Avenue Supermarts LTD (DMART In) - Initiation-1

2 April 2018
INDIA | CONSUMER | INITIATING COVERAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Key investment thesis 3

Key charts 4
DMart’s impressive unit-economics make a compelling investment case 5
LFL growth can possibly sustain in high-teens range over next several years 8
Rental vs ownership: ROIC under rental model would have been over 30% 10
How long is the runway for new store opening? 13
The big valuation debate: Is there money to be made at 78x one-year forward PE? 14
Key financial summary 16
Valuation and target price 21
Key risks 24
Annexure I: Indian organised grocery retailing is a multi-decade growth opportunity 25
Annexure II: Business Overview: Best-in-class Food & Grocery retailer 28
Annexure III: Management profile 31
Financial tables 32
Indian organised retail is a multi-decade growth opportunity. DMart

stores’ impeccable unit-economics position it well to profitably
capitalise on the same.
Three reasons to read this report:

1. Deep-dive into DMart’s single-store economics.
2. Decoding how DMart’s financials would have looked had it adopted
the conventional retail model of leasing stores.
3. Our take on whether there is still money to be made at 78x one-
year forward PE.
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2 April 2018
INDIA | CONSUMER | INITIATING COVERAGE
AVENUE SUPERMARTS LIMITED (DMART IN)

BUY, and don’t sell if it ain’t broke
Let’s deal with the valuation argument upfront - is there money to be
We launch coverage on DMart, the best-in-
made at 78x 12M forward PE?
class Food & Grocery (F&G) retailer in India
with a BUY rating. We see 28% upside on It is interesting to note that an investor who bought Titan 10-11 years
the stock; our DCF-based target price works ago when it was trading at twice (42x) its then 5-year average PER
out to INR 1,675 per share. (c.20x) has still made a return of 25% p.a. on the stock. Notably, even
if the stock was bought at a 100x forward PE at that time, the return
The attractiveness of DMart’s operating would still have been 15.6% p.a. An above-average EPS CAGR of
model stems from the significantly higher 23.4% over the last 10 years is what drove Titan’s strong stock
level of throughput that its stores generate - performance notwithstanding its rich valuation, in our view. We see a
nearly 2-3x what other retailers clock on an similar growth trajectory panning out for DMart, which, as per our
average, which helps justify its choice of workings, is well-poised to compound earnings at c.25% p.a. over the
owning the stores (including the cost of next 10 years. DMart stores’ impressive unit-economics make a
land on which they are built), and the compelling investment case. Our analysis of the network’s age-profile
discounts (‘Every Day Low Price’ instead of suggests that DMart’s LFL growth can sustain in the high-teens range
festivals or seasons related limited period over the next several years.
discounts) that it pampers its shoppers with
– the latter being one of the key drivers of Long growth runway in place; our target price of INR 1,675/share
footfalls and conversions for DMart, in our presents a 28% upside vs CMP:
view. Our analysis of the unit-economics of Our framework for analysing the potential for F&G retail in India
a representative DMart store suggests that suggests that there could be opportunity for 1,500 large-format F&G
the IRR it generates is in excess of 20% over stores in India; as such, there is a long runway for store growth in the
a 20-year lifespan, without even considering country and DMart’s impeccable store-economics model makes it best-
terminal value or asset-release at the end of placed to take advantage of this opportunity, in our view. DMart’s
the period; a typical DMart store gets to a network currently comprises 141 stores only (Dec’17). We forecast
th
mid-teens ROIC by its 4 year of operations, 27%, 29% and 35% revenue, EBITDA and net profit CAGR,
th
comfortably scaling up to c.50% by the 10 respectively, over FY17-22E and value the stock at INR 1,675 per share
year, as per our workings. We estimate the (DCF-based). Near-term valuation multiples are undoubtedly rich (46x
company’s FY21E blended post-tax ROIC to one-year forward EV-EBITDA, 78x PE) but then, a cashflow-backed
be c.25%. earning compounder rarely fails on delivery.
Recommendation and Price Target Financial Summary (INR mn)

Current Reco. BUY Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E
Previous Reco. NR Net Sales 85,655 118,746 154,493 195,457 247,497
Sales growth (%) 33.3% 38.6% 30.1% 26.5% 26.6%
Current Price Target (12M) INR 1,675
EBITDA 6,636 9,812 13,684 17,625 22,386
Upside/(Downside) 27.7%
EBITDA (%) 7.7% 8.3% 8.9% 9.0% 9.0%
Previous Price Target NA
Adjusted net profit 3,203 4,803 8,002 10,515 13,389
Change NA EPS (INR) 5.7 7.7 12.8 16.8 21.5
EPS growth (%) 50.3% 34.9% 66.6% 31.4% 27.3%
Key Data – DMART IN ROIC (%) 15.3% 17.8% 21.0% 22.7% 23.7%
Current Market Price INR 1,312 ROE (%) 23.6% 17.9% 18.9% 21.0% 22.9%
PE (x) 230.0 170.5 102.3 77.9 61.2
Market cap (bn) INR 826.8/US$ 12.7
Price/Book Value (x) 48.5 21.3 17.6 15.2 13.0
Free Float 41% EV/EBITDA (x) 112.7 83.0 59.3 46.2 36.4
Shares in issue (mn) 624.1 Dividend Yield (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4%
Diluted share (mn) 624.1 Source: Company data, JM Financial. Note: Valuations as of 28/Mar/2018
3-mon avg daily val (mn) INR 982.2/US$ 15.1 Note: Pending FY18 Final Accounts, we have not yet incorporated GST related accounting changes in our model. Estimated
52-week range 1,387/615 FY18E, FY19E, FY20E revenue under GST would be INR149bn, INR187bn and INR236bn. There is no material impact on absolute
EBITDA but % margin under GST accounting would be higher at 9.2%, 9.4% and 9.5% respectively.
Sensex/Nifty 32,969/10,114
INR/US$ 65.2
Please see Appendix I at the end of this report for Important Disclosures and Disclaimers and Research Analyst
Certification.
Price Performance
% 1M 6M 12M Richard Liu Vicky Punjabi
Absolute -1.7 26.9 110.7 Richard.Liu@jmfl.com Vicky.Punjabi@jmfl.com
Relative* 1.9 20.4 87.9 Tel: (91 22) 6630 3064 Tel: (91 22) 6630 3065
* To the BSE Sensex

Avenue Supermarts Ltd. 2 April 2018
Key charts
Exhibit 1. Organised retail in India is a multi-decade growth Exhibit 2. …and DMart’s best-in-class store-economics make it best-
opportunity… placed to leverage the opportunity…
Store Profitability Metrics
NOPAT margin - % (Store-level) Store-level ROIC % Asset-turns (x) - RHS
Indian Retail Industry - 2016 Indian Retail Industry -2020E 9.9
9.7
90% 9.4 10
9.0 9.2
IRR: 24-25%
Organised 8.3 86%
Organised CAGR = 20% 83%
Retail 80% 79%
Retail
12% 70% 7.6 76% 8
9% 7.2 7.1 7.0
6.6 69%
6.0 62%
50% 5.4 56% 56% 56% 6
51%
4.7
4.4 45%
4.1
39%
30% 3.3 4
32%
2.6 28%
23%
Unorganised 1.8 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 9% 9%
91% Unorganised 10% 16% 6% 6% 2
88% 1.2 1%
-2%
3% 5%
Food & Grocery accounted 1%
for 67% of 2016 retail trade -10% -3% 0
Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y11 Y13 Y15 Y17 Y19 Y20
Source: Avenue Supermarts Ltd IPO Prospectus, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial
Exhibit 3. …as evident from its strong pace of growth… Exhibit 4. …alongside consistent improvement in profitability and
a return-ratios
SSSG Post-tax ROIC % EBITDA margin - %
35% 25% 10%

32% 8.8% 9.0% 9.0%
8.2%
30% 7.7% 24%
26% 20% 7.3% 23% 8%
7.1% 18% 21%
25% 22% 6.2% 6.4%
21% 21% 15%
20% 20% 15% 13% 14% 6%
20% 18%
16%
15% 10%
10% 4%
7%
10%
5% 2%
5%
0% 0% 0%
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E
Source: Company, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial
Exhibit 5. Valuation is undoubtedly rich… Exhibit 6. …but history suggests premium multiple need not be a
a constraint for stock performance if earnings compound well
EV/EBITDA Avg EV/EBITDA +1SD -1SD
110 Titan Company Stock Performance in last 10-11 years
50
100x
88 Even if investors bought Valuation cushion

43 Titan in 10-11 years ago at that was available
100x forward PE, the for 15-16% CAGR
stock would still have in stock return
66 delivered a return of 15- despite the stock
trading at 2x
historical avg then
36
44
42x
20.2x
29 22
Titan stock delivered
return of 25.6% p.a. in past
0 10-11 years - despite it
22 5-yr avg PER then trading at 2x then historical Oct'07 Fwd PER
Mar-17 Jun-17 Sep-17 Dec-17 Mar-18 avg PE
Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

DMart’s impressive unit-economics make a compelling

investment case
 The attractiveness of DMart’s operating model is driven by the significantly high level of
throughput that its stores generates, which is nearly 2-3x what other retailers clock. The
high store throughput does help justify the cost of ownership of the stores (including the
cost of land on which they are built), and the higher discounts (‘Every Day Low Price’
instead of festivals or seasons related limited period discounts) that its shoppers enjoy.
The other factor is the consistent focus on operational efficiencies by the management
team, the benefits of which are ploughed back to offer the most attractive pricing for its
customers. Given that a typical middle-class Indian shopper is most concerned about
‘value-for-money’ (many quick dip-stick surveys confirm this fact), DMart’s pricing-
focused value proposition is indeed working well for the business.
Exhibit 7. DMart's revenue and profitability metrics are significantly superior vs peers'
Revenue per sq ft comparison (INR) Profitability per sq ft comparison (INR)
DMart Future Retail Hypercity DMart Future Retail Hypercity

35,000 6,000
5,000
28,000
4,000
21,000
3,000
2,000
14,000
1,000
7,000
0
0 -1,000
FY17 Revenue per avg sq ft FY17 Gross Profit per avg sq ft FY17 EBITDA per avg sq ft EBITDA per avg sq ft - before Rent
Source: Companies data, JM Financial

Note: Future Retail’s sq ft include area allocated for store back-end; accordingly, its revenue and profitability per sq ft in the above table would be slightly understated to that extent.
 Given that DMart does not operate out of ‘expensive’ locations, its rental costs, had it
adopted the conventional retail model of leasing stores akin to what most of its peers
follow, would have anyway still been lower vs competitors’ and the company may have
enjoyed the same efficiencies and still have been able to price its products as attractively
even then. Refer later section in this report on our analysis of what DMart’s financials
would have looked like under the rental model. DMart’s store-ownership model,
however, helps it to choose the ‘best’ location since there is no constraint that stores
would need to be necessarily set up only in locations that are available on rent at what is
deemed to be ‘reasonable lease rates’. DMart has, in fact, the flexibility to choose and
own any of the locations that it finds suitable for operating stores.
On the flip side, the other way to look at DMart’s ownership model is that since its
modus-operandi is to only open stores at less-expensive places, there may not be ready-
made malls operating therein (since malls are typically set up in more well-known
localities which, by their nature, would mean higher rental costs) and hence DMart
needed to necessarily own its stores if it had to operate at these locations.
Be that as it may, the company’s financial performance reports suggest that DMart’s
choice of owning the stores has worked extremely well for itself. Our conversations with
other retailers have also led us to a rather obvious conclusion that in the retail business, it
is absolutely important to have stores at one’s disposal for a long-enough period of time,
as a newly-opened store typically takes some time to mature and reach an optimal level
of operations. If a retailer has to give up the store for some reason and move to a new
location just when an existing store is maturing, the situation becomes rather sub-optimal
as the retailer will land up incubating a new store at a new location all over again, besides
losing out on perhaps what could have been the most profitable periods for the erstwhile
store that the retailer had been incubating thus far.
In the illustration below, we present our analysis of what the profitability and cash-
generation potential of a typical DMart store over a long period of operations look like.
This is based on our understanding of the philosophy that DMart follows and the
milestones that management seeks to achieve when it decides to open a new store.
We are taking a period of 20 years in our illustration, though the total lifespan of a store
could in fact be longer since DMart owns its stores including the land on which they are
constructed, and hence can operate the store out of the same location for a prolonged
period of time, in our view. It is to be noted, though, that no DMart store has completed
20 years of operations so far since the first DMart store was launched only in 2002.
Analysis of store-economics of a representative DMart outlet

Exhibit 8. DMart – Single-store data (using FY17 financials as base for calculations)
FY17 FY17
Avg Store Size - Sq ft 31,000 31,000
Per sq ft Per Store

(INR) (INR mn) DMart's INR 32k
Net Sales 32,137 996 sales per sq ft is
Gross Profit 4,917 152 significantly ahead
Gross Profit margin - % 15.3% 15.3% of peers'
Staff Costs 365 11

Contract labour charges 796 25
Electricity and fuel 269 8
Others 232 7
Estimated Store-level SG&A 1,662 52
Estimated Store-level EBITDA 3,254 101

Store-level cash margin % 10.1% 10.1%
Capex: INR per sq ft INR per store

Land 3,567 111
Buildings and fit-outs 5,145 159
Total Capex 8,712 270
Source: Company data, JM Financial
Exhibit 9. The IRR of a representative DMart store is c.25% on an average, as per our analysis (INR mn)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Gross Fixed Asset Turns (x) 1.2 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.9 5.6
Revenue 324 486 702 918 1,134 1,323 1,512 1,709 1,880 2,049 2,192 2,324 2,463 2,611 2,768 2,934 3,110 3,297 3,494 3,704
% YoY Growth 50.0% 44.4% 30.8% 23.5% 16.7% 14.3% 13.0% 10.0% 9.0% 7.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Sales per sq ft 10,454 15,681 22,651 29,620 36,589 42,688 48,786 55,128 60,641 66,099 70,725 74,969 79,467 84,235 89,289 94,647 100,325 106,345 112,726 119,489
Gross profit 43 67 100 134 169 201 234 268 297 326 351 374 399 426 454 484 513 544 577 611
Gross margin 13.3% 13.8% 14.3% 14.6% 14.9% 15.2% 15.5% 15.7% 15.8% 15.9% 16.0% 16.1% 16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.5% 16.5% 16.5% 16.5% 16.5%
Staff and Labour costs 29 34 36 37 39 41 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 63 65 68 71
Inflation - % 6.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Others 14 16 17 18 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 29
6.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
EBITDA 0 16 47 79 112 141 173 204 231 257 279 300 322 346 371 398 424 452 481 512
EBITDA margin - % 0.1% 3.3% 6.8% 8.6% 9.8% 10.7% 11.4% 11.9% 12.3% 12.5% 12.7% 12.9% 13.1% 13.2% 13.4% 13.6% 13.6% 13.7% 13.8% 13.8%
Depreciation 12 12 12 12 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 17 17 17 17 17 17 21 21 21
EBIT -12 4 35 67 99 127 158 190 216 242 265 283 305 329 354 381 407 431 460 491
Tax -4 1 12 23 35 44 55 66 76 85 93 99 107 115 124 133 142 151 161 172
Tax rate - % 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
NOPAT -8 3 23 43 65 83 103 123 140 158 172 184 198 214 230 248 265 280 299 319
Add: Depreciation 12 12 12 12 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 17 17 17 17 17 17 21 21 21
Less: Capex 270 49 62 79
Less: NWC 19 10 13 13 13 11 11 12 10 10 9 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 12 12
Free Cash Flow -285 5 22 43 64 37 106 126 145 162 178 131 207 222 238 255 271 211 308 328
Discount Factor (WACC of 11%) 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12
Present Value of FCF -257 4 16 28 38 20 51 55 57 57 56 37 53 52 50 48 46 32 42 41
IRR 24.6%
Net Present Value of a Store at 11% WACC 527
ROIC Workings
NWC - INR mn 19 29 42 55 68 79 90 102 112 122 131 138 147 156 165 175 185 196 208 221
NWC - % of sales 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Gross Fixed Assets 270 270 270 270 270 319 319 319 319 319 319 381 381 381 381 381 381 460 460 460
Accumulated depreciation 12 24 36 49 61 75 89 104 118 133 147 164 181 198 216 233 250 271 291 312
Net Fixed Assets 258 246 234 221 209 244 230 215 201 187 172 217 200 183 166 148 131 189 168 148
Invested Capital 277 275 275 276 277 323 320 317 313 309 303 356 347 338 331 323 317 386 377 368
Post-tax ROIC -2.8% 1.0% 8.3% 15.7% 23.4% 27.6% 32.0% 38.7% 44.6% 50.7% 56.3% 55.9% 56.5% 62.4% 68.8% 75.8% 82.7% 79.8% 78.5% 85.7%
Source: JM Financial
10% store-level margin & >25% post-tax ROIC by Year-6 of operation

 As evident from the table above, our store-economics analysis suggests that DMart’s
model is highly attractive both from the perspective of profitability as well as cashflow
generation, notwithstanding the fact that the business has to incur significant sums of
capex to buy the land and build the store infrastructure and interiors initially. In contrast,
the capex required for opening a new leased-store would be much lower since the retailer
would typically incur expenses only on the store interiors and fit-outs.
 We believe a representative DMart store can quite easily generate mid-teens ROIC by the
th th
4 year of its operations which would comfortably scale-up to c.50% by the 10 year.
The IRR that a representative DMart store can generate over a 20-year period is in excess
of 20%, as per our workings, without considering terminal value or release of invested
capital at the end of the period. When compared to the cost of capital (11%), this
essentially reflects the highly cash-generative nature of DMart’s business model.
 As mentioned earlier, the efficiency of DMart’s operating model and better profitability
are in large part driven by the higher throughput that its stores generate, which in turn is
boosted by the ‘Every Day Low Price’ value-for-money proposition that it provides to the
shoppers at its stores; of course, product assortments, choice and selections also have
th
important roles to play in attracting consumers to the stores. By the 7 year of a store’s
opening, we believe a representative DMart store would typically have a gross fixed asset
turn of >5x implying that its revenue would then have scaled up to >5x the initial capital
invested in opening the store (including the cost of land on which the store is built).
Our single-store economics model is based on the following assumptions:
- Average store size of 31,000 sq ft.
- Build-out capex of c.INR 8,710 per sq ft (as derived from DMart’s FY17 financials) –
this includes the cost of land, building and store fit-outs.
- Gross profit margin in the range of 13-16% - starting at the lower-end and assuming
sales-mix gets richer as time progresses.
- A steady scaling-up of revenue at the store (described in detail below).
- Given that a store’s operation is usually not at its optimum revenue potential in the
initial few years, our analysis also assumes that instore overheads and employee
related costs are at 80-90% of fully scaled-up level in the initial couple of years of
operations.
 The company’s management had alluded that, on an average, a representative DMart

store clocks an asset-turn of 2x and EBITDA margin of 5% (pre-tax cash basis) by the end
th
of the second year of operation, and most stores reach their maturity by the 8 year of
operation beyond which growth gets to a level which is just about 1-1.5% higher vs
general rate of inflation in the economy.
In light of the above, while building the store ramp-up in our single-store model, we have
pencilled in an asset-turn of 1.2x in the store’s commencement year, 1.8x in Year-2 which
steadily ramps-up to c.5.5x by Year-7. It is also important to remember here that DMart’s
store capex is much higher (3-3.5x) compared to what its competitors incur, since it
adopts an ownership model for the stores that it runs and hence needs to buy the land as
well as to construct the stores’ infrastructure. In that context, a gross asset-turn of c.1x
itself in the first year translates into a rather healthy throughput in terms of scale. By the
th
end of the 6 year, we expect a store to generate per sq ft revenue of INR40,000+ which
would lift store-level EBITDA margin to 10%+ and ROIC (post-tax) of c.25%, as per our
workings.

DMart’s LFL growth can possibly sustain in high-teens range

over next several years
 We transpose the learnings from our study of DMart’s single-store economics to analyse
the effect of new store openings on the ‘like-for-like’ (LFL) or same-store sales growth
that the company can clock over a period of time. DMart defines LFL growth to mean the
growth in revenue from sales of same stores which have been operational for at least 24
months at the end of a fiscal.
 As per our analysis, revenue growth for a representative DMart store would remain well-
th
above the 20% mark upto the store’s 5 year of operation, and then slowly moderate to
th
sub-10% by the 10 year. The high growth phase upto year-5 (50%, 44%, 30%, 23% in
years 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively, as per our estimates) is, of course, driven in large part by
the natural scale-up in footfalls and throughput to a more optimum level as the store
gains popularity with local residents and nearby shoppers over time.
 Based on growth expectations as outlined above, it seems quite probable, to us, that
DMart can continue clocking near-20% LFL growth even until FY20E - which would
moderate by FY29E but still be at the mid-teens range. Interestingly, the analysis
effectively concludes that LFL growth is a lot dependent on the pace of new store
openings. It is important to have new stores growth, if LFL growth is to remain high; this
nd th th
is because of the accelerated growth that new stores witness in the 2 to 5 /6 year of
their operations. On the flipside, however, new stores are typically margin and also ROIC
dilutive, albeit for the initial phase only; we believe a DMart store clocks a positive EBIT in
th
year-2 itself and c.15% post-tax ROIC in the 4 year.
Exhibit 10. As at Mar’17, 38% of DMart’s “same-stores” are less than 5 years old which
helps lift LFL growth at an overall level
Stores Ageing - FY17 No. of stores SSSG
>8 years 30 9%
>7 years 7 13%
>6 years 8 14%
>5 years 10 17%
>4 years 7 24%
>3 years 13 31%
>2 years 14 44%
Blended LFL growth - FY17 21%
% of "same-stores" <5 yrs in operation 38%
Source: Company, JM Financial
Exhibit 11. Store-ageing profile in FY20E could still allow DMart to clock high-teens LFL
growth, as per our workings
Stores Ageing - FY20E No. of stores SSSG
>8 years 55 7%
>7 years 7 13%
>6 years 13 14%
>5 years 14 17%
>4 years 21 24%
>3 years 21 31%
>2 years 14 44%
Blended LFL growth - FY20E 18%
% of "same-stores" <5 yrs in operation 39%
 Our financial forecasts for DMart is premised on a 15-16% CAGR in retail-area under
operations over FY18-24E and this is one of the critical parameters to monitor, we
believe, to decipher whether LFL growth for the company overall can continue to be in
the mid-to-high teens range. Another critical assumption, of course, is that consumer
sentiments do not undergo a severe downturn during this period.

 We do note that it could be harder for a retailer to ‘buy’ an altogether new property to
construct a greenfield store than ‘leasing’ a new store in a ready-to-occupy property;
DMart’s store-ownership model makes this factor all the more important to monitor,
although management has been quoted in recent media reports that the company may
be ‘willing to forgo owning its stores’.

Rental vs store-ownership model: DMart’s ROIC under the

rental model would have been over 30%
 DMart’s decision to own instead of renting its stores has often been credited as one of
the key factors that drove its success. One side of the story is that since retailers typically
incur 7-8% or more of their revenue on store rentals, taking rental costs off the P&L has
enabled DMart to aggressively discount the merchandise that it sells at its stores and
accordingly strengthen its value-proposition to the customers, which has helped it achieve
the significantly higher revenue per sq ft vs peers.
We agree that the argument does have merits, but one must also note that ownership
model requires a much higher upfront capital investment to buy land and build the
infrastructure to house the stores (‘Land’ and ‘Building' comprises >85% of DMart’s gross
block, as per FY17 annual report) and that may not be everyone’s cup of tea.
In such a model, the retailer is also committing long-term to a particular retail site – this
long-term arrangement works well if the site is good, else it may mean blocking of capital
on a sub-par asset; needless to say, the ability to choose a good site is extremely critical in
such a case.
Higher capital investment also means lower ROIC in the business, ceteris parabus.
 Given that there are media reports of DMart’s willingness to forego store ownership in
order to accelerate store openings, we thought it worthwhile to analyse how the
company’s financials would have looked in case DMart adopted the more conventional
rental approach to store-operations instead of the ownership model that it is currently
works on.
Exhibit 12. Summary profit and loss – Ownership vs Rental (INR mn)
DMART REPORTED FINANCIALS RENTAL MODEL (ESTIMATED)
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
Revenue 46,865 64,394 85,838 118,977 46,865 64,394 85,838 118,977
Gross Profit 7,021 9,522 12,802 18,167 7,021 9,522 12,802 18,167
GPM 15.0% 14.8% 14.9% 15.3% 15.0% 14.8% 14.9% 15.3%
Staff 873 1,341 1,490 1,925 873 1,341 1,490 1,925

% of revenue 1.9% 2.1% 1.7% 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 1.7% 1.6%
Rent 88 132 204 354 1,440 1,863 2,450 3,236
% of revenue 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7%
Other Exp 2,642 3,460 4,472 6,075 2,642 3,460 4,472 6,075
% of revenue 5.6% 5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 5.6% 5.4% 5.2% 5.1%
EBITDA 3,418 4,590 6,636 9,812 2,066 2,859 4,390 6,930

% margin 7.3% 7.1% 7.7% 8.2% 4.4% 4.4% 5.1% 5.8%
85bps estimated
Dep 570 815 984 1,278 282 367 426 505 difference in PBT
margin vs higher
EBIT 2,848 3,775 5,652 8,534 1,783 2,492 3,964 6,425 difference of 242bps
in EBITDA margin
Int 557 724 913 1,220 56 72 91 122 - due to savings in
finance charges &
Other Income 158 183 179 286 158 183 179 286 lower depr under
rental model
PBT 2,449 3,233 4,918 7,600 1,886 2,603 4,052 6,589
% margin 5.2% 5.0% 5.7% 6.4% 4.0% 4.0% 4.7% 5.5%
Tax 835 1,109 1,715 2,683 643 893 1,413 2,326

ETR 34.1% 34.3% 34.9% 35.3% 34.1% 34.3% 34.9% 35.3%
PAT (before minority/associates) 1,614 2,124 3,203 4,917 1,243 1,710 2,639 4,263
PAT margin % 3.4% 3.3% 3.7% 4.1% 2.7% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6%
Difference in PAT between rent and ownership -13.3%
 Our short conclusion: Ceteris parabus, post-tax profits under the rental model may have
been c.10-15% lower vs what the company actually earned, but the business’ ROIC
would have been significantly higher than what DMart reported - c.31% vs c.18%
reported for the latest financial year.

This is because the total invested capital in the business without the land/building
infrastructure would be less than half of DMart’s actual capital deployed in the business,
as per our workings (see Exhibit below).
On the earnings front, the business’ profitability in the case of a rental model would be
hit by store-rental costs which would be partly offset by lower depreciation charge.
Not related to ROIC, but the company’s interest costs would also be much lower as it may
not have needed so much of debt financing had it not invested in land and building
infrastructure for its stores. Free cashflow, of course, improves a great deal.
DMart had a net debt of INR 11bn at end-Mar’16 – the year before its initial public offer
in which the company raised INR18.7bn of capital; this converted the company’s balance
sheet into a net-cash one at end-FY17. Against this debt of INR 11bn at end-Mar’16, we
estimate there was c.INR 15.8bn of Land & Building that related to store-ownership. In
other words, DMart would have had a net-cash positive BS even before its IPO, had it not
chosen to own the stores that it operated.
 One critical assumption made by us here is the lease rent payable by DMart if it was to
lease its stores. Our workings for the purpose of this exercise are based on rentals of INR
60-70 per sq ft per month on an average (Future Retail’s rental costs work out to INR 85
per sq ft per month, as per our calculations from the company’s latest annual report). The
relatively lower rental costs that we assumed for DMart is based on the kind of localities
that DMart has thus far chosen to operate its stores at. Rather than setting up stores
based on ‘localities’ and at well-known premium malls, DMart’s philosophy and focus has
instead been on offering value to its consumers through attractive pricing of its
merchandise.
Exhibit 13. Operating stores on rental model yields lower absolute profit but significantly higher ROIC (INR mn)
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
Invsted Capital as reported 15,582 20,944 27,109 34,886
Land & Bldg excluded (75% of "bldg" excluded; 25% assumed to relate to store interiors / fitouts etc) 9,989 13,131 16,588 20,846
Less: Acc dep on Land & Bldg 936 1,227 772 1,883
Net block to be excluded 9,054 11,904 15,816 18,963
Estimated Invested Capital under the rental model 6,528 9,040 11,293 15,923
Post-tax EBIT as reported 1,877 2,480 3,681 5,522

Estimated Post-tax EBIT under rental model 1,175 1,637 2,582 4,157
ROI C as repo rt ed 14% 15% 18%

Est imat ed ROI C o n st o re-rent al mo del 21% 25% 31%
 We are, however, also cognizant of the fact that availability of quality retail space at the
desired localities would have an influence on the company’s ownership decision in the
future. Given that a typical DMart store requires quite a large area (DMart’s stores are
c.30,000sq ft in size on an average), it may not be always easy to secure such large retail
spaces in locations that are also not very expensive. This factor may have been one of the
reasons why other retailers opted for a rental model for their operations. DMart’s ability
to secure such property deals for itself would be put to test all the more whenever the
company would need to expand its operations into an altogether new region (e.g.
Eastern India).
 Moreover, rental expenses would have lowered the company’s EBITDA margin from 8.2%
to 5.8%, as per our estimates. Margin in FY14-15 would have been sub-5% in such a
scenario (where DMart rented its stores instead of owning them). We are not sure how
secure a retailer would feel to operate at such a low level of margin, especially at the
initial stage when start-up and incubation costs would also be quite high and throughput
relatively lower. The need to up margin-cushion may, in fact, tempt a retailer to think of
ways to push up its gross profit margin profile (c.15% for DMart) – this may have the

effect of diluting the essential value-proposition of ‘Every Day Low Price’ which we believe
is the corner-stone of the high throughput that DMart has been enjoying.
In our view, it is only very deep-pocketed players who would probably be able to toy with
the idea of developing a model of this nature; most others will necessarily choose the
alternative to ‘play safe’ with the conventional model of offering a good ‘shopping
experience’ as a key value-proposition. This, in our view, could also be one key reason
why no other retailer has so far attempted a model akin to that of DMart’s, even though
it has been quite evident for some time now that DMart probably enjoys the best store-
economics and profitability metrics amongst its retail peers.

How long is the runway for new store opening?

 Given the importance of new store opening in driving LFL growth for the company, as
discussed in the earlier section, and also considering the fact that in order to increase
penetration of organised retail, retailers would need to open new stores to tap newer sets
of customers at newer locations, we believe it may be worthwhile to examine the
potential for new store openings to assess the length of the runway available to retailers
such as DMart as far as new store openings are concerned.
 DMart’s financial data (FY17) indicates that revenue per bill at its stores averages
INR1,100 currently. If we take this to be an indication of the size of the shopping basket
for a typical family, and assuming an average middle-class family shops for Food &
Grocery twice a month at a supermarket/hypermarket, this would mean that DMart is
currently catering to the F&G needs of about 4.5mn households every year, assuming
these households buy most of their F&G from DMart. This implies that an average DMart
store is catering to the annual F&G requirements of approx. 37,500 families / households.
See Exhibit below for detailed workings.
 Out of the total 250mn households that are there in the country, the target segment for
organised F&G retailers would, in our view, be the urban SEC A to C households, which
currently comprises c.18% of the total households in the country. This, as per our
workings, pegs the current addressable market for organised F&G retailers at c.45mn
households.
Based on the current number of households serviced per DMart store, and assuming
these stores are running at 70-80% capacity level at present, we believe there is a
potential for 900 such stores to exist in the country. Compared to this, DMart’s current
store count is 141 (Dec’17 data), implying a share of c.15% for DMart in terms of
number of stores. DMart’s current share in total organised F&G retail appears to be in the
range of 18-20%, as per our calculations.
Taking into account the expected growth rate in population/households, alongside the
expectation of increased urbanisation and growth in households income, our conservative
estimate is that there could be a requirement for 1,500 such stores in next 10 years’ time.
In essence, store growth would be constrained more by DMart’s roll-out/execution
capability (including its ability to identify the right locations to buy land to build new
stores that can be run profitably) than by market opportunities, we believe.
Exhibit 14. Potential exists for 1,500 DMart-type stores in the country in the next 10 years
Total number of households in the country currently - mn 250
% of SEC A to C Urban Households 18%
Target households - mn nos 45
Dmart's average value per bill - INR 1,101

Average shopping bill per household p.a. assuming an avg family shops twice a month - INR 26,434
Dmart's FY17 Revenue (incl consignment sales) - INR mn 119,503

Mn no. of households serviced by Dmart in FY17 4.5
Average no. of Dmart stores in operation through FY17 121

Average no. of households serviced per store (rounded off) 37,500
Estd optimum average no. of households a single store can service 50,000
Estd no. of stores required to service the entire target households 900
Estd no. of stores that would be required in 10 years' time (rounded off) 1,520
Source: Company, Industry data, JM Financial
Note: Store requirement after 10 years computed based on 2% annual growth in number of households and increase in % of urban SEC A-
C households to 25% vs 18% at present.

The big valuation debate: Is there money to be made at 78x

one-year forward PE?
 Given DMart’s proven execution and profitability track-record, we reckon that the big
debate that we are likely to be having with investors may not be so much on DMart’s
store-economics that we have discussed at length in the earlier sections, but may centre
more around the stock’s steep near-term valuation multiples. At the current market price
of INR 1,312, DMart is trading at an EV-EBITDA of 46x on a one-year forward basis; one-
year forward PER works out to 78x. These multiples are significantly higher compared to
our consumer coverage group’s (ex-ITC) 30-31x (EV-EBITDA) and 47x (PER) respectively.
On FY20 basis, DMart’s EV-EBITDA and PER are 36x and 61x respectively. Its valuation
premium vs our consumer coverage group’s average narrows a tad (37% EV-EBITDA
premium based on FY20E financials compared to 49% premium on FY19E basis) when
valued using FY20’s financials on account of significantly higher growth rate of c.29% in
DMart’s net profit (FY18-20E) compared to the coverage group’s c.16% growth estimate
for the same period.
 Therein lies the challenge. DMart is trading at a significantly premium valuation and the
stock is more than 4x its Mar’17 initial public offer price of INR 299 a piece.
 When we look at the other stocks in our consumer coverage group, Titan Company
(TTAN IN) currently commands the richest multiple in the group (58x one-year forward
PER and 40-41x on EV-EBITDA basis). Titan’s stock is one where there have been multiple
debates on valuations at several points in time; Titan’s valuations have looked rich on
various occasions in the past but the stock has still delivered one of the best returns for
investors in recent times. The stock generated an annual return of 34%, 30% and 33%
on 3-year, 5-year and 10-year basis, respectively. Even three years back, the stock was
trading at a rich multiple of 50x – 66% higher vs then 5-year average PE of c.30x.
If we go back to Oct 2007 level, the stock was trading at a pretty rich PE multiple of 42x
which is more than twice the then 5-year average of c.20x (note that we chose Oct’07 as
the point of reference as we were looking for a time which is long enough in the past
and when the stock was trading at what was then considered an ‘obscene’ multiple
compared to its trading history). Even then, however, the stock still delivered a
compounded return of 25% between that time and now.
In fact, had an investor bought Titan at 100x forward PE at that time, the stock would
still have delivered a 15% CAGR in this 10-11 years’ timeframe to those who held on to
the stock. Titan’s above-average earning CAGR of 23.4% over the past 10 years is what
contributed to the stock’s strong performance despite its premium valuation, in our view.
We see a similar situation for DMart which we believe is well-poised to deliver 25%
earnings CAGR over the next 10 years (FY18-28E).
Exhibit 15. Titan’s stock delivered a return of 25% p.a. to investors in Exhibit 16. Had Titan been bought then (2007) even at 100x forward
the past 10 -11years, despite it quoting at a PER that was 2x then PE, the stock would still have delivered a return of 15-16% CAGR
historical average between then and now
50
25% p.a. stock return 110 15.6% p.a.
100x
42.2x
Even if investors bought Valuation
40 90 cushion that
Despite trading at 2x then 5-yr Titan in 2007 at 100x
avg PE in Oct'07, Titan still forward PE, the stock was available
delivered a 25% p.a. stock would still have delivered for 15-16%
15% p.a. return in last 10 CAGR in stock
return between then and now 70
years return despite
30 the stock
trading at 2x
50 historical avg
then
20.2x
20
30
20.2x
10 10
5-yr avg PER then Oct'07 Fwd PER 5-yr avg PER then Oct'07 Fwd PER
Source: Company. Bloomberg, JM Financial Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

 While on this subject, the other example that comes to mind is Jubilant Foodworks (JUBI
IN), the franchisee of Dominos’ Pizza in India. Jubilant did its initial public offering in early-
2010 at a price of INR 145/share. The stock rose 58% on the day of its listing to close at
INR 229. An investor who bought the stock at that price of INR 229/share and held till
today would be earned a compounded stock return of c.33% over the past 8 years.
Interestingly, even if Jubilant Foodworks was bought 8 years back at 4.5x its IPO offer
price i.e. at INR 653 per share (akin to the level at which DMart is trading today vs its IPO
price – INR 1,321 vs IPO price of INR 299), the stock would still have delivered a return of
c.17% CAGR between then and now. Incidentally, buying the stock at 4.5x the IPO offer
price 8 years back would have meant buying at 64x one-year forward PE.
One must note that such returns have, however, not always been linear and even sound
business models have their share of ‘downtime’ and rough patches, e.g. Jubilant lost
more than half its value between mid-2015 and Jan’17 when its business went through a
downturn.
Exhibit 17. Jubilant Foodworks’ stock delivered a 16.9% p.a. return even if bought at 4.5x
the IPO offer price on listing day (at 64x forward PE)
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
Implies buying
the stock at 64x
forward PE
0
IPO price (Jan10) Listing price 4.5x IPO price Mid-2015 peak Recent Low CMP
(Feb10) (Dec'16)
Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

Summary of Key Financials

Revenue
 DMart clocked a strong revenue CAGR of 39.6% over FY12-17 resulting in a 5-fold
increase in its revenue-base from INR 22.6bn in FY12 to INR 120bn in FY17. Roughly half
of the growth was attributable to the rapid pace of expansion in retail area under
operations, which grew 21.2% per annum from 1.6mn (55 stores) to 4.1mn (131 stores)
over the same period. The other half of the growth was driven by a healthy LFL growth in
same-store sales (note that DMart defines LFL growth as the growth in revenue from sales
of same stores which have been operational for at least 24 months at the end of a fiscal)
– LFL growth ranged between 21% and 32% during the 5-year period.
Exhibit 18. SSSG is expected to remain in high-teens in near future Exhibit 19. Pace of store expansion is expected to moderate
35%
SSSG - % Store Count - nos Retail Space - mn sq ft
32%
250 7
6.2
28% 26% 6
5.3
200
22%
21% 21% 4.5 5
20% 20%
21% 4.1
18% 150
16% 3.3 4
14% 2.7 3
100 2.1
1.8
1.6 2
7% 50
1
55 62 75 89 110 131 145 171 197
0% 0 0
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E
Source: Company, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial
We are building in a moderation in pace of retail expansion over FY17-20E of 14.9% vs

21.2% clocked over FY12-17. This is partially on account of subdued growth of 11.1%
expected in FY18E. We expect pace of expansion to pick-up to 18% in FY19E and 15.5%
in FY20E.
Compared to 21% growth in retail space reported over FY12-17, we are forecasting a
15% CAGR therein for the next 5 years (FY17-22E); the store expansion forecast for
FY18-20E is based on the expansion plan outlined in DMart’s IPO prospectus.
On LFL growth, we estimate 20%, 18% and 16% in FY18E, FY19E and FY20E.
respectively. Some moderation in LFL growth is attributable to the fall in pace of store
expansion as growth rates in older stores would be lower in comparison to newer stores
that benefit from a natural scale-up in footfalls and throughput to a more optimum level
as the store gains popularity with local residents and nearby shoppers over time.
The above factors are expected to drive 27.7% revenue CAGR over FY17-20E, leading
revenue to more than double to INR248bn over this period.

Exhibit 20. We expecting a healthy 28% revenue CAGR over FY17-20E (INR bn)
Net Sales - INR bn
300
247
250
195
200
154
150
119
100 86
64
47
50 33
22
0
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E
Profitability
 DMart’s earnings performance has outpaced its topline by c.8ppt p.a. with EBITDA
growth of 48% p.a. over FY12-17. The outperformance was driven by cumulative
operating margin expansion of c.200bps over the 5-year period, mainly on account of
higher store throughput helping better absorption of SG&A, though there was some
element (c.60bps) of gross margin expansion as well. Gross margin expansion was likely a
function of slightly improved product mix in older stores.
Exhibit 21. Category-mix at DMart stores hasn’t changed much over the years
General Merchandise & Apparel Non-Foods (FMCG) Foods
26.0% 25.8% 25.2% 25.9% 26.4% 26.4%
21.0% 21.2% 21.5% 21.2% 20.6% 20.0%
53.0% 53.0% 53.3% 52.8% 53.1% 53.7%
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17

 Net profit growth was significantly higher vs EBITDA at 51.6% CAGR over FY12-17
helped by slower growth in depreciation (27.8% CAGR) and interest expenses (36%
CAGR) vs revenue.
We forecast 31.6% EBITDA CAGR over FY17-20E on revenue CAGR of 27.7%. Higher
operating profit flowthrough is expected to be contributed by 78bps cumulative
improvement in operating margin over FY17-20E to 9% vs 8.2% in FY17. Margin
expansion is led almost equally by gross margin improvement (better product mix) as well
as scale-led operating leverage benefit.

Exhibit 22. EBITDA margin to sustain near FY18 levels

EBITDA - INR bn EBITDA margin - %
9.0% 9.0%
8.9%
22.4
8.3%
7.7% 17.6
7.3% 13.7
7.1%
6.5% 9.8
6.3%
6.6
4.6
3.4
2.2
1.4

Note: Pending FY18 Final Accounts, we have not yet incorporated GST related accounting changes in our model. While
this has no material impact on absolute EBITDA, % margin under GST accounting would be higher at 9.2%, 9.4% and
9.5% respectively
 Adjusted net profit is estimated to grow at 40.7% CAGR over FY17-20E (growth was
c.60% YoY in 9MFY18) to INR13.4bn in FY20E. We forecast EPS of INR12.8, INR16.8 and
INR21.5 for FY18E, FY19E and FY20E respectively.
Return-ratios
 DMart’s focus on delivering healthy returns on its capital-investment is quite visible over
the past 5 years – post-tax ROIC has steadily improved every year from a mere 6.8% in
FY12 to 17.8% in FY17 despite the aggressive ramp-up in retail area under operation,
which grew at 21% per annum. DMart’s revenue per sq ft has doubled INR 16,000 in
FY12 to INR 32,340 in FY17 – the significantly higher throughput per sq ft has driven
higher asset-turns – 3.8x in FY17 vs 2.2x in FY12. Higher throughput has also helped
operating margin expansion (explained above). ROEs are also higher now at 17.9%
(FY17) vs 8.8% in FY12 but have dropped from peak levels of 23.6% reported in FY16 on
account of recent equity dilution through IPO (Mar’17).
We expect both ROIC and ROE to scale-up to c.23% by FY20E aided by higher asset turns
as well as a slight improvement in operating margin.
Exhibit 23. ROIC & its components
Post tax EBIT margin % EBITDA margin % Post-tax ROIC % Asset-Turn (Revenue/Invested Cap) - x - RHS
25% 23.7% 5
22.7%
21.0%
4.5
20%
17.8% 4.3
4.1
15.3% 4
15% 13.3% 13.6% 3.8
3.5 3.6
9.9% 3.3
10% 8.8% 9.0% 9.0%
7.7% 8.2%
6.8% 7.3% 7.1% 3
2.9
5.1% 5.2% 5.3%
4.3% 4.6%
5% 6.2% 6.4% 4.0% 3.9%
3.1% 3.4%
2.2
0% 2
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20

Cash
 DMart has generated positive operating cashflows (OCF) in each of the past 5 years – this
stood at INR 4.6bn in FY17 – 7x that of FY12’s OCF of INR 654mn. Free Cash Flow (FCFF)
has, however, been negative every year on account of the high pace of store expansion
which necessitated higher spends on capex more so since the company chose to own
most of the stores that it operates. This led to a sharp spike in net debt from INR3.1bn in
FY12 to INR 11.4bn in FY16. However, the proceeds of INR 18.7bn from the IPO in
Mar’17 has helped the company turn its BS into a net cash positive one; DMart had a net
cash balance of INR 4.1bn at the end of Mar’17.
Given the relatively slower pace of space expansion in FY18 (11% YoY growth vs 21%
CAGR over FY12-17), we expect DMart to report a healthy INR 2.3bn in FCFF in FY18; we
expect FCFF to remain positive henceforth, although FY19E would be lower vs FY18E on
account of an expected pick up in the pace of store expansion.
Exhibit 24. Expecting DMart to be FCFF positive going forward (INR bn)
Operating Cash Flow - INR bn Free Cash Flow - INR bn
14
11.9
12
10 9.4
8 6.9
6 4.6
4.3
4 3.0
2.0 2.2 2.4
2 1.3 1.0
0.7
0
-2 -1.2 -1.1 -0.7

-2.0 -1.8
-4 -2.5
Exhibit 25. DMart's BS has now turned into a net-cash one (INR bn)
Net Cash Position - INR bn
8 6.7
5.0
4.1 4.4
5
-1
-4 -3.1
-4.5
-7 -5.7
-10 -8.5
-13 -11.4

Exhibit 26. Components of Balance Sheet (INR bn)

Figures within the bar denote amount in INR bn
Net fixed assets Cash & Cash Eqv Net Working Cap (excl cash) Others
100%
1.4 2.2 4.4 7.1
3.0 4.7
0.7 0.5
80% 0.8 0.7
0.5
19.1 IPO
60%
40% 8.6 10.4 12.6 22.7

16.3
27.8
20%
0%
-20%
Exhibit 27. Working capital trend
Inventory - days of revenue Current Liabilities - days of revenue Working Capital - % of revenue - RHS
35 8%
32
30
29 7.3% 29
30 29
31
6.6%
6.4% 6.4% 6%
25
6.0%
20 5.1%
4%
19
15 16
14 14
13
10 11
2%
0 0%

Valuation and target price
 DMart stock is presently trading at c.46x NTM EV/EBITDA and c.78x NTM earnings;
Valuations are undoubtedly rich when compared to our consumer coverage group’s
average multiple of 30x EV/EBITDA (ex-ITC) and 46x EPS. Headline valuations, however,
ignore the underlying growth potential, in our view; compared to our coverage group’s
estimated FY17-20E earnings CAGR of 15-16%, we estimate DMart’s EPS to grow at
c.35% p.a. over the next 5 years.
As discussed in earlier sections, we believe DMart is a key beneficiary of the decadal

growth opportunity in Food & Grocery retailing, which has a mere 3% organised sector
penetration – this provides DMart with an prolonged high-growth phase – we expect its
revenue and profit to be respectively at least 9x and 13x their current size in ten years’
time. In this context, relative valuation multiple based on near-term earnings probably
under-estimate the intrinsic value and growth potential of the business.
 We prefer to use DCF as the methodology for valuation in this case as it better captures
the growth potential through a longer lifecycle as well as the profitability potential
inherent in its efficient business model. Our DCF analysis yields an intrinsic value of INR
1,673 per share on the stock – this value when compared to the 12M forward earnings
yields a ‘fair valuation multiple’ of 46x on EV-EBITDA and 77x on PE basis. Our price
target implies 28% upside from current level which is almost entirely driven by growth in
earnings, which we estimate to be 31% in FY19E and 27% in FY20E. Given high inherent
growth potential, we do not expect any significant de-rating for the stock
notwithstanding the steep headline multiples that the stock is currently trading at.
 As discussed earlier, Titan Company (TTAN IN) has delivered strong return for
shareholders even when bought at relatively steep multiple compared to trading history;
Titan’s valuations have in fact looked rich at most occasions in the past but the stock has
still managed to deliver one of the best returns for investors in recent times. The stock
generated an annual return of 34%, 30% and 33% on 3-year, 5-year and 10-year basis.
Titan’s above-average earnings CAGR of 23.4% over the last 10 years is what contributed
to the stock’s strong performance despite its premium valuation, in our view.
On similar lines, DMart’s strong earnings growth trajectory (we estimate 25% earnings
CAGR over the next decade) would, in our view, enable it to boost shareholder return
even from current level where headline valuations look undoubtedly steep on near-term
earnings.
 Our DCF analysis is based on following assumptions:
a) FCFF CAGR of 28% over the explicit forecast period covering FY18-35E, followed by
9% FCFF CAGR during the fade phase (FY35-45E).
b) Weighted average cost of capital of 11%.
c) Terminal growth rate of 6%, which we believe is reasonable for the business,
considering the growth opportunity that the F&G retailing space presents in India.

Our DCF-based target price works out to INR 1,675 implying 28% upside
FY17 FY18E FY19E FY20E FY21E FY22E FY23E FY24E FY25E FY26E FY27E FY28E FY29E FY30E FY31E FY32E FY33E FY34E FY35E CAGR
Explicit Fo recast FY18-35
EBIT 8,534 12,165 15,785 20,116 25,455 32,250 40,635 51,264 64,874 78,141 93,992 112,712 131,967 154,017 179,212 208,484 234,041 262,712 294,841 20.6%
Tax Rate 35.3% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
NOPAT 5,522 7,911 10,266 13,082 16,555 20,973 26,427 33,339 42,191 50,819 61,128 73,303 85,825 100,165 116,550 135,587 152,208 170,855 191,750 20.6%
Avenue Supermarts Ltd.
Depreciation 1,278 1,519 1,840 2,270 2,758 3,347 4,058 4,917 5,890 6,951 8,125 9,407 10,790 12,263 13,884 15,556 17,273 19,204 21,370
Change in net working capital -2,699 -2,665 -2,801 -3,606 -4,275 -5,402 -6,224 -7,753 -9,482 -9,707 -11,309 -13,086 -13,343 -14,836 -16,722 -18,688 -17,235 -19,272 -21,534
Capex -6,683 -4,514 -8,431 -8,976 -10,644 -12,913 -15,547 -18,815 -19,946 -22,059 -24,077 -25,921 -27,509 -28,664 -32,705 -29,597 -33,216 -37,207 -41,593
Free Cash Flo w -2,582 2,252 874 2,770 4,394 6,005 8,714 11,689 18,652 26,004 33,866 43,702 55,763 68,927 81,007 102,859 119,031 133,579 149,993 28.0%
Discount Factor 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19
Disco unt ed FCFF 2,496 3,566 4,391 5,740 6,937 9,972 12,525 14,695 17,084 19,639 21,869 23,155 26,488 27,614 27,919 28,243
JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited

Fade Perio d FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 FY44 FY45
FCFF 167,631 186,456 206,410 227,408 249,339 272,066 295,427 319,231 343,265 367,294
% gro wt h 11.8% 11.2% 10.7% 10.2% 9.6% 9.1% 8.6% 8.1% 7.5% 7.0%
Discount factor 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07
Disco unt ed FCFF 28,436 28,495 28,418 28,206 27,862 27,389 26,793 26,083 25,267 24,357
Valuat io n
PV of explicit forecast 252,334
PV of Fade period 271,304
PV of terminal value 516,359
Ent erprise Value 1,039,998
Less:
Net Debt -4,356
Minority interest 4
Value fo r equit y shareho lders 1,044,349
No. of shares - mn 624
Target price - I NR/share 1673
Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

2 April 2018
Page 22
Exhibit 28. Global valuation comparison

Companies Currency CMP Mkt Cap CAGR (FY17-20E) PER EV/EBITDA EV/Sales
LC USD mn Sales EBITDA EPS FY19 FY20 FY19 FY20 FY19 FY20
Avenue Supermart INR 1,312 12,562 27.7% 31.6% 40.7% 77.9 61.2 46.2 36.4 4.2 3.3
Future Retail INR 551 4,245 18.5% 35.3% 44.8% 26.1 23.3 23.6 19.3 1.2 1.0
Walmart Inc USD 89 262,523 2.6% 1.2% 6.1% 17.9 16.9 9.1 8.8 0.6 0.6
Tesco Plc GBp 206 28,192 3.5% 15.7% NA 15.4 12.6 6.9 6.2 0.4 0.4
Target Corp USD 69 37,409 1.9% -2.8% 4.6% 13.2 12.8 7.2 7.1 0.7 0.6
Walmart De Mexico Sab De Cv MXN 46 44,437 7.6% 9.6% 4.6% 23.1 21.2 12.7 11.7 1.3 1.2
Sun Art Retail Group HKD 9 11,097 4.3% 7.4% 7.6% 29.3 27.2 9.7 8.6 0.7 0.6
Shoprite Holdings ZAr 25,258 12,633 8.8% 9.6% 11.0% 22.8 20.4 13.6 12.0 1.0 0.9
Costco Wholesale Corp USD 188 82,687 8.0% 9.0% 12.6% 27.5 24.6 13.9 12.8 0.6 0.5
Ramayana Lestari Sentosa IDR 1,350 696 5.5% 8.9% 6.3% 20.3 18.7 11.5 9.7 1.1 1.0
Source: Companies data, Bloomberg, JM Financial

Key risks
 Lower than expected pace of expansion would adversely impact DMart’s reported LFL
growth and its longer-term revenue potential: As explained earlier, one of the key
contributors of DMart’s high LFL growth is that it has a very low proportion of ‘matured’
stores (more than 50% of its stores as on date are less than 5 years old) – note that
revenue growth would be much higher during the initial phase of a store’s ramp-up as
newly opened stores benefit from a natural scale-up in footfalls and throughput to a
more optimum level as they gain popularity with local residents and nearby shoppers over
time. A sharper moderation in pace of expansion cf. our estimates would adversely
impact the reported LFL growth for the company and its potential for revenue generation
over the longer term as well. However, it is interesting to note here that DMart derives
c.60% of its revenues from Maharashtra implying a turnover of USD 1bn which compares
with an estimated market size of USD 94bn – this pegs its market share at a mere 1.2%.
Given this position in Maharashtra itself where DMart has the highest number of stores
within its network, we do not think there should be too many constraints on expansion at
least from a demand perspective.
 Incremental stores generating much lower revenue throughput: One argument could be
that DMart has probably already plucked most of the low-hanging fruits and its newer
stores would now only be in areas where the catchment may not be as attractive
compared to the ones where the company is already present in. This would imply much
lower throughput potential for newer stores, which would adversely impact revenue
growth assumptions for the years ahead and consequently, the company’s profitability,
return-metrics and the stock’s valuation. This argument is not entirely invalid, but unlikely
to be the case for now, though, as penetration opportunity even within existing clusters
with similar catchment appears quite high, in our view.
 Acceleration in pace of expansion without regard to unit-economics: While this definitely
has not been DMart’s stated as well as practiced philosophy, there is a possibility of
DMart being too aggressive on expansion but not pay sufficient attention on store-
economics for generating healthy returns. This could be particularly damaging in the case
of DMart as the company owns its stores, and damages from unviable stores would be
much higher than for retailers who take stores on rent.
 Competitors replicating DMart’s EDLP/EDLC strategy: The key factor behind DMart’s
higher store-throughput is its competitive pricing vs peers’ – lower in several categories
even when compared to online retailers. This model can theoretically be replicated by a
deep-pocketed competitor, which could adversely impact throughput at DMart stores.
We note, though, most competitors are already well-aware about DMart’s operational
model for quite some time now but no one has yet succeeded in replicating the same so
far; note that not all large-format retailers in the country are facing funding constraints.
 E-tailers disrupting the market and gaining significant market share from organised brick
& mortar retailers: The Indian e-tail market size is presently pegged at USD 12bn but
growing at a rapid pace – the market was sub-USD 1bn in 2012. Technopak expects e-
tailing to more than treble over next 4 years to USD 38bn. E-tail penetration has, so far,
been higher in consumer electronics (15-17%) because of high level of product-
standardisation in that segment. The F&G space, on the other hand, had a sub-0.1% e-
tail penetration which could be attributable to challenges in establishing a feasible model
given that F&G retailers operate at very low margin anyway. However, some e-tailers like
Big Basket appear to have overcome some of the initial challenges. Amazon is also in the
fray. Consumer preference for online-purchasing is driven in part by the convenience that
it offers through its door-step delivery service (mostly for free above a certain ticket size);
it is quite possible for e-tailers to gain share in the F&G space if they can offer a value-
proposition in a way that is also profitable for them. Given the high under-penetration of
organised players in F&G retailing, however, we think there is opportunity for growth for
both the formats for now. Importantly, we note that DMart’s pricing in various categories
are more competitive than e-tailers’ (e-commerce players have hitherto mostly used
discounts and promotions as a key customer-acquisition strategy) and, to that extent,
DMart’s value-proposition could continue to remain compelling for middle-class
consumers in the country, we believe.

Annexure I: Indian organised grocery retailing is a multi-

decade growth opportunity
 Size of the retail industry in India pegged at USD616bn in 2016 – this constituted c.29%
of India’s nominal GDP then. Over 2012-16, the industry grew at 12.4% p.a. which is not
too different from the growth in nominal GDP (12.6%), thereby maintaining its share in
the GDP. As per Technopak, the Indian retail industry is expected to grow at 11.7% per
annum over 2016-20 which is a tad lower vs c.13% CAGR forecasted for India’s nominal
GDP growth; consequently, retail industry’s contribution is forecasted to decline to below
28%.
However, the organised retail trade is still highly under-penetrated and constituted just
9% of the total retail industry in 2016, despite organised retail players’ presence in India
for more than two decades now. Challenges in drawing up a profitable business model
due to expensive store rentals as well as lack of adequate quality real estate spaces for
store ramp-up were some of the challenges organised retail players faced in growing their
business. This cohort grew at 19.5% CAGR over 2012-16 with just a marginal increase in
its share in the total retail pie to 9% vs 7% earlier. Technopak expects organised retail to
grow at a rate of c.20% per annum over 2016-20 which would drive organised retail’s
share to 12% level by 2020.
Exhibit 29. Organised brick and mortar retail expected to clock 21-22% CAGR over FY16-20
Source: Avenue Supermarts IPO RHP, JM Financial
 The Indian retail industry is broadly divisible into 7 categories which together constitute
c.97% of total retail trade. Food & Grocery (F&G) accounts for bulk of the retail industry
with 67% share but this segment (F&G) has an even lower organised penetration of mere
3%. The Food & Grocery trade is pegged at USD 413bn overall and notwithstanding its
size, the category is in fact still growing broadly in-line with the overall industry - 12.2%
CAGR over 2012-16 vs 12.4% CAGR for the total industry. Apparels, the second largest
category, has in fact lagged behind with 11.5% CAGR while Consumer Electronics is the
fastest growing category at 15% CAGR with a 5.7% share.

Exhibit 30. F&G retailing constitute 67% of India’s retail trade… Exhibit 31. …but make up for just 23% of organised retail
Indian Retail Industry break-up Indian Organised Retail Industry break-up
Jewellery &
Watches, 23.2%
Apparel & Footwear, 5.3%
Accessories, 8% Pharmacy &
Wellness, 3.3%
Footwear, 1.18%
Food and Grocery,

67% Jewellery & Apparel &
Accessories, 19.9% Consumer
Watches, 7.60% Electronics, 16.1%
Pharmacy &
Wellness, 2.90%
Consumer
Electronics, 5.70%
Home & Living, Food and Grocery, Home & Living,

Others, 3.30%4.30% 22.8% Others, 4.5% 4.9%
Source: Avenue Supermarts IPO RHP, JM Financial Source: Avenue Supermarts IPO RHP, JM Financial
The organised retail sector is, however, more balanced between categories with both
‘Food & Grocery’ and ‘Jewellery & Watches’ almost equal in size with c.23% share each.
Notably, just a mere 3% of the total F&G retail trade happens through organised retailers
while 27% of Jewellery & Watches retailing is organised. Even more well-penetrated is
the organised Footwear category where organised retailers enjoy a 40% share of the
overall segment.
 Within the organised retailing space, F&G is expected to grow faster than other
categories, considering that it is the biggest retailing category and also the most under-
penetrated; organised F&G retailing revenue is estimated to grow 26.5% p.a. followed by
Consumer Electronics at 23.3% p.a. Despite such a rapid pace of growth, the share of
organised F&G trade will just be 5% of overall F&G retailing by 2020 vs 3% as at the end
of 2016.
 One of the key reasons for lower organised penetration in the F&G space was developing
a profitable model as this business has an inherently low gross margin profile. Most of the
players have subsequently taken measures such as re-aligning of category offerings, space
rationalisation and format consolidation to enhance profitability and develop a more
feasible model. Post these improvements, penetration of organised retailing within the
F&G space is expected to be faster in future.
Exhibit 32. F&G retailing is expected to be the fastest growing segment in organised retail
Organised Retail - CAGR 2016-20 - %
30%
26%
25% 23%
22%
20%
17% 17%
16%
15% 14%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Food and Apparel & Footwear Jewellery & Pharmacy Consumer Home & Others
Grocery Accessories Watches & Wellness Electronics Living
Source: Avenue Supermarts IPO Prospectus, JM Financial
 Retailers have adopted different formats to drive organised retail penetration and
compete with the unorganised mom and pop stores. There are broadly four kinds of

formats in F&G retailing – the distinction is largely based on the size of the stores. These
includes:
- Hypermarkets: It is the largest format with average store sizes of 30,000 to 60,000 sq
ft. Bigger retailers like Big Bazaar, Hypercity are present through these formats. The
differentiation here is the large variety of categories and products available for
shoppers to choose from and the shopping experience that the hypermarkets offer.
- Hybrid Supermarkets: Average size of these formats range between 20,000 to 30,000
sq ft. Key retailers in this segment include D'Mart and Q'Mart and the focus is on
competitive pricing.
- Supermarkets: Store size ranges from 3,000 to 6,000 sq ft and key players include
Easy Day, Food Bazaar and Spencer's.
- Modern convenience stores: This is the smallest format with average store sizes of
1,500 to 2,000 sq ft. The focus is on fast moving products and F&G typically
constitute 65-70% of the category assortment in these stores. This is also the easiest
to ramp-up given the lower space requirement per store.
The modern convenience stores format forms the largest share of F&G retailing (53% in
2016) though as per Technopak, supermarkets are expected to be the preferred route for
expansion in future with its share in the organised pie increasing to 43% by 2020 from
40% at the end of 2016.

Annexure II: Business Overview: Best-in-class Food &

Grocery retailer
 Avenue Supermarts Ltd operates the DMart chain of supermarkets and hypermarkets in
India and sells Food & Grocery products. The company launched its first store in Powai,
Mumbai in 2002 and since then, has scaled up its presence to over 140 stores now across
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Telengana,
Chattisgarh, Punjab and Rajasthan. It currently has 141 stores (Dec’17) under operations
which is spread over 4.4mn sq ft of retail space. The company also runs distribution and
packing centres which supply goods to its retail outlets. As at Mar’17, there were 23
distribution centres and 5 packing centres in the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat,
Telangana and Karnataka.
DMart owns most of the stores that it operates – this includes long-term leases with lease
period of more than 30 years. The company focusses on a cluster-based expansion
approach for efficient utilisation of supply-chain resources and targets densely populated
areas with majority of lower-middle, middle and aspiring upper middle-class consumers.
The company’s current expansion strategy is to deepen its store network in Western and
Southern India and gradually expand to other regions pursuant to its cluster-focused
expansion strategy.
Exhibit 33. DMart adopts a cluster-based approach for its stores operations
Source: Company, JM Financial. Note: Store split in the above Exhbit was as at Mar’17.
 Focus is on selling everyday products at competitive prices: The majority of products sold
at DMart stores are everyday-use products that are largely necessities and not
discretionary in nature. The business' endeavour is to facilitate one-stop-shop
convenience for everyday shopping needs along with competitive pricing which is the
credo of its operations. To do this, DMart focuses on minimising its operating costs
through:
- Strong focus on product assortment to minimise inventory build-up
- Ownership or long-term lease arrangements for stores
- Direct procurement of goods from vendors and manufacturers
- Efficient logistics and distribution systems
 In essence, DMart’s business model is premised on offering value to consumers by using

its EDLC (Everyday Low Cost) / EDLP (Everyday Low Price) strategy. The company strives to
lower its procurement and operational costs and use the savings obtained therefrom to
offer attractive pricing to its customers on a daily basis rather than offering special
promotions for certain products or focussed on particular days of the week. This
approach has helped DMart in offering groceries at much lower prices than competitors.
Interestingly, even when compared to E-tailers, who are known for ‘discounting’ their
merchandise to attract customers, DMart’s pricing is still lower across most product-
segments. This attractive price-proposition is the key reason for the higher throughputs
that DMart stores were able to achieve over the past many years, in our view. It is
important to note here, that DMart has still successfully enhanced its operating margin
over the years (8.2% EBITDA margin in FY17 vs 6.2% five years back; GPM of 15.3% vs
14.7%) despite its lower pricing strategy; superior operational efficiencies and better
absorption of fixed costs are what make DMart’s operating model attractive, in our view.
Exhibit 34. DMart stores’ selling prices are mostly lower than those offered by e-tailers
Products Price - INR Dmart - % difference
SKU MRP DMart Big Basket Reliance SMart Amazon vs Big Basket vs Reliance vs Amazon
Detergents
Wheel - Lemon 1Kg 49 45 49 52 NA -8.2% -13.5% NA
Rin Detergent Powder 1Kg 70 65 67 75 NA -3.0% -13.3% NA
Rin Detergent Powder 2Kg 144 130 144 NA 144 -9.7% NA -9.7%
Surf Excel Easywash 1Kg 104 101 101 112 NA 0.0% -9.8% NA
Surf Excel Easywash 1.5Kg 168 138 168 187 147 -17.9% -26.2% -6.1%
Surf Excel Easywash 4Kg 448 380 448 NA 395 -15.2% NA -3.8%
Soaps
Pears 3x125g 164 140 159 174 164 -11.9% -19.5% -14.6%
Dove 75g 48 45 48 48 48 -6.3% -6.3% -6.3%
Dove 3x100g 172 157 137 182 162 14.9% -13.7% -3.1%
Toothpaste
Colgate Dental Cream 100g 46 43 45 NA NA -3.6% NA NA
Colgate Dental Cream 2x200g 168 138 NA 168 151 NA -17.9% -8.6%
Packaged Foods
Maggie Masala Noodles 420g 67 58 63 67 NA -7.9% -13.4% NA
Maggie Masala Noodles 560g 86 76 81 NA 68 -6.2% NA 11.8%
Saffola Masala Oats 400g 145 125 116 145 NA 7.8% -13.8% NA
Saffola Masala Oats Peppy Tomato 400g 145 125 123 145 145 1.4% -13.8% -13.8%
Borges Extra Virgin Olive Oil 1 Litre 1,250 625 899 NA 799 -30.5% NA -21.8%
Sunfeast Dark Fantasy Biscuits 75g 30 26 26 30 25 2.0% -13.3% 4.0%
Britannia Good Day Cashew Biscuits 200g 35 29 28 NA 30 3.6% NA -2.9%
Parle G Biscuits 800g 60 55 58 60 NA -5.5% -8.3% NA
Aashirvaad Multigrain Atta 1 Kg 56 50 56 54 55 -10.7% -7.4% -9.1%
Dairy Products
Amul Taaza 1 Ltr 62 59 62 62 NA -4.8% -4.8% NA
Go Milk 1Ltr 65 50 65 65 NA -23.1% -23.1% NA
Amul Ghee 1 ltr 470 435 459 490 NA -5.2% -11.2% NA
Amul Ghee 500ml 247 232 NA NA 237 NA NA -2.1%
Health Food Drinks

Womens Horlicks Caramel 400g 285 266 285 285 271 -6.7% -6.7% -1.8%
Bournvita Jar 500g 215 202 215 215 202 -6.0% -6.0% 0.0%
Beverages
Pepsi 2.25 Ltr 90 70 90 90 NA -22.2% -22.2% NA
Source: Dmart, Big Basket and Reliance Smart Websites, JM Financial.
Note: Blue shade in the pricing columns represents the cheapest price for that product

 Cluster-based expansion approach drives higher efficiencies: DMart has historically

expanded its store footprint using a cluster-based expansion approach. It has focussed on
strengthening its presence in the existing regions by opening new stores within a radius
of few kilometres of its existing stores and distribution centres. This approach has also
helped the company gain a better understanding of the local needs and preferences – this
helped it customise the product offerings at the stores to eliminate stock-outs as well as
wastages. That apart, a cluster-based expansion strategy also drove efficiencies in costs
due to economies of scale achieved in the supply chain and better inventory
management. Besides, it has made focused marketing and advertising initiatives possible
and aided brand visibility in the clusters where it is present.
DMart’s cluster-based expansion strategy is quite evident from its present geographical
spread – 68% of its stores (as at Mar’17) are located in the states of Maharashtra and
Gujarat. Interesting to note here that 54% of its incremental stores which were launched
over FY12-17 were in these two states. DMart is now steadily extending its presence to
other states like Karnataka, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh and these states are seen to
be the next growth drivers for the company.
Exhibit 35. Maharashtra and Gujarat constitutes 68% of total stores Exhibit 36. Maharashtra accounted for 59% of total revenues
Maharashtra and Gujarat - % of total Stores DMart - Revenue break-up statewise
100%
87% 87%
84%
81%
80% 76% Gujarat
18%
68%
Maharashtra
60% 59%
Karnataka
7%
40% AP+Telengana
14%
20% Others
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 2%
Source: Company, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial. Note: State-wise break-up in chart above based on Apr-Dec’16 revenue.
 Optimal product assortment, strong supplier network and stringent inventory

management have been the other key efficiency drivers: The knowledge gained about
regional preferences through its cluster-focused strategy has helped the business
customise the product assortments at its stores in line with local preferences and demand.
On the supply side, the company’s procurement team conducts ongoing research to
locate the best sources of supplies in relation to products and prices. DMart has, over the
years, established an extensive network of suppliers and endeavours to source products
from regions where they are widely available to minimise procurement costs. The
company make it a point to pay on-time against supplies; this enables it to obtain
prompt-payment discounts from suppliers which the company ploughs back to attract
higher footfalls and throughputs at its stores; and higher sales at stores help DMart
enlarge its order-size on suppliers which in turn enables it to negotiate for quantity
discounts and thereby procure the supplies at lower prices. And the virtuous cycle
continues.
DMart has sophisticated IT systems across its stores and supply chain network to monitor
products availability, stock levels and pricing at each store to minimise product shortage
and out-of-stock situations and pilferages.

Annexure III: Profiles of key management personnel
Exhibit 37. Brief description of key management personnel

- Managing Director & CEO
- Post-graduation degree in Marketing Management.
- Overall 20 years of experience in consumer goods Industry. Prior to joining DMart, he worked with
Ignatius Navil Noronha
Hindustan Unilever for 8 years during which he worked in the fields of market research, sales and
modern trade and at the time of leaving HUL, he was designated as the Key Account Manager - Modern
Trade.
- Director, Business Development
- Holds a graduate degree in Economics.
- Responsible for the real estate acquisition.
Elvin Machado
- Has over 28 years’ experience in sales and marketing. Prior to joining DMart, he worked with Hindustan
Unilever for c.18 years and at the time of leaving HUL, he was designated as the Branch Operations
Manager - East (Rural). He also worked with Mayo Health Care Private Limited.
- Whole-time Director & CFO
- Has 19 years’ experience in finance.
Ramakant Baheti
- A qualified Chartered Accountant.
- Responsible for formulation and execution of finance and legal strategy.
- Chief Operating Officer, Retail.
- Has over 18 years of experience in sales and business development.
Udaya Bhaskar Yarlagadda - Functions include managing store operations, merchandising private labels, marketing and store
maintenance.
- Graduation degree in Mechanical Engineering and PG diploma from IIM, Calcutta.
- Chief Operating Officer, Supply Chain Management
- Over 22 years of experience in Corporate Secretarial functions, Operations and HR management.
Narayanan Bhaskaran
- Managing supply chain and legal functions.
- PG in Human Resource.
- Vice President, Buying and Merchandising.
- Over 15 years of experience in sales and retail store management.
Dheeraj Kampani
- Heads buying and merchandising function.
- Diploma in International Trade and PG in Business Management.
- Associate Vice President, Operations
- Over 21 years of experience in sales, marketing and retail store management.
Hitesh Shah
- Role includes operational management of stores and compliances.
- Holds a graduation degree in Commerce.

Financial Tables (Consolidated)

Pro fit & Lo ss St at ement (I NR mn) Balance Sheet (I NR mn)
Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E
Sales 85,655 118,746 154,493 195,457 247,497 Shareholders' Fund 15,204 38,418 46,420 53,780 63,153
Sales Growth 33.3% 38.6% 30.1% 26.5% 26.6% Share capital 5,615 6,241 6,241 6,241 6,241
Other Operating Income 183 231 301 380 482 Reserves & Surplus 9,589 32,177 40,179 47,540 56,912
To t al Revenue 85,838 118,977 154,794 195,838 247,978 Preference Share Capital
Cost of Goods Sold/Op. Exp. 73,035 100,810 130,849 165,349 209,248 Minority Interest 1 1 2 3 4
Personnel cost 1,490 1,925 2,663 3,414 4,352 Total Loans 11,923 14,973 4,492 3,818 3,245
Other expenses 4,676 6,429 7,597 9,450 11,992 Def. Tax Liab / Assets (-) 399 505 713 985 1,329
EBI TDA 6,636 9,812 13,684 17,625 22,386 To t al - Equit y & Liab 27,527 53,898 51,627 58,586 67,731
EBITDA (%) 7.7% 8.3% 8.9% 9.0% 9.0% Net Fixed Assets 22,734 27,812 30,807 37,398 44,104
EBITDA Growth (%) 44.6% 47.9% 39.5% 28.8% 27.0% Gross Fixed Assets 22,045 28,016 32,530 40,961 49,936
Depn & Amort 984 1,278 1,519 1,840 2,270 Intangible Assets
EBIT 5,652 8,534 12,165 15,785 20,116 Less: Depn. & Amort. 973 2,238 3,757 5,597 7,867
Other Income 179 286 1,123 871 837 Capital WIP 1,662 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034
Finance Cost 913 1,220 803 343 291 Investments 166 18,770 5,674 5,653 5,653
PBT before Excep & Forex 4,918 7,600 12,484 16,313 20,661 Current Assets 8,080 11,606 20,603 22,188 26,084
Excep & forex Inc/Loss(-) 0 0 0 0 0 Inventories 6,717 9,479 12,723 16,096 20,382
PBT 4,918 7,600 12,484 16,313 20,661 Sundry Debtors 84 210 212 268 340
Taxes 1,715 2,683 4,365 5,704 7,224 Cash & Bank Balances 342 329 5,532 3,159 2,035
Extraordinary Inc/Loss(-) 0 0 0 0 0 Loans & Advances 600 1,117 1,548 1,958 2,480
Assoc. Profit/Min. Int.(-) 1 130 117 94 48 Other Current Assets 337 471 589 707 848
Reported Net profit 3,202 4,788 8,002 10,515 13,389 Current Liab. & Prov. 3,453 4,291 5,458 6,653 8,109
Adjust ed Net Pro fit 3,203 4,803 8,002 10,515 13,389 Current Liabilities 3,307 4,119 5,219 6,347 7,726
Net Margin (%) 3.7% 4.0% 5.2% 5.4% 5.4% Provisions & Others 146 172 238 305 383
Diluted share capital (mn) 561.5 624.1 624.1 624.1 624.1 Net Current Assets 4,628 7,315 15,146 15,536 17,975
Dilut ed EPS (Rs) 5.7 7.7 12.8 16.8 21.5 Applicat io n o f Funds 27,527 53,898 51,627 58,586 67,731
Diluted EPS Growth 50.3% 34.9% 66.6% 31.4% 27.3% Source: Company, JM Financial
Total Dividend + Tax 0 0 0 3,155 4,017
Dividend Per Share (Rs) 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 5.3
Note: Pending FY18 Final Accounts, we have not yet incorporated GST related accounting changes in our model. Estimated FY18, FY19, FY20 revenue under GST would be INR149bn, INR187bn and INR236bn
There is no material impact on absolute EBITDA but % margin under GST accounting would be higher at 9.2%, 9.4% and 9.5% respectively
Cash Flo w st at ement (I NR mn) Dupo nt Analysis

Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E
Profit before Tax 4,918 7,600 12,484 16,313 20,661 Net Margin 3.7% 4.0% 5.2% 5.4% 5.4%
Depn. & Amort. 984 1,278 1,519 1,840 2,270 Asset Turnover (x) 3.5 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.9
Net Interest Exp. / Inc. (-) 734 934 -320 -528 -546 Leverage Factor (x) 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1
Inc (-) / Dec in WCap. -685 -2,697 -2,665 -2,801 -3,606 RoE 23.6% 17.9% 18.9% 21.0% 22.9%
Others 25 49 0 0 0 Key Rat io s
Taxes Paid -1,642 -2,586 -4,121 -5,394 -6,837 Y/E March FY16A FY17A FY18E FY19E FY20E
Operat ing Cash Flo w 4,335 4,578 6,898 9,430 11,942 BV/Share (Rs) 27.1 61.6 74.4 86.2 101.2
Capex -6,350 -6,354 -4,514 -8,431 -8,976 ROIC (%) 15.3% 17.8% 21.0% 22.7% 23.7%
Free Cash Flow -2,015 -1,775 2,384 999 2,967 ROE (%) 23.6% 17.9% 18.9% 21.0% 22.9%
-Inc/dec in investments -151 -229 13,096 22 0 Net Debt-equity ratio (x) 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Other current assets 172 -18,259 1,006 778 790 PER 230.0 170.5 102.3 77.9 61.2
I nvest ing Cash Flo w -6,329 -24,842 9,588 -7,632 -8,185 PBV 48.5 21.3 17.6 15.2 13.0
Inc/(dec) in capital 0 18,406 0 0 0 EV/EBITDA 112.7 83.0 59.3 46.2 36.4
Dividend+Tax Thereon 0 0 0 -3,155 -4,017 EV/Net Sales 8.7 6.9 5.3 4.2 3.3
Inc/dec in loans 2,898 3,050 -10,481 -674 -573 Debtor days 0 1 1 1 1
Other assets -934 -1,203 -803 -343 -291 Inventory days 29 29 30 30 30
Financing Cash Flo w 1,964 20,253 -11,284 -4,171 -4,881 Creditor days 15 14 14 13 13
I nc / Dec (-) in Cash -30 -11 5,203 -2,373 -1,124 Source: Company, JM Financial
Opening cash balance 372 340 329 5,532 3,159
Closing cash balance 342 329 5,532 3,159 2,035

APPENDIX I
JM Financial Inst itut ional Secur ities Lim ited

(formerly known as JM Financial Securities Limited)
Corporate Identity Number: U67100MH2017PLC296081
Member of BSE Ltd., National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. and Metropolitan Stock Exchange of India Ltd.
SEBI Registration Nos.: Stock Broker - INZ000163434, Research Analyst – INH000000610
Registered Office: 7th Floor, Cnergy, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025, India.
Board: +9122 6630 3030 | Fax: +91 22 6630 3488 | Email: jmfinancial.research@jmfl.com | www.jmfl.com
Compliance Officer: Mr. Sunny Shah | Tel: +91 22 6630 3383 | Email: sunny.shah@jmfl.com
Definition of ratings
Rating Meaning
Buy Total expected returns of more than 15%. Total expected return includes dividend yields.
Hold Price expected to move in the range of 10% downside to 15% upside from the current market price.
Sell Price expected to move downwards by more than 10%
Research Analyst(s) Certification
The Research Analyst(s), with respect to each issuer and its securities covered by them in this research report, certify that:
All of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect his or her or their personal views about all of the issuers and their securities; and
No part of his or her or their compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research
report.
Important Disclosures
This research report has been prepared by JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited (JM Financial Institutional Securities) to provide information about the
company(ies) and sector(s), if any, covered in the report and may be distributed by it and/or its associates solely for the purpose of information of the select
recipient of this report. This report and/or any part thereof, may not be duplicated in any form and/or reproduced or redistributed without the prior written
consent of JM Financial Institutional Securities. This report has been prepared independent of the companies covered herein.
JM Financial Institutional Securities is registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as a Research Analyst and a Stock Broker having trading
memberships of the BSE Ltd. (BSE), National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) and Metropolitan Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (MSEI). No material disciplinary
action has been taken by SEBI against JM Financial Institutional Securities in the past two financial years which may impact the investment decision making of
the investor.
JM Financial Institutional Securities renders stock broking services primarily to institutional investors and provides the research services to its institutional
clients/investors. JM Financial Institutional Securities and its associates are part of a multi-service, integrated investment banking, investment management,
brokerage and financing group. JM Financial Institutional Securities and/or its associates might have provided or may provide services in respect of managing
offerings of securities, corporate finance, investment banking, mergers & acquisitions, broking, financing or any other advisory services to the company(ies)
covered herein. JM Financial Institutional Securities and/or its associates might have received during the past twelve months or may receive compensation from
the company(ies) mentioned in this report for rendering any of the above services.
JM Financial Institutional Securities and/or its associates, their directors and employees may; (a) from time to time, have a long or short position in, and buy or
sell the securities of the company(ies) mentioned herein or (b) be engaged in any other transaction involving such securities and earn brokerage or other
compensation or act as a market maker in the financial instruments of the company(ies) covered under this report or (c) act as an advisor or lender/borrower to,
or may have any financial interest in, such company(ies) or (d) considering the nature of business/activities that JM Financial Institutional Securities is engaged
in, it may have potential conflict of interest at the time of publication of this report on the subject company(ies).
Neither JM Financial Institutional Securities nor its associates or the Research Analyst(s) named in this report or his/her relatives individually own one per cent or
more securities of the company(ies) covered under this report, at the relevant date as specified in the SEBI (Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014.
The Research Analyst(s) principally responsible for the preparation of this research report and members of their household are prohibited from buying or selling
debt or equity securities, including but not limited to any option, right, warrant, future, long or short position issued by company(ies) covered under this report.
The Research Analyst(s) principally responsible for the preparation of this research report or their relatives (as defined under SEBI (Research Analysts)
Regulations, 2014); (a) do not have any financial interest in the company(ies) covered under this report or (b) did not receive any compensation from the
company(ies) covered under this report, or from any third party, in connection with this report or (c) do not have any other material conflict of interest at the
time of publication of this report. Research Analyst(s) are not serving as an officer, director or employee of the company(ies) covered under this report.
While reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of this report, it does not purport to be a complete description of the securities, markets or
developments referred to herein, and JM Financial Institutional Securities does not warrant its accuracy or completeness. JM Financial Institutional Securities
may not be in any way responsible for any loss or damage that may arise to any person from any inadvertent error in the information contained in this report.
This report is provided for information only and is not an investment advice and must not alone be taken as the basis for an investment decision.

The investment discussed or views expressed or recommendations/opinions given herein may not be suitable for all investors. The user assumes the entire risk
of any use made of this information. The information contained herein may be changed without notice and JM Financial Institutional Securities reserves the
right to make modifications and alterations to this statement as they may deem fit from time to time.
This report is neither an offer nor solicitation of an offer to buy and/or sell any securities mentioned herein and/or not an official confirmation of any
transaction.
This report is not directed or intended for distribution to, or use by any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country
or other jurisdiction, where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law, regulation or which would subject JM Financial
Institutional Securities and/or its affiliated company(ies) to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. The securities described herein may
or may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to a certain category of investors. Persons in whose possession this report may come, are required to inform
themselves of and to observe such restrictions.
Persons who receive this report from JM Financial Singapore Pte Ltd may contact Mr. Ruchir Jhunjhunwala (ruchir.jhunjhunwala@jmfl.com) on +65 6422 1888
in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, this report.
Additional disclosure only for U.S. persons: JM Financial Institutional Securities has entered into an agreement with JM Financial Securities, Inc. ("JM Financial
Securities"), a U.S. registered broker-dealer and member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") in order to conduct certain business in the
United States in reliance on the exemption from U.S. broker-dealer registration provided by Rule 15a-6, promulgated under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), as amended, and as interpreted by the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") (together "Rule 15a-6").
This research report is distributed in the United States by JM Financial Securities in compliance with Rule 15a-6, and as a "third party research report" for
purposes of FINRA Rule 2241. In compliance with Rule 15a-6(a)(3) this research report is distributed only to "major U.S. institutional investors" as defined in
Rule 15a-6 and is not intended for use by any person or entity that is not a major U.S. institutional investor. If you have received a copy of this research report
and are not a major U.S. institutional investor, you are instructed not to read, rely on, or reproduce the contents hereof, and to destroy this research or return it
to JM Financial Institutional Securities or to JM Financial Securities.
This research report is a product of JM Financial Institutional Securities, which is the employer of the research analyst(s) solely responsible for its content. The
research analyst(s) preparing this research report is/are resident outside the United States and are not associated persons or employees of any U.S. registered
broker-dealer. Therefore, the analyst(s) are not subject to supervision by a U.S. broker-dealer, or otherwise required to satisfy the regulatory licensing
requirements of FINRA and may not be subject to the Rule 2241 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading
securities held by a research analyst account.
JM Financial Institutional Securities only accepts orders from major U.S. institutional investors. Pursuant to its agreement with JM Financial Institutional
Securities, JM Financial Securities effects the transactions for major U.S. institutional investors. Major U.S. institutional investors may place orders with JM
Financial Institutional Securities directly, or through JM Financial Securities, in the securities discussed in this research report.
Additional disclosure only for U.K. persons: Neither JM Financial Institutional Securities nor any of its affiliates is authorised in the United Kingdom (U.K.) by the
Financial Conduct Authority. As a result, this report is for distribution only to persons who (i) have professional experience in matters relating to investments
falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the "Financial Promotion Order"), (ii)
are persons falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) ("high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.") of the Financial Promotion Order, (iii) are
outside the United Kingdom, or (iv) are persons to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of section 21 of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) in connection with the matters to which this report relates may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be
communicated (all such persons together being referred to as "relevant persons"). This report is directed only at relevant persons and must not be acted on or
relied on by persons who are not relevant persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this report relates is available only to relevant persons and
will be engaged in only with relevant persons.
Additional disclosure only for Canadian persons: This report is not, and under no circumstances is to be construed as, an advertisement or a public offering of
the securities described herein in Canada or any province or territory thereof. Under no circumstances is this report to be construed as an offer to sell securities
or as a solicitation of an offer to buy securities in any jurisdiction of Canada. Any offer or sale of the securities described herein in Canada will be made only
under an exemption from the requirements to file a prospectus with the relevant Canadian securities regulators and only by a dealer properly registered under
applicable securities laws or, alternatively, pursuant to an exemption from the registration requirement in the relevant province or territory of Canada in which
such offer or sale is made. This report is not, and under no circumstances is it to be construed as, a prospectus or an offering memorandum. No securities
commission or similar regulatory authority in Canada has reviewed or in any way passed upon these materials, the information contained herein or the merits
of the securities described herein and any representation to the contrary is an offence. If you are located in Canada, this report has been made available to you
based on your representation that you are an “accredited investor” as such term is defined in National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus Exemptions and a
“permitted client” as such term is defined in National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations. Under
no circumstances is the information contained herein to be construed as investment advice in any province or territory of Canada nor should it be construed as
being tailored to the needs of the recipient. Canadian recipients are advised that JM Financial Securities, Inc., JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited, their
affiliates and authorized agents are not responsible for, nor do they accept, any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of
this research report or the information contained herein.

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2 April 2018

INDIA | CONSUMER | INITIATING COVERAGE

Key investment thesis 3

Indian organised retail is a multi-decade growth opportunity. DMart

Three reasons to read this report:

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 2

INDIA | CONSUMER | INITIATING COVERAGE

AVENUE SUPERMARTS LIMITED (DMART IN)

Recommendation and Price Target Financial Summary (INR mn)

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 3

35% 25% 10%

Source: Company, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial

88 Even if investors bought Valuation cushion

Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 4

DMart’s impressive unit-economics make a compelling

DMart Future Retail Hypercity DMart Future Retail Hypercity

Source: Companies data, JM Financial

Analysis of store-economics of a representative DMart outlet

Per sq ft Per Store

Staff Costs 365 11

Estimated Store-level EBITDA 3,254 101

Capex: INR per sq ft INR per store

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 6

Our single-store economics model is based on the following assumptions:

- Average store size of 31,000 sq ft.

- A steady scaling-up of revenue at the store (described in detail below).

 The company’s management had alluded that, on an average, a representative DMart

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 7

DMart’s LFL growth can possibly sustain in high-teens range

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 8

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 9

Rental vs store-ownership model: DMart’s ROIC under the

Revenue 46,865 64,394 85,838 118,977 46,865 64,394 85,838 118,977

Staff 873 1,341 1,490 1,925 873 1,341 1,490 1,925

EBITDA 3,418 4,590 6,636 9,812 2,066 2,859 4,390 6,930

Tax 835 1,109 1,715 2,683 643 893 1,413 2,326

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 10

Invsted Capital as reported 15,582 20,944 27,109 34,886

Post-tax EBIT as reported 1,877 2,480 3,681 5,522

ROI C as repo rt ed 14% 15% 18%

Source: Company, JM Financial

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 11

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 12

How long is the runway for new store opening?

Dmart's average value per bill - INR 1,101

Dmart's FY17 Revenue (incl consignment sales) - INR mn 119,503

Average no. of Dmart stores in operation through FY17 121

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 13

The big valuation debate: Is there money to be made at 78x

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 14

Source: Company, Bloomberg, JM Financial

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 15

Summary of Key Financials

Source: Company, JM Financial Source: Company, JM Financial

We are building in a moderation in pace of retail expansion over FY17-20E of 14.9% vs

JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited Page 16

General Merchandise & Apparel Non-Foods (FMCG) Foods