THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Cases to digest

Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016

Issue: Considering Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, can the Supreme Court
review on certiorari the Sandiganbayan Order denying accused’s Demurrer to
Evidence?

Ruling: Yes. The prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the
demurrer to evidence through certiorari. In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to
assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

Issue: Is the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts
[except the Supreme Court], from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin
an Ombudsman investigation, valid and constitutional?

Ruling: The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these
issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure
which belong exclusively within the province of this Court.

The policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than
the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED
ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Issue: In view of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts, is the direct resort to this
Court justified?

Ruling: Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the
Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. urt. While the
hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action
for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the
Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government
takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder and impostor to
occupy a public position.

Issue: Is the Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?

Ruling: No. The Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been
for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public
position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public office. The issue to
be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a
public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally
appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If
defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that
the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other
words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to
continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render
him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.

Issue: Can the qualifications under the Constitution be waived by the JBC?

Ruling: No. As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the

Constitution itself when it prescribed the qualifications absolutely required
of a person to be eligible for appointment as a Member of the Court.

To make sure that applicants to judicial pos1t10ns possess these constitutionally-

prescribed character requirement, the JBC was created. Jardeleza captures the
purpose of the JBC which it finds to be rooted in the categorical constitutional
declaration that 11 [a] member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. To ensure the fulfillment of
these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. Jardeleza continues that, in this manner, the appointing process
itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.

Issue: Does compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing
of SALN intimately relates to a person's integrity?

Ruling: Yes. Respondent loses sight of the fact that the SALN requirement is
imposed no less than by the Constitution and made more emphatic by its
accompanying laws and its implementing rules and regulations. In other
words, one who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws;
and one who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be
a person of integrity as such equation is theoretically and practically
antithetical.

Issue: Can Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice?

Ruling: Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is a clear
violation not only of the JBC rules, but also of the law and the Constitution.
The discordance between respondent's non-filing and non-submission of the
SALNs and her claimed integrity as a person is too patent to ignore. For lack of
proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC and ought
to have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the President. As
the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth
under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent
nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise
excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of respondent in the shortlist
of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum
Constitutional qualifications.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at
the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer's
entire tenure as a continuing requirement. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate.

Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 (MR)

Issue: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to decide the quo warranto
petition against Sereno who is an impeachable official?

Ruling: The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto
action. This authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the
Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII which states that: Sec. 5. The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

As the Court pointed out in its Decision, this is not the first time the Court took
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the
consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada v. Desierto, the
Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.

Issue: Is Sereno eligible to occupy the position of Chief Justice?

Ruling: Respondent, at the time of her application, lacked proven integrity on

account of her failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her
failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for
the position. She failed to file a SALN containing sworn statements reckoned as
of her first day of service within thirty (30) days after assuming office. While she
allegedly submitted an "entry SALN" on 16 September 2010, it was unsubscribed
and the statements of her assets, liabilities and net worth were reckoned as of 31
December 2009, and not as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010.

Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, Aug. 15, 2017

Issue: Is Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in drug cases,
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme?

Ruling: Yes. The power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. As it now stands, Congress has
no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure.

Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Nov. 29, 2016

Issue: Whether or not President Aquino violated the Constitution or committed

grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice?

Ruling: No. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC
cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the
latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in
the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment
is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not
obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six
shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into
the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of
the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the
same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Feb. 21, 2017 [MR]

Issue: Did the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan
by the JBC impaired the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and
to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices?

Ruling: Yes. The independence and discretion of the JBC is not without
limits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

The clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power in the

following ways: The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five
to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a
nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nominees
applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant
Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain
why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the position
assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance
for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which
they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for
all the vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies,
the JBC established the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606), rules (Rule II, Section 1 (b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals), vest
exclusively upon the President.

OCA vs. Judge Ruiz, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, Feb. 2, 2016

Issue: Is respondent judge administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have

committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City?

Ruling: Yes. In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not
yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts
imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it
provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that
the respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient
that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the respondent
through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: Is the administrative case against him premature since his criminal
convictions by the Sandiganbayan are not yet final?

Ruling: No. Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. This grant
empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the judges' and court personnel's
administrative compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations, and to take
administrative actions against them if they violate these legal norms. In the
exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of procedure in the
discipline of judges. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A. M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, provides that the Court may institute disciplinary proceedings
against sitting judges and justices motu proprio, by the Court itself. The Court
can then on its own initiative file an administrative complaint.

FASAP vs. PAL, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018

Issue: May the Court entertain PAL’s second motion for reconsideration?

Ruling: Yes. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court disallows the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration. However, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
(IRSC) allows an exception “in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or
damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration.”

In this case, there was “higher interest of justice” since PAL was able to argue
that the decision was against prevailing jurisprudence and the decision
could affect other companies also undergoing corporate rehabilitation.
Also, the July 22, 2008 decision (assailed decision) did not yet attain finality. It is
timely to note, too, that the July 22, 2008 decision did not yet attain finality. The
October 4, 2011 resolution recalled the September 7, 2011 resolution denying PAL’s
first motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the July 22, 2008 decision did not
attain finality.

Notes: The conditions that must concur in order for the Court to entertain a
second motion for reconsideration are the following, namely:

1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the
higher interest of justice;
2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains
finality;

3. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one
of its Divisions, at least three members of the Division should vote to elevate the
case to the Court En Banc; and

4. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc’s actual

membership must be mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be
granted.

Issue: Is the resolution dated October 4, 2011 in A.M. No. 11-10-1SC (recalling the
September 7, 2011 resolution) void for failure to comply with Section 14, Art. VIII of
the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling: No. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that “No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” The constitutional
provision clearly indicates that it contemplates only a decision, which is the
judgment or order that adjudicates on the merits of a case. The October 4, 2011
resolution did not adjudicate the case on the merits. What the Court did
was to exercise its inherent power to recall orders and resolutions before
they attain finality.

Cases to be read

Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno, G.R. Nos. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014

Unanimity Rule but JBC did not include Jardeleza in the shortlist of
nominees

Issue: Can the Supreme Court exercise its expanded certiorari jurisdiction over the
JBC which does not exercise judicial nor quasi-judicial function?

Ruling: Yes. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the
Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be overcome.

Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015

Issue: Can the court exercise judicial power to determine whether the AFP and the
members of the court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion in their military
investigation?

Ruling: Yes. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts
of justice includes not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017

Issue: Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should

issue?

Ruling: No. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of
a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or
would be violated.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health
and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was
violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

Public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to
implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by
the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve air quality were
undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders,
such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and
mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major
thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile
Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts
attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the
requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general
rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It

cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of
public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or
considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of
duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,42 and
the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the
other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms
provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of
an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be
directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.

There is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform

any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the
bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing
projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1

Issue: Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus

should issue?

Ruling: We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the
issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1. there is
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; 2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and 3.
the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be
violated. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right
was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of
any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to
a balanced and healthful ecology. While there can be no disagreement with the
general propositions put forth by the petitioners on the correlation of air quality
and public health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are
guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to
bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not able
toshow that respondents failed to executeny of the laws petitioners cited. In fact,
apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on
public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the
unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal
link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Issue: Considering that the RH Law has yet to be implemented, do the petitions
present actual controversy ripe for adjudication?

Ruling: Yes. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle
the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
NOW.

Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426 & 212444, Jan. 12, 2016

Issue: In view of the abstention of the Senators from the present proceedings, is
there an actual case or controversy that is already ripe for adjudication?

Ruling: We find that the matter before us involves an actual case or controversy
that is already ripe for adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an
official confirmation to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the
Philippines x x x have already been complied with." By this exchange of
diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively performed the last
act required under Article XII(l) of EDCA before the agreement entered into
force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of
foreign military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance of an official act by the
Executive Department that led to the entry into force of an executive agreement
was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.

Issue: Will the present petitions qualify as citizens', taxpayers', or legislators' suits
and, thus, the petitioners have legal standing?

Ruling: The present petitions cannot qualify as citizens', taxpayers', or

legislators' suits; the Senate as a body has the requisite standing, but considering
that it has not formally filed a pleading to join the suit, as it merely conveyed
to the Supreme Court its sense that EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence to be
valid, petitioners continue to suffer from lack of standing.

Aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public
right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, they fail to
make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present
petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens' suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Until and unless the Legislature appropriates funds for EDCA, or unless petitioners
can pinpoint a specific item in the current budget that allows expenditure under
the agreement, we cannot at this time rule that there is in fact an appropriation or
a disbursement of funds that would justify the filing of a taxpayers' suit.

In a legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official
act have standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution of which they
are members. None of the initial petitioners in the present controversy has the
standing to maintain the suits as legislators.

Issue: What are matters of transcendental importance? Does this petition involve
matters of transcendental importance?

Ruling: While petitioners Saguisag et. al., do not have legal standing, they
nonetheless raise issues involving matters of transcendental importance.While this
Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this doctrine, it
emphasizes that not every other case, however strong public interest may be,
can qualify as an issue of transcendental importance. Before it can be
impelled to brush aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial
review, it must at the very least consider a number of factors: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party
that has a more direct and specific interest in raising the present questions.

An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the

oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional issues
that provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing. The
transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the
Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is
a much stricter mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or
bases may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S.
Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been
complied with."142 It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal
stance towards the rule on standing and to determine forthwith whether
there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive
Department.

Philconsa vs. Phil. Gov’t. [GPH], G.R. No. 218406, Nov. 29, 2016

Issue: Due to non-enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, is the challenge on the
constitutionality of the CAB and FAB--- ripe for adjudication?

Ruling: A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a
court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.

It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the
Bangsamoro Basic Law enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in
accordance with the Constitution. Any question on the constitutionality of the
CAB and the FAB, without the implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a Bangsamoro Basic Law is
passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or controversy
that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over a co-
equal branch of government.

Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, Nov. 8, 2016
Issue: Does President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred
at the LNMB involve a justiciable controversy?

Ruling: No. The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question
that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as
discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political question is outside
the ambit of judicial review.

Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014

Issue: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a

question on Jardeleza’s integrity?

Ruling: No. While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act
of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains
that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement" in legal
strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken
by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said
reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the
"unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise of his discretion as a
lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a
legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to
betray the Constitution.

Issue: Does Jardeleza’s adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of

a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral
character and integrity?

Ruling: No. Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an

essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A
lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case
entrusted to him provided that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exerts his best efforts to protect the
interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an
insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles
and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal
tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his
moral choices.

Issue: Does the “unanimity rule” apply in cases where the main point of contention
is the professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior?

Ruling: No. Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, states that “In every case where the
integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is
raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council
must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.” To fall
under the unanimity rule, there must be a showing that the act complained of is,
at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his
judgment as a professional. In this case, Chief Justice Sereno alleged that
Jardeleza was of doubtful integrity when he decided differently than his legal
team in an international arbitration case. A lawyer has complete discretion
on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided that he
lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and
that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the
bounds of the law. As long as there is no gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral
purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and
deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.
Note:
The unanimity rule means that the members of the JBC must all vote in favor of
the candidate whose integrity is being challenged.

Villanueva vs. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, Apr. 07, 2015

Issue: Is the policy of the JBC “requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts” constitutional?

Ruling: Yes. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the
JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause only states that all persons of the same class should be treated the same. A
five-year stint in the Judiciary can provide evidence of the
competence, integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking
promotion. Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist
between lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than five
years of experience, like Villanueva, and the classification enshrined in the assailed
policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The questioned policy
does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants.

OCA vs. Judge Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325, April 14, 2015

Issue: Does taking cognizance of cases outside the court’s jurisdiction tantamount
to gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling: Yes. When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Under Section 4 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, “the petition (of declaration of nullity of void marriage) shall
be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of the filling,
or in case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x.” In this case, there were many times
when Judge Flores took cognizance of petitions for declaration of nullity of
void marriages when the petitioners did not reside within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts where he was presiding.