Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124922, (June 22, 1998) : Maica P. Locsin

Maica P.
Locsin
Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124922, [June 22, 1998]
Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a fortuitous event, still private
respondent cannot escape liability. Article 1165 of the New Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of
delay responsible even for a fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. In this case, private
respondent was already in delay as it was supposed to deliver petitioner's car three (3) days before it
was lost. Petitioner's agreement to the rescheduled delivery does not defeat his claim as private
respondent had already breached its obligation. Moreover, such occasion cannot be construed as
waiver of petitioner's right to hold private respondent liable because the car was unusable and thus,
petitioner had no option but to leave it.
Montemayor v. Millora, G.R. No. 168251, [July 27, 2011], 670 PHIL 209-222
Jesus contends that offsetting cannot be made because the October 27, 1999 judgment of the
RTC failed to specify the amount of attorney's fees. He maintains that for offsetting to apply, the two
debts must be liquidated or ascertainable. For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set
forth in Articles 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code, quoted below, must be present.
ARTICLE 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and
debtors of each other.
ARTICLE 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
"A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined. It is not necessary that it be
admitted by the debtor. Nor is it necessary that the credit appear in a final judgment in order that it can
be considered as liquidated; it is enough that its exact amount is known. And a debt is considered
liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definite figures which do not require verification,
but also when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical
operation"
Maica P. Locsin
Government Service Insurance System v. Lopez, G.R. No. 165568, [July 13, 2009]
The stages of a contract of sale are: (1) negotiation, starting from the time the prospective
contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is perfected; (2) perfection,
which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale; and (3) consummation,
which commences when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract of sale,
culminating in the extinguishment of the contract.
In the present case, the parties never got past the negotiation stage. Nothing shows that the parties
had agreed on any final arrangement containing the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely,
(1) consent or the meeting of the minds of the parties; (2) object or subject matter of the contract ; and
(3) price or consideration of the sale.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp., G.R. No. 150711, August 10, 2006
Caltex May Recover from PSTC Under the Terms of the Agreement. Caltex may recover the
judgment debt from PSTC not because of a stipulation in Caltex's favor but because the Agreement
provides that PSTC shall assume all the obligations of LUSTEVECO. In this case, LUSTEVECO transferred,
conveyed and assigned to PSTC all of LUSTEVECO's business, properties and assets pertaining to its
tanker and bulk business "together with all the obligations relating to the said business, properties and
assets.
Tomimbang v. Tomimbang, G.R. No. 165116, August 4, 2009

It is undisputed that herein parties entered into a valid loan contract. The only question is, has
petitioner's obligation become due and demandable? The Court resolves the question in the
affirmative. The evidence on record clearly shows that after renovation of seven out of the eight
apartment units had been completed, petitioner and respondent agreed that the former shall already
start making monthly payments on the loan even if renovation on the last unit (Unit A) was still
pending. Genaro Tomimbang, the younger brother of herein parties, testified that a meeting was held
among petitioner, respondent, himself and their eldest sister Maricion, sometime during the first or
second quarter of 1997, wherein respondent demanded payment of the loan, and petitioner agreed to
pay. Indeed, petitioner began to make monthly payments from June to October of 1997 totalling
P93,500.00. In fact, petitioner even admitted in her Answer with Counterclaim that she had "started to
make payments to plaintiff [herein respondent] as the same was in accord with her commitment to pay
whenever she was able"
Evidently, by virtue of the subsequent agreement, the parties mutually dispensed with the condition
that petitioner shall only begin paying after the completion of all renovations. There was, in effect, a
modificatory or partial novation, of petitioner's obligation. Article 1291 of the Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified by:
(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;
(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;
(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Maica P. Locsin
UNION BANK v TIU

The appellate court held that since the General Banking Law of 2000 mandates banks to
immediately dispose of real estate properties that are not necessary for its own use in the conduct of
its business, banks should not enter into two-year contracts of lease over properties paid to them
through dacion. The Court of Appeals thus ordered Union Bank to return the rentals it collected. Even
assuming arguendo that the spouses Tiu had duly proven that it had paid rent to Union Bank, the SC
nevertheless disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that it is against public policy for banks
to enter into two-year contracts of lease of properties ceded to them through dacion en pago. Section
52.2 contemplates a dacion en pago. Thus, Section 52 undeniably gives banks five years to dispose of
properties conveyed to them in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its dealings,
unless another period is prescribed by the Monetary Board. Furthermore, there appears to be no legal
impediment for a bank to lease the real properties it has received in satisfaction of debts, within the
five year period that such bank is allowed to hold the acquired realty. The SC does not dispute that
banks should not be allowed to hold on to the properties contemplated in Section 52 beyond the five-
year period unless such bank has exerted its best efforts to dispose of the property in good faith but
failed. However, inquiries as to whether the banks exerted best efforts to dispose of the property can
only be done if said banks fail to dispose of the same within the period provided. Such inquiry is
furthermore irrelevant to the issues in the case at bar.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Rural Bank of Gerona, Inc., G.R. No. 159097
A basic first step in resolving this case is to determine who the liable parties are on the IBRD
loans that the Central Bank extended. The Terms and Conditions of the IBRD 4th Rural Credit Project
(Project Terms and Conditions) executed by the Central Bank and the RBG shows that the farmers-
borrowers to whom credits have been extended, are primarily liable for the payment of the borrowed
amounts. The loans were extended through the RBG which also took care of the collection and of the
remittance of the collection to the Central Bank. RBG, however, was not a mere conduit and collector.
While the farmers-borrowers were the principal debtors, RBG assumed liability under the Project Terms
and Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors to fulfill the obligation.
How RBG profited from the transaction is not clear from the records and is not part of the issues before
us, but if it delays in remitting the amounts due, the Central Bank imposed a 14% per annum penalty
rate on RBG until the amount is actually remitted. The Central Bank was further authorized to deduct
the amount due from RBG's demand deposit reserve should the latter become delinquent in payment.
Under the Project Terms and Conditions, Metrobank had no responsibility over the proceeds of the
IBRD loans other than serving as a conduit for their transfer from the Central Bank to the RBG once
credit advice has been issued. Under paragraph 2, of Article 1302 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:
(1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor's knowledge;
(2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor;
(3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation
pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share.

Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124922, (June 22, 1998) : Maica P. Locsin

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Maica P.

Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124922, [June 22, 1998]

Tomimbang v. Tomimbang, G.R. No. 165116, August 4, 2009

UNION BANK v TIU

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