X.

Legislative and Executive Relations with Local Governments assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of
A. Intergovermental Relations Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise
Secs. 25-38 LGC known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and
the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
LGC ARTICLE III
CHAPTER III Inter-Local Government Relations
Intergovernmental Relations Section 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. - The
ARTICLE I province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and
National Government and Local Government Units municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed
Section 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall shall be independent of the province.
exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that Section 30. Review of Executive Orders. -
their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. (a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, statutes, the governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the component city or municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or
province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through municipal mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
the city and municipality with respect to barangays. punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal mayor, as the case may
coordinate with one another and with the local government units concerned be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review, the
in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the participation of local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are
local government units both in the planning and implementation of said within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or
national projects. municipal ordinances.
(c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit (b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said
concerned, direct the appropriate national agency to provide financial, executive orders within thirty (30) days after their submission, the same
technical, or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. Such shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.
assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit Section 31. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal Officer or
concerned. Prosecutor. - In the absence of a municipal legal officer, the municipal government
(d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled may secure the opinion of the provincial legal officer, and in the absence of the latter,
corporations with field units or branches in a province, city, or municipality that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality.
shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his information and Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The
guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise
expenditures. general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or Section 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. - Local
controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of government units may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves,
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non- consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government
animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of hearing conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and
the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and
environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof. Memoranda of Agreement.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be CHAPTER IV
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Relations With People's and Non-Governmental Organizations
Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian Section 34. Role of People's and Non-governmental Organizations. - Local
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and
be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been non-governmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. autonomy.
ARTICLE II Section 35. Linkages with People's and Non-governmental Organizations. - Local
Relations with the Philippine National Police government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative
Section 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine arrangements with people's and non-governmental organizations to engage in the
National Police. - The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to
executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity
agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the Basco v PAGCOR (1991)
economic and social well-being of the people. Ganzon v CA (1991)
Section 36. Assistance to People's and Non-governmental Organizations. - A local
government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN
people's and non-governmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented, AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. vs.
CHAPTER V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Section 37. Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (Local PBAC). - Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
(a) There is hereby created a local prequalification, bids and awards Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
committee in every province, city, and municipality, which shall be primarily
responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding,
evaluation of bids, and the recommendation of awards concerning local PARAS, J.:
infrastructure projects. The governor or the city or municipal mayor shall act A TV ad proudly announces:
as the chairman with the following as members: "The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
(1) The chairman of the appropriations committee of the But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to
sanggunian concerned; annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD
(2) A representative of the minority party in the sanggunian 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because
concerned, if any, or if there be none, one (1) chosen by said —
sanggunian from among its members; A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
(3) The local treasurer; recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose
(4) Two (2) representatives of non-governmental organizations that taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
are represented in the local development council concerned, to be B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the
chosen by the organizations themselves; and law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and
(5) Any practicing certified public accountant from the private license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of
sector, to be designated by the local chapter of the Philippine local autonomy;
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, if any. C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
Representatives of the Commission on Audit shall observe the PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
proceedings of such committee and shall certify that the rules and outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
procedures for prequalification, bids and awards have been D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
complied with. monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.
(b) The agenda and other information relevant to the meetings of such (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
committee shall be deliberated upon by the committee at least one (1) week In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
before the holding of such meetings. declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as
(c) All meetings of the committee shall be held in the provincial capitol or expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective"
the city or municipal hall. The minutes of such meetings of the committee and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and
and any decision made therein shall be duly recorded, posted at a Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition;
prominent place in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall, and p. 21, Rollo).
delivered by the most expedient means to elective local officials concerned. The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers
Section 38. Local Technical Committee. - (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City
(a) There is hereby created a local technical committee in every province, Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
city and municipality to provide technical assistance to the local grounds mentioned above.
prequalification, bids and awards committees. It shall be composed of the The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue
provincial, city or municipal engineer, the local planning and development of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B
coordinator, and such other officials designated by the local prequalification, also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
bids and awards committee. land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was
(b) The chairman of the local technical committee shall be designated by originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation
the local prequalification, bids and awards committee and shall attend its was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund
meeting in order to present the reports and recommendations of the local infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2,
technical committee. 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the
franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy — legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as
State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr.
objectives: Justice Zaldivar underscored the —
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct . . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where
games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All
supervised by the Government. presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all
Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the
beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106
services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA
improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978];
eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869) SCRA 521, 540)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal
Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping
modified. with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and 371)
charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the
and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And
casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within
Ninety-Four (4,494) families. the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," raised.
monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by
enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general
(Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have
been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small
department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
SCRA 323). 343).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues
coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored raised.
principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the (Section 13 [2]).
exercise of its police power. Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined (a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil.
property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it"
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
(Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386). has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol.
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v.
Ericta, supra) Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28
to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
"to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police (c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru
the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was
708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of
of the winds of change. chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869? form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks,
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish,
franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the by the national government upon proper application and verification of the
PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a qualification of the applicant . . .
reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits"
funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees
supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in
creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices the City of Manila.
and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also
the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. exercises regulatory powers thus:
1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the
whether National or Local." responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the
franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its incorporation.
operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or delegate it to local governments.
or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation
(MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the
governments. state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p.
least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 548, emphasis supplied)
51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the
federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most
federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p.
them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied) 82, Rollo).
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture
of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The
the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary
Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force
of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
(on Local Autonomy) provides: classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa,
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the SCRA 827).
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied) equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state
1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those
"imperium in imperio." cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and
one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869.
in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive
of government. (emphasis supplied) Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a the law is and not what the law should be.1âwphi1 Under our system of
political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
Board, 162 SCRA 539). government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power.
(Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
 Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the
allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony) cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food,
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for SO ORDERED.
the Legislature to decide. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are vs.
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
define and effectuate such principles. G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self- MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were vs.
rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of
available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA
their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through JR., respondents.
the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2) G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas vs.
v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.
and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, SARMIENTO, J.:
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member
Congress to determine. of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,
Board, 162 SCRA 521 — ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful
in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health
undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health
have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang
some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor
that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:
expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly xxx xxx xxx
addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the
upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having
government: the President and the Congress. supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public,
precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and
necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service
but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public
some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has
 been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign. suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner of sixty (60) days.
handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26,
explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run- respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was
around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in
Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B). The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo complainants testified including their witnesses.
City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a
Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988
Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to
Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel
previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for
hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition
sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However,
together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the
Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to
petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
dozing water to the people and the bystanders. On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to
benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
injuries He was released only the following day. 3 petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another
The Mayor thereafter answered4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ
opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events: of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.
xxx xxx xxx The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary
(Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in
petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and the respondent Court of Appeals.
was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R.
Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R.
fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying
(Annex M). the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants Secretary, to this Court.
and their witnesses. On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of
the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto. President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting
and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards the phrase21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control
him7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates
Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
City.10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.12 He likewise contends that scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22
he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable"14 grounds, among them, that he was bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments
suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
also hospitalized16 but that the latter unduly denied his request.17 executed.23
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant,
of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and
local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
No. 93746). It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed,
rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
good excuse in contesting complaints. respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said
attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24
them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be
them18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial
never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective
Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an
duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed elective barangay official.
to him. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance
restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19 in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, suspension.
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law. be counted in computing the time of suspension.25
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?
(2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.
(3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President
concerning discipline. over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in
units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...35
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations xxx xxx xxx
euphemistically to "small republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36"Supervision" on the other
wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government. hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent
but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is
tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson
measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and possibly, a fourth one,
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no
supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However,
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide neither Lacsonnor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers,
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units to Lacson:
their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its
operation of the local units.32 proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to In Hebron we stated:
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
the power of local legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local respect to municipal officers ...46
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution In Mondano, the Court held:
contains no prohibition. ... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
as this Court has held,34 thus: involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
xxx xxx xxx written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
 by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit
Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.47 another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact
xxx xxx xxx that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
Code.48 (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend
it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of him out of office. As we held:56
his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases 2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and
difficulty in sustaining him.49 the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of
Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As
the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the
Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President,50 Commissioner electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to
Blas Ople would not.51 the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52 justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in
decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the
as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter- paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
dependence between the central administration and local government units, or suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression.
otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
government. reasons,58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and
of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central other evidence.61
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust and
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
permanent. petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
considerably. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The suspensions of the petitioners are
to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to
Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges
sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of
without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against
Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to Mayor Ganzon.
pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
pursued a consolidated effort. AFFIRMED. No costs.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior SO ORDERED.
from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ
discretion. concur.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk B. Legislative Control
of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor 1. Limitations
Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of 2. Extent of Control
sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local a. Municipal Charter
Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend b. Form of Government
the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to c. Municipal Officer
us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. d. Municipal Property
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. City of Cebu v National Waterworks (1960)
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third Province of Zamboanga del Norte v City of Zamboanga
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. (1968)
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department
of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite [G.R. No. L-12892. April 30, 1960.]
the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the THE CITY OF CEBU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS and
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellant.
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules: Ramon Duterte, Quirico del Mar, and Asst. City Fiscal Rafael Ybañez
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of for Appellee.
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide; Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Govt. Corporate Counsel Juan C.
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; Jimenez for Appellant.
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter
from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental SYLLABUS
premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may,
by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEM AS PATRIMONIAL
officials; PROPERTY OF MUNICIPALITIES; TRANSFER TO NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not SEWERAGE AUTHORITY BY LEGISLATION. — The term "public works for public
signify "control" (which the President does not have); service" must be interpreted, following the principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but of the preceding words "provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: fountains, public waters and promenades" — under Article 424 of the New Civil Code —
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or which are used freely by all, without distinction. Hence, if the public works is not for
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of such free public service, it is not within the purview of the first paragraph, but of the
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)] second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character. A
municipal water system designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is a After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment which was later amended, declaring
corporate function of the municipality (Mendoza v. De Leon, 33 Phil., 508, citing Omaha Republic Act No. 1383 unconstitutional "in so far as it vests in defendant authority
Water Co. v. Omaha 12 L.R.A., [N.S. ] 736; 77 C.C.A. 267; 147 Fed. 1; Jodson v. (NAWASA) ownership over the Osmeña Waterworks System without just compensation
Borough of Winsted, 80 Conn. 834; 15 L.R.A., [N.S. ], 91). Hence, the Osmeña as required by the Constitution, without prejudice to granting positive coercive relief
Waterworks System, which is open to the public only upon payment of rental, is a upon proper showing that defendant insists upon taking ownership of the Osmeña
patrimonial property of the City of Cebu, and not one for public use. Waterworks System," at the same time upholding the defendant’s right of control,
jurisdiction and supervision over the said System. The question as to what acts of the
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION ESSENTIAL. — The transfer of NAWASA would constitute acts of ownership or dominion and what would be
the Osmeña Waterworks System to another government agency is not a valid exercise considered as an exercise of jurisdiction, supervision and control was left open for
of the police power of the State, because while the power to enact laws intended to future determination.
promote public order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society is inherent in
every sovereign state (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), such power is not without From this decision the present appeal has been interposed by the defendant
limitations, notable among which is the constitutional prohibition against the taking of NAWASA.
private property for public use without just compensation. (Art. III, Sec. 1, Philippine
Constitution.) The provision in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1383 that the properties The facts as found by the lower court and upon which its decision was based, are as
and assets of government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority "in payment for an equal value of the
assets" of the latter, does not constitute sufficient compliance with the said "By an Act of 27 December 1910, the now defunct Philippine Legislature authorized the
constitutional provision. Municipality of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippines, to incur an indebtedness of
$125,000.00 in money of the United States, and to issue bonds covering the amount of
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENTIAL REQUISITE IN THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT the said indebtedness in gold coin of the United States, for the purpose of providing
DOMAIN. — One of the essential requisites to the lawful exercise of the right of eminent funds for the construction of sewer and drainage facilities, to secure a sufficient supply
domain is the payment to the owner of the condemned property of just compensation to of water and necessary buildings for primary schools, and for other purposes (Act No.
be ascertained according to law (Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lousville, etc. R. Co. 270 2009). The Act provided that the proceeds of the sale of the bond issue should be
III. 399; 110 NE 583, Ann. Case 1917B, 760; II Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, p. placed by the Treasurer of the Philippines to the credit of the municipality, to be drawn
1110). therefrom by appropriations by the Municipal Council of Cebu. It exclusively charged
the municipality with the obligation of reimbursing the same from its current revenues.
(Sections 4 and 7, Act No. 2009). The bonds which were to mature in 1941 were
DECISION expressly declared exempt from taxes by the government of the United States or by the
government of the Philippine Islands, and its political or municipal subdivisions, or by
any state or territory of the United States. (Sec. 1, Act No. 2009).
BARRERA, J.:
"Pursuant to the statute, the Municipality of Cebu floated the bond issue and invested
part of the proceeds of the sale thereof in the construction of a waterworks system to
To prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), created supply water to its inhabitants. The system came to be known as the Osmeña
under Republic Act No. 1383, from taking over the ownership, control, supervision, and Waterworks System in honor of the illustrious son of Cebu, former President Sergio
jurisdiction over the Osmeña Waterworks System, pursuant to the provisions of Section Osmeña, Sr., who was then the Speaker of the National Assembly that approved Act
8 of the said Act, the City of Cebu filed an action for declaratory relief in the Court of No. 2009. Since its establishment, the System has been supplying the inhabitants of the
First Instance of Cebu, naming the NAWASA as defendant, praying for a clear municipality of Cebú with water originally taken exclusively from the Buhisan basin,
interpretation of the provisions of said R. A. No. 1383; a declaration of the rights and within an area of approximately five hundred hectares, and which is admittedly within a
obligations of the parties thereunder; and a declaration that the statute or any part government reservation. The basin catches the rain water run-off from the surrounding
thereof, in so far as it deprives the plaintiff of its property rights in the Osmeña hills and impounds it in a reinforced concrete dam. From the dam the water is conveyed
Waterworks System without due process of law and just compensation, is in a 14 inch main pipe to the Tisa Filters where it is treated or purified by means of
unconstitutional. coagulants, rapid sand filtration and chlorination. After the purification process, the
water is stored in a four million-gallon clear water reservoir. From the Tisa Filters the
In its answer, NAWASA contended that as the System had always been under the water is finally conveyed through a 16-inch conduit to the city for distribution to the
control and operation of the National Government, its transfer to the defendant paying customers of the system.
NAWASA was within the competence of Congress to do; that even assuming that the
said System belonged to plaintiff, it was public property and therefore, within the "By statute, the City of Cebú came into existence as a political body corporate on 20
absolute control of Congress; and that granting that it was patrimonial property, there October 1936. (Sec. 2. Commonwealth Act No. 58). The newly created city absorbed
was proper and just compensation provided for in Republic Act No. 1383 for its transfer the former municipality of Cebú. (Sec. 3, Commonwealth Act No. 58).
to NAWASA.
"Among the general powers granted to, and duties imposed upon, the legislative body
of the City, known as the Municipal Board, is that of providing for the maintenance of Appellant, in its appeal, claims that the lower court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
waterworks for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of the city, and the
purification of the source of supply and the places through which the same passes, and 1. In declaring Republic Act Number 1383 unconstitutional in that it vests in defendant
to regulate the consumption and use of the water; to fix and provide for the collection of ownership and control of the Osmeña Waterworks System without just compensation
rents therefor; and to regulate the construction, repair, and use of hydrants, pumps, as required by the Constitution.
cisterns, and reservoirs. Sec. 17-x. Commonwealth Act 58). Pursuant to the aforesaid
charter provision, the Municipal Board of the City of Cebú has been running and 2. In not holding that under the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State,
operating the Osmeña Waterworks System. Its municipal Board provides for the Congress has the authority to enact a law transferring the Osmeña Waterworks System
budgetary expenses of the System and governs the disposition of the System’s to another agency of the Government such as the defendant National Waterworks and
revenue. Sewerage Authority in this case.

"On 16 November 1948, the Public Service Commission granted plaintiff City a 3. In declaring that Republic Act Number 1383 does not provide for just compensation
certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain the Osmeña Waterworks and also in refusing to recognize the right of the National Government to acquire the
System, subject to the terms and conditions imposed therein Exh. E). Osmeña Waterworks System by eminent domain.

"For the purpose of expanding the service to meet the water needs of its increased 4. In not dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.
population, the City of Cebu, on 11 December 1950 filed with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources an application for the use of water emanating from a The issues presented above are basically the same as those raised and determined by
natural spring in a private land belonging to the late Dr. Pio Valencia, situated in this court in the recent case of the City of Baguio v. The National Waterworks and
Hagubiao, Consolación, Cebú. The said application was in due time approved by the Sewerage Authority, 106 Phil., 144; 57 Off. Gaz. [9] 1579. In the aforesaid case,
department head. Page 5, Exh. C). passing upon the question of whether Republic Act. No. 1383 provides for the
automatic expropriation of the waterworks mentioned therein, we held, citing Section 6,
"On 17 June 1955, defendant Authority was created as a public corporation. (Sec. 1, Article XIII and Section 1-(2), Article III of our Constitution, this
Republic Act No. 1383). Pursuant to its charter, defendant shall own and/or have wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan
Water District as well as all areas now served by existing government-owned "It is clear that the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer to public
waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time,
municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines including those served by the one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for public
Waterworks and Wells and Drills Sections of the Bureau of Public Works’ (Sec. 1). use and upon payment of just compensation. There is an attempt to observe this
Defendant was also given the power ‘to acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, sell, lease, requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of appellee’s
rent, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise dispose of real and personal property waterworks system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer be made upon
including rights and franchises within the Philippines, as authorized by the purposes for payment of an equivalent value of the property. Has this been implemented? Has
which the Authority was created and reasonably and necessarily required for the appellant actually transferred to appellee any asset of the NAWASA that may be
transaction of the lawful business of the same unless otherwise provided in this Act’, considered just compensation for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the
and to exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose for which the Authority was record to show that such was done. Neither is there anything to this effect in Office
created, in the manner provided for by law for condemnation proceedings by the Memorandum No. 7 issued by the NAWASA in implementation of the provision of
national, provincial, and municipal governments;’ (Sec. 2, paragraphs [h] and [i]). Republic Act No. 1383. The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA but they are not
specified. While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtedness and issue
"Lastly, the Act provides that ‘all existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance when necessary for the
systems in cities, municipalities and municipal districts, including springs and other transaction of its business (sec. 2, par. (1), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has
water sources, as well as the water-works and sewerage bonds, sinking funds, and all been taken to comply with appellant’s commitment in so far as payment of
indebtedness in general of the said Metropolitan Water District, and government-owned compensation of appellee is concerned. As to when such action should be taken no one
waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to the National Waterworks and knows. And unless this aspect of the law is clarified and appellee is given its due
Sewerage Authority, and the Board is hereby authorized and directed to receive and compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of its property even if appellant desires to
assume all such assets and liabilities or on behalf of the said Authority, and in turn to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law. We are therefore persuaded
pledge such assets as security for the payment of waterworks and sewerage bonded to conclude that the law, insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without
debt’ and that the net book value of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water providing for an effective payment of just compensation, violates our
District and of government owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
municipalities, or municipal districts, and other government-owned waterworks and
sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of Exactly the same situation obtains in the present case. Section 8 of Republic Act No.
the assets of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority’. (Sec. 8)."cralaw 1383 (supra.) provides that "the net book value of the properties and assets of the
virtua1aw library Metropolitan Water District and of government-owned waterworks and sewerage
systems in cities, municipalities of municipal districts, and other government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an such free public service, it is not within the purview of the first paragraph, but of the
equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority." In other second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character. And, as
words, all the properties and assets of the Osmeña Waterworks System are transferred already held by this Court, a municipal water system designed to supply water to the
to the defendant NAWASA in exchange for an equal value of the latter’s assets. But inhabitants for profit is a corporate function of the municipality (Mendoza v. De Leon, 33
what these assets consist of, nothing concrete presently appears. All that is provided in Phil., 508, citing Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 12 L.R.A., [N.S. ] 736; C.C.A. 267; 147
Section 8 is that NAWASA acquires all the assets and liabilities of all government- Fed. 1; Jodson v. Borough of Winsted, 80 Conn. 384; 15 L.R.A. [N.S. ], 91).
owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the country. It is an equal value of these
unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed to be given to plaintiff-appellee as "Cases differ as to the public and private character of waterworks in some respects, but
payment of its System. Such, certainly, is not a compensation that satisfies the the weight of authority, in so far as legislative control is concerned, classes them as
Constitutional provisions. private affairs. (Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Alt. 557, 90 A.L.R. 688,
cited in City of Baguio v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, supra.)
Appellant, however, maintains that the waterworks involved herein is not a patrimonial
property of the City of Cebu but one for public use and, therefore, falls within the control The consequential effect of such declaration is foreseeable, thus:chanrob1es virtual
of the legislature. We find no merit in this contention. 1aw library

It must be remembered that the Osmeña Waterworks System was established out of Although the state may regulate the service and rates of water plants owned and
the $125,000.00 loan extended to the municipality of Cebu by the U.S. Government, operated by municipalities, such property is to employed for governmental purposes
payable within 30 years from the release thereof (Sec. 1, Act 2009), and which and in the ownership operation thereof the municipality acts in its proprietary capacity,
apparently was fully paid for by said municipality as certified to by the Insular Treasurer free from legislative interference (1 McQuillin, p. 683).
(Exh. D). For its operation and maintenance, the City of Cebu (Osmeña Waterworks
System) applied for and obtained a certificate of public convenience from the Public The water system of a city not being a property held for governmental purposes is to
Service Commission (Exh. E) and was made subject to the rates fixed and regulations subject to legislative control (Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 156 Ky. 569, 161
imposed by said body. The System owned properties which appellee estimated at SW 988).
P10,000.000.00, although appellant claims it to be worth only P1,000.000.00, and
operates on a budget approved by its Board of Directors (not by Congress), the In the ownership and control of a water system purchased by the city out of the
disbursement of which was placed under the supervision and custody of the City proceeds of the loan contracted for that purpose, the city acts in its proprietary
Treasurer (t.s.n., pp. 28-29). The mere fact that the Buhisan basin where the water is character as distinguished from its governmental capacity (Helena Consolidated Water
collected stands on a government reservation, and that the System was created to Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1, 49 Pac., 382, 37 L.R.A. 412; Public Service Commission v.
serve the needs of the residents of said City (upon payment of certain rates from which City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527; 159 Pac. 24).
the System derives material gain), to our mind do not transform the proprietary nature
of appellee’s ownership over the same to governmental or public. The flaw in Similarly, we cannot uphold appellants theory that the transfer of ownership of the
appellant’s contention that the System is a public works for public service is due to an Osmeña Waterworks System to another governmental agency is a valid exercise of the
apparent misapprehension that because the System serves the public in a manner of police power of the State, because while the power to enact laws intended to promote
speaking, it is, but that token alone, necessarily for public service. The contention public order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society is inherent in every
overlooks the fact that only those of the general public who pay the required rental or sovereign state (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), such power is not without
charge authorized and collected by the System, do make use of the water. In other limitations, notable among which is the constitutional prohibition against the taking of
words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It is open to the public (in this private property for public use without just compensation. (Art. III, Sec. 1, Philippine
sense, it is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain rental (which makes Constitution.)
it proprietary.) Article 424 of the New Civil Code cited by appellant makes clear this
distinction. It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph No exercise of the police power can disregard the constitutional guarantees in respect
to the taking of private property, due process and equal protection of the laws and it
"Art. 424. Property for public use, in the province, cities, and municipalities, consist of should to override the demands of natural justice (People v. Chicago, M & St. P.R. Co.,
the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155, 28 A.L.R. 610.)
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities. If a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, morals or
safety, has no real or substantial reason to these objects, or is a palpable invasion of
"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by rights secured by fundamental law, it is the duty of courts to adjudge, and thereby give
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."cralaw virtua1aw library effect to the Constitution, (Gaines & Co. v. Holmes, 15, Ga. 344, 144 S.E. 327, 27
A.L.R. 98.)
Thus, the term "public works for public service’’ must be interpreted, following the
principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, Action in the nature of police regulation is void if against the express provisions of the
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades’’ Constitution although otherwise within its general power to make police regulations.
which are used freely by all, without distinction. Hence, if the public works is not for (State v. Froechlich, 115 Wis. 32, 92 N.W. 115).
 23 ................................................ vacant
Appellant also urges recognition of the right of the National Government (through the It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority) to acquire the Osmeña Waterworks Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating
System by eminent domain. This, we find to be equally untenable, for one of the the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
essential requisites to the lawful exercise of this right is the payment to the owner of the On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General,
condemned property of just compensation to be ascertained according to law (Western pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in
Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 270 Ill. 399; 110 NE 583, Ann. Cas 1917B 760; question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. 3
II Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, p. 1110). Needless to state in this respect, that it On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
is precisely for this reason, that is, lack of provision regarding effective payment of just Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the
compensation, that Republic Act No. 1383 was declared violative of the Constitution, in assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new
the case of City of Baguio v. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority. ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties
Wherefore, and finding no reason to depart from the established jurisprudence on the and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably
matter, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered. between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia recommendation of the Auditor General.
and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the
assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for
G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968 Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee, therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and
vs. buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
INTERNAL REVENUE,defendants-appellants. ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39,
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants. and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the
BENGZON, J.P., J.: previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the
to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that — to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City
Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all
of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings partial payment of the P764,220.05 due it.
constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that —
gleaned from the records, 1 said properties were being utilized as follows — All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of
No. of Lots Use Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred,
1 ................................................ Capitol Site free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed for
3 ................................................ School Site emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the
3 ................................................ Hospital Site Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to
3 ................................................ Leprosarium Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken
1 ................................................ Curuan School from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City
admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46
1 ................................................ Trade School has already been returned to it.
2 ................................................ Burleigh School This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962,
2 ................................................ High School Playground a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants
9 ................................................ Burleighs
Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay) It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving
1 ................................................ San Roque plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's
rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and the
Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of P57,373.46 ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided
to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of into property for public use and patrimonial property.
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments. ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,
as prayed for. After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
12, 1963, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads: service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
private properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements (Stressed for emphasis).
thereon under certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2)
defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of
to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to be deducted from its the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium
regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held
Secretary of Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and
deduct 25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its
Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials the corresponding actuation was without jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v.
public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of Director of Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held
land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" that the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
to "A-49") upon payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification regarding
full; dismissing the counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are not classified as
declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower
1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
assessed against the defendants. On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting
It is SO ORDERED. the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this
filed a motion to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants' opposition, the governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. 10
lower court granted plaintiff province's motion. Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of declaratory relief occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the
filed in the lower court on the assertion that the law had already been violated and that public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the States in favor of the
anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only as to
proceed to the more important and principal question of the validity of Republic Act property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V.
3039. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the
buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police stations and
control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt
principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties. (3)
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot
Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The is not patrimonial property of a municipality.
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the
compensation. 6 lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by
which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject
that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as public property are the
properties in question? following:
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which
provide:1äwphï1.ñët
TCT ..................................... .....................................
5585 171-B Burleigh
Numbe Lot Number Use . .
r ..................................... .....................................
5586 173 Burleigh
..................................... ..................................... . .
2200 4-B Capitol Site
. . ..................................... .....................................
5587 172-A Burleigh
..................................... ..................................... . .
2816 149 School Site
. . We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each other
..................................... ..................................... Hospital and in turn are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per
3281 1224 records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands. Hence, there is sufficient basis
. . Site
..................................... ..................................... Hospital for holding that said eight lots constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh
3282 1226 schools, and partake of the nature of the same.
. . Site
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the
..................................... ..................................... Hospital records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former
3283 1225
. . Site Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have
..................................... 434-A- ..................................... been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the
3748 School Site
. 1 . further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such
..................................... ..................................... as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said
5406 171 School Site buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence,
. .
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with
..................................... ..................................... High School the lots in question.
5564 168
. . Play-ground But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute
..................................... 157 & ..................................... Trade mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature
5567
. 158 . School of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be
..................................... ..................................... High School for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by
5583 167 the provincial residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not
. . Play-ground
really deprived of the benefits thereof.
..................................... (O.C.T. ..................................... Curuan
6181 But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its
. ) . School
share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties
..................................... ..................................... Leprosariu since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots are:
11942 926
. . m
TCT Number Lot Number Use
..................................... ..................................... Leprosariu
11943 927 Mydro,
. . m 5577 ...................................... 177 ......................................
Magay
..................................... ..................................... Leprosariu
11944 925 13198 ...................................... 127-0 ...................................... San Roque
. . m
5569 ...................................... 169 ...................................... Burleigh 15
..................................... ..................................... Burleigh
5557 170 5558 ...................................... 175 ...................................... Vacant
. . School
..................................... ..................................... Burleigh 5559 ...................................... 188 ...................................... "
5562 180
. . School 5560 ...................................... 183 ...................................... "
..................................... ..................................... 5561 ...................................... 186 ...................................... "
5565 172-B Burleigh
. . 5563 ...................................... 191 ...................................... "
..................................... ..................................... 5566 ...................................... 176 ...................................... "
5570 171-A Burleigh
. .
5568 ...................................... 179 ...................................... "
..................................... .....................................
5571 172-C Burleigh 5574 ...................................... 196 ...................................... "
. .
..................................... ..................................... 181-
5572 174 Burleigh 5575 ...................................... ...................................... "
. . A
..................................... ..................................... 181-
5573 178 Burleigh 5576 ...................................... ...................................... "
. . B
5578 ...................................... 182 ...................................... "
5579 ...................................... 197 ...................................... "
 5580 ...................................... 195 ...................................... " P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff province. The
remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should
159-
5581 ...................................... ...................................... " then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary
B
of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's
5582 ...................................... 194 ...................................... " prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of
5584 ...................................... 190 ...................................... " action recited in the complaint 17clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the
5588 ...................................... 184 ...................................... " continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal revenue allotments of
defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff
5589 ...................................... 187 ...................................... " to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has been so far in legal
5590 ...................................... 189 ...................................... " contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the registered
5591 ...................................... 192 ...................................... " lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another
5592 ...................................... 193 ...................................... "
judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
5593 ...................................... 185 ...................................... " (1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga
7379 ...................................... 4147 ...................................... " del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for (2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of
governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties,
cannot convert public property to private. 16 after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by
along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner
along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to Fernando, JJ., concur.
the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code
— is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, e. Municipal Public Utilities
the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as f. Municipal Funds and Revenues
"special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly g. Others
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this Magtajas v Pryce (1994)
particular case. Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority (1991)
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches
is without merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
value of the properties in question. While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said vs.
properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof was PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
effected subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961
that the present controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, CRUZ, J.:
negative laches. There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth.
nature, said share to computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted
contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
formed by the Auditor General. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the
was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount of
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local
hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall
ORDINANCE NO. 3353 enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE and moral welfare of the community;
USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE NOW THEREFORE,
OPERATION OF CASINO. BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan
Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that: de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the
operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit following penalties:
shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the
operation of casino within the city limits. proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation,
Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure
any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business thereof;
establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1)
casino operation and other gambling activities. year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of
Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of
penalties, to wit: gambling CASINO.
a) Suspension of the business Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
permit for sixty (60) days for the publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
first offense and a fine of Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
P1,000.00/day PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
b) Suspension of the business March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the
permit for Six (6) months for the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
second offense, and a fine of denied on July 13, 1993. 2
P3,000.00/day Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under
c) Permanent revocation of the Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
business permit and holding that:
imprisonment of One (1) year, for 1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
the third and subsequent Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit
offenses. the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino
Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from within the City's territorial limits.
publication thereof. 2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance"
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only
reading as follows: mean "illegal gambling."
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93 3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO therefore invalid on that point.
AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR. 4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295; 5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
of CASINO; 6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al.
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in
No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction
CASINO; of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the
the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art.
entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the
embodied in Section 16 as follows: respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for Government Code.
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling
inhabitants. without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that: would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms
Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos.
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to
xxx xxx xxx Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(v) Enact ordinances intended to (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
prevent, suppress and impose orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
appropriate penalties for habitual thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code
drunkenness in public places, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
vagrancy, mendicancy, It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
prostitution, establishment and Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners,
maintenance of houses of ill in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor
repute, gamblingand other of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
prohibited games of chance, Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the
fraudulent devices and ways to provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
obtain money or property, drug (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
addiction, maintenance of drug liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
dens, drug pushing, juvenile thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
delinquency, the printing, lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
distribution or exhibition of existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
obscene or pornographic government unit concerned;
materials or publications, and xxx xxx xxx
such other activities inimical to (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
the welfare and morals of the interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
inhabitants of the city; accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5 Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and
family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the
to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have
the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their
creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has
This is the opportune time to stress an important point. been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit
it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it has only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all
and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers
their acts, and not to the courts of justice. as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the
Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause,
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. repealed.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or
6) It must not be unreasonable. concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act.
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No.
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it
"and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only governs locally-funded projects.
illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar
suppressed. as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2,
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of
But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68,
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
shrift from this Court.
 amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
amended, and obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
Apostol, 10 this Court explained: and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may
on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are
statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
bear to each other the relation of general to special. legislature. 11
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units
the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm
the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still
crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be
the government. withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will
coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that
give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we
us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against
Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local
complementary. Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention
illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is here.
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code,
the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a gambling prohibited by law.
lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these
statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only
G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991 the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
vs. unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF in Metro Manila."
MANDALUYONG, respondents. On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The
CRUZ, J.: Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the
and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license
vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints
decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged
for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among
executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
Judgments on July 13, 1990. To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers
Subsequently, the following developments transpired: and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof,
when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It
letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the
whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where responsibility among others of:
they should file their complaints. 1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination,
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance
Police Force. because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence
Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The
plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only
the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police in a direct action challenging its validity.
Command-Western Police District. For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does
driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,
memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a
Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain formal challenge to its validity.
conditions. On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty
in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which
reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs.
there was no actual case or controversy before the Court. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a
law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of
the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the
Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy. Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan
of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as
More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already
and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution
report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed of the substantive issues raised.
the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the
they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of
formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the
and could have been more assertive of their rights. proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues
presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the raised.
basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to Now to the merits.
fester. The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988,
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the
concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
such rules. measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the presence of a sufficient standard. 5
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.

facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also
justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9,
been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar,
1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties
the exercise of such delegated power.
involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the
Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were
before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same
corporations.
fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of
jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R.
No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L- or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;
and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7
2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these
procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they
petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in
do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
 Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would
and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said
Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land
ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the
thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and
is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila
verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director
Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the
driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act
Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update. 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter
xxx xxx xxx of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496,
reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made
first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the
by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration
fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila
of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose
Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not
regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan
xxx xxx xxx imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
xxx xxx xxx
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in
violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to
or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the
Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law
the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.
preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. We affirm.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances
not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.
xxx xxx xxx Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles,
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to
validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
"impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end
that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be be valid, would be ultra vires.
imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing,
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A.
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8
They are mere agents elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the questioned.
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives
will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic
merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more
of a statute. deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in
Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the
Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned fact is that there is no statutory authority for — and indeed there is a statutory
sanction. prohibition against — the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments
Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
held in part: It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such Labor . . . shall fix and collect reasonable inspection fees. (section 3). 2 chanrobles
action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license virtual law library
plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver His Honor perceived no repeal by implication, and believed there was no legislative
licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. intention to deprive the City of its power to tax and license steam boilers, pointing to the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: subsequent enactment in 1949 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Republic
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Act No. 409) repeating the identical provisions of the Administrative Code above
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; quoted. There was no repeal, in our opinion too. In the first place the City's power to
and tax steam boilers could not have been affected by the Department of Labor's power
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the to regulate or inspect them: one is taxation, the other regulation. In the second place,
license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and the power of inspection of the Secretary of Labor does not necessarily conflict with that
confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area. of the Secretary of Labor does not necessarily conflict with that of the City authorities,
SO ORDERED. because the former has particular relation to the "safety of laborers and employees"
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño- (section 1) of industrial enterprises, whereas that of the City of Manila is not limited to
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. such purpose, but is related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City,
Nocon, J., took no part. particularly of the neighborhood wherein the boilers are located. (Smoke, noise,
3. National and Local Legislation vibration, fire hazards etc.) Different purposes are served by the two
Manila Electric Co v City of Manila inspections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
LLDA v CA (1995) Anyway, this Court has already declared in U. S. vs. Chan Teinco, 25 Phil., 89: .
The mere fact that a municipality, for the purpose of protecting the health of its people,
G.R. No. L-8694 April 28, 1956 requires a permit from the president of the municipal board of health for the
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA,Defendant- slaughtering of large cattle, does not contravene nor it is repugnant to the provisions of
Appellant. the general law, a permit from the municipal treasurer for the slaughtering of large
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for appellant. cattle. The purposes of the two laws are distinct. Many instances might be given
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Milagros A. German for appellee. showing that an inhabitant of a municipality, before he can do a particular thing or
BENGZON, J.: engage in a particular class of business, should secure two permits, one from the
This is a suit to recover the sum of P4,630 (with interest) which plaintiff paid to the City municipality and another from the State.
of Manila as inspection fees of its steam boilers, in accordance with the provisions of Mr. Justice Johnson who wrote the above quotation had previously had occasion to
Chapter 117, Title 15, of the Revised Ordinances of said city. Such provisions, plaintiff make a lengthy exposition, replete with precedents, of the principle that a municipal
alleged, have been repealed by subsequent legislation. It also alleged that the fees regulation or prohibition of a certain line of activity may co-exist with national regulation
were grossly disproportionate to the services or prohibition of the same. (U. S. vs, Joson, 26 Phil., 1). Because in the opinion of the
rendered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library judicial authorities there is nothing "inherently obnoxious in the requirement that a
The Manila court of first instance, after hearing the parties, rendered judgment person engaging in a business shall have two licenses, one issued by the state and
dismissing the complaint, with costs, Judge Edilberto Barot made the following another by a political subdivision or public corporation. (33 Am. Jur.
statement of the case: 345).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff operates seven steam boilers of more than In its last assignment of error the plaintiff asserts that the inspection fees charged by
100 horse power each generating electricity in the City of Manila. As fees for the the City are "excessive, unreasonable, and grossly disproportionate to the services
inspection of its boilers by inspectors of the Department of labor under regulations rendered" by it. This point does not seem to be material. If the inspection fees had been
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 104, as demanded solely by virtue of the City's power to regulate and license steam boilers, it
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 696, plaintiff paid the National Government might be pertinent to inquire into the responsibility of the charges. However, the City
P2,390 in 1946, P2,044.10 in 1947, P2,826.50 in 1948, and P3,326, in 1949. has also authority to tax steam boilers; and there is every indication that herein charges
(Paragraph II, complaint; paragraph l, defendant's answer.) Furthermore, upon were collected both the power to tax and the power to regulate. The name "fee" not
defendant's demand, plaintiff also paid, but under protest, to defendant city, the sum of conclusive taxes are often times called fees.
P3,524 on January 24, 1949, and P1,506 on February 11, 1949, or a total of P4,630, as Where under undoubted charter power to tax is imposed for revenue alone, or for police
fees for inspection of the same boilers by the office of the City Engineer, pursuant to the regulation and revenue, the amount thereof is usually a matter for determination by the
provisions of Title 15, Chapter 117, of the Revised Ordinances. (Paragraphs IV and V, legislative branch of the municipal government. Ordinarily the courts will decline to
complaint; paragraphs II and III, defendant's answer.) interfere on the ground that the amount is oppressive or unreasonably large. (McQuillen
The Manila Chapter (1917) authorized the Municipal Board "to tax . . steam boilers" and on Municipal Corporations, 2nd. ed., Vo. 3, pp. 686-693).
to regulate . . . steam engines and boilers" and provide for the inspection thereof and for The appealed judgment will therefore be affirmed with costs against appellant. So
a reasonable fee for such inspection". 1 Pursuant to this statute the ordinance in ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
question was approved, and the payment demanded and received. However plaintiff Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L.
insists by Commonwealth Act No. 104 (1936) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
696 (1945) repealed the above portions of the Manila Charter, because these two G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
enactment direct that "for inspection of boilers and pressures vessels, the Secretary of
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
vs. important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and
BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET the individual personal interests of people, on the other?
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the
vs. aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act
BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for
BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. social and economic development.
TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain
D. PAPA, JR., respondents. sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined
vs. with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the
JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; general public over: — the environment impact of development on the water quality and
GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the
ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not
vs. taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of
BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, — likewise
FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced
vs. growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of
BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake
JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
vs. and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, disturbances, deterioration and pollution.1
BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j),
VEGA, respondents. (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, xxx xxx xxx
vs. (j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and
JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and
SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in
FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make
PACIS, respondents. experiments, whenever necessary, with the
collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and view of improving present techniques and
profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or
the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can amended by the procedure provided in the
following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to
and permits or authorizations remain in force; separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of
monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue appropriate water quality standard to be enforced
new permit for the use of the lake waters for any such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA
projects or activities in or affecting the said lake Board.2
including navigation, construction, and operation of To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the
and to impose necessary safeguards for lake Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited
quality control and management and to collect natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
necessary fees for said activities and renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use
projects: Provided, That the fees collected for of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue
fisheries may be shared between the Authority and constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited
other government agencies and political sub- powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged
divisions in such proportion as may be determined the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities
by the President of the Philippines upon and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order
further, That the Authority's Board may determine No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:
new areas of fishery development or activities Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water
which it may place under the supervision of the within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive
into account the overall development plans and jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any
programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of projects or activities in or affecting the said region including
water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
subject to the approval of the President of the fish corrals and the like.
Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay
which shall govern fisheries development activities Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of
in Laguna de Bay which shall take into San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the
consideration among others the following: socio- towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the
economic amelioration of bonafide resident towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban
fishermen whether individually or collectively in the in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig,
form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
a master plan for fishpen construction and Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to
operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all
town residents, and preference to lake shore town beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation,
residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects; municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste
(l) To require the cities and municipalities disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected,
embraced within the region to pass appropriate and the sharing with other government agencies and political
zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the
necessary to carry out the objectives of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's
Authority and enforce the same with the assistance Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following
of the Authority; manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund
notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75
public waters within the Laguna de Bay region percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the
whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake
projects; Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified
(n) To act in coordination with existing as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governmental agencies in establishing water quality governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and
standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided,
waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds
with said existing agencies of the government of
 and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied) that:
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT
"Laguna Lake" in this manner: FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant
Sec 41. Definition of Terms. to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and
this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and
covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the
meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna
said lake. Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The declared outrightly as illegal.
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean 2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so
that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be
issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. Illegal Fishing.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their
therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may: Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not
oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or
areas, within a definite zone of the municipal both at the discretion of the court.
waters, as determined by it; . . . . All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have
fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before
species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
free from any rental fee, charges or any other One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the
imposition whatsoever. illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
xxx xxx xxx them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof,
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . . otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
xxx xxx xxx Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for
Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan,
corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for
bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading
species or fish within the municipal waters. Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case
xxx xxx xxx No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig,
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco;
fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-
fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong,
area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by
all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil
the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing
policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial Corporation.
municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The
already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs
environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and
566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development
question. Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865- water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation,
71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the
concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted
and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal
the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals,
following reliefs, viz.: oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary municipal waters.
injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566; We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the
exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
co-equal body; The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that
of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
authority to issue said permits. is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It
referred to the Court of Appeals. is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions law."3
insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because
concerned. implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by
charging the following errors: a subsequent general law by mere implication.4
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the
COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA Local Government Code of 1991.
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are
AGENCY. environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is
TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. an exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the integrity and balance."
towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the "Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
concerned? development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." development of the region.
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management xxx xxx xxx
policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over . . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5 regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and
On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units." quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all
and for lake quality control and management.6 It does partake of the nature of police actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting
State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Courts have jurisdiction.
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160,
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua- otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the
culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No.
provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court charter vested on it.
in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its
which we quote: avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise
xxx xxx xxx stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
where the special law provides for another forum. It must be WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted,
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC,
declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal;
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and of discretion.
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void.
pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan;
by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled.
effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically,
policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield
local government offices/agencies within the region, public Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation;
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation,
Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS (c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit
Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso concerned, direct the appropriate national agency to provide financial,
Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and technical, or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. Such
MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit
demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority. concerned.
SO ORDERED. (d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. corporations with field units or branches in a province, city, or municipality
shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his information and
C. President’s Power of General Supervision guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and
Secs. 2 and 4, Art. X, Const. expenditures.
Sec. 25, LGC
Mondano v Silvosa (1955)
CONST Hebron v Reyes (1958)
ARTICLE X Ganzon v Kayanan (1958)
Local Government Ganzon v CA (1991)
General Provisions Taule v Santes (1997)
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Carpio v Executive Secretary (1992)
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be Drilon v Lim (1994)
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter Bito-Onon v Fernandez (2001)
provided. National Liga ng mga Barangay v Paredes (2004)
SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Batangas v Romulo (2004)
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide Kida v State (2012) (Resolution of MFR)
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and G.R. No. L-7708 May 30, 1955
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, JOSE MONDANO, petitioner,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, vs.
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the Provincial Board, respondents.
units. D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, PADILLA, J.:
and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit,
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn
functions. complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1)
LGC rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting
CHAPTER III with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant
Intergovernmental Relations Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for
ARTICLE I immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
National Government and Local Government Units appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served
Section 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall the same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending
exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the
their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against
province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent
the city and municipality with respect to barangays. provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and
coordinate with one another and with the local government units concerned approval of a bond for P500.
in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the participation of The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that
local government units both in the planning and implementation of said are inferences and conclusions of law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the
national projects. Revised Administrative Code which clothes the department head with "direct control,
direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to
that end "may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the
of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration
committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations; . . of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
."and the rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 452, which upheld same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised
"the power of the Secretary of Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been
charges against local elective municipal officials and to suspend them preventively," on abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
the board proposition "that under the presidential type of government which we have In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to
adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised
force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and Administrative Code must be done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of Republic of the Philippines he "may at any time remove a person from any position of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive." trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again,
The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law.
before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary
Congress shall provide otherwise."1 Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the requested immediate investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint
Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of the Revised Administrative
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local Code which provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully upon direction of the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive
executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to investigate the
power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation
governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189
may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section
for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve"
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office."
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board
bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative
which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial
provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot
are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28
control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn
may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, complaint of the offended spouse.4 The charges preferred against the petitioner,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those
Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local governments" is to specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such
be construedas the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the
the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without
difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law authority of law.
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or G.R. No. L-9124 July 28, 1958
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties BERNARDO HEBRON, petitioner,
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of vs.
the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. EULALIO D. REYES, respondent.
4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision E. A. Beltran for petitioner.
over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and Roxas and Sarmiento for respondent.
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G.
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondent.
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, Vicente G. Sinco and Enrique M. Fernando as amici curiae.
"he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a CONCEPCION, J.:
copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action Carmona, Province of Cavite.
by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
 In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, a member of Professor Enrique M. Fernando, were allowed to intervene as amici curiae. At the
the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and said amici curiae,
were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed their respective
term of four (4) years, beginning from January 1, 1952, on which date they memoranda, and, on September 2, 1955, the case became submitted for decision. The
presumably assumed the aforementioned offices. Petitioner discharged the case could not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the
duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he members of this Court could not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach an
received the following communication: agreement on the decision thereon. Although the term of office of petitioner herein
expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES has not thereby become entirely moot, as regards such rights as may have accrued to
Manila, May 14, 1954 him prior thereto. For this reason, and, also, because the question of law posed in the
pleadings, concerns a vital feature of the relations between the national government
SIR: and the local governments, and the Court has been led to believe that the parties,
Please be advised that the President has decided for the good of the public specially the executive department, are earnestly interested in a clear-cut settlement of
service, to assume directly the investigation to the administrative charges said question, for the same will, otherwise, continue to be a constant source of friction,
against you for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious disputes and litigations to the detriment of the smooth operation of the Government and
misconduct in office, and has designated the Provincial Fiscal of that province of the welfare of the people, the members of this Court deem it necessary to express
as Special Investigator of the said charges. Copy of his designation is their view thereon, after taking ample time to consider and discuss full every
enclosed for your information. conceivable aspect thereof.
In view of the serious nature of the aforementioned charges against you, and The issue is whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of
in order to promote a fair and impartial investigation thereof, you are hereby the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the
suspended from office, effective immediately, your suspension, to last until the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
final termination of the administrative proceedings against you Revised Administrative Code.
aforementioned. In this connection, please be advised that the Vice-Mayor has 1. At the outset, it should be noted that, referring to local elective officers, we held,
been directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during the period of your in Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93, 98), that the President has no
suspension, in accordance with the provisions of Section 2195 of the Revised "inherent power to remove or suspend" them. In said case, we declared, also:
Administrative Code. . . . Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the
The Provincial Governor and the Special Investigator have been advised particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional
hereof. limitation. . . . .
Respectfully, xxx xxx xxx
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President
By authority of the President:
sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10,
(Sgd.) FRED RUIZ CASTRO
Executive Secretary paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate
Mr. BERNARDO HEBRON control. (People vs. Brophy, 120 P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal. App., 2nd., 15.) Far
Municipal Mayor from implying control or power to remove the President's supervisory authority
Carmona, Cavite over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by law",
(Record, pp. 1-2). a clear indication of constitutional intention that the provisions was not to be
Thereupon, respondent Eulalio D. Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And the limitation does
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the charges referred to in the above-quoted not stop here. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised
letter. After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove
submitted his report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to
in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be law, which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for
forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
on May 13, 1955, he instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground What are "the causes and . . . the fashion . . . and the procedure" prescribed by law for
that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had the suspension of elective municipal officials? The aforementioned sections 2188 to
unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code read:
be entitled thereto. SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal
Respondent and the Solicitor General, who was allowed to intervene, filed their officers. — The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints
respective answers admitting substantially the main allegations of fact in petitioner's made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
complaint, but denying the alleged illegality of petitioner's suspension and alleging that corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
respondent was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and lawful judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency, he
order of the President. Owing to the nature and importance of the issue thus raised, may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be
Dean Vicente G. Sinco of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, and desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or As regards the effect of these provisions, suffice it for us to quote the opinion of Mr.
by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the Justice Tuason — former Secretary of Justice — in the case of Villena vs. Roque (93
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge Phil., 363, decided on June 19, 1953), referring, particularly, to said section 2190 of the
be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where Revised Administrative Code:
suspension is thus effected the written charges against the officer shall be filed By all canons of statutory construction and, I might say with apology, common
with the board within five days. sense, the preceding sections should control in the field of investigations of
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. — When written charges against, and suspension of, municipal officials. The minuteness and
charges are preferred by a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the care, in three long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such investigations
provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special, set a day, hour, and suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to exclude other
and place for the trial of the same and notify the respondent thereof; and at the modes of proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to
to and place appointed, the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the make the operation of said provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance
truth or falsity of said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be of higher authorities. To contend that these by their broad and unspecified
heard in his defense. The hearing shall occur as soon as may be practicable, power can also investigate such charges and order the temporary suspension
and in case suspension has been effected, not later than ten days from the of the erring officials indefinitely is to defy all concepts of the solemnity of
date the accused is furnished or has sent to him a copy of the charges, unless legislative pronouncements and to set back the march of local self-government
the suspended official shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of which it has been the constant policy of the legislative branch and of the
time to prepare his defense. Constitution to promote.
The preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than Indeed, it is, likewise, well settled that laws governing the suspension or removal of
thirty days. At the expiration of the thirty days, the suspended officer shall be public officers, especially those chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings construed in their favor.1
against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the
is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the accused, in which case the time of same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or
the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of the clear provision to the contrary — which does not exist with respect to municipal officers.
suspension: Provided, That the suspension of the accused may continue after What is more, the language of sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative
the expiration of the thirty days above mentioned in case of conviction until the Code leaves no room for doubt that the law — in the words of Mr. Justice Tuason —
Secretary of the Interior shall otherwise direct or the case shall finally be "frowns upon prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials"
decided by said Secretary. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93). Pursuant to said section 2188,
SEC. 2190. Action by provincial board. — If, upon due consideration, the . . . "the provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against
provincial board shall adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the accused has been maladministation of office." It provides that in case suspension has been
guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by reprimand or effected, the hearing shall occur as soon as practicable, in no case later than
further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such ten days from the date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless
reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if the suspended official on sufficient grounds asks from an extension of time to
suspended, shall be reinstated. prepare his defense. The section further warns that "the preventive suspension
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, shall not be for more than thirty days," and ordains that at the end of that
and in case of appeal, it shall without unnecessary delay forward to the period the officer should be reinstated in office without prejudice to the
Secretary of the Interior, within eight days after the date of the decision of the continuation of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the
provincial board, certified copies of the record in the case, including the delay in the decision of the case is due to the defendant's fault, neglect or
charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall be added request and unless in case of conviction the Secretary of the Interior shall
the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought to be otherwise direct.
suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in such xxx xxx xxx
case the board may exercise its direction to reinstate the official, if suspended. The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code,
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto which is consecrated policy in other jurisdictions whose republican institutions
shall be given preference over the current and routine business of the board. this country has copied, requires speedy termination of a case in which
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior. — Upon receiving the papers in suspension has been decreed, not only in the interest of the immediate party
any such proceedings, the Secretary of the Interior shall review the but of the public in general. The electorate is vitally interested, and the public
case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the good demands, that the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest
reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as time possible, separated from the service if proven unfit and unfaithful to its
the facts shall warrant and shall render his final decision upon the matter trust, and restored if found innocent. Special proceedings alone, restored if
within thirty days after the date on which the case was received. Disciplinary found innocent. Special proceedings alone, unencumbered by nice
suspension made upon order of the Secretary of the Interior shall be without technicalities of pleading, practice and procedure, and the right of appeal, are
pay. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the best calculated to guarantee quick result. (Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz., 93,
Department Head and approved by the President of the Philippines. 103-104, 105.)
In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local government's is to be
investigation by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, with the report of the latter, were construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79
forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 15, 1954. Yet, the administrative (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a
decision on the charges against petitioner was not rendered, either before the filing of distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.
the complaint herein, on May 13, 1955, or before the expiration of petitioner's term of In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
office, on December 31, 1955. Manifestly, petitioner's continued, indefinite suspension of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of aforementioned provisions of the fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
Revised Administrative Code. prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
2. Respondent and the amici curiae involve sections 79 (C) and 86 of the Revised hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
Administrative Code, which are of the following tenor: aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
Sec. 79 (C). Power of direction and supervision. — The Department Head and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such in the
shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and import of the provisions of section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code
offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodge
contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chief of said the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest. governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any oath against municipal officer for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall
person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a
person may summon witnesses by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail,
administer oath, and take testimony relevant to the investigation. and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
Sec. 86. Bureaus and offices under the Department of Interior. — The treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
Department of the Interior shall have executive supervision over the affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities, and other local Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
political subdivisions, except the financial affairs and financial agencies exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
thereof, . . . . municipalities . . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is
Referring to these provisions, we postulated in Mondano vs. Silvosa (97 Phil., 143; 51 the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(C) of
Off. Gaz., 2884, 2887): the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed
The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and to have been abrogated by section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution. (51
organized before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as Off. Gaz., pp. 2884, 2887-2888.)
"authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise." Section 10, In fact, said section 79(C) was inserted in the Administrative Code by Act No. 3535,
paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have passed by the Philippine Legislature, during the American regime, in line with section
control of all the executive department, bureaus, or offices, exercise general 22 of the Jones Law, pursuant to which "all Executivefunctions of the Government must
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take be directly under the Governor General or within one of the Executive Departments
care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision under the supervision and control of the Governor General." As already stated,
the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive however, this authority of the Executive has been constricted in our Constitution, which
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which maintains the presidential "control of the executive departments, bureau and offices,
he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be "but limit the powers of the Executive over local governments to "supervision" of a
provided by the law. The Department head as agent of the President has "general," not particular, character, and this only "as may be provided by law.
direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his If said section 79 (C) were fully applicable to local governments, the President — who
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative now discharges the functions of the former Secretary of the Interior — could "alter or
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that modify or nullify or set aside" any duly enacted municipal ordinance or resolution of a
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his provincial board, or "substitute" his judgment in lieu of that of municipal councils or
authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any person in the provincial boards. Yet, it is well settled that he cannot even disapprove any said
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or ordinance or resolution, except when the same is illegal (Gabriel vs. Gov't of
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over Pampanga, 50 Phil., 686; Rodriguez vs. Montinola, * 50 Off. Gaz., 4820). Thus, despite
which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as the "direct control" and "supervision" of every Department Head over all bureaus and
may be provided by law. If the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised offices under his jurisdiction, and his specific power to "repeal or modify the decisions of
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding the . . . bureaus and offices" under his department, pursuant to said section 79 (C), and
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local the fact that "provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an subdivisions" were among the "bureaus and offices under the Department of Interior",
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation according to the above-quoted section 86, the word "offices", as used in section 79 (C),
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of was not deemed to include local governments, even before the adoption of the
Constitution. Greater adherence to this view is, obviously, demand by the provision of paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general
the fundamental law reducing the presidential authority over local governments, from supervision over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate
"control" to mere "general supervision." control. (People vs. Brophy, 120, P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal. App., 2nd., 15.) Far
3. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, likewise, relied upon by from implying control or power to remove, the President's supervisory authority
respondent and the amici curiae, provides that the President shall have authority "to over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by
order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of law," a clear indication of constitutional intention that the provision was not to
any action or conduct of any person in the government services and in connection be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And the limitation
therewith, to designate the official committee or person by whom such investigation does not stop here. It is significant to note that section 64 (b) of the Revised
shall be conducted. Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove
Notwithstanding this, apparently, unqualified grant of said authority, it is obvious that the specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to
President may not apply it to members of Congress and those of the Supreme Court, in law, which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for
view of the principle of separation of powers, as to both, and of the constitutional any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
provisions on impeachment (Article IX of the Constitution), as to members of this Court. Again, petitioner herein was suspended for more than a year and seven (7) months
In other words, said section 64 (c) cannot be construed literally without violating the (representing over three-eights [3/8], or almost one-half [1/2] of his full term) and,
Constitution. Indeed, the opening paragraphs of said section 64 read: presumably, would have remained suspended up to the present, had his term not
In addition to his general supervisory authority, the (Governor- expired on December 31, 1955. In Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), it was held
General)President of the Philippines shall have such specific powers and that the power of removal does not imply the authority to suspend for a substantial
duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in period of time, which, in said case, was only one (1) year.2
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter. 5. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the
Among such special powers and duties shall be: (Emphasis ours.) Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Since the powers specified therein are given to the President, "in addition to his general same code, on the other, the latter — being specific provisions, setting forth the
supervisory authority", it follows that the application of those powers to municipal procedure for the disciplinary action that may be taken, particularly,
corporations — insofar as they may appear to sanction the assumption by the against municipal officials — must prevail over the former, as general provisions,
Executive of the functions of provincial governors and provincial boards, under said dealing with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of
sections 2188 to 2190 — would contravene the constitutional provision restricting the the Government.3
authority of the President over local government to "general supervision." Such was the view adopted in Laxamana vs. Baltazar (92 Phil., 32; 48 Off. Gaz., 3869).
4. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said section The issue therein was whether, in case of suspension of a municipal mayor, his duties
64 — similarly stressed by the respondent and the amici curiae — empowering the shall be discharged by the vice-mayor, as provided in section 2195 of the Revised
Executive: Administrative Code,4 or by an appointee of the Provincial Governor, with the consent
To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the of the Provincial Board, pursuant to section 21(a) of Republic Act No. 180 (The Revised
offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States), the Election Code).5
Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the It was held that, although subsequent in point of time, section 21 (a) of Republic Act No.
Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or 180, should yield to said section 2195.6
authority under the Government of the (Philippines Islands) Philippines. 6. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly, without
Besides, it is not claimed that petitioner falls under the second sentence of said any opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the provincial board to
provision, pursuant to which the President may "at any time remove a person from any exercise the administrative powers of both under sections 2188 to 2190 of the
position of trust or authority under the Government" for "disloyalty" to our Republic. Administrative Code, cannot be adopted without conceding that said powers are subject
There is no question of "disloyalty" in the present case. to repeal or suspension by the President. Obviously, this cannot, and should not, be
Upon the other hand, the power of removal of the President, under the first sentence of done without a legislation of the most explicit and categorical nature, and there is none
said paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised "conformably to law", which, as regards to such effect. Moreover, as stated in Mondano vs. Silvosa(supra), said legislation
municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative would, in effect, place local governments under the control of the Executive and
Code. Accordingly, in Lacson vs. Roque, supra, we declared: consequently conflict with the Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]). That such would
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend be the effect of respondent's pretense, is admitted in the very answer of the Solicitor
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of General, on page 5 of which he avers:
public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its Truly impressive in the intention to make the Constitutional grant "real and
proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. (2 McQuillen's effective" and not a mere splendid bauble is the significant fact that —
Municipal Corporations [Revised], section 574.) So it has been declared that . . . the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of
the governor of a state, (who is to the state what the President is to the the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of
Republic of the Philippines) can only remove where the power a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between
is expressly given or arises by necessary implication under the Constitution or the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government (People
statutes.(43 Am. Jur. 34.) ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871], 24 Mich., 44) and the legal theory which
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local
sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By Article VII, section 10, governments (Booten vs. Pinson, L.R.A. [N.S., 1917-A], 1244; 77 W. Va., 412
 [1915]). The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its law" but there is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be
implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in exercised. The authority must be exercised, therefore, in accord with general
imperio to the detriment of a strong national government. (Planas vs. Gil. 67 principles (of law).
Phil., 62, 78.) xxx xxx xxx
Such a compromise must have contemplated certain measure of control to be The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central government, not of
attached to the power of "general supervision", equivalent to the degree of provincial government, which are distinct an separate. If any power of general
local autonomy that may be determined by Congress, which under the supervision is given him over local governments certainly it can not be
aforestated constitutional provision, possesses final authority in applying it. understood to mean or to include the right to direct action or even to control
In this connection, the case of Rodriguez vs. Montinola (94 Phil., 964; 50 Off. Gaz., action, as in cases of school superintendents or supervisors within their
4820) is most illuminating. The issue therein was whether the Secretary of Finance respective districts. Such power (of general supervision) may include
could validly disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan abolishing correction of violations of law, or of gross errors, abuses, offenses, or
the positions of three special counsel in the province. Counsel for the Secretary of maladministration. Unless the acts of local officials or provincial governments
Finance maintained the affirmative view invoking, among other things, Executive Order constitute maladministration, or an abuse or violation of a law, the power of
No. 167 (October 8, 1938), section 2 of which provides: general supervision can not be exercised. In synthesis, we hold that the power
The Department of Finance is the agency of the National Government for the of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any express
supervision and control of the financial affairs of the provincial, city and provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his
municipal governments. (Emphasis ours.) alterego, the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which
and Executive order No. 383 (December 20, 1950) transferring the supervision local officials shall perform or comply with their duties.
and control of the personnel and finances of provincial governments from the Secretary The act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special
of the Interior to the Secretary of Finance. In a unanimousdecision, this Court, however, counsel not being contrary to law, or an act of maladministration, nor an act of
resolved the question in the negative. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Labrador — a abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting
member of our constitutional convention — lucidly stated: as a representative of the President by virtue of the latter's power of general
We must state frankly at the outset that the outset that the use of the word supervision over local governments (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964 50
"control in Executive Order No. 167 finds no support or justification either in Off. Gaz., 4820, 4825-27; Emphasis ours.)
the Constitution (which grants the President only powers of general If neither the Secretary of the Interior nor the President may disapprove a resolution of
supervision over local governments), or in any provision of the law. Any effect the Provincial Board of Pangasinan, passed within the jurisdiction thereof, because
or interpretation given to said executive order premised on the use of the word such disapproval would connote the assumption of control, which is denied by the
"control" therein would be of doubtful validity. Constitution, it is manifest that greater control would be wielded by said officers of the
xxx xxx xxx national government if they could either assume the powers vested in said provincial
Is the suppression of the position of three special counsel a financial matter board or act in substitution thereof, such as by suspending municipal officials, without
falling under the supervisory power of the Secretary of Finance over provincial the administrative proceedings prescribed in sections 2188 to 2190 of the
governments? Whether or not funds are available to pay for a newly created Administrative Code, before said board. As stated in People vs. Brophy (120 P. [2nd
position is evidently a financial matter; but the suppression of positions is not a series], pp. 946, 953).
financial matter. The problem before the provincial board was, Should not the As will be seen from an examination of the above section of the Constitution,
services of the three special counsel be stopped and the funds appropriated the powers of the Attorney General are not without limitation. Manifestly,
for them used for other services? This is not a financial matter. It is so only in "direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other
the sense that the sum appropriated for the abolished positions reverts to the law enforcement officers as may be designated by law" does not contemplate
general funds to be thereafter appropriated again as the provincial board may absolute control and direction of such officials. Especially is this true as to
provide. Were we to consider all changes in the purposes of appropriations as sheriffs and district attorneys, as the provision plainly indicates. These officials
financial matters, because they may have relation to the annual are public officers, as distinguished from mere employees, with public duties
appropriations, there would be no form of activity involving the expenditure of delegated and entrusted to them, as agents, the performance of which is an
money that would not fall within the power of the Secretary of Finance to exercise of a part of the governmental functions of the particular political unit
approve or disapprove. Such an interpretation can not be held to be within the for which they, as agents, are active. Coulter vs. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 p.
intendment of the executive order on the approval of the budget of the 121. Moreover, sheriffs and district attorneys are officers created by the
provincial board. Constitution. In that connection it should be noted that there is nothing in
Having arrived at the conclusion that the suppression of the positions of three section 21 of article V that indicates any intention to depart from the general
special counsel is not a financial matter, subject to the approval of the scheme of state government by counties and cites and counties, as well as
Secretary of Finance, we now proceed to examine the issue from another local authority in cities, as provided by sections 7 1/2, 7 1/2 a, 8 and 8 1/2, of
angle, i.e., whether the Secretary of Finance, as an alter ego of the President Article XI. By interpreting section 21 of article V in the light of the above-
of the Philippines, may not have the authority to disapprove the resolution in mentioned provisions, it is at once evident that "supervision"does not
question under the general supervisory authority given to the President of the contemplate control, and that sheriffs and district attorneys cannot avoid or
Philippines in sub-paragraph (1), section 10, of the Constitution. The evade the duties and responsibilities of their respective offices by permitting
supervisory authority of the President is limited by the phrase "as provided by a substitution of judgment. The sole exception appears to be that whenever "in
 the opinion of the Attorney-General any law of the State is not being from them" and the power of the President over local governments is limited to "general
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney-General supervision . . . as may be provided by law." Thus, commenting on the executive power
to prosecute," in which cases "he shall have all the powers of a district over municipalities, Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political Law (10th ed., pp.
attorney. But even this provision affords no excuse for a district attorney or a 695-697), expressed himself as follows:
sheriff to yield the general control of his office and duties to the Attorney Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
General. (Emphasis ours.) oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
7. The philosophy upon which our system of local governments is hinged rejects the over the supervised party. Hence, the power of general supervision over local
theory of respondent herein. governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the authority to appoint and
The starting point from which the question may he considered is article VII, remove local officials.
section 10, of the Constitution of the Philippines, subparagraph (1) of which The Congress of the Philippines may pass laws which shall guide the
provides as follows: President in the exercise of his power of supervision over provinces and
"(1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, municipalities; but it may not pass laws enlarging the extent of his supervisory
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as authority to the power of control. To do so would be assuming the right to
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." amend the Constitution which expressly limits the power of the President over
It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General local governments to general supervision.
had both control and supervision over all local governments, (Section 22, The question then arises: How should disciplinary action be taken against a
Jones Law) The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional Convention local office who might be guilty of dereliction of duty? The legal procedure in
in introducing the change, therefore, must have been to free local such cases will have to be judicial, not administrative. An action will have to be
governments from the control exercised by the central government, merely presented in court charging the official with violation of law or neglect of his
allowing the latter supervision over them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not duties. The Constitution in this respect does not establish anything novel; it
unlimited; it is to be exercised "as may be provided by law." merely revives the rule of law in place of administrative discretion.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, provincial governments had Local autonomy may thus be established to a limited degree. In the
been in existence for over thirty years, and their relations with the central deliberations of the committee on provincial and municipal governments of the
government had already been defined by law. Provincial governments were Constitutional Convention held in Manila in 1934, there was practical unanimity
organized in the Philippines way back in the year 1901 upon the approval of of opinion among the delegates that provincial and municipal governments
Act No. 82 by the Philippines Commission on January 31, 1901. The policy should enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. The first drafts prepared by the
enjoined by the President of the United States in his Instructions to the committee provincial and municipal governments included provisions intended
Philippines Commission was for the insular government to have "only to protect the local governments against the absolute control of the central
supervision and control over local governments as may be necessary to government. Some difficulty was, however, encountered in expressing
secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." objectively the necessary provisions protective of local autonomy. This was
(McKinley Instruction in Philippines Commission, April 7, 1900.) The aim of the due to the other desire of many of the delegates of establishing a strong
policy was to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self- central government. Concretely the problem was how to keep some degree of
government, with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete local autonomy without weakening the national government. The draft of the
management and control of the administration of their local affairs. This policy Committee on provincial and municipal governments was not considered
is the one now embodied in the above quoted provision of the Constitution. satisfactory, and so it was not incorporated in the Constitution. But the idea of
(Rodriguez vs.Montinola, 94 Phil., 964, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820, 4823, 4824.) giving local governments a more of autonomy was not completely given up. It
(Emphasis ours.) is, therefore, logical to conclude that the Constitution in limiting expressly the
As early as April 7, 1900, President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second power of the President over local governments to mere general supervision
Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be expresses a concession to the general demand for some local autonomy. This
"subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national idea of a compromise or concession should serve as a guide in construing the
government; that said supervision and control should be "confined within the narrowest extent of the powers of the President over local governments.
limits"; that in the distribution of powers among the governments to be organized in the The Supreme Court of the Philippines, however, while admitting that the power
Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision"; that of supervision over local governments given by the Constitution to the
the organization of local governments should follow "the example of the distribution of President is not coextensive with control, before the last war declared that the
powers between the states and the national government of the United States"; and that, totality of executive powers constitutionally vested in the President and the
accordingly, the national government "shall have no direct administration except of adoption of the Presidential type of government for the Philippines gave the
matters of purely general concern." President a comprehensive authority over all local officials. This broad
If such were the basic principles underlying the organization of our local governments, interpretation of Presidential powers would stultify the specific limitation
at a time when the same were under the control of the Governor-General (the expressly proved in the Constitution. Fortunately, newer decisions of the
representative of the United States, which has delegated to us some governmental Courts are veering away from its early pronouncements. (Emphasis ours.)
powers, to be exercised in the name of the United States), with more reason must those 8. It is urged that the authority of the President over our municipal corporations is not
principles be observed under the Constitution of the Philippines, pursuant to which identical to that of State Governors in the United States, for the former is the Executive,
"sovereignty resides in the (Filipino) people and all government authority emanates with more comprehensive powers than those of the latter, who are
merely chief executives, and in Severino vs. Governor General (16 Phil., 366, 386), it President may perform his constitutional power of general supervision. (Sinco,
was held: Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., p. 294; (Emphasis ours.)
. . . Governors of States in the Union are not the "executives" but are only the 10. It is next said that, although the power of general supervision of the President
"chief executives". All State official associated with the governor, it may be imposes upon him the duty of non-interference in purely corporate affairs of the
said as a general rule, are, both in law and in fact, his colleagues, not his governments, such limitation does not apply to its political affairs. To bolster up this
agents nor even his subordinates. . . . They are not given him as advisers; on proposition, the following has been cited:
the contrary they are coordinated with him. As a general rule he has no power "A municipal corporation, being recognized as an appropriate instrumentality
to suspend or remove them. It is true that in a few of the States the governors for the administration of general laws of the state within its boundaries and
have power to appoint certain high officials, but they can not be removed for appointed and empowered for that purpose, thereby becomes an agent of the
administrative reasons. These are exceptions to the general rule. The duties of state for local administration and enforcement of its sovereign power. This is
these officials are prescribed by Constitutional provisions or by statute, and not the governmental aspect of the municipal corporation. In their public and
by the governor. The actual execution of a great many of the laws does not lie governmental aspects municipal corporations are referred to as arms of the
with the governors, but with the local officers who are chosen by the people in state government, auxiliaries of the state, branches of the state government,
the towns and counties and "bound to the central authorities of the States by subordinate divisions of the state government, delegates of the sovereign
no real bonds of responsibility." In most of the States there is a significant state, local divisions of the state, parts of the state government, parts of the
distinction between the State and local officials, such as county and city civil governments of the state, parts of the governmental machinery of the
officials over whom the governors have very little, if any, control; while in this state, parts of the machinery by which the state conducts its governmental
country the Insular and provincial executive officials are bound to the affairs, political subdivisions of the state, political or governmental portion of
Governor-General by strong bonds of responsibility. So we conclude that the the state in which they are situated, public agencies. They are not only
powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon the Governor-General are representatives of the state, but portions of its governmental power. They
far more comprehensive than those conferred upon State governors. represent no sovereignty distinct from the state itself. The government
(Emphasis ours.) exercised by a municipal corporation is exercised as an agency of the whole
Although accurate, this view is immaterial to the issue before us. The Severino case public, and for all the people of the state. A municipal corporation is, within its
referred to the authority of the American Governor-General over local governments prescribed sphere, a political power. In its governmental capacity it may
established in the Philippines, as an unincorporated territory or insular possession of command; it is a municipal government; a public corporation." (43 C. J., 69-70)
the United States, which local governments had been placed by McKinley's Instructions The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a term which refers to
— ratified in the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of the U. S. of July 1, 1902) — and the the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government
Jones Law (Act of Congress of the U. S. of August 29, 1916), under the "control" of said are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
officer. The case at bar deals with the authority of the President of the Philippines, as appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is
a full sovereign state, over local governments created by Philippine laws, enacted by made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central
representatives of the Filipino people, who elected said representatives and are the Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
ultimate repository of our sovereignty (Sec. 1, Art. II, of the Constitution), in the exercise government. (Art. I, Sec. 2, Rev. Adm. Code; (Emphasis ours.)" (See Answer
of which they adopted and promulgated a Constitution, and ordained therein, that, in of the Solicitor General, pp. 9-10)
lieu of the power of control of the former Governors-General, our Executive shall merely These authorities are good law, but its implications have seemingly been misconstrued,
exercise "general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." for they refer to the power of the State, exercised through its law-making body, not the
(Article VII, Section 10 [1], of the Constitution.) Executive. In the Philippines, the constitutional provision limiting the authority of the
Obviously, this provision vests in the President of the Republic less powers over President over local governments to General supervision is unqualified and, hence, it
municipal corporations than those possessed by our former Governors-General.7 applies to all powers of municipal corporations, corporate and political alike. Thus, for
9. It has, also, been pointed out that municipal corporations in the United States have instance, municipal ordinances, enacted under the police power delegated to municipal
the power of "local self-government", which is not given to our political subdivisions. corporations, involve the exercise of not corporate, but political authority. Yet,
This means simply that, whereas the former may not be deprived of their right to local admittedly, such ordinances are not subject to presidential control. The Executive
"self-government", the latter have only such autonomy, if any, as may not repeal, modify or even disapprove said ordinances — no matter how unwise —
the central government may deem fit to grant thereto, and that said autonomy shall be the same being within the powers conferred by law upon local governments.
under the control of the national government, which may decree its increase, decrease, In fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the constitutional powers of the
or, even, complete abolition. But, who shall exercise this power, on behalf of the State? President as regards the corporate functions of local governments, inasmuch as the
Not the Executive, but the Legislative department, as an incident of its authority to Executive never had any control over said functions.8What is more, the same are not,
create or abolish municipal corporations, and, consequently, to define its jurisdiction and never have been, under the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of
and functions. Hence, after noting the difference between the power of control of the corporate, non-governmental or non-political functions, municipal corporations stand
Executive, under the former organic laws, and that of general supervision, under the practically on the same level, vis-a-vis the National Government or the State — as
Constitution, Dean Sinco stated in his above-cited work: private corporations.9 Consequently, the aforesaid limitation of the powers of the
. . . It is, therefore, obvious that local governments are subject to the control President over local governments from "control" to "general supervision", could have
of Congress which has the authority to prescribe the procedure by which the had no other purpose than to affect his authority with regard precisely
to political functions.
In Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451), the Solicitor General invoked the we are unable to see, how the aforementioned assumption of authority may be justified,
distinction between the governmental and the corporate powers of municipal either under the power of "general supervision," or under the duty to "take care that the
corporations in support of the alleged direct authority of the Secretary of the Interior to laws be faithfully executed." As held in Mondano vs. Silvosa (51 Off. Gaz., 2888), in line
suspend a municipal mayor. The argument was rejected by this Court in the following with settled principles in administrative law, "supervision means overseeing or the
language: power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
. . . if the power of suspension of the Secretary of the Interior is to be justified the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
on the plea that the pretended power is governmental and not corporate, the prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
result would be more disastrous. Then and thereunder, the Secretary of the the power of an official to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
Interior, in lieu of the mayor of the municipality, could directly veto municipal officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
ordinances and resolutions under section 2229 of the revised Administrative former for that of the latter." When the office of the Executive Department acted, in the
Code; he could, without any formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and case at bar, in lieu, or in substitution, of the Provincial Board of Cavite, the former
himself make appointments to all non-elective positions in the municipal sought, therefore, to "control" the latter. What is more, instead of compelling the same
service, under section 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code; he to comply with its duties under sections 2188 to 2191 of the Administrative Code, the
could, instead of the provincial governor, fill a temporary vacancy in any former, in effect, restrained, prevented or prohibited it from performing said duties.
municipal office under subsection (a), section 2188, as amended, of the said 13. Let us now examine the case of Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil.,
Code; he could even directly appoint lieutenants of barrios and wrest the 451). It involved the same Mayor of Makati, Rizal Jose D. Villena, whom the Secretary
authority given by section 2218 of the Revised Administrative Code to a of the Interior suspended, allegedly with the authority of the President, who, it was
municipal councilor. Instances may be multiplied but it is unnecessary to go claimed, had verbally expressed no objection thereto. Then Villena was advised of the
any further. Prudence, then, dictates that we should hesitate to accept the charges against him and of the designation of a given official to investigate the same.
suggestion urge upon us by the Solicitor-General, especially where we find the Thereafter notified of the date set for the hearing of the aforementioned charges, before
path indicated by him neither illumined by the light of our own experience nor said official, Villena applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Secretary of the
cemented by the virtuality of legal principles but is, on the contrary, dimmed by Interior and his agents from proceeding with said investigation. The issues raised were
the recognition however limited in our own Constitution of the right of local self- whether the Secretary of the Interior had authority (a) to order the investigation and (b)
government and by the actual operation and enforcement of the laws to suspend Villena.
governing provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other political The first question was resolved in the affirmative, upon the ground that the power of
subdivisions. It is not any question of wisdom of legislation but the existence of supervision of department heads, under section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
any such destructive authority in the law invoked by the Government that we Code, "implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power
are called upon to pass and determine here. (Villena vs. Sec. of the Interior, 67 real and effective," as held in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62).
Phil., 451, 461-462.). The Court was divided on the second question. The majority opinion, subscribed
11. The case of Planas vs. Gil, supra, cited in favor of respondent herein, is not in point, by four (4) Justices, including its writer, used the following language:
for Planas was a councilor of the City of Manila, which — for administrative purposes — . . . the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no
has, also, the status of a province (see section 2440, Revised Administrative Code; clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
Republic Act No. 409, section 14). As such, it was under the direct supervision of the municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
Department of Interior,10 unlike regular municipalities such as that Carmona, Cavite, lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code . .
which are under the immediate supervision of the Provincial Governor (section 2082, ..
Revised Administrative Code). In short, sections 2188 to 2191 of the Administrative The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by
Code have never been, and are not, applicable to the City of Manila, the charter of section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not
which contains no counterpart thereof. mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363) — likewise relied upon by respondent the Interior from exercising a similar power . . . .
— is substantially different from the one at bar. Administrative charges were filed, After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
against Mayor Villena, with the office of the President, which referred the matter to the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that
Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the Provincial Board thereof failed to act on said under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
charges for an unreasonable length of time. Under such facts it is understandable that considering the departmental organization established and continued in force
the power of supervision of the President was invoked, either to compel action, which by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
the Provincial Board had the duty to take, or, in view of its obvious unwillingness to administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
comply therewith, to cause the charges to be investigated by somebody else, in line heads of the various executive departments are assistance and agents of the
with the responsibility of the Executive "to take care that the laws be faithfully Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
executed." the Constitution or the law to act in person or in exigencies of the situation
In the present case, however, the Provincial Board of Cavite never had a to chance to demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
investigate the charges against petitioner herein. From the very beginning, the office of functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
the Executive assumed authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such assumption of departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
authority was made under such conditions as to give the impression that the Provincial and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
Governor and the Provincial Board were banned from exercising said authority. Frankly, reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
 Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451, 459-460, said opinions was anything said on the question whether said appellate authority
463.) implies a grant of original power to suspend, either without an appeal from said
Concurring in the result, Associate Justice Villareal observed: decision of the Provincial Board, or without any proceedings before said Board calling
. . . The Secretary of the Interior is nowhere given the power to suspend a for the exercise of its disciplinary functions under said provisions of the Revised
municipal elective officer pending charges, and in the absence of such power Administrative Code. In other words, the Court passed this question sub silentio.
be may not suspend him. The power to suspend cannot be implied even from Hence, the decision in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (supra) does not come within
an arbitrary power to remove, except where the power to remove is limited to the purview of the rule of stare decisis, insofar as the aforesaid question is concerned,
cause; in such case, the power to suspend, made use of as a disciplinary and, as regards the same, neither binds this Court nor bars it from passing thereon
power pending charges, is regarded as included within the power of removal (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568-569; U.S. vs. More, 3 Cranch, 159,
(46 Corpus Juris, sec. 142, page 982). Provincial governors alone are 172; U.S. vs. Sanges, 144 U.S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U.S., 82; Louisville
expressly empowered to suspend municipal officers under certain conditions Trust Co. vs. Knott, 191 U.S., 22).
by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the President of the 14. It is but fair to note that the action of the Executive Department of our Government
Philippines by section 2191, as amended, of the same Code. Though the against petitioner herein was evidently taken in the earnest belief that public interest
suspension of the petitioner by the Secretary of the Interior was unauthorized, demanded and justified it and had, in all probability, been premised upon the seeming
the implied approval by the President of the Philippines validated such implication of some of the former decisions of this Court. However, in the words of Mr.
suspension. (Id., 67 Phil., 465-466.) Justice Labrador, "the question before us is not one of necessity or usefulness, but
Likewise, Associate Justice Imperial concurred in the result, upon the ground that: exclusively one of authority or prerogative" (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz.,
. . . (1) the President of the Philippines, under sections 64 (b), and 2191 of the 4820, 4828). Furthermore, paraphrasing Lacson vs. Roque (49 Off. Gaz., 93, 99), "it
Revised Administrative Code, as the later has been amended, and section 11 may be true, as suggested, that the public interest and the proper administration of
(1), Article VII, of the Constitution, is vested with the power to expel and official functions would be best served" by granting the Executive original authority to
suspend municipal officials for grave misconduct, and it appears that the suspend a municipal mayor. However,
suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the Secretary of the . . . The answer to this observation is that the shortcoming is for legislative
Interior acted within the powers conferred upon him by section 79 (c), in branch alone to correct by appropriate enactment. It is trite to say that we are
connection with section 86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as not to pass upon the folly or wisdom of the law. As had been said in Cornejo
amended, in ordering an administrative investigation of the charges against vs. Naval, supra, anent identical criticisms, "if the law is too narrow in scope, it
the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province is for the Legislature rather than the courts to expand it." It is only when all
of Rizal. (Id., 67 Phil., 466.). other means of determining the legislative intention fail that a court may look
He dissented, however, insofar as the majority held that the acts of department into the effect of the law; otherwise the interpretation becomes judicial
secretaries are "presumptively the case of the executive" and that the suspension legislation. (Kansas ex rel, Little vs. Mitchell, 70 L.R.A., 306;
directed by the Secretary of the Interior should be considered as one "decreed by the Dudly vs. Reynolds, 1 Kan., 285.) (Lacson vs.Roque, supra.; Emphasis
President" himself. supplied.)
Then Associate Justice, later Chief Justice, Moran, similarly, dissented from said view Then again, the issue submitted for our determination has never been squarely
of the majority and concurred in the result. presented and decided. Referring to a similar situation, the Supreme Court of Illinois
It is interesting to note that the authority of the President to suspend Mayor Villena said:
was not even discussed. It was taken for granted. The reason may be gleaned from the . . . It may be frankly admitted that there are expressions in some of the
following passage of the majority opinion: decisions relied upon that lend support to counsel's position that the court has
. . . counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President heretofore intimated that section 2 of the Vacation Act is unconstitutional, but
of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his in our judgment this is the first time that the constitutionality of this act has
greater power of removal (Section 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to been squarely in the record and necessary for the consideration and decision
be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner of this court, and we are confronted with the proposition whether we should
prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if follow what is dicta in those cases in construing section 2 of the Vacation Act,
he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity and thus follow an erroneous construction of said Act. This court has said:
would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to "It is highly important that the decisions of the Court affecting the right to
remove a provincial official (section 2078, Administrative Code), the President property should be uniform and stable; but cases will sometimes occur in the
were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, decision of the most enlightened judges where the settled rules and reasons of
parenthetically, an instance where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the the law have been departed from, and in such cases it becomes the duty of
power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. (Id., 67 Phil., 460; the court, before the error has been sanctioned by repeated decisions, to
Emphasis supplied.) embrace the first opportunity to pronounce the law as it is." Frink vs. Darat 14
More important still, said majority opinion and the aforementioned separate opinions Ill. 304, 58 Am. Dec. 575.
cited section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code as the source of the power of the "The McNeer Case, supra, is a case particularly in point in support of the
Executive to suspend and remove municipal officials. However, said provision deals reasoning just given. In that case the court over-ruled the decision of Russell
with such power of suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the Provincial vs. Rumsey, 36 Ill. 362, which had been followed in Rose, vs. Sanderson, 38
Board in proceedings held under sections 2188 to 2190 of the said Code. Nowhere in Ill. 247, and Steele vs. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39, notwithstanding the decision in the
 Russel Case had stood unchallenged for 28 years and notwithstanding the was suspended "until the final determination of the proceedings" against
opinion in that case squarely decided the question involved that inchoate him, regardless of the duration thereof and cause of the delay in its disposition;11 and
dower, although only an expectancy, was as completely beyond legislative that so much of the rule laid down in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil.,
control as an estate. In Chicago, Danvilla & Vincennes Railroad Co. vs. Smith, 451) Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363), as may be inconsistent with the foregoing views,
62 Ill. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99, the court discussed at some length the doctrine of should be deemed, and, are hereby, reversed or modified accordingly.
stare decisis as authorities in other jurisdictions that bear on that subject Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, and Reyes, J. B. L.,
where a constitutional question is involved, and from that discussion we think it JJ., concur.
may be fairly said that the conclusion of the court was that the rule of stare
decisis will not prevent the courts from reviewing a constitutional question [G.R. No. L-11336. August 30, 1958.]
where the facts in the instant case are slightly different from those in former
decisions. In Arnold vs. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 90 S. W. 469, 3 L.R.A. RODOLFO GANZON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNION C. KAYANAN, Respondent-
(N.S.) 837, 5 Ann. Cas. 881, the court considered the same doctrine as to the Appellee.
necessity of recognizing to the fullest extent and adhering to that doctrine in
passing upon and construing the provisions of the organic law, but stated that Divinagracia & Divinagracia, Villalobos & Villalobos and Ganzon & Ganzon
when it is clear that the court has made a mistake it "will not decline to correct for Appellant.
it, even though it may have been reasserted and acquiesced in for a long
number of years." In Paul vs. Davis, 100 Ind. 422, the court said (page 427): Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr.
"The law is a science of principles, and this cannot be true if a departure from for Appellee.
principle can be perpetuated by a persistence in error."
"In Propeller Genesee Chief vs. Fitsnugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456, 13 L.
Ed. 1058, the court said: SYLLABUS
"It is the decision in the case of The Thomas Jefferson which mainly
embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great
weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are convinced that, if we 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PRESIDENT’S POWER AND
follow it, we follow an erroneous decision into which the court fell, when the AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND REMOVE CITY OFFICIALS. — Under section 64
great importance of the question as it now presents itself could not be (b) and (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, in connection with the provisions of
foreseen; and the subject did not therefore receive that deliberate Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution, the President may remove any
consideration which at this time would have been given to it by the eminent official in the government service "conformably to law" and to declare vacant the office
men who presided here when that case was decided. (Prall vs. Burckhartt, 132 held by the removed official. And to this end, the President may order "an investigation
N.E. 280, 287-288; Emphasis ours.)10 of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections connection therewith to designate the official committee, or person by whom such
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of investigation shall be conducted." Note that the provision refers to any official in the
the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear government service, which must necessarily include the mayor of a chartered city.
and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations —
and none has been cited to us — said procedure is exclusive; that the executive 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAUSES. — The position of mayor of a chartered city may be fairly
department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over compared in category and stature with that of a provincial governor and the former, by
local governments, may conduct investigations with a view to determining whether analogy may also be amenable to removal and suspension for the same causes as the
municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action latter, which causes, under section 2078 of the Revised Administrative Code, are:
referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in office.
governor and the provincial board should take such action; that the Executive may take
appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to
take said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial DECISION
governor and the provincial board may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to
exercise the authority conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the assumption of those powers BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
by the Executive; that said assumption of powers would further violate section 2191 of
the same code, for the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in
character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those of On August 25, 1956, Ernesto V. Rosales lodged a verified complaint against petitioner
the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original jurisdiction is vested by with the President reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
said sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, "the preventive suspension of a
municipal officer shall not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which he shall "Complainant Ernesto V. Rosales most humbly and respectfully submits to the
be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to his fault, neglect or President of the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay for investigation and appropriate
request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas petitioner herein action, the following administrative charges against the respondent Rodolfo Ganzon
incumbent Mayor of Iloilo City, which charges are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 26, 1956, the lower court declined to issue the writ and instead set the case for hearing
on the merits on September 28, 1956. At the hearing, both parties agreed to admit all
Count 1. That on August 22, 1956 the respondent taking advantage of his public the facts set forth in the pleadings and submitted the case for decision. And on October
position as Mayor of Iloilo City and accompanied by his armed body-guards and 2, 1956, the lower court rendered decision dismissing the petition. His motion for
henchmen, stormed into the broadcasting station of DYRI of Iloilo City, and with reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present appeal.
violence and intimidation, unjustifiably and unlawfully stopped the radio-press interview
program People’s Forum’ of said station, thus, suppressing and curtailing for about a The issues posed by petitioner are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
quarter hour the complainant’s right to free speech, the radio station’s right to
broadcast, and the people’s right to listen to a radio-press interviews, which acts "1. That the President of the Philippines has no authority under the Constitution or
constitute oppression or unjust exercise of authority or power and/or grave misconduct under any law to order the investigation of petitioner-appellant on the charges averred
in office. in the administrative complaint for the purpose of suspension and/or removal.

Count 2. That during the occurrence of the acts mentioned in Count 1, the respondent 2. That the charges averred in the administrative complaint are penal in nature and the
Mayor of Iloilo City arrogantly took the law in his own hands by personally pushing away remedies sought for are punitive and/or disciplinary in character;
the microphones and hitting on the back of the neck the complainant, who is a radio
commentator and program director of Station DYRI of Iloilo City, and a member of the 3. That the charges against petitioner-appellant do not allege acts constituting disloyalty
panel of interrogators of the ‘People’s Forum’, a public service press interview program to the Republic of the Philippines as provided for in Section 64(b) of the Revised
of said nature, constitutive of oppression and shameful misconduct in office. Administrative Code which is the only ground for the suspension and/or removal of an
elective city mayor, and
Count 3. That during the occurrence of the acts above-stated in Counts 1 and 2, the
respondent Mayor of Iloilo City, in a fit of devouring fury, unrestrainedly hurled 4. That granting arguendo that the grounds enumerated in Section 2078 of the Revised
invectives at the complainant, calling the latter indecent bad-mannered, damned-no- Administrative Code for the removal of provincial officials are applicable by analogy
good-Cebuano who should evacuate to Cebu and other similar names, which verbal and/or implication to an elective city mayor, the administrative complaint in question
acts constituted oppression and oral defamation, highly unbecoming of Iloilo City’s does not allege facts constituting oppression or misconduct in office and dishonesty,
supposedly No. 1 public official and model citizen. much less disloyalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the complainant most respectfully prays:chanrob1es virtual The present appeal involves the paramount issue of whether the President of the
1aw library Philippines has the power and authority under our Constitution and the laws at present
in force in this jurisdiction to investigate the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take
1. That an investigation of the administrative charges above specified be ordered by the disciplinary action against him as the evidence and law may warrant.
President of the Philippines, after which the corresponding and proper action be taken
against the respondent who has demonstrated his unfitness to continue exercising At the outset, it should be stated that petitioner is the duly elected mayor of the City of
governmental power; and, Iloilo whose charter, speaking of his removal, merely provides that he "shall hold office
for six years unless removed" (Section 8, Commonwealth Act No. 158, as amended).
2. That in the interest of public welfare and safety, the respondent be immediately The charter does not contain any provision as regards the procedure by which he may
suspended from office, so as to prevent the further misuse of authority and power be removed. Nevertheless, as this Court has once said, "the rights, duties, and
pending such investigation, particularly on witnesses to the above-specified privileges of municipal officers (including city officials) do not have to be embodied in
charges."cralaw virtua1aw library the charter, but may be regulated by provisions of general application specially if these
are incorporated in the same code of which the city organic law forms a part" (Lacson v.
On September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., No. 1, pp. 93, 97). The code herein referred to is the
designated respondent to conduct the investigation of said complaint pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code.
provisions of Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code granting said
respondent all the powers given to an investigating officer by Sections 71 and 580 of Now, the charter of Iloilo City, as we have already stated, says that the mayor "shall
the same Code. On September 18, 1956, respondent served a copy of the complaint on hold office for six years unless removed." It does not say that he shall hold office at the
petitioner and set the investigation of the charges on September 20, 1956. Petitioner, pleasure of the President unlike similar provisions appearing in other city charters. The
having filed a motion for postponement, respondent definitely set the investigation for idea is to give the mayor a definite tenure of office not dependent upon the pleasure of
September 25 and 26, 1956. the President. If this were the case, he could be separated from the service regardless
of the cause or motive. But when he was given a definite tenure, the implication is that
On September 24, 1956, petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an he can only be removed for cause.
action for prohibition with preliminary injunction questioning the authority of the
President to order his investigation and praying that respondent be enjoined to suspend "‘An inferential authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence
and desist from proceeding with the investigation and that, pending decision of the case of a defined term, ipso facto, negatives such an inference, and implies a contrary
on the merits, a preliminary injunction be issued against Respondent. On September presumption, i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject to
removal for cause.’ (state ex rel Gallaghar v. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap., 203, expressly administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
adopted by the Supreme Court in States ex rel. v. Maroney, 191 Mo. 548; 90 S. W., to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
141; States v. Crandell, 269 Mo., 44; 190 S. W., 889; State v. Salval, 450, 2d, 995; 62 them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
C. J., S., 947.)" (Lacson v. Roque, supra) perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
The question that now arises is: Does the President have power and authority to of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from
investigate petitioner with a view to his removal under the above provision of the charter this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of
of Iloilo City? If so, for what causes may he authorize such investigation? the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section
The pertinent provisions governing the power of the President over local officials, be 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. In fact, this matter has been clarified when, in
they provincial, city or municipal, are embodied in Section 64(b) and (c) of the Revised a subsequent case, this. Court made the following
Administrative Code, in connection with the provisions of Section 10, paragraph 1, pronouncement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Article VII of the Constitution. For ready reference, we will hereunder quote said
provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "In conclusion, we hold that, under the present law, the procedure prescribed in
sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and
"(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices removal of municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a
held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations
Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at any time — and none has been cited to us — said procedure is exclusive; that the executive
remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over
(Philippine Islands) Philippines. local government, may conduct investigations with a view to determining whether
municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action
(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial
investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and governor and the provincial board should take such action; that the Executive may take
in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to
investigation shall be conducted.." take said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial
governor and the provincial board may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to
"SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, exercise the authority conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the assumption of those powers
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."cralaw virtua1aw by the Executive; that said assumption of powers would further violate section 2191 of
library the same Code, for the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in
character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those of
It may clearly be inferred from the above that the President may remove any official in the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original jurisdiction is vested by
the government service "conformably to law" and to declare vacant the office held by said sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, ‘the preventive suspension of a
the removed official. And to this end, the President may order "an investigation of any municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty (30) days,’ at the expiration of which
action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection he shall be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to his fault,
therewith to designate the official committee, or person by whom such investigation neglect or request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas
shall be conducted." Note that the provision refers to any official in the government petitioner herein was suspended ‘until the final determination of the proceedings’
service, which must necessarily include the mayor of a chartered city. It cannot against him, regardless of the duration thereof and the cause of the delay in its
therefore be disputed that in the particular case under consideration the President is disposition; and that so much of the rule laid down in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior
vested with the authority to order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the (67 Phil., 451) and Villena v. Roque (93 Phil., 363), as may be inconsistent with the
good of the public service so requires, and such being the case, petitioner cannot now foregoing views, should be deemed, and, are hereby reversed or modified accordingly."
contend that the designation of respondent as the official to investigate him in (Hebron v. Reyes, supra, p. 175; Emphasis supplied)
connection with the charges lodged against him by Rosales has been done without the
authority of law. This of course is upon the premise that the charges involved in the The final question to be determined is: For what cause or causes may the President
investigation refer to those for which petitioner may be suspended or removed under order the investigation of petitioner "conformably to law?
the law, a question which we will take up later in this decision.
For this, suffice it to quote hereunder what we have said in Lacson v. Roque,
It is true that in the case of Mondano v. Silvosa, * 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2884, this supra:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him "Four Justices who join in this decision do not share the view that the only ground upon
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two which the Mayor may be expelled is disloyalty. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Padilla
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in and Mr. Justice Jugo, three of the Justices referred to, reason that, as the office of
meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court made the following digression: "In provincial executive is at least as important as the office of mayor of the City of Manila,
the latter officer, by analogy, ought to be amenable to removal and suspension for the RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
same causes as provincial executives, who under Section 2078 of the Revised vs.
Administrative Code, may be discharged for dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as
office, besides disloyalty."cralaw virtua1aw library the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
And Chief Justice Paras, in concurring in the foregoing opinion, made the following Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
interesting observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

"It is hard and illogical to believe that, while there are express legal provisions for the
suspension and removal of provincial governors and municipal mayors, it could have SARMIENTO, J.:
been intended that the mayor of Manila should enjoy an over-all immunity or sacrosanct The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
position, considering that a provincial governor or municipal mayor may fairly be Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
considered in parity with the city mayor insofar as they are all executive heads of The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member
political subdivisions. Counsel for petitioner calls attention to the fact that the peculiarly of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
elevated standard of the City of Manila and its populace might have prompted the The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,
lawmakers to exempt the city mayor from removal or suspension. Much can be said ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
about the desirability of making the executive head of Manila as strong and charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful
independent as possible but there should not be any doubt that awareness of the and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
insistence of some sort of disciplinary measures has a neutralizing and deterring detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health
influence against any tendency toward officials’ misfeasance, excesses or office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health
omission."cralaw virtua1aw library Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang
Considering that the position of mayor of a chartered city may be fairly compared in Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor
category and stature with that of a provincial governor, we are of the opinion that the are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:
former, by analogy, may also be amenable to removal and suspension for the same xxx xxx xxx
causes as the latter, which causes, under Section 2078 of the Revised Administrative In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the
Code, are: disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in office. And considering City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having
the allegations in the complaint to the effect that petitioner took advantage of his public supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,
position as mayor of Iloilo City in committing the acts of violence and intimidation upon using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public,
respondent in order to stop the radio program he was then conducting in his station pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and
thus suppressing and curtailing his right to free speech, we are of the opinion that said assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service
acts constitute misconduct in office for which he may be ordered investigated by the employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public
President within the meaning of the law. There is therefore no plausible reason to Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has
disturb the decision rendered by the lower court which we find to be in accordance with been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments
law. aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellant. handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-
around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991 Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
vs. On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents. City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991 Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where
vs. Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants
the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,
JR., respondents. together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991 Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the
 following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for
petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15,
dozing water to the people and the bystanders. 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another
petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ
injuries He was released only the following day. 3 of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.
The Mayor thereafter answered4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5
opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events: Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
xxx xxx xxx prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in
Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties the respondent Court of Appeals.
(Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of
Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel. complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R.
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R.
postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying
Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent
fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings Secretary, to this Court.
(Annex M). On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of
and their witnesses. the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
of sixty (60) days. Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law
again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards
1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their him7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last
denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo
Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. City.10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14,
complainants testified including their witnesses. 1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.12 He likewise contends that
postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce
which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he
lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was
were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital"15 witness was
postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition also hospitalized16 but that the latter unduly denied his request.17
of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary
the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove
hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988. local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his No. 93746).
witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed,
although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
good excuse in contesting complaints. investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior
attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said
City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24
them18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be
never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial
Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective
duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an
to him. elective barangay official.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19 strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based suspension.
on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law. the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as be counted in computing the time of suspension.25
the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?
and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?
meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
the phrase21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or
of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows: the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22 deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: concerning discipline.
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations
executed.23 euphemistically to "small republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative
as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to
(2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing,
but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local
tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson
measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and possibly, a fourth one,
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no
supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law,"43 a rule we reiterated
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However,
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide neither Lacsonnor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers,
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units to Lacson:
their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its
operation of the local units.32 proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.45
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to In Hebron we stated:
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
the power of local legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local respect to municipal officers ...46
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution In Mondano, the Court held:
contains no prohibition. ... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
as this Court has held,34 thus: involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
xxx xxx xxx written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be
Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.47
by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means xxx xxx xxx
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement Code.48
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove)
over local government officials does not include the power of investigation it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases
Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35 ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little
xxx xxx xxx difficulty in sustaining him.49
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36"Supervision" on the other the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner
hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President,50 Commissioner
officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent Blas Ople would not.51
with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52 justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in
decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the
as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter- paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
dependence between the central administration and local government units, or suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression.
otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.57
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
government. reasons,58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and
of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central other evidence.61
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust and
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self- permanent.
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55 not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure
another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact considerably.
that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor
faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor
question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent
him out of office. As we held:56 Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and pursued a consolidated effort.
the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of
of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the discretion.
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk
the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor
Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local vs.
Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO
the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to VERCELES, respondents.
us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department GANCAYCO, J.:
of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng
the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or mga barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules: Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of election of its officers.
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente
government in the manner the law may provide; Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold
from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental Soquerata as members.
premise of autonomy; When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding
officials; officer. Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not and Sales.
signify "control" (which the President does not have); Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but President — Ruperto Taule
may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: Vice-President — Allan Aquino
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or Secretary — Vicente Avila
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of Treasurer — Fidel Jacob
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)] Auditor — Leo Sales1
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.2
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The suspensions of the petitioners are denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan
serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the
pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the
Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against FABC in Catanduanes.3
Mayor Ganzon. On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one
AFFIRMED. No costs. to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region
SO ORDERED. V of the Department of Local Government.4
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ was denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989.5
concur. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991 respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and
void.
 Petitioner raises the following issues: municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is
Barangay Councils; limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper
protest; Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction of the results. A voter may also contest the election of any barangay officer on the
in nullifying the election; ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a sworn
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days
the following levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in after the proclamation of the results of the election.11 Only appeals from decisions of
cities, katipunang panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.
regions, katipunang pampook; and on the national level, katipunan ng mga barangay.6 The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
barangay at all levels shall be organized: the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
Sec. 110. Organization. — (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in sovereign power of the people.12 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to
the following manner: public office by popular vote.13 Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
officers. The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes 14 which do
in the next higher level of organization. not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or
pampook, which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is
panlalawigan and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute 15 and in the case
katipunang bayan in each province shall constitute the katipunang of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of
panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the katipunang bayan shall be the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.16
composed of the punong barangays of cities and municipalities, respectively. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up
xxx xxx xxx of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
Government Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests
and the rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
the initial implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
disruption of on-going programs and projects7 issued Department of Local Government the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989,8 to provide the guidelines for the conduct of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, conducted by their own respective organization.17
regional and national levels. However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and
of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of
Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective 1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules,
barangay officials. regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance
guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would thereof by said units."
vest upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II,
thereto. Book IV of the Administrative Code, to wit:
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections (3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law.18
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests
courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in
COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could
essential to give validity to their determinations.21 enforce compliance with the DLG Circular.32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater
implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume autonomy of the local government.
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local governments is respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18,
therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand. 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving
of general supervision22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional
law."23 The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest. 33
Local Government.24 The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an states that "whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election
officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or shall be declared null and void by the Department of Local Government and an election
neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to shall conduct and being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including circulars
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the and regulations34 cannot be applied retrospectively.35Moreover, such provision is null
latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction,
that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself.
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent
local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local
authority.25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawiganconsists of the
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the
body.26 presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority panlalawigan.36
to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an
allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a
Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it member of the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under
will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawiganthe
strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the
elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct elections of the officers of the FABC.
interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the
permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
governments.27 Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This be resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the
state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the commencement of an appropriate action by the parties.
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective of DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."29 To deny the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum."
Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President
officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the who shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary
autonomy of local governments. signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations permissive,37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring intended that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it
compliance" by local government units of such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to did in the elections at the town and city levels38 as well as the regional level..39
watch, observe or check.31 This is compatible with the power of supervision of the It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President
Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the
whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer,47 the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as
aforesaid mandatory provision. On this ground, the elections should be nullified. representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election declared invalid since he was never the president of the kabataang barangay city
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
of votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise
Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang
This is consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet
of the COMELEC to the supervision of the election.40 the qualifications set by law.48 The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang
There was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local
what is dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum
oversee the elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members, the qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation
the election free and honest was therefore compromised. but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be
1989 is null and void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition federation, his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified
alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention
June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of Catanduanes.41 By virtue of this the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-
memorandum, respondent governor swore into said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of
1990.42 the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until their successors
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition 43 as required by shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their
the resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990. appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by appointed.49 Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the
petitioner as something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the
was merely temporary "until such time that the provincial FABC president in that incumbent FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have
province has been elected, appointed and qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's appointed petitioner since he was elected the president of the federation but not
appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope with the problems brought Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor,
about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent Governor in
panlalawigan." the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be insulated from
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides- any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local
(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the autonomy.
vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary
of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial dated August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of
federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.) The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states: annulled.1âwphi1 A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be
xxx xxx xxx conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio
governor as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared
officer pro tempore, the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the null and void.
appointive members consisting of the president of the provincial association of No costs.
barangay councils, and the president of the provincial federation of the SO ORDERED.
kabataang barangay. (Emphasis supplied.) Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr.45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
the sangguniang panlungsod,46 declared as null and void the appointment of private CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,
respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City vs.
of Roxas representing the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain and for not THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL
having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The Court held TREASURER, respondents.
that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in
PARAS, J.: Here in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the postulate that the military cannot occupy any civil service position [in
core of the controversy now confronting us, thus: Section 6 of the Article on the Civil Service 12] Therefore, in keeping
Article XVI, Section 6: with this and because of the universal acceptance that a police force
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and military force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local it should be separated from the military force which is the PC. 13
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided xxx xxx xxx
by law. 1 Furthermore:
With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 xxx xxx xxx
entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A . . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, most of the key positions are being occupied by the military So, it is
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 up to this Commission to remove the police from such a situation so
and Senate Bill No. 463. that it can develop into a truly professional civilian police. . . . 14
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 13, Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that
1990, it was published on December 17, 1990. 2 is now Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.
sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated
seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the
temporary restraining order. Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department
But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required the public Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were
respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition placed. 15
and the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect after fifteen days following its We do not share this view.
publication, or on January 1, 1991. 3 To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be well to discuss Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
albeit briefly the history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section and offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on the matter.
6, Article XVI in our present Constitution. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been
of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18to mean "the power of [the
The PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
control was handled by the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the "National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." 19
component of the AFP. 4 Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to
the Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, 20he will have to
the civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Director-General of the INP, exercised command functions over the INP. 6 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 21 "all
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) 7 exercised administrative control and executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
over the INP units assigned within their respective localities. 8 Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component, Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he
which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. 9 Moreover, the Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
military component had superior benefits and privileges. 10 business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that acts of the Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours)
beset the system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that: Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over
xxx xxx xxx the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and
MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a modern other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 23
police organization is to remove it from the Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
military. 11 reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative
xxx xxx xxx realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries
part subsidized by the national government. for vices and abuses. 27
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the
the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police officers in question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.
commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every
administration and control at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions, presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering
to wit: the validity of the statute in question should give it such reasonable construction as can
Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The be reached to bring it within the fundamental
Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions: law. 28
xxx xxx xxx Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE
logistical requirements, communications, records, information ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP.
systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting; Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, Forces.
personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the
the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police Commission in their respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the
by the Chief of the PNP; local executives shall discharge the following functions:
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional. appellate a.) Provincial Governor — (1) . . .
boards over administrative cases against policemen and over The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list
decisions on claims for police benefits; of three (3) eligibles recommended by the PNP Regional Director.
xxx xxx xxx 4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in over the PNP units in their respective jurisdictions:
the Chief of the PNP . . . Such command and direction of the Chief of i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles
the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to the recommended by the Provincial Police Director. . . . (Emphasis ours)
units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules full control remains with the National Police Commission.
and regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . . We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is no
xxx xxx xxx usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as
effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP may constitute such other support representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the
units as may be necessary subject to the approval of the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus,
Commission. . . . unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of
xxx xxx xxx the NAPOLCOM." 29 It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who
system which shall be administered in accordance with the rules, meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be recommended by
regulations and standards; and a code of conduct promulgated by the PNP officials.
Commission for members of the PNP. . . . The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision
xxx xxx xxx and control exercised by the local officials. Those officials would simply be acting as
Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the representatives of the Commission.
NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that
Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power the questioned provisions, which read:
of "operational supervision and control" over police units in city and municipal mayors; Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. — The
in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be
Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of qualifying effected in the following manner:
entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the "People's Law a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. — Appointed by the
Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal mayors. 25 PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the
Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions. PNP for national headquarters personnel and attested by the Civil
It is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that the authority Service Commission;
of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law, b.) Inspector to Superintendent. — Appointed by the Chief of the
they intended that the day-to-day functions of police work like crime, investigation, PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by
crime prevention activities, traffic control, etc., would be under the operational control of the Civil Service Commission;
the local executives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. — Appointed
local executives. 26 by the President upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with
 proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service MR. NATIVIDAD. No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
Commission . . . MR. RODRIGO. There are two other powers of the President. The
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. — The Civil Service President has control over departments, bureaus and offices, and
Commission shall administer the qualifying entrance examinations for supervision over local governments. Under which does the police fall,
policemen on the basis of the standards set by the NAPOLCOM. under control or under supervision?
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will MR. NATIVIDAD. Both, Madam President.
undoubtedly professionalize the same. MR. RODRIGO. Control and Supervision.
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is
Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the under the Office of the President. (CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. 5, p.
commission's power of control over the PNP. 296)
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under
under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the
implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of
of its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is
consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5). subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief
erring officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national
municipality would all the more help professionalize the police force. police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security
Petitioner would likewise have this Court imagine that Section 12 of the questioned Act, of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war
the pertinent portion of which reads: powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains
National Defense. — During a period of twenty- four (24) months from a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part
the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in
shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external nature." 31 His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a
security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme
the President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not over the military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the Department shall Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under
automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members
internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of preserving (namely: the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local Government and the
external security. Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate, and the respective
xxx xxx xxx Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on
constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional
President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers." encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of control over all
That We are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A rejection thus of executive departments, bureaus and offices."
petitioner's submission anent Section 12 of the Act should be in order in the light of the But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under
following exchanges during the CONCOM deliberations of Wednesday, October 1, Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body,
1986: established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer,
xxx xxx xxx merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of
MR. RODRIGO. Just a few questions. The President of the the "involved agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of
Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out,
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President. its functions as well as the committee itself would cease altogether. 32 As an ad
MR. RODRIGO. Since the national police is not integrated with the hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an
armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the Commander-in- encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the
Chief powers of the President of the Philippines. President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the
MR. NATIVIDAD. They do, Madam President. By law they are under control or authority, of the committee. 33
the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines. As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in- are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service
Chief of the national police. Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A,
MR. NATIVIDAD. He is the President. Section 1)
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected
specific provision that the President is Commander-in-Chief of all the from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional
armed forces.
bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government. 34 Certainly, Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may
they are not under the control of the President. file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies
Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue
as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
May 5, 1987). policy.1
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that
be established thereunder. the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights. policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision
By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over
Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) local governments.2
are all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. 36 In The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the
fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
under the President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not
ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. been observed.
WHEREFORE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is hereby Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance
DISMISSED for lack of merit. with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of
SO ORDERED. the challenged decision.3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño- certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. importance of the issues raised therein.
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition
JUSTICE, petitioner, of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
vs. their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question
MANILA, respondents. in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the
The City Legal Officer for petitioner. proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.). Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court
Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila. appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in
L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation. which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
CRUZ, J.: question.
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
Government Code reading as follows: circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the
for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body
thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.5
or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments
from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may
receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or
act must be struck down. as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent
review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof
between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in exist.
accordance with law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general. requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
provision. Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive,
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did the tax measure.
not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor
mere supervision. were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec.
or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not
lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their
rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had
has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of
opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because
and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence
The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully
constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control. examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
provided in its Section 2 as follows: interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25,
however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993
suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by
twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission
oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of
economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown
that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units.[3] The RTC
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his
programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their Administrative Code.[4] Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the
validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition. petition for review filed by Quejada.[5]
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied [6] prompting the
of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government petitioner to file the present petition wherein the following issues are raised:
Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in A. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROVISION IN
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG
as to costs. SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY.
SO ORDERED. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS.[7]
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. In support of his petition, Onon argues that the Supplemental Guidelines for the
[G.R. No. 139813. January 31, 2001] 1997 Synchronized Election of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters and for the
JOELBITO-ONON, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE NELIA YAP FERNANDEZ, R.T.C. Election of the National Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay contradicts the
Br. 50 Puerto Princesa City and Palawan, and ELEGIO QUEJANO, Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga
JR., respondents. Barangay Officers and Directors and is therefore invalid. Onon alleges that the Liga ng
DECISION mga Barangay (LIGA) is not a local government unit considering that a local
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: government unit must have its own source of income, a certain number of population,
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a and a specific land area in order to exist or be created as such. Consequently, the DILG
temporary restraining order and writ of injunction seeks the reversal of the Order of the only has a limited supervisory authority over the LIGA. Moreover, Onon argues that
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, [1]Branch 50 in SPL. PROC. even if the DILG has supervisory authority over the LIGA, the act of the DILG in issuing
NO. 1056 entitled Elegio F. Quejano, Jr., petitioner vs. Joel Bito-Onon, et. al., Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the
respondents which denied herein petitioners motion to dismiss the Petition for Review conduct of the 1997 LIGA elections had the effect of modifying, altering and nullifying
of the Resolution of the Board of Election Supervisors dated August 25, 1997 in case the rules prescribed by the National Liga Board. Onon posits that the issuance of said
number L-10-97 filed by herein private respondent with said court. guidelines allowing an appeal of the decision of the BES to the regular courts rather
It appears from the records that the petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected than to the National Liga Board is no longer an exercise of supervision but an exercise
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga of control.[8]
Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, In his comment to the petition, private respondent Quejano argues that the
Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Secretary of the DILG has competent authority to issue rules and regulations like
Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for Memorandum Circular No. 97-893. The Secretary of DILGs rule-making power is
the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for conferred by the Administrative Code. Considering that the Memorandum Circular was
the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng issued pursuant to his rule making power, Quejano insists that the lower court did not
Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the commit any reversible error when it denied Onons motion to dismiss. [9]
winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation On the other hand, the public respondent represented herein by the Solicitor
protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him General, filed a separate Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment agreeing with
on August 25, 1997. the position of petitioner Onon. The Solicitor General affirms Onons claim that in issuing
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the questioned Memorandum Circular, the Secretary of the DILG effectively amended
the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa the rules and guidelines promulgated by National Liga Board. This act was no longer a
City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review mere act of supervision but one of control. The Solicitor General submits that the RTC
raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for review of the BES
the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in decision filed before it for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the rightful remedy which
connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his was to appeal to the National Liga Board.[10]
motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng On October 27, 1999, this Court denied petitioner Onons motion for the issuance
mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum of restraining order for lack of merit.
Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the After a careful review of the case, we sustain the position of the petitioner.
regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in The resolution of the present controversy requires an examination of the
excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an questioned provision of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and the Implementing Rules
exercise of control over the Ligas internal organization. and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers
On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC and Directors (GUIDELINES). The memorandum circular reads, insofar as pertinent, as
ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government [2] is follows:
vested with the power to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances Any post-proclamation protest must be filed with the BES within twenty-four (24) hours
and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the from the closing of the election. The BES shall decide the same within forty-eight (48)
hours from receipt thereof. The decision of the BES shall be final and immediately chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga
executory without prejudice to the filing of a Petition for Review with the regular courts ng mga Barangay.[23]
of law.[11] (emphasis supplied) The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
On the other hand, the GUIDELINES provides that the BES shall have the national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president and five (5) members of the
following among its duties: board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such
To resolve any post-proclamation electoral protest which must be submitted in writing to other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. [24]
this Board within twenty-four (24) hours from the close of election; provided said Board The ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government
shall render its decision within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof; and provided Code.[25] However, their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other
further that the decision must be submitted to the National Liga Headquarters within matters affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for in the
twenty-four (24) hours from the said decision. The decision of the Board of Election Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory
Supervisors in this respect shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board the to the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Local Government Code and shall always
decision of which shall be final and executory.[12] (emphasis supplied) conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.[26]
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No.
the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the
was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of
February 18, 1992.[13] The Presidents power of general supervision over local doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General
government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution. [14] The power of that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the
supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES
perform their functions in accordance with law.[15] This is distinguished from the power promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that
of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision
former for the latter.[16] but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the
On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,[17] we held that issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance
the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local by local government units of such issuances.[27] To monitor means to watch, observe or
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory check and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local
enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned
officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.[28] Besides, any
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be
restraining authority over such body.[18] Officers in control lay down the rules in the resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.[29]
doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act The public respondent judge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the respondents Petition for
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to Review for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and for lack of jurisdiction.
it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may Regional Trial Court dated June 22, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition
order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules.He cannot prescribe for Review filed by the private respondent docketed as SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 is
his own manner for the doing of the act.[19] DISMISSED.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga SO ORDERED.
barangay, which is not a local government unit?[20] Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of
Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an [G.R. No. 130775. September 27, 2004]
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L. DAVID in his
members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government capacity as National President and for his own Person, President ALEX
Code[21] defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the L. DAVID, petitioners, vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, and
for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. [22] The represented the HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and MANUEL
liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political A. RAYOS, respondents.
subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the [G.R. No. 131939. September 27, 2004]
barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN and BONY TACIO, petitioners,
elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the vs. DILG Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS and DILG Undersecretary
provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected MANUEL SANCHEZ, respondents.
presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila DECISION
Tinga, J.: WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic services to the
At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of the Liga ng people, the maintenance of public order and to further protect the interests of the forty-
mga Barangay and questions the extent of the power of Secretary of the Department of one thousand barangays all over the country, herein respondent respectfully prays:
Interior and Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the President. More immediately, a) That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
the petition disputes the validity of the appointment of the DILG as the interim pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as
caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay. the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga,
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been
therein], Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, duly elected and assumed office; ...[12]
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government units
Court (RTC) of Caloocan,[1] alleging that respondent therein Alex L. David [now by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the Liga ng mga
petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue interference by some local elective
president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay;
Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and (4) improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner
conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in David and the National Liga Board; (5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies
1997. According to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the following: (1) the measured in view of the confusion and chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga Barangay and
publication of the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without notifying in writing the the incapacity of the National Liga Board to address the problems properly.
individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;[2] (2) the Notice of Meeting dated 08 On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILGs Urgent Motion, claiming that
June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether the meeting the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any sanction against a
scheduled on 14 June 1997 was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the co-respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim, without first seeking leave of
meeting was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan;[3] and (3) the deadline for the filing of court.[13] He also alleged that the DILGs request to be appointed interim caretaker
the Certificates of Candidacy having been set at 5:00 p.m. of the third day prior to the constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not
above election day, or on 11 June 1997,[4] Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he subject to DILG control and supervision.[14]
was not able to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and before it was
Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote and acted upon by the lower court, the DILG through then Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez,
be voted for in the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.[15] It cited the reported violations of the Liga
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the ng mga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and widespread chaos and
holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter confusion among local government officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio
of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.[5] Liga members in their respective sangunians.[16] Pending the appointment of the DILG
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay by the court and until the officers
and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as and board members of the national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed
scheduled.[6] Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and office, the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city
thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of mayors, city vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. DILG regional directors and other concerned officers, as follows:
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo 1. All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio members of the sanggunian
and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, concerned until further notice from the Courts or this Department;
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary 2. All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued
Barbers.[7] Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga
the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant Barangay until further notice from the Courts or this Department. [17]
to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.[8] On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued
the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from the assailed order,[18] the pertinent portions of which read, thus:
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction over local
of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining government units, including the different leagues created under the Local Government
the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours.[9] Code of 1991 (RA 7160) finds basis in Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18,
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action 1992. Specifically, Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order provides a broad
(SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 premise for the supervisory power of the DILG. Administratively, the DILGs supervision
pending before Branch 124.[10] has been tacitly recognized by the local barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through as shown by the evidences presented by respondent David himself (See Annexes A to
respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,[11] invoking C). The fact that the DILG has sought to refer the matters therein to the National Liga
the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and Board/Directorate does not ipso facto mean that it has lost jurisdiction to act directly
seeking the following reliefs: therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be claimed or lost through
agreements or inaction by individuals. What respondent David may term as interference
should caretakership be allowed, this Court would rather view as a necessary and To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No. 267,
desirable corollary to the exercise of supervision.[19] Series of 1992, the power of general supervision of the President over local government
Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery of basic units does not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely because the Liga is
services and the perquisites of public service. In this case, the fact of confusion arising not a local government unit, contrary to the stance of the respondents.[31]
from conflicting appointments, non-action, and uninformed or wavering decisions of the Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160)[32] provides
incumbent National Liga Board/Directorate, having been satisfactorily established, that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners posit
cannot simply be brushed aside as being politically motivated or arising therefrom. It is that the duly elected officers and directors of the National Liga elected in 1994 had a
incumbent, therefore, that the DILG exercise a more active role in the supervision of the vested right to their positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause by
affairs and operations of the National Liga Board/ Directorate at least until such time affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership pursuant to
that the regular National Liga Board/Directorate may have been elected, qualified and the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not by mere issuances of the DILG, even if
assumed office.[20] bolstered by the dubious authorization of respondent judge.[33] Thus, petitioners claim
xxx that the questioned order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG for appointment as the Liga of their right to their respective offices without due process of law.
interim caretaker, until such time that the regularly elected National Liga Board of Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term local governments, over
Directors shall have qualified and assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs which the President, through the DILG Secretary, has the power of
of the National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.[21] supervision,[34] petitioners point out that still there is no legal or constitutional basis for
On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker.[35] They stress that the actions
of the assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary Barbers in contempt of contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, as what it had
Court.[22] David claimed that the 04 August 1997 order divested the duly elected sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of
members of the Board of Directors of the Liga National Directorate of their positions the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute its judgment over that of the latter
without due process of law. He also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in contempt for which are all clearly one of control.[36] Petitioners question the appointment of Rayos
having issued, through his Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, even as Liga-Caloocan President since at that time petitioner David was occupying that
before respondent judge issued the questioned order, in mockery of the justice position which was still the subject of the quo warranto proceedings Rayos himself had
system. He implied that Secretary Barbers knew about respondent judges questioned instituted.[37] Petitioners likewise claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,
order even before it was promulgated.[23] providing supplemental guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced
On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97- the implementing rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and By-
193,[24] providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the laws.[38] In fact, even before its appointment as interim caretaker, DILG specifically
provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of enjoined all heads of government units from recognizing petitioner David and/or
the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized elections honoring any of his pronouncements relating to the Liga. [39]
for the provincial and metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the national Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,[40] which, they claim, already
chapter on 06 September 1997. passed upon the extent of authority of the then Secretary of Local Government over
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment[25] in favor of the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils, as it specifically ruled that the
respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City. The Secretary [of Local Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity
appointment purportedly served as Rayoss legal basis for ex-officio membership in of the election of officers of the katipunan.[41]
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City and to qualify and participate in the For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the DILG
forthcoming National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.[26] supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of their
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections of Provincial prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various leagues, such as
and Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06 September 1997, the the Liga in this case, are themselves officials of local government units, it follows that
National Liga Chapter held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein James the Liga members are subject to the power of supervision of the DILG. [42] He adds that
Marty L. Lim was elected as President of the National Liga.[27] as the DILGs management and administration of the Liga affairs was limited only to the
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied Davids motion for conduct of the elections, its actions were consistent with its rule-making power and
reconsideration,[28] ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider the power of supervision under existing laws.[43] He asserts that in assailing the
appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and to cite appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision of
Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.[29] positive law in support of their stance. Thus, he adds, if a law is silent, obscure or
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari[30] under insufficient, a judge may apply a rule he sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public respondent judges orders of 04 chosen is in harmony with general interest, order, morals and public policy, [44] in
August 1997 and 01 October 1997. They dispute the latters opinion on the power of consonance with Article 9 of the Civil Code.[45]
supervision of the President under the Constitution, through the DILG over local On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has shared
governments, which is the same as that of the DILGs as shown by its application of the petitioners position. He states that the DILGs act of managing and administering the
power on the Liga ng mga Barangay. Specifically, they claim that the public respondent affairs of the National Liga Board are not merely acts of supervision but plain
judges designation of the DILG as interim caretaker and the acts which the manifestations of control and direct takeover of the functions of the
DILG sought to implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the scope of National Liga Board,[46] going beyond the limits of the power of general supervision of
the Chief Executives power of supervision. the President over local governments.[47] Moreover, while the Liga may be deemed a
government organization, it is not strictly a local government unit over which the DILG Barangay. The mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty
has supervisory power.[48] buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of the local
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly elected governments are tolerated and left unchecked.
President of the National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment in Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political
Intervention,[49] with his Comment in Intervention attached,[50] invoking the validity of the subdivisions should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain
DILGs actions relative to the conduct of the Liga elections.[51] In addition, he sought the their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
dismissal of the instant petition on the following grounds: (1) the issue of validity or partners in the attainment of national goals.[63] In the case of De Leon v.
invalidity of the questioned order has been rendered moot and academic by the election Esguerra,[64] the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine and
of Liga officers; (2) the turn-over of the administration and management of Liga affairs meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-reliant communities.[65]
to the Liga officers; and (3) the recognition and acceptance by the members of Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a question
the Liga nationwide.[52] otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [66] For the
In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer for a question of whether the DILG may validly be appointed as interim caretaker, or assume
Temporary Restraining Order, [53] was filed by several presidents of Liga Chapters, a similar position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect again, and yet
praying that this Court declare the DILG Secretary and Undersecretary are not vested the question may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the termination of
with any constitutional or legal power to exercise control or even supervision over the said assumption even.
National Liga ng mga Barangay, nor to take over the functions of its officers or suspend So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the wrong
its constitution; and declare void any and all acts committed by respondents therein in impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. Verily, that does not
connection with their caretakership of the Liga.[54] The petition was consolidated with appear to be the correct conclusion to make since by applying opposite precedents to
G.R. No. 130775, but it was eventually dismissed because the petitioners failed to the issues the outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum
submit an affidavit of service and proof of service of the petition. [55] circulars.
Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was substituted by The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to
his legal representatives.[56] DILG supervision, and whether the questioned caretakership order of the respondent
Petitioners have raised a number of issues.[57] Integrated and simplified, these judge and the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute control in
issues boil down to the question of whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the barangay, as the
abuse of discretion in appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and coordination.
manage the affairs of the National Liga Board, per its order dated 04 August 1997.[58] In As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and
turn, the resolution of the question of grave abuse of discretion entails a couple of implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the
definitive issues, namely: (1) whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be
organization that is subject to the DILG Secretarys power of supervision over local expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled. [67]
governments as the alter ego of the President, and (2) whether the respondent Judges On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay[68] is the organization of
designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga has invested the DILG with all barangays, the primary purpose of which is the determination of the representation
control over the Liga and whether DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, issued of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of
before it was designated as such interim caretaker, and DILG Memorandum Circular issues affecting barangay government administration and securing solutions thereto,
No. 97-193 and other acts which the DILG made in its capacity as interim caretaker of through proper and legal means.[69] The Liga ng mga Barangay shall have chapters at
the Liga, involve supervision or control of the Liga. the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.[70] The
However, the Court should first address the question of mootness which municipal and city chapters of the Liga are composed of the barangay representatives
intervenor Lim raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the present from the municipality or city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city
petition a general election was held; the new set of officers and directors had assumed chapters of the Liga form the provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of
their positions; and that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the management the Liga. The presidents of the chapters of the Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces
and administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and directors.[59] Respondent Rayos and the Metro Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the
has joined him in this regard.[60] Forthwith, the Court declares that these supervening National Liga ng mga Barangay.[71]
events have not rendered the instant petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to
of this Court. influence and direct the development of the entire country. This was heralded by the
This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the DILG as interim adoption of the bottom-to-top approach process of development which requires the
caretaker of the Liga and the Liga officers and directors who were elected to replace development plans of the barangay to be considered in the development plans of the
petitioner David and the former officers.At the core of the petition is the validity of the municipality, city or province,[72] whose plans in turn are to be taken into account by the
DILGs caretakership of the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as such caretaker central government[73] in its plans for the development of the entire
which exceeded the bounds of supervision and were exercise of control. At stake in this country.[74] The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach
case is the realization of the constitutionally ensconced principle of local government materialize and produce results.
autonomy;[61] the statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of barangays and The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels,
municipalities by providing them opportunities to participate actively in the automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang
implementation of national programs and projects;[62] and the promotion of the avowed Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan,respectively. They shall serve as such only
aim to ensure the independence and non-partisanship of the Liga ng mga
during their term of office as presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no case shall be In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,[83] this Court defined supervision as
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.[75] overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote the perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his
development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.[76] In line subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
with this, the Liga is granted the following functions and duties: officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of latter.[84] In Taule v. Santos,[85] the Court held that the Constitution permits the President
the national government; to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for peoples participation in officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. [86] Supervisory power,
local government administration in order to promote untied and concerted when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it
action to achieve country-wide development goals; does not include any restraining authority over such body. [87]
c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment The case of Drilon v. Lim[88] clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
within the barangay; The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials; himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but
government and non-governmental organizations and thereby promote only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the
the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions followed[89]
which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga
welfare of the barangay inhabitants.[77] Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,[90] where the Court ruled
Code. However, they are empowered to make their own constitution and by-laws to that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG
govern their operations. Sec. 507 of the Code provides: Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters not Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local which is not a local government unit?
government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice
are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association,
Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are
existing laws. either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of
own Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the corporate powers of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
the Liga, expressed or implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and
the Liga which shall: securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[91]
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said Liga; including The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident,
the power of appointment, assignment and delegation; whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment
b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said Liga; of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong
c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and expenditures for the barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal,
year, including the plans or schemes for funding purposes; and city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all
d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the said the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board
board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions. [78] members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which
The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the conduct of the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at
its Ligas general elections.[79] And, as early as 28 April 1997, the Liga National Chapter all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time
had already scheduled its general elections on 14 June 1997.[80] serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG
Constitution, which reads in part: as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular No.
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the
governments. National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and
power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains
departments bureaus and offices.[81] Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its multi-
Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been interpreted to level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its
exclude the power of control.[82] dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role
played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of the
welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect of Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
Service Commission,[92] our national officials should not only comply with the In the Bito-Onon[94] case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of 193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board
liberty upon which these provisions are based.[93] of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already
manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the promulgated by the Liga. The decision reads in part:
management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his
of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.Supervision does not cover such
new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
caretakership was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform
officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act.
of the Constitution. xxx
With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not
Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules,
guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means
Barangay;scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter to watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG
elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter. Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local
These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with
importantly, of the barangay as an institution.The election of Liga officers is part of local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
the Ligas internal organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In government.[95]
succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, In Taule,[96] the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no
issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga- authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of katipunan ng
conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the power of control which mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was lodged before the
even the President does not have. Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay
president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos
general Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The DILG issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be
substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong conducted. The Court ruled:
barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority
panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow
extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the position respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution
was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself, thereby grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit
preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening
power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of
partiality. fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the
lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.[97]
this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave
incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG
committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and By-laws and its implementing Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires,
rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control a power which is denied by the
have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own Constitution even to the President.
rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum Circulars No. as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special Provisions,
97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being unconstitutional and ultra vires. Title XXXVI A. Internal Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following
No pronouncements as to costs. proviso:
SO ORDERED. ... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS (P5,000,000,000) shall be
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval- earmarked for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund for the funding
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, requirements of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient implementation
JJ., concur. of devolved functions and services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No. 7160,
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
such amount shall be released to the local government units subject to the
[G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004] implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HERMILANDO I. equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local government units subject
MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution as
Secretary and Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution; constituted pursuant to Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal
HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, Department of Budget and Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., Secretary, Department of Interior Management to the Local Government Units concerned.
and Local Government, respondents. On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary
DECISION Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005
CALLEJO, SR., J.: and OCD-99-006 entitled as follows:
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, OCD-99-005
filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE
Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos PhP5 BILLION CY 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) AND REQUESTING HIS
they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO
(P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION SCHEME.
Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof. OCD-99-006
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE
capacity as Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia PhP4.0 BILLION OF THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
Boncodin of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose EQUALIZATION FUND AND ITS CONCOMITANT GENERAL
Lina of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). FRAMEWORK, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS FOR
Background ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION.
Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION OCD-99-003
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The program was established to facilitate the RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT
process of enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE
of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY
concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.[1] The Oversight Committee PERCENT (20%) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
(referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has been PROJECTS AND OTHER PRIORITY INITIATIVES FOR LGUs
tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPABILITY BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
effective implementation.[2] Further, to address the funding shortfalls of functions and THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS AS
services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the PROMULGATED BY THE COMMITTEE.
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created. [3] For 1998, the DBM was These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on October 6,
directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on 1999.
the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial fund was Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005,
to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. [5] For the five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as follows:
1999 and the succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the 1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with the
program was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has allocation scheme and implementing guidelines and mechanics
been authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the promulgated and adopted by the OCD. To wit:
equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.[7] a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with
The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999 the codal formula sharing scheme as prescribed under the 1991
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the program was Local Government Code;
renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance
(LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was allotted with a modified 1992 cost of devolution fund (CODEF) sharing
 scheme, as recommended by the respective leagues of provinces, k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD consistent with
cities and municipalities to the OCD. The modified CODEF sharing the aforementioned objectives and guidelines;
formula is as follows: 4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be determined by the
Province : 40% Oversight Committee on Devolution, this portion of the LGSEF shall
Cities : 20% not be used in expenditures for personal costs or benefits under
Municipalities : 40% existing laws applicable to governments. Generally, this fund shall
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts granted to cover the following objects of expenditures for programs, projects and
individual provinces, cities and municipalities as assistance to cover activities arising from the implementation of devolved and regular
decrease in 1999 IRA share due to reduction in land area have been functions and services:
taken out. a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials critical to the full
2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be earmarked to support and effective implementation of devolved programs, projects
local affirmative action projects and other priority initiatives submitted by and activities;
LGUs to the Oversight Committee on Devolution for approval in b. repair and/or improvement of facilities;
accordance with its prescribed guidelines as promulgated and adopted c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment;
by the OCD. d. acquisition of basic equipment;
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside the one billion e. construction of additional or new facilities;
pesos or 20% of the LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs) of f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or collective projects
LGUs. This remaining amount was intended to respond to the urgent need for additional among groups of municipalities, cities and/or provinces
funds assistance, otherwise not available within the parameters of other existing fund related to devolution and delivery of basic services.
sources. For LGUs to be eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the 5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall submit to the
LGSEF, the OCD promulgated the following: Oversight Committee on Devolution through the Department of
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY: Interior and Local Governments, within the prescribed schedule and
1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay), individually or by group or timeframe, a Letter Request for Funding Support from the Affirmative
multi-LGUs or leagues of LGUs, especially those belonging to the Action Program under the LGSEF, duly signed by the concerned
5th and 6th class, may access the fund to support any projects or LGU(s) and endorsed by cooperators and/or beneficiaries, as well as
activities that satisfy any of the aforecited purposes. A barangay may the duly signed Resolution of Endorsement by the respective
also access this fund directly or through their respective municipality Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The LGU-proponent shall
or city. also be required to submit the Project Request (PR), using OCD
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local priority, with Project Request Form No. 99-02, that details the following:
high development impact and are congruent with the socio-cultural, (a) general description or brief of the project;
economic and development agenda of the Estrada Administration, (b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project, which
such as food security, poverty alleviation, electrification, and peace should highlight the benefits to the locality and the expected
and order, among others. impact to the local program/project arising from the full and
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising from, but not limited efficient implementation of social services and facilities, at
to, the following areas of concern: the local levels;
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, hospital services (c) target outputs or key result areas;
and other tertiary services; (d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
b. delivery of social welfare services; (e) total cost requirement of the project;
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for youth and (f) proponents counterpart funding share, if any, and identified
community development; source(s) of counterpart funds for the full implementation of
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research; the project;
e. improvement of community-based forestry projects and other local (g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the LGSEF.
projects on environment and natural resources protection Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee as contained
and conservation; in Attachment - Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required to identify the
f. improvement of tourism facilities and promotion of tourism; projects eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit
g. peace and order and public safety; the project proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the DILG for
h. construction, repair and maintenance of public works and appraisal. The project proposals that passed the DILGs appraisal would then be
infrastructure, including public buildings and facilities for submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. Upon its
public use, especially those destroyed or damaged by man- approval, the Oversight Committee would then serve notice to the DBM for the
made or natural calamities and disaster as well as facilities preparation of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash
for water supply, flood control and river dikes; Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the said LGUs.
i. provision of local electrification facilities; The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and equipment;
 Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the amount complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the LGUs, while the amount of 1.5 billion
of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of the latter amount, P400,000,000
taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso earmarking five was to be allocated and released as follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance to the
billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special LAAPs of LGUs; P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover the decrease in the IRA
Provisions, Title XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that of LGUs concerned due to reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the LGSEF
contained in the GAA of 1999. Capability-Building Fund.
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated June 22, The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001
2000, adopted the following allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos LGSEF In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations law for 2001,
for 2000: the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the LGUs therein
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be allocated to and and the proviso earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
shared by the four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities, On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No. OCD-
municipalities, and barangays, using the following percentage-sharing 2002-001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows:
formula agreed upon and jointly endorsed by the various Leagues of Modified Codal Formula P 3.000 billion
LGUs: Priority Projects 1.900 billion
For Provinces 26% or P 910,000,000 Capability Building Fund .100 billion
For Cities 23% or 805,000,000 P 5.000 billion
For Municipalities 35% or 1,225,000,000 RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is to be allocated
For Barangays 16% or 560,000,000 according to the modified codal formula shall be released to the four levels of LGUs,
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the provinces, i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
cities, municipalities and barangays shall draw up and adopt the LGUs Percentage Amount
horizontal distribution/sharing schemes among the member LGUs Provinces 25 P 0.750 billion
whereby the Leagues concerned may opt to adopt direct financial Cities 25 0.750
assistance or project-based arrangement, such that the LGSEF Municipalities 35 1.050
allocation for individual LGU shall be released directly to the LGU Barangays 15 0.450
concerned; 100 P 3.000 billion
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs are used RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority projects shall be
in accordance with the general purposes and guidelines promulgated distributed according to the following criteria:
by the OCD for the implementation of the LGSEF at the local levels 1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
pursuant to Res. No. OCD-99-006 dated October 7, 1999 and 2.0 Projects in consonance with the Presidents State of the Nation Address
pursuant to the Leagues guidelines and mechanism as approved by (SONA)/summit commitments.
the OCD; RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF capability building fund
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to the OCD for shall be distributed in accordance with the recommendation of the Leagues of
its approval their respective allocation scheme, the list of LGUs with Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by the OCD.
the corresponding LGSEF shares and the corresponding project Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the
categories if project-based; individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of LGUs Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to
shall be endorsed to the DBM as the basis for the preparation of the disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government
corresponding NCAs, SAROs, and related budget/release Code of 1991.
documents. On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be 2002-001.
earmarked to support the following initiatives and local affirmative The Petitioners Case
action projects, to be endorsed to and approved by the Oversight The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the
Committee on Devolution in accordance with the OCD agreements, provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed
guidelines, procedures and documentary requirements: are the Oversight Committees Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum authorizing then 006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The
Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the 2.5 billion petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions,
pesos LGSEF for 2000 in accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-023. insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of President 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION, Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the just
IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the
CY 2000. Under this resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF was to Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the just share of the LGUs shall be
be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution No. OCD-2000-23, to
automatically and directly released to them without need of further action are, likewise, to determine what is the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. In other words,
cited. Congress is the arbiter of what should be the just share of the LGUs in the national
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion- taxes.
peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government Code
implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines of 1991, which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the not intended to be a fixed determination of their just share in the national
Constitution that the LGUs share in the national taxes shall be automatically released to taxes. Congress may enact other laws, including appropriations laws such as the GAAs
them. The petitioner maintains that the use of the word shall must be given a of 1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 of the
compulsory meaning. Local Government Code of 1991 was merely intended to be the default share of the
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually by law their just share. However,
Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release of the the LGUs have no vested right in a permanent or fixed percentage as Congress may
LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local increase or decrease the just share of the LGUs in accordance with what it believes is
autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of appropriate for their operation. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits
1991. The petitioner cites as an example the experience in 2001 when the release of Congress from making such determination through the appropriations laws. If the
the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight Committee was not able to provisions of a particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the constitutional
convene that year and no guidelines were issued therefor. Further, the possible power of the legislature to enact, they should be sustained whether the courts agree or
disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would not in the wisdom of their enactment.
result in the diminution of the latters share in the IRA. On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is outright as the same is defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues which
the improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the should be properly threshed out in the lower courts, not this Court, not being a trier of
percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA as facts. Specifically, the petitioners allegation that there are portions of the LGSEF that it
follows: Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays 20%. [8] This has not, to date, received, thereby causing it (the petitioner) injury and damage, is
formula has been improperly amended or modified, with respect to the five-billion-peso subject to proof and must be substantiated in the proper venue, i.e., the lower courts.
portion of the IRA allotted for the LGSEF, by the assailed OCD resolutions as they Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already been rendered
invariably provided for a different sharing scheme. moot and academic as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs for the
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive years 1999, 2000 and 2001, have already been released and the government is now
branch of a substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter dated operating under the 2003 budget. In support of this, the respondents submitted
December 5, 2001 of respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent certifications issued by officers of the DBM attesting to the release of the allocation or
Secretary Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of funds to certain shares of the petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001. There is, therefore,
LGUs from the LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten instructions of President nothing more to prohibit.
Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it
allocated. Further, there are still portions of the LGSEF that, to date, have not been has not suffered any injury. In fact, the petitioners just share has even
received by the petitioner; hence, resulting in damage and injury to the petitioner. increased. Pursuant to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional and void the of the provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the provinces 40%
assailed provisos relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5
assailed OCD resolutions (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, billion to the provinces. On the other hand, OCD No. 2001-001 allocated 25% of P3
OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight billion to the provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered any injury in the
Committee pursuant thereto. The petitioner, likewise, prays that the Court direct the implementation of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
respondents to rectify the unlawful and illegal distribution and releases of the LGSEF for OCD resolutions.
the aforementioned years and release the same in accordance with the sharing formula The Ruling of the Court
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Finally, the petitioner urges Procedural Issues
the Court to declare that the entire IRA should be released automatically without further Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall first rule on the following
action by the LGUs as required by the Constitution and the Local Government Code of procedural issues raised by the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal
1991. standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves factual
The Respondents Arguments questions that are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to had been rendered moot and academic.
dismiss the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the The petitioner has locus standi
respondents contend that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 to maintain the present suit
and the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
infirm. The respondents advance the view that Section 6, Article X of the Constitution stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the phrase as determined by law in the same illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[9] Accordingly, it has been held that the
constitutional provision means that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening
is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. [13] Even in cases where
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. [10] bench, bar and public.[14]
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now
the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it
or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[15] For the GAAs in the coming years may
LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners constitutional claim is, in contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the
substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this
OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
automatic release to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury Substantive Issue
that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this case calls
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the for the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local
implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the autonomy.[16] In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted as a
petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, policy that:
2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has a plain, direct and Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing
The petition involves a significant and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State policy in
legal issue this wise:
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos contained in Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
and the Local Government Code of 1991.This is undoubtedly a legal question. On the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision.[17] This provision has
other hand, the following facts are not disputed: been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in the powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim:[18]
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted budget for An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
2001; he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for the even decide to do it himself.Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor
allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not
implementing rules and regulations therefor; and lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance with rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to
the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no
mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight Committee. judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.[19]
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question The Local Government Code of 1991[20] was enacted to flesh out the mandate of
now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a the Constitution.[21] The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:
trial court.[11] In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.[12] end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
transcendental importance of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the units.
present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed
in order to resolve the case forthwith. provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year
The substantive issue needs to be resolved the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions
notwithstanding the supervening events promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution and the Local Government
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the Code of 1991.
case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
now operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this constitutional precept on local autonomy
 Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads: parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the out by legal methods.[23]
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. The just share of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law or
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked
determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that such amount shall be
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions, underscores released to the local government units subject to the implementing rules and
the automatic release of the LGUs just share in this wise: regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government units shall have distribution of said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that
the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution. Pursuant thereto, the
efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion
and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and pesos LGSEF such that:
charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be For 1999
retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and P2 billion - allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
directly released to them without need of further action; P2 billion - Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 40%;
... Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%)
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit P1 billion projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.[24]
shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, For 2000
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) P3.5 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 26%;
days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 16%);
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. P1.5 billion projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.[25]
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local For 2001
government units under existing laws. P3 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 25%;
Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%)
either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a P1.9 billion priority projects
reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton. Further, P100 million capability building fund.[26]
the word automatically is defined as in an automatic manner: without thought or Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight
conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, Committees prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion
receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the for 2001), the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down
Local Government Code of 1991, the just share of the LGUs shall be released to them guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of
without need of further action. Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify
Jr. v. Aguirre,[22] viz: the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c)
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval
Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or projects.
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. As a To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the
rule, the term SHALL is a word of command that must be given a compulsory LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of
meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE. the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
percent of the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation in the country. Such the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions,
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory
equivalent to a holdback, which means something held back or withheld, often mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The
temporarily. Hence, the temporary nature of the retention by the national government LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision mandate is obeyed.[27] Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use of the
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.[28]
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
 Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more responsive and
distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.
subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of
Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective adherents, to liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila.Autonomy,
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure compliance with the however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. [29] In fact, its creation the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime
was placed under the title of Transitory Provisions, signifying its ad of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under
hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal author and the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose
sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the Committees work was than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
supposed to be done a year from the approval of the Code, or on October 10, As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national
1992.[30] The Oversight Committees authority is undoubtedly limited to the administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
same.Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
LGUs. delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and
promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
Commission, to wit: progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the Local Government Code, managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
the existence of subprovinces is still acknowledged by the law, but the statement of the President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs
Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably by the Committee on are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that
Legislation. A second point, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that under Article 2, Section 10 of he can substitute their judgments with his own.
the 1973 Constitution, we have a provision which states: Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
units, especially the barrio, to insure their fullest development as self-reliant the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
communities. minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
This provision no longer appears in the present configuration; does this decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the
mean that the concept of giving local autonomy to local governments is no autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
longer adopted as far as this Article is concerned? constituency.[34]
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on Preamble, National Territory, Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The fairly
and Declaration of Principles, that concept is included and widened upon the initiative of recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre[35] is particularly instructive. The Court declared
Commissioner Bennagen. therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that. their resources in accordance with their own priorities:
With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation of sources as provided by Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
previous law was subject to limitations as may be provided by law, but now, we are autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
using the term subject to such guidelines as may be fixed by law. In Section 7, mention autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of
is made about the unique, distinct and exclusive charges and contributions, and in revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
Section 8, we talk about exclusivity of local taxes and the share in the national national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
wealth.Incidentally, I was one of the authors of this provision, and I am very with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials
thankful. Does this indicate local autonomy, or was the wording of the law changed to in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the
give more autonomy to the local government units? [31] national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also decentralization because local needs and resources or not ...[36]
political units can collect taxes, fees and charges subject merely to guidelines, as Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally
recommended by the league of governors and city mayors, with whom I had a dialogue mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. [37]
for almost two hours. They told me that limitations may be questionable in the sense Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as unconstitutional
that Congress may limit and in effect deny the right later on. Section 4 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered the withholding,
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on automatic release of national tax share points effective January 1, 1998, of ten percent of the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and
to more local autonomy. Is this the intention? evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.[32] situation.
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals[33] in In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and
this wise: the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold
the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the just share of the LGUs. This contention
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code
down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld. of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend properly enacted in a separate legislation.[42]
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
Section 284[38] of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
year of its effectivity, the LGUs share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be unit.[43] Any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an
40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except in the event the national inappropriate provision. The category of inappropriate provisions includes
government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
with stringent requirements set forth in the same section: because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.[44]
Sec. 284. ... Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable sharing therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the
and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot sanction.
the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to the herein assailed
the national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal provisos. In other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have not earmarked any amount
year; Provided, further That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local of the IRA for the LGSEF. Congress had perhaps seen fit to discontinue the practice as
government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment it recognizes its infirmity. Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be necessary to make a definitive ruling on the matter in order to prevent its recurrence in
entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved personnel services. future appropriations laws and that the principles enunciated herein would serve to
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory guide the bench, bar and public.
automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the Conclusion
current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly
year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the
amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made century when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine
on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue Commission dated April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government to devote their attention
taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is no in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives
allegation that the national internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, of the Islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the
2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years. opportunity to manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable,
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs: and subject to the least degree of supervision and control in which a careful study of
Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. The share of local government units in their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent
the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner: with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.[45] While the 1935 Constitution had no
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%) specific article on local autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%); governments to general supervision ... as may be provided by law. [46] Subsequently, the
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that [t]he State shall guarantee and promote the
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%). autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion development as self-reliant communities.[47] An entire article on Local Government was
pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in incorporated therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme. For principle of local autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the
example, for 1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces 40%; powers of the local governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful
Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%.[39] For 2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was allocated in local autonomy.
this manner: Provinces 26%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 26%. [40] For Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured
2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated, thus: Provinces 25%; Cities 25%; by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.[48] As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, a
Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%.[41] distinguished French political writer, [l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the strength
The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science;
does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local they bring it within the peoples reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation
Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws,
may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit of municipal x-----------------------x
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.[49] G.R. No. 197282
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these vs.
provisions are based.[50] COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are x-----------------------x
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. G.R. No. 197392
SO ORDERED. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
Vitug, (Acting Chief Justice), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, vs.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., on official leave. x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197454
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of vs.
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON
INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ELECTIONS, Respondents.
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners, RESOLUTION
vs. BRION, J.:
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for
BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e)
Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents. the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan
x-----------------------x Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280;
G.R. No. 196305 (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R.
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the
vs. temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate
of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous
Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Representatives, Respondents. President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
x-----------------------x positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
G.R. No. 197221 The Motions for Reconsideration
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their
vs. motion:
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents. ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE
x-----------------------x CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS
G.R. No. 197280 SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO UNITS.
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners, II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
vs. III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of 18, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents. PRINCIPLE[.]1
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that: xxxx
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA
OF ARMM CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153
TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO
GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT AMEND RA 9054.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS xxxx
MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS
AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN
FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs. RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL xxxx
MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS
DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN
PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN- AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE xxxx
POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY. DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS xxxx
THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and
AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS. underscoring supplied)
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND A.
QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS. ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT
OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC
THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS. REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE
OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE
ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW. REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON
SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".
DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE B.
CONSTITUTION. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION. IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT C.
SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT
IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE
CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST
ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied) POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that: REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7,
IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.
IN ITS LANGUAGE. D.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS,
UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN- SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE
OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED
APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE ELECTIONS.4
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THEFOREMOST Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
 a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the
elections; discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will
by constitutional mandate, guides the governance of the Republic; temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE
comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of Representatives and the Senate, FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite; JUNE 1992."
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner
after their terms are over and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant Davide be recognized.
elective positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
choice; MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view
e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new
which does not include the power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
elective officials; and REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
and local elections as this will make it easier for the authorities to implement I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions
election laws. giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions: then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for
elections with national and local elections? said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain,
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional? 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for Members
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an
and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices? election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years,
President’s supervisory powers over autonomous regions? their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992
The Court’s Ruling and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the
We deny the motions for lack of merit. local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my
intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state: mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Manila area. During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. the body approved — the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be
xxxx for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national,
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall
extended to noon of June 30, 1992. serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution From then on, we shall have an election every three years.
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to
synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections
xxxx held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the
President and Vice-President in 1992. synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. since they are regional elections and not local elections.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is,
the Senators and local officials with the election of the President? wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the meaning except where technical terms are employed."9 Applying this principle to
assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as
President and Vice-President would really end in 1992. understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International
MR. GUINGONA. Yes. Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision." Obviously,
the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases and underscoring ours) the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces,
down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections
temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.10
We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,6 where we RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the
local elections."7 Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling. We cannot agree with their position.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular
elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333
the Constitution. and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to left in RA No. 9054.
consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the We reiterate our previous observations:
time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of
constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent
endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as history.
ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the
indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections,
unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No.
process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. 8 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or
the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter
local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides: law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
State under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and the 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was
"regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the not ratified through a plebiscite.
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12 (emphases supplied) requirement20 applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution.
9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous
be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections. units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act21 – require ratification through a
whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
recommend the inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.
attention had been called to the omission.14Providing for lapses within the law falls While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately
within the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, resides with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with
have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space. the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before
Article XVII of RA No. 9054. becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government
established that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
RA No. 905415 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the
irrepealable laws. President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government, and
these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the Again, we disagree.
plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16 The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-
to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or and assumed office.
abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic
bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the
future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."
existing statutes. [emphasis ours] Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of
mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which amend RA RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a
No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials
vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections
we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective
upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18 officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:
dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The
enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the
because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution."19 Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
qualified. preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours]
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6
and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in place but do not occur or had to be suspended because
various laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and
cases22 is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang other analogous circumstances.
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this
ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of
terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. BP 881.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this
the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 23 Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with
clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of
when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three
wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of years.
discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to President’s authority to appoint OICs
fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains
complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization. only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.25 Section
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power,
(COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. thus:
To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 24 Although the Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions: appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments
the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The
in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the provision states:
various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-
1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group and assumed office.
of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following exchange: The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the
because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.26 petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum,
Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No.
Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional
Commission on Appointments. elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office –
"catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on
that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. 28 The wide latitude given to May 13, 2013.
the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to
power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In Congress to address the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent
other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b)
provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the
President to fill the office by appointment. next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of
should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in order to be supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in
recognized.29 Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already
regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last
appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the available option.
Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No.
power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought
Constitution,30 which merely grants the President the power of supervision over about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In
autonomous regions. other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed
confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or
The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 31 This is distinguished We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders. However, we
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order
judgment of the former for the latter."32 to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable
the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President
power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the units.
President and not of the people. The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The
power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus September 13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)
Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case.
Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). 34 While it may be true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court
21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly
as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1âwphi1 There is, therefore, no legal
argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting
numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our Conclusion
decision until we have ruled with finality on this case. As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No.
We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay
only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. 35 In other words, the principle of This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal
"judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed
higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the
proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.36Consequently, this principle cannot be course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections,
applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of
otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally
whole system of government is founded upon. impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, of elective local officials for less than three years.
and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay
Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these
the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, 37 a specific government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity should some
decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the probability exists that their motion For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.
for reconsideration may be granted."38 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the SO ORDERED.
aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the
TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective.
He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011
decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if
not outright insolence"39 to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC, 40 where the Court
held that while it had already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is
not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance,41 where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court,
noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued. 42
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a
motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that
the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a final and executory decision,
especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18,
2011 decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing
the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this