Montecillo vs Del Mar (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for

contending parties;
60 SCRA 234 – Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Duty to the Courts – (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
Contemptuous Language documentary evidence;

Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment
Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he of rental fees; and
successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower
court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the illegitimate children.
adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the
where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled recommendation.
threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective
decision” and “judgment has been rendered through memoranda and the case was deemed submitted for
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. resolution.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar
from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating
second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
punished for contempt. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but
letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one
asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the year.
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil
case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15
court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
of a compromise agreementwhere del Mar agreed to pay
damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Held: This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of
Del Mar from practice. Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC recommended penalty.
to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the
Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire (a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.
of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez,
Court as to who were the judges who voted against him. also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia,
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar Compliance before the RTC. The Presiding Judge warned
in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being
stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-
in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have MK.
continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
allegedly committing injustice”. conflicting interests except by written consent of all
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the
same. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended. conflicts with that of his present or former client.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties
violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court, any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client
the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that administration of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of
they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely. fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.
Rochelle P. Lacsina 3-B Clarita J. Samala vs. Atty. Luciano
D. Valencia (b) On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence.
A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed
Facts: Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite
Disbarment on the following grounds: the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the
name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

1
During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent
avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency
was the time that he came to know that the title was already that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as
complaint, he did not do anything anymore. that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the respectable members of the community.
truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for
rescission was filed in 2002. Respondent failed to comply ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21,
which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

It matters not that the trial court was not misled by

respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002
dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent,
this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is
was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
already issued in the name of Alba. signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and
two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the
(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a
nonpayment of rental fees. copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such,
the contested will was executed and acknowledged before
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
cases: Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was
never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the
(i) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; Records Management and Archives Office of the National
(ii) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on
(iii) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given
v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public
the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the with due care and with due regards to the provision of
two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she existing law and had complied with elementary formalities
filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was
and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal
respondent) for trespass to dwelling. As culled from the case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.
records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court
occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was
pursuant to their retainer agreement. affirmed with modification against the respondent and in
favor of the complainant.
The Court finds the charge to be without sufficient basis.
The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in
the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for
on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative notarizing a spurious last will and testament?
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was
being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule
protecting the interest of his client and his own right would 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806
be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus,
to defend and prosecute the right of his client. Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one
year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition,
(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected
illegitimate children. of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is
perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary
The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by Public.
siring illegitimate children. During the hearing, respondent
admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still In re: Gutierrez
alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first
wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after Legal Ethics – 5 SCRA 661 – Conditional Pardon will not bar
his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. disbarment

Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one
one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the
However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a penalty of reclusionperpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion
relationship and does not consider the latter as his second of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by
family. He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay the President. He was released on the condition that he shall
because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco
in Marikina. filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the
latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

2
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private
considering the fact that he was granted pardon. respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made
reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco,
pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were
been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his not acted upon. Petitioner then filed an action with the
official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, for
time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree ofmoral illegal dismissal against private respondent.
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession. NLRC dismissed the case and the subsequent MR filed by the
petitioner was denied. The SolGen opined that the
petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
Case Digest on Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133) Gross Misconduct reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work
during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
possession of the property in litigation using abusive without notice and hearing.
methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The
illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA ISSUE (relevant to the subject PALE): Was the conduct of the
& while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force. lawyers in this case in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Held: Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property
without the consent of its occupants & in contravention of Ruling: The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties,
the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and
utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are invites reproof. Both counsels may well be reminded that
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
they “peacefully” took over the property, such “peaceful” zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous
prohibited from counseling or abetting “activities aimed at ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation
system.” but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic
forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life.
He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, conduct of litigation. Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
and JON DE YSASI, respondents. Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if
This case is truly unique. For this case is an action filed by an it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of
the only heir against his own father. them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
The records do not show that they took pains to initiate
Two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even
each other, were personal matters affecting father and son as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain their respective clients. In the same manner, we find that the
to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
in the way. than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards
Facts: Petitioner Jon de Ysasi III was employed by his father the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
Jon de Ysasi and private respondent in this case, as farm jurisdiction." Note: Petitioner was illegally dismissed.
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Dispositive portion: Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. His employment as farm petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3)
administrator was on a fixed salary, and his duties include years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of
supervision of daily activities and operations of the reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, etc. for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.
He lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work
daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on
two separate occasions in June and August, 1982.

In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the

surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.

In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and,

thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.

3
PAJARES VS. ABAD SANTOS permits a party “to move for a definite statement or for a bill
30 SCRA 748 of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him to
FACTS: prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.”
1. Udharam Bazar & Co., sued Gloria Pajares before the
Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of
money. (Php 354.85) MANUEL C. YUHICO, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ A.C.
No. 8391 November 23, 2010
2. The complaint averred that defendant ordered from the
FACTS: Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of
plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her
P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico. Gutierrez then claimed that
in good condition and same were already sold, but did not
he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his
make the full payment up to the present time.
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed
3. Instead of answering the complaint, Gloria moved for a bill the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very
of particulars praying that Udharam Bazar itemize the kinds soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees
of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said from a Japanese client. Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a
company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the
they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized.
that without this bill she would not be able to meet the Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting
issues raised in the complaint. to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two
loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico
4. The court , through Judge Estrella Abad Santos, denied the asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and
motion for a bill of particulars. in a text message he asked for an extension of time to pay.
Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow
5. When her motion for reconsideration was denied, Gloria money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his
filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Manila alleging that daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take
respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board.
denying her motion for a bill of particulars Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts within a
month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez
6. Udharam Bazar filed a motion to dismiss the petition for any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez
the reasons that the allegations of the complaint are clear, the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text
specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant of the nature message to Yuhico and requested him to give him another
of the case of action against her and that the things asked for week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his
which are beyond the pale of such bill. debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant
complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
7. The lower court dismissed the petition also a motion for Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). On
reconsideration January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit
his Answer on the complaint against him. In a Resolution,
8. Hence this appeal.
IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to
ISSUE:
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
Are the allegations of the complaint sufficient to appraise
Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of
her? just debts and likewise guilty of gross misconduct.

HELD: RULING: Atty. Gutierrez is guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT. He

It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave is ordered to pay the amount of P90,000.00 to the Yuhico
abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in with interest.
denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
private respondent- appellee for the recovery of her misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
indebtedness of P 354.85 representing the overdue balance suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
facts constituting the cause of action against her, in honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people¶s faith
accordance with the requirement of the Rules of Court. and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must,
at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
“submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of
goods represented by the alleged amount of P 354.85, giving the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no question as to
to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and
by whom they were received.|” These particulars sought all his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation.
concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his
scope of Rule 12, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have

4
contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to commissions. And, allegedly, per complainant’s instructions,
pay. he remitted the remaining balance of P281,900.00 to a
certain Belen Johnnes.[4]
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of
employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that
the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of
obtaining debts without the intention of paying them.
squatters on the property.
Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making
promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in
deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to
promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving the spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the price
excuses without actually making good of his promises, is of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to the
transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with these
clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate
facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in
lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muñoz sent a demand
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to
the court. Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from
the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the
of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never
tendered or offered to tender the same to complainant.
foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the
Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has
IBP, it cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar since not remitted the amount equivalent to P838,100.00
Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had (P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for
already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP the second).[5]
pointed out, the court does not have double or multiple
disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have
a law mandating a minimum 5year requirement for Complainant also averred that the Special Power of
Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's
to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the
infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot signature therein were not the real signatures of
disbar him anew. complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not have
acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were
not in the Philippines at the time.[6]

Nelia Pasumbal de Chavez-Blanco vs Atty. Jaime For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the
Lumasag, Jr, accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.[7]

RESOLUTION Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the

true owner of the properties, which had to be titled in
TINGA, J.: complainant’s name, as Mario Blanco was a U.S. citizen.
Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of the
properties and, in the course of selling them, respondent
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed claimed that he had only transacted with the former and
by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco never with complainant. Respondent averred that he had
against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, been authorized in November 1989 to sell the property,
dishonesty and gross misconduct. through a Special Power of Attorney, for a price of not less
thanP250,000.00 net for the owner.[8]
In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December
2001,[1] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute
Commissioner Milagros San Juan found respondent guilty of sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March
the charges and recommended the penalty of disbarment. 1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the amount
Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario
penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV- Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld, pending
2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9 the relocation of the squatters who had been occupying the
December 2002, the Court, however, remanded the case to premises. And when respondent had finally collected the
the IBP in view of its findings that no formal proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years after,
hearing/investigation was conducted. he asked Mario Blanco if the former could use the amount
for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful, he would
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to share with the latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think
IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were twice and consented to the proposal. The venture, however,
accordingly held thereafter. did not push through.[9]

Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muñoz, Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2)
complainant alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.[10]
resident of theUnited States of America together with her
husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned two Finally, respondent denied the charge of
(2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an area falsification. He claimed that complainant and her spouse,
of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the Special Power of
Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her Attorney, but it was only notarized later.[11]
name. In a document dated 20 November 1989, she
authorized respondent, who were her husband’s first cousin, In his Report and Recommendation dated 4
to sell said lots.[3] December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the
following findings:
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported
that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00 It appears from the records that
and therefrom he deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and the two lots were sold by Respondent

5
for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00 as absence in the country on that date. Other
alleged by Complainant. The basis is the acceptable documents such as a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11, certification from the Bureau of
1990 which shows that the two lots Immigration would have been
composing 800 sq. meters being sold appropriate but which, however, had not
forP560,000.00. There appears to be no been presented. In any case, Respondent
documentary basis for the claimed denies the charge of
amount of P1,120,000.00 of Complainant. falsification.[12] (Citations omitted)
However, Respondent in his Comment [Emphasis supplied]
stated that the two lots were sold by him
for P563,960.00. In any case, we shall
uphold and apply the amount stated in Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended
the Deed of Absolute Sale. that, in view of the fact that respondent was already 72 years
old, he be meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)-
In Respondent’s letter year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed for and
dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier resolved by the
that he already received P320,000.00 as IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner
the “total value of one lot”. Moreover, the recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to
computation shows that the P320,000.00 Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal
was only for 400 sq.m. as the interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.
computation stated: “400 sq.m.
x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00.” Therefore, if On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
the first lot was sold for P320,000.00, passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and
then the second lot must have been sold approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
for P240,000 x x x Commissioner.[13]

x x x there was clear The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion
deception on the part of of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is
Respondent when he wrote the letter called for, following the dictum that the appropriate penalty
dated March 20, 1990 “informing” the for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
Blanco spouses that he had sold only judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[14]
one of the two parcels of land
for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
he wrote the letter, a Deed of Absolute continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of
Sale was executed by him selling the two Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold
lots for P560,000.00. This Deed of at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
1990. During the hearing, Respondent
admitted that the Deed of Sale covered Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not
two lots. Clearly, Respondent was not engage in unlawful, dishonest and
forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses. immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to

arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed
x x x Instead of representing dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the
that two lots had been sold complainant and her spouse.
for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot Records show that two lots had been sold by
forP320,000.00 and pocketing the respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11
balance of P240,000.00. March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the
absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines
xxx and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in
a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can
During the course of hearing, be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the
Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted
referred to above is a fake, and that there to complainant and her spouse. Respondent’s contention,
is a Deed of Sale showing a selling price though, that he had been authorized to retain the proceeds of
of P320,000.00 which is the real Deed of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could
Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has not have given the same, having been left in the dark as
been presented by Respondent and no regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to date, there
such Deed of Sale appears in the records. is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid.
Later in the hearing, Respondent Thus, respondent’s deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary
retracted his statement claiming he was sanction and a directive for the remittance of the remaining
merely confused. proceeds is in order.

As for the alleged falsification of As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees
a Special Power of Attorney dated with the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated.
January 16, 1989, wherein the signatures Settled is the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the
of the Blanco spouses appear in the SPA burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
when they were not in the Philippines on complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
the United States, their absence in the cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the
country has not been satisfactorily facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under
established since mere xerox copies of no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[15] Mere
their passports, although noted by a allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[16]
notary public, cannot duly establish their

6
 Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for
which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or

suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.— A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to so do.

Complainant asks that respondent be

disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The
supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers,
where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be
too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes
that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension,
by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a
means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is
ordered to deliver to complainant the amount
of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum
computed from March 1990.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in

respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and notice
thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.