290. Newsweek vs.

IAC, 142 SCRA 171

Facts:
- Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a case in their own
behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province against Newsweek Inc. and two of
their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry Came.- The complaint alleged that petitioner
committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in their magazine. The article
supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who exploited the
impoverished sugarcane laborers and brutalized and killed them with impunity. They claim that the article showed
a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light-
Petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complainant
made no allegation that anything contained in the article referred specifically to any one of them--and libel can be
committed only against individual reputation OR, if is claimed to be directed at a group, there i defamation only if
the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's
reputation.

Ruling:
- Decision of the IAC is reversed and the respondents' complaint is dismissed.
Rationale:
- There is no cause of action.- Corpus v Cuaderno, Sr.: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim
be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named.- Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity
of the person upon whom the imputation is case affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers
could have identified the personality of the individual defamed.- This principle is important especially where a group
or class of persons claim to have been defamed because the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the
individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.- Where the defamatory is alleged to have
been directed at a group or lass, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply
to every individual in the that group OR sufficiently specific so that each individual can prove the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him so that he can bring action separately.- The case is NOT a class suit. It is not a
case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the
decree is indispensable to make each member an actual party.- The plaintiffs here have a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in this controversy.- The disputed
portion of the article that they claim is libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The report merely
stated that the victim has been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Sola, the mayor
of Kabankalan. The report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the
real of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.- The article in question is
not libelous in nature.- The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural
workers in the sugar industry and various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the
benefit of the workers.- Undoubtedly, the statements in the article are sweeping and exaggerated, but these articles
may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who do
not have.

291. Kapisanan vs. Camara Shoes, 11 SCRA 477

It appears that complainant Ramos was being deducted the amount of P1.00 by the respondent in
partial payment of his loan of P50.00 for medical expense, and P500.00 for two (2) cartloads of
second hand lumber and building materials taken from the demolished store at Nueva Street.
Compelainant agreed to the deduction as partial payment of his obligations but later on spoiled the
payroll of the company by placing therein "under protest". For this act of dirtying the official copy of
the payroll, he was justifiably suspended indefinitely on May 28, 1969, hence, the complaint for
reinstatement. Clearly the suspension of the complainant is for cause and could not be attributed to

1
unfair labor practice. On July 1, 1969, complainant was reinstated (Exh. "B") after one month
suspension, rendering this case moot and academic

Demetrio Ramos, petitioner alleges that the deduction of P1.00 a day from his salary without his
consent was unlawful; and that when he wrote "under protest" on the company payroll, he was
merely exercising his right to air his grievances on the unauthorized deductions made by respondent
company. Petitioner denied that he incurred a loan from the respondent company in the amount of
P50.00, and P500.00 for two cartloads of second hand lumber and building materials taken from the
demolished store at Nueva Street. Petitioner asserts that his suspension was due primarily to his
union activities. He contends that his suspension was discriminatory and constitutes an unfair labor
practice.

Issue: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?

Held: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal
limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing
that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and
illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company
payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of
expression as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue
harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein.

292. IN RE: Atty. Tipon, 79 SCRA 372

FACTS:
The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice dated May 17, 1965
transmitted certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel Tipon might have violated
the Lawyer’s Oath for having imported Playboy magazine, which was considered as non-
mailable matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the magazine could be considered as obscene
HELD:

In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza (Secretary of Public Works and

Communication) rendered the opinion that Playboy magazine cannot be characterized as
obscene and that it can be carried and deposited in Philippine mails.

The Secretary said that he scrutinized the background of Atty. Tipon, a 1955 law
graduate of the University of the Philippines who placed third in the bar examinations, a
Fullbright Smith-Mundt scholar, and a holder of the Master of Laws degree from the Yale Law
School. The Secretary concluded that "there is absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon had
violated or intended to violate the postal laws, the lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics."

Secretary Raquiza requested that the Postmaster General's t of May 17, 1965 be
considered withdrawn.

WHEREFORE, this case is considered closed for having become moot and academic.

2
293. Lacsa vs. IAC, May 23,1988

FACTS: Petitioner, a CPA and a former member of the Board of Directors of Philippine Columbian Association
(PCA). He volunteered his services to audit the PCA. During the course of his audit he found out that PCA
President Ponciano Marquez was a mere associate member of the association and cannot hold position as
President. This prompted petitioner to write to the board and branded the private complainant, Marquez as a
"de facto president." The letter, which the petitioner eventually caused to be published and circulated among
the members of the association. Not content, petitioner again caused the publication in a newsletter
circulated to the association's members, of an item entitled "Doubt As To the Legitimacy Of The Incumbent
President." Hence Marquez filed a criminal case of libel. Lacsa alleged the following defenses (1) the term "de
facto president," which he used to describe the private complainant, is not libelous per se; and (2) even
assuming that the said term is indeed libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless
constitute privileged communication and cannot give rise to a libel conviction.

ISSUE: W.O.N. the petitioner is guilty of libel.

HELD: YES. In the first dismissing the first contention, considering that there are two classes of membership
in the PCA — associate and proprietary — and it is only those of the latter who are qualified to be voted as
president of the association, the act of the petitioner in branding complainant Marquez as a mere de facto
president and insinuating imperfection in the latter's status as a proprietary member, most certainly exposed
Marquez to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of subtlety designed to camouflage the ill-effect of the
petitioner's misdeed would erase the impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous
materials. The Solicitor General is correct in stating that calling Marquez a de facto president "is equivalent to
saying that he is a pretender, a fraud, and impostor and he is arrogating unto himself certain powers, rights,
and privileges to which he is not entitled.

Secondly, the Court cannot likewise subscribe to the assertion of the petitioner that the letter and newsletter
article complained of partake of privileged communication. To be classified as a privileged communication,
the disputed letter and article must be absolutely free from any taint of malice which, unfortunately, is not the
case here.

294. Kapunan vs. De Villa, December 6, 1988

Facts: prohibition and/or habeas corpus, petitioners, who were implicated in the unsuccessful
coup d'etat of August 28, 1987 and relieved of their duties in the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), seek the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
(1) to set aside, as null and void, the "pre-trial investigation “report finding a prima facie case
against them and recommending their trial for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer
and the denial of their motion for reconsideration, and
(2) to enjoin respondent General Court Martial No. 8 from further proceeding in the case of
"People v. Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan, et al."Further, petitioner Kapunan seeks the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus to procure his release from confinement. In the aftermath of the
failed August 28,1987 coup d'etat where cadets of the Philippine
Military Academy reportedly openly supported the plotters and issued statements to that
effect.
PMA Board of Officers to investigate the alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the

3
 PMA A fact-finding investigation was conducted by the PMA Board from September 1 to 11,
1987 and on September 23, 1987 it submitted its findings to the AFP Chief of Staff. Charge
sheets were filed against petitioners for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and a "pre-
trial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado. Kapunan was allegedly
summoned to the General Headquarters of the AFP fora dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat
on September4, 1987 he was ordered confined under "house arrest “by then Chief of Staff
Gen. Fidel Ramos. On February19, 1988, the arrest of petitioner Kapunan, together with three
(3) others, was ordered by respondent Chief of Staff De Villa in connection with the killing of
Atty.Rolando Olalia and Leonore Alay-ay
Issue: Whether or not the house arrest or confinement of Kapunan is illegal
Held: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition. The Court finds that petitioner Kapunan's
continued confinement is not tainted with illegality. Among the grounds for the disallowance of
the writ of habeas corpus is that the applicant has been charged with or convicted of in offense.
In the instant case, petitioner Kapunan had been charged with mutiny, a serious offense
punishable by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. There is a legal
cause of his confinement. Art. 70. Arrest or confinement.—Any person subject to military law
charged with crime or with a serious offense under these Articles shall be placed in
confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require; but when charged with a minor offense
only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest
under the provisions of this article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent,
unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. ...It cannot be gainsaid that certain
liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may
be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law
depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks

Not within the protection of the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution

Read:
295. P. vs. Kettinger, 45 Phil. 352

FACTS: On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera
Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently
were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company. Out of these facts
arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera
Supply Co., obscene and indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. The
pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent,
disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries

4
the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries
the legend "Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle,
Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field
Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A-5 has the legend
"Moros Philippines."

CONTETION OF THE ACCUSED: That the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the
true costumes regularly worn by them and that those pictures represented the natives (non-
Christians) in their native dress.

RESOLUTION: The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning
something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy. "Indecency" is an act against behavior
and a just delicacy. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without
attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the
Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be
shocked by photographs of this type. The SC is convinced that the post-card pictures in this case
cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. SC hold that pictures
portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in
the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law.
Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted
with all costs de oficio.
296. P vs. GO PIN, August 8, 1955

Facts:

Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large number
of one-real 16-millimeter films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or
immoral. At first, he pleaded not guilty of the information but later was allowed by the court to change
his plea to that of guilty which he did. Not content with the plea of guilty the trial court had the films in
question projected and were viewed by it in order to evaluate the same from the standpoint of decency
and morality. Thereafter, and considering the plea of guilty entered by the accused, and the fact that
after viewing the films the trial court noted only a slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality
in them, it sentenced Go Pin to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcciconal and to pay a fine of P300,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Go Pin appealed.

Issue:

Whether paintings and pictures of women in the nude are obscene and offensive.

Held:

Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind are not offensive because
they are made and presented for the sake of art. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in

5
art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in
art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures
were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and
profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it
would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the
privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of
satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who
because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and
perverting effects of these pictures.

297. Miller vs. California , 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 4.

Facts:
In this case, the Appellant, Miller (Appellant), conducted a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of illustrated adult material books. The Appellant’s conviction was
specifically based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be
sent through the mail. The brochures consist primarily of pictures and drawings very
explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of
sexual activities, with genitals often predominantly displayed. This case thus involves
the application of a state’s criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually
explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients.
Issue: Whether mass mailings depicting sexual acts constitute obscenity, which is not
afforded First Amendment protection.
Ruling: Yes.
The Court held that the states have a legitimate interest in prohibiting distribution of
mass mailings depicting sexual acts to unwilling recipients since there exists a high risk
the materials are offensive. In addition, the Court confined the scope of state obscenity
regulations to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. Prohibited conduct must
be specifically defined by state law and must also be limited to works which, as a
whole, appeal to a prurient interest in sex, portray sex in a patently offensive way and
lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value.
The Court held the appropriate three-pronged test to apply in determining whether
material is obscene is:
1. Whether the average person would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest (apply contemporary community standards as opposed to
national standard);
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and

6
 3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Here, exploiting sex and nudity cannot be done with less limitation than live sex in public
places. Depictions of sexual conduct must at least retain serious literary, artistic,
political,
298. Ginsberg vs. New York ,390 U.S. 629

FACTS: Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore
on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-
called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and
purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents
to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. Consequently, on October 26, 1965, Ginsberg
sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police
officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr.
Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual
conduct. Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen
years of age of
1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or
2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were
“harmful to minors.”
It defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or representation of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that
1) predominantly appealed to the indecent, shameful or morbid interest of minors,
2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what
was suitable material for minors, and
3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. Ginsberg was tried before a
judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of
violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction.

ISSUES:
1. Did Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments on
its face because it restrained expression?
2. Was Section 484-h of the Penal Law unconstitutionally vague and uncertain on its face, in
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD: No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that
Section 484-h did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on
expression. Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech
or press. He acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized
that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the magazines in question to persons
seventeen years of age or older. Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the
scope of the constitutional freedom to read material concerned with sex did not depend upon
whether that person was an adult or a minor. He rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section

7
484-h was a violation of minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms, characterizing Section
484-h as New York’s attempt to adjust the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual
interests of minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in the well-being of its
children, and that this subject was within New York’s constitutional power of regulation. The
Court followed the ‘‘variable concepts’’ notion of obscenity that Justice Brennan introduced in
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), which adapted the Roth standard (Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 1957) according to the ‘‘sexual interests’’ of the ‘‘intended and probable
recipient group,’’ including ‘‘sexually immature persons.’’ As Justice Brennan argues for the
majority in affirming the New York court’s decision, the ethical or moral development of youth
is an important interest of the state and accordingly within the state’s constitutional authority
to regulate. Thus, it was ‘‘rational’’ for New York’s legislature to limit exposure to sexual
material in order to avoid its harmful effects on minors even if this material would not be
considered obscene from an average adult’s perspective. Justice Brennan dismisses in passing
Ginsberg’s claim that New York’s statute was vague as well as his challenge to the scienter
requirements of the law. Justice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He rejected Ginsberg’s argument that Section 484-h
failed to give adequate notice of what was prohibited. The New York Court of Appeals
previously read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene material to minors, and the
Court also read a knowledge requirement into other similar state statutes. Justice Brennan also
rejected Ginsberg’s argument that the statute was impermissibly vague, as Section 484-h
expressly stated that a defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a reasonable
bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor in question. Justice Potter Stewart
concurred. He argued that while the First Amendment protected men’s freedom to decide what
they will read and listen to, government regulation could extend to settings where a person
lacked
299. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362

FACTS:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized and confiscated from dealers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was
Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.

On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila,
seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press.

The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate seizure.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials but admitted that
these were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments were not raided.The other defendant, WPD
Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.

On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties

8
to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized,
confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".

On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is not without restraint.

In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:

The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate
petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.

ISSUE: Whether the claim of petitioner that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine
which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press be granted.

HELD: Yes. Petition granted

Ratio:
Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows:
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger)

When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, - "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of
the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both
cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-
Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.

The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and
established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the
reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.

Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an
assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary,
if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is
it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid
advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation.

9
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the
divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.

Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection.
In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the
authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger."

As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that
the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were
not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This
not answered, one can conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police
power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission
to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests,
the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account for a crime committed.

The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused
of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who
ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign)
without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make
the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It
appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure have been destroyed, the Court declines
to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic.

Libel or slander; test of-

Read:
Lopez and Manila Times cases, supra
300. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510

FACTS: The respondents Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and Roberto Villanueva are the
publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager respectively of The Manila Chronicle, a daily
newspaper published and circulated in English in the City of Manila. On July 15, 1949, the petitioner,
Norberto Quisumbing, filed a complaint against said respondents in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of damages in the sum of P50,000 as a result of the following alleged

10
libelous publication in The Manila Chronicle of November 7, 1947.
After answer and trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment dismissing the
complaint from which the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter Court, in its decision
promulgated on January 19, 1953, affirmed the judgment of the court of origin; and the case is now
before us on petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals found "that the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true
report of official or public proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a press
release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N.B.I., and was a
substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate
report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid
on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders'; and related the steps actually taken or to be
taken by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of
official actuations. The theory of the petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the
news item may be considered as being a fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation
of the Anti-Usury Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its
headline “NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS", admittedly not forming part of the basic
press release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had
thereby been branded and condemned as a "usurer" when as a matter of fact no criminal charge
was even filed against him for the crime of usury in any court of justice. The petitioner has cited
American authorities to the effect that the headline, in which "sting" is frequently found, when
unsupported by the article, is in itself libelous; or that the headline may be libelous while the body is
privileged.
Upon the other hand, the respondents contend that the published matter alleged to be libelous must
be construed as a whole.The Court of Appeals adopted this contention and invoked the following
rule: "The article must be construed as an entirely including the headlines, as they may enlarge,
explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context . . ..
Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its
entirely." Indeed, the appellant cited in his brief the following cases in support of the same
proposition that the whole article including the headline must be read and construed together.
ISSUE: Whether or not the headline is libelous?
HELD: We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner, while assuming
that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per se) added by the
respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not borne out by the facts
recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news item would come to the
conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of usury. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said to contain a correct description of the
news story. the fact that the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint
against the petitioner and two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-
Usury Division that criminal action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to
think that the persons involved were userers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article
suggested the idea that the petitioner was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury.
The word "userer" simply means one who practices usury or even a mere money lender (Webster
New Int. Dictionary), but certainly not a usury convict. One reason invoked in the authorities cited by
the appellant for basing an action for libel on the headline, is that often times it is the only part of the
article which is read. If so, the petitioner's positions would be untenable, since by reading merely the
headline in question nobody would even suspect that the petitioner was referred to; and "libel cannot
be committed except against somebody and that somebody must be properly identified"
(People vs. Andrada, 37 Off. Gaz., 1763). It may be insisted that the identity of the petitioner is
revealed in the body of the news item, but we should remember that nowhere in the context is the
petitioner portrayed as one charged with or convicted of the crime of usury.

11
Cases under sub-judice Read:

301. P. vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265

Facts:
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The
People of the Philippines v. Salvador Alarcon, Et Al., convicting the accused therein except one — of the crime of
robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Federico Manga has who,
as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article
published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court.

Held:
he elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other
jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punish able
by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801; In re Abistado,
57 Phil., 668.) It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. (Nixon v. State 207 Ind.,
426, 193 N. E., 591, 97 A. L. R., 894.) What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments
is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case
to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend
it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of was published
after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after
that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating
the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it
was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.

If it be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of
Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as was the theory of the provincial fiscal below
which was accepted by the lower court, we take the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our
integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings
to the appellate court, and this last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts
committed after the perfection of the appeal.

The Solicitor-General, in his brief, suggests that "even if there had been nothing more pending before the trial court,
this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the reason that the publication scandalized the
court. (13 C. J., p. 37, 45; o R. C. L., 513.)" The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is involved in some
doubt under modern English law and in the United States, "the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect
that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press."
(Annotations, 68 L. R. A., 255.) Other considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As stated,
the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case is ended." (In re Lozano and Quevedo,
supra; In re Abistado, supra.) In at least two instances, this Court has exercised the power to punish for contempt
"on the preservative and on the vindicative principle" (Villa vicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil., 778), "on the corrective and

12
not on the retaliatory idea of punishment." In re Lozano and Quevedo, supra.) Contempt of court is in the nature of
a criminal offense (Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil., 548), and in considering the probable effects of the
article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theory of defendant’s
innocence will be indulged (State v. New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N. M., 102, 177 p. 751), and where a reasonable
doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted. (State v. Hazel tine, 82
Wash., 81, 143 p. 436.)

The appealed order is hereby reversed, and the respondent acquitted, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

WHEN THE COMMENT/STATEMENT HAS THE TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT,

IMPEDE, OR INSULT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Read:
302. GOV. ENRIQUE GARCIA VS. MANRIQUE , GR No. 186592,October
10, 2012

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation
wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements
against the Supreme Court. The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov. Garcia), Aurelio
C. Angeles, Jr. (Angeles), Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento) and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De Mesa) alleged that
the subject article undermines the people’s faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they
employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary restraining
order (TRO) in G.R. No. 185132. The pertinent portions of the article which was entitled, "TRO ng Korte
Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20-M?" was published and reproduced in the January 14 to 20, 2009 issue of the
Luzon Tribune. Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he
only stated the facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he
made any degrading remarks against the Supreme Court and claimed that the article simply posed academic
questions. If the article ever had a critical undertone, it was directed against the actions of the petitioners,
who are public officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any rate, he asseverated that whatever
was stated in his article is protected by the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the contents of Manrique’s article would constitute indirect contempt.
2. Whether Manrique’s invocation of freedom of speech in his criticism tenable.

HELD:

1.Yes. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it is indispensable to their right of self-
preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the maintenance of their authority; and consequently
to the due administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes
that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise. The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the courts
impenetrable to public scrutiny nor does it place them beyond the scope of legitimate criticism. Every

13
citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. It is the cardinal condition of all such
criticisms however that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect courts and therefore
warrants the wielding of the power to punish for contempt.

Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications relating to court and to court proceedings which can
warrant the exercise of the power to punish for contempt: (1) that which tends to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding; and (2) that which
tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute. The subject article illustrative of the second kind of contemptuous publication for
insinuating that this Court’s issuance of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on an illegal cause. The
glaring innuendos of illegality in the article is denigrating to the dignity of this Court and the ideals of
fairness and justice that it represents. It is demonstrative of disrespect not only for this Court, but also for
the judicial system as a whole, tends to promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary
by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially.

2. No. Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press,
albeit unpersuasively, to extricate himself from liability. However, said constitutional protection is not a
shield against scurrilous publications, which are heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but to
trigger doubt on their integrity based on some imagined possibilities. Freedom of speech is not absolute,
and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. Certainly, the making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said
right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and
confidence therein. Manrique's article, lacking in social value and aimed solely at besmirching the
reputation of the Court, is undeserving of the protection of the guaranties of free speech and press.

Freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of

grievances
Read:
303. IBP VS. MAYOR ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241, February 24 , 2010

FACTS:
Harry Roque and Joel Butuyan with the IBP appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals that
found no abuse of discretion on the part of Mayor Atienza in granting a permit to rally in a venue other

14
than the one applied for by the IBP. They filed a permit to rally at the foot of the Mendiola Bridge on
June 22, 2006 from 2:30 to 5:30 pm however a permit was issued by the mayor but indicated the place
Plaza Miranda as the venue. The Court of Appeals was unable to release a decision within 24 hours. The
partial grant of the application violated the right to freedom of expression and public assembly.

ISSUE:
 Whether the city mayor violated the freedom of assembly.

HELD:
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be
heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavourable
action on the permit.
Mayor Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to
such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would
have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It
smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was
slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such
grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory

304. Gesite vs. CA, 444 SCRA 58

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Leonore Gesite and the other petitioners are public school teachers of the E. de los Santos Elementary
School in Manila. Beginning March 1990, simmering unrest struck the ranks of the public school teachers
in Metro Manila. They pressed for, among others, the immediate payment of their allowances, 13th month
pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the recall of Order No.
39, Series of 1990, issued by the (DECS), directing the over sizing of classes and overloading of teachers,
and the hiring of 47,000 new teachers. When their demands were not granted, the dissatisfied teachers
resolved to take direct mass actions.
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila did not conduct
classes. Instead, they assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances. When their
representatives conferred with then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario, he brushed aside their complaints,
warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass actions. He then ordered the teachers to
return to work within (24) hours, otherwise they will be dismissed from the service. Meantime, he directed
the DECS officials to initiate immediate administrative proceedings against those found obstinate. The
action of the DECS Secretary caused more teachers to join the protest action. These included the above-
named four petitioners and one of them is Leonora Gesite who did not report for work on September 19-
21, 1990. Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for defying his return-
to-work order. They were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil
Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave.

15
 Despite receipt of notice to file their answer within (72) hours but not more than five (5) days,
petitioners failed to do so. Consequently, they were deemed to have waived their right to controvert the
charges. They were found guilty as charged and ordered dismissed from the service. Subsequently, this
penalty was reduced to (9) months suspension for petitioners Adelaida Macalindong and Guia Agaton and
(6) months suspension for petitioners Leonora Gesite and Fe Lamoste. Petitioners interposed an appeal to
the Merit System Protection Board, but it was denied for lack of merit.
On appeal to the (CSC), the same was also denied. The CSC found that petitioners are liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service on the ground that they acted without due regard to
the adverse consequences of their action which necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of
classes, to the prejudice of the pupils/students to whom (they) were responsible. The CSC imposed upon
them the penalty of (6) months suspension without pay. Their respective motions for reconsideration were
denied. Hence, petitioners filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari, which we referred to the
Court of Appeals. On November 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a joint Decision dismissing the
petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners, in joining the mass actions taken by the public school teachers, may be held liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, when they only exercised their Constitutional rights
to air their grievances.
HELD:
While petitioners admit their participation in the mass actions of the public school teachers in
September to mid-October, 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila, they assert,
however, that they were not on strike. Rather, they were merely exercising their Constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. Thus, they may not be
penalized administratively.
The Solicitor General submits that although the Constitution recognizes the rights of government
workers to organize, assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances, however, the
exercise of these rights is not a license for them to engage in strikes, walkouts, and temporary work
stoppages.
The question of whether the concerted mass actions launched by the public school teachers, including
herein petitioners, in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October 1990 was a strike has long
been settled. In Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:

The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from
September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has been decided by this Court in a resolution,
dated December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al.
vs. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 95445 & 95590, August 6, 1991, 200 SCRA 323). It was there held that from
the pleaded and admitted facts, these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers
duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioner’s purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling (Board of Education vs. New Jersey
Education Association (1968) 53 NJ 29, 247 A2d 867).

16
 Actually, petitioners here were not charged administratively because they engaged in strike. Former
DECS Secretary Isidro Cario filed administrative complaints against them because, as aptly held by the
Court of Appeals, they were absent from classes from September 19-21, 1990, in violation of his return-to-
work order. Their unauthorized absences disrupted classes and prejudiced the welfare of the school
children.
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in
the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Here, petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of their students.
While petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however, they should have
exercised such right in a lawful manner. As this Court held in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals,

Moreover, the petitioners here x x x were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble
peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having
absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to
participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the
deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves
of their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court
could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the
temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very
evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its
nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be
made answerable.

We thus find that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioners engaged in an activity
proscribed by the Civil Service Law and Rules. Their absences without authority caused adverse effects
upon their students for whose education they are responsible. Clearly, their acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an offense punishable under Section 46(27), Chapter 7
(Discipline), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

305. Bayan vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups. Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
et al, KMU, et al.
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa

17
No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR, "Calibrated Pre-emptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan et al argued
that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is
thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause,"
"opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated their rights as organizations
and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005

Held: Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage
in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in
the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without
the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such
action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis
of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected. Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances
and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as
to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and
Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and
promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not
an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner
of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
"opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since
they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances"
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health
the so-called calibrated pre-emptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must
be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used

18
by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.880 cannot be condemned
as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-
sound "clear and present danger "standard. In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further
in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to
designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such
parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the
municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of
whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written
notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

306. Randy David vs. Ermita, 489 SCRA 160

Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No.
5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to
bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-
GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was
also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.
The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power
and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

19
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes
of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered
the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has
been met.

307. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255 6.

Earnshaw the alleged President of the Communist Party of the Philippines requested a necessary
permission to hold a popular meeting at the plaza. The mayor denied the request and prohibits all kinds
of meeting held in the city. The mayor was not held liable for Article 131 inasmuch as the doctrines and
principles advocated by the communist party were highly seditious in that they suggested and incited
rebellious conspiracies and disturbed and obstructed the lawful authorities in their duties. The
Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th day
of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party

20
within the city, the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff
further prays "that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue
a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila."

The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-
mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the
City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization,
which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to
its constitution and by-laws.

By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist Party of the
Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid association in
different parts of the City of Manila, in which seditious speeches were made urging the laboring class to
unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the
present government, and stirring up enmity against the insular and local police forces by branding the
members thereof as the enemies of the laborers and as tools of the capitalists and imperialists for
oppressing the said laborers.

Issue: whether or not the CPP were deprived of their constitutional right to hold meetings or parades

Held:

It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the constitution and by-
laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by
its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they
suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.

Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he cannot
expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades in the manner
herein described. Furthermore, it may be noted that the complaint of the case is written merely in
general terms and calls only for a judicial declaration upon a question which is not at present an issue
between the parties to this case. But be that as it may, it must be considered that the respondent
mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite
the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government," did only
the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit
previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law —
"To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of
the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are
being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for
which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest."

308. Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias,

manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano

21
Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza
Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found “that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government,
and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent based his refusal to the
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating
freedom of assembly.
HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these
rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s police power –that they should
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the
community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others,
and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored
the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places
and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.

309. De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346

FACTS: Fernando ignacio and Simeon de la Cruz, both members of a religion called Jehovah’s Witnesses
requested that they be allowed to use the town plaza proper, including the stand or kiosko for the
purpose of holding a meeting for religious purposes. They were permitted to hold said meeting but only
on the north western part of the plaza. They contend that they should be allowed to use the town plaza
proper including the kiosko for it allegedly infringed upon the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
freedom of speech, assembly, and worship. The respondent countered that he did not prohibit the said

22
meeting from occurring but merely regulated where they could hold their religious gathering. He also
advanced the defense that he was merely exercising the police power to regulate said meeting to
maintain public order and public safety and to prevent any untoward incident from occurring, for the
plaza and the kiosko were located near a church of the Catholics.
ISSUE: WON the Jehovah’s witnesses were denied the right to assembly and worship?
HELD: It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though
guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be
“injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society”, and this power may be exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their
constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public
order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets of Petitioners’ congregation are
derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in
denying their request.

310. Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731

FACTS:
On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a
DemocraticPhilippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying
to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day, the respondent
wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that, they have temporarily adopted the policy
of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays
due to the events that happened from the past week. On the same letter, the respondent gave the
petitioner an option to use the Sunken Garden near Inamura’s for its rally, and for it to be held
earlier for it to end before dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on
the ground that it violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right to the equal protection
of the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates
the petitioners’ Right to peaceable assembly and right to the equal protection of the law.
Held:
The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police power of testament
right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the Constitution, is not
absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under the
police power of the state, which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication
may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised
insubordination to the general comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace and good
order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied

311. Philippine Blooming Mills Case,51 SCRA 189

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Petitioners: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization, Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio,
Padrigano Rufino, Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
Respondents: Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations

Ponente: J. Makasiar
Facts:
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after
learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration
was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a
strike against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally
took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No
Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.

Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as a
violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition of the employers
Held:
1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.

24
If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or
otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe
were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according
to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to
observe regular working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a
stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police
abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part
of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1)
regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The
Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day’s pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.

312. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553

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Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition
sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy
which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila
mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence
reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He
also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the
500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention
to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to
Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our
constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Condition. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.pp0pp”ll

HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats
from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be
invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds
and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time,
the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger
test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured
that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the
ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the
rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether
or not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been
raised an an issue in this case).

313. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233

FACTS:
On the very afternoon of the same day, there was this manifestation from respondent Mayor: "1. On
November 22, 1983, the petitioner, allegedly the coordinator of the, Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for
National Reconciliation, had their request for a prayer rally and parade/march received in the Office of
the Mayor. 2. That even before the request, the respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular
program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before

26
hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group that would like to
exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. 3. That respondent when interviewed on the matter
by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', a newspaper of general circulation in Olongapo and Zambales,
mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the
November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper. A copy of the newspaper is hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof as Annex 'A'. 4. On November 23, 1983, the City Mayor approved the
request of the petitioner to hold a prayer rally and a parade/march on December 4, 1983. A copy of
the permit is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex 'B'. 5 " The prayer was for
the dismissal of the petition. The permit reads as follows: "23 November 1983, Dr. Hector S. Ruiz,
Coordinator, Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, Olongapo City. Dear Dr. Ruiz:
Your request for a PERMIT to hold a prayer rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City and a
parade/march from Gordon Avenue at 1:00 p.m. of 4 December 1983 as stated in your letter dated 19
November 1983 received in this office on 22 November is hereby GRANTED provided that: 1. The
parade/march and rally will be peaceful and orderly; 2. Your organization will be responsible for any
loss or damage to government property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; 3. The
parade/march shall proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave., and Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave.,
thence to the Rizal Triangle. Please coordinate with the Integrated National Police for appropriate
traffic assistance. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) Richard J. Gordon, City Mayor."

At its next session then of November 27, the Court, in the light of the above manifestation, resolved to
grant such plea for dismissal. From petitioner came, on December 1, 1983, a motion dated November
29 to withdraw petition. As therein stated: "Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully moves to withdraw the
above-entitled petition on the ground that the permit being sought in the prayer-rally to be held on 4
December 1983 from 1:00 to 6:00 PM has been granted by the respondent." Then the next day,
December 2, 1983, the answer of respondent came reiterating what was set forth in his manifestation.
The reason for the delay of such pleading, the due date the service had been served on petitioner
being December 1, 1983, was obviously the distance between Manila and Olongapo City. It was not
served until November 30. At any rate, no prejudice was caused either party as in the meanwhile, the
Court had acted on the very day the manifestation was submitted. That was on December 1, 1983.

ISSUE:
Freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievancess

HELD:
There is relevance to a recital of such facts. It appears that the guidelines set forth in the extended
opinion in the aforesaid J.B.L. Reyes decision as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to
hold peaceable assembles may have to be supplemented. This is how the J.B.L. Reyes opinion reads on
this point: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes

27
'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight
of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. Clearly
then, to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between this resolution and that of Navarro v.
Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear in the original resolution of October 25,
1983. "

As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been
obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had
been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most
interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable
time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on the request, such party or his
representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the
decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that
way, there need not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from
which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit.

While, therefore, this petition should be dismissed, the Court deems it best to set forth the above to
specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the
least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that the factual
background on which is dependent the determination of whether or not the clear and present danger
standard has been satisfied. Lastly, a certiorari petition to this Court is likewise available to the losing
party.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed.

314. Villar vs. TIP, 135 SCRA 705

FACTS:
Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco were all
refused enrollment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise of
their constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in MALABANAN vs RAMENTO,
petitioners cannot be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly.
In opposition to the petition filed by petitioners, respondent made reference to the
academic records of petitioners, invoking the constitutional provision on academic freedom
enjoyed by institutions of higher learning. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all
obtained failing grades while petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements
for retention in the said institute, entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of
assembly.

2. Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit the students with failing grades under the
constitutional provision on academic freedom regarded to institution of higher learning.

RULING:
1. NO. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to
free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College.

28
2. YES. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being
disregarded. To that extent therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the
aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

315. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not
in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested
in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building
and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the
period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding
an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and
before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of
the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in
the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there
was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to
be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway
and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character
of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly
is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.

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