The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text

Author(s): Paul Ricœur

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 91-117
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468410
Accessed: 28/09/2010 20:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
New Literary History.

http://www.jstor.org
 The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action
Considered as a Text

PaulRicoeur

MY AIM IN THIS PAPER will be to test an hypothesis. I assume

that the primary sense of the word "hermeneutics" concerns
the rules required for the interpretation of the written docu-
ments of our culture. In assuming this starting point I am remaining
faithful to the concept of Auslegung as it was stated by Wilhelm Dilthey;
whereas Verstehen (understanding, comprehension) relies on the rec-
ognition of what a foreign subject means or intends on the basis of all
kinds of signs in which psychic life expresses itself (Lebensiiusserungen),
Auslegung (interpretation, exegesis) implies something more specific: it
covers only a limited category of signs, those which are fixed by writing,
including all the sorts of documents and monuments which entail a
fixation similar to writing.
Now my hypothesis is this: if there are specific problems which are
raised by the interpretation of texts because they are texts and not
spoken language, and if these problems are the ones which constitute
hermeneutics as such, then the social sciences may be said to be her-
meneutical (I) inasmuch as their object displays some of the features
constitutive of a text as text, and (2) inasmuch as their methodology
develops the same kind of procedures as those of Auslegung or text-
interpretation.
Hence the two questions to which my paper will be devoted: (i) To
what extent may we consider the notion of text as a good paradigm for
the so-called object of the social sciences? (2) To what extent may we
use the methodology of text-interpretation as a paradigm for interpreta-
tion in general in the field of the social sciences?

I. The Paradigm of Text

In order to justify the distinction between spoken and written lan-

guage I want to introduce a preliminary concept, that of discourse. It
92 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

is as discourse that language is either spoken or written. Now, what is

discourse?
We shall not seek the answer from the logicians, not even from the
exponents of linguistic analysis, but from the linguists themselves. Dis-
course is the counterpart of what linguists call language systems or
linguistic codes. Discourse is language-event or linguistic usage. This
pair of correlative terms-system/event, code/message-has played a
basic role in linguistics since it was introduced by Ferdinand de Saus-
sure and Louis Hjelmslev. The first spoke of language (langue)-speech
(parole), the second of schema-usage. We can also add competence-
performance in Chomsky's language. It is necessary to draw all the
epistemological consequences of such a duality, namely, that the lin-
guistics of discourse has different rules from the linguistics of language.
It is the French linguist Emile Benv6niste who has gone furthest with
this distinction. For him, these two linguistics are not constructed upon
the same units. If the sign (phonological or lexical) is the basic unit of
language, the sentence is the basic unit of discourse. Therefore it is the
linguistics of the sentence which support the theory of speech as an
event. I will retain four traits from this linguistics of the sentence which
will help me in a little while to elaborate the hermeneutic of the event
and of discourse.
First trait: Discourse is always realized temporally and in a present,
whereas the language system is virtual and outside of time. Emile Ben-
v6niste calls this the "instance of discourse."
Second trait: Whereas language lacks a subject-in the sense that the
question "Who is speaking?" does not apply at its level-discourse refers
to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as the personal
pronouns. We will say that the "instance of discourse" is self-referential.
Third trait: Whereas the signs in language refer only to other signs
within the same system, and whereas language therefore lacks a world
just as it lacks temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about
something. It refers to a world which it claims to describe, to express,
or to represent. It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language
is actualized.
Fourth trait: Whereas language is only the condition for communica-
tion, for which it provides the codes, it is in discourse that all messages
are exchanged. In this sense, discourse alone has not only a world, but
an other-another person, an interlocutor to whom it is addressed.
These four traits taken together constitute speech as an event. It is
remarkable that these four traits appear only in the movement of ef-
fectuation from language to discourse. Every apology for speech as an
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 93

event, therefore, is significant if, and only if, it makes visible the effectua-
tion by which our linguistic competence actualizes itself in perform-
ance. But the same apology becomes abusive as soon as this event-
character is extended from effectuation, where it is valid, to under-
standing. What is it to understand a discourse?
Let us see how differently these four traits are actualized in spoken
and written language:
(I) Discourse, as we said, exists only as a temporal and present in-
stance. This first trait is realized differently in living speech and in
writing. In living speech, the instance of discourse has the character of
a fleeting event, an event that appears and disappears. That is why
there is a problem of fixation, of inscription. What we want to fix is
what disappears. If, by extension, we can say that one fixes language-
inscription of the alphabet, lexical inscription, syntactical inscription-
it is for the sake of that which alone has to be fixed, discourse. Only
discourse is to be fixed, because discourse disappears. The atemporal
system neither appears nor disappears; it does not happen. Here is the
place to recall the myth in Plato's Phaedo. Writing was given to men
to "come to the rescue" of the "weaknessof discourse," a weakness which
was that of the event. The gift of the grammata-of that "external"
thing, of those "external marks," of that materializing alienation-was
just that of a "remedy" brought to our memory. The Egyptian king of
Thebes could well respond to the god Theuth that writing was a false
remedy in that it replaced true reminiscence by material conservation
and real wisdom by the semblance of knowing. This inscription, in
spite of its perils, is discourse's destination. What does writing fix? Not
the event of speaking, but the "said" of speaking where we understand
by the said that intentional exteriorization constitutive of the aim of
discourse thanks to which the sagen-the saying-wants to become
Aus-sage-the enunciation, the enunciated. In short, what we write,
what we inscribe, is the noema of the speaking. It is the meaning of
the speech event, not the event as event.
What does writing fix? If it is not the speech event, it is speech itself
in so far as it is said. But what is said?
Here I would like to propose that hermeneutics has to appeal not
only to linguistics (linguistics of discourse vs. linguistics of language)
as it does above, but also to the theory of the speech act such as we
find it in Austin and Searle. The act of speaking, according to these
authors, is constituted by a hierarchy of subordinate acts which are
distributed on three levels: (I) the level of the locutionary or proposi-
tional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionary act or
94 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY

force, that which we do in saying; and (3) the level of the perlocu-
tionary act, that which we do by saying. When I tell you to close the
door, for example, "Close the door!" is the act of speaking. But when
I tell you this with the force of an order and not of a request, this is
the illocutionary act. Finally, I can stir up certain effects, like fear, by
the fact that I give you an order. These effects make my discourse act
like a stimulus producing certain results. This is the perlocutionary act.
What is the implication of these distinctions for our problem of the
intentional exteriorization by which the event surpasses itself in meaning
and lends itself to material fixation? The locutionary act exteriorizes
itself in the sentence. The sentence can be identified and reidentified
as being the same sentence. A sentence becomes an enunciation (Aus-
sage) and thus is transferred to others as being such and such a sentence
with such and such a meaning. But the illocutionary act can also be
exteriorized in grammatical paradigms (indicative, imperative, and
subjunctive modes, and other procedures expressive of the illocutionary
force) which permit its identification and reidentification. Certainly,
in spoken discourse, the illocutionary force leans upon mimicry and
gestural elements and upon the nonarticulated aspects of discourse, what
we call prosody. In this sense, the illocutionary force is less completely
inscribed in grammar than is the propositional meaning. In every case,
its inscription in a syntactic articulation is itself gathered up in specific
paradigms which in principle make possible fixatiod by writing. Without
a doubt we must concede that the perlocutionary act is the least in-
scribable aspect of discourse and that by preference it characterizes
spoken language. But the perlocutionary action is precisely what is the
least discursive in discourse. It is the discourse as stimulus. It acts, not
by my interlocutor's recognition of my intention, but energetically, by
direct influence upon the emotions and the affective dispositions. Thus
the propositional act, the illocutionary force, and the perlocutionary
action are apt, in a decreasing order, for the intentional exteriorization
which makes inscription in writing possible.
Therefore it is necessary to understand by the meaning of the speech-
act, or by the noema of the saying, not only the sentence, in the narrow
sense of the propositional act, but also the illocutionary force and even
the perlocutionary action in the measure that these three aspects of the
speech-act are codified, gathered into paradigms where, consequently,
they can be identified and reidentified as having the same meaning.
Therefore I am here giving the word "meaning" a very large accepta-
tion which covers all the aspects and levels of the intentional exterioriza-
tion which makes the inscription of discourse possible.
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 95

The destiny of the three other traits of discourse in passing from

discourse into writing permits us to make more precise the meaning of
this elevation of saying to what is said.
(2) In discourse, we said-and this was the second differential trait
of discourse in relation to language--the sentence designates its speaker
by diverse indicators of subjectivity and personality. In spoken discourse,
this reference by discourse to the speaking subject presents a character
of immediacy that we can explain in the following way. The subjective
intention of the speaking subject and the meaning of the discourse over-
lap each other in such a way that it is the same thing to understand
what the speaker means and what his discourse means. The ambiguity
of the French expression vouloir dire, the German meinen, and the
English to mean attests to this overlapping. It is almost the same thing
to ask "What do you mean?" and "What does that mean?" With
written discourse, the author's intention and the meaning of the text
cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text
and the mental intention is what is really at stake in the inscription
of discourse. Not that we can conceive of a text without an author; the
tie between the speaker and the discourse is not abolished, but distended
and complicated. The dissociation of the meaning and the intention is
still an adventure of the reference of discourse to the speaking subject.
But the text's career escapes the finite horizon of its author. What the
text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and
every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a
meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author.
Using Plato's expression again, written discourse cannot be "rescued" by
all the processes by which spoken discourse supports itself in order to
be undertood-intonation, delivery, mimicry, gestures. In this sense,
the inscription in "external marks," which first appeared to alienate
discourse, marks the actual spirituality of discourse. Henceforth, only
the meaning "rescues" the meaning, without the contribution of the
physical and psychological presence of the author. But to say that the
meaning rescues the meaning is to say that only interpretation is the
"remedy" for the weakness of discourse which its author can no longer
'"save.5"
(3) The event is surpassed by the meaning a third time. Discourse,
we said, is what refers to the world, to a world. In spoken discourse
this means that what the dialogue ultimately refers to, is the situation
common to the interlocutors. This situation in a way surrounds the
dialogue, and its landmarks can all be shown by a gesture, or by
pointing a finger, or designated in an ostensive manner by the discourse
96 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

itself through the oblique reference of those other indicators which

are the demonstratives, the adverbs of time and place, and the tense
of the verb. In oral discourse, we are saying, reference is ostensive.
What happens to it in written discourse? Are we saying that the text
no longer has a reference? This would be to confound reference and
demonstration, world and situation. Discourse cannot fail to be about
something. In saying this, I am separating myself from any ideology
of an absolute text. Only a few sophisticated texts satisfy this ideal of
a text without reference. They are texts where the play of the signifier
breaks away from the signified. But this new form is valuable only as
an exception and cannot give the key to all other texts which in one
manner or another speak about the world. But what, then, is the sub-
ject of texts when nothing can be shown? Far from saying that the text
is then without a world, I will now say without paradox that only man
has a world and not just a situation. In the same manner that the
text frees its meaning from the tutelage of the mental intention, it
frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference. For us, the
world is the ensemble of references opened up by the texts. Thus we
speak about the "world" of Greece, not to designate any more what
were the situations for those who lived them, but to designate the
nonsituational references which outlive the effacement of the first and
which henceforth are offered as possible modes of being, as symbolic
dimensions of our being-in-the-world. For me, this is the referent of all
literature; no longer the Umwelt of the ostensive references of dialogue,
but the Welt projected by the nonostensive references of every text that
we have read, understood, and loved. To understand a text is at the
same time to light up our own situation, or, if you will, to interpolate
among the predicates of our situation all the significations which make
a Welt of our Umwelt. It is this enlarging of the Umwelt into the World
which permits us to speak of the references opened up by the text-it
would be better to say that the references open up the world. Here again
the spirituality of discourse manifests itself through writing, which frees
us from the visibility and limitation of situations by opening up a world
for us, that is, new dimensions of our being-in-the-world.
In this sense, Heidegger rightly says-in his analysis of verstehen in
Being and Time-that what we understand first in a discourse is not
another person, but aiproject, that is, the outline of a new being-in-the-
world. Only writing, in freeing itself, not only from its author, but
from the narrowness of the dialogical situation, reveals this destination
of discourse as projecting a world.
In thus tying reference to the projection of a world, it is not only
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 97

Heidegger whom we rediscover, but Wilhelm von Humbolt, for whom

the great justification of language is to establish the relation of man to
the world. If we suppress this referential function, only an absurd
game of errant signifiers remains.
(4) But it is perhaps with the fourth trait that the accomplishment of
discourse in writing is most exemplary. Only discourse, not language,
is addressed to someone. This is the foundation of communication. But
it is one thing for discourse to be addressed to an interlocutor equally
present in the discourse situation, and another to be addressed, as is
the case in virtually every piece of writing, to whoever knows how to
read. The narrowness of the dialogical relation explodes. Instead of
being addressed just to you, the second person, what is written is ad-
dressed to the audience that itself creates. This, again, marks the
spirituality of writing, the counterpart of its materiality and of the
alienation which it imposes upon discourse. The vis-a-vis of the written
is just whoever knows how to read. The copresence of subjects in a
dialogue ceases to be the model for every "understanding." The rela-
tion writing-reading ceases to be a particular case of the relation
speaking-hearing. But at the same time, discourse is revealed as dis-
course in the universality of its address. In escaping the momentary
character of the event-the bounds lived by the author and the narrow-
ness of ostensive reference-discourse escapes the limits of being face
to face. It is no longer a visible auditor. An unknown, invisible reader
has become the unprivileged addressee of the discourse.
To what extent may we say that the object of the social sciences con-
forms to the paradigm of the text? Max Weber defines this object as
sinnhaft orientiertes Verhalten, as "meaningfully oriented behavior."
To what extent may we replace the predicate "meaningfully oriented"
by what I would like to call readability-characters derived from the
preceding theory of the text? Let us try to apply our four criteria of
what a text is to the concept of meaningful action.

a. The Fixation of Action

Meaningful action is an object for science only under the condition

of a kind of objectification which is equivalent to the fixation' of a dis-
course by writing. This trait presupposes a simple way of being mean-
ingful which is similar to the dialogical situation as regards language.
Meaningful action may be grasped and understood within the process
of interaction, which is quite similar to the process of interlocution in
98 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

the field of discourse. It is at this strategic level that the so-called phi-
losophy of actions operates among post-Wittgensteinian thinkers.
G. E. M. Anscombe in Intention, A. I. Melden in Free Action, and
Richard Taylor in Action and Purpose require no other conceptual
framework for their theory of action than the one which is at work
in ordinary language. Science is another "language game" based on
quite different semantic rules. It is one thing to speak of actions, pur-
poses, motives, agents and their agency, and it is something else to speak
of movements as happening, of mental events (if there are any), or of
physical or mental causes. The duality of linguistic games, that of
ordinary language and that of the behavioral and the social sciences,
is inseparable. As is known, the main discrepancy between both lan-
guage games concerns the irreducibility of motive, conceived as "reason
for," to cause interpreted in Humean terms as an antecedent event
logically distinct from, and contingently linked to, its consequent. But is
it true that a scientific approach must necessarily exclude the character
of meaningfulness and that ordinary language alone preserves it? Is
there not a scientific language for which action would be both "objec-
tive" and "meaningful"?
The comparison between interlocution and interaction may help us
at this stage of our analysis. In the same way that interlocution is over-
come in writing, interaction is overcome in numerous situations in
which we treat action as a fixed text. These situations are overlooked
in a theory of action for which the discourse of action is itself a part of
the situation of transaction which flows from one agent to another,
exactly as spoken language is caught in the process of interlocution,
or, if we may use the term, of translocution. This is why the under-
standing of action at the prescientific level is only "knowledge without
observation," or as G. E. M. Anscombe says, "practical knowledge"
in the sense of "knowing how" as opposed to "knowing that." But this
understanding is not yet an interpretation in the strong sense which
deserves to be called scientific interpretation.
My claim is that action itself, action as meaningful, may become an
object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, by
virtue of a kind of objectification similar to the fixation which occurs
in writing. By this objectification, action is no longer a transaction to
which the discourse of action would still belong. It constitutes a de-
lineated pattern which has to be interpreted according to its inner con-
nections.
This objectificationris made possible by some inner traits of the action
which are similar to the structure of the speech act and which make
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 99

"doing" a kind of utterance. In the same way fixation by writing is

made possible by a dialectic of intentional exteriorization inherent in
the speech-act itself, a similar dialectic within the process of transaction
prepares the detachment of the meaning of the action from the event
of the action.
First, an action has the structure of a locutionary act. It has a proposi-
tional content which can be identified and reidentified. This "proposi-
tional" structure of the action has been clearly and demonstratively
expounded by Antony Kenny in Action, Emotion and Will. The verbs
of action constitute a specific complex of predicates which are similar
to relations and which, like relations, are irreducible to all the kinds of
predicates which may follow the copula "is." The class of action predi-
cates in its turn is irreducible to the relations and constitutes a specific
set of predicates. Among other traits, the verbs of action allow a plurality
of "arguments" capable of complementing the verb, ranging from no
argument (Plato taught) to an indeterminate number of arguments
(Brutus killed Caesar, in the Curia, on the Ides of March, with a ...,
with the help of. . . .). This variable polydicity of the predicative
structure of action-sentences is typical of the propositional structure
of action. Another trait which is important for the transposition of
the concept of fixation from the sphere of discourse to the sphere
of action concerns the ontological status of the "complements" of the
verbs of action. Whereas relations hold between terms equally existing
(or nonexisting), certain verbs of action have a topical subject which
is identified as existing and to which the sentence refers, and comple-
ments of which do not exist. Such is the case with the "mental acts"
(to believe, to think, to will, to imagine, etc.).
Antony Kenny describes some other traits of the propositional struc-
ture of actions derived from the description of the functioning of the
verb of action. For example, the distinction between states, activities,
and other performances can be stated according to the behavior of the
tenses of the verbs of action which fix some specific temporal traits of
the action itself. The distinction between the formal and the material
object of an action (let us say the difference between the notion of all
inflammable things and this letter which I am now burning) belongs
to the logic of action as mirrored in the grammar of the verbs of
action. Such, roughly described, is the propositional content of action
which gives a basis to a dialectic of event and meaning similar to that
of the speech-act. I should like to speak here of the noematic structure
of action. It is the noematic structure which may be fixed and detached
from the process of interaction and become an object to interpret.
I00 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

Moreover, this noema has not only a propositional content, but also
presents "illocutionary" traits very similar to those of the complete
speech act. The different classes of performative acts of discourse de-
scribed by Austin at the end of How to do Things with Words may be
taken as paradigms not only for the speech acts themselves, but for the
actions which fulfill the corresponding speech acts. A typology of action,
following the model of illocutionary acts, is therefore possible. Not only
a typology, but a criteriology, inasmuch as each type implies rules, more
precisely "constitutive rules" which, according to Searle in Speech-Acts,
allow the construction of "ideal models" similar to the ideal types of
Max Weber. For example, to understand what a promise is, we have
to understand what the "essential condition" is according to which a
given action "counts as" a promise. This "essential condition" of Searle
is not far from what Husserl called Sinngehalt, which covers both the
"matter" (propositional content) and the "quality" (the illocutionary
force).
We may now say that an action, like a speech act, may be identified
not only according to its propositional content, but also according to
its illocutionary force. Both constitute its "sense-content." Like the
speech act, the action-event (if we may coin this analogical expression)
develops a similar dialectic between its temporal status as an appearing
and disappearing event, and its logical status as having such and such
identifiable meaning or "sense-content." But if the "sense-content" is
what makes possible the "inscription" of the action-event, what makes
it real? In other words, what corresponds to writing in the field of
action?
Let us return to the paradigm of the speech-act. What is fixed by
writing, we said, is the noema of the speaking, the saying as said. To
what extent may we say that what is done is inscribed? Certain meta-
phors may be helpful at this point. We say that such and such event
left its mark on its time. We speak of marking events. Are there not
"marks" on time, the kind of thing which calls for a reading, rather
than for a hearing? But what is meant by this metaphor of the "im-
printed mark"? The three other criteria of the text will help us to
make the nature of this fixation more precise.

b. The Autonomization of Action

In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an action is
detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own. This
autonomization of human action constitutes the social dimension of
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 101

action. An action is a social phenomenon not only because it is done

by several agents in such a way that the role of each of them cannot
be distinguished from the role of the others, but also because our deeds
escape us and have effects which we did not intend. One of the mean-
ings of the notion of "inscription" appears here. The kind of distance
which we found between the intention of the speaker and the verbal
meaning of a text occurs also between the agent and his action. It
is this distance which makes the ascription of responsibility a specific
problem. We do not ask, "Who smiled?" "Who raised his hand?" The
doer is present to his doing in the same way the speaker is present to
his speech. With simple actions like those which require no previous
action in order to be done, the meaning (noema) and the intention
(noesis) coincide or overlap. With complex actions some segments are
so remote from the initial simple segments, which can be said to express
the intention of the doer, that the ascription of these actions or action-
segments constitutes a problem as difficult to solve as that of authorship
in some cases of literary criticism. The assignation of an author becomes
a mediate inference well-known to the historian who tries to isolate the
role of an historical character on the course of events.
We just used the expression "the course of events." Could we not
say that what we?call the course of events plays the role of the material
thing which "rescues" the vanishing discourse when it is written? As
we said in a metaphorical way, some actions are events which imprint
their mark on their time. But on what did they imprint their mark?
Is it not in something spatial that discourse is inscribed? How could
an event be printed on something temporal? Social time, however, is
not only something which flees. It is also the place of durable effects,
of persisting patterns. An action leaves a "trace," it makes its "mark"
when it contributes to the emergence of such patterns which become
the documents of human action.
Another metaphor may help us to delineate this phenomenon of the
social "imprint": the metaphor of the "record" or of the "registration."
John Feinberg, in Action and Responsibility, introduces this metaphor
in another context, that of responsibility, in order to show how an
action may be submitted to blame. Only actions, he says, which can be
"registered" for further notice, placed as an entry on somebody's
"record," can be blamed. And when there are no formal "records"
(like those which are kept by institutions like employment offices,
schools, banks, and the police), there is still an informal analogue of
these formal records which we call reputation and which constitutes a
basis for blaming. I would like to apply this interesting metaphor of
a record and reporting to something other than the quasi-judicial
102 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

situations of blaming, charging, crediting or punishing. Could we not

say that history is itself the record of human action? History is this
quasi-"thing" on which human action leaves a "trace," puts its mark.
Hence the possibility of "archives." Before the archives which are
intentionally written down by the memorialists, there is this continuous
process of "recording" human action which is history itself as the sum
of "marks," the fate of which escapes the control of individual actors.
Henceforth history may appear as an autonomous entity, as a play
with players who do not know the plot. This hypostasis of history may
be denounced as a fallacy, but this fallacy is well entrenched in the
process by which human action becomes social action when written
down in the archives of history. Thanks to this sedimentation in social
time, human deeds become "institutions," in the sense that their
meaning no longer coincides with the logical intentions of the actors.
The meaning may be "de-psychologized" to the point where the sinnhaft
(meaningfulness) resides in the work itself. In the terms of P. Winch,
in The Idea of Social Science, the object of the social sciences is a
"rule-governed behavior." But this rule is not superimposed; it is the
meaning as articulating from within these sedimented or instituted
works. Such is the kind of "objectivity" which proceeds from the
"social fixation" of meaningful behavior.

c. Relevance and Importance

According to our third criterion of what a text is, we could say that
a meaningful action is an action the importance of which goes "beyond"
its relevance to its initial situation. This new trait is very similar to the
way in which a text breaks the ties of discourse to all the ostensive
references. Thanks to this emancipation from the situational context,
discourse can develop nonostensive references which we called a "world,"
in the sense in which we speak of the Greek "world," not in the cos-
mological sense of the word, but as an ontological dimension.
What would correspond in the field of action to the nonostensive
references of a text?
We juxtaposed, in introducing the present analysis, the importance
of an action to its relevance as regards the situation to which it
wanted to respond. An important action, we could say, develops
meanings which can be actualized or fulfilled in situations other than
the one in which this action occurred. To say the same thing in dif-
ferent words, the meaning of an important event exceeds, overcomes,
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 103

transcends the social conditions of its production and may be reenacted

in new social contexts. Its importance is its durable relevance and, in
some cases, its omnitemporal relevance.
This third trait has important implications for the relation between
cultural phenomena and their social conditions. Is it not a fundamental
trait of the great works of culture to overcome the conditions of their
social production, in the same way a text develops new references and
constitutes new "worlds"? It is in this sense that Hegel spoke, in the
Philosophy of Right, of the institutions (in the largest sense of the
word) which "actualize" freedom as a second nature in accordance
with freedom. This "realm of actual freedom" is constituted by the
deeds and works capable of receiving relevance in new historical situa-
tions. If this is true, this way of overcoming one's own conditions of
production is the key to the puzzling problems raised by Marxismi con-
cerning the status of the "superstructures." The autonomy of super-
structures as regards their relation to their own infrastructures has its
paradigm in the nonostensive references of a text. A work does not
only mirror its time, but it opens up a world which it bears within
itself.
d. Human Action as an "Open Work"

Finally, according to our fourth criterion of the text as text, the

meaning of human action is also something which is addressed to an
indefinite range of possible "readers." The judges are not contempo-
raries, but, as Hegel said, history itself. Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht.
That means that, like a text, human action is an open work, the meaning
of which is "in suspense." It is because it "opens up" new references
and receives fresh relevance from them that human deeds are also
waiting for fresh interpretations which decide their meaning. All sig-
nificant events and deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind of
practical interpretation through present praxis. Human action, too, is
opened to anybody who can read. In the same way that the meaning
of an event is the sense of its forthcoming interpretations, the interpre-
tation by contemporaries has no particular privilege in this process.
This dialectic between the work and its interpretations will be the
topic of the methodology of interpretation that we shall now consider.

II. The Paradigm of Text-Interpretation

I want now to show the fruitfulness of this analogy of the text at

the level of methodology.
I 04 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

The main implication of our paradigm, as concerns the methods of

the social sciences, is that it offers a fresh approach to the question of
the relation between erkldren (explanation) and verstehen (under-
standing, comprehension). As is well known, Dilthey defined this re-
lation as a dichotomy. For him, any model of explanation is bor-
rowed from a different region of knowledge, that of the natural sciences
with their inductive logic. Henceforth the autonomy of the so-
called Geisteswissenschaften Is preserved only by the recognition of
the irreducible factor of understanding a foreign psychic life on the
basis of the signs in which this life is immediately exteriorized. But if
verstehen is separated from erkliiren by this logical gap, how can the
social sciences be scientific at all? Dilthey kept wrestling with this
paradox. He discovered more and more clearly, mainly after having
read Husserl's LogicadtInvestigations, that the Geisteswissenschaften are
sciences inasmuch as the expressions of life undergo a kind of objectifica-
tion, which makes possible a scientific approach somewhat similar to that
of the natural sciences, in spite of the logical gap between Natur and
Geist, factual knowledge and knowledge by signs. In this way the
mediation offered by these objectifications appeared to be more im-
portant, for a scientific purpose, than the immediate meaningfulness
of the expressions of life for everyday transactions.
My own investigation starts with this last perplexity in Dilthey's
thought. And my hypothesis is that the kind of objectification implied
in the status of discourse as text provides a better answer to the problem
raised by Dilthey. This answer relies on the dialectical character of the
relation between erkliiren and verstehen as it is displayed in reading.
Our task therefore will be to show to what extent the paradigm of read-
ing, which is the counterpart of the paradigm of writing, provides a
solution for the methodological paradox of social sciences.
The dialectic involved in reading expresses the originality of the
relation between writing and reading and its irreducibility to the dia-
logical situation based on the immediate reciprocity between speaking
and hearing. There is a dialectic between explaining and comprehending
because the writing-reading situation develops a problem of its own
which is not merely an extension of the speaking-hearing situation con-
stitutive of dialogue.
It is here therefore that our hermeneutic is most critical of the Ro-
manticist tradition in hermeneutics, which took the dialogical situation
as the standard for the hermeneutical operation applied to the text. My
contention is that it is this operation, on the contrary, which reveals the
meaning of what is already hermeneutical in dialogical understanding.
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 105

Then, if the dialogical relation does not provide us with the paradigm
of reading we have to build it as an original paradigm, as a paradigm
of its own.
This paradigm draws its main features from the status of the text
itself as characterized by (I) the fixation of the meaning, (2) its dis-
sociation from the mental intention of the author, (3) the display of
nonostensive references, and (4) the universal range of its addressees.
These four traits taken together constitute the "objectivity" of the text.
From this "objectivity" derives a possibility of explaining, which is not
derived in any way from another field, that of natural events, but
which is congenial to this kind of objectivity. Therefore there is no
transfer from one region of reality to another, from the sphere of facts,
let us say, to the sphere of signs. It is within the same sphere of signs
that the process of objectification takes place and gives rise to explana-
tory procedures. And it is within this sphere of signs that explanation
and comprehension are confronted.
I propose that we consider this dialectic in two different ways: (I) as
proceeding from comprehension to explanation, and (2) as proceeding
from explanation to comprehension. The exchange and reciprocity
between both procedures will provide us with a good approximation of
the dialectical character of the relation.
At the end of each half of this demonstration I shall try to indicate
briefly the possible extension of the paradigm of reading to the whole
sphere of the human sciences.

a. From Understanding to Explanation

This first dialectic--or rather this first figure of a unique dialectic-

may be conveniently introduced by our contention that to understand
a text is not to rejoin the author. The disjunction of the meaning and
the intention creates an absolutely original situation which engenders
the dialectic of erkliiren and verstehen. If the objective meaning is
something other than the subjective intention of the author, it may
be construed in various ways. The problems of the right understanding
can no longer be solved by a simple return to the alleged intention of
the author.
This construction necessarily takes the form of a process. As E. D.
Hirsch says, there are no rules for making good guesses. But there
106 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

are methods for validating guesses.1This dialectic between guessing and

validating constitutes one figure of our dialectic between comprehension
and explanation.
In this dialectic both terms are decisive. Guessing corresponds to
what Schleiermacher called the "divinatory," validation to what he
called the "grammatical." My contribution to the theory of this dia-
lectic will be to link it more tightly to the theory of the text and text-
reading.
Why do we need an art of guessing? Why do we have to "construe"
the meaning?
Not only-as I tried to say a few years ago-because language is
metaphorical and because thd double meaning of metaphorical language
requires an art of deciphering which tends to unfold the several layers
of meaning. The case of metaphor is only a particular case for a general
theory of hermeneutics. In more general terms, a text has to be con-
strued because it is not a mere sequence of sentences, all on an equal
footing and separately understandable. A text is a whole, a totality.
The relation between whole and parts-as in a work of art or in an
animal-requires a specific kind of "judgment" for which Kant gave
the theory in the Third Critique. Concretely, the whole appears as a
hierarchy of topics, or primary and subordinate topics. The reconstruc-
tion of the text as a whole necessarily has a circular character, in the
sense that the presupposition of a certain kind of whole is implied in
the recognition of the parts. And, reciprocally, it is in construing the
details that we construe the whole. There is no necessity and no evidence
concerning what is important and what is unimportant, what is essen-
tial and what is unessential. The judgment of importance is a guess.
To put the difficulty in other terms, if a text is a whole, it is once
more an individual like an animal or a work of art. As an individual
it can only be reached by a process of narrowing the scope of generic
concepts concerning the literary genre, the class of text to which this
text belongs, the structures of different kinds which intersect in this
text. The localization and the individualization of this unique text are
still guesses.
Still another way of expressing the same enigma is that as an in-
dividual the text may be reached from different sides. Like a cube, or
a volume in space, the text presents a "relief." Its different topics are

I Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, 1967): "The act of understanding is at

first a genial (or a mistaken) guess, and there are no methods for making guesses,
no rules for generating insights. The methodical activity of interpretation commences
when we begin to test and criticize our guesses" (p. 203). And further: "A mute
symbolism may be construed in several ways."
THEMODEL
OFTHETEXT 107
not at the same altitude. Therefore the reconstruction of the whole has
a perspectivist aspect similar to that of perception. It is always possible
to relate the same sentence in different ways to this or that sentence
considered as the cornerstone of the text. A specific kind of onesided-
ness is implied in the act of reading. This onesidedness confirms the
"guess" character of interpretation.
For all these reasons there is a problem of interpretation not so much
because of the incommunicability of the psychic experience of the
author, but because of the very nature of the verbal intention of the
text. This intention is something other than the sum of the individual
meanings of the individual sentences. A text is more than a linear
succession of sentences. It is a cumulative, holistic process. This specific
structure of the text cannot be derived from that of the sentence.
Therefore the kind of "plurivocity" which belongs to texts as texts is
something other than the polysemy of individual words in ordinary lan-
guage and the ambiguity of individual sentences. This plurivocity is
typical of the text considered as a whole, open to several readings and to
several constructions.
As concerns the procedures of validation by which we test our guesses,
I agree with Hirsch that they are closer to a logic of probability than
to a logic of empirical verification. To show that an interpretation is
more probable in the light of what is known is something other than
showing that a conclusion is true. In this sense, validation is not
verification. Validation is an argumentative discipline comparable to
the juridical procedures of legal interpretation. It is a logic of uncer-
tainty and of qualitative probability. In this sense we may give an
acceptable sense to the opposition between Geisteswissenschaften and
Naturwissenschaften without conceding anything to the alleged dogma
of the ineffability of the individual. The method of conveyance of
indices, typical of the logic of subjective probability, gives a firm basis
for a science of the individual deserving the name of science. A text
is a quasi-individual, and the validation of an interpretation applied
to it may be said, with complete legitimacy, to give a scientific knowl-
edge of the text.
Such is the balance between the genius of guessing and the scientific
character of validation which constitutes the modern complement of
the dialectic between verstehen and erkliiren.
At the same time, we are prepared to give an acceptable meaning
to the famous concept of a hermeneutic circle. Guess and validation
are in a sense circularly related as subjective and objective approaches
to the text. But this circle is not a vicious circularity. It would be a
I O8 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

cage if we were unable to escape the kind of "self-confirmability"which,

according to Hirsch (pp. 165 ff.), threatens this relation between guess
and validation. To the procedures of validation also belong procedures
of invalidation similar to the criteria of falsifiability emphasized by Karl
Popper in his Logic of Discovery. The role of falsification is played here
by the conflict between competing interpretations. An interpretation
must not only be probable, but more probable than another. There are
criteria of relative superiority which may easily be derived from the
logic of subjective probability.
In conclusion, if it is true that there is always more than one way
of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal and
may be assimilated to so-called "rules of thumb" (Hirsch, p. 203). The
text is a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation
allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and skepticism.
It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to
confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them, and to seek for
an agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our reach.
To what extent is this dialectic between guessing and validating para-
digmatic for the whole field of the social sciences? That the meaning
of human actions, of historical events, and of social phenomena may be
construed in several different ways is well known by all experts in the
social sciences. What is less known and understood is that this methodo-
logical perplexity is founded in the nature of the object itself and, more-
over, that it does not condemn the scientist to oscillate between dog-
matism and skepticism. As the logic of text-interpretation suggests,
there is a specific plurivocity belonging to the meaning of human action.
Human action, too, is a limited field of possible constructions.
A trait of human action which has not been emphasized in the pre-
ceding analysis may provide an interesting link between the specific
plurivocity of the text and the analogical plurivocity of human action.
This trait concerns the relation between the purposive and the motiva-
tional dimensions of action. As many philosophers in the new field of
action theory have shown, the purposive character of an action is fully
recognized when the answer to the question what? is explained in the
terms of an answer to the question why? I understand what you in-
tended to do, if you are able to explain to me why you did such and
such an action. Now, what kinds of answer to the question why?
make sense? Only those answers which afford a motive understood as
a reason for... and not as a cause. And what is a reason for... which
is not a cause? It is, in the terms of G. E. M. Anscombe and A. I.
Melden, an expression, or a phrase, which allows us to consider the
action as this or that. If you tell me that you did this or that because
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT IO9

of jealousy or in a spirit of revenge, you are asking me to put your

action in the light of this category of feelings or dispositions. By the
same token, you claim to make sense with your action. You claim to
make it understandable for the others and for yourself. This attempt is
particularly helpful when applied to what G. E. M. Anscombe calls
the desirability-character of wanting. Wants and beliefs have the prop-
erty not only of being forces which make people act in such and such
ways, but of making sense, by virtue of the apparent good which is the
correlate of their desirability-character. I may have to answer the
question, as what do you want this? On the basis of these desirability-
characters and of the apparent goods which correspond to them, it is
possible to argue about the meaning of an action, to argue for or
against this or that interpretation. In this way the account of motives
already foreshadows a logic of argumentation procedures. Could we
not say that what can be (and must be) construed in human action
is the motivational basis of this action, i.e., the set of desirability-
characters which may explain it? And could we not say that the process
of arguing linked to the explanation of action by its motives unfolds
a kind of plurivocity which makes action similar to a text?
What seems to make legitimate this extension from guessing the
meaning of a text to guessing the meaning of an action is that in ar-
guing about the meaning of an action I put my wants and my beliefs at
a distance and submit them to a concrete dialectic of confrontation with
opposite points of view. This way of putting my action at a distance
in order to make sense of my own motives paves the way for the kind
of distancing which occurs with what we called the social inscription of
human action and to which we applied the metaphor of the "record."
The same actions which may be put into "records" and henceforth
"recorded" may also be explained in different ways according to the
plurivocity of the arguments applied to their motivational background.
If we are correct in extending to action the concept of "guess" which
we took as a synonym for verstehen, we may also extend to the field
of action the concept of "validation" in which we saw an equivalent
of erkliiren. Here, too, the modern theory of action provides us with
an intermediary link between the procedures of literary criticism
and those of the social sciences. Some thinkers have tried to elucidate
the way in which we impute actions to agents in the light of the juridical
procedures by which a judge or a tribunal validates a decision con-
cerning a contract or a crime. In a famous article, "The Ascription of
Responsibility and Rights" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 49
[1948-49], I71-94), H. L. A. Hart shows in a very convincing way
I 10 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

that juridical reasoning does not at all consist in applying general laws
to particular cases, but each time in construing uniquely referring de-
cisions. These decisions terminate a careful refutation of the excuses
and defenses which could "defeat" the claim or the accusation. In
saying that human actions are fundamentally "defeasible" and that
juridical reasoning is an argumentative process which comes to grips
with the different ways of "defeating" a claim or an accusation, Hart
has paved the way for a general theory of validation in which juridical
reasoning would be the fundamental link between validation in literary
criticism and validation in the social sciences. The intermediary func-
tion of juridical reasoning clearly shows that the procedures of vali-
dation have a polemical character. In front of the court, the plurivocity
common to texts and to actions is exhibited in the form of a conflict
of interpretations, and the final interpretation appears as a verdict to
which it is possible to make appeal. Like legal utterances, all interpre-
tations in the field of literary criticism and in the social sciences may
be challenged, and the question "What can defeat a claim?" is common
to all argumentative situations. Only in the tribunal is there a moment
when the procedures of appeal are exhausted. But it is so only because
the decision of the judge is implemented by the force of public power.
Neither in literary criticism nor in the social sciences is there such a
last word. Or, if there is any, we call that violence.

b. From Explanation to Understanding

The same dialectic between comprehension and understanding may

receive a new meaning if taken in the reverse way, from explanation
to understanding. This new Gestalt of the dialectic proceeds from the
nature of the referential function of the text. This referential function,
as we said, exceeds the mere ostensive designation of the situation
common to both speaker and hearer in the dialogical situation. This
abstraction from the surrounding world gives rise to two opposite atti-
tudes. As readers, we may either remain in a state of suspense as re-
gards any kind of referred-to world, or we may actualize the potential
nonostensive references of the text in a new situation, that of the
reader. In the first case, we treat the text as a worldless entity; in the
second, we create a new ostensive reference thanks to the kind of "exe-
cution" which the art of reading implies. These two possibilities are
equally entailed by the act of reading, conceived as their dialectical
interplay.
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT III

The first way of reading is exemplified today by the different struc-

tural schools of literary criticism. Their approach is not only possible,
but legitimate. It proceeds from the suspension, the epoche, of the
ostensive reference. To read in this way means to prolong this suspen-
sion of the ostensive reference to the world and to transfer oneself into
the "place" where the text stands, within the "enclosure" of this world-
less place. According to this choice, the text no longer has an outside,
it has only an inside. Once more, the very constitution of the text as
text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of
the literary things into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind
of closed system which phonology discovered at the root of all dis-
course, and which de Saussure called "la langue." Literature, according
to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of "la langue."
On the basis of this abstraction, a new kind of explanatory attitude
may be extended to the literary object, which, contrary to the expecta-
tion of Dilthey, is no longer borrowed from the natural sciences, i.e.,
from an area of knowledge alien to language itself. The opposition
between Natur and Geist is no longer operative here. If some model
is borrowed, it comes from the same field, from the semiological field.
It is henceforth possible to treat texts according to the elementary rules
which linguistics successfully applied to the elementary systems of signs
that underlie the use of language. We have learned from the Geneva
school, the Prague school, and the Danish school that it is always
possible to abstract systems from processes and to relate these systems-
whether phonological, lexical, or syntactical-to units which are merely
defined by the opposition with other units of the same system. This
interplay of merely distinctive entities within finite sets of such units
defines the notion of structure in linguistics.
It is this structural model which is now applied to texts, i.e., to
sequences of signs longer than the sentence, which is the last kind of
unit that linguistics takes into account.
Id his Anthropologie structurale, Claude L6vi-Strauss formulates this
working hypothesis in the following way in regard to one category of
texts, that of myths: "Like every linguistic entity, the myth is made
up of constitutive units. These constitutive units imply the presence of
those which generally occur in the structures of language, namely
phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes. Each form differs from the
one which precedes it by a higher degree of complexity. For this
reason we will call the elements, which properly belong to the myth
(and which are the most complex of all): large constitutive units" (p.
233). By means of this working hypothesis, the large units, which are
I 12 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

at least the same size as the sentence and which, put together, form
the narrative proper to the myth, can be treated according to the same
rules as the smallest units knowns to linguistics. It is in order to insist
on this likeness that Claude Levi-Strauss speaks of mythemes, just as
we speak of phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes. But in order to
remain within the limits of the analogy between mythemes and the
lower-level units, the analysis of texts will have to perform the same
sort of abstraction as that practiced by the phonologist. To him, the
phoneme is not a concrete sound, in an absolute sense, with its acoustic
quality. It is not, to speak like de Saussure, a "substance" but a
"form," that is to say, an interplay of relations. Similarly, a mytheme
is not one of the sentences of a myth, but an oppositive value attached
to several individual sentences forming, in Levi-Strauss' terms, a
"bundle of relations." "It is only in the form of a combination of such
bundles that the constitutive units acquire a meaning-function" (p.
234). What is here called a meaning-function is not at all what the
myth means, its philosophical or existential content or intuition, but the
arrangement, the disposition of mythemes-in short, the structure of
the myth.
We can indeed say that we have explained a myth, but not that we
have interpreted it. We can, by means of structural analysis, bring out
the logic of it through the operations which relate the bundles of re-
lations among themselves. This logic constitutes "the structural law of
the myth under consideration" (p. 241). This law is preeminently an
object of reading and not at all of speaking, in the sense of a reciting
where the power of the myth would be reenacted in a particular situa-
tion. Here the text is only a text, thanks to the suspension of its
meaning for us, to the postponement of all actualization by present
speech.
I want now to show in what way "explanation" (erkliiren) requires
"understanding" (verstehen) and brings forth in a new way the inner
dialectic which constitutes "interpretation" as a whole. As a matter of
fact, nobody stops with a conception of myths and narratives as formal
as this algebra of constitutive units. This can be shown in different ways.
First, even in the most formalized presentation of myths by Lvi-Strauss,
the units he calls "mythemes" are still expressed as sentences which
bear meaning and reference. Can anyone say that their meaning as
such is neutralized when they enter into the "bundle of relations" which
alone is taken into account by the "logic" of the myth? Even this
bundle of relations, in its turn, must be written in the form of a sen-
tence. Finally, the kind of language game which the whole system of
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 113

oppositions and combinations embodies would lack any kind of signifi-

cance if the oppositions themselves, which, according to Levi-Strauss,
the myth tends to mediate, were not meaningful oppositions concerning
birth and death, blindness and lucidity, sexuality and truth. Beside
these existential conflicts there would be no contradictions to over-
come, no logical function of the myth as an attempt to solve these
contradictions. Structural analysis does not exclude, but presupposes,
the opposite hypothesis concerning the myth, i.e., that it has a meaning
as a narrative of origins. Structural analysis merely represses this func-
tion. But it cannot suppress it. The myth would not even function as
a logical operator if the propositions which it combines did not point
toward boundary situations. Structural analysis, far from getting rid
of this radical questioning, restores it at a level of higher radicality.
If this is true, could we not say that the function of structural analysis
is to lead from a surface-semantics, that of the narrated myth, to a
depth-semantics, that of the boundary situations which constitute the
ultimate "referent" of the myth?
I fully believe that if such were not the function of structural analysis,
it would be reduced to a sterile game, a divisive algebra, and even the
myth would be bereft of the function which LUvi-Strauss himself as-
signs to it, that of making men aware of certain oppositions and of
tending toward their progressive mediation. To eliminate this reference
to the aporias of existence around which mythic thought gravitates
would be to reduce a theory of myth to the necrology of the meaning-
less discourses of mankind. If, on the contrary, we consider structural
analysis as a stage-and a necessary one--between a naive interpre-
tation and a critical interpretation, between a surface-interpretation
and a depth-interpretation, then it would be possible to locate expla-
nation and understanding at two different stages of a unique herme-
neutic arc. It is this depth-semantics which constitutes the genuine
object of understanding and which requires a specific affinity between
the reader and the kind of things the text is about.
But we must not be misled by this notion of personal affinity. The
depth-semantics of the text is not what the author intended to say, but
what the text is about, i.e., the nonostensive reference of the text. And
the nonostensive reference of the text is the kind of world opened
up by the depth-semantics of the text.
Therefore what we want to understand is not something hidden
behind the text, but something disclosed in front of it. What has to be
understood is not the initial situation of discourse, but what points
toward a possible world. Understanding has less than ever to do with
I14 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY

the author and his situation. It wants to grasp the world-propositions

opened up by the reference of the text. To understand a text is to fol-
low its movement from sense to reference, from what it says to what
it talks about. In this process the mediating role played by structural
analysis constitutes both the justification of this objective approach and
the rectification of the subjective approach. We are definitely prevented
from identifying understanding with some kind of intuitive grasping of
the intention underlying the text. What we have said about the depth-
semantics which structural analysis yields invites us rather to think of
the sense of the text as an injunction starting from the text, as a new
way of looking at things, as an injunction to think in a certain manner.
Such is the reference borne by depth-semantics. The text speaks of
a possible world and of a possible way of orientating oneself within it.
The dimensions of this world are properly opened up by, disclosed by,
the text. Disclosure is the equivalent for written language of ostensive
reference for spoken language.
If, therefore, we preserve the language of Romanticist hermeneutics,
when it speaks of overcoming the distance, of making "one's own," of
appropriating what was distant, other, foreign, it will be at the price
of an important corrective. That which we make our own-Aneignung
in German-that which we appropriate, is not a foreign experience,
but the power of disclosing a world which constitutes the reference of
the text.
This link between disclosure and appropriation is, to my mind, the
cornerstone of a hermeneutic which would claim both to overcome
the shortcomings of historicism and to remain faithful to the original
intention of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. To understand an author
better than he could understand himself is to display the power of
disclosure implied in his discourse beyond the limited horizon of his
own existential situation. The process of distancing, of atemporalization,
to which we connected the phase of Erkliirung, is the fundamental
presupposition for this enlarging of the horizon of the text.
This second figure, or Gestalt, of the dialectic between explanation
and comprehension has a strong paradigmatic character which holds
for the whole field of the human sciences. I want to emphasize three
points.
First, the structural model, taken as a paradigm for explanation, may
be extended beyond textual entities to all social phenomena because
it is not limited in its application to linguistic signs, but applies to all
kinds of signs which are analogous to linguistic signs. The intermediary
link between the model of the text and social phenomena is consti-
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT I 15

tuted by the notion of semiological systems. A linguistic system, from

the point of view of semiology, is only a species within the semiotic
genre, although this species has the privilege of being a paradigm for
the other species of the genre. We can say therefore that a structural
model of explanation can be generalized as far as all social phenomena
which may be said to have a semiological character, i.e., as far as it
is possible to define the typical relations of a semiological system at their
level: the general relation between code and message, relations among
the specific units of the code, the relation between signifier and sig-
nified, the typical relation within and among social messages; the
structure of communication as an exchange of messages, etc. Inasmuch
as the semiological model holds, the semiotic or symbolic function, i.e.,
the function of substituting signs for things and of representing things
by the means of signs, appears to be more than a mere effect in social
life. It is its very foundation. We should have to say, according to this
generalized function of the semiotic, not only that the symbolic func-
tion is social, but that social reality is fundamentally symbolic.
If we follow this suggestion, then the kind of explanation implied by
the structural model appears to be quite different from the classical
causal model, especially if causation is interpreted in Humean terms
as a regular sequence of antecedents and consequents with no inner
logical connection between them. Structural systems imply relations of
a quite different kind, correlative rather than sequential or consecutive.
If this is true, the classical debate about motives and causes which
has plagued the theory of action these last decades loses its importance.
If the search for correlations within semiotic systems is the main task
of explanation, then we have to reformulate the problem of motivation
in social groups in new terms. But it is not the aim of this paper to
develop this implication.
The second paradigmatic factor in our previous concept of text-
interpretation proceeds from the role we assigned to depth-semantics
between structural analysis and appropriation. This mediating func-
tion of depth-semantics must not be overlooked, since the appropria-
tion's losing its psychological and subjective character and receiving a
genuine epistemological function depends on it.
Is there something similar to the depth-semantics of a text in social
phenomena? I should tend to say that the search for correlations
within and between social phenomena treated as semiotic entities
would lose importance and interest if it would not yield something like
a depth-semantics. In the same way that linguistic games are forms
of life, according to the famous aphorism of Wittgenstein, social struc-
116 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

tures are also attempts to cope with existential perplexities, human

predicaments, and deep-rooted conflicts. In this sense, these structures,
too, have a referential dimension. They point toward aporias of social
existence, the same aporias around which mythical thought gravitates.
And this analogical function of reference develops traits very similar
to what we called the nonostensive reference of a text, i.e., the display
of a Welt which is no longer an Umwelt, the projection of a world
which is more than a situation. May we not say that in social science,
too, we proceed from naive interpretation to critical interpretations,
from surface-interpretations to depth-interpretations through structural
analysis? But it is depth-interpretation which gives meaning to the
whole process.
This last remark leads us to our third and last point. If we follow
the paradigm of the dialectic between explanation and understanding
to its end, we must say that the meaningful patterns which a depth-
interpretation wants to grasp cannot be understood without a kind of
personal commitment similar to that of the reader who grasps the
depth-semantics of the text and makes it his "own." Everybody knows
the objections which an extension of the concept of appropriation to
the social sciences is exposed to. Does it not make legitimate the in-
trusion of personal prejudices, or subjective bias into the field of
scientific inquiry? Does it not introduce all the paradoxes of the her-
meneutical circle into the social sciences? In other words, does not
the paradigm of disclosure plus appropriation destroy the very concept
of social science? The way in which we introduced this pair of terms
within the framework of text-interpretation provides us not only with
a paradigmatic problem, but with a paradigmatic solution.
This solution is not to deny the role of personal commitment in
understanding human phenomena, but to qualify it. As the model of
text-interpretation shows, understanding has nothing to do with an
immediate grasping of a foreign psychic life or with an emotional
identification with a mental intention. Understanding is entirely
mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures which precede it
and accompany it. The counterpart of this personal appropriation is
not something which can be felt, it is the dynamic meaning released
by the explanation which we identified earlier with the reference of
the text, i.e., its power of disclosing a world.
The paradigmatic character of text-interpretation must be applied
down to this ultimate implication. This means that the conditions of
an authentic appropriation, as they were displayed in relation to texts,
are themselves paradigmatic. Therefore we are not allowed to exclude
THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
'I7

the final act of personal commitment from the whole of objective and
explanatory procedures which mediate it.
This qualification of the notion of personal commitment does not
eliminate the "hermeneutic circle." This circle remains an insuperable
structure of knowledge when it is applied to human things, but this
qualification prevents it from becoming a vicious circle.
Ultimately, the correlation between explanation and understanding,
between understanding and explanation, is the "hermeneutic circle."

UNIVERSITY OF PARIS