G.R. No. 208802. October 14, 2015.

*
 
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS
OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG, JR., represented by ROMEO
BATTUNG, SR., respondents.

Civil Law; Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence;

The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons,
corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services
to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e.,
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its
passengers.—The law exacts from common carriers (i.e.,
those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public) the highest degree of
diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the
safety of its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Civil Code state: Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the
nature of their

_______________

*  FIRST DIVISION.

 
 
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580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
 Same; Same; Same; Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that “[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.”—In this
relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n case
of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.” This disputable
presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident
was caused by a fortuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; It is imperative for a party claiming
against a common carrier to show that the injury or death to the
passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common carrier and/or
its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.—It is
imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under
the above said provisions to show that the injury or death to the
passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common carrier
and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.
In Pilapil v. CA, 180 SCRA 546 (1989), the Court clarified that
where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due
(1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common
carrier’s employees with respect to the foregoing — such as when
the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which
the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there
would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in
its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent
employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the
Civil Code should not apply.

 
 

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Same; Same; Diligence of a Good Father of the Family; Since

Battung’s death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable
provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that “a
common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise
of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.”—Since Battung’s death was caused
by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the
Civil Code, which states that “a common carrier is responsible
for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.” Notably, for this obligation, the law
provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father
of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the
common carrier’s part.
Same; Same; Same; Case law states that the concept of
diligence of a good father of a family connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would
have observed when confronted with a similar situation.—Case
law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family
“connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an
ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted
with a similar situation. The test to determine whether
negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Alagar, Silverio Law Offices for petitioner.
  Public Attorney’s Office for respondents.

 
 
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G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 97757, which affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated
August 29, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan,
Isabela, Branch 22 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 22-1103 finding
petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. (petitioner),
Federico M. Duplio, Jr. (Duplio), and Christopher Daraoay
(Daraoay) jointly and severally liable to respondents heirs
of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (respondents) for damages arising
from culpa contractual.
 
The Facts
 
Respondents alleged that in the evening of March 22,
2003, Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (Battung) boarded petitioner’s
bus with body number 037 and plate number BVJ 525 in
Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.5 Battung was
seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during
the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao
Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio,
stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this
point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus
stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a
companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of
the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital,
but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.6 Hence,
respondents filed a complaint7 on

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 10-34.

2   Id., at pp. 42-58. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta, with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Angelita A.
Gacutan, concurring.
3  Id., at pp. 60-61.
4  Id., at pp. 92-100. Penned by Judge Felipe Jesus Torio II.
5  Id., at p. 93.
6  Id., at pp. 43-45. See also pp. 63-64.
7  Dated July 14, 2008. Id., at pp. 62-65.

 
 

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July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of

P1,826,000.008 based on a breach of contract of carriage
against petitioner, Duplio, and Daraoay (petitioner, et al.)
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103.
Respondents contended that as a common carrier,
petitioner and its employees are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on the part
of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus,
responsible therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be
held civilly liable for Battung’s death.9
 In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they
had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law
from common carriers. In this relation, they claimed that a
common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers
and that Battung’s death should be properly deemed a
fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, as well as the payment of their counterclaims
for damages and attorney’s fees.10

The RTC’s Ruling

 
In a Decision11 dated August 29, 2011, the RTC ruled in
respondents’ favor and, accordingly, ordered petitioner, et
al. to pay respondent the amounts of: (a) P1,586,000.00 as
compensatory damages for unearned income; (b)
P50,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages.12
The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to
rebut the presumed liability of common carriers in case of
inju-

______________

8   Broken down as follows: (a) P1,316,000.00 as loss of earning

capacity; (b) P150,000.00 as actual damages; (c) P300,000.00 as moral
damages; (d) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (e) P10,000.00 as
litigation expenses; id., at pp. 64-65.
9   Id., at p. 63.
10  Id., at pp. 46-47.
11  Id., at pp. 92-100.
12  Id., at p. 100.

 
 
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G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

ries/death to its passengers due to their failure to show

that they implemented the proper security measures to
prevent passengers from carrying deadly weapons inside
the bus which, in this case, resulted in the killing of
Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable
for the latter’s death based on culpa contractual.13
Dissatisfied, petitioner, et al. appealed to the CA.14
 
The CA’s Ruling
 
 In a Decision15 dated May 31, 2013, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC in toto.16 It held that the killing of
Battung cannot be deemed as a fortuitous event,
considering that such killing happened right inside
petitioner’s bus and that petitioner, et al. did not take any
safety measures in ensuring that no deadly weapon would
be smuggled inside the bus.17
Aggrieved, only petitioner moved for reconsideration18
which was, however, denied in a Resolution19 dated August
23, 2013; hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

 
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding
petitioner liable for damages to respondent arising from
culpa contractual.

_______________

13  Id., at pp. 98-99.

14  See Notice of Appeal dated September 15, 2011; id., at p. 101.
15  Id., at pp. 42-58.
16  Id., at p. 57.
17  Id., at p. 49.
18  See Motion for Reconsideration dated June 19, 2013; id., at pp. 129-
134.
19  Id., at pp. 60-61.

 
 
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The Court’s Ruling

 
The petition is meritorious.
 
I.
 
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public)20 the highest degree of diligence (i.e.,
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its
passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
state:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.

 
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that “[i]n case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755.” This disputable presumption may
also be overcome by a showing that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event.21

_______________

20  See Article 1732 of the Civil Code.

21  See Tiu v. Arriesgado, 481 Phil. 1, 20-21; 437 SCRA 426, 443 (2004),
citing Estrada v. Consolacion, 163 Phil. 540, 551; 71 SCRA 523, 530
(1976).

 
 

586

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G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be

pointed out that the law does not make the common carrier
an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. In
Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas,22 the Court explained that:

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from

common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of
extraordinary care, vigilance[,] and precaution in the
carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as
human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes
compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to
all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of
fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its
passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being,
from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a
mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by
proof that the common carrier had exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by law in the
performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a
fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the
Code Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of
drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct
of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the
business of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the
passenger’s safety, but that its liability

_______________

22  612 Phil. 85; 594 SCRA 569 (2009).

 
 
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for personal injuries sustained by its passenger

rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires.23 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a
common carrier under the above said provisions to show
that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the
negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in
providing safe transport to its passengers.
In Pilapil v. CA,24 the Court clarified that where the
injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due (1) to
any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the
common carrier’s employees with respect to the foregoing
— such as when the injury arises wholly from causes
created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or
prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue
regarding the common carrier’s negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent
employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756
of the Civil Code should not apply:

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence

against the carrier is only a disputable presumption. [The
presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established
proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of
diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the
instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in
no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in
the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful
acts of [the common car-

_______________

23   Id., at p. 90; p. 575, citing Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil.

1031, 1036; 180 SCRA 546, 551-552 (1989).
24  Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, id., at p. 1037; pp. 552-553.

 
 
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G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

rier’s] employees, and therefore involving no issue of

negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as
well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the
carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not
have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the
carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the
lawmakers. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 
In this case, Battung’s death was neither caused by any
defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of
petitioner’s employees, namely, that of Duplio and
Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor,
respectively. Instead, the case involves the death of
Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-
passenger who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly
alighted from the vehicle.25 Thus, there is no proper issue
on petitioner’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence in
ensuring the safety of the passengers transported by it, and
the presumption of fault/negligence against petitioner
under Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of
the Civil Code should not apply.
 
II.
 
On the other hand, since Battung’s death was caused by
a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of
the Civil Code, which states that “a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.” Notably, for this

_______________

25  See Rollo, pp. 45-47.

 
 
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obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence,

i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the
existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part.
Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good
father of a family “connotes reasonable care consistent with
that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test
to determine whether negligence attended the performance
of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.”26
In ruling on this case, the CA cited Fortune Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals27 (Fortune) in ascribing negligence on
the part of petitioner, ratiocinating that it failed to
implement measures to detect if its passengers were
carrying firearms or deadly weapons which would pose a
danger to the other passengers.28 However, the CA’s
reliance was plainly misplaced in view of Fortune’s factual
variance with the case at bar.
In Fortune, the common carrier had already received
intelligence reports from law enforcement agents that
certain lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn
some of its buses; and yet, it failed to implement the
necessary precautions to ensure the safety of its buses and
its passengers. A few days later, one of the company’s buses
was indeed hijacked and burned by the lawless elements
pretending as mere passengers, resulting in the death of
one of the bus passengers. Accordingly, the Court held that
the common carrier’s failure to take precautionary
measures to protect the

_______________

26  Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 845, 856-857; 409 SCRA

528, 535 (2003), citing Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
378 Phil. 991, 1003; 321 SCRA 375, 386 (1999), further citing Picart v.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918).
27  364 Phil. 480; 305 SCRA 14 (1999).
28  See Rollo, pp. 53-54.

 
 

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G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

safety of its passengers despite warnings from law

enforcement agents showed that it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the
attack against one of its buses; thus, the common carrier
was rightfully held liable for the death of the
aforementioned passenger.
In contrast, no similar danger was shown to exist in this
case so as to impel petitioner or its employees to implement
heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its
passengers. There was also no showing that during the
course of the trip, Battung’s killer made suspicious actions
which would have forewarned petitioner’s employees of the
need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the
passengers. Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company,29 has held that common carriers
should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the
passengers they take in will not bring anything that would
prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers,
unless there is something that will indicate that a more
stringent inspection should be made, viz.:

In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that

while it is true the passengers of appellant’s bus should not be
made to suffer for something over which they had no control, as
enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor,
fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s
duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to
the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their
common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will
not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and
limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to
be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage
and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in

_______________

29  140 Phil. 459; 30 SCRA 69 (1969).

 
 
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the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally

made as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such
is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being
transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the
service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the
passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger
had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and
other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without
judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not
beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect
individual human rights and liberties. Withal, what must be
importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of
the fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein
involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose
on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers,
considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse
for mischief and abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient
indications that the representations of the passenger
regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the
interest of the common safety of all, the assistance of the
police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force
the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the
needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety
and, above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger. It
is in this sense that the mentioned service manual issued by
appellant to its conductors must be understood.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

 
In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at
San Jose City to let four (4) men ride petitioner’s bus (two
[2] of which turned out to be Battung’s murderers), the bus
driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note
of

_______________

30  Id., at pp. 464-465; p. 75.

 
 
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592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung,
Jr.

what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus

conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them
pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did.31 During
the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing
which would rouse their suspicion that the men were
armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no
such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a
more stringent search (i.e., bodily search) on the aforesaid
men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that
petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the
diligence of a good father of a family in relation to its
responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil Code. As such,
petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 97757 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed
by respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.

Notes.—The rule as stated in Article 1735 of the Civil

Code is that in cases where the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence required by law.
(Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Insurance Company of
North America, 561 SCRA 262 [2008])

_______________

31  See Records, pp. 15-17.

 
 

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A common carrier is bound by law to exercise

extraordinary diligence and utmost care in ensuring for the
safety and welfare of its passengers with due regard for all
the circumstances. (Philippine Airlines, Incorporated vs.
Court of Appeals, 566 SCRA 124 [2008])
 
 
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