Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62680 November 9, 1988

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner,

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Sixto P. Demaisip for respondent Romerico Chavez.

CRUZ, J.:

It is the policy of the State to encourage and promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with
the social justice Ideal enshrined in the Constitution. At the same time, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such
resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony.

This policy is involved in the case at bar, which deals with the confirmation of an imperfect title over
a tract of land allegedly owned by the private respondent. The land is situated in Barrio San Miguel,
Municipality of Jordan, Sub-province of Guimaras, in the Province of Iloilo, and consists of 181.4776
hectares. 1 On December 29, 1976, Romerico Chavez filed an application for its registration 2 with the
Court of Fast Instance of Iloilo. 3 Only the Director of Lands opposed. After hearing, with the
applicant as the lone witness, the application was granted. 4 The petitioner then appealed to the
Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed the decision but reduced the area of the grant to 144 hectares as
the maximum allowable. 6 Disagreeing, the petitioner has come to this Court in this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Republic of the Philippines contends that: 1) the subject land was not sufficiently Identified with
indubitable evidence; and 2) the nature and length of possession required by law had not been
adequately established.

On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, 7 where it was
held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the
Director of Lands" was "a statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the Identification of the
land sought to be registered. As what was submitted in the case at bar to Identify the subject
property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent
court should have rejected the same as insufficient.

We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it observed that in that
case the applicant in effect "had not submitted anything at all to Identify the subject property"
because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast—

In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement of the
law as the subject property was sufficiently Identified with the presentation of
blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No.
 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this connection that the Bureau of
Lands has certified to the correctness of the blueprint copy of the plan including the
technical description that go with it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the
Reyes case, that applicant has provided ample evidence to establish the Identity of
the subject property. 8

Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 9 where we held that while the best evidence to Identify a piece of land for registration
purposes was the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other
evidence could also provide sufficient Identification. This rule was bolstered only recently in the case
of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 10 where the Court declared through Chief Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan:

We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that
Exhibit "O", the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the
purpose of Identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was found by the appellate
court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of
the Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified and approved by the Bureau
of Lands on April 25, 1974 pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing
from the Land Registration Commission the authority to approve original survey
plans. It contained the following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality
(Amadeo) and province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379
square meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions signed
by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In fine,
Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information necessary for a proper and
definite Identification of the land sought to be registered, thereby serving the purpose
for which the original tracing cloth plan is required. The fact therefore that the original
survey plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract
from the probative value thereof. ....

The second ground will require a review of the findings of fact of the trial court which, significantly,
were not questioned in the Court of Appeals. The private respondent has raised the objection that
such findings are as a rule not reviewable on appeal and more so, we might add, if as in the case at
bar they were not disputed at all by the appellant.

Considering, that we deal here with the alienation of public land, which must be permitted only after
the most careful examination of the applicant's claim, the Court dispenses with the general rules
above-cited. As an exception thereto, it will address itself to the evidence of the alleged possession
of the subject property, reiterating that:

This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the
case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate
court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986). This
case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this
Court. 11

and—
 ... in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering
such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned
as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. 12

Testifying for himself, the private respondent declared that the land in dispute used to form part of a
huge tract of land covered by Plan Psu-13870 and owned by Miguel Chavez, who was his great-
grandfather. It was inherited and held for 23 years by his grandfather, Hugo Chavez, who in 1941
passed it on to his father, Jose Chavez, from whom he and his two brothers and a sister acquired it
by virtue of a "Deed of Definite Sale" on May 27, 1961. Thereafter, on September 24, 1975, he and
the other vendees executed a "Subdivision Agreement" under which Lot 2755, the property now
sought to be registered in his name, was assigned to him. 13

The private respondent further testified that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open possession of the land "since time immemorial" (being one
of the multitude who favor this cliche). He added that he had been paying taxes on the property and
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had planted coconut and mango trees thereon although they were not yet fruit-bearing. He had no
co-owners and there were no tenants on the land, which was also free of any lien or encumbrance. 14

The Court feels that the evidence presented on this requirement is not sufficient.

The private respondent can trace his own possession of the land only to 1961, when he claims he
(along with his brothers and sister) purchased the same from their father. Assuming the purchase to
be true, he would have possessed the property only for 15 years at the time he applied for its
registration in 1976. However, he would tack it to that of his predecessors' possession, but there is
not enough evidence of this except his own unsupported declarations. The applicant must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.

The private respondent showed that he had been paying taxes on the land only from 1972 and up to
1977. There was no showing of tax payments made on the same land before 1972 by his
predecessors-in-interest although they are supposed to have been in possession thereof "since time
immemorial.

Although he declared in 1977 that he had planted one thousand mango and five thousand coconut
trees on the land, he added that they were not yet productive. It takes only ten years for mango trees
and five years for coconut trees to begin bearing fruit, which can only mean that they had been
planted in less than these numbers of years, or not earlier than 1967. This weakens his claim of
possession which under P.D. Nos. 1073 and 1529, amending Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
must commence not later than June 12, 1945.

Furthermore, if it is true that his predecessors-in-interest were in possession "since time

Finally, even assuming that he had really planted those trees, such an act will hardly suffice to prove
possession as this would constitute what this Court has called "a mere casual cultivation" in a parcel
of land of this vast area. As Justice Pacifico de Castro put it in Republic of the Philippines v. Vera: 15
 ... It is to be noted that in the instant case evidence for the respondents tend to show
that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation
of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the state.

It is worth noting that when the private respondent testified at the only two hearings on December 8,
1977, and on February 17, 1978, the counsel for the petitioner was not present. 16 While his absence
did not vitiate the proceedings, they nevertheless became in effect ex parte and left the government
without any representative to protect its interests. It is possible that if its counsel had been present,
the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted by the applicant would have been more
carefully examined.

In any event, the Court finds that although the subject property was sufficiently Identified with the
blueprint copy of the survey plan, the applicant has failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive,
continuous, and open possession necessary to support his claim of ownership. For this reason, the
registration sought should have been, as it is now, denied.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 1982 is REVERSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.