TOSHIHIRO WADA

THE ANALYTICAL METHOD OF NAVYA-NYĀYA

INTRODUCTION

‘Navya-nyāya’ is the name given to the new school of Nyāya, which

preserved the traditions of both Nyāya and Vaiśes. ika. Gaṅgeśa, who
lived in the 14th century,1 is regarded as the representative philosopher
of this school. The Navya-nyāya literature is characterized by long
Sanskrit compounds and many technical terms. This feature is one of
reasons which hinders us from having easy access to this literature. In
this paper I would like to examine common features of the Navya-nyāya
literature and present a single feature of the Navya-nyāya method of
analysis which is more fundamental than these common features. I also
wish to examine the function of two well-known terms of this school,
namely, avaccedaka (delimitor) and niūpaka (describer), and discuss
the relationship between these two terms and that single feature.

THE FEATURES OF NAVYA-NYĀYA

Vidyabhusana (1921: 402–403): A History of Indian Logic presented

the following main features of Navya-nyāya: (1) its principal text is
Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāman. i; (2) its arguments are organized under the
framework of the means of valid cognition; (3) its elaborate argu-
ments lead to precise definitions of terms; (4) Navya-nyāya devised a
terminology which makes feature (3) possible.
These features are also pointed out by later scholars. Feature (1) is
mentioned, for instance, by Arthur Keith (1975(1921): 33), Goekoop
(1967: vii), Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (1993: 6), and Vattanky
(1984: ix), and feature (2) by Jadunath Sinha (1956: 699), Kuppuswami
Shastri (1961: xxxvii), Umesh Mishra (1966: 237), and so on. Feature
(3) is pointed out by Dasgupta (1975(1922): 308), Radhakrishnan
(1983(1923): 41–42), Hiriyanna (1983(1932): 227–228), Guha (1968:
5), Vattanky (1984: x), and others, and feature (4) by Jadunath Sinha
(1956: 699), Kuppuswami Shastri (1961: xxxvii), to name a few. Matilal
(1977: 101) refers to features (2), (3), and (4).

Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 519–530, 2001.

c 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
520 TOSHIHIRO WADA

At first glance, these four features might appear to bolster the claim
that Gaṅgeśa is the founder of Navya-nyāya. But, leaving aside feature
(1) for the moment, we can say that features (2), (3), and (4), each by
itself, do not exclusively support this claim. Here I will not discuss who
founded Navya-nyāya, though this problem is inextricably linked to the
aim of this paper. It is enough to note that there are three main answers to
the problem: Udayana (11th century), or Gaṅgeśa, or someone unknown
who lived between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa.2
With regard to the second feature, it is Bhāsarvajña (860–920)3
and not Gaṅgeśa who first argued under the framework of the means
of valid cognition. His Nyāyasāra consists of three chapters entitled
perception (pratyaks. a), inference (anumāna), and verbal testimony
(āgama) respectively. It is unreasonable to contend that the third and
fourth features are found only in Gaṅgeśa and later authors, because the
Navya-nyāya term avacchedaka (delimitor) is employed in the works
of pre-Gaṅgeśa authors, such as the Nyāyasiddhāntad¯ıpa of Śaśadhara
(1275–1325) and the Nyāyaratna of Man. ikan. t.ha Miśra (1275–1325).4
Thus, we can conclude that each of the three features does not
exclusively support the view that Gaṅgeśa founded Navya-nyāya. The
first feature that the principal text is the Tattvacintāman. i does not
contradict the view that Navya-nyāya was founded by Udayana. There
is, after all, no rule that a text written by the founder must be the
principal one of his school. If, however, we interpret feature (1) as an
‘intrinsic’ rather than ‘extrinsic’ feature, we might naturally conclude
that Gaṅgeśa founded Navya-nyāya. This conclusion appears reasonable
if we consider that it is Gaṅgeśa who together exhibits the ‘internal’
features (2), (3), and (4) in his work.
Before proceeding further, we should stop to reflect on our method
of solving the problem. We started out by investigating what are the
features of Navya-nyāya, and enumerated four main points. But in
enumerating them we seem to have unconsciously taken into account
only Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa authors. As a result we appear to have
fallen into circular reasoning, and to avoid this we need to find a new
starting point.
But in order to find quite a new starting point, we must necessarily
look again at the four main features of Navya-nyāya. These features,
which at first glance appear unrelated to one another, do not give us
a clear and coherent picture of the Navya-nyāya system. If we could
arrive at one concept which would explain the connection among (2),
(3), and (4) and give us a clear and coherent picture of the Navya-nyāya
 NAVYA-NYĀYA 521

system, that concept will facilitate our understanding of the historical

and philosophical significance of Navya-nyāya.
That single concept is ‘relation’ (sam 5
. bandha). Navya-nyāya is
keen to rationally explain human behavior in the mundane world.
Behavior is based on cognition, which necessarily refers to relation.
When one recognizes, for instance, that there is a pot on the ground
(ghat. avad bhūtalam), classical Nyāya expounds the object of this
cognition in the framework of the Vaiśes. ika ontology. The connection
among potness (ghat. atva) and the pot, and groundness (bhūtalatva) and
the ground is inherence (samavāya); the connection between the pot
and the ground is contact (sam . yoga). However, that framework cannot
properly work in analyzing the structure of the object of cognition such
as the cognition that John is the father of Mary, because the relation of
father or fatherness (pit. tva) referred to by this cognition does not come
under that framework. Navya-nyāya philosophers have to deal with
such cognition as is beyond the reach of that framework. Because they
are nirākāravādins who maintain that cognition has no content in itself,
that which is called content is its object existing outside. They hold
that the outer world originates the cognition of it, and that the existence
of the outer world as object necessarily precedes the origination of its
cognition. For Navya-nyāya, however, cognition is the only means to
prove the existence of the outer world, which abounds in relations.
Thus, the key term, or concept ‘relation’, enables us to explain why
feature (2) is characteristic of Navya-nyāya.
Furthermore, this key term can also explain why (3) and (4): elaborate
arguments about terms and their definitions, and a new terminology, are
the features of Navya-nyāya. Two terms characteristic of Navya-nyāya
are avacchedaka (delimitor) and nirūpaka (describer), as all modern
scholars have noted. To my knowledge, these two terms are employed
to specify, or ‘identify’, relation, and hence we can derive features (3)
and (4) from the Navya-nyāya approach of interpreting the structure
of the world in terms of relation.

ANALYSIS OF RELATION

We will show in detail how the terms avacchedaka (delimitor) and

nirūpaka (describer) perform the task of specifying, or ‘identifying’
relation.6 Let us take the statement “a pot-maker is the cause of a
pot” (kumbhakārah. kumbhasya kāran. am) and assume that any pot is
produced by some pot-maker. In other words, no one but a pot-maker
makes a pot.
522 TOSHIHIRO WADA

We do not know whether this statement expresses the relation between

a particular pot-maker and a particular pot produced by him or the
relation between all pot-makers and all pots. The statement itself does
not clarify the realm of entities called pot-maker, that is, it does not tell
us the number of pot-makers. Nor does the statement clarify the number
of pots. The statement expresses the fact that the relation of a pot-maker
to a pot is cause. We understand this meaning from the statement, but
not the quantities of the two relata, i.e., pot-maker and pot. Hence, we
cannot identify exactly what that relation is. The delimitor clarifies the
quantity of the relatum and helps identify the relation.
We commonly designate the relation of a pot-maker to a pot as cause,
while Navya-nyāya regards the property of effectness (kāryatā) residing
in a pot as such a relation. It is common in Navya-nyāya to express
relation in terms of a property which exists in a relatum. Moreover,
such a property is expressed by a relative general term plus the abstract
suffix -tva or -tā.7
The relation which the statement “a pot-maker is the cause of a
pot” refers to is causeness (kāran. atā), and its relata are pot-maker and
pot. Let us suppose that the statement refers to all pot-makers. In all
of them there exist causeness and pot-maker-ness (kumbhakāratva).
Navya-nyāya philosophers take the view that pot-maker-ness confines
causeness to all pot-makers or that pot-maker-ness limits the realm
of causeness to all pot-makers. They select a property which confines
another property functioning as a relation as the delimitor of the other
property. That the pot-maker-ness existing in all pot-makers is the
delimitor of causeness implies that all pot-makers are the cause.
Furthermore, let us suppose that the statement refers to all pots. In
all pots there exists potness (kumbhatva, ghat. atva). Since all pots are
the products of all the pot-makers, effectness (kāryatā) also exists in all
pots. As in the above case of the delimitor of causeness, Navya-nyāya
philosophers assume that potness confines effectness to all pots or that
potness limits the realm of effectness to all pots.8 Thus, potness is
selected as the delimitor of effectness. To say that potness existing in
all pots is the delimitor implies that all pots are effects.
In order to explain the above analysis more clearly, I have presented
below a series of diagrams.9
In Figure 1 the upper rectangle (X) represents a property (dharma),
and the lower rectangle (Y) represents its possessor (dharmin). The line
between X and Y indicates the relation between the entity (p) denoted
by X and the entity (q) denoted by Y. A property is that which exists
in something, and its possessor is that in which the property exists, or
 NAVYA-NYĀYA 523

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

is the locus of the property.10 If we substitute causeness for p, and a

pot-maker for q, we come up with Figure 2.
Furthermore, if pot-maker-ness is the delimitor of causeness, we come
up with Figure 3. In Figure 3, the arrow is drawn from the rectangle
denoting the delimitor to the rectangle denoting the delimited entity
(avacchinna, avacchedya).
When potness is the delimitor of effectness, the connection among
potness, its delimitor, pot-maker-ness, and the delimitor of pot-maker-
ness is as shown in Figure 4.
We have seen how Navya-nyāya identifies relation by specifying the
quantity of its relata. It also makes use of another term to help identify
relation. When we make the statement “a pot-maker is the cause of a
524 TOSHIHIRO WADA

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

pot”, the causeness residing in a pot-maker functions as a relation. The

delimitor of causeness tells us the number of pot-makers, but from this
delimitor it is still not known what the other relatum of the relation of
causeness is. Even if we say that the delimitor of effectness is potness,
we understand by that only that all pots are effects or products, and it
is not known what they are effects or products of. In other words, one
way of identifying relation is to show the other relatum which is not
the locus of the property regarded as relation. To be more precise, for
this kind of identification Navya-nyāya utilizes the other relatum or a
property residing in this relatum.
In order to illustrate the Navya-nyāya method of analysis, we will
take up an example in which a property of the other relatum functions
for identification of relation.11 Let us examine the situation in which we
 NAVYA-NYĀYA 525

state only “pot-makers are causes”. From this statement we understand

that causeness is the relation, and that one of its relata is a pot-maker.
However, we do not understand that pots are the other relatum. One
may object: the statement itself implies that pots are produced by pot-
makers, and so it will be understood that pots are the other relatum.
This objection is not reasonable, and we can present a counter example.
Let us suppose that any pot-maker has at least one child, which sounds,
of course, very strange. Then, a pot-maker is the cause not only of a
pot/pots but also of his child. His child, on the other hand, is the effect
of his efforts. Consequently, the statement “pot-makers are causes” does
not always imply that pots are the effects.
When Navya-nyāya states that a pot-maker is the cause of his child,
it also assumes that in the pot-maker there is causeness regarded as the
relation of his child to him. However, causeness in this case is different
from causeness in the case of the statement “pot-makers are the cause
of pots”. If causeness in both cases does not differ, they will have a
baby when hoping to produce pots or will produce pots when hoping to
have a baby. This never happens in the real world, and so Navya-nyāya
needs a device for differentiating the causeness of a pot-maker to a pot
from the causeness of a pot-maker to his child.
To differentiate these two kinds of causeness, Navya-nyāya utilizes
two kinds of effectness which reside in the other relata (i.e., the pot
in one case and the child in the other) which are not the locus of
causeness. Navya-nyāya holds that when a pot-maker is the cause of
the pot produced by him, causeness is explained by the effectness
residing in the pot; on the other hand, when a pot-maker is the cause
of his child, causeness is explained by the effectness residing in the
child. Thus, Navya-nyāya selects as the differentiating factor a property
existing in the other relatum which is not the locus of the property
regarded as relation. Such a property which helps describe the relation
is called the describer (nirūpaka).12 Thus, relations expressed by one
and the same term can be distinguished by describers.13
Making use of the describer in the case of the statement “a pot-maker
is the cause of a pot”, we can clarify the statement as: the ‘causeness
residing in a pot-maker’ described by the effectness residing in a pot
(kumbhanis. .thakāryatānirūpitakumbhakāranis. .thakāran. atā).14 We can
illustrate the connection among the entities referred to in this clarification
in Figure 5.
The arrow of the double line in the figure indicates that the effectness
denoted by the rectangle from which the arrow points is the describer
of causeness denoted by the rectangle to which the arrow points.
526 TOSHIHIRO WADA

Figure 5.

If the statement “a pot-maker is the cause of a pot” refers to all

pot-makers and all pots, we will obtain the following clarification by
simultaneously using both the delimitor and describer: the ‘cause-
ness residing in a pot-maker’ delimited by the pot-maker-ness which
(causeness) is described by the ‘effectness residing in a pot’ delimited
by potness (kumbhatvāvacchinnakumbhanis..thakāryatānirūpitakumbha-
kāratvāvacchinnakumbhakāranis. .thakāran. atā). We can illustrate the
connection among the entities referred to in this clarification in
Figure 6.

Figure 6.

We may furthermore remove the expressions ‘residing in a pot-maker’

(kumbhakāranis. .tha) and ‘residing in a pot’ (kumbhanis. .tha) from the
clarification. Because it is a general rule that the delimitor shares a locus
 NAVYA-NYĀYA 527

with the delimited,15 that causeness resides in a pot-maker is implied

by the expression ‘causeness delimited by pot-maker-ness’. Similarly,
that effectness resides in a pot is implied by the expression ‘effectness
delimited by pot-ness’. Incorporating both these implications, we can
simplify somewhat the above clarification illustrated in Figure 6 as
follows: causeness delimited by pot-maker-ness which is described
by effectness delimited by potness (kumbhatvāvacchinnakāryatā-
nirūpitakumbhakāratvāvacchinnakāran. atā).16 We can illustrate the
connection among the entities referred to in Figure 7.

Figure 7.

CONCLUSION

The delimitor indicates the quantity of the relatum, while the describer
specifies a property (e.g., effectness) residing in this relatum (e.g., pot)
which is not the locus (e.g., pot-maker) of the relation.17 Through
the specification of such a property, the describer indicates as what its
locus, i.e., the relatum, is regarded.18 By using both terms, Navya-nyāya
identifies relation. Moreover, it adopts the method of describing the
content of analysis, i.e., the connection among property-possessors (e.g.,
all pot-makers and all pots), in terms of the connection among their
properties (e.g., causeness, pot-maker-ness, effectness, and potness) as
shown in Figure 7.19 There are many other technical terms that deal with
relation, which are not referred to in this paper. It is the Navya-nyāya
method of analyzing relation by means of such terms that may have
given Navya-nyāya its reputation among modern scholars as a system
involving elaborate, detailed argumentation and definitions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank Charles Pain for correcting my English, and the Ministry
of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Tokyo for its financial support
of this paper.
528 TOSHIHIRO WADA

NOTES
1
On the date of Gaṅgeśa, I have followed D. Bhattacharya (1958: 101), who places
him ca. 1325.
2
On this problem, see Wada (1999).
3
On the dates of the Nyāya and Vaiśes. ika authors, see Potter (1977: 9–12) and
Potter and Bhattacharyya (1993: 10–13).
4
The concept of avacchedaka is frequently used in the Vyāptivāda of the Nyāyasid-
dhāntad¯ıpa and less frequently in the Parāmarśavāda of the Nyāyaratna.
5
Guha (1968: 56) calls Navya-nyāya relational logic, but he does not make clear the
connection between relation and the two fundamental Navya-nyāya terms – delimitor
(avaccedhaka) and describer (nirūpaka) - that will be dealt with later in this paper.
6
The explanation of the function of the two terms is based upon Wada (1990:
66–98).
7
On relation in Navya-nyāya, see Wada (1988: 183) or Wada (1990: 66). Navya-nyāya
philosophers are keenly aware of the direction of relation, that is, the relation of
what to what, but they do not have a term which directly expresses direction. Instead,
they designate as the base-relatum (anuyogin) the relatum which is the locus of a
property regarded as relation, and the other relatum as counter-relatum (pratiyogin).
Direction is understood as moving from the counter-relatum to the base-relatum. It
should be noted that direction differs in Navya-nyāya and modern logic.
8
Effectness in the present case functions as status rather than as relation. Status
presumes the function of relation and is also a type of relation. To be more precise,
effectness is the relation of a pot to a pot-maker, which is not expressed by the
statement “a pot-maker is the cause of a pot”.
9
On the system of diagrams, see Wada (1990: 47–50). On their origin and history,
see Wada (1995).
10
It is possible in other cases to substitute some terms for dharma and dharmin.
On this, see Wada (1990: 47).
11
We should first point out that the describer can be either the relatum (regarded
as the property-possessor [dharmin]) or a property (dharma) of this relatum. Both
types can be further divided into those which are expressed by a absolute general
term and those which are expressed by a relative general term plus the suffix -tva
or -tā. On what is selected as a describer and how it is expressed, see Wada (1990:
68–69).
12
Ingalls (1951: 44–47) renders nirūpaka as ‘describer’, which seems to be the
best rendering at present. Ingalls (1951: 47) arrives at the following features of the
describer and the described: Navya-nyāya does not always select a property (e.g.,
kāryatā) expressing relation for the describer; a described property (nirūpita), on the
contrary, is always expressed by a relative term (e.g., kāryatā) in Navya-nyāya or a
term (e.g., kārya) suggesting relation.
13
It is not clear which of the terms, ‘delimitor’ or ‘describer’, in the Navya-nyāya
sense appears earlier in Sanskrit texts.
14
This Sanskrit expression is not found in a Navya-nyāya text. But to explain the
function of the describer, it is constructed from a similar expression which con-
tains the describer. The expression, as Wada (1990: 79 n.16) states, is obtained
from the expression ‘tadvannis. .thaviśes. an. atānirūpitatannis. .thaprakāratā-’ in the
Nyāyabodhin¯i (pp. 24,1–2) by substituting ‘kumbha’ for ‘tadvat’, ‘kāryatā’ for
‘viśes. an. atā’, ‘kumbhakāra’ for ‘tat’, and ‘kāran. atā’ for ‘prakāratā’. We find an
expression similar to the present expression in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāman. i (Vol. 1,
pp. 296,2–297,1): jñānatvāvacchinnakāryyatānirūpitakāran. atābhinnakāran. atā-’.
15
For this rule, see Wada (1990: 91).
 NAVYA-NYĀYA 529
16
This Sanskrit expression is not found in a Navya-nyāya text. But to explain the
function of the describer, it is constructed from a similar expression which contains the
describer. The expression is obtained from the expression ‘vahnitvāvacchinnaprakāratā-
nirūpitavyāptitvāvacchinnaviśes. yatāyā . . . ’ in the Nyāyabodhin¯ı (p. 36,9) by sub-
stituting ‘kumbhatva’ for ‘vahnitva’, ‘kāryatā’ for ‘prakāratā’, ‘kumbhakāratva’
for ‘vyāptitva’, and ‘kāran. atā’ for ‘viśes. yatā’. We find an expression similar to
the present expression in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāman. i (Vol. 1, pp. 296,2–297,1):
jñānatvāvacchinnakāryyatānirūpitakāran. atābhinnakāran. atā-’.
17
In the present paper I have not dealt with the case in which the relatum (e.g.,
pot) is the describer of causeness. On this case, see Wada (1990: 73–74).
18
If effectness is selected as the describer, the locus of the describer (i.e., the
relatum) is regarded as effect. If potness is selected as the describer, that locus is
regarded as a pot. In either case, the quantity of the locus or relatum is not known.
19
Ingalls (1951: 1) states the Navya-nyāya method of description: Navya-nyāya, by
means of abstract properties and the combination of negatives, expresses the facts
which we normally express by quantification.

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∗ The present paper is a revised English version of part of Wada (1999).

Department of Indian Studies

Nagoya University
Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku
Nagoya 464-8601
Japan