Legislative Cases 54-60

54.
TARROSA VS. SINGSON

232 SCRA 553
MAY 25, 1994
FACTS:
Gabriel Singson, respondent, was appointed as Governor of the Bangko Sentral

by then President Fidel Ramos on July of 1993. The petitioner, Jesus Tarrosa in his
capacity as a taxpayer files a petition of prohibition questioning the above appointment
on grounds that such appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. He seeks to remove Singson from office until he is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. He also questions Salvador Enriquez, then Secretary of
Budget and Management for disbursing public funds to pay salaries and emoluments to
Singson while in office. Tarrosa grounds his claims upon Section 6 of RA 7635 “The
governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be head of a department and his
appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.”
The respondent’s defense is that Congresss has exceeded its legislative power in
RA 7635 and that the appointment of Singson in not one of those that need confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments as provided in Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution “The President shall nominate and with consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this constitution.
Respondents also say that the BSP has its own budget and is not subject to the
provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge the appointment
Whether or not the appointment of Singson is valid
HELD:
The petition in nature is a quo warranto in that it seeks to oust Singson from public
office. However, a quo warranto proceeding can only be instituted by the Solicitor General
or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office. In the case at bar, Tarrosa has no
capacity to file such claim whatsoever. If such is granted, then it encourages every
disgruntled citizen to come to court over any appointment they do not seem fit. Because
Tarrosa has no legal capacity, his whole case crumbles and there is no need to question
the disbursement of salaries.
55.
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA
172 SCRA 160
April 13, 1989
FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII,
without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government
"whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction
of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
RULING:
No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments
which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of
President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she
appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited
power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments
that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to

appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that
is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim
appointments.
56.
SARMIENTO III VS. MISON
156 SCRA 549
December 17, 1987
FACTS:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison
was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon
Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,
and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it
appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.
HELD:
No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of
those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require
confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation
by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong
to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
58.
ROBLES VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates
for the position of Congressman of the 1st District of Caloocan City in the last May 11,
1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December
23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st District of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed
an electoral contest with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET electoral
fraud and irregularities) and called for re-counting of votes. Santos filed a Motion to
Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motionn to Recall/Disregard his previous motion.
The first motion was not acted upon by HRET and the second motion was granted. Robles
claimed that the first motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
thus giving the supreme jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest
the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. Certainly, the tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and
the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. To hold otherwise
would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is
dismissed.
59.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii,
USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define
what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of
certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing
power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
60.
VILANDO v. HRET
G. R. No. 192147 & 192149
August 23, 2011
FACTS:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because
of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification
cases againstLimkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen
of the
Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
mother, lost her Filipinocitizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father.
During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, election
daycame and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival
Paras.COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after
the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On
the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062
adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspendingthe proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases
which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the
involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed Paras’ petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which hasthe
jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUES:
Whether Limkaichong is qualified to hold a position in the government.
HELD:
YES. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese
citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization
of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Records also disclose
that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied
on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959Orders of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared
Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

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54.

TARROSA VS. SINGSON

Gabriel Singson, respondent, was appointed as Governor of the Bangko Sentral

Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to

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