US Vs Ah Chong - Digest

Case: US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910, 15 Phil.
488
Topics: Elements of Criminal Liability; Mental Element; Deliberate Intent (Dolo); Mistake of Fact
Petitioner: The United States
Respondent: Ah Chong
Facts
Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same
place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was
awakened by some one trying to open the door, and called out twice, "Who is there?" He received
no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again called out: "If
you enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed
against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and
fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his
employers and rushed back into the room to secure bandages to bind up the wound.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have been on friendly
and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
While there can be no doubt of defendant's exemption from liability if the intruder had really been
a robber, the question presented is whether, in this jurisdiction, a person can be held criminally
responsible when, by reason of a mistake of f acts, he does an act for which he would be exempt
if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true
state of facts at the time.
Issue
Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide
or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act?
Held
No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is

sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
“4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”
Under these provisions there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of
the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would
kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness
of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available
weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting
for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had
intended to commit.
Spanish jurist Pacheco: A voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention)
there can be no crime; the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."
The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors.
Legal maxims.:
 Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless
his intention were so”;
 Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my
act;"
Moral science and moral sentiment: no one deems another to deserve punishment for what
he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil.
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris
non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), However Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as
they appear to him.
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed
to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves
to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge.
Ruling
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.

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Case: US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910, 15 Phil.

Petitioner: The United States

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

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