Regents of The University of California vs. Bakke

Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke
FACTS:
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis (hereinafter Davis) had two
admissions programs for the entering class of 100 students -- the regular admissions
program and the special admissions program. The school, as part of the
university’s affirmative action program, had reserved 16 percent of its admission places
for minority applicants. No disadvantaged whites were admitted under the special
program, though many applied. Allan Bakke, a white California man who had twice
unsuccessfully applied for admission to the medical school, filed suit against the
university to compel his admission to Davis, alleging that the special admissions program
operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which provides, inter alia, that no person shall on the ground of race or color be
excluded from participating in any program receiving federal financial assistance.
Petitioner cross-claimed for a declaration that its special admissions program was
lawful. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota,
because minority applicants in that program were rated only against one another, and
16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. Declaring that petitioner could not
take race into account in making admissions decisions, the program was held to violate
the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI.
ISSUES:
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that
resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical
school?
RULING:
The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a

factor in the admissions process.
Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in
reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends
to dictate constitutional principles.
J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce

the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially
unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone.
The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may
be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a
specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal — minority
students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational
environment.
Racial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently suspect and call for the most
exacting judicial scrutiny. While the goal of achieving a diverse student body is
sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in admissions decisions under
some circumstances, Davis's special admissions program, which forecloses
consideration to persons like Bakke, is unnecessary to the achievement of this
compelling goal, and therefore invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
Dissent.
Justices William Brennan (J. Brennan), Byron White (J. Brennan), Thurgood Marshall (J.
Marshall), and Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissent, believing the special admissions
program to be constitutional. In particular, the Justices argue that the racial
classification in the present case is remedial, serves an important government objective
and also substantially related to that objective and thus insulated from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s general prohibition of such classifications.
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents, citing that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits the denial of any individual on the basis of race from participation in any
program receiving federal funding. J. Stevens argues that prohibiting white students
from participation in the special admissions program is a direct violation of Title VI.
Concurrence.
J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur so much as the Supreme

Court’s opinion allows race to be considered as a factor in the admissions process.
However, the Justices believe that in this particular example, race should be allowed as
a single determining factor.
J. Stevens concurs to the extent that the special admissions program is impermissible.
However, J. Stevens holds that the constitutional issue is not reached, because the
federal statutory ground (Title VI) prohibits the activity directly.
Discussion:
J. Powell’s basic problem with the special admissions program is this: there are 84 places
open for white applicants and 100 positions open for minority applicants. This differential
treatment solely on racial grounds is unconstitutional, according to J. Powell. It is
important to note that in Bakke, the Court did not technically hold the special
admissions program unconstitutional. J. Stevens and the three other Justices joining his
opinion do not reach the constitutional issue because of the federal statute.

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Regents of The University of California vs. Bakke

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Regents of the University of California v.

The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a

J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce

J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur so much as the Supreme

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