AGUINALDO AND PEREZ vs.

VENTUS AND JOSON

Topic: Suspension of Arraignment/Speedy Trial
FACTS:
 Claiming to be business partners in financing casino players, Ventus and Joson alleged that
sometime in March and April 2002, Aguinaldo and Perez connived in convincing them to
part with their (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles
which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be
owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
 Respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa
against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)
of Manila.
 Perez denied the accusation against him, and claimed that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially
introduced them to each other.
 Respondents alleged that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the
registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as the one who
personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
 Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution7 recommending both petitioners to be
indicted in court for estafa. He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit
any controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
 Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail to be Posted in
Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even date. Public respondent
issued an Order granting the motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the
recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution
of her motion for reconsideration with the OCP.
 Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending
resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon
the prosecution's motion, the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred
until the resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Public respondent ordered
the case archived pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the
OCP of Manila.
 The OCP of Manila filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial, considering that petitioners'
motions for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
 On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition
for review.
 Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for trial,
Public respondent issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
 On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings, until their petition for review before the DOJ is resolved
with finality.
 Public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel arraignment and
suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration.
 Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates, filed a Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the private
complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an
Opposition alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file,
awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before the DOJ.
 On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation informing the public respondent
that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated September 6, 2004 denying
petitioners' petition for review.
 The public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to
Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest is
GRANTED. The case is REINSTATED and let warrant of arrest be issued against
accused Aguinaldo.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest.
 On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest, and setting petitioners'
arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only
a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. He also ruled that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court. He also noted that records
do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for review, although photocopies were
presented by De Castro.
 Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and petitioners argue that the
provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners
of their procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been
resolved by the DOJ. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for
review under Rule 65 was filed with the SC alleging Grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES: Whether a procedural techinicality that the suspension allowed for arraignment is
already beyond the 60- day period may be relaxed in the interest of an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
RULING:
 No. Petition denied.
 The Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision of Section 11 (c), Rule
116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days
is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ
resolves their petition for review with finality.
 In Samson v. Judge Daway,the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for
review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment.
 In Diño v. Olivarez, the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of the
proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary,
to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on the rule provided under
Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the
period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75)
days.
 In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that in a long line of decisions, it
has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the
mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted
only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.
 With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003, the
public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August
23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The
Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 2005 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their
petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment
to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11)
years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have
yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in
 the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for
review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
 On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary investigation
as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative. Having submitted
his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder- Affidavit to the OCP of Manila before the filing of
Information for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary
investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally
informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information,
she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation.
 In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by
one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition
for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the
public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the
public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
 Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without petitioners
having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial court for trial
on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the
"Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a
Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.'" In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke
violation of their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes
in computing the time within which trial must commence the delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA
and the Court.
 Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the pendency
of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a
cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a
warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists.
Moreover, judges should take note of the following:
1.If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation of
the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings
upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the
accused and direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the
motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be
more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of the motion
to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed with the arraignment as
scheduled and without further delay.
2.If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend
the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the
arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing
of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance,
could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before
the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and
without further delay.