Deckers v. Romeo & Juliette - Complaint
Deckers v. Romeo & Juliette - Complaint
Deckers v. Romeo & Juliette - Complaint
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7 FINDINGS OF FACT
8 1. Deckers is a publicly traded corporation located in Santa Barbara,
9 California. In 1995, Deckers purchased the UGG ® footwear company.
10 2. Thomas Romeo is the sole shareholder and Chief Executive Officer of
11 Romeo & Juliette, a California corporation located in Citrus Heights, California.
12 3. Romeo & Juliette designs, manufactures, and sells footwear under the
13 “BearPaw” brand.
14 4. On September 15, 2009, the United States Patent Office issued the ‘999
15 Patent to Deckers.
16 5. Deckers embodied the ‘999 patent in its “Bailey Button” boot.
17 6. On May 25, 2010, the United States Patent Office issued the ‘189 Patent
18 to Deckers.
19 7. Deckers embodied the ‘189 patent in its “Bailey Button Triplet” boot.
20 8. On November 8, 2010, in this District, Deckers filed an action against
21 Romeo in Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Tom Romeo, et al., Case No. CV 10-08489 DSF-
22 FMO, alleging, inter alia, trade dress infringement with regard to the UGG Classic
23 boot [“2010 Litigation”].
24 9. In the 2010 Litigation, Deckers alleged, inter alia, that a version of Romeo
25 & Juliette’s BearPaw Victorian boot infringed the UGG Classic boot’s trade dress
26 because the BearPaw Victorian “imitated” Deckers’ one-button Bailey Button boot,
27 which embodied the UGG Classic boot.
28 10. Originally, the BearPaw Victorian boot had two buttons, one on each side;
1 thereafter, Romeo & Juliette changed the design of the BearPaw Victorian boot so that
2 it had only one button.
3 11. No party submitted sufficient or credible evidence to establish the date the
4 BearPaw Victorian boots’ design changed; however, Romeo & Juliette argued that it
5 changed the design in December, 2010.
6 12. In February, 2012, Deckers and Romeo entered into a confidential
7 settlement agreement to resolve all claims alleged in the 2010 Litigation [“2012
8 Settlement Agreement”].
9 13. The 2012 Settlement Agreement states, inter alia, that Deckers and Romeo
10 “desire to fully and finally settle, resolve and release all claims, issues and differences
11 between them in this Agreement. The Parties acknowledge that they are entering into
12 this Agreement to resolve disputed claims... .”
13 14. Paragraph 1 of the 2012 Settlement Agreement states: “Defendants shall
14 change the shape of the license plate on the heel of all of their footwear from a
15 rectangular shape to any other shape that is not rectangular... . Defendants shall use
16 its best efforts to (i) immediately commence implementation of this change in the design
17 of its footwear and (ii) cease manufacturing of any footwear without the [changed
18 license plate] as soon as possible, which, in no event, shall be later than January 1,
19 2013 (the “Termination Date”). Defendants shall be allowed to sell off all footwear
20 inventory manufactured prior to the Termination Date without restriction through
21 December 31, 2013.”
22 15. Paragraph 1 of the 2012 Settlement Agreement expressly limited the scope
23 of what Romeo was allowed to sell, and the time period for those sales; namely,
24 Paragraph 1 gave Romeo the “unrestricted” right to sell before December 31, 2013,
25 those boots in inventory that were manufactured prior to January 1, 2013, that had been
26 affixed with a rectangular or square “license plate” logo.
27 16. Paragraph 2 of the 2012 Settlement Agreement states “nothing in this
28 agreement is intended to grant any license or rights to Defendants under any trademark,
1 Litigation because that case was filed on November 8, 2010; accordingly, Deckers
2 retained the right to enforce its intellectual property rights, including patent rights,
3 against the one-button BearPaw Victorian boot, and its progeny.
4 24. Deckers did not act in a misleading way when it contractually gave Romeo
5 & Juliette the right to sell potentially infringing boots in the 2012 Settlement
6 Agreement.
7 25. Neither party submitted sufficient or credible evidence to establish when
8 Deckers first knew about the one-button Bearpaw boot designs.
9 26. However, Romeo & Juliette argued that Deckers was aware of the one-
10 button designs as early as 2011; even if that were true, Deckers did not act in a
11 misleading manner because Deckers had no obligation to settle claims that exceeded the
12 scope of the 2010 Litigation.
13 27. The jury found, in an advisory verdict, that the ‘189 Patent was not invalid
14 as obvious.
15 28. Any Finding of Fact erroneously categorized below as a Conclusion of
16 Law is hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.
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18 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
19 Equitable Estoppel
20 1. Equitable estoppel can be a ban to all relief for patent infringement. A.C.
21 Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22 2. To establish its equitable estoppel defense, Romeo & Juliette must prove,
23 inter alia, that Deckers knew that Romeo & Juliette’s infringed the ‘999 Patent, and
24 that Deckers’ conduct misled Romeo & Juliette to reasonably infer that Deckers did not
25 intend to enforce its patent rights against Romeo & Juliette. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d
26 at 1021, 1042.
27 3. A patentee’s inaction, when coupled with other facts regarding the
28 relationship or contacts between the patentee and an alleged infringer, may constitute
1 misleading conduct if, under the totality of the circumstances, the inaction gave rise to
2 the necessary inference that the claim against the alleged infringer was abandoned.
3 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1021.
4 4. In interpreting the 2012 Settlement Agreement, the Court must give effect
5 to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time it was executed. See Wind
6 Dancer Prod. Grp. v. Walt Disney Pictures, 10 Cal. App. 5th 56, 68-69 (2017).
7 5. Generally, the objective intent of the contracting parties is determined by
8 only the contract’s terms. Walt Disney, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 69.
9 6. The Court must consider the contract as a whole and interpret its language
10 in context so as to give effect to each provision, rather than interpret particular
11 contractual language in isolation. Walt Disney, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 69.
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13 Patent Invalidity
14 7. Patents are presumptively valid upon issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
15 8. Inherent in the presumption of validity is a presumption of non-
16 obviousness. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359-1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
17 9. To overcome the presumption of validity, Romeo & Juliette, as the party
18 challenging the ‘189 Patent's validity, must prove that the patent is invalid by clear and
19 convincing evidence. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1359.
20 10. When the Court submitted the issue of obviousness to the jury for its
21 advisory verdict, the factual determinations underlying the question of obviousness
22 were, implicitly, submitted to the jury for its resolution. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v.
23 Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1359-1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
24 11. To reach its verdict as to obviousness, the jury considered: (1) The scope
25 and content of prior art; (2) The level of ordinary skill in the art; (3) The differences
26 between the claims invention and the prior art; and (4) Any objective indicia such as
27 commercial success or long-felt need. See Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225
28 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1 12. The Court must accept all implicit factual findings supporting the jury’s
2 conclusion, provided the implicit findings are supported by substantial evidence. See
3 Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1359-1360.
4 13. There was substantial evidence presented at trial to support the jury’s
5 implicit factual findings and ultimate conclusion as to obviousness. See Kinetic
6 Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1359-1360.
7 14. The ‘189 Patent is not invalid as obvious. See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d
8 at 1359-1360.
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10 Remaining Issues
11 15. Any Conclusion of Law erroneously categorized as a Finding of Fact is
12 hereby incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
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