VMTC Risk Assessment Presentation PDF

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 138

Risk Assessment

Course Objective

By going through this training session, you shall be able to:

 Understand why it is necessary to perform safety risk assessment and


how to conduct Veritas Safety Risk Assessment process

 Know how to utilize safety risk assessment for improving safety on board
and minimizing the potential for accidents

 Inculcate and improve awareness and predict risk or danger associated


within the work environment onboard vessels;

 Develop a method in handling preventive and corrective actions in any


predictable incidents onboard;

 Explain the Regulatory and Company’s requirements and concepts of the


modern risk management.

Page 2
Participant Introduction

Please introduce yourself.

Page 3
VMTC House Rules

 No wearing of slippers, short pants, T-shirts without collars and other attire not
within the bounds of proper grooming.

 Cellular phones and other electronic gadgets must be switched off while inside
the training room.

 Do not bring your coffee, chocolate drinks, tea or any other beverages, other
than bottled water, inside the training room.

 BE PUNCTUAL. No trainee will be permitted to join the class after the scheduled
starting time of the course had elapsed. Doors will be locked.

 Breaks normally are from 1000H – 1015H and 1500H – 1515H or as per
discretion of the Instructor. After 15 minutes, doors will be locked.

 Under any circumstances, no trainee shall be permitted to leave the room and
perform any other activity e.g. reporting to Crewing Department, going to the
Accounting Department and claiming training allowance, etc. The only exception
is during emergency and call of nature.

Page 4
Veritas Training Dept. Introduction

The Veritas Training Department

Page 5
Introduction

 Risk Assessment is as old as human life.

 One of the main senses that enable human kind to survive


was the sense of fear and his ability to utilize his judgment to
overcome any hazards around him.

 Man’s decisions were always based on common sense and


an intuitive way of understanding risk.

Page 6
Introduction

 As the human kind developed, the risk environment


that man faces has significantly changed. The
challenge now is not the physical survival but the
commercial domination.

 Risk Assessment and Risk Management Systems


are nowadays the modern way for managing
hazardous operations in most advanced industries,
including shipboard operation.

Page 7
 The Risk Assessment is not only a
Company requirement,

 It was based on the following International


Regulation or codes:

Page 8
ISM

 The ISM Code is a SOLAS (Safety of Life at SEA)


requirement adopted by all recognized Flag States.
All commercial vessels (chartering) 500 tons and over
have been required to comply with the code since
July, 2002.

 International Safety Management Code (ISM) under


the United Nations' International Maritime
Organization (IMO) is a ship management system
embracing quality control in the areas of safety and
pollution prevention.

 It is a formal 13 point system.

 The requirements create an onboard and shore side


Safety Management System (SMS) under which each
vessel operates.

 Third Party Certification.

Page 9
ISM CODES

1. Safety Management System

2. Safety & Environmental Protection Policy

3. Company Responsibilities & Authority

4. Designated Person (s)

5. Master’s Responsibilities & Authority

6. Resources & Personnel

7. Development of Plans for Shipboard Operations

8. Emergency Preparedness

9. Reports and Analysis of Nonconformities & Accidents

10. Maintenance of the Ship & Equipment

11. Documentation

12. Company Verification, Review & Control

13. Certification, Verification & Control

Page 10
TMSA

 Tanker Management and Self Assessment


(TMSA) is issued by Oil Companies International
Marine Forum (OCIMF) in Mid 2004 to assist
ship operators to measure and report on their
own management systems.

 It has 12 elements for safety and environmental


excellence.

 It requires self-assessment of companies in


process, procedures and practices

 It uses “scoring” system as performance


indicator

Page 11
TMSA ELEMENTS

1. Management, leadership and accountability

2. Recruitment and management of shore-based personal

3. Recruitment and management of ships’ personnel

4. Reliability and maintenance standards

5. Navigational safety

6. Cargo, ballast and mooring operations

7. Management of change

8. Incident investigation and analysis

9. Safety management

10. Environmental management

11. Emergency preparedness and contingency planning

12. Measurement, analysis and improvement

Page 12
OHSAS

 This Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series


(OHSAS) Standard gives requirements for an occupational
health and safety (OH&S) management system, to enable an
organization to control its OH&S risks and improve its OH&S
performance. It does not state specific OH&S performance
criteria, nor does it give detailed specifications for the design
of a management system.

Page 13
OHSAS 18001:2007 / TMSA / ISM

OHSAS 18001:2007 TMSA Elements ISM Codes

(17 Requirements) (12 Elements) (13 Codes)

1 Scope

2 Reference publications

3 Terms and definitions (23 items)

4 OH&S management system requirements 9. Safety Management 1. Safety Management System

4.1 General requirements

4.2 OH&S Policy 2. Safety & Environmental Protection


Policy

4.3 Planning 7. Management of change

4.3.1 Management of Change

4.3.1 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and determining controls 9. SM – (Risk Assessment) 1. SMS – (Risk Assessment)

Page 14
Introduction

 The foundation of an effective risk assessment is


a Company wide risk awareness involving
employers and seafarers. Unless risks are
identified, one cannot even start to assess. Risk
awareness is the responsibility of all
shipboard personnel. Awareness of the risks
attributed to personal and work activities not only
would lead an individual to work safely but instill
a safety culture onboard.

Page 15
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 The development and establishment of Safety


Risk Assessment as an approach to Safety
Management Systems can be traced through
a series of major accidents, mainly related
with shore side industries, in Europe.

Page 16
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 Catastrophic accidents in nuclear plants


(Windscale Pile Fire), chemical plants
(Flixborough, Seveso, Beek) and offshore
platforms (Piper Alpha Fire, Alexander
Killand), have shown that traditional Safety
Management Systems based only on
regulations and analysis of accidents in order
to avoid similar occurrences in the future are
not enough anymore.

Page 17
Review of Past Incidents

The Flixborough Disaster

 1st June 1974 marked a disastrous event at a


chemical plant in the UK, which killed 28 people
and caused extensive damage and injuries in the
surrounding villages.

 One of the reactors became cracked and a


temporary pipe was installed. The pipe was not
designed by professionally qualified engineer.

Page 18
Review of Past Incidents

Page 19
Review of Past Incidents

The Bhopal Gas Tragedy

 Occurred late at night, soon after shift change, on Mon. 03rd Dec.
1984

 MIC tank overheated, over pressured and vented through scrubber

 Elevated discharge of massive quantity of MIC (approx. 25 tons)

 Operational staff retreated upwind, no casualties

 Staff from other plants evacuated, few casualties

 8,000 people died in the immediate aftermath, now the death toll is
over 16,000

 Over 120,000 people suffer from medical complications today


Page 20
Review of Past Incidents

Page 21
Review of Past Incidents

Page 22
Review of Past Incidents

Page 23
Review of Past Incidents

Page 24
Review of Past Incidents

Page 25
Review of Past Incidents

Page 26
Review of Past Incidents

Page 27
Review of Past Incidents

Tenerife Airport – KLM / PAN-AM


Both aircraft – Pan American Boeing 747-121 N736PA, and KLM
Boeing 747-206B PH-BUF had been diverted to Los Rodeos Airport
on the Spanish Island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands due to a
bomb threat at the airport at their final destination, the neighboring
island of Las Palmas.

The aircraft collided on the runway while departing Tenerife as the


KLM Boeing 747’s Captain initiated a takeoff without permission
while the Pan American aircarft was using the runway to taxi out for
departure.

All 14 crew & 234 passengers died.

Collision casualties: 335 fatalities.

Page 28
Review of Past Incidents

Page 29
Review of Past Incidents

Page 30
Review of Past Incidents

The Titanic
On April 10, 1912, the RMS Titanic set sail from Southampton on her
maiden voyage to New York. At that time, she was the largest and most
luxurious ship ever built.

At 11:40 PM on April 14, 1912, she struck an iceberg about 400 miles off
Newfoundland, Canada.

Despite warnings about icebergs in the area, she was traveling at near
top speed of about 20.5 knots when one grazed her side.

Less than 3 hours later, the Titanic plunged to the bottom of the sea,
taking more than 1500 people with her. Only a fraction of her passengers
were saved. It carried some of the richest, most powerful industrialist of
her day. Together, their personal fortunes were worth $600 million in
1912!

Page 31
Review of Past Incidents

Page 32
Review of Past Incidents

Page 33
Review of Past Incidents

The Torrey Canyon


The Torrey Canyon was built in the USA in 1959, with a cargo capacity of
60,000 tons. Later, she was expanded to twice that capacity in Japan to
carry 120,000 tons of cargo.

Registered in Liberia with Italian crew.

On 18 March 1967, at 17 kts, Torrey Canyon hits Pollard’s Rock in the


Seven Stones reef (Isles of Scilly, UK), and rips open 6 tanks.

Over the next few weeks, all the oil escaped and spread along the south
coast of England and the Normandy coast of France, laying waste to the
sea biology of the region.

There were no plans to combat this; it was the first of the big oil disasters.

Page 34
Review of Past Incidents

Page 35
Review of Past Incidents

Page 36
Review of Past Incidents

The “Dona Paz” Ferry

In Dec. 1987, the domestic Philippine ferry “Dona Paz”,


collided with a 629 ton oil tanker carrying 8,800 barrels.

The impact ignited an explosion and fire. Of 1,583


passengers & 60 crew listed on the manifest only 24 people
survived.

Actual estimates of the death toll range to over 4,000


persons. Only 275 bodies were recovered.

Page 37
Review of Past Incidents

Page 38
Review of Past Incidents

Page 39
Review of Past Incidents

The Estonia

The ro-ro passenger ferry “ESTONIA”, on its way from


Tallinn, Estonia to Stockholm, Sweden, sunk on 28 Sept.
1994 with the loss of 852 lives.

A design flaw in the ship’s bow door allowed it to be jolted


open by rough seas.

Also, the crew were slow to respond and warning alarms did
not sound until five minutes after the ferry began listing
heavily, by which time it was difficult for passengers to
escape.

Page 40
Review of Past Incidents

Page 41
Review of Past Incidents

Page 42
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 In the past the use of “prescriptive controls” resulted in


comfort that accidents will not happen again. This was based
on the concept that by rectifying the “cause” of the problem,
similar accidents would not happen again. However this is
not enough for modern, sophisticated and complex systems
where a large number of different things can go wrong
anytime.

Page 43
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 As a result of the increasing complexity of the operating


environment, including the human factor element, RISK
ASSESSMENT methodologies and the implementation of
Risk Management Systems became a COMPULSORY
REGULATION for minimizing the RISK of accident in a
number of hazardous industries.

Page 44
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 Traditionally marine regulations are reactive in the sense that


they usually come after a major accident.

 Historically, we have seen the following evolution of


regulations and major conventions:

Page 45
Evolution of Risk Assessment

Page 46
Evolution of Risk Assessment

TORREY CANYON

MARPOL

Page 47
Evolution of Risk Assessment

HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE

ISM

Page 48
Evolution of Risk Assessment

EXXON VALDEZ

OPA 90

Page 49
Evolution of Risk Assessment

 We have only recently seen the introduction of Risk


Assessment as an important Safety Tool in the shipping
industry.

 Oil Major companies have utilized the process of Risk


Assessment for a number of years in offshore industry and
have now transferred it to the management of tankers
through the TMSA code.

Page 50
Perception of Risk

 The general understanding of risk from the public is


not always the same with the technical meaning of
the term

 Different people understand RISK differently

Page 51
Page 52
Most people consider risky what they fear

Page 53
When in reality certain daily habits or task
can be the most hazardous ones

Page 54
Definitions

Hazards

 Condition which exist which may potentially lead to


an undesirable event.

Page 55
Spot the Hazards

Page 56
Spot the Hazards

Page 57
Spot the Hazards

Page 58
Definitions

Controls

 Are the measures taken to prevent hazards from causing


undesirable events.

 Controls can be physical (safety shutdowns, redundant


controls, conservative designs, etc.), procedural (written
operating procedures), and can address human factors
(employee selection, training, supervision).

Page 59
Definitions

Event

 Is an occurrence that has an associated outcome. There are


typically a number of potential outcomes from any one initial
event which may range in severity from trivial to catastrophic,
depending upon other conditions and add-on events.

Page 60
Why do we need Risk Assessment and
Risk Management?

 The existing SMS’s are based on a set of rules and


requirements and provide the necessary procedures
and instructions in order to safely perform most of
the shipboard operations. However, they are static
and prescriptive, in the sense that they cannot
anticipate changing operational conditions or
peculiarities that may appear per case, i.e. :

Page 61
 Extreme operating environment.

 Changing operational parameters.

 Human factor.

 Lack of experience.

 Complexity of operations.

 New equipment or systems.

 New procedures.

 Local requirements, etc.


Page 62
Risk Assessment

To gain understanding of the risk of an operation, one must


answer the following questions:

1. What can go wrong? (Hazard Identification)

2. How bad? (Consequence)

3. How often? ( Frequency Estimation)

4. What can happen? (Risk Assessment)

5. What do I do? (What do I do)

Page 63
Risk Assessment

Risk Understanding

How likely is it?


What can go wrong? What are the impacts?

Page 64
Veritas’s Risk Assessment (MOI 4.1)

 The Company’s Safety Management System is used to manage risk on a


daily basis. The management of risk first requires the assessment of risk.
This assessment requires recognizing hazards, quantifying or qualifying the
consequences, and determining the likelihood or potential of consequences
from actually occurring. Once the risk has been identified, controls can be put
in place to manage that risk.

 The processes and controls outlined in the Company’s Management System


have been developed to address and manage the risk

 Risks that have been identified through a Risk Assessment Process.

 Risk Assessment (RA) is intended to be a careful examination of what, in the


nature of operations, could cause harm, so that decisions can be made as to
whether sufficient precautions have been taken or whether additional actions
need to be taken in order to prevent harm. The aim is to minimize accidents
and ill health onboard ship.

Page 65
Purpose

 The purpose of risk assessment is to identify hazards, estimate the


consequences arising from those hazards and define control
measures to prevent harm to employees by ensuring that all
identified risks are managed so that the risk is AS LOW AS
REASONABLY PRACTICABLE (ALARP).

Page 66
Veritas’s Vessel Risk Assessment
Process

 RA is not a solitary process. It is the dynamic assessment of


hazards, evaluation of risks and determination of safety
controls that the team involved in the assessed task shall
generate.

 The RA should first establish the hazards that are present at


the place of work and then identify the significant risks arising
out of the work activity. Finally, control measures are
recorded and adopted so as to ensure that risk in all
company operations is AS LOW AS REASONABLY
PRACTICABLE (ALARP)

Page 67
Veritas’s Vessel Risk Assessment
Process

 All Veritas employees are responsible for ensuring the proper


implementation of the Company’s Risk Assessment
processes.

 Records of all risk assessments shall be maintained on board


for twenty-four (24) months’ period.

 RA’s that are required to be submitted to the Office shall be


maintained also ashore for the same period.

Page 68
Veritas’s Vessel Risk Assessment
Process (MOI 4.1.5)

 The Master, in coordination with the Chief Engineer


and other ship officers, is responsible to ensure that
risk assessment is used for identifying and
managing hazards on board and that adequate risk
control measures are implemented so that risks are
AS LOW AS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE
(ALARP).

Page 69
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board?

“Risk Assessment is to be implemented on


board when an operation or activity is
scheduled and can place the crew, the
vessel, the environment or property at
risk.”

Page 70
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

RISK ASSESSMENT ON BOARD IS REQUIRED


WHEN;

1. Non-routine repairs following equipment


breakdown, or arising from the potential for
breakdown, present a hazard. (C/O, C/E, &
Master)

2. Changes to procedures or equipment are to


be implemented on board. (C/O, C/E, &
Master)
Page 71
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

3. Unsafe acts and conditions are identified on board.


Such acts and conditions may be related to both
routine and non-routine operations/activities, such
as:
 Hotwork outside safe designated areas

 Entering enclosed/confined spaces

 Lowering of lifeboats into the water

 Working aloft, aside or in restricted spaces

(C/O, C/E, & Master)


Page 72
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

4. Routine or non-routine maintenance of critical


equipment is required (MOI Section 9.6.1) (C/O,
C/E, & Master)

5. A ship is acquired. The initial on board risk


assessment is to ensure that all anticipated mooring
arrangements and equipment are adequate and do
not present a significant risk to employees. (C/O,
C/E, & Master)

Page 73
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

Vessels MUST forward to the Safety Department


and their responsible fleet shore personnel all risk
assessments conducted for onboard tasks as
described in the following list.

Permission for commencing these tasks shall be


subject to a risk-based decision after Risk
Assessments (RA) have been properly reviewed.

Page 74
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

1. Hot work

2. Lowering of lifeboats into the water

3. Entry in enclosed or confined spaces

4. Whenever critical equipment that does not have any


redundancy is shut down for routine planned
maintenance

5. In cases when the Managing Office requests a Risk


Assessment to be forwarded by the vessel.

Page 75
When a Risk Assessment is to be Carried
Out On Board? (MOI 4.1.6)

In addition, when a vessel’s RA indicates that the risks in an


operation are not within ALARP, the crew undertaking the
RA shall:

 Classify the task

 Identify hazards

 Determine risk

Page 76
Classifying Tasks (MOI 4.1.6.1)

The Objective of this work procedure is to ensure that tasks are


planned in a systematic manner and to ensure that risks are
identified in terms of consequence and probability and that the
required safeguards are put in place.

Task shall be defined by the appropriate Head of Dept. and shall be


based by the following questions:

 Is this work required to maintain the safe and efficient running of the
vessel and its crew?

 Do we have the equipment to safely and efficiently do the task? (e.g.


Efficiency is an important decision at this point in the task planning.
Although we may be able to do the task safely, could the task be done in
a more timely manner using other resources such as outside
contractors?)

Page 77
Classifying Tasks (MOI 4.1.6.1)

 Do we have the personnel that are capable and have the experience and
/ or training to carry out the work in a safe manner?

 Do we have the personnel that are capable of supervising the task to


ensure it is being carried out in a safe manner?

 Is there sufficient time?

Page 78
Classifying Tasks (MOI 4.1.6.1)

Particular attention is to be given due to lack of


experience, lack of training, lack of time, lack of
resources, crew fatigue, new
operation/activity/equipment/procedure, any unsafe
conditions that may prevail during the
operation/activity (e.g. such as extreme weather
conditions, explosive atmosphere, lack of
maintenance, breakdown of equipment, etc.)

Page 79
Classifying Tasks (MOI 4.1.6.1)

In order to assist individuals with the task identification


process, the Company has developed a methodology under
which the Risk Assessment (RA) is to be performed.

The Company has identified systems and subsystems to


allow simple classification of task types and which should be
used to categorize risk assessments.

Page 80
Company’s Systems & Sub Systems
(MOI 4.1.6.2)

The main SYSTEMS directly associated with the Company’s ship operations
and which may incorporate a number of hazards and operational risks are:

 Cargo and Water Ballast Operations

 Mooring Operations

 Safety and Emergency Preparedness

 Navigation

 Maintenance and Repair

 Management of Change

 Environmentally-Related Operations

 Security Operations (VSP)

Page 81
Company’s Systems & Sub Systems
(MOI 4.1.6.2)

The following systems also have a bearing upon the


ship’s operation:

 Recruitment & Management of Sea Going Personnel

 Recruitment & Management of Office Personnel

 Incident Investigation and Analysis;

 Measurement, analysis, and improvement.

Page 82
Company’s Systems & Sub Systems
(MOI 4.1.6.2)

 The first set of SYSTEMS is divided into a number of


processes / activities / operations, which may be
implemented by the Company/ships.

 The processes / activities / operations which are


recommended to be INITIALLY analyzed and investigated
through the proposed RA process are tabulated as per your
handouts.

Page 83
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 84
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 85
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 86
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 87
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 88
Systems and Sub-systems

Page 89
Identifying Hazards MOI (4.1.6.1)

Asking these three questions should help to identify


where there is a hazard:

 Is there a source of harm?

 Who (or what) could be harmed?

 How could harm occur?

Page 90
Identifying Hazards MOI (4.1.6.1)

Hazards that clearly possess negligible potential for harm


should not be documented or given further consideration,
provided that appropriate control measures remain in place.

To help with the process of identifying hazards, they are


categorized by topic:

Page 91
Identifying Hazards MOI (4.1.6.1)

 Mechanical

 Electrical

 Physical

 Burns

 Substances (e.g. chemicals)

 Fire and Explosion

Page 92
Identifying Hazards MOI (4.1.6.1)

Additional categories relate to specific injuries that could occur:

 Slips/falls on deck

 Falls of persons from a height

 Falls of tools, materials, etc., from a height

 Inadequate headroom

 Inadequate ventilation

 Hazards from plant and machinery associated with assembly, commissioning,


operation, maintenance, modification, repair and dismantling.

 Hazards from manual handling

Page 93
Identifying Hazards MOI (4.1.6.1)

 The previous mentioned categories in identifying hazards is


not exhaustive, and Master’s are responsible to ensure that
this principle is followed when they conduct their own risk
assessments on board their respective vessels.

 Hazards are recorded on QR-SQE-45 Onboard Risk


Assessment Form in the section entitled “SUMMARY OF
HAZARDS IDENTIFIED AND ASSOCIATED RISK BEFORE
ADDITIONAL CONTROL MEASURES”.

Page 94
Factors Leading To Hazard

1. External Factors or Influences

( Strong wind, Fog/Reduced Visibility, Flood, Heat, Cold, Humidity, etc.)

Page 95
Factors Leading To Hazard

2. Operating Errors & Other Human Factors


 Vessel crew not properly trained/familiarized with the operation/activity,

 Not following procedures, action error by vessel crew,

 Not adequate procedures/instructions for the operation/activity,

 Ergonomics, surroundings, training

 Management, organisation,

 Work practices (permits, testing, maintenance, inspections),

 Fatigue

 Communication language

 No adequate planning/supervision
Page 96
Factors Leading To Hazard

3. Maintenance Problems
 Procedures and permits

 Hotwork, confined space entry

 Electrical protections (e.g. 110V, 220V, etc.)

 Scaffolds

 Crane lifts

 Monitoring/inspections/approvals

Page 97
Factors Leading To Hazard

4. Measurement Errors
 Navigational measurement errors

 Mechanical/electrical systems measurement errors

 Cargo related measurement errors

 Atmosphere measurement errors

Page 98
Factors Leading To Hazard

5. Equipment/Instrument Malfunction
 Cargo related equipment system malfunction/breakdown

 Machinery systems malfunction/breakdown

 Navigational equipment malfunction/breakdown

6. Emergency Operations That May Be Needed


 Emergency Preparedness

 Implications for operations

 Communications

 Changed roles, specific duties, conflicts, etc.

Page 99
Determining Risk MOI (4.1.6.2)

 QR-SQE-45 Onboard Risk Assessment Form must indicate


identified hazards and the frequency and consequence scores
attributed to those hazards.

 The methodology for attributing frequency and hazard is identical


to that used in office risk assessments above.

Page 100
Assigning Risk MOI (4.1.3.1)

 RISK is assessed based on a combination of frequency of hazard and


consequence of hazard.

Risk Rating (R) = Frequency (F) X Consequence (C)

Page 101
Assigning Frequency MOI (4.1.3.2)

Frequency

 is assigned based on a judgment of how often an identified


hazard could occur and it is assigned a score as per the Risk
Matrices (handout).

Page 102
Assigning Frequency

 Once during a voyage (highly likely) (5)

 Once during a ship year (likely) (4)

 Once during a ship life (moderate likely) (3)

 Once during a Company year (unlikely) (2)

 Once during a Company’s life (highly unlikely) (1)

Page 103
Assigning Consequence MOI (4.1.3.3)

Assigning consequence requires a judgment of the impact of a hazard.

 Negligible (at most a single minor injury) (1)

 Marginal (multiple minor injuries and/or single major injury) (2)

 Critical (at most a single fatality and/or multiple major injuries) (3)

 Catastrophic (multiple fatalities) (4)

Page 104
Example A:

 A meteor falling on a fully laden tanker while sailing.

 Although the consequence is high, (CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCE)

 The probability (frequency) of such an incident to happen is very low


(VERY LOW PROBABILITY) almost zero.

 By combining/multiplying a big number (High Consequence) with a very


low figure (Almost Zero Probability) the resulted figure, (RISK) is very low,
(Almost Zero) = “Acceptable Risk Event”.

 No further actions needed.

Page 105
Example B:

 Consider an overflow pollution incident on a tanker during bunkering.

 The consequence is low (MARGINAL CONSEQUENCE) but the


probability of such an event to happen is high (HIGH PROBABILITY). The
resulted risk is much higher compared to our previous example (HIGH
RISK EVENT). In this case safeguards must be provided in order to
reduce the risk of a pollution incident during bunkering.

Page 106
Assigning Consequence MOI (4.1.3.3)

 By comparing the two examples we see why there are so many


precautions taken during a bunkering process, such as checklists,
procedures, specific duties, diagrams, etc. Where there are no such
precautions for avoiding falling meteors although a falling meteor may
completely destroy a vessel (if of course such an incident occurs).

Page 107
Risk Criteria ( MOI 4.1.3.4)

Risk criteria

 are used to convert estimated frequency and consequence


scores into risk value judgments which allow risks to be
prioritized into three broad categories:

Page 108
Risk Criteria ( MOI 4.1.3.4)

 Intolerable (A) – Risks regarded as unacceptable regardless


of any perceived benefit. Activities causing intolerable risks
are prohibited.

 Tolerable (B) – Risks that are tolerated and balanced


against benefits. Tolerable risks are managed so that the risk
is kept as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) by
adopting reduction measures unless the cost of the reduction
is grossly disproportionate to the reduction in risk that could
be achieved.

 Broadly Acceptable (C) – Risks that are regarded as


insignificant. Further action to reduce exposure is NOT
normally required.

Page 109
As Low As Reasonably Practicable

 The concept of ALARP requires to adopt safety


measures unless the effort (in terms of resources,
money, time or trouble) is grossly disproportionate to the
risk reduction. Once all such measures have been
adopted, the risk are said to be ALARP

Page 110
The ALARP Framework

Page 111
How safe is safe enough?

 Using the ALARP framework , above a certain level, a risk is


regarded as intolerable and cannot be justified in any
ordinary circumstances (UNACCEPTABLE REGION).

 Below such levels, an activity is allowed to take place


provided that the associated risks have been made as low as
reasonably practicable (TOLERABLE REGION)

 In pursuing any further safe improvements to demonstrate


ALARP, account should be taken of available resources,
time, and cost.

 What we are trying to achieve is that all our operations or


hazardous activities are within acceptable levels of risk (i.e.
within ALARP).
Page 112
Risk Matrix

Page 113
Determining Risk MOI (4.1.6.2) Cont’

Any ship operation/activity involving risk at a level above


ALARP is to be immediately addressed as follows:

A. Risk control measures are to be agreed and implemented


prior to initiating the operation/activity to adequately mitigate
and control the risk within acceptable levels (ALARP). QR-
SQE-45 On Board Risk Assessment Form is to be used for
documenting the agreed controls in the section titled
“DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL CONTROL MEASURES”.
The Managing Office must be notified.

Page 114
Determining Risk MOI (4.1.6.2) Cont’

B. If the operation/activity is already in progress the control


measures are to be implemented as soon as possible and
the Managing Office is to be immediately notified. QR-SQE-
45 On Board Risk Assessment Form is to be used for
documenting the agreed control actions.

C. If the resources available and / or circumstances are such


that the risk cannot be lowered to an acceptable (at least
ALARP) then the Managing Office is to be immediately
notified. All work must stop until agreed mitigating actions
have been agreed upon and implemented.

Page 115
Determining Risk MOI (4.1.6.2) Cont’

 In all circumstances where work involves a risk above the


level of ALARP, any action decided and the period for which
it will remain effective is to be recorded in QR-SQE-45 On
Board Risk Assessment Form.

 After agreed control measures have been identified, the


Master, or other person delegated by the Master to conduct
the risk assessment, must revisit the hazards that were
originally identified and reassess them based on the control
measures proposed for implementation.

 If the control measures are effective, they should reduce


either the frequency or the consequence of a hazard, and
should therefore result in a lower risk score.

Page 116
Follow up Action and records
(MOI 4.1.6.3)

 Upon completion of the risk assessment process the On Board


Risk Assessment Form is to be completed, filed and copied to the
Managing Office as appropriate.

 All risk assessments records must be approved by the Master.

 Any ship personnel responsible for the implementation of the


required action shall notify the Master upon completion.

 The Master, in coordination with the Chief Engineer, is responsible


to ensure the verification of the implementation of the
required action.

Page 117
Use of Forms (QR-SQE-45)

A. A description of the operation/activity/event that shall be assessed


and the relevant system/subsystem.

B. A description of the hazards identified in relation to the


operation/activity to take place.

C. The probability (or frequency) that the hazard may actually occur on
board with the current measures. This figure is to be taken from the
risk matrix utilized by the Company.

D. The severity of occurrence of the hazard (consequence). This figure


is to be taken from the risk matrix utilized by the Company.

E. The risk associated with the identified hazard. This figure is obtained
by combining the probability (frequency) with the consequence.

Page 118
Form (QR-SQE-45)

Page 119
Forms (QR-SQE-45)

Page 120
Forms (QR-SQE-45)

Page 121
Use of Forms

 By carrying out the above you should be able to decide


whether there are any hazards outside the acceptable risk
levels (ALARP) and whether additional measures are
necessary or not.

Page 122
Risk Management

Once you have assessed the relevant risk, you may


decide additional measures to mitigate and better control
the identified hazards. Such measures may include:
 Issuing instructions,

 Improving a procedure,

 Establishing additional controls,

 More frequent testing, measuring and sampling,

 Training related to the hazard,

 Additional personnel,

 Delaying or even postponing the process/activity until the risk is at the


required levels (ALARP).
Page 123
Risk Management

 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the additional measures,


you need to evaluate the risk after taking these additional
measures. The process is the same as before, but in this case,
when assigning probability (frequency) and consequence, the
effect of the additional measures must be taken into consideration.

 The above process is to be continued until all identified hazards


have a residual risk within acceptable levels (ALARP).

Page 124
Risk Management Terminology

Page 125
Risk Management

Other Risk Management practices in place:

 Safety and Pollution Prevention Meetings

 Safety Officer

 Near Miss Reporting

Page 126
Group exercise

 Make a Risk Assessment for the given System and Sub system

Page 127
Tool Box Meeting (MOI 4.2)

Purpose

The Objective of this procedure is to ensure that all


shipboard tasks are coordinated in a systematic manner so
that all risks are identified and prioritized in terms of
probability and consequence and that all of the required
safeguards to protect against these identified risks are put in
place.

Page 128
Toolbox meeting Overview (MOI 4.2.3)

 A Tool Box Meeting is to be conducted at the beginning of


the work day by each and every department and a Tool Box
Talk is to be conducted involving each and every participant
in a job prior to the beginning of the job after each and every
participant has had the opportunity to physically review the
work place (where possible) of the said job. A separate Tool
Box Meeting will take place for any job where the
Management System requires a Permit and a notation shall
be made on the permit that a Tool Box Meeting took place.
Tool Box Meetings and Tool Box Talks are intended to
identify risks, determine the severity and likelihood of any
hazard, and to ensure such risks and / or hazards are
mitigated, to the fullest extent possible, prior to commencing
a task
Page 129
Toolbox meeting ( MOI 4.2.4.2)

Defining the Tasks for the Day


 The tasks of the day shall be pre-defined by the appropriate Head of Department:

 After the tasks have been defined, the Head of Department shall require that the
person(s), who shall be responsible for carrying out the work (PIC), will conduct a
Toolbox Meeting.

 The PIC shall, based on the individual’s specific knowledge and experience, list
the steps that are to be executed to carry out the task, determine the hazards that
exist in each step and identify the safeguards that shall be put in place to
eliminate or mitigate those hazards.

 At this meeting, the Head of Department, in consultation with the PIC, will
determine if a formal Risk Assessment is required. If they agree that no
formal Risk Assessment is required then the job will proceed without delay.

Page 130
Personal Prompt Cards

 In order to enhance the ability of all crew members to


continually assess the work environment for potential
hazards and to assist them in understanding the
consequences of those hazards, the Company has created
Personal Prompt Cards.

Page 131
Personal Prompt Cards

Page 132
Personal Prompt Cards

 Upon reviewing the hazards of the job on scene, and if it is determined


that the hazards cannot be effectively mitigated prior to engaging in the
task, the job shall be stopped and the risks reassessed to ensure they are
as low as reasonably practical (ALARP).

Page 133
Exercise

Instructions:

 Conduct a risk assessment using the Veritas Form, QR-SQE-45 Onboard Risk
Assessment Form.

Page 134
Exercise

Overview

 Using the Company standard form for risk assessment, select an operational
activity, identify the hazards it contains and the risks they pose, decide on the
best option for eliminating or minimizing these, implement your solutions and
monitor their effectiveness.

Page 135
Exercise

 Instructions

 Choose an operational activity on which to carry out the risk assessment.

 For example, working aloft or overside, loading and discharging cargo.

 Use the Company standard form on to list all the hazards which this
operational activity contains.

 For each hazard in turn:

 Identify the risks which the hazards pose by asking and recording the
answers to relevant ‘what if….?’ questions.

 Assess the severity of the risks you have identified by deciding how
likely they are to occur and the level of consequences if they do.

 Explore and record the options for dealing with the risks. This step will include
deciding to take no action about risks which you have assessed as minor.

Page 136
Exercise

 Using the form:

 Record the corrective actions you have selected to minimise or eliminate


those risks which you have assessed as significant.

 Make a note of why you selected these particular solutions.

 Record the actions which must be taken to implement your solutions,


including the timescale. Don’t forget to communicate with all of those who
will be affected.

 The purpose of recording your results from the project is to provide you with a
permanent record of how it went and what you learned from it, both for your own
reference and, if necessary, to discuss with the Master, your fellow officers and
shore based managers.

Page 137
Risk Assessment

The End

Page 138

You might also like