought before the Court of the petition on the ground that under Article VII, Section
10 (4) of the Constitution, petitioners ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may
only become ineffective upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress.
ISSUE
Whether or not the term adjournment is construed to be applied on regular sessions of Congress.
HELD
No. It is true that the provision of the Constitution with phrase “until the next adjournment of the
Congress “ does not make any reference to any specific session of the Congress, - whether
regular or special, - but such silence is of no moment, for it is well-known maxin in statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Resins v. Auditor General 25 SCRA 754
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
RESINS VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS
Petitioner, Resins Incorporated, seeks for refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that
it was exempt from the margin fee under the RA No. 2609 for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue of which it was a
manufacturer. The specific language of the Act speaks of “urea formaldehyde”, and petitioner
admittedly did import urea and formaldehyde separately.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imported urea and formaldehyde by the petitioner is exempt from the margin
fee under RA No. 2609.
HELD
‘Urea formaldehyde’ is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde’, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resins
known as ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde’. Thus, petitioners import is not exempt from margin fee.
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260
G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product
which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues
his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration
of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner
would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor
General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous
resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid.
HELD:
The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not
“UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by
Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of
the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor
General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 43
Crisolo v. Macadaeg 94 SCRA 517
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
CRISOLO VS. MACADAEG

FACTS
Petitioner asserts that he denied paternity in an answer properly files to Marieta Villa’s complaint
for support of Maria Erlinda Crisolo as his and her natural daughter, and that upon request of
complainant, the respondent judge, acting in excess of jurisdiction. Before the hearing of the
case, and without affording petitioner a chance to object, issued an order directing him to pay
Marieta Villa monthly for support pendent lite and for medical expenses of said minor Maria
Erlinda. Respondents reply that support pendent lite was ordered in the interest of justice, after
the judge had been shown the birth certificate of the child and a medical certificate.
ISSUE
Whether or not the documents, specifically the birth certificate exhibited to the respondent judge
established prima facie evidence.
HELD
No, the birth certificate does not constitute prima facie evidence. The document stating that
Maria Erlinda Crisolo and legitimate daughter of Marieta Villa and Pedro Crisolo would be
prima facie proof but having alleged and admitted that Maria Erlinda was not a legitimate
daughter, complainant completely destroyed the certificates worth as evidence. The maxin falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus would at once come to mind poisoning the question whether it applies
to documents as well as witnesses.
Morales v. Subido 26 SCRA 150
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
MORALES VS. SUBIDO

FACTS
The petitioner, Enrique Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of the chief of police,
the petitioner was designated acting chief of police and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the Mayor of Manila. The respondent Comission of Civil
Cervice Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment
for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the
said position”.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is qualified for appointment as chief of police.
HELD
No, The Act under consideration makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or
a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite. Section 10 of the Act
needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear and the purpose is to require both
educational and service qualifications of those seeking appointment as a chief of police. Hence,
the petition is not qualified.
Vera v. Avelino 77 Phil 192
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
VERA VS. AVELINO

FACTS
The COMELEC submitted its report regarding the national elections to the President and
Congress. The report states that the voting in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan
and Tarlac did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will because of the acts of
terrorism and violence. Consequently, Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero (the
petitioners), who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber. The
petitioners brought an action to compel the respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and
to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD
No, because no court has ever held and will ever hold that it possesses power to direct the Chief
Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. The rule is non-
interference. The Court could not order one branch of the Legislative to reinstate a member
thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of
checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.
TITLE: Vera vs Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (GR No. L-24750, 16 May1980)
FACTS:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the Commission on elections

submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the
national elections held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by reason of
certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will. In the course of the session on May 25, 1946, a resolution known as Pendatun was
approved referring to the report and ordering petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
E. Romero, who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections, shall defer the
administration of oath/ sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber pending the hearing and
decision on the protests lodged against their elections. Petitioner sought “to desist and to abstain
from carrying out" the so-called Pendatun Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has the power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
petitioners against the carrying out of the so-called Pendatun Resolution.
HELD:
No. This court lacks jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
petitioners. Political rights are the rights sought to be exercised or protected by petitioners. The
questions raised are political questions, and it is well settled that the equitable remedy of
injunction is not available for such a purpose. The principle is that a court will not entertain a suit
calling for a judgment upon a political question.
Case dismissed. No costs.
Bakings v. Director of Prisons 28 SCRA 850
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Palanca v. City of Manila 41 Phil 125
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Palanca vs City of Manila, 41 Phil 125 (GR No. L-15819, 27 October 1920)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an amended decision of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
requiring the defendant City of Manila to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,400 with legal
interest thereon from the respective dates on which the several payments composing the amount
were made, without costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff, by taking out and paying for his license as a distiller, is entitled to
sell the products of his distillery in a store separate and distinct therefrom without the necessity
of taking out and paying for an additional license as a wholesale liquor dealer.
HELD:
Yes. “Statues which are plain and specific should be applied without attempted construction and
interpretation.” (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico[1913], 24 Phil., 504; Philippine Railway Co.
v. Nolting [1916], 34 Phil., 401; U.S. v. Fisher [1804], 3 Branch, 358.). Manila Liquor License
Act No. 59, as amended by Act No. 95. Section 16 and 17 thereof, the latter as superseded by
Act No. 95, provides license to be granted to distillers not only authorizes the licensee "to
conduct the business of a distiller of alcoholic liquors" but also "to sell, give away or otherwise
dispose of the products of such distillery, in quantities of one gallon or more". No provision of
the Act limits the place of sale or disposition of the products of the licensed distiller to the
distillery proper.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STARE DECISIS: Power of judicial review upon
constitutional questions
Dumlao v. Comelec 95 SCRA 392
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
Facts:
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however
have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the
other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD:
No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been
merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case
does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree
could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same
office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STARE DECISIS: Judicial Legislation
National Marketing Corp v. Tecson 29 SCRA 70
Citation: G.R. No. l-29131 (29 SCRA 70) 27 August 1969
Short Title: National Marketing Corp v. Tecson
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
On November 14, 1955, CFI Manila rendered its judgment in favor of Price Stabilization
Corporation against Miguel Tecson. The order became final and executory on December 21,
1955. On December 21 1965, National Marketing Corporation as successor of Price Stabilization
Corporation, filed before the same court a revival of judgment against Tecson. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of action.
The court ruled in favor of Tecson, stating that the action had had prescribed two (2) days before
the motion was raised since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years, the action must have prescribed
on December 19, 1965. NMC appealed to the Court of Appeals and was forwarded to the
Supreme Court on March 20, 1969. NMC contended that ‘calendar year’ should be computed by
the number of days it actually has. Tecson pointed out Article 13, NCC that when law speaks of
years, it must be of 365 days. The NMC’s final contention is that if the extra 1 day of leap year
does not belong to a year, so to what years does it particularly belong.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra one (1) day of leap year is counted as to the contention of the
Appellant.
Held:
No, the court ruled that even though it is true that 366th day constitutes a leap year and the
law is silent when it comes to that subject, the court has no power for such judicial legislation to
interpret and consider the extra 1 day being included in the leap year. Article 13, NCC explicitly
provides that a year is of 365 days. If such subject demands public interest, the revision of such
provision is made through a legislative process and not by a judicial decree.
Decision affirmed.
National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson
Case No. 184
G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969)
Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18
FACTS:
On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount
was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial
case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The complaint
was dismissed as having prescribed.
ISSUE:
W/N the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was
considered to be December 21, 1965.
HELD:
NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and
1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10)
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955,
expired on December 19, 1965.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7b
Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STARE DECISIS: Judicial Legislation
Floresca v. Philex Mining G.R. No. 30642 April 30 1985
Citation: G.R. No. 30642 (136 SCRA 142) 30 April 1985
Short Title: Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corp’s mine sites. The
heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA).
Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners
with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the
CFI (now RTC) of Manila.
Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial
accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the
case. Philex argues that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under section 5
and 46 of the WCA.
Philex further contends that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the
employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation
in the event that the employer was negligent.
The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction as their complaint is not based
on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence.
The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held:
Majority Opinion; Makasiar, J.
Several opinions [amicus curiae] were advanced as to the nature of the remedies
provided for under the WCA, namely:
1) CUMULATIVE – Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that the heirs may file a complaint
for damages (which is different from compensation under the-e WCA) with the
regular courts on the basis of the negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil
Code provisions.
2) EXCLUSIVE – Atty. (now Senator) Angara believes that recovery under the WCA
is exclusive and therefore precludes an action of damages under the Civil Code.
3) SELECTIVE – Atty. Bacungan believes that the remedies are selective, i.e., the heirs
had the option of choosing between availing of the compensation under the WCA or
filing an action for damages arising out of negligence under the provisions of the
Civil Code. If the heirs had chosen one remedy and have collected under that remedy,
they can no longer avail of the other remedy.
The allegations of the complaint indicate that there was a breach of contract which may
justify an award for damages under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The question now
is whether or not the action for damages will prosper, notwithstanding the fact that the heirs have
already received compensation under the WCA.
The Court agreed with the petition of Atty. Bacungan that the two remedies are selective.
The WCA is based on a theory of compensation distinct from existing theories on damages.
Recovery under the WCA is not based on any theory on the part of the employer.
Since the two remedies are distinct and the heirs have the option of selecting which
remedy to avail of, are the heirs now precluded from selecting the remedy under the Civil Code,
considering that they had already availed of (and received compensation) under the WCA?
The heirs have a choice but they cannot pursue both choices simultaneously.
The court, however, noted that the heirs only learned of the negligence report after they
had already availed and received compensation under the WCA; they thus could not make an
intelligent and informed choice at the time they opted for the WCA remedy.
The heirs were thus allowed to pursue the Civil Code remedy but they are not entitled to
recover under both remedies. Any payment they received under the WCA shall be deducted from
the court’s award of damages, if any.
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation
Case No. 47
G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
FACTS:
Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and
wanton negligence.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages.
HELD:
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages
from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the
instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it
did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 17, 40a
Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation
Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved
to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the WCA.
Issue:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
Held:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may
be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized
that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be
defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law
killeth but its spirit giveth life.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already
liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage
suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly
removed by the legislature NOT the SC.
TITLE: Floresca vs Philex Mining, GR No. L-30642, April 30, 1985
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the Order dated December 16, 1968 of the former Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIII dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for damages for the death
of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex. Said employees died while
working underground at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967 burying them in the tunnels of the
mine. Petitioners allege that Philex negligently and deliberately failed to take the required safety
measures for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. On August 3,
1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen’s compensation claim or a claim
for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.
HELD:
“It is stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the
work-related nature without any fault on part of the employers. Justice Holmes pronounced that
“judges do and must legislate but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar
to molecular motions”. However, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights
and statutory enactments expounding on the scope of the provisions protecting human rights.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review
the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act. The trial court’s
order of dismissal is reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to it for further proceedings.
Should a greater amount of damages be decreed in favor of petitioners, the payments already
made to them pursuant to the workmen’s compensation act shall be deducted. No costs.
Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STAE DECISIS: Void for vagueness
People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 186
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
People v. Nazario
Case No. 218
G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988)
Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a
municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum.” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the
ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to
him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
HELD:
No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said
to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the
Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes
within the term “manager”. While it appears that the National Government is the
owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated. It
is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the
ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include the
Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from
taxes.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6c, 37
Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STAE DECISIS: Void for vagueness

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STARE DECISIS: Prospective application of judicial
precedents
People v. Jabinal 55 SCRA 607
Citation: G.R. No. L-30061 (55 SCRA 607) 27 February 1974
Short Title: People v. Jabinal
Long Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, v. JOSE
JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Ponente:
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in People v. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent,
which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as
peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Macarandang and People v.
Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People v. Macarandang and People v. Lucero were reversed and
subsequently abandoned in People v. Mapa.
Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandang and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Held:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence,
of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
People of the Philippines vs. Jabinal

FACTS
Jose Jabinal, the accused, kept in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver with
ammunition without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same. The
accused admitted that he was in possession of such weapon however, he claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander. The
said appointments expressly carried with them to be authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.
ISSUE
Whether the Macarandang and Lucero doctrines are applicable in the present case.
HELD
Yes, the Macarandang and Lucero doctrines are applicable in the present case. The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed,
since the Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent thus
construed intends to effectuate. At the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and when he arraigned by the trial court, the doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero, under which no criminal liability is attached to the accused, prevailed.
Topic: SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION: Constitution
Perfecto v. Meer 85 Phil 552
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
PERFECTO VS. MEER
FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation
as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution
thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed
against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the
Constitution.
Endencia v. David 93 Phil 696
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
ENDENCIA VS. DAVID
FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in Manila declaring section
13 of RA No. 590 unconstitutional and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor Endencia and to Justice Fernando Jugo the income
tax collected on their salary. When the SC held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers exempt
from salary tax because the collection thereof was a decrease or diminution of their salaries
which is prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress thereafter promulgated RA No. 590,
authorizing and legalizing the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional
HELD
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duly of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No.
590 is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase found in
section 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution which refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature may not
legally provide therein that a statue be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thus the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of RA No. 590.
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA
590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in
compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a
task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his
salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 7a, 24a
Nitafan v. Commissioner 152 SCRA 284
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges David Nitafan, Wenceslaus Polo and
Maximo Savellano, Jr. , seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents., the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that “any tax withheld from
their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of
their salaries contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that “during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of taxes in the compensation of Judicial officers is contrary to the
1987 Constitution.
HELD
Yes. The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed expressed
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to “give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government”. It was further expressly made
clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax
applied to all tax payers. With the foregoing pretation, the rulling that “the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of the judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution” in
Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 190
G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987)
Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46
FACTS:
Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and
compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that
“during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”, even as it is
anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers.
HELD:
Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution
of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Endencia
vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded
because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as
the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the
members of the judiciary taxable.
LATIN MAXIM:
3, b1
Topic: SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION: Ordinances
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta 93 SCRA 462
Citation: G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)
Short Title: Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta, 93 SCRA462 G.R. No. L-26702 October 18,
1979
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by defendants whereby Ordinance No. 3, s. 1964 was declared null and
void by the Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated June 29,
1966.On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car
within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to
stop for violating Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for
overtaking a truck." Primicias surrendered his license and a temporary operator's permit was
issued to him. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta
against Primicias for violation of said ordinance. Plaintiff Primicias filed for an annulment of
said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining the
Municipality of Urdaneta to enforce said ordinance and from further proceeding in the criminal
case. The Court of First Instance declared the ordinance null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act No.4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid when the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code,
became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was
approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied
in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136. Appellants further argued that a general rule that a later
law prevails over an earlier law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on March13,1964 by the Municipal
Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid.
HELD:
No. An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . .
the statute," for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict
between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way.
The appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244
G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)
Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14
FACTS:
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged
with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”.
Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the
issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said
ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is valid.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of
Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136
(The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a
later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance
is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
LATIN MAXIM:
4, 6c, 49
Topic: SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION: Contracts and wills
Interstate estates of Father Rigor v. Rigor 89 SCRA 493
Citation: G.R. No. L-22036 (89 SCRA 493) 30 April 1979
Short Title: Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac v. Rigor
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
This case is about the efficaciousness or the enforceability of a device of rice lands
located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around 44 hectares. That estate was made in
the will of the late Fr. Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male
relative who would study priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands appealed to the
SC from the decision of the CA affirming the order of the probate court, declaring that the said
devise was inoperative (Rigor v. Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, 1 August 1963).
Fr. Rigor, a parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on Aug. 9, 1935, leaving a will
executed on Oct. 29, 1933 which was probated by the C. F. I. of Tarlac. In its order of Dec. 5,
1935, named as devises in the will were the testator’s nearest relatives, namely, his tree sisters:
Florencia Rigor- Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator
also gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition the will contained the following controversial bequest:
1. That he bequeathed the rice lands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would
pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. the devisee could not sell the rice lands
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
administer the rice lands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and
administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would seize to enjoy
and administer the rice lands if he discontinued his studied for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obliged to celebrated every year twenty
masses wit prayers for the repose of the soul of Fr. Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy ad
administration of the rice lands would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and
his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is not qualified devisee, as contemplated above,
the administration of the rice lands would under the responsibility of the incumbent
parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest administrator of the rice lands would accumulate annually the
product thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his
administration and of his corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish
priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devisee
in the bank in the name of his bequest.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratrix, in 1940 submitted the project of
partition containing the ff. item
LEGACY OF THE CHURCH

“that it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male
relative who shall take the Priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual
Catholic priest of the Roman Catholic Church, of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his
successors the real properties herein below indicated to wit:
Judge Cruz in his order of Aug. 15, 1940 approving the project of partition, directed that
after payment if the obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the Church
of the Victoria Parish) the administratrix should deliver to the devisee their respective shares.
In as much as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and
the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the rice lands,
the sale where not delivered to the ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, on Feb. 19, 1954, the
petitioner filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new
administrator (succeeding the deceased administratrix, Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to
the church the said rice lands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render
an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. On Jan. 31, 1957 the petitioner
filed another petition for the delivery of rice lands to the church as trustee.
Issue:
Whether or not the will of Fr. Rigor can be rendered inoperative
Held:
Yes. In view of the testamentary provisions, it may be presumed that the testator really
intends to hand down the Riceland to the nearest male relative who would become a priest, who
is forbidden to sell the rice lands, who would lose the devise if he will discontinue to his studies
for the priesthood, or having been ordained as a priest was excommunicated, and who would be
obliged to say twenty masses with prayers annually for he repose soul of the testator and his
parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the rice
lands in two conditions: during the interval of time that no nearest relative of the testator would
study for the priesthood and that in case the nearest relative being ordained a priest and was
excommunicated.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters and second
degree relatives: Mr. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. When the testator specified
his nearest male relative; he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would
be his third degree relative, or possibly a grand nephew. But since he could not prognosticate the
exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be
living at the time of his death he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his
nephew or grand nephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to used the term
“nearest male relative”.
Under Article 1025, of the Civil Code, which states that “In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
the case of representation, when it is proper”, this court held that the said bequest refers to the
nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not anytime after his death.
Moreover, it was contended by the legal heirs that the said devisee reality intended for the
testators nephew and godchild, Ramon Quiambao, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Nestora
Quiambao. To prove the contention, the legal heir presented in the lower court an affidavit of
Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan who exposed that after Fr.
Rigor’s death, her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was
studying for the Priesthood at the san Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Fr. Rigor
had intended that devise for his nearest male relative belonging to the Rigor family. Moreover,
Mrs. Gamalinda further stated that her own grandchild, Edgardo Cunanan, was not the one
contemplated in Fr. Rigor’s will and that Edgardo’s father told her that he was not consulted by
the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator’s grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the
priesthood at the San Jose Seminary. Unfortunately, Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961
and for that reason the legal heirs informed the CA that the probate court’s order adjudicating the
rice land to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand up.
Following the interpretation of the will, the question would be whether at the time Fr.
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for priesthood. That was answered in
paragraph 4 of the appellant’s petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957 wherein he
alleged that “ no nearest male relative of the late Fr. Rigor ha sever studied for the priesthood.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Thus, the administration
of the rice land by the parish priest of Victoria, as the envisaged in the will, was likewise
inoperative. In connection to this, the CA correctly ruled that this case is covered by Art. 888 of
the old Civil Code, now Art. 956, which provides that “if the bequest for any reasons should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the state, except in cases of substitution and those in which
the right of accretion exists.”
This case is also covered by Art. 912 (2) of the old Civil Code, now Art. 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will (does not disposed of all that belongs to
the testator). There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said rice lands, the same should
be distributed among the testator’s legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition of the said rice lands.
TESTATE ESTATE OF FATHER RIGOR VS. RIGOR
FACTS
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, left a will executed and was probated by the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will
were the testators nearest relatives, his three sisters. In addition, the will provided that it be
adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall
take the priesthood.
ISSUE
Whether or not the bequest in question be declared inoperative.
HELD
In the law of contracts and statutory construction, the primary issue is the determination of the
testator's intention which is the law of the case. What is no clear is on how long after the
testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. The SC held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at
the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). Inasmuch as the testator was
not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest
in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
Topic: SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION: Other issuances which have the binding force
and effect of laws
Conte v. COA 264 SCRA 19
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
CONTE VS COA
FACTS
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the Social
Security System (SSS) who retired from government service. They availed of compulsory
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660. In addition, petitioners also claimed benefits
granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971 that provides financial incentive and
inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as
amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by giving them
“financial assistance” equivalent in amount to the difference between what a retiree would have
received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to under RA 660. Thereafter, COA issued a
ruling disallowing in audit “all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No.
56” for the reason that it results in the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing
retirement laws.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not public respondent abused its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners’
claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56.
2. Whether or not SSS Resolution No. 56 is valid.
HELD
1. No. The Commission bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated under SSS
Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. It is clear
that petitioners applied for benefits under RA 660 only because of the incentives offered by Res.
56, and that absent such incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission.
2. No. The said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that has the effect
of modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660. It is simply beyond dispute that
the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan and in the guise of
rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. Hence, SSS Resolution
No. 56 is hereby illegal, void and no effect.
TITLE: Conte vs COA, 264 SCRA 19 G.R. No. 116422 November 4, 1996
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA seeking

reconsideration of COA’s ruling of July 10, 1989 disallowing claims for financial assistance
under Res. 56. Petitioners argue that the financial assistance under Res. 56 is not a retirement
plan prohibited by RA 4968, and that Res. 56 provides benefits different from and “aside from”
what a retiring SSS employee would be entitled to under RA 660. They said it is a form of social
amelioration and economic upliftment for the welfare of retiring employees. However, the court
ruled that Res. 56 constitutes a supplementary retirement plan, and thus does not conform with
RA 4968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SSS Resolution No. 56 is within the ambit of and thus proscribed by Sec. 28
(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance
or retirement plan other than the GSIS to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such
plans. Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no
effect.
In statutory construction, between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
[ i] “A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.” Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby
declared ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. The SSS is urged to assist petitioners and
facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by existing
regulations, the corresponding amounts representing the difference between the two benefits
programs. No costs.
Topic: PARTS OF A LAW: Title
Philconsa v. Gimenez 15 SCRA 479
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

FACTS
RA No. 3836, “An Act Amending Subsection ©, Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered
186. As Amended by Republic Act Numbered 3096”, allows a Senator or a member of the House
of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age
and whose service must be at least 12 years. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. , a non-
profit civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine laws instituted this petition
challenging the constitutionality of the law in question.
ISSUE
Whether or not the little of RA No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
HELD
No. It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection c of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS. This paragraph
is related and germane to the subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of RA. No 3836
refers to members of Congress and elective in any manner to the subject of CA. No. 186
establishing the GSIS and which provides both retirement and issuance benefits to its members.
The constitutionality requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect

their contents is not met by the title of said RA. No. 3836, thus , void.
Topic: PARTS OF A LAW: Title
Lidasan v. Comelec 21 SCRA 496
Citation: G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
Short Title: Lidasan v. COMELEC
Long Title:
Ponente:
LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

FACTS
RA No. 4790 entitled “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao
del Sur ‘, was signed into law and came to light later that barrios mentioned in the body of that
statue are within the municipalities of the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur only.
Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted its resolutions for the purposes of
establishments of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes. The Office of
the President recommended the COMELEC that the operation of the statue be suspended until “
clarified by correcting legislation”. COMELEC stood by its own interpretion, hence this motion
by Bara Lidasan as a resident, taxpayer and a qualified voter of Parang Cotabato.
ISSUE
Whether or not the title of the statue conforms with the constitutional requirement.
HELD
No. The title of RA No. 4790 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent Province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Such title did not
inform the people in towns in Cotabato and the province itself that part of their territory is being
taken away and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur. Transfer of sizable territory
from one province to another is as important as the creation of a municipality, yet, the title did
not reflect this fact. The legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, hence RA No. 4790 is
null void.
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148
G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
FACTS:
Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on
the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato,
violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution
in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE:
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.
HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao
del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the
members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These
are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.
swwwaLATIN MAXIM:
Topic: PARTS OF A LAW: Preamble
People v. Purisima 86 SCRA 542
Citation: G.R. No. L-42050-66 (86 SCRA 542)
Short Title: People v. Purisima
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts :
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as
they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Information were filed charging the
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the
respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order
quashing or dismissing the Information, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
Issue:
Are the Information filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9? There are two elements to the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any
dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of
statutory construction.
Held:
Court dismissed all motions made by the petitioner and affirms all decisions made by the
respondent judges.
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant
with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute
the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the
crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9,
it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, b2
Case: People v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66
Facts:
This case actually involves 17 petitions, in which informations in each petition were filed
against the respective accused with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3. The accused in each petition filed a motion to quash, and
the judge concur...red with the motions filed, filing an order to quash or dismiss the said
informations on the ground that that the information in each petition did not assert facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3 because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime. In one case, the information contended that the accused carried a carving
knife 6 inches long, which the accused carried outside of his residence, not being used as a tool
or something for him to earn his livelihood, nor being used in an activity that has connection
therewith, which the information concluded as contrary to law. The judge who handled the case,
Amante Purisima, ruled that the information should have shown that the possession of the bladed
weapon was for the purpose of carrying out or worsening of criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder, etc. in accordance to what is being mentioned in Proclamation 1081. The
information filed didn’t have the requirement, since the accused didn’t have the motivation to
carry out lawlessness as was in Proclamation 1081, since the bladed weapon is concealed.
Hence, it doesn’t establish the facts to constitute an offense against P.D. 9(3). The petitioner
argues that P.D. 9(3) punishes mala prohibita acts, hence for public policy. Furthermore, the
presidential decree here doesn’t only condemn carrying a bladed weapon in connection with the
commission of the crime, but in relation to criminality as a whole which characterized the pre-
martial law era. The petitioner further said that the preamble of a statute, usually introduced by
the word “whereas”, is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or
cure inherent defects in the statute, and that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree,
if it provides limits to the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself because the
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.
Issue:
Whether the informations filed by the prosecutors in each petition are sufficient in form
and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” punishable
under P.D. No. 9(3).
Held:
The Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner. First, the Court said that the
preamble or the explanatory note of a statute contains the legislative intent and spirit of the
decree if there will be problems as to how we should construe a statute. The Court then stated
that the results of implementing P.D. No. 9 (3) should be within its legislative intent. The Court
accorded with Judge Purisima’s ruling, saying that it is only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with an intention or motivation connected with or in relation with desired result of
Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9(3), and nothing else. Furthermore, in
construing this presidential degree, there should be an inquiry concerning the consequences of a
word-for-word implementation of which, and it is a presumption that in any statute, maladaptive
consequences where never intended by the legislator, and this is a characteristic of P.D. No. 9(3),
and the way the petitioner claimed the presidential decree is to provide hardships for the citizens.
The Court also found, as did Purisima, that the elements[1] to constitute the violation of P.D.
9(3) were not mentioned in the informations, the second element being absent, hence upheld the
decision of Purisima. The petition therefore was denied.
Statutory Construction Issue: 1) pursuit of legislative intent; 2) preamble and explanatory note
as construction aids; 3) construing vis-à-vis the consequences of the statute
[1] The first element is the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed
weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act
of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PURISIMA
FACTS
Information’s were filed before the three Courts of First Instance involved in charging the
defendants with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of PD No. 9. The three
respondent Judges issued in the cases filed an Order quashing or dismissing the informations on
a common ground that the information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized
by PD No. 9 because it failed to state one element of the crime. The missing element of the
offense charged is the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon in furtherance or on the occasion of connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but
by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
ISSUE
Whether or not the preamble is an essential part to determine the real nature of the crime
charged.
HELD
Yes, because the aid available to ascertain the intent or reason of PD No. 9 is clearly spelled out
in the “Whereas” clauses, or the preamble of the statute. A “preamble” is the key of the statute,
to open the minds of the makers as to the mischief which are to be remedied, and objects which
are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute. While the preamble of the statute is not
strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainly which otherwise does not
exist.
Topic: PARTS OF A LAW: Preamble
People v. Echavez 95 SCRA 663
Citation: G. R. No. L-47757-61 (95 SCRA 663) January 28, 1980
Short Title: People v. Echaves
Long Title:
Ponente: Aquino, J.
Facts:
On October 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen (16) persons charging them with squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772. The said decree penalized squatting and similar acts in urban
communities. In separate informations, each of the accused was claimed to have occupied and
cultivated the agricultural land without the consent of applicant-possessor-occupant Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, Jr. Five (5) of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan,
Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge
Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II. Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order
which the five informations even before the arraignment of the accused, based on the following
grounds: (1) the allegation that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy" is not
the same as "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner", which was the one specified in the decree; and (2) under the rule of
ejusdem generis, the decree did not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
The fiscal amended the information by claiming that “stealth and strategy” was in
accordance with “the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner." However, the lower court denied it. Hence, the fiscal appealed to
the Supreme Court based on R. A. No. 5440.
Issue:
Whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalized squatting and similar acts in urban
communities, applied to agricultural lands.
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. Based on the preamble
of Presidential Decree No. 772, the decree was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. On the other hand, the squatting complained of involved agricultural lands in rural
areas. Moreover, based on the clarity of the intent of the said decree, the rule of ejusdem generis
(of the same kind or species) did not apply in this case.
Stat Con relation: The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) does not apply to
this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato
Commercial Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
Topic: PARTS OF A LAW: Body or purview
People v. Carlos 78 Phil 535
Citation: G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
Short Title: People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Long Title:
Ponente:
FACTS:
The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the
constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal
on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision
which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the
disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution;
(3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a
provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery
for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and
germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional
rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
FACTS:
The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked
the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its
title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court
and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with
its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all
parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATIONS: General, Special or Local
Garcia v. Pascual 3 SCRA 655
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Garcia vs Pascual, et al., 3 SCRA 655, G.R. No. L-16950, December 22, 1961
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija declaring the
appointment of petitioner-appellee, Simeon T. Garcia as clerk of court of the justice of the peace
court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija valid, and, ordering the respondents to approve the vouchers
previously returned by the treasurer with the information that they be first approved by the
municipal mayor who refused to approve them for reason that Rep. Act No. 1551has repealed
Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act because section 1 of Rep.
Act No. 1551 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid by the general funds of the
municipality shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommendation of the chief of office, so
that, as the clerk of court of the justice of the peace is paid out of the general funds of the
municipality the power to appoint the said clerk should be lodged in the mayor as with all other
subordinate officials of the municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a specific provision or Section 75 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296) has been
repealed by a general law or Rep. Act No. 1551.
HELD:
No. Pursuant to the separation of powers among the three departments of the government, what
Rep. Act No. 1551 intended to be made subject to appointment by the municipal mayor are
subordinate officials in the municipality, like employees in the executive branch and employees
in the municipal council or board. The court further stated
that when the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the
provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the
passage of such general law does not operate to modify or repeal the special law, either wholly or
in part, unless such modification or repeal is provided for in express words, or arises by
necessary implication (Black on Interpretation of Laws).
Decision affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Garcia v. Pascual, et al.
Case No. 110
G.R. No. L-16950 (December 22, 1961)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 118
FACTS:
Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligible, was appointed by the Justice of
Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers were
submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1551
has repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act.
Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of
court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective
justices. RA 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296
provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the
municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551.
HELD:
The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the
Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law
that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. Also, there
being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of
court, the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor.
Lastly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of
the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics.
LATIN MAXIM:
6b, 9a, 32, 36d, 50, b2
Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan 16 SCRA 755
Citation: GR L-21516 (16 SCRA 755) 29 April 1966
Short Title: Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on leave
Facts:
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise (RA. 399, 18 June 1949), for an
electric light, heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms
and conditions established in Act 3636, as amended by CA 132 and the Constitution. It was also
issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18
March 1954. On 1 October 1950, Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or receipts tax of
any business operated in the city. This ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14 December
1950), by enumerating the kinds of businesses required to pay the tax. It was further amended by
Ordinance 131 (16 May 1961) by modifying the penal provision, and further by Ordinance 148,
approved on 11 June 1962 by including within the coverage of taxable businesses “those
engaged in the business of electric light, heat and power (sic).” On 13 April 1960, Ordinance 104
was enacted, making it unlawful for any person or firm to cut or disconnect the electrical
connection of any consumer in the city of Butuan without his consent.
The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152;
Petition for declaratory relief), the court declared Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and 148 of the City of
Butuan unconstitutional and ultra vires, as far as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or
receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power of Butuan Sawmill. The court also
annulled Ordinance 104 for being unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive.
Hence, the direct appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision with costs against appellant City of
Butuan.
1. Taxation of franchise beyond city’s taxation power.
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of
Butuan Sawmill (see Section 2, Act 2264). The inclusion of the franchised business of the
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the city of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing
ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power
therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise,
since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power. It must be noted that
the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18 June 1949 while the city’s charter was
approved on 15 June 1950.
2. Earlier special over the latter general
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general
broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and
the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular
case.(State v. Stoll; Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty).
3. Construction must consider other provisions of the same act; and its effects
Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264) specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on
persons paying franchise tax. Further, the city’s interpretation of the provision would result in
double taxation against the business of the franchisee because the internal revenue code already
imposes a franchise tax. The logical construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264, that would not
nullify section 2 (j) of the same Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and
power utilities that are not subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes
additional taxation by cities or municipalities.
4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police power
The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to
any consumer’s building with the power plant, without the consent of the consumer, except in
case of fire, clear and positive danger to residents, or order of the authorities, is an unwarranted
exercise of power for the general welfare The ordinance compels the electric company to keep
supplying electric current to a company even if the latter does not pay the bills thereof, and to
that extent deprives the company of its property without due process. How the general welfare
would be promoted under the ordinance has neither been explained nor justified. The general
welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of the complaining consumers against the
franchise holder, because the legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction, supervision and
control over public services and their franchises in the Public Service Commission, and not in the
City of Butuan.
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan
Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966)
FACTS:
The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric
light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with the
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service
Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and
148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the
city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is
deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner
of property without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained
that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for
general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950.
ISSUE:
W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the
coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation.
HELD:
No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter.
Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated
to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the absence of an express or
specific grant of power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special
and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining
exception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a
particular case.
LATIN MAXIM:
25, 50, d
TITLE: Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan, 16 SCRA 755, G.R. No. L-21516, April 29, 1966
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan declaring Ordinance
Nos. 7, 11, 131, and 148 as unconstitutional and ultra vires and annulling Ordinance No. 104 as
unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive.
The City of Butuan claims that the franchise of Butuan Sawmill is subject to 2% tax on the gross
sales or receipts of the business of electric light , heat and power system as empowered and
authorized by the city’s Charter (RA 523 approved on June 15, 1950) and the Local Autonomy
Act (RA 2264 approved on June 19,1959). Considering that Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a
legislative franchise by virtue of RA 399 approved on June 18, 1949 for an electric light, heat
and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions under
Act 3636, as amended by Commonwealth Act 132 and the Constitution; it, on the other hand,
disputes the constitutionality of the taxing ordinances and maintains that the said ordinances are
ultra vires and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Butuan has the authority to impose the 2% tax on the gross sales or
receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power system.
HELD:
No. The inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan
within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the city’s taxing power under
its charter nor an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise since the charter
did not expressly or specifically provide any such power. The Local Autonomy Act did not
authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business citing Sec.2, par.(j) of said act that
withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax like Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. The court further noted that
“where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general – the terms of the general
broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special……. the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as
the law of a particular case.”

City of Manila v. Teotico 22 SCRA 267
Citation: G.R. No. L-23052 (22 SCRA 267) 29 January 1968
Short Title: City of Manila v. Teotico and CA
Long Title: City of Manila v. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries.
Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal,
CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue:
WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Held:
Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision."
TITLE: City of Manila vs Teotico, 22 SCRA 267 G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the City of Manila from a decision of the Court of Appeals. On January
27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m.,
Genaro N. Teotico, who was about to board a jeepney, fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. He suffered injuries: head hit the rim of the
manhole breaking his eyeglass and causing broken pieces to pierce his left eyelid, contusions on
the left thigh, the left upper arm, right leg and upper lip, abrasion on the right infra-patella
region, and allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the
hospital. As a consequence, he filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint /
claim for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer, and chief of police. In defense, the City of Manila presented evidence to prove that
they immediately act on reports of loss catch basin cover and diligently perform their duty to
install, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila. The Court of First Instance of
Manila sustained the defendants’ theory and dismissed complaint without costs. Plaintiff Teotico
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed except in so far as the City of
Manila to pay P6,750.00 for damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act 409 should prevail over Article 2189 of the Civil Code considering
that it is a special law intended for the City of Manila
HELD:
Not intended as a basis of the present action. Section 2 of RA 409 establishes a general rule
regulating liability of the City of Manila for the damages or injury to persons or property arising
from negligence in general while Article 2189 of the Civil Code includes a particular
prescription due to defective streets in particular. Thus, Article 2189 is decisive thereon
considering that the present action is based on the alleged defective condition of the street.
Decision affirmed with costs against the City of Manila.
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATIONS: Remedial, Penal or Curative

Castro v. Sagales 94 Phil 208
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATION: Public or Private
Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Tañada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a a writ of mandamus, invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern, to compel the respondent public officials to cause the publication of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letters of implementations, and administrative order. Respondent further contend that the
publication in Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law
because law themselves provides their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE:
W/N the publication in Official Gazette is required before any law or statute takes effect
HELD:
Yes. The publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative or executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concern. On the other hand, presidential issuances of general
applicability which have not been published shall have no force & effect.
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATION: Public or Private
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
(Check this)
Tanada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non
excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the
court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette
immediately.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATION: Prospective or Retroactive

Laceste v. Santos 56 Phil 472
Citation: G.R. No. 36886 (56Phil 472) 1 February 1932
Short Title: Laceste v. Santos
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Clemente Laceste and Nicolas Lachica were found guilty for the crime of rape against
Magdalena de Ocampo. Lachica married the victim and was accordingly released from the
criminal prosecution by virtue of Section 2 Art. No. 1773 and Art. 448 of the Penal Code then in
force which provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability.
However, under the Revise Penal Code, Laceste is now also entitled (RPC took effect
January 1, 1932) to the benefits accruing from such marriage in accordance to the last paragraph
of Article 344 of the RPC which provides:
“In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of
the offender with the offended party shall extinguish criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes.”
Issue:
Whether or not Article 344 of the RPC shall be applied retroactively in the case at bar.
Held:
Article 344 shall be applied retroactively. The case at bar is an exemption to the general
rule that laws are prospective, not retrospective (lex prospicit, non respicit). The situation in the
case favors the accused therefore article 22 of the RPC shall apply. Article 22 provides that:
“Penal laws shall have a retrospective effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.”
Laceste v. Santos
Case No. 140
G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932)
Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No. 1
FACTS:
Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect
before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena
de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner
continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty
through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for
continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the
RPC.
ISSUE:
W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.
HELD:
Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to
the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be
retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and
good law justify this exception.
LATIN MAXIM:
48
Laceste v. Santos
G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932)
Facts:
Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect before the
effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was
accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence
but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that
there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last
sentence of Art. 344 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.
HELD:
Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to the accused in
certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in
question favors the accused applies. Conscience and good law justify this exception.
Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATION: Prospective or Retroactive
Camacho v. CIR 80 Phil 848
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Parts of a law – Title
City of Baguio v. Marcos 27 SCRA 342
Citation: G.R. No. L-26100 (27 SCRA 342) 28 February 1969
Short Title: City of Baguio v. Marcos
Long Title: City of Baguio, ET AL. v. PIO R. MARCOS, ET AL.
Ponente: Sanchez, J.
Facts:
On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
instituted the reopening of cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil
Case No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the land involved (Baguio
Townsite) was among those declared public lands.
On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He
claims that the land (Baguio Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.) he and
his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times 2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file their claim to the land
in question.
On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J.
Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their contentions
are as follows: 1.) The reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by
R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published 3.) as lessees of the land, they have a
standing to appear in the reopening proceedings.
Issue/s:
Statcon issue here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period
provided by R.A. 931 (enacted June 20, 1953). Joaquin’s group contests that the title of the
said act is in conflict with section 1 of the same act, thus invalidating the petition of Lutes to
reopen the civil case.
Title of the act reads:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 of the act provides:
SECTION 1. …in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted…
Held:
The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year
period imposed by the act.
Joaquin’s group believes that the difference between the title (BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED and in section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is
material. If the title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922 should be the date used in
reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year period; counted from the date of the
enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title are to be
followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date the Director of lands instituted the reopening
of the case, would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the 40-year period.
The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally (see
page 12 of statcon book). The spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should
prevail over its letter. In this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives an opportunity to any person who has
any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land to present his claim
within the time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent provides a mode
of relief to landowners who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the
court cannot see an inconsistency between the title and its section.
The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very substance of the law
itself. The constitutional jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title,
breathes the spirit of command because the constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on which was
rendered on Nov. 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
TITLE: City of Baguio vs Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 G.R. No. L-33628, February 28, 1969
FACTS:
This is a petition to oppose reopening of cadastral proceedings under RA 931,

An Act o Authorize the Filing in the Proper Court, Under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims
of Title to Parcels of Land That Have Been Declared Public Land, By Virtue of Judicial
Decisions Rendered Within the Forty Years Next Preceding The Approval of This Act
. On July 25, 1961,Belong Lutes, respondent, petitioned the cadastral court to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1as to the parcel of land he claims on the following grounds: ( 1 ) He and
his predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse , peaceful and continuous possession and
cultivation of the land since Spanish times or before July 26, 1894 and paying taxes then and; (2)
his predecessors were illiterate Igorots without knowledge on cadastral proceedings, thus, not
able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Joaquin and Buchholz, who are tree farm lessees,
registered opposition to the reopening. On May 5, 1962, City of Baguio likewise opposed
reopening. Cadastral court denied private petitioners’ right to intervene in the case because of a
final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 which declared such tree farm lessees
were null and void. Private petitioners then filed for reconsideration and averred that said
declaratory relief judgment did not bind them for they were not parties to that action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings.
HELD:
When engaged in the task of construing, an obscure expression in the law or where exact or
literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, the title maybe resorted
to in the determination of legislative intent or congressional will. The title of the law serves as an
index of or clue or guide to legislative intention.
Petition for certiorari granted; the cadastral court’s orders dated August 5, 1963, November 5,
1963, and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby
directed to admit petitioners’ oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs.
CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN,

SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ v. HON. PIO R.
MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, BELONG LUTES, and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-26100, February 28, 1969
SANCHEZ, J.:
Facts:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen the cadastral proceedings
under Republic Act 931 was attacked on the grounds of: (1) the reopening petition was filed
outside the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was
not published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court
standing under Republic Act 931. To cite a background information on the third claim, the
cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision
was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July25, 1961
.
Issue:
WON the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of
respondent Lutes?
Held:
Given that there is a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body of R.A. 931, there is a
need to determine legislative intent of the said law. When an obscure expression in the law or
where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, the title
thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will.
Since from the title, there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction, a liberal view
should be adopted. With these, the interpretation of the law proves that claims of title under
R.A.931 may be filed there under embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public
land and therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to
reopen the cadastral proceedings come within the 40-year period and is within the power of the
cadastral court.

Central Capiz v. Ramirez 40 Phil 883
Citation: G.R. No. 16197. March 12, 1920
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
CENTRAL CAPIZ VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS
The respondent, Ana Ramirez, contracted with the petitioner, Central Capiz, to supply the latter
with sugar cane. The said contract was to be converted into a right in rem, recorded in the
Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the
same. However, the respondent refused to continue with her contract obligations in the view that
it violates Act No. 2874, “An Act To Amend And Compile the Laws Relating to Lands Of
The Public Domain, And For Other Purposes.” Both parties concede that the land involved is a
private agricultural land and raises the question whether such land is within the scope of Act No.
2874.
ISSUE
Whether or not the private agricultural land of the respondent is within the scope of Act No.
2874.
HELD
No, The purpose of the Legislature in enacting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to
lands of public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. The little of the Act is indicative of such
legislative intent. The phrase “and for other purposes” contained in the title of the Act must be
discarded and treated as non-existent, without force and effect, as it violates the single subject
requirement.
Central Capiz v. Ramirez

Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)
FACTS:
Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30
years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No.
2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain,
and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.
ISSUE:
W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.
HELD:
The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to
limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership
are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby.
Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
LATIN MAXIM:
d
TITLE: Central Capiz vs Ramirez, 40 Phil 883 G.R. No. L-16197,March 12, 1920
FACTS:
This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation
and application of the intent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature,
known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects agricultural lands, privately owned. The
petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, Ramirez contracted with
the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in rem and
recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all
future owners of the same. However, Act No 2874 became effective in the execution of said
contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's property. The respondent,
while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto,
bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the
petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States. It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that
is, land which is held and owned by the respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which
are privately owned.
HELD:
In construing the act, the California State Constitution provides, “Every Act shall embrace but
one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any subject shall be embraced in an act
which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall
not be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said ”… that the
purpose of the act was the creation of a primary election law and "other purposes. Under the
cloak of "other purposes," all and every conceivable kind of legislation could hide and thrive in
the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision be set at naught… when these words
"for other purposes" are found in the title of an act of the state legislature they accomplish
nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to them…. These matters of legislation, not
being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the ground.”
Having demonstrated that said Act No 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there
being no objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any
finding as to costs.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito 156 SCRA 803
Citation: G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO
FACTS
The petitioner, Bienvenido Ebarle, is the then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a
candidate for election for the same position. He has been charged for the violation of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. RA No. 3019, and various provisions of
the Revised Penal Code by the herein respondents. The petitioner claims on his defense that the
respondents failed to comply with the provisions of EO N.O. 264, “Outlining the Procedure by
Which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with Commission of
Irregularities Should Be Guided”, prior to their criminal recourses.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of EO No. 264 are applicable to the respondents.
HELD
No, EO No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The title
speaks of “commission of irregularities”. There is no mention, not even by implication, of
criminal offenses, that is to say, crimes. Even though crimes amount to irregularities, the
aforesaid Order could have very well referred to the more specific term, had it intended to make
itself applicable thereto.
TITLE: Ebarle vs Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803 G.R. No. L-33628, December 29, 1987
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by Ebarle, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a
candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971. He also sought injunctive relief in two
separate petitions to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases filed in Pagadian City and
Fiscal’s office as well for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act(RA 3019) and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code as commenced by the Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines. On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, Supreme Court issued
temporary restraining order (TRO) that respondents to desist from further proceedings. Anti-
Graft League moved to have it lifted and the case itself dismissed. Petitioner submits that the
prosecutions in question are politically motivated as he being a candidate for reelection as
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and citing provisions of EO 264 Outlining the Procedure by
which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with Commission of
Irregularities Should Be Guided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative and not
criminal complaints.
HELD:
The title of the Order speaks of “COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES”. There is no mention

of criminal offenses or of the word “crimes.” Had the Order intended to make it applicable
thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific term. It is not the business of the SC to
resolve complaints as it is not in a position to decide on the case. Disposition of the case belongs
to another agency.
Petitions are dismissed. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against the petitioners.
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Parts of a law – Preamble

People v. Echavez 95 SCRA 663
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Parts of a law – Context
Aboitiz v. City of Cebu 13 SCRA 449
Citation: G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
ABOITIZ VS. CITY OF CEBU

FACTS
The petitioner’s vessels docked at the public wharves of piers located in the City of Cebu, the
respondent. They were asked to pay wharf age charges, pursuant to Ordinance No. 207
implemented by the said city. The petitioners filed an action to have the Ordinance declared the
void to refund the amount collected, as the wharves, docks and other landing places, where the
vessels are situated, belong to the National Government. However, the respondent contends that
the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National
Government. As such, both fall within the scope of the power granted under Section 17 of the
city’s charter, which states that the Municipal Board shall have the power to fix the charges to be
paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.
ISSUE
Whether or not the content of Section 17 of the City of Cebu’s charter provides that it has the
power to fix wharf age charges against the petitioners.
HELD
No. When the lawmaking body used the term public wharves, etc, “in the context of Section 17,
it meant to refer to those owned by the City of Cebu. The power granted to the City of Cebu
under, Section 17 is limited to those belonging to the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the
National government.
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965)
FACTS:
The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of
Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light
of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge
wharfage.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
HELD:
The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The
Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are
owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only
those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 25a, 36b

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461
Citation: (79 SCRA 461) 15 November 1947 G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947
Short Title: Krivenko v. Registry of Deeds of Manila
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Alexander A. Krivenko, a foreigner, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate,
Inc. in December 1941, but the registration was interrupted due to war (Second World War). In
May 1945, he tried to accomplish the registration of the aforementioned residential lot but then
he was denied by the Registry of Deeds of Manila because he was not a Filipino citizen.
The constitutional provision in question is Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution
(1935) which provides; “Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated. And with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to
Filipino citizens.”
Krivenko contends that the land he bought is not covered by the said constitutional
provision because it was a private residential land and not a public agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not an alien, under our Constitution, may acquire residential land.
Held:
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution (1935) provides; “save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.”
It is a rule in statutory construction that a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. The only
difference between “agricultural land” under Section 1 and “agricultural land’ under section 5, is
that the former is public and the latter is private. But such difference refers to the ownership and
not the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections and for the conservation of national
patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless whether it is owned
by the State or by its citizens.
Additional Note:
In determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Therefore,
most residential lands are also considered as agricultural lands.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Case No. 139
G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947)
Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60
FACTS:
Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted
by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which
ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.
ISSUE:
W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
HELD:
Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be presumed that what the
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration
that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the Constitution,
only agricultural lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given by the
Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of
“public agricultural lands”.
It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that
“residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”. If the term "private agricultural
lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales 205 SCRA 184
Citation: (205 SCRA 184) G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992
Short Title: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc

Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for the 1st quarter
of 1981 and consequently paying an income tax on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent
quarters, TMX Sales suffered losses so that when it filed its annual ITR for the year ended
December 31, 1981, it declared net loss amounting to P6,156,525.00. Thereafter, TMX filed with
the Appellate Division of BIR a claim to refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing
overpaid income tax. This was not acted upon by the Commissioner of BIR, so, TMX filed for
review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) against Commissioner of BIR to pay the said
overpaid income tax. Commissioner of BIR averred that the petitioner4 is barred from claiming
considering that more than two years had already elapsed between the payments. Consequently,
CTA granted the petition of TMX and ordering the Commissioner of BIR to refund the amount
claimed. Thus, petitioner Commissioner of BIR seeks for the reversal of CTA decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously
collected tax provided for in Section 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to
run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final
Adjustment Return.
Held:
The filing of a quarterly income tax return required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and
implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be
considered mere installments of the annual tax due. Consequently, the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the date of filing the
Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax. Thus, TMX
Sales, Inc. suit for a refund on March 14, 1984 is not yet barred by prescription. Petition denied.
Decision affirmed.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

Case No. 80
G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992)
FACTS:
Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in
the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two
years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period
and not the quarterly payment made.
ISSUE:
W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax
was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment).
HELD:
The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme
Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid
an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.”
LATIN MAXIM:
11a, 36b, 36d
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Punctuation Marks

Florentino v. PNB 98 Phil 959
Citation: (98 Phil 959) 28 April 1956 G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956
Short Title: Florentino and Zandueta v. PNB

Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
On December 27, 1953, Marcelino Florentino and Lourdes Zandueta offered to pay their
loan with PNB through a back pay certificate, but PNB refused to accept the back pay certificate
as payment for their loan.
The legal provision involved in this case is Section 2 of RA 897 which provides that back
pay certificates may be used to pay “obligations subsisting at the time of approval of this
amendatory Act for which the applicant may be directly liable to the Government or to any of its
branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the Government, or to
any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.
Issue:
Whether the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement” refers to
ALL antecedents (the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, corporations owned
or controlled by the Government) or only to the last antecedent (any citizen of the Philippines, or
any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines).
Held:
It should be noted that there is a comma before the words “or to any citizen of the
Philippines” which would separate the phrase from the preceding ones. Therefore, the “who may
be willing...” clause only refers to the last antecedent.

People v. Subido 66 SCRA 545
Citation: 1975 (66 SCRA 545) G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975
Short Title: People v. Subido

Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Appellant Abelardo Subido was found guilty of libel of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The lower court’s decision reads;
“ From the facts above stated, the court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is
hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the accessory
penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify
the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand
(10,000.00) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the
costs.”
Appellant has taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said judgment
striking out the penalty of arresto mayor and lowering the indemnity from P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.
Appellant contends that the lower court required the subsidiary imprisonment only in
case when he will not be able to pay the indemnity and not the failure to pay the fine.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court’s decision intended subsidiary imprisonment to apply
only to failure to pay indemnity and not the fine.
Held:
No. A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause “with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” is separated by a comma (,) from the preceding
clause”is hereby sentenced to three months arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the
law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand (10,000.00) pesos.” The use of a comma (,) in the
part of the sentence is to make “the subsidiary in case of insolvency” refer not only to non-
payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.
Note:
Article 39 of RPC as amended due to retroactive effect exempt subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency to pay indemnity. Therefore, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
to pay the fine is applicable in the case at bar.
US v. Hart 26 Phil 149
Citation: G.R. No. L-8848 (26 Phil 149) 21 November 1913
Short Title: US v. Hart
Long Title: THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff- appellee, v. WILLIAM C. HART, C. J.
MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD, defendants-appellants
Ponente:
Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy
under the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that
each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to
support themselves. However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that in
Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase “no visible means of support” only applies to the clause
“tramping or straying through the country” and not the first clause which states that “every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” thus making the 3
appellants guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for “without visible means
of support” to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would
have been omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.
Issue:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-
General’s argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.
Held:
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect intended by t
he Legislature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the
meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain,
if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will
give it effect. Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing from such a construction of the
law is also helpful in determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that the argument
of the Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of the
legislature of the various classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the
defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual,
Hart, Miller and Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Topic: US v. WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD,

G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913
Trent, J.:
Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under the
provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of the
defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to support
themselves. However, the Attorneysible me-General defended his clients by arguing that in
Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase “no vi ans of support” only applies to the clause “tramping
or straying through the country” and not the first clause which states that “every person found
loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” thus making the 3 appellants guilty
of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for “without visible means of support” to
qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.
Issue:
WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-General’s argument
based on a mere grammatical criticism.
Held:
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect intended by the
Legislature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the
meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give
it effect. Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing from such a construction of the law is
also helpful in determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that the argument of the
Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of
the various classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the defendants were
earning a living by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and
Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de oficio
US. v. Hart
Case No. 159
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
FACTS:
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act
No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means
of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the
country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other
Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase
“without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said
portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.
ISSUE:
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD:
The construction of a statute should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the
effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had,
“visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the
conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants
are acquitted.
LATIN MAXIM:
11e, 33
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Words and phrases

Colgate Palmolive Philippines v. Pedro Jimenez G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Case No. 67
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
household remedies. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is
among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:
“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors …
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.”
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax
ISSUE:
W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17%
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.
HELD:
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely:
food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The “stabilizers and
flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and
therefore not subject to exemption
Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers and
flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following
which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate,
cattle, and industrial starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.
LATIN MAXIM:
26, 29, 36
Fule v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-79094 June 22 1988
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Fule v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37
FACTS:
Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22,
the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence
and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming
the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the
Appellate Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation
of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
HELD:
The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, “No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”.
Because of the word “shall”, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is
mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
LATIN MAXIM:
9d

Paras v. Comelec G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Paras v. COMELEC
Case No. 196
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday
of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to
include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Headnotes or epigraphs

People v. Yabut 58 Phil 499 (1933)
Citation: 1933 (58 Phil 499)
Short Title: People v. Yabut
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
On August 1, 1932, appellant Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the
Bilibid Prison, hit Sabas Arceo, also a prisoner in the Bilibid Prison, with a wooden club
inflicting upon various physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the latter’s
death after 24 hours. At the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a recidivist,
he having been previously convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical
injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by a competent tribunal. The Court of First
Instance of manila, in punishing the appellant, applied article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
which states that:
“Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another

previous offense –Penalty—Besides the provision of Rule 5 of Article 62 any
person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony.
The appellant advances that the lower court erred in applying Article 160 of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “another” in the epigraph of Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code applies only in cases where the new crime is different in character from the former crime
for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
Held:
No. It is a familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or
epigraphs of a section for the interpretation of the text especially where such epigraphs or
headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the
text that follows.
Recidivist – is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC.
Habitual delinquent – when a person within a period of ten years from the date of release, or last
conviction, is found guilty of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft,
estafa, or falsification a third time or oftener.
Quasi-recidivist – any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same shall be punished
with the maximum period of punishment prescribed by law for the new felony.
1
People of the Philippines v. Yabut

Case No. 231
G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993)
FACTS:
Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
HELD:
No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is
not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Headnotes or epigraphs

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010
Citation: GR No. 191002, 17 March 2010
Short Title: De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution
prohibiting the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should
appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates
should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to compel the
submission of JBC’s nominees to the president?
This issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot
of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We limit our discussion
with GR 191002 for brevity.
Issues:
Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar Council has until
May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of the public
who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The question raised before the court is
in fact of transcendental importance. The court dispels all doubt to remove any obstacle or
obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented. Standing is a peculiar
concept to constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Intent and Policy
Roa v. Collector of Customs 23 Phil 315
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
US v. Go Chico 14 Phil 128
Citation: 1909 (14 Phil 128)
Short Title: United States v. Go Chico
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
On August 4, 1908, in the City of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of his
stores a number of medallions in the form of small button imprinted with the picture of Emilio
Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used in the late insurrection in the Philippine Island
to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. The appellant
being ignorant of the law against the display of medallions was arrested but played for acquittal
based upon two (20 propositions:
1. That before the conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the
part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of identical banners,
devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those armed
rebellion against the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not criminal intent is a requisite of conviction in violation of Section 1 of Act
No. 1696 of the Philippine.
Held:
No. It is a mistake, a notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law as an
essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and where there is an absence of such intent, there
is no offense. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person,
the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to
the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is
not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299
G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909)
Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49
FACTS:
Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag
Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button,
upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo,
and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the
Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and
consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the
ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was
referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc.
ISSUE:
1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with
criminal intent.
2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the
Defendant.
HELD:
1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law.
2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of
the class of articles referred to by the law.
Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal
intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to
hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution
impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear
so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid
defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag,
but to a type of flag.
LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

Regalado v. Yulo 61 Phil 173
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935)
FACTS:
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A
few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by
Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of
Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office.
ISSUE:
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further
amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed
prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of
65.
HELD:
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by
said amendment (Act No. 3899).
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 46a

Eugenio v. Drilon 252 SCRA 106
Citation: G.R. No. 109404 (252 SCRA 106) 22 January 1996
Short Title: Eugenio v. Drilon
Long Title: FLORENCIO EUGENIO, petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FRANKLIN M.DRILON, et al, respondents
Ponente: Panganiban, J
Facts:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private
respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the
property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered
under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to
him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development,
reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the
payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the
Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and
that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided
P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
Held:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D.
957 is to give retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its
enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provided for retroactivity in its entirety, but such
can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the
law.”
Held:
The petition is DENIED and DISMISSED.
Eugenio v. drillon
Facts:
On May 10, 1972, Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment basis from Florencio
Eugenio and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in
Quezon City. The Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc. complained to the National
Housing Authority for non-development of their subdivision and the NHA rendere...d a
resolution on January 17, 1979 ordering Florencio Eugenio to cease and desist from making
furthur sales of lots in said village or any project owned by him. Prospero Palmiano filed a
complaint case against against Eugenio because, Eugenio sold a lot to the spouses, Rodolfo and
Adelina Relevo. Palmiano alleged that he suspended his payments because of the failure to
develop the village.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of Eugenio to
cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed Palmiano's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying
P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio to complete the subdivision development and to reinstatem
Palmiano's purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other. The Executive Secretary Franklin
Drilon, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. Eugenio filed a Petition
for review before the Supreme Court.
In his Petition before this Court, Eugenio avers that the Executive Secretary erred in
applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village
justified Palmiano’s non-payment of his amortizations. Eugenio avers that inasmuch as the land
purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said
law cannot govern the transaction.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition of the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion and
that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior
to its enactment in 1976.
Held:
The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D.
957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its
enactment in 1976.
Stat Con relation.

The relation is that the statute was enacted to protect small lot owners from abuses of
subdivision and developers. The principle of social justice was adhered by giving the law
retroactivity effect.
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USEREGULATORY
BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO G.R. No. 109404, January 22, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Prospero Palmiano on installment basis from Eugenio, the petitioner, and his co-owner/developer
Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. He started to default on
amortization payments beginning May 1975 due to the petitioner’s non-development of the said
lots. Further, the petitioner sold one of the two lots to Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo upon
Palmiano’s cease of payment.
Eugenio then filed a petition to set aside the decision of the respondent which affirmed the order
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to “immediately refund to the complainant-
appellant Prospero Palmiano all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates
from date of receipt hereof until fully paid." Petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in
applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village
justified private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Further, the petitioner avers that
inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.
Issue:
WON Executive Secretary Drilon showed a grave abuse in discretion when he applied P.D. 957
and concluded that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private respondent's
non-payment of his amortizations.
Held:
The respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given
retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in1976 given
that the intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Moreover, the preamble of the law clearly
expresses that the law’s intent is to protect helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers,
"suggesting that to remedy the said alarming situations, P.D. 957 should operate retrospectively
even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment.
Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses
Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner
claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been
given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment
of the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide
for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”
LATIN MAXIM:
9a

Gajuiat v. Mathay 124 SCRA 710
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Tinio v. Francisco 98 Phil 32
Citation: G.R. No. L-7747 (98 Phil 32) 29 November 1955
Short Title: Tinio v. Frances
Long Title: NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, v. GREGORIO FRANCES,
ET AL., defendants and appellees
Ponente: Labrador, J.
Facts:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In
1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor, but
because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947,
the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their
favor. In 1953, the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead
and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the
parcel of land was valid.
Held:
NO. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply
with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of Lands is
satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his
homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus, the conveyance made by
the heirs of Nicolas was null and void.
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)

Facts:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs,
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
Issue:
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of
land was valid.
Held:
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was
null and void.
Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs,
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of
land was valid.
HELD:
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was
null and void.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Explanatory Notes and Legislative Debates

People v. Lidres 108 Phil 995
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Explanatory Notes and Legislative Debates
De Villa v. Court of Appeals 195 SCRA 722
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a
dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
ISSUE:
W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.
HELD:
The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was
committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s
allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to
apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Legislative history and prior laws on which the statute is
based
Filipinas Assurance v. Court of Tax Appeals 21 SCRA 622
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Legislative history and prior laws on which the statute is
based
Salaysay v. Castro 98 Phil 364
Citation: G.R.No.L-9669 (98 Phil 364) 31 January 1956
Short Title: Salaysay v. Castro
Long Title: Nicanor Salaysay, Petitioner, v. Hon.Fred Ruiz Castro et al., Respondent
Ponente:
Facts:
Hon. Engracio Santos and herein petitioner Nicanor Salaysay is the mayor and vice-
mayor, respectively, of San Jose Del Monte, Rizal. On the month of September 1955, the former
was temporarily suspended, thus, herein petitioner and then vice-mayor was set to act as mayor
by virtue of Section 2195 of the revised administrative code. On the same month, the latter filed
for a certificate of candidacy to run for mayor of San Jose Del Monte, Rizal.
Consequently, by virtue of Section 27 of the revised election code, the petitioner's filing
of candidacy for mayor effectuated his automatic resignation as vice-mayor, thus, stripping him
of his duty to act as mayor in the temporary suspension of the mayor, since aforementioned duty
was part to his obligations as vice-mayor.
Due to the preceding circumstance, the office of the president appointed Braulio Sto.
Domingo as acting vice-mayor of San Jose Del Monte, Rizal on September 12, 1955. Since Sto.
Domingo was appointed as acting vice-mayor during the pendency of the mayor's suspension
and with the petitioner's automatic cessation to continue as vice-mayor acting as mayor due to
his filing of candidacy for a position different from that which he was officially elected to hold in
office, he was advised to turn-over the office of the Mayor to acting vice-mayor Sto. Domingo.
The petitioner refused to turn over the office of the mayor and contended that Section
27of the revised election code did not apply to him for which he believed that he was actually
holding office as the mayor, hence, his candidacy running for mayor was not a different from the
position he currently holds.
Issue:
WON Section 27 of the revised election code applies to herein petitioner.
Held:
The SC rules in favor of the respondent. The Supreme Court, lacking jurisprudence to
guide them in the case at bar, looked into the history and origin of Section 27 of the revised rules
of court which was Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act No. 666 which allowed elected
provincial, municipal or city official running for the same office continue in the same office until
the expiration of his term. The lawmakers intended for the continuity of the official's office once
he was to be re-elected to avoid breaking his previous term in the event that he may be re-elected
for the same office. This provision was later on amended, from, to wit:
"Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office other than the one for
which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his once from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
Amending the phrase emphasized in the above mentioned provision to, to wit:
"xxx for which he is actually holding xxx"
Wherein the petitioner holds his contention from the literal interpretation of such
amended portion of the provision of origin.
The court interpreted the meaning of actually holding office to include, not only those
elected, but also those appointed in office, as this was the controversy lying on Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 666 when former President Osmeña mainly had local officials seated as
the latter's appointees and not duly elected, thus, in applying Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 666 sans amendment, the appointees are deprived of the right to continue their term in office
even if they run for the same position.
Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Presumptions and implications
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 125 SCRA 220
Citation: (123 SCRA 220) 26 October 1983
Short Title: Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes
Long Title: Heirs of Ardona v. Hon. Reyes (CFI of Cebu) and Phil. Tourism Authority
Ponente:
FACTS:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu for the
expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land for the development into integrated resort complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct
a sports complex, clubhouse, playground and picnic area on said land. An electric power grid
will also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary
support facilities (malls, coffee shops) will also be created. The defendants alleged that the
taking is not impressed with public use under the Constitution, that the land was covered by the
land reform program and therefore the Court of Agrarian Reform and not the CFI of Cebu has
jurisdiction over the case, and that the expropriation would impair the obligations and contracts.
Nonetheless, upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, CFI
authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public use requirement for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been complied with.
HELD:
Yes. There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. Sec 2-Article IV states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Section 6- Article XIV allows the State- in the interest
of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13-
Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to deserving citizens.
The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purpose for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means “use by the public” has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into
play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and
that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
Also, the contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of police power and
likewise eminent domain.
Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
City of Manila v. Gomez 107 SCRA 98
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines

Case No. 23
G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
FACTS:
The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual
realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447),
which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax
and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit
set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125,
effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half
percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the
Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void
as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila
should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax.
ISSUE:
W/N the tax ordinance is valid.
HELD:
The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction
sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax
is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. While the 1949
Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969
Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed
by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax
that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property
Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was
also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49
Chua v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
Citation: G.R. No. 88979, 7 February 1992
Short Title: Lydia O. Chua v. The Civil Service Commission
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2
December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of
government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization.
Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered
service minimum of two years.
Sec. 2. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as
well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
PCINP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority
(NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects.
Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application
on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however,
denied the same.
She was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for
every year of service commencing from 1980.
a) coterminous with the project— When the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds
for the same.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a
coterminous employee.
Held:
It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and
emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they
complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that
note, the court believes that the denial of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits by
the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to
the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which
is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental
projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 60
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who
are qualified:
Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation…”
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent
Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the
benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain
Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.
The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
1
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Verba legis non est recedendum

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong 132 SCRA 663
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
IBAA EMPLOYEES UNION VS. INCIONG

FACTS
On June 20, 1975, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of
holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, NLRC in Manila. Conciliation having failed,
the case was certified for arbitration and later on a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter
granting petitioner’s complaint. Respondent bank complied by paying the holiday pay to and
including January 1976. On December 1975, PD 850was promulgated amending the provisions
of the Labor Code with the controversial section stating that monthly paid employees receiving
uniform monthly pay is presumed to be already paid the “10 paid legal holidays”. Policy
instruction 9 was issued thereafter interpreting the said rule. Respondents bank stopped the
payment by reason of the promulgated PD 850 and Policy Instruction 9.
ISSUE
Whether or not monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefit of holiday pay.
HELD
No. It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is
clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the
provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and
explicit- it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy
Instruction 9, the then Secretary of Labor categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid
their regular holiday pay. While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a
statue by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the
courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong

Case No. 62
G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)
FACTS:
Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia
and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and
IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of
DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s
decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then
appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a motion
for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent
considering that it has become final and had been partially executed.
2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid.
HELD:
A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked
after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by
paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment
as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they
amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 17, 37, 40c

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople 138 SCRA 273
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Ala Mode Garments v. NLRC 268 SCRA 497
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC

Case No. 7
G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997)
Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53
FACTS:
Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line
leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line leaders
did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to
enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit written explanations
as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their
explanation letters.
Despite their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and
were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real
reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But
other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5
and 6, l993.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their
work constitutes dismissal from the service?
2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a
period not exceeding three 3 years?
HELD:
Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally
dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new
doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the
company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees
elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in
awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Ratio legis est anima legis
Paras v. Comelec G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Paras v. COMELEC
Case No. 196
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday
of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to
include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Mens legislatoris

Prasnik v. Republic 98 Phil 665
Citation: (98 Phil 665) 1956
Short Title: People v. Republic
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
After his marriage to Catherine Prasnik was dissolved by a divorce decree in the U.S.,
Leopoldo Prasnik and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Out of this relation, four (4) children was born. These children were recognized natural
children of petitioner. Prasnik filed with the court of First Instance of Rizal a petition to adopt
these four children.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition for the adoption invoking article 338 (1) of the
Civil Code which provides:
“Article 338. The following may be adopted:
(1) The natural child, by the natural father or mother xxxxx”
The Solicitor General argues that this article refers only to those who has not been acknowledged
natural child.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 338 (1) refers only to acknowledged natural children.
Held:
No. The law evidently intends to allow adoption of a natural child whether the child is
recognized or not, if the intention were to allow adoption of unrecognized children, then said
article would be of no useful purpose because such children would have been validly adopted
even without the provision. This is because an unacknowledged natural child has no right
whatsoever and being considered as a total stranger to his parents, may be adopted under Article
337.
It should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the greater advantage of the latter if he be
given, through legal action, a legitimate status.
This view is in keeping with modern trend that considers adoption as an act not merely
establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate
status.
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 125
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz
Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this
stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his
father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It
maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or
mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for
it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children
of the father or mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would
be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the
illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it comes to
adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the
adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural
child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following
the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Mens legislatoris

Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284
Citation: GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA 284)
Short Title: Matabuena v. Cervantes
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts:
On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law
relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September
1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,
questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during
a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the
donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
Held:
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2)
declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate
disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law relationship
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during
the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is
contrary to public policy (JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law;
‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to]
the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection
for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the
law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in
his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains
the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached
to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. Spirit of the law
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must
be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. “El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la
luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'’ It is a principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is
written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
3. Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive right of plaintiff on property
The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married.
After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because
the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet
married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and
Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 9c
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Dura lex, sed lex

People v. Macarandang 106 Phil 715
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)
FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been
appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the
“peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
“peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant
acquitted.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24a

People v. Mapa 20 SCRA 1164
Citation: G.R. No. L-22301 (20 SCRA 1164) 30 August 30 1967
Short Title: People of the Philippines v. M. Mapa
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended
by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control
a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused
admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that
he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of
appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People v. Macarandang, stating
that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers
equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to
illegal possession of firearms.
Held:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the
law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person
to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted.
People of the Philippines v. Mapa

Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not
contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The
Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

People v. Santayana 74 SCRA 25
Citation: G.R. No. L-22291 (74 SCRA 25) 15 November 1976
Short Title: People v. Santayana
Long Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. JESUS
SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
Ponente: Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to
sit in 2nd division
Facts:
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as Special Agent by
then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS.
On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the
accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum
Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was
authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his
personal protection.
On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the
firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and
thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial
after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held:
The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace
officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879
(People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with
the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according
to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to
Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People v.
Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August
1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at
the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision,
conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana,
canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People v. Santayana
Case No. 115
No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)
FACTS:
Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which
apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
HELD:
Yes. At the time of appellant’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the
appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of
a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879”.
LATIN MAXIM:
46a
People v. Santayana
74 SCRA 25, November 15, 1976
Facts:
On October 29, 1962, Jesus Santayana, a “special agent as appointed by Col. Jose C.
Maristela (Chief of CIS), was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of a pistol and ammunitions.
He was then convicted by the court of First Instance of Manila for illegal possession of firearms
because Santayana did not secure a license for his possession of the weapon mentioned above.
It should be noted that at the time of his arrest, the prevailing doctrine was the
People v. Macarandang case. It was only later that the Supreme Court revoked the
Macarandang ruling in the People v. Mapa case.
Issue:
Whether or not Santayana must be convicted for illegal possession of firearms.
Held:
No. Santayana was acquitted. At the time of his arrest (October 29, 1962), the prevailing
doctrine was People v. Macarandang where a civilian appointed as a secret agent is equivalent to
a peace officer, therefore exempted from the license requirements. The case of People v. Mapa
revoked the doctrine of the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967.
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Expressio unius ext exclusivio alterius

Acosta v. Flor 5 Phil 18
Citation: (5 Phil 18) 1905
Short Title: Acosta v. Flor
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Appellant Pedro Acosta and Appellee David Flor were candidates for the Office of the
Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Appellee won the elections. Appellant then filed an
action praying that Flor be excluded from the exercise of the office on account of irregularities
allegedly committed during the elections.
During the trial, Acosta failed to prove that he was entitled to the office in question. The
court dismissed the action.
Issue:
Whether or not can maintain the action.
Held:
No. Acosta cannot file the action for usurpation of public office. If the legislature had
intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain such action for such, it would have plainly
said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such a far-reaching importance. A simple
provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the legislature has, on the contrary,
especially and specifically provided in Sections 199, 200 and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure
those who must and may bring such an action; and it was very clear that it was its intention to
give such right to those expressly mentioned in said sections and to no other, following the well-
known rule of law, “EXPRESSION UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS.”
Acosta v. Flor
Case No. 5
G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905)
Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No. 187
FACTS:
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the
Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected
to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same.
However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations
that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor can it be
inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said
election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal President of
Laoag, now held by Defendant.
ISSUE:
Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the
Defendant from the exercise of said office?
HELD:
No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the
Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring
such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to
maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have plainly said so in the
law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance.
LATIN MAXIM:
30a
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Ejusdem generis

Mutuc v. Comelec 36 SCRA 228
Citation: GR L-32717 (36 SCRA 228) 26 November 1970
Short Title: Mutuc v. Comelec
Long Title:
Ponente: First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate
opinion
Facts:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a
candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in
his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner
impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however
contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and
the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”
Issue:
Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”
Held:
Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred
to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of
the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition
on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
“and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute
resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the
Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the
use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without
pronouncement as to costs.
US v. Sto. Nino 13 Phil 141
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
United States vs. Sto. Nino

Case No. 302
FACTS:
Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted
under Act No. 1780, which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly
weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of
persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same
under the provision of this Act.
The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only
apply to bladed weapons
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis.
HELD:
No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only
resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule
must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were
covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 29

Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Social Security System Commission 1 SCRA 10
Citation: GR L-15045 (1 SCRA 10) 20 January 1961
Short Title: In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. SSC
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 reserves vote
Facts:
On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed
with the Social Security Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, and all religious and
charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially,
operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,” be exempted from compulsory
coverage of RA 1161, as amended (Social Security Law of 1954). Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution 572 (s.
1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments
and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request,
however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958); hence, this appeal taken
in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended.
The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security
Commission, with costs against appellant.
1. Definition of employer, employee, and employment (as defined in law)
The term “employer” as used in the law is defined as “any person, natural or juridical, domestic
or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of
any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the
employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government” (par. [c], sec.
8), while an “employee” refers to “any person who performs services for an `employer’ in which
either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such
services” (par. [d] sec. 8). “Employment”, according to paragraph [j] of said section 8, covers
any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like
employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic
service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at
bar, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment
of all kinds except those expressly excluded. The definition of the term “employer” is, thus,
sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit within its meaning. Had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation
of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an “employer” in
such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.
3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law
When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for
religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage
thereof (sec. 8, par. [j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by
express provision of RA 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the
Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries
The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of
industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is
readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law
are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
5. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice
The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power, pursuant to the “policy of
the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall
provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death.” It
affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with
the constitutional provisions on the “promotion of social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people.”
6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public
funds for the benefit of a priest; does not violate right to disseminate religious information
The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging
to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming that said
funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement, death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution,
since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an
employee. Further, the contributions are not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with
the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the
protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 263
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities,
and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be
exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social
Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should—
following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on
“undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are
pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition
is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be
hindered and defeated. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 29
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est

People v. Manantan 5 SCRA 684
Citation: GR L-14129 (5 SCRA 684) 31 July 1962
Short Title: People v. Manantan
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was a Justice of peace who was accused of having violated Section
54 of the Revised Election Code which provides:
“No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee that shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any election or take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.”
Manantan raised the statutory construction argument of EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSION ALTERIUS. He contends that since Justice of Peace was not included in the
express enumeration of the persons prohibited from engaging in political partisan activities, then
under the principle of EXPRESSIO UNIUS ST EXCLUSION, the position of Justice of Peace is
deemed excluded. This is supported by the fact that in the prior law, the position of justice of
Peace was included.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of EXPRESSION UNIUS EST EXCLUSION is applicable
to the case at bar.
Held:
No. The legislative intent is clear. There is no room for application of the rules of
Statutory Construction because there was no omission or exclusion in this case. Justice of Peace
were not excluded but were merely called under a different term included in the term “judges.”
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter,
the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People
v. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case
cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code
Held:
Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus omisus” can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of
the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive
sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting
in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In
Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously
made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of
the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of
the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of
Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded
the case for trial on the merits.
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, v. GUILLERMO

MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
I. FACTS
In an information filed, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. The trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one
of the officers enumerated in Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, where it
was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54. The lower
cited by the defense.
II. ISSUES
Whether or not the justice of peace was ruled out from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
III. HELD
The rule casus omisus has no applicability in this case. The maxim casus omisus can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule
of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. The intention of the Legislature did
notexclude the justice of the peace from its operation.
The court of appeals and the trial court used “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in
deciding that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. This rule has no application in
the case.
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est

Lopez and Sons v. CTA 100 Phil 850
Citation: GR L-9274 (100 Phil 850) 1 February 1957
Short Title: Lopez v. CTA
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts:
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis
of consular and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were
released. Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight
of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount
of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the
appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of
Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal,
Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of
Tax Appeal.
Held:
Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the
other hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who
may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy
between the two sections, it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act,
the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to
the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over
his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons
affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. The Courts are
not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a
clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the
evident intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and
RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs;
with costs.
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 151
G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957)
FACTS:
Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs
Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties
were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and
imposed additional duties.
Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says that “the
Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However,
under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector
of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector
of Customs.
HELD:
Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The
Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical
error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. To
support this, the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under
Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code, ‘the Collectors of Customs are
mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision
and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified
an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous
intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter,
but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important.
LATIN MAXIM:
9c, 16a, 16c, 36a
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: In pari materia

Natividad v. Felix G.R. No. 111616 February 4, 1994
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Noscitur a sociis
Sanciangco v. Rono 137 SCRA 671
Citation: GR L-68709 (137 SCRA 671) 19 July 1985
Short Title: Sanciangco v. Rono
Long Title:
Ponente: En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1
took no part
Facts:
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17
May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the
President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis
Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said
election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin
A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as
member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A.
Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned
from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue:
Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of a certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan.
Held:
Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one
construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated
therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials,
the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to
appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading “any person
holding public appointive office or position,” is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that
when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative intent to cover public
appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be
construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan
Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s
Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.
Sanciangco v. Rono
Case No. 273
G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985)
Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.106
FACTS:
Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of
Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner
of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections.
ISSUE:
W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran for
the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
HELD:
The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. Since he is
unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to
be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan
elections.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Noscitur a sociis

Aisporna v. Court of Appeals 113 SCRA 459
Citation: (113 SCRA 459)
Short Title: Aisporna v. Court of Appeals
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited
the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate
of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife
was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal
action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent
when she solicited the application form.
In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited
a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was
absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husband’s desk to inform him of what
transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in
1971 in the Cabanatuan city court.
In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the
insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating that she didn’t violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. The receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of
the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner
Issues:
Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC
without reference to the 2ndparagraph of the said section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the
aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second
paragraph.
Held:
Aisporna acquitted. Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that “No insurance company doing
business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or
other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person
shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an
agent of such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement
of applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner.
Par. 2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for
any insurance company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be
an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to
which an insurance agent is subject.
Par. 3 500 peso fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section.
The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of
authority from the commissioner
In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules
The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not
the 1nd. The fact that she didn’t receive compensation wasn’t an excuse for her acquittal because
she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of
authority as under par 1.
The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to
paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph.
The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits
insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits
an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent.
The SC said that this was a reversible error.
The CA said that Aisporna didn’t receive compensation.
The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189
(check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the
1st and third paragraphs.
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People

Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted
her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation.
ISSUE:
W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec.
189.
HELD:
Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent.
Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a kept
subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of the
same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the agent in
par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189. A
statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos
People v. Evangelista 110898 February 20 1996
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Cessante rationale legis, cessat ipsa lex
Commendador v. Camua G.R. No. 96948 August 2 1991
Citation: G.R. No. 96948, 2 August 1991
Short Title: Commendador v. Camua
Long Title: B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ
PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF
CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, v.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN
PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14, respondents.
Ponente:
Facts:
The petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against
its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408. It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the
scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-
affidavits. The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-
affidavits. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent to them that "failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners have been denied of due process.
Held:
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. But even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The Court do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself
withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it
could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as,
in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime.”
Topic: LATIN MAXIMS: Salus populi est suprema lex
Calalang v. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Constitution
Estrada v. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity Ombudsman as, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents
FACTS
In the 1998 elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Since the beginning of his term, Estrada encountered
problems that cause the deterioration of his popularity. Singson accused petitioner of receiving
money from jueteng lords and that issue ignited rage.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. In January 16, when by a vote of 11-
10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” The ruling was met with outburst and the people assembled in the EDSA shrine in
protest. Then one by one, his officers resigned from their posts.
Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines and the petitioner, with his family, fled. The petitioner released a press statement
and along with it was a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office and made the Vice-President the Acting President.
After he left the position, numerous legal problems surfaced and cases previously
filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
HELD
A. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond objection: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. At
the case, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang after the oath-taking of Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20,
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
B. Petitioner assumes that Arroyo as Vice President has no power to declare the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency and the Congress has the ultimate
ability. The House of Congress and The Senate both recognized Arroyo as President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. In fine, even if the
petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Tax laws

Commissioner v. Court of Appeals 271 SCRA 605
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 73
G.R. No. 95022 (March 23, 1992)
FACTS:
This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL
Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income.
RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan, including all the retirement
benefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income tax. Soon
after, P.D. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of
interest on bank deposits previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is
exempt from income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income
tax under RA 4917.
Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917
and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax.
ISSUE:
W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of
P.D. 1959.
HELD:
Yes. The deletion in P.D. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under
the old law can’t be deemed to be applicable to the employees’ trusts. P.D. 1959 is
a general law, hence, it can’t repeal a specific provision impliedly.
It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in
character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless
there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. Also in Villegas v. Subido, such rule is
upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 5a, 43, 50
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Tax laws
MCIAA v. Marcos 261 SCRA 667
Citation: G.R. No. 120082 (261 SCRA 667) 11 September 1996
Short Title: Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created to “principally
undertake to economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport… and such other airports as may be established in the province of
Cebu…” Section 14 of its charter exempts the authority from payment of realty taxes but in
1994, the City Treasurer demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging
to the other. MCIAA filed a petition in RTC contending that, by nature of its powers and
functions, it has the same footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government.
The RTC dismissed the petition based on Section 193 & 234 of the local Government Code or
R.A. 7160. Thus this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes?
Held:
With the repealing clause of RA 7160 the tax exemption provided. “All general and
special in the charter of the MCIAA has been expressly repeated. It state laws, acts, City
Charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are hereby repeated or
modified accordingly.” Therefore the SC affirmed the decision and order of the RTC and herein
petitioner has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective January 1, 1992 up to the
present.
Mactan Cebu Int’l Airport (MCIAA) vs Judge Marcos
Facts:
MCIAA, since the time of its creation, enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment
of realty taxes in accordance with its charter. The Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
however, demanded from it the payment of realty taxes over several parcels of land belonging to
it. Mciaa was compelled to pay under protest, thus, it filed a petition for declaratory relief with
the RTC. The latter dismissed the petition on the ground that under Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Gov’t Code of 1991 (LGC), such exemption from taxes in favor of GOCCs had been
expressly cancelled/withdrawn.
MCIAA invoked Section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of
LGUs on an instrumentality of the gov’t performing governmental functions (i.e. carrying out
government policies of promoting and developing the Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as
centers of int’l trade & tourism x x x). On the other hand, respondents argued that MCIAA is a
GOCC whose tax exemption privilege had been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 & 234 of
the LGC.
Issue:
WON MCIAA, a GOCC, is exempted from the payment of realty taxes pursuant to
Section 133 of the LGCC.
Held:
Taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. While it may be true that
under its charter MCIAA was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was
withdrawn by sec 234 of the LGC
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

Case No. 157
G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996)
FACTS:
Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the
Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958
which exempt it from payment of realty taxes.
Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it
has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such
power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it
may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of
realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant
of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to
make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes.
Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the
nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax
exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore
is the exception.
LATIN MAXIM:
43
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Labor laws

Villavert v. ECC 110 SCRA 233
Short Title: Villavert v. Employees Compensation Commission
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
The petitioner, Donna Villavert, was the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert who died
of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on December 12, 1975. He was employed as a code verifier in
the Philippine Constabulary. The day before he died, he performed his duties not only as a code
verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs. He was
also required to render overtime. When he went home and went to bed, Marcelino was found by
his mother gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words. He was
sent to the hospital but was pronounced dead at 5:30 in the morning. The petitioner filed a claim
for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denied the claim on the ground that acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner has failed to show
that there was a casual connection between the fatal ailment Marcelino and the nature of his
employment.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) which
affirmed on May 31, 1978 the decision of GSIS denying the claim. Now, this is a petition to
review the decision of the ECC.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines’ interpretation or
application applies in claiming the income benefits for the death of the petitioner’s son.
Held:
Yes. Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “All
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.
The decision of the ECC was set aside and the GSIS was ordered to pay the petitioner
benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.
TITLE: Villavert vs ECC, 110 SCRA 233 G.R. No. L-48605, December 14, 1981
FACTS:
This is a petition to review decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission affirming

decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits on
the ground that acute hemmorhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease, thus, petitioner
failed to show the causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert and the
nature of his employment. He was employed at the Philippine Constabulary as code verifier.
However, due to shortage of qualified civilian personnel to handle certain task, he was assigned
various tasks that would require him to render overtime services especially in the preparation of
the checks for the salary of the Philippine Constabulary and the National Integrated Police
personnel throughout the country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru mother Domna Villavert is entitled to death benefits?
HELD:
Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of the labor”. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service
Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(Php6,000.00).
Villavert v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 313
G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981)
FACTS:
The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary.
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, as
amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner
had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC
which affirmed the denial.
ISSUE:
W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of
the Petitioner.
HELD:
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of
alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used
drugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a

Manahan v. ECC 104 SCRA 198
Short Title: Manahan v. Employees Compensation Commission
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
The petitioner, Maria Manahan was the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of
“enteric fever” while employed as a classroom teacher in Las Piňas Municipal School, Las Piňas,
Rizal, on May 8, 1975.
The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
death benefit under Presidential Decree 626.
On June 19, 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario
Manahan, Jr. was not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
on the ground that the deceased was in perfect health when admitted to the service and that the
ailment of said deceased was attributable to his employment.
GSIS affirmed the denial of the claim on the ground that “enteric fever” or “paratyphoid”
is similar in effect to “typhoid fever,” in the sense that both are brought about by ‘salmonella
organisms.”
Petitioner appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed
the decision of the GSIS. Now, petitioner filed a petition to review the decision of the ECC.
Issue:
Whether or not the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act applies in claiming the
death benefit of the petitioner’s deceased.
Held:
Yes. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor f the worker, and that social
legislation – like Women’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code – should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable objective, in other words, to give relief to the workman and/or
his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.
In this case, applying the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant. The decision of ECC was set
aside and the GSIS was ordered to pay the petitioner the amount of P600 as death compensation
benefit and P600 as attorney’s fees; to reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical
services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased, Nazario Manahan , Jr., duly supported
by paper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.
TITLE: Manahan vs ECC, 104 SCRA 198 G.R. No. L-44899 April 22, 1981
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC
Case No. 0070 (Nazario Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan, Appellant, versus
Government Service Insurance System, (Las Piñas Municipal High School).GSIS denied the
claim for death benefit. The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is the widow of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever" while employed as classroom teacher in Las
Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas Rizal, on May 8, 1975. In a letter dated June 19, 1975,
the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever,
is not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health when admitted to the service and
such ailment was attributable to his employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner thru his mother is entitled to death benefits.
HELD:
Yes. It is not improbable that the deceased might have contracted the illness during those rare
moments that he was away from his family. I was a medically accepted principle that enteric
fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by ingestion of contaminated food
or drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion of animals such as
rodents flies, or human beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection in meat of animals
as food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in the transmission of this
type of species, since the organism may multiply even before ingestion. ..."These findings of the
respondent Commission lead to the conclusion that the risk of contracting the fatal illness was
increased by the decedent's working condition.
Decision of ECC is set aside and the GSIS is ordered (1) To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit; (2)To pay the petitioner the
amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees; (3)To reimburse the petitioner
expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario
Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts; and (4)To pay administrative fees.
Manahan v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 79
G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981)
FACTS:
Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a
teacher in the Las Pinas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband
was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to
his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his
employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to
the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim.
ISSUE:
W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits.
HELD:
Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in
perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his
employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was
supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe.
Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric
Fever.
Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should
be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case
should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally
construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents.
LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 9a, 9d, 40b

Bustamante v. NLRC 265 SCRA 61
Citation: (265 SCRA 61) 1996
Short Title: Bustamante v. NLRC
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
The petitioners were illegally dismissed by the respondent corporation Evergreen Farms,
Inc., on June 25, 1990.
There are three (3) pertinent statutes which were considered in the case at bar. These are:
(1) Republic Act No. 875, the Industrial Peace Act, approved on June 17, 1953,
Sections 5 and 15 thereof provided this:
“Section 5. Unfair Labor Practices Cases – (c) xxx. If after

investigation, the court shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complain has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair
labor practice, then the court shall state that its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice and take such affirmative action as will effectuate the
policies of this Act, including (but not limited to) reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay and including rights of the
employees prior to dismissal including seniority.
Section 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively. – xxx. “Any

employee who has stopped as a consequence of such look out shall
be entitled to back pay.”
(2) Presidential Decree No. 442, the Labor Code of the Philippines which took
effect on November 1, 1974. Its posture on the award of back wages, as
amended, was expressed as follows:
“Article 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular

employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back
wages computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his reinstatement.
(3) Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect March 21, 1989 amending the Labor Code.
Article 279 thereof state in part:
“Article 279. Security of Tenure. – An employee who is unjustly

dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of security rights and other privileges and to his full back wages,
inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation is withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The Court of Industrial Relations (First Division) affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter dated April 26, 1991 with the
modification that back wages shall be paid to the date of
reinstatement.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are only entitled to full back wages equivalent to three
years.
Held:
No. In accordance with Republic Act No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full back
wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time
their actual compensation was withheld from up to the time of actual reinstatement.
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Republic Act No. 675 is to give more
benefits to workers than was previously given them under the “Mercury Drug earnings
elsewhere”’
In other words, the provision calling for “full back wages” to illegally dismissed
employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without
attempted or strained interpretation.
TITLE: Bustamante vs NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 G.R. No.11165 March 15, 1996
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the NLRC Resolution of May 3, 1993setting
aside earlier resolution dated March 8, 1993 and deleting the award of backwages in favor of
petitioners. Osmalik Bustamante and three others were employed as laborers and harvesters
while Lamaran was employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent company’s plantation. They
all signed contracts of employment for a period of six months from January 2, 1960 to July 2,
1990 but started working sometime in September 1989. Before the contracts expire in July
2,1990, their employments were terminated on June25, 1990 on the ground of poor performance
on account of age, not one of them was allegedly below forty years old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to backwages after a finding by the NLRC that they had
become regular employees.
HELD:
Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of the labor”. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service
Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php
6,000.00).
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Rules of Court

Bello v. Court of Appeals 56 SCRA 509
Short Title: Bello v. Court of Appeals
Long Title: Juan and Filomena Bello v. CA, Judge Francisco Llamas and RP
Ponente:
Facts:
Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of
Pasay and they were convicted and sentenced under respondent city court’s decision on February
26, 1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended
party the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit. The offended party, Atty. de Guzman, had
represented his son who was a suspect with two others for robbery before the City Fiscal’s Office
(CFI) and upon case dismissal of the charged P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and since they had no
money to pay him, required them to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an
imaginary lady’s ring to sell “on commission basis” for P1,000.00. Commission basis when his
only association with them was his demand of payment of his P1,000.00 attorney’s fee.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to CFI of Pasay City, but
the prosecution filed a “petition to dismiss appeal”. He appeal had been taken directly to the
Court of Appeals (CA) as provided by Section 87 of the Judiciary Act 296, as amended.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s dismissal motion and invoking the analogous
provision of Rule 50, Section 3. The CFI ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the
records to the city court “for execution of judgment.”
Petitioners averred that they were not notified of the order of dismissal. Hence, they filed
with the city court their “motion to elevate appeal to the CA” on December 7, 1971.
Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the People and respondent city and to compel respondent city court to elevate
their appeal to the CA.
The CA, however, per its decision on December 17, 1973, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it.
The decision of the CA dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition against respondent city court which is hereby
enjoined from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused.
Issue:
Is Rule 50, Section 3 applicable in the given case?
Held:
The Court finds merit in the petition and holds that the CFI acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused’s appeal. We find that the CA also acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside the challenged order of the
CFI. The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners’ appeal taken to the CFI was
“procedurally wrong.”
Rule 50, Section 3. (In a misdirected appeal to the CA of a case that pertains to the CFI’s
jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly provides that the CA “shall not dismiss the appeal but shall
certify to the proper court.”
Bello v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 15
G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)
FACTS:
Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should
have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) directing
the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the
proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal.
Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the
execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissed
the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance
may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held
that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party
respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”.
ISSUE:
W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of
judicial decision.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose
and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid
such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be taken
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The
Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
justice to be bound by the same rule.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b

Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission 133 SCRA 840
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Case No. 52
No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984)
FACTS:
Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied their
motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that the 30-day
period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of the Judiciary
Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final
order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC.
HELD:
No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. The SEC is not a court. It is
an administrative agency. Repeals by implication are not favored. The 30-day
period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic law of the SEC, is still in force.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b

Martinez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112387 October 13, 1994
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Insurance laws and
contracts
Ty v. First National Surety and Assurance Corp 1 SCRA 1324
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Ty vs First National Surety and Assurance Corp., 1 SCRA 1324 G.R. No. L-16138,
April 29, 1961
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the
actions filed by Diosdado Ty to 8 local insurance companies which insured him for personal
accident policies. Diosdado Ty is employed as an operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway
Cotton Factory in Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal at a monthly salary of P185.00. He insured
himself in 18 local insurance companies. Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer, Broadway
Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out
destroying totally the Broadway Cotton Factory. From the incident, Ty was injured on the left
hand by a heavy object. He was given first-aid at the Manila Central University. He proceeded
then to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries, fractures in his left hand.
He underwent medical treatment from December 26, 1953 to February 8, 1954. Plaintiff filed the
corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim to recover indemnity under paragraph II of
the policy.
Plaintiff’s claim was rejected for reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left
hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by the policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity for total or partial disability.
HELD:
No. The court cannot go beyond the express and clear conditions of the insurance policies which
define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist.
Considering that there is no amputation in the present case, he decision appealed from is
affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.

Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies,
among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him
personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally
destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff
was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total
disability of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and
notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the
policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that
there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by
him was not covered by his policy.
ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the
Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies.
HELD:
The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial
disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. There
was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court,
which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporary
total disability of plaintiff's left hand." In addition, the agreement contained in the
insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are
clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture
or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be
unwarranted.
LATIN MAXIM:
6b, 7a, 9c

contracts
Dela Cruz v. Capital Insurance and Surety Co 17 SCRA 559
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: De La Cruz vs Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17SCRA 559 G.R. No. L-21574, June
30, 1966
FACTS: This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (in Civil Case No. U-265), ordering it to indemnify
therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the death of the latter's son, to pay the burial expenses, and
attorney's fees. Eduardo de la Cruz was employed in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. in Baguio. He
was a holder of an accident insurance policy (No. ITO-BFE-170) underwritten by the Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., for the period beginning November 13, 1956 to November 12,
1957. On January 1,1957, Eduardo dela Cruz participated in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.
sponsored- boxing contest for general entertainment in connection with the celebration of the
New Year. In the course of his bout with another person, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his
opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting
the rope of the ring. He was brought to the Baguio General Hospital the following day. The
cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
ISSUE:
Whether or not death caused by the participation in a boxing contest entitles the petitioner to
indxdemnity under the insurance policy.
HELD:
3ecYes. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary
act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the
resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury from accident.
Therefore, decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against appellant.
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.

Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy
underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest
participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the
left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company
for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company set
up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
ISSUE:
W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or
disability caused by accidental means.”
HELD:
The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have
not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is
performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. The
failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or
other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend
to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death.
LATIN MAXIM:
3, 25a, 30a
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Naturalization Laws

Co v. Republic 108 Phils 265
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Co v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 24
G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court
ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of
two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for
in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from
the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply
with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles
underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon
cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our
constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for
naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law.
HELD:
Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not
necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred
to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his
family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering
that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7b, 43
contracts
Velasco v. Republic 108 Phil 234
Citation: (108 Phil 234) 25 May 1960
Short Title: Velasco v. Republic
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
A petition for naturalization filed by Richard Velasco, a Chinese citizen, before the CFI
of Manila was denied for his failure to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner appealed,
contending that he was born and has continuously resided in the Philippines; that he is presently
employed at a drug store with a monthly salary of P150.00 a month; that he is not suffering from
any contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos; that he knows how to
speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is a Catholic by faith; and has never been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude; that he has shown desire to embrace the customs and
tradition of the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a Filipino citizen because he considered
the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization.
Held:
No. It appeared that the character witness of petitioner is his mother-in-law and as such,
her testimony is biased. And that the drug store, which the petitioner was employed, is partly
owned by his mother which lead the court to believe that petitioner’s employment is but a
convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to comply with the
requirements of the law.
“Naturalization Laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant.”
Decision appealed from is affirmed.
Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 165
G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960)
FACTS:
Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the
requirements of the law.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization.
HELD:
No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are
constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for
naturalization.
LATIN MAXIM:
43
Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines

108 Phil 234, May 25, 1960
Facts:
The petitioner, Richard Velasco, filed for naturalization before the Court of First Instance
of manila and was denied.
Velasco, a Chinese citizen, was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 and has lived in
the country ever since. At the time when he was filing for naturalization, he was employed at
Wilson drug Store with a salary of P150.00 per month and was engaged to a Filipina, Noemi
Eugenio.
In his application for naturalization, his qualification as to moral character was attested
by Santiago Mariano and Paz Eugenio, the mother of Noemi Eugenio.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s application for
naturalization.
Held:
No, because the character witness, Paz Eugenio, was the petitioner’s prospective mother-
in-law and therefore her testimony is biased. And the other witness, Santiago Mariano was also a
character witness of the petitioner’s brother. This shows that the petitioner has a limited circle of
Filipino friends.
Regarding his employment at the Wilson drug Store, which was, by the way, partly
owned by the petitioner’s mother, it was found out that it was only one month prior to the filing
for naturalization. This indicates that his employment was merely to show token of compliance
with the requirement that to become a Filipino citizen, one must have lucrative income.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant.
TITLE: Velasco vs Republic, 108 Phil 234 G.R. No. L-14214 May 25, 1960
FACTS:
This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after
trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has
appealed. Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and
Miguela Tiu who became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that he continuously resided in
the Philippines; that he has finished his elementary, high school and collegiate studies in the
Philippines; that he is presently employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a
monthly salary of P150.00; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is
a Catholic by faith; and has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that he
does not own any real property but has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the Repubclic
Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00
shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he has mingled
socially with the Filipinos; that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of
the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a Filipino citizen because he considered the
Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
No. It was found out that his qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago
Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper,
who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner and such testimony is
biased. The limited character witnesses indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino
friends. His present income is only P150.00 a month which is neither lucrative nor substantial to
meet the requirements of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must a lucrative income or
occupation. Decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

contracts
Lee Cho v. Republic 106 Phil 775
Citation: (106 Phil 775)
Short Title: Lee Cho v. Republic
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Petitioner Lee Cho, alias Sem Lee, who was born in China, filed a petition for
naturalization before the CFI of Cebu. Said court approved the petition. The government
appealed it. Petitioner claimed that he did not file any declaration of intention to be a Filipino
citizen because he had resided in the Philippines for 30 years and had provided for his children’s
primary and secondary education in school recognized by the government, which would entitle
him to an exemption under Sec. 6 of Naturalization Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such exemption.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner cannot claim such exemption on the
ground that he failed to provide education to two (2) of his daughters, Angelita Lee and Lourdes
Lee, who had just finished grade five and third year high school, respectively.
Decision reversed.
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959)
FACTS:
Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that
he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the
filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The
law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in
the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school
recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the
Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and
secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools
recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
recognized by the government.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his
duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children.
HELD:
No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education
to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to
complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays
the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in
spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school
which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the
Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and
nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that
Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should
be denied.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7b, 43
TITLE: Lee Cho vs Republic, 106 Phil 775 G.R. No. L-12408 December 29, 1959
FACTS:
This is a petition for naturalization filed by Lee Cho before the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On August 30, 1956, the Court rendered Decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino
citizen. However, on October 2, 1957, the government filed motion for new trial on the ground
that a newly discovered evidence which if presented, the Court may render an adverse decision.
However, after re-hearing, the Court rendered decision reaffirming previous decision where the
government interposed the present appeal.
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China of Chinese parents. He came to the Philippines in February
1921 and continuously residing in Cebu since then. He was issued the corresponding alien
certificate of residence and registration. He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He
married Sy Siok Bin with whom he had 13 children, all born in Cebu City. All these children
were issued alien certificates except for William who is not of school age, Lourdes who married
a naturalized Filipino citizen and Angelita who rendered only grade five.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Naturalization Law to
become a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Despite claims that petitioner has resided continuously in the Philippines for thirty years or
more and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
recognized by the Government, petitioner Lee Cho failed to give such education to his daughters
Lourdes Lee who got married but continued secondary education in a Chinese school and
Angelita Lee who reached fifth grade only without explanation why no secondary education was
afforded to her where the teaching of the subjects Philippine Civics, Philippine History and
Philippine Government is taught embracing Philippine citizenship. As such, petitioner should
have not tolerated such deviation from the educational requirement of the law.
Decision reversed. Costs against the petitioner.
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Expropriation laws

City of Manila v. Chinese Community 40 Phil 449
Citation: G.R. No. L-14355 (40 Phil 449) 31 October 1919
Short Title: City of Manila v. Chinese Community
Long Title: THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, v. CHINESE COMMUNITY
OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees
Ponente:
Facts:
On Dec. 11, 1916 presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain
lands used by the Chinese Community as their cemetery be expropriated for an extension of
Rizal Avenue. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if expropriation would take
effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, and would require a large sum of money
to transfer the bodies; furthermore, the expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement.
Plaintiff’s theory however is that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has
authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of
the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the
court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or
ask any questions concerning the necessities thereof; that the courts are mere appraisers of the
land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila may expropriate the lands used as cemetery
for extending Rizal Avenue.
Held:
Under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the City of Manila), the city has the
authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. However, said charter contains no
procedure by which the authority may be carried not effect, and how eminent domain may be
exercised. The Court then opines that the power of the court is not limited to determining
whether or not a law exists permitting the plaintiff to expropriate. The right of expropriation is
not inherent in municipal corporations, and before it can exercise such some law must exist to
confer such power. When the courts determine the question, they must find only that a law exists
for such a reason, and that the right or authority being exercised is in accordance with the law. In
the present case, there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: 1, the land must be private, and 2,the purpose must be public. If the court upon trial finds
that neither exists or either fails, it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law. The necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not
a judicial question. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity of appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and may select the exact location of the improvement. The
questions of utility of proposed improvement, the extent of public necessity for its construction,
the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of its location and the necessity of taking the
land for its site are all questions exclusive for the legislature to determine. The taking of private
property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of
the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of
the legislature to delegate. Whether or not the cemetery is private or public is immaterial. The
Court opines that it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law providing
expressly that such places under such circumstances should be violated. To disturb the mortal
remains of those endeared to us in life becomes sometimes the sad duty of the living, but except
in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave should be maintained. In
the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record shows no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record
shows that the adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which
should answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.

Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919)
FACTS:
Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands,
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a pu blic improvement – the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient
that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes.
ISSUE:
W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire
into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation.
HELD:
In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
proof upon, those questions (of necessity).
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that
the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24a, 43
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919
Facts:
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has
the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners
of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the
law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Issue:
W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
Held:
Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that
the courts have the right to inquire into.
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Election laws
Villanueva v. Comelec 140 SCRA 352
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Villanueva v. COMELEC
Case No. 170
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor
of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza
who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the
election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent
Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not
duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petit3eee3ion for the annulment of the
proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that
Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after
January 4.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical
defects.
HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute
candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his
candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth
after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent
Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and
substitution of other persons as candidates.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 9a, 39c
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Wills
Tampoy v. Alberstine 107 Phil 100
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SPECIFIC LAWS: Wills
Avera v. Garcia 42 Phil 145
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
Topic: CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION: Executive construction – Quasi-
legislative/Rule making power
San Miguel v. Inciong 103 SCRA 139
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: San Miguel vs Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 G.R. No. L-49774, February 24, 1981
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed on January 3, 1977 by Cagayan Coca-Cola Free Workers Union against
San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant) for the alleged failure or refusal of the latter
to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or maternity
leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular
holidays and night differentials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential Decree851,
payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special
holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials should be considered.
HELD:
Citing certain provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines specifically

Art. 87 on overtime work performed beyond 8 hours a day is paid as additional compensation
equivalent to a regular wage plus 25% hereof and Art 93 on work performed on any special
holiday as an additional compensation of at least 30% of the regular wage of the employee,
clearly, additional compensation is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary
under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851.
Therefore, additional compensation shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-
month pay.
The Orders of the Deputy Labor Minister dated June 7, 1978 and December 19, 1978 are hereby
set aside and a new one entered as above indicated. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on February 14, 1979 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Molina v. Rafferty 38 Phil 167
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Molina vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 167 G.R. No. L-11988, April4, 1918
FACTS:
Plaintiff Molina
contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an "agricultural product" within the
meaning of that term as used in paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 (now section 1460
of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the disputed tax was levied, and that he is
therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act
No. 2339, as amended: “(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the
land where grown, whether in their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 4ww1.)”
ISSUE:
Whether or not
fish in general constitute an agricultural products, and therefore exempt from the percentage tax
on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended.
HELD:
The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought
in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . what
was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under
which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . . And where the law
has contemporaneously been put into operation, is entitled to great respect, as being very
probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although
it is not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.).Therefore, fish produced in
ponds are agricultural products and thus, exempted from taxation when sold by the producer or
he owner of the land. Administrative conclusion of tax law should be followed unless clearly
erroneous. Judgment affirmed.
Madrigal v. Rafferty 38 Phil 414
Citation: G.R. No. L-12287 (38 Phil 414) 7 August 1918
Short Title: Madrigal and Paterno v. James J. Rafferty and Concepcion
Long Title:
Ponente:
Facts:
Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno were legally married prior to January 1, 1914. The
marriage was contracted under the provisions of law concerning conjugal partnerships (sociedad
de gananciales). On February 25, 1915, Vicente Madrigal filed sworn declaration on the
prescribed form with the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR), showing, as his total net income
for the year 1914, the sum of P292,302.73. Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the
said P292,302.73 did not represent his income for the year 1914, but was in fact the income of
the conjugal partnership existing between himself and his wife Susana Paterno, and that in
computing and assessing the additional income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October
3, 1913, the income declared by Vicente Madrigal should be divided into two equal parts, one-
half to be considered the income of Vicente Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno.
The Plaintiffs want for the recovery of the sum P3,786.08, alleged to have been
wrongfully and illegally collected by the defendants from the plaintiff, Vicente Madrigal, under
the provisions of the Act of Congress known as the Income Tax Law. The burden of the
complaint is that if the income tax for the year 1914 had been correctly and lawfully computed
there would have been due payable by each of the plaintiff the sum of P2,921.09, which taken
together amounts to a total of P5,842.18 instead of P9,669.21, erroneously and unlawfully
collected from the plaintiff Vicente Madrigal, with the result that plaintiff Madrigal has paid as
income tax for the year 1914, P3,786.08, in excess of the sum lawfully due and payable.
Issue:
Whether or not the taxes imposed by the Income Tax Law are, as the name implies, taxes
upon income tax and not capital and property.
Held:
In all instances, the income of husband and wife whether from separate estates or not, is
taken as a whole for the purpose of the normal tax. Where the wife has income from a separate
estate makes return made by her husband, while the incomes are added together for the purpose
of normal tax they are taken separately for the purpose of the additional tax. In this case, the wife
has no separate income within the contemplation of the Income Tax Law. The Income Tax Law
was drafted by the Congress of the United States and has been by the Congress extended to the
Philippine Islands. Being thus a law of American origin and being peculiarly intricate in its
provisions, the authoritative decision of the official who is charged with enforcing it has peculiar
force for the Philippines. It has come to be a well-settled rule that great weight should be given
to the construction placed upon a revenue law, whose meaning is doubtful, by the department
charged with its execution.
TITLE: Madrigal vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 414 G.R. No. L-12287August7,1918
FACTS:
ss
Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno legally contracted marriage prior to January 1, 1914 under
the provisions of law concerning conjugal partnerships (sociedad degananciales). On February
25, 1915, Vicente Madrigal filed sworn declaration on the prescribed form with the Collector of
Internal Revenue, showing, as his total net income for the year 1914, the sum of P296,302.73.
Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the said P296,302.73 did not represent his
income for the year 1914, but was in fact the income of the conjugal partnership existing
between himself and his wife Susana Paterno, and that in computing and assessing the additional
income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, the income declared by Vicente
Madrigal should be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be considered the income of Vicente
Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno. The general question had in the meantime been
submitted to the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands who in an opinion dated March17,
1915, held with the petitioner Madrigal. The revenue officers forwarded the correspondence with
the opinion of the Attorney-General to Washington for a decision by the United States Treasury
Department. The United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue reversed the opinion of the
Attorney-General, and thus decided against the claim of Madrigal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional income tax should be divided into two equal parts because of the
conjugal partnership existing between Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno.
HELD:
No, The income of husband and wife should be taken as a whole for the purpose of the normal
tax regardless as to whether from separate estates or not. “The counter contentions of appellees
are that the taxes imposed by the Income Tax Law are taxes upon income tax and not upon
capital and property; that the fact that Madrigal was a married man, and his marriage contracted
under the provisions governing the conjugal partnership, has no bearing on income considered as
income, and that the distinction must be drawn between the ordinary form of commercial
partnership and the conjugal partnership of spouses resulting from the relation of
marriage.”dxJudgment affirmed, costs against appellants.

legislative/Rule-making power
PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue 90 Phil 674
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: PLDT vs Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 G.R. No. L-3222, January 21, 1952
FACTS:
PLDT filed complaint against CIR for collecting P 3, 977.22 representing franchise tax. The CFI
of Manila absolved CIR from said complaint. The petitioner filed case before the Supreme Court
arguing that PLDT should not be obliged to pay franchise tax on uncollected fees due from
regular customers because such earnings were not representative of gross receipts as what CIR
construed it to be. PLDT further contended that CIR’s prolonged practice of non-collection of
franchise tax on items of the same nature as those questioned in the case was an administrative
construction of great weight.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of executive construction is properly applied for in the instant case.
HELD:
No. Said principle is not absolute and may be overcome by strong reasons to the contrary. If
thfrough a misapprehension of law, an officer has erroneously executed it forw a long time, the
error may be rectified when the true construction is ascertained. The CIR’s construction is in
accordance with the Constitution because a person may have earned his salary but may not have
collected the same. Thus, the uncollected “gross receipts” which should be construed as meaning
the same thing as “gross earnings” should be subject to franchise tax.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Topic: CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION: Executive construction – Legal opinions

Phi3el Global Communication v. Relova 145 SCRA 385
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
2q
TITLE: Phil Global Communication vs Relova, 145 SCRA 587 GR No. L-60548, November 10,
1986
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine Global Communications Inc.
seeks to set aside decision dated April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without authority to
establish, maintain and operate, apart from its single principal station in Makati, any other branch
or station within the Phils.
On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of Communications an application
for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purpose of rendering international
telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside Phils. This was opposed by the
private respondents. On March 24, 1977, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-
13designating Metropolitan Manila area as the sole gateway, point of entrance into and exit
from) for communications in the Phils. And defining what constitutes domestic record
operations. I was on Jan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional authority to establish
a station in Cebu City subject to condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have upgraded
their facilities, applicant shall ceases its operation and interface with domestic carriers. On May
24, 1979, BOC granted petitioner the final authority to establish a branch/station in Cebu City
subject to prior approval, anywhere in the PHils. Private respondents filed petition for
declaratory judgment on the proper construction of petitioner’s franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners
sought dismissal of petition. Motion was denied. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Court held that the suit for declaratory relief fell within the competence of
the Judiciary and did not require prior action by the administrative agency concerned under the
concept of primary jurisdiction.
Parties then agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their respective pleadings and
memoranda . Court rendered judgment on April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without authority
to establish, maintain and operate any other branch or station within the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the establishment of such stations or substations constitutes domestic service
within the terms of petitioner’s legislative franchise.
HELD:
It is stressed that RA 4630 and 4617 are in pari material, meaning, these two acts relate to the
same thing or have the same purpose or object. When statutes are in pari material, they should be
construed together. Therefore, as to the issue and the legislative franchise, the answer is no. The
establishment of such stations constitutes international service having Metropolitan Manila as the
sole gateway of all messages received and transmitted in the course of a carrier’s international
record carrier operation.
The decision appealed from is reversed and judgment rendered declaring petitioner with
authority to establish, maintain and operate in accordance with its legislative franchise and
Memorandum Circular No.08-8-83.
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova

Case No. 236
G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986)
FACTS:
In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an
application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of
rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside
the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was designated as
the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC gave
Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon as domestic
carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations.
Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which ruled in
favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to
establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a petition seeking to set
aside the ruling rendered.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or
points outside Metro Manila?
HELD:
Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate,
apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches within the
Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. This can be
seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The opinion of the
Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other
stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 36b

judicial/Adjudicative power
Phil Sugar Central v. Collector of Customs 51 Phil 131
Citation:
Short Title:
Long Title:
Ponente:
TITLE: Phil Sugar Central vs Collector of Customs, 51 Phil 131 G.R. No. L-27761, December 6,
1927
FACTS:
This is
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect the duty of $1 per
gross ton of 1,000 kilos as a charge for wharfage on goods, wares and merchandise exported
through a port of entry of the Philippine Islands or shipped therefrom to the United States, where
it appears that the Government does not own the wharf and that the sugar in question was loaded
from a wharf which was the sole property of a private person.
HELD:
In view of its history, its long continuous construction, and what has been done and
accomplished by and under it, clearly the Government is entitled to have and receive the money
in question even though the sugar is shipped from a private wharf.
Judgement of the lower court reversed, with costs.
Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs

Case No. 241
No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927)
FACTS:
Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United
States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. Wharf
was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant
collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf.
ISSUE:
W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by
government.
HELD:
Yes. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would
overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government, in and by which millions
of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of
Government wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the
Government wharf at Pulapandan.”
Dissenting Opinion:
Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be
taxed or levied upon.
LATIN MAXIM:
3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d
Topic: CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION: Weight of administrative construction

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations 72 SCRA 396
Citation: G.R. No. L-43760 (72 SCRA 396) 21 August 1976
Short Title:
Long Title: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(PAFLU), petitioner v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE
CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC., respondents.
Ponente: FERNANDO, Acting C.J.
Facts:
On February 27, 1976, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. held a certification
election on who would be the exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees. The National
Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) won, with 429 votes as against the 419 votes of the
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). Four (4) votes were cast wherein no
union was preferred. The Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo Noriel, then certified NAFLU as
the exclusive bargaining agent of Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.’s employees.
Despite winning by a majority, which is what is required under the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code, to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, PAFLU sought to
invoke the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial
Relations, wherein spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. As there
were 17 spoiled ballots, PAFLU argued that there was grave abuse of discretion by Director
Noriel in certifying NAFLU.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v.
Court of Industrial Relations should be applied in this case.
Held:
NO, it should not.
First off, only 10 of the spoiled ballots were for PAFLU, so even if they were all counted,
PAFLU would still lose with 424 votes to 429 for NAFLU.
The essence of the certification process is to give every labor organization the
opportunity in a free and honest election to be the exclusive CBA of employees. PAFLU was
given a fair election, and lost. In the US, it is also the rule that only a majority of all valid ballots
will be needed to win the election.
As the country is on a wide-scale industrialization project, a stable structure of law and
order in the productive sector is needed, that need it best attained through a collective bargaining
regime. Requiring an absolute majority to be obtained by the valid CBA would unnecessarily
protract the process and frustrate the goal looked to.
No fault of a grave or serious character can be imputed to Director Noriel as the case of
Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated
under the Industrial Peace Act. The Labor Code superseded the Industrial Peace Act, and the
present relative majority rule should be first proved to be in repugnant to the Labor Code, which
was not done.
High repute must also be given to the contemporaneous construction placed by the
executive officials entrusted with applying the statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing
the Labor Code were issued by Secretary Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect in
1975, the Labor Code taking effect in 1974. There was more than enough time for a serious
study of such regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Labor Code.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations

Case No. 120
G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)
FACTS:
Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the
certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in
Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.
Tallied votes are as follows:
NAFLU 429
PAFLU 414
Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted)
Abstained 4
Total Ballots 864
(Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.)
Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a
previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based
on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code
and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing
the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers
Association of the Philippines vs. CIR.
HELD:
There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis
of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor
Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has
been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in
the case at bar.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 2a, 39a
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

Fernando, Acting C.J. (August 21, 1976)
Facts:
On February 27, 1976, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. held a certification
election on who would be the exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees. The National
Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) won, with 429 votes as against the 419 votes of the
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). 4 votes were cast wherein no union was
preferred. The Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo Noriel, then certified NAFLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent of Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.’s employees.
Despite winning by a majority, which is what is required under the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code, to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, PAFLU sought to
invoke the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial
Relations, wherein spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. As there
were 17 spoiled ballots, PAFLU argued that there was grave abuse of discretion by Director
Noriel in certifying NAFLU.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of
Industrial Relations should be applied in this case?
Held:
No, it should not.
First off, only 10 of the spoiled ballots were for PAFLU, so even if they were all counted,
PAFLU would still lose with 424 votes to 429 for NAFLU.
The essence of the certification process is to give every labor organization the
opportunity in a free and honest election to be the exclusive CBA of employees. PAFLU was
given a fair election, and lost. In the US, it is also the rule that only a majority of all valid ballots
will be needed to win the election.
As the country is on a wide-scale industrialization project, a stable structure of law and
order in the productive sector is needed, that need it best attained through a collective bargaining
regime. Requiring an absolute majority to be obtained by the valid CBA would unnecessarily
protract the process and frustrate the goal looked to.
No fault of a grave or serious character can be imputed to Director Noriel as the case of
Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated
under the Industrial Peace Act. The Labor Code superseded the Industrial Peace Act, and the
present relative majority rule should be first proved to be in repugnant to the Labor Code, which
was not done.
High repute must also be given to the contemporaneous construction placed by the
executive officials entrusted with applying the statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing
the Labor Code were issued by Secretary Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect in
1975, the Labor Code taking effect in 1974. There was more than enough time for a serious
study of such regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Labor Code.
Topic: AMENDMENTS, REPEALS, AND PARTIAL INVALIDITIES

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters v. Feliciano 13 SCRA 377
Short Title: Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters v. Feliciano
Long Title:
Ponente:
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano

Case No. 127
G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965)
Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No. 61
FACTS:
Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the
Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may
designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as
embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend
that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.
HELD:
The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong
exclusively to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing
so. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the
local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is
certified by the National Economic Council, the President may authorize such
importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws,
although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different
circumstancxde4edes. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the
legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent
and repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal.
LATIN MAXIM:
38b, 39a
…….
Natividad v. Felix
February 4, 1994
Facts:
The petitioner, Mayor Natividad was investigated by Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor as requested by PNP
for his involvement in the death of Lourdes Aquino¶s husband, Severino Aquino, at the Ramos Police
Station.During the investigation, PNP filed another complaint with the Tarlac Municipal Circuit Court,
which directed Mayor Natividad¶s arrest with bail. He posted bail with the Manila RTC, which later
issued an order recalling warrant. After conducting the preliminary investigation, MCTC determined that
there was probable causeto hold Natividad for murder with bail. The Provincial Prosecutor approved the
filing of information against Natividad and Llerina in the Tarlac RTC (where Hon. Felix was the
judge).Warrant of arrest was issued. Upon seeing that the MCTC judge failed to conduct the second
staged in the preliminary investigation, RTC recalled the warrant and remanded the case for further
preliminary investigation. Mayor Natividad alleged that there was no preliminary investigation, and that
Hon. Felix had no jurisdiction because it was the Ombudmans, not the provincial prosecutor, who had
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and that the proper court was the Sandiganbayan.
Hon.Felix denied Mayor Natividad¶s motion, and committed the latter to Tarlac Penal Colony.
Issue:
Whether or not Hon. Felex committed grave abuse off discretion in admitting the amended information
filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing Natividad¶s arrest
Held:
No. The latest law on Sandiganbayan (PD 1606) states that there are 2 requirements for an offense to
fall under the Sandiganbayan¶s jurisdiction: 1) offense committed by a public officer must be in relation
to his office, and 2) that the penalty be higher that prision correccional or imprisonmentfor 6 years or a
fine of P6,000. The 2ndrequirement was met, but the 1strequirement was not because the offense
charged was murder. The offense could not have been committed in the performance of the mayor¶s
responsibility to maintain peace and order. The alleged act doesnot fall under any of the functions of the
municipal mayor in the Local Government Code. Also, Natividad wasn¶t denied due process as he has
been afforded every opportunity to present his counter-affidavit. He was notified, but it was he who did
not appear.
…………….
People of the Philippines v. Evangelista
G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista
Ponente: Mendoza, J
Facts:
Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the RTC. He was found guilty and
sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay P
5,000.00 to the offended party for medical expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment, and the
costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the priveleged mitigating circumstances of incomplete
self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the conviction but modified his sentence by imposing an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Private respondent filed a petition for probation. RTC ordered private respondent to report for
interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B.
Valdehueza recommended denial of private respondent’s application for probation on the ground
that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have then applied for probation,
private respondent waived the right to make his application. The RTC set aside the Probation
Officer’s recommendation and granted private respondent’s application for probation. Hence this
petition by the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents is qualified for probation under PD 968
Held: YES. The Court holds that it did. Reason: When the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus the fact that he appealed meant that private respondent was taking
his chances which the law precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment
in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law,
“probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the
administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.”
……
Group 6 Digest
Calalang vs. Williams
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:
The petitioner, Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of
Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30
Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice?
Held:
1. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est
suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
…………………..
Consti II case digest:ESTRADA VS DESIERTO:

Rights of an Accused During Trial SUMMARY OF RIGHTS: CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joseph Estrada accused by Juan Ponce Enrile that he received more than 200M
from jueteng, which was followed by the privilege speech of the minority leader, Guingone,
accused that the petitioner herein received 70M from Singson. Calls for the resignation of the
petitioner. House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment which was signed by
115 members, or more than ⅓ of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner’s Secretary of Finance took the witness stand
alleging that the petitioner herein that he has a Jose Velarde account showing that he has 3.3B.
People also assembled in EDSA shrine praying for the resignation of the Petitioner, and even
some 130, 000 member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines withdraw their support. On
January 20, President Arroyo had her oath as the new President of the Philippines. This take over
of the position was also recognized by other State and when even the Former President of the
United States called her to show recognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court answered in negative. The contention of the petitioner cannot be
sustained that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism.And publicity does not prove by itself that it so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. There must be proof and allegation that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records DO NOT show that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Wherefore,
the petition was denied.
…………………………..
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of rep and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8
of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material
relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service
of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during
and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case
Digest
Newer Post
………….
Statutory Construction- People vs. Purisima
Statutory Construction
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima

GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978
FACTS OF THE CASE:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of
the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
……
Martines vs Court of Appeals
……………………………
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner

GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring
Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with
Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel
street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental
witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the
contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name and thumbmark at
the foot of the testament in the second page, in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses.
However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of
the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. On 22 February 1957, the testator died in
here house in Argao. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and
testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand
margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner
appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because
it involves purely a question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will
void
Held: Yes, Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very
strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the petition for probate is
unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs
counter to the express provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three
instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to
probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law
relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September
1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,
questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during
a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the
donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses
during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates
of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is
contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It
is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of
it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not
be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared
the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso
heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition
in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
Dhere dhere
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by
then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an
undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the
pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment
as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of
his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in
Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them.
An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held: The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace
officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879
(People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with
the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according
to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to
Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs.
Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967,
years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time
of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the
pistol in question.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of
the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional
release; with costs de oficio.
People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to
reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act
6236. Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications
for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31
December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The
judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on
22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor
of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of ¼ each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the
lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of
Cadastral Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general
rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If
RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral
cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The
intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared
public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of
cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes
bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents’
contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which
shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly
extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared
public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA
6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly
did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for
free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from “filing an
application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.”
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating
the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.
Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a
candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in
his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970.
Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent
however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the
jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred
to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of
the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition
on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
“and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution
of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec
from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of
political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement
as to costs.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter,
the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People
vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower
cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus
omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The
application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its
most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said,
who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace
from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the
legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case
for trial on the merits.
Lopez vs. CTA

GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis
of consular and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were
released. Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight
of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount
of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the
appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of
Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal,
Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of
Tax Appeal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other
hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may
appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy
between the two sections, it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act,
the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to
the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over
his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons
affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. The Courts are
not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a
clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the
evident intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA
1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with
costs.
Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17
May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the
President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis
Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said
election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin
A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as
member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A.
Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned
from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of a certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one
construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated
therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials,
the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to
appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading “any person
holding public appointive office or position,” is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that
when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative intent to cover public
appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be
construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan
Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s
Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.
Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]

Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.
Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for
the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a
sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in
consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls
and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein.
Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo,
however, was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967.
Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential
damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs.
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract
which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI
of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the
court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.
1. Where personal actions may be filed
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same
rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or
transferred from one province to another.
2. “May” only permissive
The word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under
ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty.
“May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case
at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said
stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga.
They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek
recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See
related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Since the
complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is
properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]

Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur
Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital
to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in
Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling,
she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at
Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she
enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic
records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S.
Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed
any felony or misdemeanor.
She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially
denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the
surname.
The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to
change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon;
without costs.
1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively
The word “principally” as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively”
so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in
reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally
use the surname of her father.
2. Grounds for change of name
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may
warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is
a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion,
the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S.
Alfon since childhood.
Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]

Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on
different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol,
denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a
single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17
months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When
the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for
probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura
is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable
to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court
denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence
the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the
petitioner’s application for probation; without costs.
1. “Previous” applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime
The statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the
crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment.
When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the
subject of his application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the
crime.
………………………..
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as

guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants.
CASE NUMBER
G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921
CASE TITLE
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose
Garcia,objectors-appellants.
LAWYERS
Dionisio Villanueva for appellants.
Marcelino Lontok for appellee.
PONENTE
STREET, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera instituted for probate of the will
of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the
capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified — with details not necessary to be here specified — that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing
faculties. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted
for by the proponent of the will. After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the
proof thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will
was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He
accordingly admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE
whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the
will instead of the left margin.
HELD
YES, The second point involved in this case is whether, under section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction
that the names of the testator and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the left margin
of each page, as required in said Act, and not upon the right margin, as in the will now before us;
and upon this we are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says
that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each
and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is also
deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.Thus, such deviation must be considered
too trivial to invalidate the instrument. The judgment appealed from will be affirmed.Costs
against the appellants.
……..
LINDASAN vs COMELECFACTS:
Petitioner Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan
came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang,also in the Province of Cotabato and not of
Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]
Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints forvoter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified forbeing unconstitutional
because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it wouldbe including in
the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE:
won RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province -
Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which
may be enactedinto law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill?
HELD:
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title
did notinform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in thetowns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of theirterritory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected bythe bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to theprejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against theconstitutionality of RA 4790.
…………………………..
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA

G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries.
Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal,
CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.

In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have
been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was
and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility
is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or
supervision."
………………..
Statutory Construction- People vs. Purisima

Statutory Construction
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima

GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978
FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of
the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
I hope this helps.

……
People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980)
25
APR
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial
Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,
ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and
MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging
them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be
arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five
informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the
land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with
the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to
agricultural lands.
HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to
urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a
tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
…………………..
TRANQUILINO ROA vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. L-7011 October
30, 1912 Facts:
An appeal from the Court of First Instance of Cebu’s order recommitting Tranqilino Roa,
appellant, to the custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring its right to deport the
appellant to China as he is a subject of the Chinese Empire and has no right to enter and live
within the Philippine territory
On July 6, 1889, appellant was born in Luculan, Mindanao to father, Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a
Chinese native, and mother and native to he Philippines, Basilia Rodriguez
Appellant’s parents were legally married in the Philippins during his time of birth
In 1895, the father of Roa eturned to China and died in 1900
In 1901, Roa went to China on the sole purpose to study there

Roa returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship, Kaifong, on October 1, 1910 from
Amoy, China. The appellant was a few days under 21 years and three months of age
The Board of Special Inquiry found Roa as a Chinese and not a citizen of the Philippine Islands
thereby not entitling him to land
Roa was born in lawful wedlock
The appeal to the Incular Collector of Customs was affirmed and the Court of First Instance of
Cebu remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs
The laws of the Philippine Islands state that children, while they remain under parental authority,
born in the Philippine Islands have the nationality of their parents Issue:
Whether or not Tranquilino Roa is a citizen of the Philippine Islands. Held:
Yes, Roa is a citizen of the Philippine Islands
Appellant follows the nationality of his mother, thereby making him a citizen of the Philippine
Islands
Section of the Philippine Bill: “

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
”
"no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and
more constantly acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be
in favor of the claimant of it."
…………………….
PEOPLE vs. LIDRESG.R. No. L-12495, July 26, 1960

Barrera, J.
FACTS:Dionisio Lidres was charged with the crime of usurpation of official functions asdefined
and penalized in Republic Act No. 10 at the Court of First Instance of Cebuconsidering that he
perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade classof the Biasong Elementary
School which was assigned to and occupied by Miss JosetaDiutay who had been duly appointed
to said position. The accused pleaded not guilty during arraignment and after trial, he was
foundguilty to the crime charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 3
years to 5 years, and to pay the costs. Hence, he appealed the said judgmentalleging the error
based on the trial court’s finding that he was guilty of the crime of usurpation of the official
functions.Records show that a certain Magdalena P. Echavez who is a public school teacher
atBiasong Elementary School in Cebu was granted maternity leave. Then, Josita Diotayand
defendant Lidres filed their respective applications as substitute teachers. Thus,the supervising
teacher Hilario Laspiñas recommended Diotay to fill up the position of Echavez wherein an
agreement of “50-50 basis” shall be equally divided betweenthem. Diotay then took over the job
of Echavez and began teaching the secondgrade class in said school.On the basis of the above-
mentioned agreement, the defendant prepared aresignation letter for Diotay to sign to which the
latter refused to do so. Thus, thedefendant insisted in taking over the class of Diotay wherein one
of them conductedclasses with the other 2 rows of pupils. The said incident was reported by
Diotay tothe principal teacher.On the following day, both Diotay and defendant were summoned
by the supervisingteacher (Laspiñas) for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said
supervisingteacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go
backto school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant again took over Diotay's classagainst
the latter's will.Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at
thebeginning of this opinion.ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant should be held liable for the
crime of usurpation of official functions under Republic Act No. 10?
HELD:Appellant now contends in his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to
hiscase because this law is an emergency measure and intended to apply only tomembers of
subversive organizations.Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of
subversiveorganizations, it is neither alleged in the information aforequoted, nor proved
duringthe trial that defendant is a member of said seditious organizations engaged insubversive
activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under said provisionof Republic Act. No.
10.But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense"without
pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts alleged in theinformation fail to
constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of authority, as
distinguished from usurpation of official functions, underthe first paragraph of Article 177, as
amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely,that of representing to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department oragency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, inasmuch as theinformation does not charge the same.Wherefore, the decision
appealed from was reversed; the accused acquitted, withcosts de oficio, and the bond given for
his provisional liberty cancelled.
……………
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest

Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the
municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to
tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish
municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by
P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No.
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual
role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it
in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of
the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and
fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
…………………………
CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. OPLE

GR. No. L-44717
28 August 1985
FACTS:On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint
with the Department of Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten
(10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal
holidays from November 1, 1974. Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside
the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its
decision on the provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law and abused his
discretion in denying the claim of petitioners HELD:While it is true that the respondent Minister
has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the
statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. An administrative interpretation which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously
ultra vires. Any slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with
the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor..
…………………

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Topic: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Definition

Caltex v. Palomar 18 SCRA 247

BANAWA VS. MIRANO

GUEVARA VS. INOCENTES

RESINS VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

CRISOLO VS. MACADAEG

MORALES VS. SUBIDO

VERA VS. AVELINO

Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the Commission on elections

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections

Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting

Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STAE DECISIS: Void for vagueness

People of the Philippines vs. Jabinal

PERFECTO VS. MEER

ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

The appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

LEGACY OF THE CHURCH

2. Whether or not SSS Resolution No. 56 is valid.

This is a petition filed by AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA seeking

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

The constitutionality requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.

Decision affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATIONS: General, Special or Local

Decision affirmed with costs against the City of Manila.

Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATIONS: Remedial, Penal or Curative

Tañada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

Topic: LAW CLASSIFICATION: Prospective or Retroactive

This is a petition to oppose reopening of cadastral proceedings under RA 931,

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN,

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Parts of a law – Title

CENTRAL CAPIZ VS. RAMIREZ

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO

The title of the Order speaks of “COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES”. There is no mention

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ABOITIZ VS. CITY OF CEBU

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Parts of a law – Context

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

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Short Title: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Punctuation Marks

Short Title: Florentino and Zandueta v. PNB

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Punctuation Marks

Short Title: People v. Subido

Topic: US v. WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD,

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Words and phrases

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Fule v. Court of Appeals

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Grammatical Aids – Words and phrases

Topic: AIDS TO STATCON: Headnotes or epigraphs