Nat. Dept Co. Vs CA Full..
Nat. Dept Co. Vs CA Full..
Nat. Dept Co. Vs CA Full..
Balgos & Perez Law Office for private respondent in both cases.
PARAS, J.:
These are appeals by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No: L- 46513-R entitled "Development Insurance and
Surety Corporation plaintiff-appellee vs. Maritime Company of the Philippines and National Development Company defendant-appellants,"
affirming in toto the decision ** in Civil Case No. 60641 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
The facts of these cases as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On April 22, 1965, the Development Insurance and Surety Corporation filed before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila an action for the recovery of the sum of P364,915.86 plus attorney's fees of
P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP (Record on Appeal), pp. 1-6).
Interposing the defense that the complaint states no cause of action and even if it does, the action
has prescribed, MCP filed on May 12, 1965 a motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 7-14). DISC
filed an Opposition on May 21, 1965 to which MCP filed a reply on May 27, 1965 (Record on Appeal,
pp. 14-24). On June 29, 1965, the trial court deferred the resolution of the motion to dismiss till after
the trial on the merits (Record on Appeal, p. 32). On June 8, 1965, MCP filed its answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim against NDC.
NDC, for its part, filed its answer to DISC's complaint on May 27, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 22-
24). It also filed an answer to MCP's cross-claim on July 16, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40).
However, on October 16, 1965, NDC's answer to DISC's complaint was stricken off from the record
for its failure to answer DISC's written interrogatories and to comply with the trial court's order dated
August 14, 1965 allowing the inspection or photographing of the memorandum of agreement it
executed with MCP. Said order of October 16, 1965 likewise declared NDC in default (Record on
Appeal, p. 44). On August 31, 1966, NDC filed a motion to set aside the order of October 16, 1965,
but the trial court denied it in its order dated September 21, 1966.
On November 12, 1969, after DISC and MCP presented their respective evidence, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC the
sum of P364,915.86 plus the legal rate of interest to be computed from the filing of the complaint on
April 22, 1965, until fully paid and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. Likewise, in said decision, the trial
court granted MCP's crossclaim against NDC.
MCP interposed its appeal on December 20, 1969, while NDC filed its appeal on February 17, 1970
after its motion to set aside the decision was denied by the trial court in its order dated February
13,1970.
On November 17,1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court.
NDC's appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 49407, while that of MCP was docketed as G.R. No.
49469. On July 25,1979, this Court ordered the consolidation of the above cases (Rollo, p. 103). On
August 27,1979, these consolidated cases were given due course (Rollo, p. 108) and submitted for
decision on February 29, 1980 (Rollo, p. 136).
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 827 OF THE CODE OF COMMERCE
AND NOT SECTION 4(2a) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 65, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT IN DETERMINING THE LIABILITY FOR LOSS OF
CARGOES RESULTING FROM THE COLLISION OF ITS VESSEL "DONA NATI" WITH THE
YASUSHIMA MARU"OCCURRED AT ISE BAY, JAPAN OR OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
II
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION IF
ANY EXISTS AS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS EXHIBIT "H" AND IN FINDING ON THE BASIS THEREOF THAT THE
COLLISION OF THE SS DONA NATI AND THE YASUSHIMA MARU WAS DUE TO THE FAULT
OF BOTH VESSELS INSTEAD OF FINDING THAT THE COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE
FAULT, NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF SKILL OF THE COMPLEMENTS OF THE YASUSHIMA
MARU WITHOUT THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE COMPLEMENT OF THE SS DONA
NATI
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE CODE OF
COMMERCE PETITIONER APPELLANT MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES IS A SHIP
AGENT OR NAVIERO OF SS DONA NATI OWNED BY CO-PETITIONER APPELLANT NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND THAT SAID PETITIONER-APPELLANT IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE
WITH SAID CO-PETITIONER FOR LOSS OF OR DAMAGES TO CARGO RESULTING IN THE
COLLISION OF SAID VESSEL, WITH THE JAPANESE YASUSHIMA MARU.
VI
The pivotal issue in these consolidated cases is the determination of which laws govern loss or
destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters, and the extent of liability
as well as the rules of prescription provided thereunder.
The main thrust of NDC's argument is to the effect that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should
apply to the case at bar and not the Civil Code or the Code of Commerce. Under Section 4 (2) of
said Act, the carrier is not responsible for the loss or damage resulting from the "act, neglect or
default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the
management of the ship." Thus, NDC insists that based on the findings of the trial court which were
adopted by the Court of Appeals, both pilots of the colliding vessels were at fault and negligent, NDC
would have been relieved of liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Instead, Article 287 of
the Code of Commerce was applied and both NDC and MCP were ordered to reimburse the
insurance company for the amount the latter paid to the consignee as earlier stated.
This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC (1 50
SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it was held under similar circumstance "that the law of the country to
which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their
loss, destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down
that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed
primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code).
Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San
Francisco, California and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or due to a collision
which was found to have been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding
vessels. Under the above ruling, it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is
immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all circumstances of each
case. Accordingly, under Article 1735 of the same Code, in all other than those mentioned is Article
1734 thereof, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negigently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.
It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so
that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles
826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision of vessels.
More specifically, Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to
the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and damages
incurred after an expert appraisal. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same
Code, which provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own
damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their
cargoes.
Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the
shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or
negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of
the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the
owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage (Y'eung Sheng
Exchange and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., 12 Phil. 751 [1909]).
There is, therefore, no room for NDC's interpretation that the Code of Commerce should apply only
to domestic trade and not to foreign trade. Aside from the fact that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(Com. Act No. 65) does not specifically provide for the subject of collision, said Act in no uncertain
terms, restricts its application "to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from Philippine
ports in foreign trade." Under Section I thereof, it is explicitly provided that "nothing in this Act shall
be construed as repealing any existing provision of the Code of Commerce which is now in force, or
as limiting its application." By such incorporation, it is obvious that said law not only recognizes the
existence of the Code of Commerce, but more importantly does not repeal nor limit its application.
On the other hand, Maritime Company of the Philippines claims that Development Insurance and
Surety Corporation, has no cause of action against it because the latter did not prove that its alleged
subrogers have either the ownership or special property right or beneficial interest in the cargo in
question; neither was it proved that the bills of lading were transferred or assigned to the alleged
subrogers; thus, they could not possibly have transferred any right of action to said plaintiff- appellee
in this case. (Brief for the Maritime Company of the Philippines, p. 16).
The records show that the Riverside Mills Corporation and Guilcon, Manila are the holders of the
duly endorsed bills of lading covering the shipments in question and an examination of the invoices
in particular, shows that the actual consignees of the said goods are the aforementioned companies.
Moreover, no less than MCP itself issued a certification attesting to this fact. Accordingly, as it is
undisputed that the insurer, plaintiff appellee paid the total amount of P364,915.86 to said
consignees for the loss or damage of the insured cargo, it is evident that said plaintiff-appellee has a
cause of action to recover (what it has paid) from defendant-appellant MCP (Decision, CA-G.R. No.
46513-R, p. 10; Rollo, p. 43).
MCP next contends that it can not be liable solidarity with NDC because it is merely the manager
and operator of the vessel Dona Nati not a ship agent. As the general managing agent, according to
MCP, it can only be liable if it acted in excess of its authority.
As found by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, the Memorandum Agreement of September
13, 1962 (Exhibit 6, Maritime) shows that NDC appointed MCP as Agent, a term broad enough to
include the concept of Ship-agent in Maritime Law. In fact, MCP was even conferred all the powers
of the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the NDC (Decision, CA
G.R. No. 46513, p. 12; Rollo, p. 40). Consequently, under the circumstances, MCP cannot escape
liability.
It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done
where both are impleaded (Philippine Shipping Co. v. Garcia Vergara, 96 Phil. 281 [1906]); that in
case of collision, both the owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain
(Yueng Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., supra citing Article 586 of the Code of
Commerce; Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Castelo, 42 Phil. 256, 262 [1921]); that while it is
true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or agent, is not expressly provided in
Article 826 of the Code of Commerce, it is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of
jurisprudence under the Civil Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article
586 of the Code of Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and agent (Naviero)
should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action
had its origin in a tortious act and did not arise from contract (Verzosa and Ruiz, Rementeria y Cia v.
Lim, 45 Phil. 423 [1923]). Consequently, the agent, even though he may not be the owner of the
vessel, is liable to the shippers and owners of the cargo transported by it, for losses and damages
occasioned to such cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the ship, to
the extent of the value of the vessel, its equipment, and the freight (Behn Meyer Y Co. v. McMicking
et al. 11 Phil. 276 [1908]).
As to the extent of their liability, MCP insists that their liability should be limited to P200.00 per
package or per bale of raw cotton as stated in paragraph 17 of the bills of lading. Also the MCP
argues that the law on averages should be applied in determining their liability.
MCP's contention is devoid of merit. The declared value of the goods was stated in the bills of lading
and corroborated no less by invoices offered as evidence ' during the trial. Besides, common
carriers, in the language of the court in Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Barrette et al., (51 Phil. 90 [1927])
"cannot limit its liability for injury to a loss of goods where such injury or loss was caused by its own
negligence." Negligence of the captains of the colliding vessel being the cause of the collision, and
the cargoes not being jettisoned to save some of the cargoes and the vessel, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals acted correctly in not applying the law on averages (Articles 806 to 818, Code of
Commerce).
MCP's claim that the fault or negligence can only be attributed to the pilot of the vessel SS
Yasushima Maru and not to the Japanese Coast pilot navigating the vessel Dona Nati need not be
discussed lengthily as said claim is not only at variance with NDC's posture, but also contrary to the
factual findings of the trial court affirmed no less by the Court of Appeals, that both pilots were at
fault for not changing their excessive speed despite the thick fog obstructing their visibility.
Finally on the issue of prescription, the trial court correctly found that the bills of lading issued allow
trans-shipment of the cargo, which simply means that the date of arrival of the ship Dona Nati on
April 18,1964 was merely tentative to give allowances for such contingencies that said vessel might
not arrive on schedule at Manila and therefore, would necessitate the trans-shipment of cargo,
resulting in consequent delay of their arrival. In fact, because of the collision, the cargo which was
supposed to arrive in Manila on April 18, 1964 arrived only on June 12, 13, 18, 20 and July 10, 13
and 15, 1964. Hence, had the cargoes in question been saved, they could have arrived in Manila on
the above-mentioned dates. Accordingly, the complaint in the instant case was filed on April 22,
1965, that is, long before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the lost or damaged cargo "should
have been delivered" in the light of Section 3, sub-paragraph (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the subject petitions are DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes