Filosofia Unisinos

Unisinos Journal of Philosophy New version with erratum

17(1):63-68, jan/apr 2016 published on December 5th, 2016
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2016.171.08

PHILOSOPHY SOUTH

Non-Epicurean Desires1
Fabien Schang2

ABSTRACT
In this paper, it is argued that there can be necessary and non-natural desires. After a discus-
sion about what seems wrong with such desires, Epicurus’ classification of desires is treated
similarly to Kripke’s treatment of the Kantian table of judgments. A sample of three cases is
suggested to make this point.
Keywords: desire, Epicurus, judgment, nature, necessitation.

Introduction
There are impossible desires, those that cannot be satisfied due to physical limitations: flying
like a bird, teleporting to the other side of the world, and the like. But this paper will talk about
conceptual impossibilities, that is, whatever cannot be thought of by definition. Let us see why it is
largely assumed that there are also conceptually impossible desires.

Epicurean desires
After describing Epicurus’ classification of desires, we will focus on his assumed opposition
between necessity and vanity.

Analogy I: Modal tables

Due to its connection with epistemological concepts like belief, will, or intention, desire has
been studied as a modality of action impacting on human judgment (see, e.g., Gardiès, 1979). Like
necessity or knowledge, desire can be studied as a proper, “boulic” modality of judgment.
There also seems to be a structural analogy between epistemic and boulic modalities, based
on the distinction between subjective and objective contents of judgment. The objective part is
expressed by the concept of knowledge, which makes the transition from belief to truth through
justification; in the same way, the objective part of desire is expressed by the concept of will, which
transitions from desire to reality through intention. Table 1 helps to see this analogy in a clearer way.
The sort of impossibility on which I want to focus is not located in the object of desire;
rather, it relates to inconceivability and lies at a definitional level. A look at Epicurus’ theory of
desire may throw some light upon it.
1
The research leading to these
results has received funding from
the Basic Research Program at
Necessity and Vanity
the National Research University
Higher School of Economics. In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus makes a distinction between good and bad desires.
2
National Research University According to him, there are three sorts of desire: natural and necessary desires; natural and
Higher School of Economics.
Staraya Bassmanaya Street,
21/4, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC
schangfabien@gmail.com BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
 Fabien Schang

Table 1. An analogy between epistemic and boulic modalities.

Epistemic modalities Boulic modalities

objective knowledge will
subjective knowledge (“I am sure of it!”) subjective will (“I want it!”)
belief desire
doubt aboulia
justification intention

non-necessary desires; and vain desires. The first category Therefore, the controversy lies in the moral value of
splits into three different goals: happiness (eudaimonia); bodi- necessity and finiteness: according to the Epicureans, good
ly well-being (aochlèsia); and life for itself (survival means). desires are those that can be satisfied within the limits of
The second category corresponds to merely natural desires human nature; knowledge of this nature is a precondition
that can be dispensed with: sexual activities, pleasures of the of happiness.
table, and the like. The third category of desires is considered Is there any sort of sufficient reason behind such a classi-
to be the source of pain and an unhappy life: avidity, anger, fication of desires? Let us try to tackle this issue, even to chal-
thirst for power, etc. Epicurus strongly advises us to avoid lenge the Epicurean taxonomy of desires.
these bad desires because they are “devoid” (kenai) or empty
desires. These are the most important in what follows, due to
their radical opposition to necessary desires: quests for power,
Non-Epicurean desires
riches, or honour are said to be “empty” desires insofar as they
First, let us consider the way in which Epicurus came
do not have a proper end.
to his famous classification. Then let us see how far it can be
altered in a relevant way.
Vanity against necessity!

This statement may seem difficult to accept for anyone

A combinatorial picture
who has not studied theoretical philosophy: who can claim
Two basic elements are used by Epicurus, namely, nat-
that power, riches, and honour are not frequent targets in
uralness and necessity. A combination of both results in the
our everyday life? Who has never dreamt about seducing the
three above kinds of desires; however, a pure combination
prettiest boy or girl in one’s class, or becoming the president
of the two elements should yield not three but, rather, four
of one’s state? Of course, Epicurus would reply that such de-
elements. Let Na and Ne be symbols for naturalness and ne-
sires are not “empty” in the sense of having no finality. Rather,
cessity, respectively. Then the powerset of the basic set of
the trouble with these vain desires is their self-growing and
desires D = {Ne, Na} is P(D) = {{Ne,Na}, {Ne}, {Na}, {}}.
endless development: they can never be fully satisfied, inso- The first subset {Ne,Na} is the set of both necessary and
far as their temporary satisfaction always leads to other, more natural desires, whilst the third {Na} is the set of natural and
demanding desires. For this reason, Epicurus urges us to re- not necessary desires. Somehow ironically, the fourth subset
nounce to them because attempting to fulfil them completely of “empty”, i.e., neither necessary nor natural desires, corre-
is a vain project. In this respect, the third category of desires sponds to the empty subset {}. As for the second element
corresponds to the sort of impossible desires mentioned at the {Ne}, it is never mentioned in Epicurus’ theory of desire: the
beginning of the paper. subset of necessary and not natural desires. Admittedly, phi-
losophers will mostly reply that such a combinatorial pic-
Vanity for necessity? ture presents a typically anachronistic reading that is both
immaterial and misleading for any serious philosophical in-
And yet, a capitalist-friendly agent could reply that the vestigation. But does it?
self-cumulative feature of vain desires is a virtue: just as Prot- Our initial question about whether there are concep-
estants bless a sense of effort and hardworking behaviour, it tually impossible desires can thus be reformulated as fol-
might be replied to Epicurus that nothing great can be accom- lows: can there be desires that are both necessary and not
plished without obstinacy. Or even that the criterion of ascet- natural? A momentary reflection should be sufficient to
icism for a good life is just a bad excuse for lazy losers. Here is answer negatively; but this is just the beginning of the in-
where Epicureans depart from capitalists, roughly speaking: vestigation: the point is not to rely upon commonsensical
vain desires are vicious for the former; while they are virtuous beliefs but, rather, to find their roots and see how these can
for the latter. Pleasure is not the whole story. be relevantly questioned.

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 Non-Epicurean Desires

Analogy II: Kantian table This combination seems meaningless, indeed, given that
culture is the domain par excellence of contingent things like
An analogy between two sorts of modalities was drawn habits, norms, or taboos. Nevertheless, such an idea is not more
above. The same can be drawn between Epicurean desires and absurd than the hypothesis of analytic a posteriori judgments.
Kantian judgments (in Kant, 2007 [1781]), despite their as- Table 3 can be qualified in two opposite ways: by re-
sumed difference in nature. At the same time, the comparison stricting, extending, or squarely cancelling its valid combi-
made by Gardiès (1979) between epistemic and aboulic mo- nations.
dalities refers to two kinds of judgment. Could desire be viewed
as a special sort of judgment? Or should so-called boulic mo- Restriction of Kant’s table
dalities be restricted to the sole case of will, i.e., the objective
part of desire? In fact, the following analogy does not need to According to Kant (2007 [1781], B15-16), the judg-
fulfill the condition that desires be proper sorts of judgment. ment “7 + 5 = 12” is both synthetic and a priori: it is synthet-
For analogy differs from identity: an analogy consists in say- ic because it is not analytic, insofar as the predicate concept
ing that whatever holds for a with respect to b also holds for “equal to 12” is not contained within the subject concept “7
c with respect to d, even if there is no logical interconnection + 5”; it is a priori, because the justification of such a predi-
between the elements of the pairs a,b and c,d. For our present cation does not depend upon experience. The main problem
concerns, let a and b be symbols for the Epicurean necessary concerns what Kant meant with “analyticity”: a containment
and natural desires, respectively; and let c and d be symbols for relation between subject and predicate in a judgment. How
the Kantian analytic and a priori judgments. The same table can it be warranted that the number 12 contains the sum of 7
(Table 2) appears as with the previous analogical table (Table and 5? What is the source of such a relation?
1) of epistemic and boulic modalities, accordingly: A controversy arose at the end of the 19th century be-
tween those who took logic to ground mathematics (e.g.,
Table 2. An analogy between Epicurus’ classification of desires Frege, 1980 [1884]; Carnap, 1947) and those who did not
and Kant’s classification of judgments. (e.g., Poincaré, 1968 [1902]). According to the former, “7 + 5
= 12” is not a synthetic but, rather, an analytic a priori judg-
Epicurean desires Kantian judgments ment: the concept “7 + 5” is taken to be necessarily identical
to the concept “12”. Like Kant, this assumes a connection be-
(1) necessary analytic
tween arithmetic and apriority: no such justification can stem
(2) not necessary synthetic from the domain of experience, given that it is in principle not
(3) natural a priori possible to find counterevidence against what is grounded a
(4) not natural a posteriori priori, i.e., universally. Against Kant, the concept of analytici-
ty has been separated from the criterion of containment and
updated by the logical positivists: an analytical judgment is a
Note that Kantian judgments are lexicalized by posi- judgment that is true by definition, according to the meanings
tive concepts, unlike some of the Epicurean desires. How- given to its terms in a given language. This more conventional
ever, it is not difficult to find positive counterparts to “not definition helps to avoid the psychologist connotation of ana-
necessary” and “not natural”: contingent, for the former; lyticity. Above all, it shows how a controversy can be raised in
cultural, for the latter. Consequently, our main issue can be philosophy with a redefinition of its main concepts. Why not
reformulated as follows: can there be desires that are both do the same with the Epicurean table of desires?
necessary and cultural?
An obvious similarity arises between the way in which
Extension of Kant’s table
Epicurus and Kant made use of their respective concepts:
there are three and only three possible combinations, in both
According to Kripke (1980), there is no restriction at
cases. This is displayed in Table 3, where the same shaded row
all in the Kantian table of judgments: each row constitutes a
(2) is ruled out by the two theories.
proper judgment on its own, including the case of necessary a
posteriori judgments. Again, a prior redefinition of the basic
Table 3. An analogy between Epicurus’ forbidden desires and terms is required to go from a negative to a positive reception
Kant’s forbidden judgments.
of Kripke’s strategy. The same should apply to an extension of
Epicurus’ table of desires.
Epicurean desires Kantian judgments
Take Kripke’s famous case of analytic a posterio-
(1) necessary, natural analytic, a priori ri judgment: “Water is H2O”. Strictly speaking, “analytic”
(2) necessary, cultural analytic, a posteriori should be replaced by “necessary” in Kripke’s terminolo-
(3) contingent, natural synthetic, a priori gy; and “judgment” should be turned interchangeably into
“proposition” or “sentence”. How can such a sentence be
(4) contingent, cultural synthetic, a posteriori
true in every case, anyway?

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 Fabien Schang

Firstly, Kripke proposes a redefinition of analyticity in the Kantian table of judgments. Besides, Quine claimed that
terms of necessary truth, i.e., truth in every possible world. Carnap’s distinction between “external” and “internal” ques-
Whether “possible” is to be taken in the same sense as “con- tions relies upon an arbitrary distinction between facts and
ceivable” or not is not at issue now, despite the close connec- theories. Every true sentence has an empirical content, Quine
tion between conceivability and our issue of conceptually argued, in the sense that true sentences always have a linguis-
impossible desires. tic and factual component.
Second, Kripke’s point is that there are some sentences Whether Quine’s rejection of pure analyticity should be
that are both necessary and based on experience. Thus, the endorsed is not the point; rather, the controversy helps to call at-
chemical nature of water is taken to be a scientific fact; but tention to those who accept the Epicurean table unreflectively.
as a fact, it needs to be discovered by experimental methods
before it is shown to be true necessarily. There seems to be a
clear-cut difference in the present controversy between Kant
Entailment
and Kripke and the opposition between Kant and logical pos-
In any case, there is something common between the
itivists: in the latter case, the two sides agreed that experience
aforementioned tables: both locate the problem in row (2).
has no role to play in the justification of arithmetic judgments; A logical analysis shows that this corresponds to the issue of
in the former case, however, Kripke claims that experience entailment.
does contribute to the justification of analytic judgments.
Isn’t there some misunderstanding here when it comes
to the usual distinction between the origins of a concept and Analogy III: Truth-table
its justification? For if Kant accepted the empirical origin
of concepts like numbers and operation signs, this does not Another deep epistemological obstacle seems to justify
mean that he thereby accepted the empirical foundation of the open consensus around Epicurus’ taxonomy of desires:
an arithmetical identity such as “7 + 5 = 12”. In a nutshell, the set-theoretical relation of inclusion between necessary
doesn’t Kripke, with his necessary aposteriority, reproduce and natural desires. A logical link with set theory is easily
made through the connective of the conditional, which is
the mistake made by John Stuart Mill? According to Mill
said to approximate the relation of entailment. Little wonder
(1974 [1843]), the empirical observation that adding seven
that the Kantian table of judgment nicely matches with the
apples to five oranges resulted in a set of twelve fruits was tak-
truth-table characterizing the logical connective of condition-
en to be an argument for the empirical foundation of mathe-
al, “if … then” (Table 4).
matics. Just as Frege (1980 [1884]) stressed this confusion be-
tween occasion and foundation, Kripke (1980) could equally
be blamed for reproducing the same conceptual flaw. Table 4. The truth-table of logical conditional and its “forbidden”
Yet this is not the case. I take this distinctive reception truth-condition.
of Kripke’s hypothesis to rely upon a deep revision of what
“analyticity” means. From a Kantian perspective, analytici- p q
ty is closely related to the categories of pure reason, i.e., to (1) T T
what stands in the a priori conditions of thought. No such
transcendental analysis seems to be at hand in the Kripkean (2) T F
account of necessary a posteriori sentences: “Water is H2O” (3) T F
is a necessarily true sentence not in the light of pure reason (4) F F
but, rather, as a discovery holding in every world. Kantians
must view rigid designators as a regressive emancipation of
metaphysics from epistemology; in any case, the changes in The prohibited shaded row (2) is the case in which the
analytic philosophy from Kripke (1980) to the two-dimension- antecedent p is true and the consequent q is false, in the con-
alism of Chalmers (2006) should be tolerated with respect to ditional sentence p ⊃ q. A logical interpretation of this table
the classification of desires too. comes to the same result as a Kantian interpretation of ana-
lytic a posteriori judgments: it is impossible for the complex
Cancellation of Kant’s table sentence p ⊃ q to be true whenever p is true and q is not true
(i.e., false), just as it is impossible for a desire to be entertained
Recall how Quine also shook the ongoing debate around whenever it is said to be necessary and not natural (i.e., cul-
the distinction between analytic and synthetic. According to tural). The same sort of inclusive relation is presupposed by
Quine (1951), there is no difference in nature but, rather, a Kant’s transcendental philosophy: no judgment can be ana-
mere difference in degree between these two kinds of judg- lytically true and a posteriori at once, according to the Kan-
ment. Mathematical and logical sentences are “more analyti- tian reading of analyticity in terms of the categories of pure
cally true” than truths from empirical sciences, but there is no reason inherent to human nature. Similarly, no desire can be
purely analytic or synthetic sentence in the sense assumed by necessary and cultural at once, according to the Epicurean

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 Non-Epicurean Desires

reading of necessity in terms of the properties inherent of hu- Necessitation

man nature. Drug addiction cannot be said to be “necessary”
in this sense: it is made necessary, and such a necessitation is A relative sense of necessity implies that whatever has
not a feature of human nature at all but a mere by-product of been accepted in the past cannot be modified afterwards, just
cultural devolution. like the rules of a game. Such an analogy with game theory
By analogy, any disagreement about the content of the echoes what Bouveresse (1987) has said about Wittgenstein’s
preceding table is a disagreement about the logical relation language-game theory: quoting Goethe in his preface, Bou-
between its terms. On the one hand, the logicists think that veresse compares the foundations of language games with the
there is no entailment but, rather, an equivalence or bi-condi- mysterious sources of human societies by depicting them as
tional relation between analyticity and a priority: whatever products of necessitated conventions. This quotation insists on a
is analytic (or synthetic) is therefore a priori (or a posterio- paradoxical link between necessity and conventionality: con-
ri), and conversely; on the other hand, Kripke thinks that vention is a product of contingent decision, and whatever is
there is no logical connection at all between the two: wheth- contingent cannot be necessary, by definition. The explana-
er a sentence is necessary (or not) entails nothing particular tion is this: conventions are contingent by definition; how-
about its being a priori or a posteriori. Finally, Quine cancels ever, they are made necessary or necessitated once accepted
the logical relation by refusing any single occurrence of an- within a given area of study: language, with Wittgenstein;
tecedent and consequent. mind, with Epicurus.
At any rate, whoever wants to break with the limits of An ultimate epistemological obstacle has to be over-
Kant’s transcendental reason and opt for Kripke’s possible come in order to proceed with desires as Kripke did with
worlds should also tolerate the same stance with respect to judgments: the view that human nature is given once and for
the limits of human nature. If so, why not extend necessity all independently of human cultures, just as Kant located
beyond the realm of naturalness, just as Kripke did by build- analytic judgments beyond particular experience. Anyone
ing a channel between necessity and aposteriority? who has sympathy for transhumanism should make the jump
without difficulty. But it can be done without even assuming
Relative necessity such a metaphysical stance.
Three cases for cultural necessitation will now be sug-
Nothing of this kind can be conceived with necessity, so gested, namely: neurotic desires; mimetic desires; taboos, as a
long as the latter is associated with eternity. On the one hand, negative version of necessitated “counter-desires”.
whatever is eternal is standing and cannot change, by oppo- In Freud (1991 [1916])’s theory of the unconscious mind,
sition to the poietic feature of cultural things. On the other “the ego is not the master in its own house”. According to Freud,
hand, the conjunction of necessity and culture can be validat- this is due to the opposition between two instances of mind,
ed if necessity is reduced to a relative or context-dependent viz. conscious and unconscious. Whether or not psychoanaly-
sense of irrevocability. sis is a reliable theory is not the point; rather, the explanatory
Borrowing from the Aristotelian distinction between role of neuroses is that they give an example of unnatural de-
relative (haplos) and absolute (katolou) forms of true predi- sires that are formed after birth and through the negative ef-
cation, a logical truth is said to be either relative or absolute fect of repressive education. If such uncontrollable desires are
according to whether its truth depends on given premises or accepted as neuroses, then there are some desires that are both
not. Syllogisms are relatively necessary truths, insofar as the impossible for the agent to restrain and non-natural.
conclusion cannot be validated without accepting at least Following Girard (1966), desire is an essentially mimetic
two prior sentences. The same is held about theorems in process: far from the naturalistic picture given by Epicurus,
modern logic: any given formula can be a theorem in this some desires result from a triangular relationship between
logical system and not a theorem in that one, as witnessed the owner’s desired object, the object itself, and the desiring
by “p or not p”: this is a theorem in classical logic, but not in agent. Desire has thus been made necessary by socialization,
intuitionist logic. and everyone desires what another has. Such a cogent the-
Comparison is not reason, however, and an advocate ory helps to account for current human behaviors like se-
of natural philosophy might reply that the way in which duction or consumption. La Rochefoucauld (2002 [1665], n.
logicians handle necessity has nothing to do with the top- 136) summarizes it in the following words: “There are some
ics that Epicurus dealt with. My reply, again, is that Kant’s people who would never have fallen in love if they had not
concept of analyticity also differs from what Kripke meant heard there was such a thing”. Anyone who admits the prom-
by necessity: the former was in accordance with the epis- inence of such social desires may object to their necessity, in
temic categories of pure reason, whereas the latter con- the sense of their being inherent to human nature. But still, it
cerns metaphysical truth in every possible world. There- can be accepted by anyone who sees an impetus in them that
fore, in the following I shall give a relative non-answer to cannot be cancelled out by the social conditions of life.
the initial question: are there impossible desires, conceptu- Finally, a reverse form of cultural necessity may be found
ally speaking? in taboos. Following Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]), taboos can

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 Fabien Schang

be seen as a third example of what socialization may make system. Is the occurrence of necessary and cultural desires an
necessary through the force of education, after Freud’s neu- external or internal question? Quineans should question the
roses and Girard’s desires of desires. In fact, taboos proceed very distinction between what a concept means inside and
as counter-desires: they are feelings produced by prohibited outside of a philosophical system.
rules in a given community, and the stronger they are the more Are there non-Epicurean desires, in conclusion? Not im-
natural they appear. Disgust provoked by the incest taboo, for possibly, at any rate.
example, is a feeling where agents do more than merely not
desire something: they desire not to do what is made shame-
ful by the tacit rules of the community. Therefore, anthropol-
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In fact, the central problem concerns the conditions for Submitted on March 23, 2016
making sense of an idea inside or outside of a philosophical Accepted on June 21, 2016

Erratum: Missing footnote 1 included on page 63.

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