Bruckner's Symphonies and Sonata Deformation Theory
Bruckner's Symphonies and Sonata Deformation Theory
Bruckner's Symphonies and Sonata Deformation Theory
Bruckner’s Symphonies
and Sonata Deformation Theory
JULIAN HORTON
Introduction
Recent investigation of the sonata‐type repertoire of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries has increasingly emphasized the concept of deformation as a defining
characteristic. The widespread structural experimentation in this period, ranging from
expansion or truncation to double‐function forms and the merging of movements, has
prompted an attempt to classify practice as a system of deviant or non‐normative
formal procedures.
The seminal impetus for this approach has come from James Hepokoski.1 His basic
conviction is that attitudes towards sonata forms after Beethoven become increasingly
driven by the distortion of classical precedents, mediated by the emergence of a body
of theory, which standardized a set of ‘reified defaults’, and therefore enabled an
expanding range of formal deviations.2 As Hepokoski puts it:
By the last third of the nineteenth century there had arisen a whole arsenal of what I have
termed deformations of the Formenlehre (standard‐textbook) structures… These structures cannot
1
See for example James Hepokoski, ‘Fiery Pulsed Libertine or Domestic Hero? Strauss’ Don Juan
Revisited’, in Richard Strauss: New Perspectives on the Composer and His Work, ed. Bryan Gilliam
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 135–75 and Sibelius: Symphony No. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 5–9 and 19–30. Hepokoski has also traced the relationship of norm and
deformation back into the classical style, in this case abandoning the orientation around the
Formenlehre model in favour of a theory of norms derived from practice itself: see ‘Back and Forth
from Egmont: Beethoven, Mozart and the Nonresolving Recapitulation’, Nineteenth‐Century Music 25
(2002), 127–154; ‘Beyond the Sonata Principle’, Journal of the American Musicological Society 55 (2002),
91–154; and, with Warren Darcy, ‘The Medial Caesura and Its Role in the Eighteenth‐Century Sonata
Exposition’, Music Theory Spectrum 19 (1997), 115–54. A full‐length study of the issue, in collaboration
with Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types and Deformations in the Late‐Eighteenth‐Century
Sonata, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
2 See Hepokoski, ‘Fiery Pulsed Libertine’, 143.
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Julian Horton
be said to ‘be’ sonatas in any strict sense… Still, as part of the perceptual framework within
which they ask to be understood, they do depend on the listener’s prior knowledge of the
Formenlehre ‘sonata’.3
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Bruckner’s Symphonies and Sonata Deformation Theory
the demands of resolution imposed by this paradigm. Jackson, alternatively, places
Hepokoski’s categories in a Schenkerian context, and associates certain types of de‐
formation, particularly the reversal of recapitulatory order, with Aristotelian rhetorical
figures of tragedy.10
Although many of the practices observed by these commentators are undoubtedly
present in the music they analyse, it is less clear whether it is reasonable to
characterize them as deformations. Indeed, the concept of deformation courts a series
of problems that have yet to receive close attention. The aim of this paper is to obviate
and scrutinize these matters, and to recommend an alternative approach via a case
study of Bruckner’s symphonic first movements.11
Critique
Perhaps the most immediate difficulty with the concept of deformation concerns the
relationship of norm and exception. Deformation is only meaningful insomuch as we
recognize a standard, either in theory or practice, against which it is measured. As a
theoretical construct, this is considered to be the Formenlehre model of sonata form
established by A. B. Marx and others. As a component of praxis, this is manifest in a
supposed body of music, in which the normative pattern is realized. These two
components—a normative model and a normative repertoire—must be in place for the
idea of deformation to have theoretical or empirical credibility. If either or both of
these elements can be regarded as suspect, then the concept of deformation itself
becomes dubious.
In fact, there are grounds for viewing the normativity of both the Formenlehre
model and its resultant repertoire with suspicion. In the first place, it is inadequate to
condense nineteenth‐century theory into a single aggregate definition: the models of
sonata form proposed by Marx, Czerny, Reicha and others are not reducible to one
general formula. Reicha, as is well known, did not describe sonata form at all, but ‘la
10
The relationship between reversal and the Aristotelian rhetoric of tragedy is considered in Jackson,
140–9. Jackson considers works by Bruckner, Brahms, Schubert, Haydn, Cherubini, Beethoven, Liszt,
Berlioz, Mahler, Sibelius and Schoenberg in this context.
11 The following critique draws on material taken from Julian Horton, Brucknerʹs Symphonies: Analysis,
Reception and Cultural Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 152–60, as well as
work done in collaboration with Paul Wingfield on sonata procedures in the music of Schumann,
presented in ‘Norm and Deformation in Nineteenth‐Century Sonata Forms’ at the 11th Biennial
Conference on Nineteenth‐Century Music (Royal Holloway, University of London, June 2000), and
of Mendelssohn, to be presented in ‘Norm and Deformation in Mendelssohn’s Sonata Forms’ at a
conference on Mendelssohn in the Long Nineteenth Century (Trinity College, Dublin, July 2005).
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Julian Horton
grande coupe binaire’ or the large binary arch.12 Marx departed from Reicha both in
naming sonata form and in understanding it as a three‐part rather than a two‐part
structure, but shared with him a notion of form as the product of a work’s content,
which Czerny’s model, although in agreement with Marx’s tripartite reading,
conspicuously lacked.13 As Scott Burnham observes, Marx developed the relationship
of content and form into a dialectical theory that recent commentators have largely
ignored.14 For Marx, form was the large‐scale expression of the dialectic of rest and
motion (Ruhe and Bewegung) incipient in the musical material, embodied in the phrase
forms of the Satz and Gang respectively. The idea that Marx sought to standardize
sonata form as an architectural pattern is thus itself a theoretical misconception. In his
view, all forms are in a sense ‘content based’.15
Even if we accept a generalized Formenlehre model, we nevertheless encounter the
question of whether it is really acceptable to assert that all composers in whose work
deformations are apparent engaged in the conscious distortion of an agreed theoretical
norm. At best, this contention demands a hunt for the theoretical texts that
conditioned each composer’s concept of sonata form before it can be verified, in which
circumstances the aggregate model again comes apart, since it is plainly not the case
that a single didactic text, or an aggregation of the available models, was employed in
the same way in all countries and at all times. In late nineteenth‐ and early twentieth‐
century Russia, for instance, Marx’s Formenlehre gained widespread acceptance, and a
link between this definition and patterns of distortion in the Russian symphony could
be tentatively made. Bruckner, on the other hand, drew principally on Ernst Friedrich
Richter’s Die Grundzüge der musikalischen Formen und ihre Analyse during his lessons
with Otto Kitzler.16 Richter agreed with Marx in understanding sonata form as arising
12
See Anton Reicha, Traité de haute composition musicale, vol. 2 (Paris: Zetter, 1826), 300.
13
Adolf Bernhard Marx, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel,
1845) and see also selected writings in the same author’s Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven, trans.
and ed. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
14
See Scott Burnham, ‘The Role of Sonata Form in A. B. Marx’s Theory of Form’, Journal of Music Theory
33 (1989), 247–72. Czerny’s definition of sonata form appears in School of Practical Composition, vol. 1
(London, 1848), especially as tabulated on p. 33.
15 Marx was keenly aware of this issue: ‘In general: how can one speak of form in art as something that
exists for itself; how can form and content be separated, since the characteristic essence of art rests in
its revelation of spiritual content — the idea — through material embodiment?’ See Marx, Musical
Form in the Age of Beethoven, 56.
16
Ernst Friedrich Richter, Die Grundzüge der musikalischen Formen und ihre Analyse (Leipzig: Verlag von
Georg Wigand, 1852). On this matter, see also Paul Hawkshaw, ‘A Composer Learns his Craft: Anton
Bruckner’s Lessons in Form and Orchestration, 1861–3’, in Perspectives on Anton Bruckner, ed. Paul
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from its constituent expressions of ‘the musical idea’, but departed from him in
conceiving of the whole as a two‐part form.17 By these terms, we cannot consider
Brucknerian deformations to arise from the same conception of form as deformations
in, for example, a symphony by Borodin. If the origin of deformation is theory, then a
separate model of the relationship between norm and deviation is required for each
instance of the reception of theory.
The idea that practice can be reduced to the esthesics of theory is troublesome for
other reasons. The simple fact that a composer encountered a given theory is not in
itself proof of that theory’s compositional influence. Composers, in other words, may
reject or ignore theory in favour of other precedents. The notion of sonata form
applied, for instance, in a Bruckner symphony might arise as much from an
engagement with Beethoven as it does from the absorption of a didactic text.
Deformation would thus need to be reconceived as part of the reception of earlier
practice, which for the nineteenth‐century symphony was virtually synonymous with
the Beethoven paradigm. It seems historically obtuse, in short, to view Bruckner as
more concerned with the misprision of A. B. Marx than with the misprision of
Beethoven.
There is, moreover, an historical mismatch between the theoretical sources against
which deformation is measured, and the sources in compositional practice that
Hepokoski cites. Given that the earliest example of a consensus model of sonata form
is usually taken to be Marx’s treatise of 1845–7, how is it possible that deformational
procedures have their foundations in the music of Berlioz, Mendelssohn, Chopin and
Schumann, and especially of Beethoven, Weber and Schubert? Although some of the
later sonata‐type music of Mendelssohn, Schumann and Chopin is contemporary with
Marx’s work, it is scarcely credible to suggest that these composers either consciously
or unconsciously distorted Marx’s definition. The earliest sonata movements of
Chopin and Mendelssohn, which plainly exhibit deformations, even predate the
dissemination of Reicha’s treatise of 1826. Tracing the idea back to Beethoven and
Schubert is even more tendentious; can we really assert that the variety of sonata
structures in their music arises from the distortion of ‘reified defaults’?
Hawkshaw, Crawford Howie and Timothy L. Jackson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 3–29, and Stephen
Parkany, Kurth’s Bruckner and the Vocabulary of Symphonic Formal Process in the Late 19th Century (PhD
diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1989), 146–57.
17
See Richter, 27–48.
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Recently, Hepokoski has sought to compensate for this difficulty by proposing a
generic, rather than a theoretical, norm for classical sonata forms.18 Yet, as Charles
Rosen recognized, it is not at all clear that a common conception of sonata form as an
architectural pattern, rather than a general stylistic principle, existed in classical
practice either.19 Such a norm cannot be inferred simply by isolating procedures that
seem unusual (non‐tonic recapitulations, for instance), because the practices they
supplant tend to operate at the level of style, system or material process rather than
architecture (tonic recapitulations confirm a property of the tonal system, not an
abstracted formal category). The suggestion that sonata form has the status of a genre
is similarly questionable: does a principle found in symphonies, concertos, quintets,
quartets, trios, duos, sonatas, arias and even the occasional Mass really warrant an
independent generic designation? There must surely be a difference between genre
and form, in this instance as in many others; otherwise we risk nonsensically asserting,
for example, that the Kyrie of a Mass by Haydn and the first movement of a symphony
by Mozart inhabit the same genre because they exhibit similar forms. Sonata form, in
other words, must be trans‐generic.
Whether our focus is the classical ‘generic’ sonata form or its theorized nineteenth‐
century counterpart, we are compelled in both cases to establish the presence of a
corresponding normative repertoire before we can classify deformations as theoreti‐
cally distinctive. Yet the evidence for a body of work that fulfils rather than distorts
the Formenlehre model (whatever that might be) remains patchy. It is, in truth, hard to
find a canonical nineteenth‐century sonata form that does not in some sense deviate
from the models of Reicha, Marx or Czerny.20 We could, of course, assert that the
normative repertoire exists in a hinterland of neglected works by neglected composers,
and that an extensive digression into this terrain would render it visible. Yet none of
the research applying the concept of deformation has thus far provided the statistical
18 As for example in the claims that ‘Beethoven was working most fundamentally within sonata‐
generic guidelines firmly established by precedent’ or that other instances of ‘non‐resolving
recapitulation’ constitute ‘subtypes of the genre’. See Hepokoski, ‘Back and Forth from Egmont’, 133
and 136.
19 I think, of course, of Rosen’s The Classical Style: Mozart, Haydn and Beethoven (London: Faber & Faber,
1971) and Sonata Forms (New York: Norton, 1980).
20
I assert this pace Charles Rosen’s observation that ‘except for those of Chopin, most nineteenth‐
century sonatas were written according to the orthodox recipe, and mostly for the worse’. See Rosen,
The Classical Style, 31. It is hard to reconcile this observation with the diversity of practices in the
music of Mendelssohn, Schumann, Liszt, Brahms and certainly Bruckner, amongst many others.
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or analytical evidence to support this contention.21 But without a normative repertoire
against which deformation can be measured, the idea of the normative model has no
palpable form, existing purely as an aggregation of theory.
A partial escape from these problems might be sought by designating the norm as
a platonic form, or more practically as an abstraction that has become basic to
contemporary listening strategies, even if it remains evasive within the repertoire or
from an historical perspective. Hepokoski at times moves towards something
resembling these positions; the assertion that deformations ‘depend on the listener’s
prior knowledge of the Formenlehre sonata’ invokes a prevalent contemporary
perception as much as an historical phenomenon. This proposition, however, carries
its own critical difficulties. The fact that some models of sonata form may have become
didactic standards is no reason to accept them as benchmarks for comprehending
theoretically troublesome repertoire. Hepokoski generally defines these benchmarks
as categories of ‘necessary’ sonata procedure: ‘essential structural closure’, ‘essential
expositional closure’, ‘essential structural trajectory’ and so forth.22 This argument
courts self‐justification: a posteriori definitions of formal necessity will naturally
exclude some structural procedures, and the categories of deformation become self‐
selecting under the terms of the abstracted normative model. It also risks a kind of
musicological naïvety: the strategies developed by composers in response to their
generative material end up being viewed as exceptional under the terms of an
historically indifferent theoretical construct.
Generally, the notion of deformation is part of a tendency that has been endemic to
the theoretical and analytical discourse on large‐scale nineteenth‐century instrumental
forms, which is a consistent reticence to read their structures as stylistically, formally
or systemically distinct. Although deformations predominate to the virtual exclusion
of the normative model, the possibility that they should be theorized apart from the
distortion of theoretical precedents is not pursued. We could instead understand
deformation as part of a general process of post‐Beethovenian diversification: it is not
that nineteenth‐century sonata forms fall within the shadow of a theorized high‐
classical principle that they can only distort, but that the Beethovenian achievement
enables a diversity of formal procedures that the relative homogeneity of the classical
style constrains. This progression is of course aesthetic and social as well as formal.
The increased plurality of sonata‐type practices is a function of the liberating effects of
21
For a broad survey of such works, see William S. Newman, The Sonata since Beethoven (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carlina Press, 1969).
22 See for instance Hepokoski, ‘Back and Forth from Egmont’, 128–9.
JSMI, 1 (2005–6), p. 11
Julian Horton
the emergence of a radical concept of autonomy, for which Beethoven’s music came to
be regarded as prototypical. Sonata procedures are reinvented to accommodate a fresh
set of social, aesthetic and expressive demands: they are therefore not deformations,
but rather reformations of the classical principle, to use a term suggested by Nicholas
Marston.23
From this perspective, what appears to be distortion is really a shift in the basis of
practice; theory represents a parallel effort to classify the sources of influence that this
practice inherits. Nineteenth‐century sonata forms are therefore in essence dialectical:
they simultaneously acknowledge and supersede the high‐classical model, whilst
presenting the result as a synthetic whole. The dialectic is the norm of its time;
Hepokoski’s deformations are its individual manifestations.
Analysis
Bruckner’s symphonic first movements from the First to the Ninth symphonies attest
to these points.24 Each movement contains consistent principles, which plainly
respond to Beethovenian and Schubertian archetypes. Casting the net more broadly
than Darcy, these principles can be grouped into four basic categories: expansion,
teleology, negation and discontinuity. The categories are not exclusive, but interact.
Generally, they underpin Hepokoski’s deformations; they are the cause, of which the
types of deformation are the effect.
The most frequently noted example of expansion is the increased delineation of
second group and closing section, to the extent that the closing section becomes a third
group in itself. There are four main ways in which this is achieved. In the First and
Second symphonies, the third group is prepared as a tonal and gestural goal by a
cadential phrase that is also integral to the second group. In the Third, Fourth, Sixth
and Seventh symphonies, the two groups are connected by an appended, cumulative
intensification. This type also invokes the category of teleology: the third group is the
goal of a motivic and harmonic intensification, forcing a structural reorientation
through which the first and second themes appear as preparatory. This practice is
complicated in the Fourth and Sixth symphonies by the harmonic relationship
between the second and third groups. In the former, the transition to the third theme
resumes and resolves the dominant preparation of V interrupted at the end of the first
23
Reported from private communication.
24 Analyses refer to the editions of the Anton Bruckner Gesamtausgabe, edited by Leopold Nowak.
Where multiple versions exist, the following were consulted: No. 1 (1866/77); No. 2 (1877); No. 3
(1873, 1877, 1889); No. 4 (1878/80); No. 8 (1890).
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group (bars 71–74 and 115–119). In the latter, the force of the arrival of the third theme
at bar 101 is compromised by its harmonic function as an interrupted cadence. In these
examples, teleology, expansion and discontinuity interact. The Fifth and Ninth
symphonies deploy discontinuity without teleology: the second theme is liquidated,
the texture dissolves and the third theme is introduced in a new, unprepared tonality.
In both cases, teleological intensification is reserved for the end of the third group. The
Eighth Symphony combines elements of the previous two types: the transition
between second and third groups comprises a thematic liquidation that also prepares
the tonality of the third theme, and the moment of teleological intensification is
transferred to the end of the exposition in the same manner as the Fifth and Ninth
symphonies.
Negation involves a redeployment of teleology and discontinuity in the
recapitulation, such that the expected continuity of tonal context and material
presentation is disrupted, and is a feature of the first movements from the Fifth
Symphony onwards. In the Fifth and Sixth symphonies, this results from locating the
reprise of the first theme as the goal of the movement’s most extensive intensification
process thus far: a protracted dominant preparation in the Fifth; a false recapitulation
and its rectification in the Sixth. The result in the Fifth is a fragmentation of the first
group and an expansion of the teleological intensification in the third group. In the
Sixth, the intensification preceding the third group is removed and replaced by
liquidation and discontinuity. The recapitulation in the first movement of the Seventh
Symphony is even more extensively denuded of the points of intensification
characterising the exposition. The end of the reprised second group carries no
preparatory function, and the third group begins over an interrupted cadence.
Perhaps the most emphatic example of negation occurs in the first movement of the
Eighth Symphony.25 Here, the functions of development and recapitulation overlap in
a way that enhances the material’s dramatic force, whilst depleting its capacity for
stabilizing the structural tensions of the exposition. As Example 1 reveals, the reprise
at pitch of the first theme in augmentation in the bass from bar 224 is simultaneously a
25 Warren Darcy (‘Bruckner’s Sonata Deformations’, 274–6) considers this, along with the first
movements of the Symphony in F minor and the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth
symphonies, as an example of ‘sonata process failure’. In this instance, he links structural collapse to
the presence of an ‘alienated secondary theme zone’, on the grounds that the second theme in the
exposition tonicizes V instead of III. The mechanism of the moment of recapitulation is however not
considered in detail.
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Bruckner’s Symphonies and Sonata Deformation Theory
thematic recapitulation and part of an ongoing developmental process pressing
towards the climactic recovery of the tonic C minor at bar 249. The return of the first
theme sustains neither a stable point of thematic reprise, being part of a continuous
process of development, nor a stable tonal reprise, being harmonically oblique and
part of an ascending sequence. Conversely, the return to the tonic cannot support a
thematic reprise, since the necessity of tonic prolongation is compromised by the first
theme’s harmonic instability. Moreover, whereas in the exposition, the first theme is
set against an ascending semitonal line in the upper voice, which twice leads, in bars
23 and 40, to an attempted cadential assertion of the tonic, in bars 224–9 this is
replaced by a counterpointing free variant of the second theme. Consequently, the first
theme becomes detached from the voice‐leading mechanism, which in the exposition
facilitated the cadential presentation of C minor.
The antithetical demands of thematic presentation and tonal stability provoke a
negation of recapitulatory function. In the space between this climax and the return of
the second theme (bars 249–310) a structural gap opens up in which the expected first‐
group reprise is replaced by the sequential repetition of motivic residues. The phrase
structure of the group is reassembled in bars 282–302, but this is undercut at bar 303
by a chromatic interruption leading to the second group. The relationship of second
and third groups is now changed from one of preparation to discontinuity. The second
group culminates on an unresolved diminished seventh, and the third group enters
after a caesura at bar 341. Bruckner again compensates by placing a more forceful
teleological intensification at the end of the third group, but here there is no attempt to
balance this climax with a synthetic coda, and the movement ends in profound
fragmentation.
The Ninth Symphony, which is concerned in many ways with expanding the
procedures presented relatively concisely in the first movement of the Eighth, takes
the clash of recapitulatory and developmental functions a stage further. On the largest
scale, the first movement plays out a conflict between bipartite and tripartite formal
conceptions. The second and third groups are reprised in varied but more or less
complete forms, but the tonic return of first‐group material from bar 333 is again
elided with the end of the development, and the tonal recapitulation is caught between
the competing structural demands of development and reprise, intensification and
resolution. Bruckner’s response once more turns on a redistribution of these
properties. The tonic restatement of first‐group material becomes part of a chromatic
sequence, yielding at bar 355 to a new passage of developmental intensification. The
discontinuity between second and third groups is exacerbated rather than resolved,
and the intensification process at the end of the third group is concomitantly
expanded.
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As Darcy observes, negation of recapitulatory function often transfers a burden of
resolution onto the coda.26 In the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh symphonies, the coda
responds positively to these demands, supplying a cumulative intensification in the
tonic major. In the Eighth Symphony, Bruckner adopts the opposite strategy, closing
the first movement with an exacerbation of the recapitulatory crisis. The first
movements of the Third and Ninth symphonies mediate these two extremes: the coda
supplies a final teleological intensification, which emphatically negates the possibility
of a synthetic minor‐major trajectory. In cases where negation is sustained at the end
of the first movement, the responsibility of synthesis is placed more heavily on the
finale. At the same time, Darcy’s association of ‘sonata process failure’ with the
absence of ‘redemption from minor to major’ is perhaps too limited.27 Negation also
results from an inability to accommodate the conflicting demands of intensification
and recapitulatory stabilisation, and the concomitant redistribution of teleology and
discontinuity.
Conclusions
Of the many interesting reminiscences in Carl Hruby’s Meine Erinnerungen an Anton
Bruckner, the following is especially germane to the present context:
After [Bruckner] had spent a while sunk in thought…he suddenly broke the silence: ‘I think, if
Beethoven were still alive today, and I went to him, showed him my Seventh Symphony and
said to him, “Don’t you think, Herr von Beethoven, that the Seventh isn’t as bad as certain
people make it out to be—those people who make an example of it and portray me as an idiot—”
then, maybe, Beethoven might take me by the hand and say, “My dear Bruckner, don’t bother
yourself about it. It was no better for me, and the same gentlemen who use me as a stick with
which to beat you still don’t really understand my last quartets, however much they may
pretend to.” Then, I might go on and say, “Please excuse me, Herr von Beethoven, if I’ve gone
beyond you…”’ (Bruckner was referring to his use of form!) ‘“…but I’ve always said that a true
artist can work out his own form and then stick to it.”’28
Assuming Hruby’s account is reliable, it sheds a revealing light on the current
debate. Bruckner’s remarks read like an encapsulation of the dialectical compositional
mindset. On the one hand, he makes plain the necessity of engaging with
Beethovenian formal archetypes. On the other hand, his apology to Beethoven for
26 Darcy, ‘Bruckner’s Sonata Deformations’, 274.
27 As note 26.
28 As translated in Stephen Johnson (ed.), Bruckner Remembered (London: Faber & Faber, 1998), 160;
originally in German in Carl Hruby, Meine Erinnerungen an Anton Bruckner (Vienna, 1901).
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‘going beyond’ him in the realm of form concerns what is antithetical to the
Beethovenian model, and therefore describes the innovation that necessarily
supersedes the precedents offered by tradition. Bruckner plainly considered the result,
however, to be greater than the sum of these parts. The admonition that ‘a true artist’
should ‘work out his own form and then stick to it’ describes a concept of form uniting
tradition and innovation within a consistent compositional attitude.
What Bruckner’s comments do not imply is the conscious deformation of a
standard textbook form; neither do they suggest that the relationship between
influence and form is anything more than a matter of accepting and surpassing
paradigms in the repertoire. Of course, Bruckner’s attitude towards theory was more
complex than this. His engagement with Simon Sechter and with the various
authorities drawn upon by Kitzler left an indelible mark on his compositional
imagination and on his conception of the relationship between strict and free
composition, as evinced most clearly in the complex harmonic and metrical
annotations he added to his scores. But none of this leads inevitably to the conclusion
that sonata form in the symphonies is a matter of deforming these precedents. On the
contrary, Bruckner seemed to rely on them as a means of demonstrating the theoretical
consistency of his own ideas, rather than as a platform for deviation.
Ultimately, this study pleads for a more concerted effort to derive analytical
principles for Bruckner in particular, and for nineteenth‐century sonata forms in
general, that are epistemically specific; that is to say, which do not repeat, in fresh
guises, the old habit of understanding nineteenth‐century practices either as negative
reflections of classicism, or as a preparation for tonal disintegration and the various
forms of fin‐de‐siècle modernism. At the risk of sounding overtly Foucauldian, it seems
more appropriate to give the nineteenth century its own analytical and theoretical
space, and to allow its epistemological conditions to determine how we fill that space.
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