December 21, 1990.

percent of all civil forfeitures resulting from criminal investigations in which he was
William R. Simpson, Jr., Little Rock, for appellant. involved. However, the payment of the informant's fee in Glosson was contingent on
Kelly Hill, Asst. Attorney General, Little Rock, for appellee. his cooperation, testimony in, and successful prosecution of the case. Based upon
these circumstances, the Florida court held the contingent fee arrangement to be
GLAZE, Justice. violative of due process.

Appellant, along with codefendant Yvette Foster, was charged with delivery of a Initially, we note that Florida appears to be the only state which has held that the use
controlled substance, cocaine. At trial, the trial court granted Foster's directed of contingent fee informants violates due process. Even in Florida, the Glosson
verdict motion and dismissed her case, but appellant's case went to the jury which decision has been narrowly interpreted and limited to its facts. See Annotation,
*297 convicted him. Appellant was sentenced to forty years imprisonment as a Contingent Fee Informant Testimony in State Prosecutions, 57 A.L.R.4th 643 (1987).
habitual offender. On appeal, appellant raises four points for reversal. We affirm. Further, the case specifically relied upon by Glosson for its holding, Williamson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1962), was expressly overruled in United States
Appellant first challenges the fee arrangement between the North Little Rock Police v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1987), cert, denied, Nelson v. United
Department and the confidential informant to whom appellant allegedly sold the States, 484 U.S. 1026, 108 S. Ct. 749, 98 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1988).
cocaine. The informant was paid $60.00 for each successful drug transaction that he
completed. Appellant also complains that the informer, who had moved from the Additionally, the case before us is clearly distinguishable from Glosson. Here, the
state after appellant and Foster were charged, was also reimbursed his expenses by confidential informer was paid $60.00 for each completed drug transaction, and his
the North Little Rock Police Department and paid "court leave" by his employer payment was not contingent upon his cooperation, testimony and the successful
during the period the informant appeared as a witness. Appellant asserts that these prosecution of the case, as was the situation in Glosson. Thus, Glosson is not
payments and reimbursements violate Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-801(2) (1987), a applicable to this case.
witness fee provision, and his constitutional rights to due process under the United
States and Arkansas Constitutions.[1] We disagree. We choose to follow the strong policy articulated in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966), that the veracity of a witness is left to be
First we address the language in § 16-43-801(2) which provides that witnesses in tested on cross-examination, and the *298 credibility of a witness's testimony is to
criminal cases shall be paid at a rate of $5.00 per day. Appellant argues this statute be determined by a properly informed jury. Historically, this state has followed the
was violated since the arrangements in this case resulted in the informant being paid general rule that credibility of witnesses is for the jury. See Wallace v. State, 28 Ark.
more than $5.00 per day for his testimony. In examining the language in § 16-43- 531 (1873). There is no reason to change that policy now. As long as the informant is
801(2), we find no indication that the General Assembly intended the $5.00 to be a subject to cross-examination regarding the fee arrangement, as he was in the present
ceiling amount. In fact, this same statute provides the same $5.00 amount in civil case, there is no reason to reverse a conviction simply because an informant was paid
cases, and this court, in promulgating ARCP Rule 45, established a $30.00 per day a contingent fee for his services. In other words, it should be left to the jury to
witness fee plus a $0.25 per mile travel amount. More importantly, though, the evaluate the credibility of the compensated witness.
arrangements in this case do not constitute compensation for the witness's
appearance in court. An original payment of $60.00 was made to the informant at For his second point, appellant argues that, if we find it was not error to allow the
the time of the drug transaction; it was not connected to his appearance in court as testimony of the contingent fee informant, we should find error in the trial court's
a witness. Also, payment of the informant's expenses is not precluded under § 16- refusal to give appellant's proffered cautionary instruction on the credibility of
43-801(2), nor is any payment made to him by his employer. informants. Appellant's proffered instruction reads as follows:

In support of his argument that the contingent nature of the informant's fee violates The testimony of a paid informer, or any witness whose self-interest or attitude is
due process, appellant cites the Florida case of State v. Glosson, 441 So. 2d 1178 shown to be such as might tend to prompt testimony unfavorable to the accused,
(Fla.App. 1 Dist.1983), appr'd. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1985). In Glosson, the confidential should always be considered with great caution and care.
informant had an arrangement with the authorities whereby he would receive ten
While some federal courts have adopted such cautionary informer instructions, our convicted of theft of *299 property in Pine Bluff in 1979. He contends the order is
court has not. The trial judge here correctly gave AMCI 104 which contains the inconclusive as to whether it represents one of appellant's convictions rather than
general instruction on the credibility of witnesses. Because AMCI 104 adequately one belonging to someone else, using appellant's name as an alias. He also asserts
instructed the jury with respect to the credibility issue, the judge was not required to that the Arkansas Department of Correction Admission Summary indicates he was
repeat the instruction in a different manner. See Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 found not guilty of one of the alleged convictions.
S.W.2d 571 (1979).
Appellant is correct in stating that the state has the burden of proving a defendant's
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in not granting his motion for severance. prior convictions for purposes of the habitual offender statute. Stewart v. State, 300
Immediately prior to trial, appellant moved for a severance based on information Ark. 147, 777 S.W.2d 844 (1989). However, the statute specifically permits the proof
that the confidential informant's testimony was going to focus more on appellant to be by any evidence that satisfies the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that
than his codefendant, Foster. According to appellant, the defenses had become the defendant has previously been convicted of the felonies alleged. Ark.Code Ann.
"antithetical." However, at trial the informant's testimony did not focus solely on § 5-4-504(a) (1987); Thomas v. State, 303 Ark. 210, 795 S.W.2d 917 (1990). Further,
appellant, but implicated his codefendant as well. Two officers who were conducting while the trial court must find the existence of the convictions beyond a reasonable
surveillance of the transaction also implicated Foster. Further, neither defendant doubt, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence that the appellant
attempted to place the blame on the other. was convicted of the felonies in question. Stewart, 300 Ark. 147, 777 S.W.2d 844.

Severances are to be determined by the trial court on a case-by-case basis in the light In reviewing the "pen pack," we find it contains numerous records, including ones
of all attendant circumstances. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. Ruiz v. State, from the Arkansas Department of Correction Sentence Data Records and the United
299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989). The trial court's ruling on a motion to sever will States Department of Justice, which indicate appellant, Bobby Dale Wiliams, was
only be reversed when that discretion has been abused. Wilkins v. State, 292 Ark. convicted of theft of property in 1979. There is also abundant evidence that he was
596, 731 S.W.2d 775 (1987). Also, a trial court is said to have abused its discretion convicted of two counts of theft of property in 1976 and one count of theft by
when it is manifest from the record that a severance was necessary in order to have receiving in 1982. Also, the "pack" was accompanied by fingerprints of appellant and
a fair determination of an accused's guilt or innocence. Legg v. State, 262 Ark. 583, was certified as being the original penal records of appellant.
559 S.W.2d 22 (1977). In light of the fact that appellant's codefendant was implicated
by both the informant and the officers, it is not manifest from the record that a From our review of the "pen pack," we conclude there is substantial evidence to
severance was necessary to a fair determination of the appellant's guilt or innocence. support the trial court's finding that appellant had been previously convicted of four
Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. felonies. And with respect to appellant's additional argument that one of the penal
records indicates he was found not guilty of the 1979 theft of property offense,
Also on the issue of severance, appellant argues that the trial court was in error in appellant simply misreads the record. Instead, that record indicates the appellant
not granting a severance after it directed a verdict in favor of his codefendant. entered a plea of not guilty, but it further shows he was sentenced to more than nine
According to appellant, this was prejudicial because it prevented him from arguing years in prison on the charge. Further, the judgment and commitment order clearly
the guilt of his codefendant in his closing argument. Appellant failed to raise this indicates that appellant was found guilty of the charge.
argument below, and as we have previously held, parties on appeal are bound by the
scope and nature of those arguments presented to the trial court for its Because we find no merit in appellant's arguments, we affirm.
consideration. Taylor v. State, 299 Ark. 123, 771 S.W.2d 742 (1989). Therefore, we do
not reach this argument since it is made for the first time on appeal. NOTES
[1] Appellant also sought to have this court rule on the propriety of a purported
Finally, appellant contends that the "pen pack" offered by the state was insufficient $200.00 fee paid a confidential informant in an unconnected case. Because such a
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been previously convicted of four fee is not involved in this case, we do not consider it.
felonies. Specifically, appellant contends that one of the judgment and commitment
orders in the pack was for a James L. Williams, a/k/a Bobby Dale Williams, who was