3rd DCA On Miami-Dade Co Vs Matheson 2015

40 Fla. L.
Weekly 01267
I l
Cases that cite th is headnote

187 So.3d 221
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District. (2) Counties
- Ordin ances and by-laws
Bruce C. MATHESON, Appellant, The court should invalidate a county
V. referendum ballot question only if the record
MIAMI-DADE COUNIY , Florida, a politic al shows that the ballot language is clearly and
Subdivision of the State of Florida, and International co nclusively defective. (Per Fernande z, J.,
Player s Championship, Inc., Appe llees. with one judge concurring separate ly.) West's
F.S.A. § 101.161(1) .
No. 3D14-405.
Cases that cite th is headnote
I
May 27, 2015.
I (3) Election Law
Rehearing Denied April 15, 2016. - Ballots in genera l
Synopsis Purpose of requirem ent that the substance

Background:Heirs of grantors of deed to land used as of a public measure be print ed in "clear
a public park brought action against county cha llenging and unambiguous" language on the ballot is
lawfulness of county referendum ask ing voters if they to provide the vo ter with fair notice of the
approved construction of new permanent facilities at content of the proposed measure so that he
tennis center in th e park. Operators of profe ssiona l tennis or she will not be misled as to its purpose
tournament intervened. The Circuit Court, Miami - Dade and may intelligently cast his or her vote.
County, Mar c Schumacher , J., entered judgment in favor (Per Fernand ez, J ., with one judge concurring
of county and tournament operators. Heirs appealed. separate ly.) West's F.S .A . § 101.161( 1).
Cases that cite this head note
(Holding:)The District Court of Appeal , Fernandez , J.,

)4) Election Law
held that ballot summary properly provided voters with
Ballots in genera l
"chief purpo se" of referendum.
Ballot question does not have to expla in
every detail or ram ificat ion of the propo sed
Affirmed. amendment; it only must describe its chief
purpo se. (Per Fernandez, J., with one
Emas , J., filed concurring opinion. judge concurring separate ly.) West's F .S.A. §
101.16 1(1).
Wells, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Cases tha t cite this head note
(5) Counties
West Headnot es (5)
.,- Ordinances and by-laws
Ballot summary prop erly pro vided voters
Ill Appeal and Error with "chief purpo se" of county referendum
¥- De novo review asking voters if they approved construction
The standard of review of a trial court's ruling of new permanent facilities at tenni s center
on a summary judgm ent motion is de novo. in public park ; a lthoug h summ ary failed to
(Per Fernandez, J. , with one judge concurr ing detail all approvals on which improvements
sepa rately. ) hinged , it wou ld have been impossible to
40 Fla. L. Weekly D1267
present a ny question listing all the required Th e Agreement was amended m 1988 and 1990 and
development approva ls within the 75-word remains in effect through 2023.
limit, question gave voters the material
terms of proposed additional permanent In 1988, heirs of Malcom and Julia Matheson sued
structures and material terms of extensio n th e County , alleging, among other things, that th e IPC
and modification of coun ty's agreement with Agre ement violated a deed restriction that required the
opera tor s of professional tennis tournament , County to use Crando n Park "fo r public park purposes
and process for obta ining remaining required on ly." White v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 563 So.2d 117,
approvals stayed the same following passage 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). In White, this Court held
of refere ndum. (Per Ferna nd ez, J. , with one that "co nstruction of the tennis complex did not violate
judge concurring separately.) West's F.S.A . § the 'public park purposes only' provision of the deed
101.161. restriction." Id. at 123-24 . 1
Cases that cite this headnote

In 1991, the Matheson heirs filed a seco nd lawsui t in Dade
County v. Matheson , 605 So .2d 469 (Fla . 3d DCA 1992) ,
trying to aga in prohibit the construction of the tennis
stadium at Crandon Park. Id. at 470 . This Court agreed
Attorneysand Law Firms with the County a nd held that the issue of whether or
not a stad ium may be built as part of the tennis compl ex
*221 Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, R ichard J . Ovelmen ,
had a lready been decided by thi s Court in White. Thus ,
Enrique D . Arana and Jason P. Kairalla , Miami , for
th e Matheson heirs were not permitted to re-litigate the
appe llant.
County's ability to build the tennis stadium in the tenn is
*222 Steams Weaver Miller Weissler A lhadeff & comp lex. Id.
Sitterson, Eugene E. Stearn s, Joshua A. Munn and
Jo seph J. Onorati , Miami ; R .A . Cuevas , Jr. , Miami - Dade Thereafter , in order to resolve th e litigation , the County
County Attorney , Oren Rosenthal , Miami, Monica Rizo and the Matheson heirs en tered int o a Settlement
and Miguel A . Gonzalez , for appellees. Agreement in 1993. Thi s Settlement Agreement ordered
the creat ion of the Cra nd on Park Master Plan , "depicting
Before WELLS , EMAS and FERNANDEZ , JJ. a ll permitted uses of various areas on the Crandon Park
lands , including guide lin es and sta nda rds for the typ e,
Opinion location , size, co lor, landscaping and other features of all
structures, improvements and recreational facilities to be
FERNANDEZ , J.
located" on the Crandon Park lands. The Master Plan is
Bruce C. Matheson appea ls the final judgm ent entered contained in the Amended Fina l Jud gment in Matheson
by the trial court in favor of Miami-Dade County and v. M etropolitan Dade County, No. 88- 2449 1 (Fla. I 1th
In ternatio nal Player s Championship, Inc. and against Cir.Ct. Oct. 18, 2000). It was a lso recorded as a restrictive
Matheson on all counts. We affirm the final judgm ent covenant running wit h the land, in the public records of
on all cou nt s because the tria l court's finding that the Miami - Dade Co unt y.
"c hief purpo se" of the referendum was properly provided
to Miami-Dade Co unty voters by the title and ballot This Ma ster Plan , however , 1s not fixed but rather
summ ary is correct. is ame nab le to modification. *223 The Settlement
Agr eement entered into by the Matheson heirs and the
In 1986, Miami - Dade County and International Players County provided for ways to amend the Crandon Park
Championsh ip, Inc. (IPC) entered into an agreement for Master Plan. The Settlement Agreemen t stated, in part:
IPC to operate a men's and women's professiona l tenni s
The Cra ndon Park Master
tournament from the Crandon Park Tenni s Center in
Plan as implemented by the
Crandon Park, Key Biscayne , F lorida. IPC cond ucts what
above ment ioned Decl aratio n of
is today the Miami Open. At the time, it was the Lipton
Restr ictions and Fi na l Judgment,
International Players Champions hip T enni s Tournament.
may be ame nd ed following ado ption

onl y by th e followin g proced ur e: (1)
the County by affirmativ e vote of
the Cou nt y Boar d of Commissioners
( I) Wh enever a cons titutional
amendment or ot her public
measure is submitted to the vote
--
["BOCC "] sha ll propo se an of the people, a ballot summar y
amendment throu gh ac tion by of such ame ndm ent or other
resolution; (2) th e County shall public measure shall be printed in
appoint two persons to a Committee clear and una mbi guou s language
on Amendment of th e Cra ndon on the ballot after the list of
Park Ma ster Plan , and the Nationa l candid ates , followed by the word
Pa rks a nd Co nversa tion Associa tion "yes " and also by the word " no ,"
(or a successor non-profit park and shall be styled in such a
pre servati on organization mutually mann er that a "yes" vote will
agreed up on by th e Par ties) sha ll indica te approval of th e proposal
likewise appoint two members to a nd a " no" vote will indicate
such Com mitte e on Am endm ent of rejection . Th e ballot summ ary of
the Cra ndon P ark M as ter Plan .... th e amendment or ot her public
measure a nd the ballot title to
ap pear on th e ballot shall be
In additi on, the Amend ed Fin a l Jud gment in case numb er
emb odied in the constitutional
88-2 4491 , Malcom Math eson, Jr. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, reflects that the Ma ster Plan ca n be changed. revision commis sion proposal ,
co nstituti onal convention
Th e Declara tion of Restrictive Cove nant s also state s that
pro po sa l, taxa tion and budget
amendin g the Ma ster Pla n is possible. 2
reform comm issio n propo sal, or
ena blin g resolution or ordinance.
Section 7.02, " Restri ction s and Exception s," of
Th e ballot summ ary of th e
Articl e 7 of the Miami - Dade Co unt y Hom e Rule
a mendment or other public
Char ter- " PARKS , AQUATI C PRESERVES , AND
measure shall be an explanatory
PRES ERV A Tl ON LANDS ," states in pert inent part:
sta tement , not exceedin g 75 wo rd s
in length , of the chief purpose
In furtherance of this po licy parks
shall be used for publi c park of the meas ure. In ad diti on, for
purp oses only , and subject to th e every amendment propos ed by
limited exceptions set forth in thi s initiative, the ballot sha ll include ,
Article , there shall be no perm anent follow ing the ballot summ ary ,
stru ctur es or privat e commercial a separa te fina ncial impact
advertising erec ted in a publi c sta tement concerning th e meas ure
*224 park or private co mm ercial prepared by the Finan cial
use of a publi c park or renewals, Im pact Estimating Co nferen ce in
expan sion s, or extens ions of existing acco rdan ce with s. 100.37 1(5).
leases , licenses, or concessions to Th e ballot title sha ll consist of a
pri vate par ties of publi c park cap tion, not exceedi ng 15 words
pr ope rty, unle ss each such stru ctu re, in lengt h, by which the measure is
lease, license, renewal, expa nsio n, commonl y referr ed to or spoken
exte nsion, concession or use sha ll be of. This sub secti on does not app ly
approved by a majorit y vot e of the to co nst itution al amendm ent s
voters in a co unty-wid e referendum. or revisions proposed by joint
reso lution.
In additi on, section 101.161( 1), Fl orid a Statut es (2012),
sta tes: Crand on Park is one of the listed parks in Articl e 7, which
require s an affirmative vo te of two-thir ds of the electorate
of Miami-Dade County before any development can Plan and the Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, and
occur there. becau se it could not be implemented without approval of
the Amendment Committee and a vote of the BOCC) ;
Consequently, on August 23, 2012, the BOCC adopted 2) that the propo sal was non-binding and thus violated
Resolution R- 660- 12, which scheduled for November 6, Article 7 of the Home Rule Charter; and 3) that the
2012, a county-wide referendum election, asking voters if ballot title and summ ary failed to disclose facts and thus
they approved construction of new permanent facilities violated the "Truth in Government " provi sion of the
within the Crandon Park Tenni s Center. The referendum County Charter and that Miami - Dade County Ma yor
also asked voters if they approved modification of existing Carlos Gimenez violated the same pro vision by stating
contractual relationships between Miami - Dad e County that the improv ement s would be paid for with private
and IPC. Specifically, the title and wording of the ballot funds.
were the following:
Mathe son eventually moved for summary judgment.
Referendum Regarding Structures and Modification of Following the BOCC's approval of the ag reements , the
Existing Agreements for the Tennis Center at Crandon County and IPC also moved for sum mary judgment.
Park The trial court denied Matheson's motion and granted
summar y judgment against Mathe son on all three coun ts
In accordance with Article 7 of the Home Rule Charter ,
of his complaint. On appea l, Mathe son contends that the
do you approve as set forth in Resolution R- 660-12:
ballot language fails the requirement s of section l O1.161( l )
Erection of permanent structures and expansion of by "hiding the ball " a nd " flying under false colors. "
existing stru ctures at Crandon Park Tenni s Center for
public park and tenni s tourn a ment use, which shall be Ill 121 The standard of review of a trial court's ruling
funded solely by tennis center and tournam ent revenues on a summary judgment mot ion is de novo. Volusia Cnty .
and privat e funds; and v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P. , 760 So.2d 126, 130
(F la .2000). How ever, with regard to the ballot question at
Modification and exte nsion of agreements with issue in this appeal , this Court should invalidate it " only
operator of Son y Open Tenni s Tournament or its if the record shows that the [ballot language] is clearly and
successors? conclusively defective. " Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7,
11 (Fla.2000) .
Resolution R-66 0-12 included two exhibits - Exhibit
A, descr ibing "Th e Propo sed Additional Permanent 131 141 Section 10 1.161(1) requires that the substanc e of
Structures," a nd Exhibit B, describing the " Propo sed the public measure be printed in "clea r and unambiguous"
Terms for the Extension and Modification *225 of language on the ballot. According to City of Miami v.
the Existing Agreements for Use of the Crandon Park Staats, 919 So.2d 485, 487 (Fla . 3d DCA 2005), " [t]he
Tennis Center for the Sony Open." Exhibit A described purpose of this requirement is to provide the voter with
and limited the dimension and scope of the proposed fair notice of the content of the propo sed mea sure so
perman ent structure in great detail. In ad dition , Exhibit B that he or she will not be misled as to its purpose and
pro vided the materi al terms for extendin g and modifying ma y intelligently cas t his or her vote. " S ee also Askew
the existin g agree ments between Miami - Dade County v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 15 1, I 55 (Fla .1982) (stating "the
and IPC. Seventy-two percent of the voters approve d the ballot must give the voter fair notic e of the decision he
referendum. mu st make"). Section 101.16 1(1) requires that the County
and !P C explain to voters, in a summary not exceeding
Bruce C. Matheson then brought suit aga inst Miami - seventy-five words , the "chief purpose of the measure. "
Dade County to declare the referendum unlawful. IPC Florida Jaw makes it clear that the ballot question does
moved to int ervene, and the trial court allowed the not have to "explain every detail or ram ificat ion of the
intervention. In his co mplaint , Math eson alleged three propos ed amendment. " City of Rivi era Beach v. R iviera
counts: 1) that the referendum "flew und er false colors" Beach Citizens Task Force, 87 So.3d 18 (Fla . 4th D CA
and "hid the ball, " in violation of section 101.161(1) 2012) (quot ing Fla. Educ. Ass'n 11. Fla. Dep't of Stat e, 48
because it did not disclose that the expansion was So.3d 694, 700(F la.20 12)). It only must describe its chief
prohibited by the Settlement Agreement, the Master
purpose. Id. ; see also L et Miami Beach Decide v. City of

Mi ami Beach, 120 So.3d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Three approvals are needed in order to make changes to
the Master Plan: 1) voter approval via referendum; 2) the
15) Matheson contends on appeal that the ballot did BOCC's approva l; and 3) the Committee on Amendment's
not contain sufficient details. However, there is no approva l. Nowhere in the record does it specify in which
requirement that all the details of a proposal must be order these appro vals need to be obtained , and that is
explained to voters. Florida courts have previously held because there is no requirement that these approvals be
that section 101.161(1) does not require *226 excessive obtained in any particular order. It just so happens that ,
detail. See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Cnty, in this case, compliance with Article 7 was the first step
394 So.2d 981, 987 (Fla . 1981); Miami H eat Ltd. P'ship v. taken by Miami - Dade County and IP C. This was not
L eahy, 682 So.2d 198, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). merely a "straw ballot," as Matheson suggests because
the County and IPC were required under Florida law in
Matheson further alleges that the County and IPC Article 7 of the Home Rule Charter to present this issue
"hid the ball" regarding the proposal's chief purpose. to the voters. Because Crandon Park is one of the listed
However, this is inaccurate. As previously discussed, the parks in Article 7, it requires an affirmative vote of two -
Crandon Park Tennis Center improvements hinge on thirds of the electorate of Miami - Dade County before any
severa l approvals. As the County contends, it would be development can occur there. The only way to get this
impossible for it to present any question listing all the affirmative vote was to put it on a ballot for the voters to
required development approvals that were needed within vote.
the seventy-five word limit requir ed by section IO1.161(1).
This is why the ballot questions referenced Resolution R- In support of his position , Matheson cites to Askew v.
660- 12, which contained all the details. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla.1982 ); however this case
is inapplicable here. In A skew, the trial court entered
The referendum adv ised voters that their approval was an order validating the capt ion and summary of a
being sought , in accordance with Article 7 of Miami - Dade propo sed constitut iona l amendment schedu led to appear
County's Home Rule Charter, to permit IPC to build on the November 1982 general election ballot. Id. at
add itiona l permanent struc ture s at the Tennis Center and 152. Previously , in the November 1976 genera l election,
to allow extension and modification of the agreement with Florida voters approved add ing section 8, the "Sunshine
IPC. The ballot question gave vote rs the material terms Amendment, " to Article II of Florida 's Constitution. Id.
of the proposed additional permanent struct ures and the Section 8 declared a public office a public trust which
material terms of the extension and modification of the should be *227 secure against abuse. As a result, section
IPC Agreement. As such, the County and IPC are correct 8 required full, public financial disclosure by elected
that the "chief purpose " of the Tennis Center Referendum officers and candidate s for elected offices, provided for
was communicated. This "chief purpose " was to find loss of pens ion or retirement benefits if a pub lic officer
out if at least two-thirds of the electorate in Miami - or emp loyee is convicted of a felonious breach of the
Dade County supp or ted 1) the "erect ion of permanent public trust, and prohibited members of the legislature
structures and the expansion of existing structures at the and statew ide elected officers from lobby ing their former
Crandon Park Tennis Cen ter for public park and tennis governmenta l bodie s or agencies for two years following
tournament use, which sha ll be funded so le by tennis vacation of office. Id. at 153.
center and tournament revenues and private funds ," and
2) the "mod ification and extension of agreements with the On the next to last day of the 1982 regular session, the
operators of the Sony Open Tennis Tournament or its legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 1035. Id. The
successors ." Because the chief purpose of the referendum title read: "A joint resolution proposing an amendment to
did not alter or change procedures for amending the Section 8 of Art icle II of the State Const itut ion relating
Crandon Park Master Plan, the referendum did not to lobbying by former legislators and statewide elected
violate section l O1.161( ! ). Even after the referendum officers." Id. The proposed amendment would remove
passed with two-thirds of the electorate voting in its the two-year ban on lobbying by former legislators and
favor, the process for obtaining the remaining required elected officers, retaining that ban only if an affected
approva ls stayed the same.
40 Fla. L. Weekly 01267
person failed to make financial disclosure. The title and The ballot summary neglects to
substance propo sed was the following: advise the public that ther e is
presently a complete two-year ban
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BEFORE on lobb ying before one's agency and ,
LOBBYING BY FORMER LEGISLATORS AND while it does require the filing of
STATEWIDE ELECTED OFFICERS finan cial disclosure before anyone
ma y appear before any agency for
Prohibit s former legislators and statew ide elected
the two years after leaving office,
officers from rep resenting other per sons or entitie s for
the amendment's chief effect is to
compensation before a ny sta te government body for a
abolish the present two-year tota l
period of 2 years following vacation of office, unless
prohibition. Although the summ ary
they file full and publ ic disclosure of their financial
indicate s that the amendment is
intere sts. a restriction on one's lobbying
activities, the amendm ent actually
Id.
gives incumbent office holder s,
The appe llant s sued the Secretar y of State to prevent upon filing a financial disclosure
inclusion of the propo sed title and sub stance on the state ment , a right to immediat ely
Nove mber ballot. Appellants claimed the title and commence lobbying before *228
substance were misleading under section IO1.16 1 because, their former agencies which is
among other thing s, "the instant summ ary discloses presently pr eclud ed. The prob lem,
only the prop osed addition of finan cial disclosur e as a therefore, lies not with what the
cond ition to after-term lobbyin g and fails to revea l that summ ary says, but , ra ther , with
the propo sal would repeal the existing, more stringent what it doe s not say.
after-term prohibition on lobbyin g." Id. at 154. The trial
Id. at 155- 56 (footnote omitted) . The same cannot be
court found that the language was clear and unambi guous
said for Mathe son' s case now before this Cou rt. The
as to the chief purpo se of the measure. Th e Florid a
purp ose in Askew was to impo se an immediate change.
Suprem e Court disag reed.
Th e referendum in that case was misleading because it
appeared th at it was increasing the prohibition , but in
Th e Florid a Supreme Court stated:
actuality, it was lessening the existing prohibition. In the
Th e requir ement for propo sed constitutional case before us, the "chief purpo se" of the referendum was
amendm ent ballots is the same as for all ballots, i.e., to find out if at least two-thirds of the voters supp orted
"that the voter shou ld not be misled and that he ha ve what was being asked in the referendum. However, there
an opportunity to know and be on notic e as to the was no immediate change to anything after the results of
propos ition on which he is to cast his vote .... All that the the refere ndum were tallied. Th e only result was that the
Constitution requ ires or that the law compels or ought public, by an affirmat ive vote of more than two-third s
to compe l is that the voter have notic e of that which he of the electorat e, appro ved the proposed development
must decide .... What the law requir es is that the ballot at Cran don Park and the modificati on of agreements
be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enab le him relating thereto. In addition , the ballot here did not
intelligently to cast his ballot." try to accom plish the opposi te of what the voters were
being asked, which is what happened in Askew. As such,
Id. at 155 (quoting Hill v. Miland er, 72 So.2d 796, 798 Askew is dist inguishable and does not supp ort Matheson's
(F la. I 954)). The Court further state d, "S imply put, the position.
ballot mu st give the voter fair notice of the decision he
mu st make. " Id. The Court add ed: Matheson also cites to Arm strong v. Harris, 773 So.2d
7 (Fla .2000), in support of his position that the ballot
As it stands, subsection 8(e) language is misleading by "hidin g the ball" and "flying
precludes lobbying a former body under false colors." Ho wever, a review of Armstrong
or agency for two years after indicates that it, too, is distinguishable and does not
an affected person leaves o ffice. support his position.
issue in Askew, the present ballot "is decepti ve, because
In Arms trong, a referendum was held where in voters were although it contain s an absolutely true statement , it
asked to vote in favor of amending Florid a's Constitution omit s to stat e a mater ial fact necessary in order to
to make it eas ier to impo se the death pena lty. Id. at make the statement made not misleading ." Askew , 421
9- 10. If the voters approved the a mendm ent , the basis So.2d at 158 (Ehrlich , J., conc urrin g). Th e only way
for imp osing th e death penalty would have changed a vote r would know what changes were being effected
immediately. Id. at 18. Just as in Askew, the ballot qu estion by an affirmative vote on the ballot would be to know
in Armst rong was misleading beca use it concea led what what section 2.11 of the cou nty charter pro vided prio r
the amendment did . Th e ballot question was tryin g to to amendment. As then Jud ge Grime s noted in his
accomplish the opposite of what the voters were being dissent below: " [T]here was nothing on the ballot to
asked. The chief purpo se of the referendum in Arm strong inform the voter of the change to be acco mplished by
was to ch ange Fl orida's Constitution. As pr eviously the amendment, which is the very reaso n why section
discussed, that is not the case before us, so Armstrong is IO1.161(I) requires an exp lanatory statem ent. " 50 I
also inappli cable . So.2d at 124 (Gr imes, J., dissentin g). See also Kobrin
v. Leahy, 528 So.2d 392 (F la. 3d DCA) (plac ement
Matheson further cites to Wadhams v. Board of on ballot of prop osition to provide th at the boar d of
County Commissioners of Sarasota County, 567 co unt y co mmissioners sha ll be the govern ing boar d
So.2d 414 (Fla.1990) . In that case, the Board of of the fire and rescue service district , but makin g no
Co unty Commissioners of Sarasota Co unt y pro posed mention of the elimination of the existing governing
amendme nt s to the co unt y charter concerning meetings body of the Fire and Rescue District , was misleadin g
of the county's Charter Review Boa rd. Id. at 415. The to voters a nd violated section 101.161( 1), especially in
proposed amendm ents were approved by a majority of the light of simultaneou sly conducted election of per sons to
voters. Id. Petitioners then filed a complaint challenging the existing governin g board), review denied, 523 So.2d
the amendment to the count y charter , contendin g that 577 (Fla. 1988).
the referendum failed to comply with section 101.161(1)
Id. at 416- 17 (empha sis in original).
because it did not provide a summar y of the propose d
change s. Id. Th e tria l co urt did not invalidate the result s of
Again , the ballot question was misleading becau se it failed
the referendum , and the Second District Co urt of Appeal
to includ e the expla na tory sta tement required by section
affirmed, stat in g th at " [t]he fact that a ballot may be
101.161(1), and thu s failed to inform the voter s of the
conf using to some does not ma ndate a co urt to inva lidate
"chief purpose" of the mea sure. It told the voters that
the results of an otherwise prop erly conducted election."
the Charter Review Board would only be permitt ed to
Id. (citati ons omitted) .
meet once every four yea rs, but failed to tell them that
Th e Fl orida Supreme Court disagree d a nd stated that there wa s present ly no restrict ion on meetings and that the
the ballot in Wadhams had the same problem as the chief purp ose of the amendment was to curtail the Charter
ballot in Askew. Wadhams, 567 So .2d at 416 . The Court Review Board's right to meet. In the facts of Math eson's
stated that the "chief purpos e" of the referendum was not appeal , the referendum (which was just a few words shy
communi ca ted to the voters: of the seventy-five word maximum requirement) included
a reference to R-660 - 12, which had all the details of the
By containing the enti re section as it would actua lly existing structur es expans ion , as well as the detail s of the
appear subsequent to amendm ent, rather than a modification a nd extension of the existing agreements .
summ ary of the am endment to the section, the ballot
arguably inform ed the voters that the Chart er Review Similarly , Ma theson's reliance on thi s Court 's opinion in
Boa rd would only be permitted to meet once every Miami - Dade County v. Village of Pinecrest, 994 So.2d
four years. By failing to conta in an exp lanatory *229 456 (Fla . 3d DCA 2008), is misplaced, as this case does
sta tement of the amendment , however , the ballot failed not supp ort his position. In Village of Pinecrest, Miami -
to inform the publi c that there was presentl y no Dade Co unt y presented a ballot qu estion add ressing the
restrictio n on meet ings and that the chief purpose of system by which fire an d rescue services are provided to
the amendment was to curt a il the Charter Review the citizens of Miami - Dad e Co unty. The ballot tit le and
Board' s right to meet. Simila r to the 6allot summa ry at summ ary were the following:
, .. . ,....,,... .. . . , .. .. I":"\ .... r'\ .. I"\ ..,...,

COUNTY CHARTER AMENDMENT Id. This is very different from the facts in the case before
CREATING UN IFORM COUNTYWIDE us. The referendum in the case before us did not fail to
FIRE AND RESC UE SER VICE AND mention anything. Th e referendum here did not allege
PRESERVING EXISTING CITY SERVICE that it created any new rights for citizens while act ually
doing the opp osite and eliminat ing existing rights. Th e
SHALL TH E CHA RTER BE AMENDED TO referendum at issue before us simply provided voters
REQUIRE TH AT THE BOARD OF COU NTY with deta iled info rmat ion regar ding the Cra ndon Park
COMM ISSIONERS PRO VIDE A UN IFORM , expa nsion, co nsistent with Fl orida law and Article 7 of
COUNTYWIDE SYSTEM OF FIR E PROTE CTIO N Miami- Dade County' s Home Rul e Charter.
AND RESCUE SERVI CES FOR ALL
INC ORPORATED AND UNINCORPORATED In sum, the referendum did not "hide the ball" or
AREA S OF TH E COUNTY WITH TH E "fly under false colors ." Section 101.161, of the Florida
EXCEPTION OF THE CITIES OF MIAMI , MIAMI Statute s, required that IPC and Miami - Dade Coun ty
BEACH , HIALEAH , CORAL GABLES , AND KEY tell the voters , in clear and un amb iguous langu age, the
BISCAYNE WHI CH MAY PROVID E FOR FIRE chief purpose of the referendum. And the referend um
AND RES CUE PROTECTION SER VICES WITHI N did ju st th at. Th e referendum language was clear and
THOSE CITIES? unambi guou s and not misleading. It info rmed the voters
of its chief purpose, which was to find out whet her at
*230 Id. at 457- 58 (emphasis in original). In Village of
least two-thi rds of the voters supp or ted 1) the "[e]rection
Pinecrest, the appellees claimed that the ballot title was
of permanent struc tu res and the expansion of existing
misleading because it implied there previously did not
struct ures at Cra nd on Park Tennis Center for public
exist a "uniform countywide fire and rescue service." Id.
park and tennis tourn ament use, which [would] be fund ed
at 458. Th e app ellees further argued the ballot summ ary
solely by tennis center and tournament revenues and
was misleading because it failed to adv ise vote rs th at it
private funds; and 2) the [m]odification and extension of
curt ailed th eir right to esta blish their own system. Id. The
agreements with the opera tor of the Sony Open Tenni s
pr ovision of the Charter which the appellees claimed the
Tournam ent or its successors" . The referendum did not
Count y fatally failed to mention in the ballot summary was
change in any way the proced ure for amend ing the
the following:
Crandon Park Master Plan. The referendum language
SECTION 6.02 MUNICIPAL POWERS comp lied with Article 7 of Miami-Dade Co unt y's Home
Rule Charter and section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes
Each municipality shall have the authority to exercise (20 12). Accordingly, we affirm the trial cour t's Final
all powers relating to its local affairs not inco nsistent Judgm ent.
with thi s char ter. Each municip ality may provide for
higher standa rds of zon ing, service and regulat ion than Affirmed.
those pro vided by the Boar d of Cou nty Comm issioners
in or der that its individua l character and stand ards may
be preserved for citizens.
EMAS , J ., concurs.
Miami- Dad e Count y, Fla ., Charter art. 6, § 6.02.
EMAS , J., concurr ing.
Th is Co urt agreed with the Village of Pinecres t, sta ting: I concur in affirming the final jud gment below, and write
to further expla in my rea sons.
This proposa l doe s bo th . It "flies under false colors"
of a titl e that promises to be "C reating (a] Uniform
Altho ugh our stand ard of review is de novo, such review
Countywide Fire and Rescue Service" when one has
is tempered by the "strong pub lic policy again st court s
existed in Miami - Dade Co unt y for nearly thirty years,
interfering in the democratic processes of elections. " Let
and "hides the ball" by purporting to create new rights
Miami Beach Decide v. City of *231 Miami Beach, 120
for the citizens while actually curt ailing or eliminating
So.3d 1282 (Fla . 3d DCA 2013) (quotin g Fla. L eague of
existing right s.
Ci1ies v. Smith , 607 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1992)). Therefore ,
40 Fla . L. Weekly D1267
"[a] court may declare a propo sed ... amendment invalid park or private commercia l use
only if the record shows that the propo sa l is clearly and of a publi c park or renewals ,
conclusively defective. " O'Connell v. Martin Cnty ., 84 expan sions, or extension of existing
So.3d 463, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Armstrong leases, licenses, or concessions to
v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla .2000)). private par ties of public park
prop erty, unless each such structur e,
I agree that the language of the ballot summary informed lease, license, renewal , expa nsion ,
the voters of the "c hief purpo se" of the referendum extension , concession or use shall be
without "flying under false colors" or "hiding the ball," approved by a majority vote of the
thu s satisfying section 101.161, which requires that "the voters in a County -wide referendum.
voter have notice of that which he must decide .... What the
law require s is that the ballot be fair and advise the voter In addition , Article 7.02 creates a special class of public
sufficiently to enable him intelligentl y to cast his ballot." parks (which include s Crandon Park ), and impo ses the
Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 13 (quotin g Ask elV, 421 So.2d heightened requirement of a two-thirds vote of the
151, 154-55 (F la. 1982)). electorate before certain commercial uses may be made for
this class of park s:
Determining the "chief purpose " of the referendum
requires us to look to the reason why the balJotquestion To ensure aquatic preserve s, lands
was placed before the voters in the first place. Contr ary acquired by the Co unty for
to Matheson' s position , the referendum was not intend ed pr eservati on, and publi c parks or
to (and in fact could not) modify, alter or amend part s thereof which are nature
the pre viously-created Crandon Park Ma ster Plan , the preserves, beaches, natural forest
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants , the Final Judgment areas , historic or archeological
or the Settlement Agr eement. Rather , the referendum was areas, or otherwise po ssess unique
intended to comp ly with the requirem ents of Article 7 natural values in their present
of the Charter of Miami-Dade County . Article 7.01 sets state , such as ... Crandon Park, ...
forth a policy that sta tes in pertinent part : and all other natural or historic al
resource based par ks do not lose
Park s ... and lands acquired by the their natural or histori cal values,
Count for preserva tion sha ll be held any structure, lease, license, renewal,
in trust for the education, pleasure, extension, concession or use in any
and recrea tion of the public and of this class of public parks or in
they shall be used and maintain ed aquatic preserves and preservation
in a ma nner which will leave them lands must be approved by an
unimpair ed for the enjoyment of affi rmative vote of two-thirds of the
futur e generations as a part of the voters in a County -wide referendum .
public' s irreplaceable heritag e. (Emphasis added.)
Article 7.02 pro vides restrictions for the use of public Given thi s ba ckdrop , it is clear that the "c hief purpo se"
parks and require s a majority vote of the electo rate before of the referendum was to com ply with the Chart er's
certain commercia l uses may be made. It provides the requirement *232 that two-thirds of Miami - Dade voters
following genera l restriction: approve any pro pose d expa nsion of the facilities in
Cra ndon Park. The chief purpo se of the referendum
In furtherance of this policy parks
was decidedly not to determin e whether Miami - Dade
shall be used for publi c park
voters wished to amend the Cra ndon Park Master Plan ,
purp oses on ly, and subject to the
the D eclaration of Restrictive Covenants , the Final
limited exception s set forth in this Judgm ent , or the Sett lement Agreement. In po int of fact,
Article , there shall be no permanent no vo te of Miami- Dad e citizens would or could have
stru ctur es or private commerc ial
effectuated any such amendment s; und er the express term s
advertising erected in a publi c
of the Settlement Agreement , the only manner in which the amendment's chief effect is to
the Crandon Park Master Plan could be amended was abolish the present two-year total
by a majority vote of the Miami - Dade County Board prohibition. Although the summary
of Commiss ioners, together with a majority vote of the indicates that the amendment is
Committee on Amendment of the Crandon Park Master a restriction on one's lobbying
Plan. This amendment process did no t require any vote act ivities, the amendme nt actually
of the electorate. Therefore , under the circumstances gives incumb ent office holders ,
presented, the "chief purpose " of the vote was simply a upon filing a financial disclosur e
mandated referendum to determine whether two-thirds of statement, a right to immediately
the Miami - Dade County electorate wished to permit the commence lobbying before their
proposed expansion of the facilities. former agencies which is presently
precluded. Th e prob lem, therefore ,
Matheson's reliance on Askew and Armstrong is lies not with what the summary says,
misplaced. Each of those cases involved a vote which, but , rather , with what it does not
in and of itself, effectuated a change to the existing say.
provisions of the state consti tution . In Armstrong, the
Askew, 421 So.2d at 155- 56 (footnote omitted).
ballot summary misled the voters because it created the
impression that the proposed amendatory language would
The distinction between Askew and the instant case is
provide great er const itutiona l protection when in rea lity it
underscored by the following observation in Askew:
accomplis hed the opposite:
Had [the ballot proposal] not
[A] citizen cou ld well have voted in
been an amendment to an existing
favor of the proposed amendment
provision , if it had been a totally
thinking that he or she was
protecting state constituti ona l rights new provi sion, its ballot summary
and title would probably have
when in fact the citizen was doing
been permissible. The change to
the exact opposite i.e., he or she was
subsect ion 8(e) [of Article II of
voting to nullify those right s.
the Constitution] is as stated, but
the stated change is only incidental
Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 18.
to the true purpose and meaning
of section 8 in its entirety. Public
Similarly , Askew involved a propo sed amendment
financi al disclosure is needed to
which purported to strengthen Florida' s constitutional
assure the accountabi lity of *233
restrictions on lobbying activities. However, the actual
state officers and is the heart of
effect of the proposed amendment was to weaken the
section 8. But, in subsection (e),
existing constitutional provision:
section 8 also expresses another vital
As it stands, [the existing concern - the ban on lobby ing. The
con stitutional provision] precludes ballot summary fails to give fair
lobbying a former body or agency notice of an exception to a present
for two years after an affected prohibition.
person leaves office. The ballot
Id. at 156.
summary neglects to advise the
public that there is presently a
Matheson attempt s to portray the referendum in the
complete two-year ban on lobbying
instant case as an amendment to the Crandon Park Master
before one's agency and, while
Plan. But it is not. Unlike the referenda in Armstrong
it does require the filing of
and Ask ew, pa ssage of this referendum did not amend,
financial disclosure before anyone
modify or alter anything. It is the legal equivalent of "a
may appear before any agency for
totally new provision " as described in Askew . And unlike
the two years after leaving office,
the summaries in Armstrong and Askew, no material dispute between Bruce Matheson , the County and IPC are
ramifications were left undisclosed in the instant case, nor largely set forth in our initial decision in White:
did the ballot language fail to apprise the voters of the "ful]
sweep" of the proposal. Rather , it adequately informed In 1940, several members of the Matheson family
the voters of the sweep, effect, and ramification of the deeded three tracts of land located on the northern
portion of Key Biscayne to Dade County. This land,
referendum. The electorate's approval of the referendum
did not impact the Crandon Park Master Plan, and did consisting of 680 acres, came to be known as Crandon
Park. In the recorded deeds, the gran tors expressly
not , on its own, permit the Co unt y or any private entity
to erect permanent structures, expand existing structures , provided:
or extend or modify agreements with the operator of the This conveyance is made upon the express condition
tennis tournament. It was certainly not necessary to advise that the lands hereby conveyed shall be perpetually
voters that no such expansion cou ld take place without an used and maintained for public park purposes only;
amendment to the Crandon Park Master Plan. The fact and in case the use of said land for park purposes
that the terms of the Crandon Plan Master Plan current ly shall be abandoned , then and in that event the said
prohibited such expansion was not material , as the voters [grantor] , his heirs, grantees or assigns, *234 shall
were not asked to amend the Crandon Park Master Plan. be entit led upon their request to have the said lands
reconveyed to them.
In the instant case, because the referendum did not
effectuate any change beyond complying with the Charter-
mandated procedure for approving "any structure, lease,
license, renewal, extension, concession or use" in the class In 1986, the Dade County Board of County
of public parks that included Crandon Park, it satisfied Commissioners passed Resolution R- 891- 86, which
the requirement that it place "the voter on notice of that authorized the execution of an agreement with
which he must decide" and "adv ise the voter sufficient ly Arvida International Championships , Inc., (Arvida),
to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot," Armstrong, and the International Players Champion ship, Inc. ,
773 So.2d at 13. (IPC), to construct a permanent tennis complex. The
construct ion of the court facilities and infrastructure
I therefore concur in affirming the judgment of the trial began in the summer of 1986, and terminated in 1987.
court. Initially , the tennis comp lex consisted of fifteen tennis
courts, service roads , utilities, and landscaping, all
located on 28 acres.
WELLS , Judge (dissenting). The agreement provided that for two weeks each year,
I respectfu lly dissent. Because I find that the ballot subject to a renewal provision , the tennis comp lex
summary misled the voters and failed to disclose material would become the site of the Lipton International
information necessary for the public to make an informed Players Championship Tennis Tournament (Lipton
decision under section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes tournament). This renowned tournament is on ly open
(2012), I wou ld reverse. to world class players who compete for two weeks.
In February 1987, the first Lipton tournament was

I. Underlying Facts held before approximate ly 213,000 people. The county
manager cons idered the Lipton tourn ament to be
Twice before , this court has considered a dispute between
such a tremendous success that he recommended, and
members of the Matheson Family and the County over the
the County Commission approved in Resolution R-
erection of structures at the Crandon Park Tennis Center
827- 87, the construction of "Phase II," a permanent
and IPC's operation ofa tennis tournament at that center.
clubhouse/fitness facility. This 15,000-to - 33,000-
See Dade Cnty. v. Matheson , 605 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA
square - foot facility was to house locker rooms , training
1992); White v. Metro . Dade Cnty., 563 So.2d 117 (Fla .
and exercise equipment , meeting rooms , food and
3d DCA 1990). The underlying facts leading to the instant
beverage concessions, and a sporting goods store.
As a result of "community input, " the clubhouse
was ultimately reduced to 9,800 square feet. Thi s our resolution of the first lawsuit in White had alread y
"community input " consisted of informal meetings with addressed whether construction of a stadium as part of
residents and one public hearing. the proposed tennis complex violated the terms of the
Matheson deed restriction and concluded that it did not.
During the four Lipton tournaments held thus far on See Math eson, 605 So.2d at 470. We also noted that
Key Biscayne, temporary seating has been provided. although the second lawsuit did not raise any arguments
Appellants contend that a 12,000-seat permanent that the tennis tournament as it was then being run
stadium is part of the future development plans. still amo unt ed to a "virtual ouster" of the public from
Crandon Park in violation of the deed restr iction, anyone
with proper standing to raise that issue "wo uld have the
In 1987 and again in 1988, Dade County attempted to right to go back before the original trial court , [which]
obtain the consent of one of the heirs, Hardy Matheson, has juri sdiction over this matter , to seek the appropriate
for the operation of the Lipton tournament. Hardy relief or enforcement , be it of a[n] equitable nature or
Matheson refused to give his consent , and informed the otherwise ." Id. at 47 1. Encouraged by this statement, the
County that the tennis comp lex and the operation of the Mathesons filed an Emergency Motion for Supplemental
Lipton tournament was contrary to the deed restriction. and Additional Relief and to Amend Final Judgment in
the first (the White) proceeding.
White, 563 So.2d at 121- 22.
On January 14, 1993, while this motion was pend ing,
In White, we held that while "the construction of the tennis the Mathe son Family and the County entered into a
park comp lex did not violate the 'public park purposes Settlement Agreement to "a micably resolve once and for
only' provision of the deed restriction," operation of all time, the appropriate park uses to which the County
the tournament did violate the restriction because it may put Tracts 1, 2 and 3 of the Crandon Park lands
"deprive[d] the public of the use and enjoyment of and the locat ions of such uses within the Crandon Parks
Crandon Park, includin g the use and enjoyment of the land s." To this end, the Settlement Agreement called for
tennis facilities." Id. at 123- 24. The basis for the violation the creation of a Crandon Park Master Plan, drafted by
was that operation of the tournament , as it was at experts, subjected to public scrutiny, and implemented
that time, amounted to the "virtual ouster of the public by a "Declaration of Restrictions" recorded in the public
from the park for periods of time during the two week records to run with the land:
tournament. " Id. at 125. As we explained:
(a) Creation. The Parties agree tha t a Crandon Park
Our ruling does not prevent Dad e Master Plan shall be prepared by the professional pa rk
Cou nty from using the tennis plannin g Olmsted Firm ... depicting all permitted uses
complex for tenni s tournaments . of various areas on the Crandon Park lands .... It is the
It merely seeks to insur e that in Parties' i11te11tion
that the Cra11do11 Park Master Pla11
holding such tournament s, public created pursuant to this Settlement Agreement , and
access to the rest of Crandon Park is implemented through the Declaration of Restrictions
not infringed; and use of the tenni s hereinafter described , shall determine Jo,· all time
comp lex is not denied to the public ( subject to ame11dme11tas herein after pr ovided) the uses
for unrea sonable periods of time. of, a11dimproveme11tsupon, a11dtheir location withi11,the
Crando11Park la11ds.
Id. at 126.
(b) Consultation With The Parties; Draft Plan; Final
In 1991, Matheson heirs filed a second lawsuit specifically Plan; Amendment. In creating the Crandon Park Master
directed at the construction of a permanent 7,500-sea t Plan , the Olmsted Firm shall consu lt with the County
stadium at the tennis comp lex, claiming that *235 and its designated Park profe ssiona ls, and with the
the stadium construct ion violated the deed restriction Matheson Fam ily, and their designated representatives.
on the subject property . The trial court agreed with In addition the Olmsted Firm shall consult with the
the Math esons and ent ered a permanent injunction County's professiona l tennis tournament operators
prohibiting the construction. We reversed, finding that concerning the use of the "Te nnis Center " at Cra ndon
Park ... for the operation of the International Player s the proposed amendment to the
Championsh ip .... The Olmsted Firm shall submit a proposed Crandon Park Master
draft of the Crandon Park Master Plan ... to the Parties, Plan and an affirmative vote of no
and the County sha ll hold a public hearing [there]on .... less than three members of such
Comm ittee shall be required to
(Emphasis added). amend the Crandon Park Master
Plan, which amendment shall be
This agreement , among other things, expressly provided incorporated by the County in
that the Crandon Park Master Plan was to "be consistent an amendment to the Declaration
with all of the terms of this Settlement Agreement," and of Restrictions implementing the
that no new or add itiona l permanent structures would be Crandon Park Master Plan. Should
erected at the Tennis Center: a proposed amendment to the
Crandon Park Ma ster Plan fail
No New Permanent Structures on the Tennis Center ....
to receive an affirmative vote of
Except as provided above with respect to the [then
at least three members of such
contemplated ] permanent tennis stadium, the Tennis
Committee on the Amendment of
Center sha ll include only such permanent structures as
the Crandon Park Master Plan, the
are presently located on the Tennis Center. ...
proposed amendment shall fail and
the Crandon Park Ma ster Plan shall
*236 The Settlement Agreement also provided that
be enforced as previou sly in force.
the Master Plan, as implemented by a Declaration of
Restrictions that was to be recorded in the public records
As contemplat ed by the Settlement Agreement , a Crandon
of Miami - Dad e County and made part of the final
Park Ma ster Plan was drafted and approved by the
judgment in White, would be subject to change or
Matheson Family and the County. That 102- page plan
amendment only upon approval by both the County
and its 24 appendices delineate detailed objectives for all
Commiss ion a11da Committee on Amendment of the
Crandon Park Master Plan: areas comprising Crandon Park. 3 Among other things ,
this plan expressly precludes construct ion of virtually any
The Crandon Park Master additional permanent structures with in Crandon Park:
Plan as implemented by the
above mentioned Declaration of
Restrictions and Final Judgment, Except as expressly provided in this Master Plan,
may be amended following adoption there sha ll be no new structures, impro vements,
only by the following procedure: features , or major modifications to existing structures
(I) the County by affirmative or improvem ents (defined as renova tion s or repairs
vote of the County Board of constituting more than 50% of the value of the existing
Commissioners sha ll propose an structure or improvement) , whethe r temporary or
amendment throu gh action by permanent, located or constructed on the Crandon Park
resoluti on; (2) the County shall Land s, provided that resurfacing of any tenni s court
appo int two persons to a Committee in excess of 50% of the va lue of the court sha ll be
on Amendment of the Crandon permitted.
Park Master Plan , and the Nationa l With regard to the Tenni s Center , described in the Master
Park s and Conservation Association Plan as comprising a tenni s stadium, a clubhouse, and 27
(or a successor non-profit park tennis court s, no new permanent structures or expansion
preservation organization mutually whatsoever was author ized:
agreed upon by the Parties) sha ll
No New Permanent Structures on the Tennis Center ...
likewise appoint two members to
Except as provided ... with respect to the permanent
such Comm ittee on Amendment
tennis stadium , the Tenni s Center shall include on ly
of the Crandon Park Master
such permanent struct ures as are presently locat ed on
Plan. The Committee shall consider
the Tennis *237 Center and depicted in the Master Property shall be restricted to those uses and
Plan Site Plan. improvements set forth in the Crandon Park Master
Plan attached hereto ... subject to modification or
Significantly , the Master Plan provides that any amendment only in accordance with the provisions
amendments either to it or to the contemplated contained therein. It is the intention of the County and
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants memorialjzing it the Matheson family that the Crandon Park Master
"shall be adopted sparingly, in conformity with [the Plan , which has been created pursuant to the Settlement
Master Plan's] Statement of Intent and consistent with Agreement and implemented through this Declaration ,
the provisions of the Settlement Agreement reached on shall determine for all time (subject to modification
January 14, 1993 by and between the Matheson family and or amendment only as herein provided) the uses of,
and improvements upon , and their location within , the
Dade County ." 4
[Crandon Park] Property. No structure, improvement
On August 25, 2000, as required by the Settlement or other facility, whether permanent or temporary,
Agreement between the Matheson Family and the shall be located or constructed upon the [Crandon
Park] Property unless provided by the terms of this
County, a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants was
recorded in the public records of Miami-Dade County. Declaration.
That Declaration confirmed that consistent with the
2. BINDING EFFECT OF DECLARATION. This
Settlement Agreement and the Crandon Park Master
Declaration shall *238 constitute a covenant running
Plan: (I) it was the intention of the County and the
with the land , and shall be binding upon the County,
Matheson Family for all time to restrict the use of and
upon it successors and assigns, and upon all parties
improvements to Crandon Park by limiting those uses and
having any right , title or interest in [the Crandon Park]
improvements to those authorized by the Crandon Park
Property. This Declaration sha ll be recorded in the
Master Plan; (2) that under the Master Plan no structures
public records of Miami - Dade County, Florida, and
or improvements other than those then contemp lated
shall remain in full force and effect until such time as
or existing and described in the Master Plan were to
the Declaration is modified or amended in accordance
be made at Crandon Park unless authorized by the
with the terms contained herein.
Declaration which incorporated the terms of the Master
Plan and Settlement Agreement; (3) that the Declaration
with its incorporated Settlement Agreement and Master
Plan were to run with the land; and (4) the Declaration 4. MODIFICATION AND AMENDMENT. This
was not subject to modification except as provided by Declaration may be modified or amended on ly in
the Settlement Agreement and Master Plan-that is, with accordance with the provisions contained in the
the approval of both the County Commission and the Settlement Agreement dated January 14, 1993, which
Committee on Amendment of the Crandon Park Master appears as Appendix F to the Crandon Park Master
Plan: Plan .. . and upon compliance with the terms of
such Settlement Agreement as to amendment of the
WHEREAS, in order to fulfill the requirements of Crandon Park Master Plan, by a written instrument
the Settlement Agreement [between the County and duly recorded in the public records of Miami-Dade
the Matheson Family] and forever to resolve the County.
disputes and litigation between [them], the County [as
owner of Crandon Park] has agreed to restrict the Finally , on October 18, 2000, pursuant to the terms of the
uses of and the improvements upon Crandon Park as Settlement Agreement , the trial court in White entered an
provided in this Declaration, subject to modification Amended Final Judgment approving and incorporating
or amendment on ly in accordance with the provisions the Crandon Park Master Plan and ordering the parties
contained herein; to comply with the provisions of that plan and the
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants.
1. CRANDON PARK MASTER PLAN. Upon the

2. The /11sta11tMatter
recordation of this Declaration , the [Crandon Park]
· - · ~- • . . ...... '-"'r\/"\_.n.,...t
40 Fla. L. Wee kly D1267
On August 23, 2012, the Co unt y's Board of Coun ty he claimed that the ballot title and summary of the
Co mmissioners passed Resoluti on R-660- 12, auth or izing referendum failed to comp ly with section l0l.161 of
th e following question to be placed on the Novem ber 2012 the Florida Statutes (count I); second, he claimed that
ballot: the ballot title and summ ary of the referendum violated
art icle 7 of the County's Home Rule Charter (count II) ;
ReferendumRegarding Structuresand Modifications of and third, he claimed that the County's misstateme nts
Existing Agreements for the Tennis Center at Crandon and concealments with respect to the referendum and
Park Resolution R-66 0- 12 violated paragra ph A(2) of the
Citizens' Bill of Right s in the Co unt y's Home Rul e Char ter
In accor dance with Article 7 of the Home Rul e Charter,
(count III ). IPC was allowed to intervene in the actio n.
do you appro ve as set forth in Reso lution R-66 0- 12:
• Erection of perm anent stru ct ures and expa nsion of While th is mat ter was pending, the County finalized
existing structu res at Cran don Park Tenni s Center for an agreement with IPC which it claims are within
public park and tennis tournament use, which sha ll the parameters delineated in Resolution R- 660- 12. Th e
be funded solely by tennis center and tourn ament Board of County Commi ssione rs con ditionall y approved
revenues and pri vate fund s; and that agreeme nt.
• Modification and extension of agreements with In August 2013, Ma theso n moved for ent ry of final
opera tor of Sony Open Tennis Tournament or its summary jud gment. As to cou nt I, he argued that the
successors. ballot tit le and summ ary of the referendum violated
the accuracy req uirement s of section 10 l.161 of the
Attached to the resoluti on was a det ailed prop osal for Florida Statute s by failing to infor m the electo rate of
additi onal perman ent structur es to be constructed at the existence of the Settlement Agreement and Am ended
the tennis complex, includin g: numerou s new perman ent Final Judgment in the White litiga tion, as well as the
additi ons to the curr ent stadium ; thre e new permanent Cra ndon Park Master Plan and the D eclarat ion of
courts with spectator gra nd stand s; a lake cottage; and Restrictive Covenants , all of which operate to restrict
open pav ilions. Also attached to the reso lution were future expansion of the tennis complex subject to the
th e propose d terms for the extension an d modification Master Plan being amen ded as set forth in the Settl ement
of existing agreements between the Count y and IPC , Agreement. As to count II, he argued that the ballot
pursuant to which IPC operates an annual tennis title and summa ry of the referendum violat ed ar ticle 7
tourn ament at the Tennis Center. Th erein, IPC prop osed of the Count y's Home Rul e Charte r by as king the vote rs
a new operating agreement to replace the existing to endor se what were then non-bindin g proposals for
agree ment, to fund the development of the additional the expansion of the tennis complex and to appr ove
permanent structure s at the tennis complex, and to be agree ments between the Cou nty and IPC that had yet to be
allowed to lease office space within the current stad ium for negotiated. Math eson made no argument s in his motion
year ro und use. with respect to count III.
Alth ough no agreement from the Committee on Th e Count y oppo sed the motion and also mo ved for
Amendmen t of the Crandon Park Master Plan to amend summar y judgment on Matheson's claims. As to cou nt I,
the Master Plan or to modify the Declara tion or the the County argued that section IO1.16I was not violated
Settlement Agreem ent to allow the propo sed additi ona l because the required amendment of the Master Plan by
structur es or use of the park was secured, the referendum three of four voters on the Committ ee on Am endment
app roved by the County Commission was placed on the of the Cra nd on Park Master Plan was "the needle in the
Nove mber 6, 2012 ballot and ap pro ved by the voters of proverbial haystack of development approvals required
Miami - Dad e County. to acco mplish the Tennis Center project," therefore, it
was not necessary to mention anyt hing specifically with
A month after the election, Bruce Mat heso n filed respect thereto either in the ballot question or in the
the insta nt action against *239 the Count y seeking resolution referenced therein. The Coun ty also argued
to invalidat e the referendum on thr ee grounds: first, that the ballot title and summ ary were sufficiently specific
to put the voters on notice of the chief purpose of the

§ 101.161(1), Fla . Stat . (2012) (emphasis supp lied); Askew
referendum. As to count II , the County argued that
the referendum did not violate Article 7 of the Home v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 155- 56 (F la.1982) (confirming
that section 101.161 applies to "all ballots"); see also
Rule Charter because it was not required to present the
voters with fully negotiated, final deals prior to the issues Wadhams 11. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Saraso ta Cnty., 567
So.2d 414,416 (Fla.1990) (applying section 101.161 to a
being put on the ballot. IP C filed its own cross -moti on
for summary judgment, arguing that summary judgment county ballot initiative to amend a county charter).
should be granted on Matheson's claims for many of the
The purpose of these requirements "is to assure that
same reasons argued by the County .
the electorate is advised of the true meaning , and
ramifications , of an amendment " so that the electorate is
After holding a hearing on the parties' motions , the trial
not misled but is put on " fair notice of the decision [it] must
court entered an order granting final summary judgment
make. " Askew , 421 So .2d at 155- 156; see also Wadhams,
in favor of the County and IPC as to counts I and
567 So.2d at 416 . This means not just that a ballot title
II, finding the " 'chief purpose ' of the referendum was
and summary must faithfu lly track the text of a proposed
properly provided to the voters by the title and ballot
initiative, but that they may not "fly under false colors"
summary," and as to count III because Matheson had
or " hide the ball" by failing to disclose the initiative's true
made no argument as to it. This appea l ensued.
effect. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So .2d 7, 16 (Fla.2000) .
3. Legal Analysis In Askew, for example, the Florida Legislature by joint

resolution proposed an amen.dment to Section 8 of Article
The standard of review of the instant final summary II of the Florida Const itution relating to lobbying by
judgment is de novo. See Miami - Dade Cnty. v. Viii. former legislators and statewide elected officials. That
of Pinecrest, 994 So .2d 456, 457 (F la. 3d DCA 2008) proposal wou ld have removed an abso lute two-year ban
(applying a de novo standard of review in determining on lobbying by former legislators and statewide elected
whether a local referendum *240 complied with the officia ls who filed financial disclosures. Askew, 421 So.2d
accuracy requirements of sect ion 101. 161 of the Florida at 155. While the title to the proposed amendment and
Statutes ). its summary accurate ly disclosed that former legislators
and statewide elected officials who failed to file financial
Florida law requires that every ballot initiative placed disclosures wou ld be precluded from lobbying activities
before the public for a vote must be accompanied for two years , it was struck down for failure to disclose
by a short title and a summary which clearly and that the proposa l wou ld repea l the exist ing, more stringent
unambiguously state the primary purpose of the ballot post-term prohibition on lobbying:
initiative:
As it stands, subsection 8(e) precludes lobbying a
Whenever a ... public measure is former body or agency for two years after an affected
submitted to the vote of the people , person leaves office. The ballot summary neglects to
a ballot summary of such ... public advise the public that there is presently a complete
measure sha ll be printed in clear two-year ban on lobb ying before one's agency and,
and un ambiguous language on the while it does require the filing of financial disclosure
ballot after the list of candidates .... before anyone may appear before any agency for
The ballot summary of the ... public the two years after leaving office, the amendme nt 's
measure shall be an exp lanatory chief effect is to abolish the present two-year total
statement , not exceeding 75 words prohibition. Although the summary indicates that the
in length, of the chief purpose of amendment is a restriction on one's lobbying activities,
the measure .... The ballot title shall the amendment actua lly gives incumbent office holders,
consist of a caption , not exceeding upon filing a financial disclosure statement, a right to
15 words in length , by which the immediately commence lobbying before their former
measure is commonly referred to or agencies which is presently prohibited. The problem,
spoken of.
40 Fla . L. Weekly 01267
therefore, lies not with what the summary says, but, their federal counterparts.... In short: "[T]he federal
rather, with what it does not say. Constitution ... represents the floor for basic freedoms;
the state const itu tion, th e ceiling." Id.
In the present case , by chang ing the wording of the

If the legislature feels that the present prohibition Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause to become " Crue l
against appear ing before one 's former colleagues is and Unus ual" and by requiring that our state Clause be
wrong, it is appropriate for that body to pass a joint interpreted in conformit y with its federal counterpart ,
resol ution and to ask the citizens to *241 modify the proposed amendment effective ly strikes the state
that prohibition. But such a change must stand on Clause from the constitutiona l scheme. Under such
its own merits and not be disguised as something a scenario , the organic law governing either crue l or
else. The purpose of sectio n 10 1.161 is to assure that unusual punishment s in Florida would consis t of a
the electorate is advised of the true meaning, and floor ... and nothing more ....
ramifications , of an amendment. A proposed amendment
cannot fly under fal se colors; this one does. In the present case, a citizen could well have voted in
favor of the propo sed amendment thinking that he or
Id. at 155-56 (some emphasis added) (foot note omitted); she was protecting state const itutional rights when in
see also Wadhams, 567 So .2d a t 416 (invalidating a vote fact the citizen was doing the exact opposite-i.e ., he or
approv ing an amendment to a county charter because she was voting to nullify tho se rights.
although the amendment's title and summary accurate ly
tracked the amendment's language which provided that Arm strong, 773 So.2d at 17- 18 (footnote omitted ).
the County's Charter Review Board wou ld only be
permitted to meet once every four years , the ballot failed to The Arm strong Court th en concluded that the ballot
explain that currently there was no restriction on meetings summary a lso "hid the ball" by failing to acc uratel y
- thus , making the chief purpose of the amendment to state the chief purpose or main effect of the proposed
curtail the Board's rig ht to meet) . amendment, that is, to nullify the Cruel or Unusual
Puni shment Clause of Florida's cons titution:
In Armstrong , the Florida Supreme Court struck a ballot
To conform to section 101.106(1),
initiative because , much like in Wadhams , the ballot was
a ballot summary must state " the
defective "for what it d[id] not say." Armstrong, 773
chief purpose " of the proposed
So.2d at 21. There , the Court first found a ballot title
amendment. In evaluating an
and summary "flew under false colors" becau se the ballot
amendment's chief purpose, a court
misleadingly implied that by amending article I , sectio n
must look not to subjective criteria!
17 of the Florida Constitut ion to prohibit imposition
espo used by the amendment's
of "cruel and unu sual punishment " rather than "crue l
sponsor but to objective criteria
or unusual punishment ," the rights of Florid a citizens
inherent in the amendment itself,
would be enhanced or promoted through the ruling s of the
such as the amendment 's main
Un ited States Supr eme Court:
effect. In the pre sent *242 case ,
Use of the word " or" instead of " and " in [article 1, as explained above, the main effect
section 17] indicat es that the framers intended that of the amendment is simple, clear -
both alternatives (i.e., "crue l" and " unu sua l") were to cut, and beyond dispute: The
be embraced individually a nd disjun ctively within the amendment will nu llify the Cruel
Clause's pro scription. or Unusu al Puni shment Clause.
This effect far outstrips the stated
This Court in Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 purpose (i.e., to " pre serve" the death
(Fla.1992) , explained that our system of constitutional penalty), for th e amendment will
government in Florida is grounded on a principle of nullify a longstanding constitutional
"rob ust individuali sm" and that our state constitutiona l provision that app lies to all criminal
rights thus provide greater freedom from government punishments , not ju st the death
intrusion into the lives of the citizens than do
penalty. Nowhere in the summary, that the changes proposed by the resolution for which
however, is this effect mentioned- approva l was sought could not be made by virtue of a
or even hinted at. The main effect "yes" vote on the referendum. See Armstrong, 773 So.2d
of the amendment is not stated at 21 (finding a ballot question hid the ball from the
anywhere on the ballot. (The voter is voters where the "ballot title and summary give no hint
not even told on the ballot that the of the radical change in state constitut ional law that the
word "or" in the Crue l or Unusua l text actua lly foments"); Ask ew, 421 So .2d at 156 (striking
Punishment Clause will be changed a reso lution that proposed a constitutional ame ndment
to "and "-a sign ificant change by because the ballot sum mary was "misleading to the public
itself.) concern ing ma teria l changes to an existing constitut ional
provis ion ").
Id. at 18 (foot not es omitted); see also Village of Pinecrest,
994 So .2d at 458 (invalidating a ballot initiati ve amending The County takes exception to the view that it hid the ball,
Miami - Dade County's H ome Rule Charter because its suggesting that Resolution R- 660- 12 which is referred to
title flew under false colors by promising to create a in the ballot summary ade quate ly addresses these matters.
uniform county wide fire and rescue service when one had It points to exhibi t B to the reso lution wherein IPC
long existed and hid the ball by purporting to create new proposed " that it would undertake to seek the receipt
rights while actua lly curtailing or elimina ting them). of a ll required development approvals to ensure *243
that a ll the Additional Permanent Structures comp ly with
Here , as in Askew and Armstrong, the ballot summary all legal ob ligat ions." (Emphasis supplied). The County
both "fl[ies] under false colors" and "hide[s] the ball." suggests that the amendment of the Master Plan " is ju st
While the ballot summa ry suggests that the electorate is one of many development approva ls that [IPC] will need
being asked to " approve " the "[e]rection of permanent to obtain in order to upgrade the existing, and construct
structures and expans ion of existing structures at Crandon new, facilities at" the tennis comp lex, comparing it to
Park Tennis Center for public park and tennis tournament a laundry list of development approva ls it must obta in
use" and "modifica tion s and extension of agreements" before the proposed expansion may occur, from the U.S.
with IP C, in reality it is not hing more than a condit iona l Army Corps of Engineers to the South Florida Water
or non-binding straw ballot with no binding officia l effect. Ma nagement District. Not only is the County's argument
Compare City of Miami v. Staats, 919 So.2d 485 , 486- misleading, it is also wrong.
87 (F la . 3d DCA 2005) (find ing a City of Miami ballot
question which clearly stated that it was a " Straw Ballot" The subject Master Plan prohibition on the erection
and asked "Shall the voters of Miami-Dade elect the of permane nt structures at Crandon Park is a unique
Tax Assessor instead of the County Manager of Miami - condit ion that only app lies to this public park , is the
Dade County appointing the Tax Assessor," flew under result of a Settlement Agreement reached after years of
false colors and hid the ball because the ballot title and litigation, and is memorialized in the public record in
summary failed "to adequate ly inform the voting public a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants that runs with
that their response ha[d] no officia l effect, i.e., that the the land - none of which are even mentioned in the
ballot question [was] simp ly a nonbinding opinion poll"), resolution. The Master Plan amendment process is hardly
with City of Hialeah v. Delgado, 963 So.2d 754, 757 (Fl a. the equ iva lent of the routine approvals that must be
3d DCA 2007) (findin g that a straw ballot which asked secured before making an improvement on public land.
" Would you support a voter petition" to resolve the same Moreover, to increase or expand the struct ure s currently
issue addressed in Staats comp lied with section IO1.161(I) located at the Tennis Center would require more than
because the ballot language adequate ly informed the just a modification of the Crandon Park Master Plan. It
voters that the ballot measure had no binding effect). would also enta il inva lidating the Sett lement Agreement
and Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, and modifying
The ballot summary also "hid[ ] the ball" by failing to a long since final judgment - no ne of which are simply
mention or disclose that approval of the proposed changes routi ne development approval s. ln any event , reference
were conditioned on the agreement of a third party, the to " development approva ls" in a n exhibit to the subject
Committee on Amendment to the Crando n Park Master reso lution is not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to
Plan. That is, the summary failed to inform the voters
. .. . ...,..,., .. . ..... ,-=-- r'\,-,._,,.. "'T"I

inform the voters of the unique circumstances that exist

Fin ally, IPC que stion s the validity of the Settlem ent
as to expa nsion of the tennis comp lex at Crandon Park or
Agreement in the White proc eeding, suggesting tha t
to the cond itions that must be met before any expa nsion
the Mas ter Plan amendment pro cess was an unlawful
may occur.
delegation of legislative auth ority by the Board of Coun ty
Commiss ioners. However , IPC abandoned this argum ent
Thi s all could ha ve been avoided simpl y by adv ising voters
at the summar y judgment hearing below, agreeing that
th at the approvals being sought were conditioned on
this que stion would be resolved in separate litigation
approval by a third part y, all of which easily could have
pendin g in the circuit court . A substanti al portion of IP C's
been accomplished in seventy five wor ds as required by
Answer Brief *244 on this appeal is dedicated to this
section 101.161:
very issue, which IPC cand idly adm its is not now properl y
In accorda nce with Home Rule Charter Articl e 7, and before us in this appea l. Ind eed, after spending some
subject to Cra ndon Park Master Plan Amendmen t twenty pages providing the factua l background for and
Committe e appro va l, do you approve as Resolution R- discussing the "unlawful delegation" issue, IPC co ncedes
660- 12 pro vides: "[t]hat issue can only be solved in [the trial] court , such as
in /P C v. Ma theson, which may late r reach this Court. "
• Erect ion of permanent structures and expa nsion of Need less to say, this particu lar issue need not be addre ssed
existing structure s at Cra ndon Park Tennis Center for in this appea l.
public park and tennis tournament use, to be fund ed
solely by tennis center and tou rn ament revenues and
pr ivate fund s; and 4. Conclusion
Modificat ion and extension of agreements with Because the ballot summary misled the voters as to the
operator of Sony Open Tenni s Tourn ame nt or its true legal effect of the referendum and failed to disclose
successors. materi al information necessary for the publi c to make an
informed decision und er section 101.161, I wou ld find
In finding that the ballot summ ary fails to comp ly with that the ballot is defective and that the po st-election
section 101.161(1), I do not disagree with the Count y's results of the subject referendum must be inva lidated. I
contention that Article 7 of the County's Home Rule would therefore reverse the ord er gran ting final summary
Charter requ ires that voters also approve of the prop osed judgm ent in favor of the County and IPC and remand with
expa nsion of the tennis complex and modificat ion/ instructions that final summ ary jud gmen t be granted in
extension of agreements with IPC in a Co unt y-wide favor of Matheson.
referend um . Ho wever, if the voters are being as ked to
approve the changes that the County wished to make , they
All Citations
must be made aware of the fact th at the Cou nty's desires
and their approva l of them are conditiona l or will not 187 So.3d 22 1, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1 267
effectuate the proposed changes.
Footnotes
1 Thi s Court did hold , howe ver, that the operation of the Lipton tournament violated the deed restriction because it deprived
the public "of the use and enjoyment of Cra ndon Park , including the use and enjoyme nt of the tenn is facilities." Id. at
124 . This Court reasoned that because the public is deprived of using the facilities for thre e to four wee ks during the
tournament period , the operation of the Lipton tournament amounted "to the virtual ouster of the public from the park"
during the tourn ament. White, 563 So.2d at 125.
2 There is evidence in the reco rd that the Master Plan has been previous ly amended. In December 2013, the Director of
the Miami-Dade Parks, Recreation and Open Spaces Department at the tim e, Mr. Jack Kardys , stated in his affidavit
that the Master Plan has been amended severa l times over the yea rs, including with respec t to the Crandon Park Tennis
Center . The following is a list of the amendments he listed in his affida vit: 1) On October 22, 2002, the BOCC approved
an amendment to the Master Plan to allow the temporary seating for the Sony Open Ten nis Tournament to be stored on
the upper deck of the Tenni s Stadium at Crandon Park; This amendment was approved by the Amendment Committee
, .. , ......,.. .... . Ai.t it,.. ;;:'\ ....,r\_.l"\ "'T"'I

on November 12, 2002 ; 2) On October 22, 2002 , the BOCC appro ved an amendment to the Master Plan to allow the
already existing lighted ball fields to remain at Crandon Park permanently rather than being removed by January 1, 2005 ,
as specified in the Master Plan. On May 4 , 2005 , the Amendment Committee approved the amendment to allow the
lighted ball fields to remain beyond 2005 but for only an additional eight years , or until 2013 ; 3) On October 22 , 2002 ,
the BOCC approved an amendment to the Master Plan to allow existing boat dry storage facility at the Crandon Park
Marina for 130 boats to remain instead of being reduced to 20 boats , as required by the Master Plan. On November
12, 2002, the Amendment Committee approved the amendment; 4) On December 16, 2003, the BOCC approved an
amendment to the Master Plan to allow the construction of a marina dive shop larger than that permitted by the Master
Plan and to allow additional uses for that marina dive shop beyond those permitted by the Master Plan. On December 7,
2004, the Amendment Committee approved the amendments to the Master Plan to allow expanded size and uses of the
marina dive shop ; 5) On April 5, 2005 , the BOCC approved an amendment to the Maste r Plan to allow the expansion and
modifications of utilities infrastructures at Crandon Park to account for increased demand and technological upgrades . On
February 15, 2007 , the Amendment Committee approved the expansion and modifications of utilities infrastructure sought
by Bellsouth ; 6) On March 15, 2011 , the BOCC approved an amendment to the Master Plan to eliminate restrictions on
the exit and traffic circulation at the Crandon Park Marina and to allow a permanent awning to replace the fabric awning
at the marina. The Amendment Committee approved this amendment on May 4, 2011 .
3 The areas specifically addressed were Crandon Boulevard , the Crandon Park Marina, the ibis preserve , the Crandon
Park Golf Course, the Crandon Park Tennis Center, the West Point Preserve, the Fire Stat ion , the Calusa Mangrove
Trail and Archaeological sites , the Crandon Park Service Area , the Crandon Park Zoo and Gardens , the Crandon Park
Cabanas , the Parking and Beach Drive, the Crandon Park Beach, the Crandon Park Visitors and Natu re Center, and
the Bear Cut Preserve.
4 The Declaration of Restrictive Covenants similarly prov ides that any modification or amendment of the Declaration itself
must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Master Plan , and that any modification or amendment of the
Master Plan may be made "only in accordance with the provisions contained in the Settleme nt Agreement dated January
14, 1993 ...."
End of Doc ument © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3rd DCA On Miami-Dade Co Vs Matheson 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

3rd DCA On Miami-Dade Co Vs Matheson 2015

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

3rd DCA On Miami-Dade Co Vs Matheson 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

40 Fla. L.

Cases that cite th is headnote

Synopsis Purpose of requirem ent that the substance

Cases that cite this head note

(Holding:)The District Court of Appeal , Fernandez , J.,

Cases that cite this headnote

may be ame nd ed following ado ption

purpose. Id. ; see also L et Miami Beach Decide v. City of

, .. . ,....,,... .. . . , .. .. I":"\ .... r'\ .. I"\ ..,...,

In February 1987, the first Lipton tournament was

1. CRANDON PARK MASTER PLAN. Upon the

to put the voters on notice of the chief purpose of the

3. Legal Analysis In Askew, for example, the Florida Legislature by joint

In the present case , by chang ing the wording of the

. .. . ...,..,., .. . ..... ,-=-- r'\,-,._,,.. "'T"I

inform the voters of the unique circumstances that exist

, .. , ......,.. .... . Ai.t it,.. ;;:'\ ....,r\_.l"\ "'T"'I

You might also like