DAMASCIUS ON KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECT

Published in Rhizai 1/2004

eds. I. Christov, I. Bodnar, P. Gregoric, K. Ierodiakonou
pp. 107-124

Copyright Cosmin I. Andron

cosmin.andron@gmx.net

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Damascius on knowledge and its object Cosmin I. Andron
Rhizai 1, 2004 pp.107-124

DAMASCIUS ON KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECT1

1.

Neoplatonists inherited from Plato and Aristotle and developed in a remarkably intricate
way something that, roughly, can be called philosophy of mind.2 In a few words, what all
of them agree upon is that to each ontological level (level of reality) corresponds a
specific type of cognitive receptor (faculty), always posited in the soul,3 and representing
a certain morphological aspect of the soul. 4 Each of these faculties has its own object:
sense-perception deals with the perceptible object (aistheton), representation with the
appearance (phantasma), having an opinion deals with the conjecturable (doxaston),
thinking with the thinkable (dianoeton) and intellection with the intelligible (noeton). Thus,
our knowledge (gnosis) is the conjoined activity of sense-perception (aisthesis), representation

1 This article originates in a paper I gave at the University of Maine in 2002 at the International Society for
Neoplatonic Studies annual meeting. I received on that occasion many challenging questions which helped me
later to address some of the more controversial issues raised here. I am most grateful for very helpful
comments and corrections on various drafts of this paper to Anne Sheppard, John Dillon, Richard Sorabji,
David Sedley, Peter Adamson, Michael Frede, Dominic O’Meara and an anonymous reviewer. Their
influence has been so great that only a blanket acknowledgment can save the paper from being outsized by
the footnotes. It is a truism to mention that all the remaining faults are mine. However on this occasion
this is more than true since I wilfully chose to ignore some of the suggestions made on these occasions
either because I was not sure if I could commit entirely to them nor conclusively refute them (at least at
this stage), or because it would have broadened too much a discussion which I wished to keep
concentrated. I feel that the research in Damascius’ epistemology is still in its infancy and I am sure that
this paper, as controversial as some of its conclusions might seem, is just one possible way into this
universe. Last but not the least I owe a debt of gratitude to Katerina Ierodiakonou who proposed me to
publish this paper and had a huge amount of patience waiting for the final version of it at a time when
Damascius turned into the least of my worries.
2 cf. A.C. Lloyd, The anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990. pp. 140-163; H.J. Blumenthal, Aristotle and

Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of ‘De Anima’, London 1996.

3 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.91: ÀOti ka/lloj e)stiì th=j yuxh=j h( gnw½sij dia\ to\ "e)kfane\j kaiì

e)ra/smion", h( de\ kaqara\ tou= aiãsxouj th=j uÀlhj kaiì th=j a)gnoi¿aj eÃti meizo/nwj kalh/,
"kalli¿sth" de\ h( t%½ noer%½ fwtiì sugkekrame/nh. tou=to de\ nu=n eÃfh w•j pro\j th\n met'
ai¹sqh/sewj gnw½sin. - ‘Knowledge is beauty of the soul because of its brilliance and its loveliness
[Phaedr.250d7-e1], the soul that is free from the ugliness of matter and from ignorance is even more
beautiful, but most beautiful of all is the soul that has blended itself with the light of intelligence. Here,
however, he uses the superlative in a comparison with the knowledge that depends on sense-perception.’
(tr. Westerink modified).
4 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.78: ÀOti to\ me\n sw½ma a)gnoi¿# sunousi¿wtai (sunagwgo\j ga\r h(

gnw½sij, to\ de\ pa/ntv meme/ristaiŸ: o( de\ nou=j au)tognw½sij, oÀti kat' ou)si¿an a)me/ristoj.
tw½n de\ e)n me/s% h( me\n aiãsqhsij skoteinota/th gnw½sij, e)peidh\ ou)k aÃneu tou= fu/sei
a)gnoou=ntoj: h( de\ yuxh\ h( logikh\ fanote/ra kaiì e(auth=j gnwstikh/, oÀti ma=llon
a)me/ristoj: h( de\ fantasi¿a me/sh pwj, dio\ kaiì nou=j e)sti paqhto\j kaiì meristo/j. - ‘Of the
body, ignorance is the natural characteristic (for knowledge unites, while the body is utterly divided);
intelligence [i.e. non-discursive thinking], on the other hand, is absolute knowledge, because it is indivisible
by its very essence. As for the intermediates, sense-perception is the dimmest kind of knowledge, because it
cannot dispense with the body, which is naturally ignorant; rational soul is brighter and knows itself, being
closer to the indivisible; representation is somehow between them, and it is therefore described as passive
and divisible intelligence.’ (tr. Westerink modified); Damascius, in Phaed. I §.87.1-3: àOti o( logismo\j
nou=j e)sti diecodiko/j, tau/tv me\n tou= nou= a)poleipo/menoj, v de\ nou=j th=j ai¹sqh/sew¯j te
kaiì fantasi¿aj u(pere/xwn: kaiì eÃsti yuxh=j e)ne/rgeia logikh=j. - ‘An account is discursive
thinking, and in so far inferior to non-discursive thinking, but qua thinking it is superior to sense-
perception and representation; it is an activity of the rational soul.’ (tr. Westerink modified).

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(phantasia), having opinions (doxazein), discursive thinking (dianoeisthai) and non-discursive

thinking (noesis). The following text from de Princ. investigates this:

Sense-perception exists in accordance with a percept (aisthema), representation exists

according to an imprint (typos), having opinions and discursive thinking exist, one
according to a discursive thought (dianoema) and the other according to an opinion
(doxasma). Generally speaking, knowledge exists according to gnosma, if we can
say so.5

Therefore our faculty is conditioned by the content it receives. Aisthema, doxasma and
dianoema are not, as Combès, Galpérine and Rappe wish to translate them: objects of sense
perception, opinion or discursive thinking. To aistheton, the perceptible, is the object of
sense perception. Aisthema is the way the perceiver6 is affected, i.e. the percept, the content
of perception. For example: when I perceive a black patch, the black patch7 is what I
perceive (the sense-datum) while the perceived object is, let’s say, a book. This is the
same as saying that I have the percept (aisthema) of a black patch that is given to my sight
(perception / aisthesis) by a sensible object (aistheton), i.e. a black book. The perceptual
content ‘black’ and the black book are not the same.8 Otherwise the linguistic difference
stressed by Damascius here would be pointless.

Damascius seems to be concerned, however, less with each faculty individually than with
the combination of them. Knowledge is the genus under which the forms of cognition
(i.e. exercise of cognitive faculties) fall9 and therefore the content of each faculty should
fall, in its turn, under a genus. However, we are not used to speaking indiscriminately
about the content of our knowledge, this being usually specified as sensation, opinion
etc., and it seems rather artificial (from the perspective of common language) to coin
such a term as gnosma; hence Damascius’ reluctance (ei hoion te phanai).

Damascius, -like other fellow Neoplatonists- seems to understand all the faculties of the
mind in an analogous manner to sense perception. The difference between the different
faculties would be due to the nature of the object, i.e. its place in the ontological
hierarchy. The perfect type of object of knowledge is incorporeal while ‘the dimmest’
(skoteinotate10) type of knowledge deals with sensible (physical) objects. Perception is in
accordance (kata) with aisthema just as representation is conditioned by the imprints of
memory and imagination and thought and opinion by propositions. Generally speaking,
each act of knowledge is conditioned by its content (gnosma). Therefore, ‘in all forms of
knowledge (gnosis) the object (to gnoston) must occur.’11 Returning to our example,

5 Damascius, de Princ. II 149.13-17: Kaiì ga\r h( aiãsqhsij kata\ to\ aiãsqhma, kaiì h( fantasi¿a
kata\ to\n tu/pon u(fi¿statai, kaiì h( do/casij kaiì h( diano/hsij, h( me\n kata\ to\ diano/hma,
h( de\ kata\ to\ do/casma. Kaqo/lou toi¿nun h( gnw½sij kata\ to\ gnw½sma, ei¹ oiâo/n te fa/nai.
6 Aristotle, Metaph. 1010b.31-33: to\ me\n ouÅn mh/te ta\ ai¹sqhta\ eiånai mh/te ta\ ai¹sqh/mata

iãswj a)lhqe/j (tou= ga\r ai¹sqanome/nou pa/qoj tou=to/ e)stiŸ – ‘Now it is doubtless true that
neither perceptible things nor sense-impressions (which are an affection of a perceiver) would exist;’ (tr.
Kirwan). Cf. also Sorabji’s discussion in Aristotle, On Memory, Providence 1972, pp.82-83 with the
difference that there the act of perception is included as well.
7 i.e. the mental ‘black patch’.
8 G. E. Moore, ‘The refutation of idealism’ and ‘The nature and reality of objects of perception’ in

Philosophical studies, London 1922.

9 Cf. Proclus, in Euclid. 3.14 ff; David, Proleg. 27.3-6.
10 cf. supra. Damascius, in Phaed. I 78.3.

11 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.88.3: deiÍ me\n ga\r e)n tv= gnw¯sei to\ gnwsto\n e)ggi¿gnesqai: (tr.

Westerink modified).

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experience gives us a book: for touch it is a hard surface, for sight it is a black patch, I can
infer what it is and even talk about its purpose. For me, as knower, it is an object of
knowledge (gnoston / a knowable), and what I have from it are the knowledge-data
(gnosmata), which are dependent on the presence of the object.

However, this raises a new question:

Is gnosma identical with the object of knowledge, but now in-substantial 12 to the
knower?13

The ‘traditional’ answer is yes. For Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus, to take only three
examples, there is an identity between the knower and the object of knowledge.
However, it seems that in this case knowledge is equated with thinking –either discursive
or non-discursive.14 In the case of Aristotle, the first stage in holding such a theory is to
assume that there is no difference between the object of thought and the act of thinking
it, i.e. that they are numerically identical.15 The next stage is to assume that, since the act
of thinking and the object are identical, they must be numerically identical with the
thinker16 as well. This is certainly the case with Aristotle’s god. In Plotinus, who seems to
take over Aristotle’s view, we are dealing this time explicitly with non-discursive thinking
(noesis) and the identity thesis becomes a necessity motivated by the existence of the
truth:

12 e)nousiwme/non: it seems to me to be a term specific to Damascius. The other occurrences are:

Damascius, In Phileb. §.175.7 - e)nousiwme/na; Damascius, de Princ. I 163.7-8 - e)nousiwme/n%;
Simplicius, In Phys. 780.5 and In Phys. 784.4 - e)nousiwme/noj where Simplicius quotes from Damascius’
work On Number, Place and Time. The only occurrence outside the works of Damascius is to be found in
Hierocles’ In Carmen Aureum Comm. II 3.7 - e)nousiwme/noj. Also there is the form e)nou/sion –2
occurences- to be found in the Anonymous Commentary to Parmenides XII 5-6 as contrasted to a)nou/sion.
13 Damascius, de Princ. II 149.17-19: To\ de\ gnw½sma/ e)stin au)to\ to\ gnwsto/n, a)ll' hÃdh t%½

gignw¯skonti e)nousiwme/non; - I take this last sentence with Ruelle and Galpérine as being a question,
and thereby I keep Ruelle’s punctuation against Combès-Westerink. It cannot be an assertion as long as it
gets refuted in the following sentence, as I will try to prove later.
14 In Aristotle we are dealing with episteme, which is theoretical knowledge as opposed to knowledge

through the senses (perception); in Plotinus and Proclus the identity thesis is applied to non-discursive
thinking (nous).
15 Aristotle, De an. 431b.20-432a.1: Nu=n de/, periì yuxh=j ta\ lexqe/nta sugkefalaiw¯santej,

eiãpwmen pa/lin oÀti h( yuxh\ ta\ oÃnta pw¯j e)sti pa/nta: hÄ ga\r ai¹sqhta\ ta\ oÃnta hÄ nohta/,
eÃsti d' h( e)pisth/mh me\n ta\ e)pisthta/ pwj, h( d' aiãsqhsij ta\ ai¹sqhta/: pw½j de\ tou=to, deiÍ
zhteiÍn. te/mnetai ouÅn h( e)pisth/mh kaiì h( aiãsqhsij ei¹j ta\ pra/gmata, h( me\n duna/mei ei¹j
ta\ duna/mei, h( d' e)ntelexei¿# ei¹j ta\ e)ntelexei¿#: th=j de\ yuxh=j to\ ai¹sqhtiko\n kaiì to\
e)pisthmoniko\n duna/mei tau)ta/ e)sti, to\ me\n <to\> e)pisthto\n to\ de\ <to\> ai¹sqhto/n.
a)na/gkh d' hÄ au)ta\ hÄ ta\ eiãdh eiånai. au)ta\ me\n dh\ ouÃ: ou) ga\r o( li¿qoj e)n tv= yuxv=, a)lla\
to\ eiådoj: - ‘Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing
things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and
sensation is in a way what is sensible: in what way we must inquire. Knowledge and sensation are divided
to correspond with the realities, potential knowledge and sensation answering to potentialities, actual
knowledge and sensation to actualities. Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are
potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. They must be either the
things themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible: it is not the stone which is
present in the soul but its form.’ (tr. Smith). Cf. also: De an. 425b.26-426a.26; and the discussion in R.
Sorabji, Time, Creation & the Continuum, London 1983. pp.144-145.
16 A disembodied thinker only, e.g. God.

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In this case, contemplation must be identical with the contemplated thing

and the intellect (nous) identical with the intelligible (noeton); and if they are
not identical, there will be no truth.17

In Proclus, keeping in mind the differences,18

each non-discursive faculty (nous) thinks itself: but the primal intellect (nous)
knows itself only, and intellect and the intelligible are here numerically one;
whereas each subsequent intellect knows simultaneously itself and its priors,
so that, to it, the intelligible is, on the one hand itself and on the other its
source.19

Admittedly, the identity theory does not apply to human subjects, which are not just
intellects.20 Nevertheless, the core of the theory states that a pure mind (discursive or
not) is identical with its objects, and for Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius there
were such pure minds.

At any rate, Damascius’ answer seems to differ from the answer given by Aristotle,
Plotinus and Proclus:

We answer that knowledge exists entirely in accordance with this [i.e. the
content of knowledge (gnosma)], but that knowledge is not identical with
this.21

From this passage Sara Rappe infers that Damascius denies the identity thesis.22
Nonetheless, although Damascius makes it clear that there is no identity between
knowledge (gnosis) and its object (gnoston) as such, the meaning of the whole paragraph
depends on how one reads the passage from de Princ. II 149.17-19:

To\ de\ gnw½sma/ e)stin au)to\ to\ gnwsto/n, a)ll' hÃdh t%½
gignw¯skonti e)nousiwme/non;

Is gnosma identical with the object of knowledge, but now in-substantial to the
knower?

While Combès-Westerink choose to see it as simply an addition to the previous sentence,

Ruelle, followed by Galpérine, chooses to see two separate sentences, of which the latter
is interrogative. (i.) Following the first reading, the translation would run:

17 Enn. V 3 5.21-23: Ei¹ tou=to, deiÍ th\n qewri¿an tau)to\n eiånai t%½ qewrht%½, kaiì to\n nou=n
tau)to\n eiånai t%½ noht%½: kaiì ga/r, ei¹ mh\ tau)to/n, ou)k a)lh/qeia eÃstai:
18 The division of non-discursive thinking into noeron, noeton and noeron kai noeton. Cf. Proclus, The elements of

theology, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1963. pp.285-289; L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science,
Edinburgh 1996. pp. 154-158.
19 El. Theol. 167.1-4: Pa=j nou=j e(auto\n noeiÍ: a)ll' o( me\n prw¯tistoj e(auto\n mo/non, kaiì eÁn

kat' a)riqmo\n e)n tou/t% nou=j kaiì nohto/n: eÀkastoj de\ tw½n e)fech=j e(auto\n aÀma kaiì ta\
pro\ au)tou=, kaiì nohto/n e)sti tou/t% to\ me\n oÀ e)sti, to\ de\ a)f' ou e)stin. (tr. Dodds modified).
20 Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation & the Continuum, London 1983. p.146.

21 Damascius, de Princ. II 149.19-20: ÄH kata\ me\n tou=to pa/ntwj h( gnw½sij, ou) tou=to de\ h(

gnw½sij.
22 S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Cambridge 2000. p.218.

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Generally speaking, knowledge exists according to gnosma, if we can say so, and
gnosma is identical with the object of knowledge, but already consubstantial with
the knower.

This explains the interpretation of Combès: ‘De fait la connaissance se produit selon
l’objet de connaissance, en tant que celui-ci est consubstantialisé avec le connaissant.’23
(ii.) For Rappe, although she chooses the text of Combès-Westerink, however, the
translation runs:

In general, then, knowledge corresponds to the object of knowledge, to coin

a new term for this, and the object of knowledge is that which is capable of
being known when it has come to be an object of knowledge for a knower.
We can say, therefore, that knowledge completely accords with its object, but
it is not its object.24

I believe that both understandings of the text are misguided, and I will tackle the issue
differently.

(i.) The version of Combès-Westerink, although it reaches the conclusion

intended by Damascius, i.e. that knowledge is not identical with gnosma, makes such a
conclusion impossible by misunderstanding the premise. Damascius’ problem is twofold:
a.) Firstly he asks if gnosma (a knowledge-datum) is the same thing as to gnoston (the object
of knowledge); b.) The second problem is if the object of knowledge (to gnoston) is
consubstantial with the knower, during the act of knowing. The answer he gives is that
the act of knowing (gnosis) is not identical with the object of knowledge, denying, thus,
the first Aristotelian hypothesis, and making the sequel impossible. The reading of
Combès-Westerink, although it accepts the rejection of the first Aristotelian hypothesis
(identity between the act of knowing and its object), implicitly accepts the second
Aristotelian hypothesis, i.e. the identity between the object of knowledge and the knower,
by accepting the identity –at least this is how I understand e)nousiwme/non - between
gnosma, gnoston and the knower.
(ii.) Rappe’s reading, on the other hand, mistranslates a)ll' hÃdh t%½
gignw¯skonti e)nousiwme/non as to allow the conclusion that the act of knowing is
not identical with the object of knowledge.
(iii.) Both translators muddle the distinction gnosma – gnoston translating them
indiscriminately as ‘object of knowledge’. Only in the passage from II 149.17-18, where
they occur together, do they take gnosma as ‘object of knowledge’ (objet de connaissance)
and gnoston as ‘that which is capable of being known’ (le connaissable).. If the terms are
synonymous, why would Damascius choose to differentiate them? In the end ‘the
knowable’ and ‘the object of knowledge’ are one and the same thing. Moreover, they are
both covered by one and the same word in Greek: to\ gnwsto/n, and for using this one,
Damascius does not need to apologise- it is well used through the centuries, before and
after him. Nevertheless, he ‘invents’ a new term, gnosma, and this must mean something
different. As I suggested above, and as Damascius does explicitly in his text using the
analogy with aisthesis, gnosma must be understood as the cognitive content of knowledge,
distinct from the object of knowledge. Galpérine, when translating the above mentioned

23 Damascius, Traité des premiers principes, vol. II, ed., trad. et notes par L.G. Westerink et J. Combès, Paris
1989. p.LII.
24 S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Cambridge 2000. p.218.

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passage, maintains the confusion in the case of aisthesis, etc. but leaves gnosma
untranslated.

Still, there are some other problems with this passage:

(i.) It is true that Damascius, denying Aristotle’s first hypothesis, implicitly denies the
second as well. As already mentioned, in Aristotle’s case, the identity is referred to episteme
and its object, and Damascius’ mentioning of the faculties of knowledge in II 149.13-16
included doxa and dianoia as well. However, he does not include noesis. Therefore, since in
the case of Plotinus and moreover, Proclus the object of the identity theory is nous (non-
discursive thinking) I do not think that we can infer from this passage, as Rappe does,
that Damascius ‘criticizes the Neoplatonic theory of intellection and specifically the
identity thesis that underlies it.’25 Even less, we can hold with Gerson that ‘Damascius [...]
coins a new term, gnw=sma, on analogy with no/hma...’26

(ii.) In the commentary to Phaedo we read that:

intellect’s non-discursive thinking is the truest [knowledge] because it is

indivisible from the intelligible.27

How then are we to understand Damascius? Is the identity between knowledge and its
object and implicitly the identity between the knower and the object of knowledge denied
by Damascius only as long as it covers the field of discursive thinking? On the other
hand, is the identity between non-discursive thinking and its object endorsed? What are
we supposed to make of passages such as in Phaed. I §7828 where non-discursive thinking
is ranked as ‘perfect knowledge’ (au)tognw=sij), and therefore a species of knowledge
(gnw=sij)?29

2.

What I will try to prove further is that, despite appearances, Damascius indeed denies any
type of identity between knowledge and its object, non-discursive thinking included. I
will do this by showing how these texts can be harmonized, and then I will try to show
the motives for which Damascius denies any identity between knowledge and its object.

25 S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Cambridge 2000. p.220.

26 L.P. Gerson, ‘The concept in Platonism’, in Traditions of Platonism. Essays in honour of J. Dillon, 1999, pp.65
–80. p.80. This series of objections might seem petty pedantry As I will try to prove further, I agree with
the conclusion that, indeed, Damascius rejects such a theory, in both its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic form.
Nevertheless, I consider it hasty to draw such a conclusion only from this passage and what immediately
follows it as Rappe does. The way she presents (pp.218-222) the arguments of Damascius, may induce the
idea that ‘the argument Damascius uses to defeat the identity thesis seems heuristic and even ad hoc...’
p.220 n.49. On the contrary, I believe that, followed correctly, the argument presents a strong case for the
rejection of the identity theory.
27 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.90.5-6: h( tou= nou= no/hsij a)lhqesta/th, dio/ti a)me/ristoj pro\j ta\

nohta/. (tr. Westerink modified). Westerink substitutes ‘perception’ for ‘knowledge’, but the passage is
about the types of knowledge, perception being one of them. Moreover, in §.78.2-3 where the same idea is
expressed, the actual term used is ‘knowledge’.
28 Cf. supra n. 4.
29 Proclus too treats non-discursive thinking as a species of knowledge, cf. In Parm. 924.

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(i.) The puzzle lies in how we interpret ‘a)me/ristoj pro\j ta\ nohta/.’ Is it to be
equated with e)nousiwme/non? If yes, then we have an identity between non-discursive
thinking and its objects. )Enousiwme/noj signifies, indeed, in this context, numerical
unity, i.e. identity. However, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, explaining to
Seleucus what Aristotle means by ‘individual and numerically one’ in Categ. 2, 1b.6-830,
Dexippus says:

Atomic is used, not in the sense of indivisible (adiairetos) or partless (ameristos) but
in the sense of not admitting of division as of genus into species, or of
species into things distinguished numerically as one. Each one among
sensible objects is said to be one not by reason of a single potency (dunamis),
but because all converge in a single substance.31

In this passage, ameristos is distinguished from and opposed to the numerically one and
the consubstantial. Nevertheless, by itself, this is not enough to allow us to infer that in
our text from the commentary on Phaedo, ameristos cannot imply identity.

(ii.) That mind is not identical with the objects of thought is stated by Damascius in §.88
of in Phaed. I:

Non-discursive thinking is sometimes described as sight because it is an

impassive activity, sometimes as touch because it is united with its objects, so
as to become all but identical with them.32

This time, we find explicitly denied here the identity thesis between non-discursive
thought (noesis) and its object (noeton). However, what is affirmed is that there is a kind of
union between noesis and its object, which approaches identity. I assume that this type of
union is to be equated with the type of relation ameristos supposes.

(iii.) Beginning his inquiry into the issue of knowledge, Damascius asks the question:

Nevertheless, what is knowledge? We answer –he continues- that it is the

capture of the object of knowledge in the knower.33 However we do not yet
know what we are talking about; what is, in fact, the object of knowledge or
the knower, is not easy to know, when we do not know what knowledge is.34

30 Aristotle, Categ. 2, 1b.6-8: a(plw½j de\ ta\ aÃtoma kaiì eÁn a)riqm%½ kat' ou)deno\j u(pokeime/nou
le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/n% de\ eÃnia ou)de\n kwlu/ei eiånai: - ‘Things that are individual and
numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent them from
being in a subject.’ (tr. Ackrill).
31 Dexippus, In Categ.: ãAtomon me\n ouÅn le/getai ou)x w•j to\ a)diai¿reton kaiì a)me/riston, a)ll'

w•j to\ mh\ dexo/menon tomh\n ge/nouj ei¹j eiãdh mhde\ eiãdouj ei¹j ta\ kaq' eÁn a)riqm%½
diwrisme/na. eÁn de\ eÀkaston tw½n ai¹sqhtw½n le/getai ou) kata\ mi¿an du/namin, a)ll' oÀti
pa/nta ei¹j mi¿an neu/ei ou)si¿an. (tr. Dillon).
32 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.88.1-2: àOti th\n no/hsin w•j me\n e)ne/rgeian a)paqh= kalou=sin oÃyin,

w•j de\ toiÍj nohtoiÍj h(nwme/nhn kalou=sin a(fh/n, oiâon au)ta\ sxedo\n ouÅsan ta\ nohta/. (tr.
Westerink modified).
33 Cf. David, Proleg. 46.26-47.17.

34 Damascius, de Princ. II 147.20-148.1: Ti¿ de/ e)stin oÀmwj h( gnw½sij; ÄH a)nti¿lhyij tou= gnwstou=

e)n t%½ gnwstik%½. ¹All' ouÃpw ti iãsmen wÒn le/gomen: ti¿ ga\r aÄn eiãh to\ gnwsto\n hÄ to\
gnwstiko/n, ou) r(#/dion gnw½nai, a)gnooume/nhj th=j gnw¯sewj.

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Therefore, he proposes a set of definitions:

(a.) Knowledge (gnosis), as the name suggests, is non-discursive thought that

comes into being (gignomene nosis), which is non-discursive thinking; and non-
discursive thinking (noesis), because it goes (neitai) and returns (epaneisi)
towards being (einai) and towards it is (esti), can be rightly called return
(neoesis).35
(b.) Maybe knowledge (gnosis) wants to be, also, creation (genesis) of being (on)
and substance (ousia): since by its return towards being, the knower
(gignoskon) gets its substance (ousiotai) according to the knowledge (gnosis), not
according to the first [substance], but according to – as it were - the
substantialisation which comes into being (gignomene ousiosis); hence the
intellect (nous) is the things it thinks, as Aristotle also says.36

Indeed these two etymological definitions defy translation.37 Regardless of their baroque
features, they seem convincing enough for Gersh to draw the conclusion that the set of
terms: gnwsto/n – gnwstiko/j – gnw=sij is equivalent, in most contexts, to the set:
nohto/n – now=n - no/hsij, and thus cognition (gnw=sij) is

equated not only with the third term in the triad of remaining, procession
and reversion, but also with the triad itself.38

The whole discussion concerning knowledge will tackle the issue against the background
of the aporiai raised by the relationship between knowledge, the triad and the traditional
interpretations of it. These two definitions are displayed only with the title of hypothesis
and as expressions of what the philosophical tradition so far understands by these
terms.39 The proper answer given by Damascius begins at de Princ. II 149.12 ff. As we
have seen before, Damascius explicitly denies the identity thesis, in its Aristotelian form,
between gnosis and gnoston (de Princ. II 149.19-20). Also it seems that he denies it even in
the Plotinian – Proclean form in in Phaed. Nevertheless, there is another implication in
the etymological definition of gnosis, which is held by most of the Late Platonists:
knowledge in the sense of non-discursive reason (cf. supra) creates beings.40 Damascius
comes to deny this thesis as well:

If knowledge had an active force, then, in so far as it acts in some way and
makes something subsist, it is no longer knowledge of an object of

35 Damascius, de Princ. II 148.1-4: ¸H gnw½si¿j e)stin, w•j to\ oÃnoma paradhloiÍ, gignome/nh nw½sij,
oÀ e)stin no/hsij: h( de\ no/hsij, oÀti e)piì to\ eiånai kaiì to\ eÃstin neiÍtai kaiì e)pa/neisi,
neo/esij e)n di¿kv aÄn klhqeiÍsa:
36 Damascius, de Princ. II 148.19-149.2: ãIswj de\ kaiì ge/nesij oÃntoj kaiì ou)si¿aj h( gnw½sij eiånai

bou/letai: ou)si¿wtai ga\r tv= ei¹j to\ oÄn e)pano/d% to\ gignw½skon kata\ th\n gnw½sin, ou) th\n
prw¯thn, a)ll' oiâon gignome/nhn ou)si¿wsin: dio/per o( nou=j ta\ pra/gmata, fhsiì kaiì
¹Aristote/lhj.
37 Cf. S. E. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, Leiden, 1978. pp.106-107, n.130.
38 S. E. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, Leiden, 1978. p.106 ff.
39 Cf. the very inspired discussion in S. E. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, Leiden, 1978. p.106 ff, who,

although discussing Damascius in Proclean terms, provides a very accurate insight into the treatment of the
relation between causation and cognition.
40 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. I 352.8-9. See the discussion in S. E. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, Leiden, 1978.

p.110 ff.

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knowledge, but the productive cause of a produced thing. However, the

proper (characteristic) of the knower is not production, but only to get to the
knowledge of an existing thing, while substance and life make things to
subsist [...].41

3.

‘What is, then, the affection of the knower, when he does not yet know?’ – asks
Damascius next. ‘We answer that he desires the object of knowledge.’ 42 The object of
knowledge is, for Proclus, pure Being.43 For Damascius, however, things are different:

Therefore, knowledge is the attainment of the object of knowledge qua

object of knowledge: and if knowledge [attains] being, it [attains] being qua
object of knowledge. What is then, the object of knowledge and in what way
does it differ from being? We answer that an object of knowledge is related to
another, while a being exists in itself . This is what belongs to them, before the
nature of each one is differentiated. There is on one side subsistence, and on
the other the object of knowledge as manifestation of the subsistent. In fact, for the
form-in-matter, for example, subsistence is one thing, while being
perceptible is another; for what, for the form-in matter, is perceptible, is
what is projected from it and shines out from it, and shines out as far as
perception, and thus becomes commensurable with it.44

The initial distinction between the object of knowledge (gnoston) and the mental content
(gnosma) becomes very relevant now. Being is not relational; a-certain-thing is. However,
introducing a-certain-thing as a name for being, we indicate a being and therefore we
establish a difference between us and what becomes now the object of our assertions, i.e.
object of knowledge. Being is ‘available’ only as object of knowledge. The very
‘availability’ of being is, ipso facto, required by a knower, thus, being gives itself as different,

41 Damascius, de Princ. II 164.5-10: Ei¹ ga\r kaiì drasth/rioj eiãh h( gnw½sij, a)lla\ kaqo\ dr#= ti
kaiì u(fi¿sthsin, ou)ke/ti gnw½sij w•j gnwstou=, a)lla\ poihtikh/ tij ai¹ti¿a tino\j poih/matoj.
Ou) ga/r e)sti poieiÍn iãdion tou= gignw¯skontoj, a)lla\ mo/non gignw¯skein hÃdh ti oÃn, th=j de\
ou)si¿aj kaiì th=j zwh=j to\ u(fista/nein, […].
42 Damascius, de Princ. II 149.20-21: Ti¿ ouÅn pa/sxei to\ gnwstiko/n, oÀte mh/pw gignw¯skei; ÄH

o)re/getai tou= gnwstou=.

43 Proclus, In Parm. 946.2-6: ou) ga\r eÀcij h( e)keiÍ e)pisth/mh ou)de\ poio/thj, a)ll' uÀparcij

au)totelh\j e(auth=j ouÅsa kaiì e)n e(autv= pageiÍsa, kaiì t%½ e(auth\n gignw¯skein to\
prw¯twj e)pisthto\n, oÁ dh/ e)sti to\ a(plw½j oÄn, gignw¯skousa: - ‘for knowledge There is not a
faculty nor a quality, but it is an independent substance belonging to itself, knowing also the primary object
of knowledge, which is pure Being.’ (tr. Dillon).
44 Damascius, de Princ. II 149.21-150.8: Ou)kou=n h( gnw½sij teu=cij e)stiì tou= gnwstou= v gnwsto/n:

kaiì ga\r ei¹ tou= oÃntoj, a)ll' v gnwsto\n to\ oÃn. Ti¿ ouÅn to\ gnwsto/n, kaiì p$== diafe/ron tou=
oÃntoj; ÄH oÀti gnwsto\n me\n pro\j aÃllo, kaq' au(to\ de/ oÀ e)stin, oÃn. ÄH kaiì tou=to me\n
pro/sestin, ouÃpw de\ ti/j e(kate/rou diw¯ristai fu/sij. ÄH to\ me/n e)stin h( u(po/stasij, to\
de\ gnwsto\n oiâon to\ fano\n th=j u(posta/sewj. Kaiì ga\r aÃllo t%½ e)nu/l% eiãdei fe/re ei¹peiÍn
h( u(po/stasij, aÃllo to\ ai¹sqht%½ eiånai: kaiì eÃstin au)tou= to\ ai¹sqhto\n to\ propi¿pton
au)tou= kaiì prola/mpon au)tou=, kaiì prola/mpon eÀwj ai¹sqh/sewj, kaiì tau/tv su/mmetron
pro\j au)th\n gigno/menon.

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as object of knowledge. Then again, there is no difference between being and the object of
knowledge. They are not two distinct realities. The object of being is the manifestation,
i.e. availability of being. This is not so hard to accept, when we think of partial
perception, for example. A glass full of water is given as object of knowledge to all our
senses, with the exception of taste. Does it represent the very being of what my senses call:
a glass of water? Yes. Does my knowledge-datum (gnosma) fully cover this object? No. My
knowledge, or more correctly, its quality, is in accordance with (in relation to) this
knowledge-datum (h( gnw½sij kata\ to\ gnw½sma). Assume that I taste the water and I
find out that it is salty. Does this change the ‘reality’ of the object? No. It changes the
quality of my knowledge-datum only, in this case giving me a fuller ‘picture’ of the object.
Assume now that all my cognitive faculties have entertained the object: does it mean that
I possess its being as knowledge data? No, again. The mere fact that my knowledge
established its distinction from this object of knowledge using all its faculties does not
allow me to assume more than that I know the object of knowledge, i.e. what was given
to my faculties, but I cannot know, or assert, more than that.

4.

We can tackle the issue from another direction as well. By naming things, claims
Damascius, what we actually do is to name them according to a single property – usually
the distinctive property. This accounts for the way our mind works, i.e. through division.
That is to say that our mind cannot work with ‘complete surrounding realities’ (o(/laij
perioxai=j) by comprehending them in all their completeness. Thus, we name such a
complete (pa/mforon) reality as the cosmos by using only one of its characters: its fact of
being ordered (kekosmhme/non).45 But does this mean that things themselves are such
conglomerates of qualities (idiotetes)? It seems possible up to a point to read de Princ. II
198 in such a key. Also we can add the following passage from in Phaed. I:

Hence he [Dionysus] can be said to be at the same time indivisible and

divisible, for such is the nature of the universe, which has rather the
character of an aggregate and is held together by a totality whose parts are
distinct.46

Nevertheless, what is important here is that the relationship which is established between
the mind and its object (specifically here, in the case of naming) is to extract a particular
character which gives to it (either universal or individual) a name, i.e. identity.

A further question that can be raised is: if mind operates by identifying characters is this
happening in a pictorial manner or in other way? And since the language used to describe
the cognitive activity is so visually oriented does it mean we always think with images?

45 Damascius, de Princ. II 198-199.

46 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.4.12-13: dio\ kaiì a)me/ristoj aÀma kaiì meristo/j: toiou=ton ga\r to\
pa=n oiâon a)qroi¿smati ma=llon e)oiko\j kaiì o(lo/thti diakekrime/nv toiÍj me/resi
sunexo/menon. (tr. Westerink). It seems that giving a name to something amounts to establishing its
idiotês; however I did not find enough information to warrant that such a theory would be essential or
representative for a possible theory of names in Damascius.

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Insofar as the human intellect is concerned Aristotle47 answers yes, as does Porphyry48.
Nevertheless, Damascius’ answer is negative again:

The existence of non-imaginative knowledge is proved by knowledge of

indivisible things, such as the unit, the point, the now, as well as by the
knowledge of the universals (any definite shape is already individual and
already this); it is proved also by those realities which we cannot visualize, e.g.
justice and temperance; it appears also from the fact that transcendent forms
can be shown to be indivisible and incorporeal and from the proofs of the
existence of incorporeal things generally.49

Would it be, then, fair to infer that, although all the faculties of knowledge, from sense-
perception to discursive thinking know only the manifestation (phanon)50 of being (what
we later identified as properties), only one of them, non-discursive thinking, attains being
itself? It has been accepted by Damascius that non-discursive thinking operates in unity
with its objects, by being ‘all but identical’.51 Would it not be fair to assume that in the
case of such a unity (ameristos), non-discursive thinking deals with its objects, not as with
manifestations of being, but as being itself? Is not Damascius stressing that in non-
discursive thinking, ‘the primary objects of knowledge are present?’52 Such an inference,
however, is not valid. Even non-discursive thinking is a form of knowledge, therefore a
form of differentiation, and obtains being as pros allo:

And so intellect knows being, but necessarily according to its manifestation,

in our view. Yet it desires being. We answer that it desires it qua being but
attains the same thing qua object of knowledge. Perhaps even desire should
be said to be of being according to the object of knowledge; for natural

47 Aristotle, De an. 431a.14-17: tv= de\ dianohtikv= yuxv= ta\ fanta/smata oiâon ai¹sqh/mata
u(pa/rxei, oÀtan de\ a)gaqo\n hÄ kako\n fh/sv hÄ a)pofh/sv, feu/gei hÄ diw¯kei: dio\ ou)de/pote
noeiÍ aÃneu fanta/smatoj h( yuxh/. - ‘To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of
perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why
the soul never thinks without an image.’. (tr. Smith) However, Ps.-Simplicius in De an. comm.268.8 ff.
objects that this would apply also to nou=j.
48 Porphyry, Sent. 16.6-11: kaiì ouÃte aiãsqhsij eÃcwqen ouÃte no/hsij † aÃllh pote\ de\ † w•j t%½

z%¯% ou)k aÃneu pa/qouj tw½n ai¹sqhtikw½n o)rga/nwn ai¸ ai¹sqh/seij, ouÀtw kaiì ai¸ noh/seij
ou)k aÃneu fantasi¿aj: iàn' vÅ to\ a)na/logon, w•j o( tu/poj parakolou/qhma z%¯ou
ai¹sqhtikou=, ouÀtw to\ fa/ntasma yuxh=j {z%¯ou} e(po/menon noh/sei. - ‘Neither sense-perception
nor non-discursive thinking come from outside, but, as perceptions in the living being do not occur
without affection of the sense-organs, so there is no non-discursive thinking without images: in the same
way as the impression, accompanies the living being when it is perceiving, similarly, the image in the soul
{of the living being} follows non-discursive thinking .’
49 Damascius, in Phaed. I §. 112.1-5: ÀOti eÃstin a)mo/rfwtoj gnw½sij, dhloiÍ me\n h( tw½n a)merw½n,

oiâon mona/doj, shmei¿ou, tou= nu=n: dhloiÍ de\ kaiì h( tw½n kaqo/lou (pa=j ga\r tu/poj hÃdh
aÃtomoj kaiì hÃdh ouÂtojŸ: dhloiÍ de\ kaiì wÒn morfa\j ou)k eÃxomen, oiâon dikaiosu/nh kaiì
swfrosu/nh: dhloiÍ de\ kaiì ta\ xwrista\ eiãdh a)me/rista kaiì a)sw¯mata e)pideiknu/mena
kaiì oÀlwj ai¸ tw½n a)swma/twn a)podei¿ceij. (tr. Westerink); followed by Olymp. in Phaed. §.2.15-17:
ti¿ ouÅn fhsin; ou)k eÃsti no/hsij a)fantasi¿astoj; hÄ h(ni¿ka ta\ kaqo/lou ginw¯skei h( yuxh/,
to/te aÃneu fantasi¿aj e)nergeiÍ. - ‘Is there no thought unaccompanied by imagination? Yes, there is;
when the soul apprehends universals, imagination has no part in its activity.’ (tr. Westerink).
50 Damascius, de Princ. II 150.9.
51 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.88 and also §.90.

52 Damascius, in Phaed. I §.88. 4: e)n de\ t%½ n%½ au)ta\ ta\ prw½ta gnwsta/, (tr. Westerink modified).

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desires are for the same things as they actually attain, and it is agreed that the
knower attains being according to what is known.53

Moreover, even in the case of self-reflection, ‘in nous, by the very fact of discrimination,
the knower is manifest.’54

5.

On the grounds that Damascius distinguishes between being and its manifestation, he
has been branded as subjectivist and idealist.55 I see the situation differently. Damascius,
if he is to be branded, seems to me rather a realist.56 Not only the principle of Berkeley,
‘esse est percipi’ is not endorsed, it even gets challenged. Reality is not granted by
knowledge, but knowledge itself gets limited by its own faculties (dunameis). Does this
mean that we can never know reality? On the contrary: we are part of reality in the full
meaning of ‘to be’ and we can, also, fully know reality, i.e. in non-discursive thinking. Of
course, if we want to know reality by identification with it (identity thesis), then we will
fail, but only because we mistakenly consider both identity and knowledge as ontological
matters. For Damascius, however, knowledge is an epistemic matter while identity is
couched in ontic terms. The very nature of knowledge -whatever its degree- resides in
alterity while being is an identity statement.

Can we say, in consequence, that Damascius is a subjectivist? Putting forward such a

thesis one can be making a quite uninspired suggestion. There is a multiplicity of
significations the term subjectivity covers, and the unwanted luggage of associations it
brings with it makes it virtually too ambiguous to be used here. However, what I have in
mind, I think, can be narrowed to what one might call perspectivism. The way the mind
works is dictated by its inherent principle of division, therefore our knowledge is always
perfectible. It is like watching a three-dimensional object: it never reveals its back to the
eye and even though the mind fills in the gap with the help of the other faculties, a
faculty by itself never manages to deal with all the objects of knowledge in a unitary
manner. Even in the case of non-discursive thinking, we still need the difference that
allows mind to relate itself to its object.

53 Damascius, de Princ. II 150.17-24: àWste to\ me\n oÄn gignw¯skei o( nou=j, a)lla\ kata\ to\ fano/n,
w•j fame/n, a)nagkai¿wj. Kaiì mh\n tou= oÃntoj o)re/getai. ÄH o)re/getai me\n w•j oÃntoj,
tugxa/nei de\ tou= au)tou= w•j gnwstou=. Ta/xa de\ kaiì h( oÃrecij r(hte/a tou= oÃntoj kata\ to\
gnwsto/n: ai¸ ga\r kata\ fu/sin o)re/ceij tw½n au)tw½n ei¹sin wÒn kaiì ai¸ teu/ceij,
o(mologoume/nwj de\ h( teu=cij tou= oÃntoj t%½ gignw¯skonti kata\ to\ gignwsko/menon.
54 Damascius, de Princ. II 152.12-13: Kaiì ga\r t%½ n%½ kata\ to\ diakekrime/non e)nefa/nh to\

gnwstiko/n.
55 J. Combès in Damascius, Traité des premiers principes, vol. II, ed., trad. et notes par L.G. Westerink et J.

Combès, Paris 1989.; A. Linguiti, ‘Giamblico, Proclo e Damascio sul principio anteriore all’uno’, Elenchos 1,
1988, pp.95-106.; L.P. Gerson, ‘The concept in Platonism’, Traditions of Platonism. Essays in honour of J. Dillon,
1999, pp.65 –80. p.80: ‘Thus does Damascius depart remarkably in an idealistic manner from the Plotinian
and Proclean responses to Stoic and Peripatetic realism.’ A more moderate approach in S. Rappe, Reading
Neoplatonism, Cambridge 2000. pp.222-224.
56 I found quite puzzling the variety of ‘definitions’ given to both realism and idealism throughout various

encyclopaedias or histories of philosophy. If Berkeley is an idealist, Kant does not seem to me to fit in the
same class. Several similarities can be singled out between the way Kant and the way Damascius choose to
see the relation between knowledge and its object, although there is not the place here for going in such
details. In naming this type of approach a realist one, I follow A.E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, Edinburgh
1961. p. 68 ff.

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Cosmin I. ANDRON
Royal Holloway College & King’s College,
University of London

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