8 Mcdonalds V LC Big Mak

11/13/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

McDonald’s Corporation vs. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.
*
G.R. No. 143993. August 18, 2004.
MCDONALD’S CORPORATION and MCGEORGE FOOD

INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioners, vs. L.C. BIG MAK BURGER,
INC., FRANCIS B. DY, EDNA A. DY, RENE B. DY, WILLIAM B.
DY, JESUS AYCARDO, ARACELI AYCARDO, and GRACE
HUERTO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; A party intending to appeal from a judgment

of the Court of Appeals may file with the Supreme Court a petition for
review under Section 1 of Rule 45 raising only questions of law; Question of
Law and Question of Fact Distinguished.—A party intending to appeal from
a judgment of the Court of Appeals may file with this Court a petition for
review under Section 1 of Rule 45 raising only questions of law. A question
of law exists when the doubt or difference arises on what the law is on a
certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Trademarks and Trade Names; Infringement; Elements to Establish
Trademark Infringement.—To establish trademark infringement, the
following elements must be shown: (1) the validity of plaintiff’s mark; (2)
the plaintiff’s ownership of the mark; and (3) the use of the mark or its
colorable imitation by the alleged infringer results in “likelihood of
confusion.” Of these, it is the element of likelihood of confusion that is the
gravamen of trademark infringement.
Same; Same; A mark is valid if it is “ distinctive” and thus not barred
from registration under Section 4 of RA 166; Once registered, not only the
mark’s validity but also the registrant’s ownership of the mark is prima facie
presumed.—A mark is valid if it is “distinctive” and thus not barred from
registration under Section 4 of RA 166. However, once registered, not only
the mark’s validity but also the registrant’s ownership of the mark is prima
facie presumed.
Same; Same; A mark which is not registered in the Principal Register
and thus not distinctive has no real protection.—The Court also finds that
petitioners have duly established McDonald’s exclusive ownership of the
“Big Mac” mark. Although Topacio and the Isaiyas Group registered the
“Big Mac” mark ahead of McDonald’s, Topacio, as petitioners disclosed,
had already assigned his rights to McDonald’s. The Isaiyas Group, on the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001670c18e262dc46e893003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/33
other hand, registered its trademark only in the Supplemental Register. A

mark which is not registered in the Principal Register, and thus not dis-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 11
tinctive, has no real protection. Indeed, we have held that registration in the
Supplemental Register is not even a prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark on the goods specified in the
certificate.
Same; Same; Confusion of Goods and Confusion of Business
Distinguished.—Section 22 covers two types of confusion arising from the
use of similar or colorable imitation marks, namely, confusion of goods
(product confusion) and confusion of business (source or origin confusion).
In Sterling Products International, Incorporated v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft, et al., the Court distinguished these two types of
confusion, thus: [Rudolf] Callman notes two types of confusion. The first is
the confusion of goods “in which event the ordinarily prudent purchaser
would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was
purchasing the other.” x x x The other is the confusion of business: “Here
though the goods of the parties are different, the defendant’s product is such
as might reasonably be assumed to originate with the plaintiff, and the
public would then be deceived either into that belief or into the belief that
there is some connection between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact,
does not exist.”
Same; Same; Two Tests in Determining Likelihood of Confusion, the
Dominancy Test and the Holistic Test.—In determining likelihood of
confusion, jurisprudence has developed two tests, the dominancy test and
the holistic test. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the
prevalent features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion.
In contrast, the holistic test requires the court to consider the entirety of the
marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity.
Same; Same; Court rejected the holistic test in Societe Des Produits
Nestlé S.A. vs. Court of Appeals.—In the 2001 case of Societe Des Produits
Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the holistic test
in this wise: [T]he totality or holistic test is contrary to the elementary
postulate of the law on trademarks and unfair competition that confusing
similarity is to be determined on the basis of visual, aural, connotative

comparisons and overall impressions engendered by the marks in
controversy as they are encountered in the realities of the marketplace.
Same; Same; While proof of actual confusion is the best evidence of
infringement its absence is inconsequential.—Petitioners’ failure to present
proof of actual confusion does not negate their claim of trademark
infringement. As noted in American Wire & Cable Co. v. Director of
Patents, Section 22 requires the less stringent standard of “likelihood of
confusion” only. While proof of actual confusion is the best evidence of
infringement, its absence is inconsequential.
12
Same; Unfair Competition; Essential Elements of Unfair Competition.

—The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are: (1)
confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to
deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may
or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other
external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. The intent to
deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance
of the goods as offered for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need
not be shown.
Same; Same; Trademark infringement is a form of unfair competition;
Trademark infringement constitutes unfair competition when there is not
merely likelihood of confusion but also actual or probable deception on the
public because of the general appearance of the goods.—Unfair
competition is broader than trademark infringement and includes passing off
goods with or without trademark infringement. Trademark infringement is a
form of unfair competition.Trademark infringement constitutes unfair
competition when there is not merely likelihood of confusion, but also
actual or probable deception on the public because of the general
appearance of the goods. There can be trademark infringement without
unfair competition as when the infringer discloses on the labels containing
the mark that he manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public from
being deceived that the goods originate from the trademark owner.
Same; Same; Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the
defendant, by imitative devices on the general appearance of the goods,
misleads prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise under the
impression that they are buying that of his competitors.—Passing off (or
palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on the
general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into
buying his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his
competitors.Thus, the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of
the goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that
the goods are those of his competitor.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners.
Vicente M. Joyas for respondents.
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VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 13

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 26 November
2
1999 of the Court of Appeals finding respondent L.C. Big Mak
Burger, Inc. not liable for trademark infringement and unfair
competition and ordering petitioners to pay respondents P1,900,000
in damages, and of its Resolution dated 11 July 2000 denying
reconsideration. The Court 3
of Appeals’ Decision reversed the 5
September 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 137, finding respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. liable for
trademark infringement and unfair competition.
The F acts
Petitioner McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s”) is a corporation

organized under the laws of Delaware, United States. McDonald’s
operates, by itself or through4 its franchisees, a global5 chain of fast-
food restaurants. McDonald’s owns a family of marks including the
6
“Big Mac” mark for its “double-decker hamburger sandwich.”
McDonald’s registered this trademark with the United
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. with Presiding Justice Jainal D.
Rasul and Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes concurring.
3 Penned by Judge Santiago Ranada, Jr.
4 Itself a registered service mark.
5 Some of McDonald’s registered marks representing food items (f) and services
(s) are: McDONALD’S HAMBURGERS (s); McDONALD’S (f); RONALD
McDONALD (s); McDONALDLAND (s); McCHEESE & DESIGN (f); EGG

McMUFFIN (s); EGG McMUFFIN (f); McDONALD-LAND (f); McDONALD’S &
ARCHES (s); McFEAST (f); McCHICKEN (f); McDONALD’S & ARCHES (f);
McDONUTS (f); McPIZZA (f); McPIZZA (s); McHAPPY DAY (s); MINI MAC (s);
McDOUBLE (f); TOGETHER-McDONALD’S & YOU (s); CHICKEN
McNUGGETS (f); McDONALD’S & YOU (s); SUPER MAC (f); McSNACK (s);
MAC FRIES (f); McRIB (f); MAPLE McCRISP (f); LITE MAC (f); BIG MAC (s);
CHICKEN McSWISS (f); McMUFFIN (f); McD.L.T. (f). (McDonald’s Corporation
v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 [1986]).
6 Aside from Big Mac sandwiches, McDonald’s menu includes cheeseburgers,
special sandwiches, fried french potatoes, chicken nuggets, fried
14

7
States Trademark Registry on 16 October 1979. Based on this
Home Registration, McDonald’s applied for the registration of the
same mark in the Principal Register of the then Philippine Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology (“PBPTT”), now the
Intellectual Property Office (“IPO”). Pending approval of its
application, McDonald’s introduced its “Big Mac” hamburger
sandwiches in the Philippine market in September 1981. On 18 July
1985, the PBPTT allowed registration of the “Big Mac” mark in the
Principal Register based on its Home Registration in the United
States.
Like its other marks, McDonald’s displays the “Big Mac” mark
8 9
in items and paraphernalia in its restaurants, and in its outdoor and
indoor signages. From 1982 to 1990, McDonald’s spent P10.5
million in advertisement for “Big Mac” hamburger sandwiches
10
alone.
Petitioner McGeorge Food Industries (“petitioner McGeorge”), a
11
domestic corporation, is McDonald’s Philippine franchisee.
Respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. (“respondent
corporation”) is a domestic corporation which operates fast-food
12
outlets and snack vans in Metro Manila and nearby provinces.
Respondent corporation’s menu includes hamburger sandwiches and
13
other food items. Respondents Francis B. Dy, Edna A. Dy, Rene B.
Dy, William B. Dy, Jesus Aycardo, Araceli Aycardo, and Grace
Huerto (“private respondents”) are the incorporators, stockholders
14
and directors of respondent corporation.
On 21 October 1988, respondent corporation applied with the
PBPTT for the registration of the “Big Mak” mark for its hamburger
sandwiches. McDonald’s opposed respondent corporation’s
application on the ground that “Big Mak” was a colorable imitation
_______________
fish sandwiches, shakes, hot pies, sundaes, softdrinks, and other beverages.
7Certificate of Registration No. 1,126,102.
8 Table napkins, tray liners, cups and food wrappers.
9 Labels, promotional items and packages.
10 TSN (Arlene Manalo), 26 July 1990, pp. 34-35.
11 McDonald’s and petitioner McGeorge are referred to as petitioners.
12 Rizal, Laguna, Bulacan and Quezon.
13 E.g. pizzas, noodles, siopaos, hotdog sandwiches, ham sandwiches, fish burgers,
fruit juices, softdrinks and other beverages.
14Respondent corporation and private respondents are referred to as respondents.
15
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 15

of its registered “Big Mac” mark for the same food products.
McDonald’s also informed respondent Francis Dy (“respondent
Dy”), the chairman of the Board of Directors of respondent
corporation, of its exclusive right to the “Big Mac” mark and
requested him to desist from using the “Big Mac” mark or any
similar mark.
Having received no reply from respondent Dy, petitioners on 6
June 1990 sued respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 137 (“RTC”), for trademark infringement and unfair
competition. In its Order of 11 July 1990, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against respondents enjoining
them from using the “Big Mak” mark in the operation of their
15
business in the National Capital Region. On 16 August 1990, the
16
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction replacing the TRO.
In their Answer, respondents admitted that they have been using
the name “Big Mak Burger” for their fast-food business.
Respondents claimed, however, that McDonald’s does not have an
exclusive right to the “Big Mac” mark or to any other similar mark.
Respondents point out that the Isaiyas Group of Corporations
(“Isaiyas Group”) registered the same mark for hamburger
sandwiches with the PBPTT on 31 March 1979. One Rodolfo
Topacio (“Topacio”) similarly registered the same mark on 24 June
1983, prior to McDonald’s registration on 18 July 1985.
Alternatively, respondents claimed that they are not liable for
trademark infringement or for unfair competition, as the “Big Mak”
mark they sought to register does not constitute a colorable imitation
of the “Big Mac” mark. Respondents asserted that they did not
fraudulently pass off their hamburger sandwiches as those of
17
petitioners’ Big Mac hamburgers. Respondents sought damages in
their counterclaim.
In their Reply, petitioners denied respondents’ claim that
McDonald’s is not the exclusive owner of the “Big Mac” mark.
Petitioners asserted that while the Isaiyas Group and Topacio did
register the “Big Mac” mark ahead of McDonald’s, the Isaiyas
Group did so only in the Supplemental Register of the PBPTT and
such registration does not provide any protection. McDonald’s
_______________
15 Records, p. 37.
16 Ibid., pp. 457-458.
17 Ibid., pp. 414-426.
16

disclosed that it had acquired Topacio’s rights to his registration in a

18
Deed of Assignment dated 18 May 1981.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
On 5 September 1994, the RTC rendered judgment (“RTC

Decision”) finding respondent corporation liable for trademark
infringement and unfair competition. However, the RTC dismissed
the complaint against private respondents and the counterclaim
against petitioners for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC held:
Undeniably, the mark “B[ig] M[ac]” is a registered trademark for plaintiff

McDonald’s, and as such, it is entitled [to] protection against infringement.
xxxx
There exist some distinctions between the names “B[ig] M[ac]” and
“B[ig] M[ak]” as appearing in the respective signages, wrappers and
containers of the food products of the parties. But infringement goes beyond
the physical features of the questioned name and the original name. There
are still other factors to be considered.
xxxx
Significantly, the contending parties are both in the business of fast-food
chains and restaurants. An average person who is hungry and wants to eat a
hamburger sandwich may not be discriminating enough to look for a
McDonald’s restaurant and buy a “B[ig] M[ac]” hamburger. Once he sees a
stall selling hamburger sandwich, in all likelihood, he will dip into his
pocket and order a “B[ig] M[ak]” hamburger sandwich. Plaintiff
McDonald’s fast-food chain has attained wide popularity and acceptance by
the consuming public so much so that its air-conditioned food outlets and
restaurants will perhaps not be mistaken by many to be the same as
defendant corporation’s mobile snack vans located along busy streets or
highways. But the thing is that what is being sold by both contending parties
is a food item—a hamburger sandwich which is for immediate consumption,

so that a buyer may easily be confused or deceived into thinking that the
“B[ig] M[ak]” hamburger sandwich he bought is a food-product of plaintiff
McDonald’s, or a subsidiary or allied outlet thereof. Surely, defendant
corporation has its own secret ingredients to make its hamburger sandwiches
as palatable and as tasty as the other brands in the market, considering the
keen competition among mushrooming hamburger stands and multinational
fast-food chains and restaurants. Hence,
_______________
18 Ibid., pp. 460-463.
17
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 17

the trademark “B[ig] M[ac]” has been infringed by defendant corporation

when it used the name “B[ig] M[ak]” in its signages, wrappers, and
containers in connection with its food business. x x x x
Did the same acts of defendants in using the name “B[ig] M[ak]” as a
trademark or tradename in their signages, or in causing the name “B[ig]
M[ak]” to be printed on the wrappers and containers of their food products
also constitute an act of unfair competition under Section 29 of the
Trademark Law?
The answer is in the affirmative. x x x x
The x x x provision of the law concerning unfair competition is broader
and more inclusive than the law concerning the infringement of trademark,
which is of more limited range, but within its narrower range recognizes a
more exclusive right derived by the adoption and registration of the
trademark by the person whose goods or services are first associated
therewith. x x x Notwithstanding the distinction between an action for
trademark infringement and an action for unfair competition, however, the
law extends substantially the same relief to the injured party for both cases.
(See Sections 23 and 29 of Republic Act No. 166)
Any conduct may be said to constitute unfair competition if the effect is
to pass off on the public the goods of one man as the goods of another. The
choice of “B[ig] M[ak]” as tradename by defendant corporation is not
merely for sentimental reasons but was clearly made to take advantage of
the reputation, popularity and the established goodwill of plaintiff
McDonald’s. For, as stated in Section 29, a person is guilty of unfair
competition who in selling his goods shall give them the general
appearance, of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the
goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are
contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their
appearance, which would likely influence purchasers to believe that the
goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer. Thus, plaintiffs have established their valid cause of
action against the defendants for trademark infringement and unfair

19
competition and for damages.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision provides:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs McDonald’s

Corporation and McGeorge Food Industries, Inc. and against defendant L.C.
Big Mak Burger, Inc., as follows:
1. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on [16 August

1990] is made permanent;
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 149-154.
18

2. Defendant L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. is ordered to pay plaintiffs

actual damages in the amount of P400,000.00, exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00, and attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation in the amount of P100,000.00;
3. The complaint against defendants Francis B. Dy, Edna A. Dy, Rene
B. Dy, Wiliam B. Dy, Jesus Aycardo, Araceli Aycardo and Grace
Huerto, as well as all counter-claims, are dismissed for lack of
20
merit as well as for insufficiency of evidence.”
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 26 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment

(“Court of Appeals’ Decision”) reversing the RTC Decision and
ordering McDonald’s to pay respondents P1,600,000 as actual and
compensatory damages and P300,000 as moral damages. The Court
of Appeals held:
Plaintiffs-appellees in the instant case would like to impress on this Court

that the use of defendants-appellants of its corporate name—the whole
“L.C. B[ig] M[ak] B[urger], I[nc].” which appears on their food packages,
signages and advertisements is an infringement of their trademark “B[ig]
M[ac]” which they use to identify [their] double decker sandwich, sold in a
Styrofoam box packaging material with the McDonald’s logo of umbrella
“M” stamped thereon, together with the printed mark in red bl[o]ck capital
letters, the words being separated by a single space. Specifically, plaintiffs-
appellees argue that defendants-appellants’ use of their corporate name is a

colorable imitation of their trademark “Big Mac”.
xxxx
To Our mind, however, this Court is fully convinced that no colorable
imitation exists. As the definition dictates, it is not sufficient that a similarity
exists in both names, but that more importantly, the over-all presentation, or
in their essential, substantive and distinctive parts is such as would likely
MISLEAD or CONFUSE persons in the ordinary course of purchasing the
genuine article. A careful comparison of the way the trademark “B[ig]
M[ac]” is being used by plaintiffs-appellees and corporate name L.C. Big
Mak Burger, Inc. by defendants-appellants, would readily reveal that no
confusion could take place, or that the ordinary purchasers would be misled
by it. As pointed out by defendants-appellants, the plaintiffs-appellees’
trademark is used to designate only one product, a double decker sandwich
sold in a Styrofoam box with the “McDonalds” logo. On
_______________
20 Records, pp. 1431-1432.
19
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 19

the other hand, what the defendants-appellants corporation is using is not a

trademark for its food product but a business or corporate name. They use
the business name “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” in their restaurant business
which serves diversified food items such as siopao, noodles, pizza, and
sandwiches such as hotdog, ham, fish burger and hamburger. Secondly,
defendants-appellants’ corporate or business name appearing in the food
packages and signages are written in silhouette red-orange letters with the
“b” and “m” in upper case letters. Above the words “Big Mak” are the upper
case letter “L.C.” Below the words “Big Mak” are the words “Burger, Inc.”
spelled out in upper case letters. Furthermore, said corporate or business
name appearing in such food packages and signages is always accompanied
by the company mascot, a young chubby boy named Maky who wears a red
T-shirt with the upper case “m” appearing therein and a blue lower garment.
Finally, the defendants-appellants’ food packages are made of plastic
material.
xxxx
x x x [I]t is readily apparent to the naked eye that there appears a vast
difference in the appearance of the product and the manner that the
tradename “Big Mak” is being used and presented to the public. As earlier
noted, there are glaring dissimilarities between plaintiffs-appellees’
trademark and defendants-appellants’ corporate name. Plaintiffs-appellees’
product carrying the trademark “B[ig] M[ac]” is a double decker sandwich
(depicted in the tray mat containing photographs of the various food
products xxx sold in a Styrofoam box with the “McDonald’s” logo and
trademark in red, bl[o]ck capital letters printed thereon x x x at a price

which is more expensive than the defendants-appellants’ comparable food
products. In order to buy a “Big Mac,” a customer needs to visit an air-
conditioned “McDonald’s” restaurant usually located in a nearby
commercial center, advertised and identified by its logo—the umbrella “M,”
and its mascot—“Ronald McDonald.” A typical McDonald’s restaurant
boasts of a playground for kids, a second floor to accommodate additional
customers, a drive-thru to allow customers with cars to make orders without
alighting from their vehicles, the interiors of the building are well-lighted,
distinctly decorated and painted with pastel colors x x x. In buying a “B[ig]
M[ac]”, it is necessary to specify it by its trademark. Thus, a customer needs
to look for a “McDonald’s” and enter it first before he can find a hamburger
sandwich which carry the mark “Big Mac.” On the other hand, defendants-
appellants sell their goods through snack vans x x x x
Anent the allegation that defendants-appellants are guilty of unfair
competition, we likewise find the same untenable.
Unfair competition is defined as “the employment of deception or any
other means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off the
goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or service,
for those of another who has already established good will for his
20

similar good, business or services, or any acts calculated to produce the

same result” (Sec. 29, Rep. Act No. 166, as amended).
To constitute unfair competition therefore it must necessarily follow that
there was malice and that the entity concerned was in bad faith.
In the case at bar, We find no sufficient evidence adduced by plaintiffs-
appellees that defendants-appellants deliberately tried to pass off the goods
manufactured by them for those of plaintiffs-appellees. The mere suspected
similarity in the sound of the defendants-appellants’ corporate name with
the plaintiffs-appellees’ trademark is not sufficient evidence to conclude
unfair competition. Defendants-appellants explained that the name “M[ak]”
in their corporate name was derived from both the first names of the mother
and father of defendant Francis Dy, whose names are Maxima and Kimsoy.
With this explanation, it is up to the plaintiffs-appellees to prove bad faith
on the part of defendants-appellants. It is a settled rule that the law always
presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages
due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad
21
faith or with ill motive.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision

but the appellate court denied their motion in its Resolution of 11
July 2000.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners raise the following grounds for their petition:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

RESPONDENTS’ CORPORATE NAME “L.C. BIG MAK
BURGER, INC.” IS NOT A COLORABLE IMITATION
OF THE MCDONALD’S TRADEMARK “BIG MAC”,
SUCH COLORABLE IMITATION BEING AN
ELEMENT OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT.
A. Respondents use the words “Big Mak” as trademark for

their products and not merely as their business or corporate
name.
B. As a trademark, respondents’ “Big Mak” is undeniably and
unquestionably similar to petitioners’ “Big Mac” trademark
based on the dominancy test and the idem sonans test
resulting inexorably in confusion on the part of the
consuming public.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO

CONSIDER THE INHERENT SIMILARITY BETWEEN
THE MARK “BIG MAK” AND THE WORD MARK
“BIG MAC” AS AN INDICATION OF
_______________
21 Rollo, pp. 233-237 (Capitalization in the original).
21
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 21

RESPONDENTS’ INTENT TO DECEIVE OR DEFRAUD FOR

22
PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING UNFAIR COMPETITION.
Petitioners pray that we set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision
and reinstate the RTC Decision.
In their Comment to the petition, respondents question the
propriety of this petition as it allegedly raises only questions of fact.
On the merits, respondents contend that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in finding them not liable for
trademark infringement and unfair competition and in ordering
petitioners to pay damages.
The Issues
The issues are:
1. Procedurally, whether the questions raised in this petition

are proper for a petition for review under Rule 45.
2. On the merits, (a) whether respondents used the words “Big

Mak” not only as part of the corporate name “L.C. Big Mak
Burger, Inc.” but also as a trademark for their hamburger
products, and (b) whether respondent corporation is liable
for trademark infringement and unfair competition.23
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
On Whether the Questions Raised in the Petition are

Proper for a Petition for Review
A party intending to appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals

may file with this Court a petition for review under Section 1 of
24
Rule 45 (“Section 1”) raising only questions of law. A question
_______________
22 Ibid., p. 24.
23While petitioners seek to hold liable respondent corporation only, the Court’s
opinion will refer not only to the latter but also to all the respondents as all of them
filed the pleadings in this petition.
24 This provision states: “Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Su-
22

of law exists when the doubt or difference arises on what the law is
on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt
25
or difference arises on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Here, petitioners raise questions of fact and law in assailing the
Court of Appeals’ findings on respondent corporation’s non-liability
for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Ordinarily, the
Court can deny due course to such a petition. In view, however, of
the contradictory findings of fact of the RTC and Court of Appeals,
the Court opts to accept the petition, this being one of the recognized
26
exceptions to Section 1. We took a similar course of action in Asia
27
Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals which also involved a suit for
trademark infringement and unfair competition in which the trial
court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.
On the Manner Respondents Used

“Big Mak” in their Business
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
corporate name “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” appears in the
packaging for respondents’ hamburger products and not the words
“Big Mak” only.
The contention has merit.
The evidence presented during the hearings on petitioners’
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction shows
that the plastic wrappings and plastic bags used by respondents for
their hamburger sandwiches bore the words “Big Mak.” The other
descriptive words “burger” and “100% pure beef” were set in
28
smaller type, along with the locations of branches. Respondents’
cash invoices simply refer to their hamburger sandwiches as “Big
_______________
preme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”
25 Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., 125 Phil. 701; 19 SCRA 289
(1967).
26 Ducusin v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 248; 122 SCRA 280 (1983).
27 G.R. No. 103543, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 437.
28 Exhibits “E-1” to “2”, “F-1” to “2” and “G-1” to “2”.
23
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 23

29
Mak.” It is respondents’ snack vans that carry the words “L.C. Big
30
Mak Burger, Inc.”
It was only during the trial that respondents presented in evidence
the plastic wrappers and bags for their hamburger sandwiches relied
31
on by the Court of Appeals. Respondents’ plastic wrappers and
bags were identical with those petitioners presented during the
hearings for the injunctive writ except that the letters “L.C.” and the
words “Burger, Inc.” in respondents’ evidence were added above
and below the words “Big Mak,” respectively. Since petitioners’
complaint was based on facts existing before and during the hearings
on the injunctive writ, the facts established during those hearings are
the proper factual bases for the disposition of the issues raised in this
petition.
On the Issue of Trademark Infringement
Section 22 (“Section 22”) of Republic Act No. 166, as amended

32
(“RA 166”), the law applicable to this case, defines trademark
infringement as follows:
Infringement, what constitutes.—Any person who [1] shall use, without the
consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation of any registered mark or trade-name in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or
services, or identity of such business; or [2] reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or
colorably imitate any such mark or trade-name and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in
connection with such goods, business or services, shall be liable to a civil
33
action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies herein provided.
_______________
29 Exhibits “E”, “F” and “G”.

30Exhibits “L-10”, “L-16” to “27”.
31Exhibits “34”, “36-37”.
32 RA 166 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 8293 (“RA 8293”), the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which took effect on 1 January 1998.
Section 22 is substantially identical with Section 16 of the United States’ 1946
Trademark Act (“Lanham Act”).
33Superseded by Section 155 of RA 8293 (“Section 155”).
24

Petitioners base their cause of action under the first part of

Section22, i.e. respondents allegedly used, without petitioners’
consent, acolorable imitation of the “Big Mac” mark in advertising
and selling respondents’ hamburger sandwiches. This likely caused
confusion in the mind of the purchasing public on the source of the
hamburgers or the identity of the business.
To establish trademark infringement, the following elements
must be shown: (1) the validity of plaintiff’s mark; (2) the plaintiff’s
ownership of the mark; and (3) the use of the mark or its colorable
imitation by the alleged infringer results in “likelihood of
34
confusion.” Of these, it is the element of likelihood
35
of confusion
that is the gravamen of trademark infringement.
On the Validity of the “ Big Mac” Mark

and McDonald’s Ownership of such Mark
A mark is valid if it is “distinctive” and thus not barred from

36
registration under Section 4 of RA 166 (“Section 4”). However,
_______________
34 See A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 770
(2001).
35 Shaley’s Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426 (1983). Also referred to as the “lynchpin”
(Suncoast Tours, Inc. v. Lambert Groups, Inc. 1999 WL 1034683 [1999]) or
“touchstone” (VMG Enterprises, Inc. v. F. Quesada and Franco, Inc., 788 F. Supp.
648 [1992]) of trademark infringement.
36 This provision states: “Registration of trade-marks, trade-names and service-
marks on the principal register.—There is hereby established a register of trade-
marks, trade-names and service-marks which shall be known as the principal register.
The owner of a trade-mark, trade-name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods,
business or services from the goods, business or services of others shall have the right
to register the same on the principal register, unless it:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter; or matter

which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt
or disrepute;
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions, or of any foreign nation, or
any simulation thereof;
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name,
signature, or portrait of a deceased President of
25
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 25

once registered, not only the mark’s validity but also the registrant’s
37
ownership of the mark is prima facie presumed.
_______________
the Philippines, during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent
of the widow;
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or trade-name which so resembles a mark or

trade-name registered in the Philippines or a mark or a trade-name previously
used in the Philippines by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when
applied to or used in connection with the goods, business or services of the
applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers; or
(e) Consists of a mark or trade-name which, when applied to or used in

connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant is merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or when applied to or used
in connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant is
primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,
or is primarily merely a surname;
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section
nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark or trade-name used by
the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods, business
or services. The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark
or trade-name has become distinctive, as applied to or used in connection
with the applicant’s goods, business or services, proof of substantially
exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark or trade-name by the
applicant in connection with the sale of goods, business or services for five
years next preceding the date of the filing of the application for its
registration.” This has been superseded by Section 123 of RA 8293.
37 Section 20, RA 166. This provision states: “Certificate of registration prima

facie evidence of validity.—A certificate of registration of a mark or trade-name shall
be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant’s ownership
of the mark or trade-name, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in
connection with the goods, business or services specified in the certificate, subject to
any conditions and limitations stated therein.” This has been superseded by Section
138 of RA 8293. Neither RA 166 nor RA 8293 provides when the presumption of
validity and ownership becomes indubitable. In contrast, under the Lanham Act, as
amended, (15 United States Code § 1065), such takes place once the trademark has
become “incontestable” i.e. after the mark owner files affidavits stating that the mark
is registered and has been in continuous use for five consecutive years; that there is no
pending proceeding; and that there has been no adverse decision concerning the regis-
26

Respondents contend that of the two words in the “Big Mac” mark,
it is only the word “Mac” that is valid because the word “Big” is
generic and descriptive (proscribed under Section 4[e]), and thus
38
“incapable of exclusive appropriation.”
The contention has no merit. The “Big Mac” mark, which 39
should
be treated in its entirety and not dissected word for word, is neither
generic nor descriptive. Generic marks are commonly used as the
40 41
name or description of a kind of goods, such as “Lite” for beer or
42
“Chocolate Fudge” for chocolate soda drink. Descriptive marks, on
the other hand, convey the characteristics, functions, qualities or
ingredients of a product to one who has never seen it or does not
43 44
know it exists, such as “Arthriticare” for arthritis medication. On
the contrary, “Big Mac” falls under the class of fanciful or arbitrary
marks as it bears no logical relation to the actual characteristics of

45
the product it represents. As such, it is highly distinctive and thus
valid. Significantly, the trademark “Little Debbie” for snack cakes
46
was found arbitrary or fanciful.
The Court also finds that petitioners have duly established
McDonald’s exclusive ownership of the “Big Mac” mark. Although
Topacio and the Isaiyas Group registered the “Big Mac” mark ahead
of McDonald’s, Topacio, as petitioners disclosed, had already
assigned his rights to McDonald’s. The Isaiyas Group, on the other
_______________
trant’s ownership or right to registration (See Luis Vuitton Malletier and Oakley,
Inc. v. Veit, 211 F.Supp.2d 556 [2002]). However, both RA 166 (Section 12) and RA
8293 (Section 145) require the filing of the affidavit attesting to the continuous use of
the mark for five years and, under Section 145, failure to file such affidavit will result
in the removal of the mark from the Register.
38 Rollo, pp. 525-527.
39 Societe Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112012, 4 April
2001, 356 SCRA 207; McKee Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corporation, 738 F.
Supp. 1272 (1990).
40 Societe Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Miller
Brewing Co. v. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (1977).
41 Miller Brewing Co. v. Heileman Brewing Co., supra note 40.
42 A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (1986).
43 Societe Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39 citing §
43(A) of the Lanham Act, as amended.
44 Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338 (1992).
45 Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1980).
46 McKee Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corporation, supra note 39.
27
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 27

hand, registered its trademark only in the Supplemental Register. A

mark which is not registered in the Principal Register, and thus not
47
distinctive, has no real protection. Indeed, we have held that
registration in the Supplemental Register is not even a prima facie
evidence of the validity of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
48
mark on the goods specified in the certificate.
On Types of Confusion
Section 22 covers two types of confusion arising from the use of
similar or colorable imitation marks, namely, confusion of goods
(product confusion) and confusion of business (source or origin
confusion). In Sterling Products International, Incorporated v.
49
49
Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, et al., the Court
distinguished these two types of confusion, thus:
[Rudolf] Callman notes two types of confusion. The first is the confusion of
goods “in which event the ordinarily prudent purchaser would be induced to
purchase one product in the belief that he was purchasing the other.” x x x
The other is the confusion of business: “Here though the goods of the parties
are different, the defendant’s product is such as might reasonably be
assumed to originate with the plaintiff, and the public would then be
deceived either into that belief or into the belief that there is some
connection between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does not
exist.”
50
Under Act No. 666, the first trademark law, infringement was
limited to confusion of goods only, when the infringing mark is used
51
on “goods of a similar kind.” Thus, no relief was afforded to
_______________
47 See A. MILLER AND M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS,

TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL, pp. 177-178 (1983).
48 See Lorenzana v. Macagba, No. L-33773, 22 October 1987, 154 SCRA 723; La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Fernandez, etc., et al., 214 Phil. 332; 129 SCRA 373
(1984). RA 8293 no longer provides for a Supplemental Register and instead
mandates a single registry system (Section 137). Under Section 239, marks registered
in the Supplemental Register under RA 166 will remain in force but are no longer
subject to renewal.
49 137 Phil. 838; 27 SCRA 1214 (1969).
50 Enacted on 6 March 1903.
51 Section 3 of Act No. 666 provides: “The ownership or possession of a trade-
mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in the foregoing section provided, shall
be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent, as are other
property rights known to the law. To
28

the party whose registered mark or its colorable imitation is used on

different although related goods. To remedy this situation, Congress
enacted RA 166 on 20 June 1947. In defining trademark
infringement, Section 22 of RA 166 deleted the requirement in
question and expanded its scope to include such use of the mark or
its colorable imitation that is likely to result in confusion on “the
source or origin of such goods or services, or identity of such
52
business.” Thus, while there is confusion of goods when the
products are competing, confusion of business exists when the
products are
_______________
this end any person entitled to the exclusive use of a trade-mark to designate the
origin or ownership of goods he has made or deals in may recover damages in a civil
action from any person who has sold goods of a similar kind, bearing such trade-
mark, and the measure of the damages suffered, at the option of the complaining
party, shall be either the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have
made had the defendant not sold the goods with the trade-mark aforesaid, or the profit
which the defendant actually made out of the sale of the goods with the trade-mark,
and in cases where actual intent to mislead the public or to defraud the owner of the
trade-mark shall be shown, in the discretion of the court, the damages may be
doubled. The complaining party, upon proper showing, may have a preliminary
injunction, restraining the defendant temporarily from use of the trade-mark pending
the hearing, to be granted or dissolved in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure, and such injunction upon final hearing, if the complainant’s property in the
trade-mark and the defendant’s violation thereof shall be fully established, shall be
made perpetual, and this injunction shall be part of the judgment for damages to be
rendered in the same cause as above provided.” (Emphasis supplied)
52 The United States Congress had introduced the same amendment to the Lanham
Act in 1946. In 1962, the US Congress again amended Section 16 of the Lanham Act
(“Sec. 43[A]”) by deleting the phrase “the source or origin of such goods or services,
or identity of such business” in the definition of trademark infringement. This led
courts in that jurisdiction to hold that post-sale confusion by the public at large
(Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 [1991]. See also Koppers Company, Inc. v.
KrupKoppers, 517 F. Supp. 836 [1981]) or “subliminal confusion,” defined as
confusion on a subliminal or subconscious level, causing the consumer to identify the
properties and reputation of one product with those of another, although he can
identify the particular manufacturer of each, (Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation v.
American Cyanamid Company, 361 F. Supp. 1032 [1973]. See also Farberware, Inc.
v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291 (1990); Dreyfus Fund Incorporated v. Royal
Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108 [1981]) are sufficient to sustain a trademark
infringement claim. Section 155 substantially reproduces Sec. 43(A).
29
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 29

non-competing but related enough to produce confusion of

53
affiliation.
On Whether Confusion of Goods and

Confusion of Business are Applicable
Petitioners claim that respondents’ use of the “Big Mak” mark on
respondents’ hamburgers results in confusion of goods, particularly
with respect to petitioners’ hamburgers labeled “Big Mac.” Thus,
petitioners alleged in their complaint:
1.15. Defendants have unduly prejudiced and clearly infringed upon the
property rights of plaintiffs in the McDonald’s Marks, particularly the mark
“B[ig] M[ac].” Defendants’ unauthorized acts are likely, and calculated, to
confuse, mislead or deceive the public into believing that the products and
services offered by defendant Big Mak Burger, and the business it is
54
engaged in, are approved and sponsored by, or affiliated with, plaintiffs.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since respondents used the “Big Mak” mark on the same goods, i.e.
hamburger sandwiches, that petitioners’ “Big Mac” mark is used,
trademark infringement through confusion of goods is a proper issue
in this case.
Petitioners also claim that respondents’ use of the “Big Mak”
mark in the sale of hamburgers, the same business that petitioners
are engaged in, results in confusion of business. Petitioners alleged
in their complaint:
1.10. For some period of time, and without the consent of plaintiff
McDonald’s nor its licensee/franchisee, plaintiff McGeorge, and in clear
violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive right to use and/or appropriate the
McDonald’s marks, defendant Big Mak Burger acting through individual
defendants, has been operating “Big Mak Burger”, a fast food restaurant
business dealing in the sale of hamburger and cheeseburger sandwiches,
french fries and other food products, and has caused to be printed on the
wrapper of defendant’s food products and incorporated in its signages the
name “Big Mak Burger,” which is confusingly similar to and/or is a
colorable imitation of the plaintiff McDonald’s mark “B[ig] M[ac]”, x x x.
Defendant Big Mak Burger has thus unjustly created the impression
_______________
53 AGPALO, THE LAW ON TRADEMARK, INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR

COMPETITION, 45-46 (2000).
54 Records, p. 5.
30

that its business is approved and sponsored by, or affiliated with, plaintiffs.
xxxx
2.2 As a consequence of the acts committed by defendants, which unduly
prejudice and infringe upon the property rights of plaintiffs McDonald’s and
McGeorge as the real owner and rightful proprietor, and the
licensee/franchisee, respectively, of the McDonald’s marks, and which are
likely to have caused confusion or deceived the public as to the true
source, sponsorship or affiliation of defendants’ food products and
restaurant business, plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer actual
damages in the form of injury to their business reputation and goodwill, and
of the dilution of the distinctive quality of the McDonald’s marks, in
55
particular, the mark “B[ig] M[ac].” (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents admit that their business includes selling hamburger

sandwiches, the same food product that petitioners sell using the
“Big Mac” mark. Thus, trademark infringement through confusion
of business is also a proper issue in this case.
Respondents assert that their “Big Mak” hamburgers cater mainly
to the low-income group while petitioners’ “Big Mac” hamburgers
cater to the middle and upper income groups. Even if this is true, the
likelihood of confusion of business remains, since the low-income
group might be led to believe that the “Big Mak” hamburgers are the
low-end hamburgers marketed by petitioners. After all, petitioners
have the exclusive right to use the “Big Mac” mark. On the other
hand, respondents would benefit by associating their low-end
hamburgers, through the use of the “Big Mak” mark, with
petitioners’ high-end “Big Mac” hamburgers, leading to likelihood
of confusion in the identity of business.
Respondents further claim that petitioners use the “Big Mac”
mark only on petitioners’ double-decker hamburgers, while
respondents use the “Big Mak” mark on hamburgers and other
products like siopao, noodles and pizza. Respondents also point out
that petitioners sell their Big Mac double-deckers in a styrofoam box
with the “McDonald’s” logo and trademark in red, block letters at a
price more expensive than the hamburgers of respondents. In
contrast, respondents sell their Big Mak hamburgers in plastic
wrappers and plastic bags. Respondents further point out that
petitioners’ restaurants are air-conditioned buildings with drive-thru
service, compared to respondents’ mobile vans.
_______________
55 Ibid., pp. 4, 6-7.
31
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 31

These and other factors respondents cite cannot negate the

undisputed fact that respondents use their “Big Mak” mark on
hamburgers, the same food product that petitioners’ sell with the use
of their registered mark “Big Mac.” Whether a hamburger is single,
double or triple-decker, and whether wrapped in plastic or
styrofoam, it remains the same hamburger food product. Even
respondents’ use of the “Big Mak” mark on non-hamburger food
products cannot excuse their infringement of petitioners’ registered
mark, otherwise registered marks will lose their protection under the
law.
The registered trademark owner may use his mark on the same or
similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different
price levels depending on variations of the products for specific
segments of the market. The Court has recognized that the registered
trademark owner enjoys protection in product and market areas that
are the normal potential expansion of his business. Thus, the Court
has declared:
Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a

trademark is entitled is not limited to guarding his goods or business from
actual market competition with identical or similar products of the parties,
but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior appropriator of a trade-
mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where
prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the
complaining party has extended his business into the field (see 148 ALR
56 et seq.; 53 Am Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the activities of
the infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his
56
business (v. 148 ALR, 77, 84; 52 Am. Jur. 576, 577). (Emphasis supplied)
On Whether Respondents’ Use of the “ Big Mak” Mark Results in

Likelihood of Confusion
In determining likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed
57
two tests, the dominancy test and the holistic test. The dominancy
test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the
competing trademarks that might cause confusion. In con-
_______________
56 Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, 133 Phil. 1006; 24 SCRA 1018 (1968).

57 Societe Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Emerald
Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, 29
December 1995, 251 SCRA 600.
32

trast, the holistic test requires the court to consider the entirety of the
marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging,
in determining confusing similarity.
The Court of Appeals, in finding that there is no likelihood of
confusion that could arise in the use of respondents’ “Big Mak”
mark on hamburgers, relied on the holistic test. Thus, the Court of
Appeals ruled that “it is not sufficient that a similarity exists in both
name(s), but that more importantly, the overall presentation, or in
their essential, substantive and distinctive parts is such as would

likely MISLEAD or CONFUSE persons in the ordinary course of
purchasing the genuine article.” The holistic test considers the two
marks in their entirety, as they appear on the goods with their labels
and packaging. It is not enough to consider their words and compare
58
the spelling and pronunciation of the words.
Respondents now vigorously argue that the Court of Appeals’
application of the holistic test to this case is correct and in accord
with prevailing jurisprudence.
This Court, however, has relied on the dominancy test rather than
the holistic test. The dominancy test considers the dominant features
in the competing marks in determining whether they are confusingly
similar. Under the dominancy test, courts give greater weight to the
similarity of the appearance of the product arising from the adoption
of the dominant features of the registered mark, disregarding minor
59
differences. Courts will consider more the aural and visual
impressions created by the marks in the public mind, giving little
weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets and market
segments.
60
Thus, in the 1954 case of Co Tiong Sa v. Director of Patents,
the Court ruled:
x x x It has been consistently held that the question of infringement of a

trademark is to be determined by the test of dominancy. Similarity in size,
form and color, while relevant, is not conclusive. If the competing
trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another,
and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place.
Duplication or imitation is not necessary; nor is it necessary that the
_______________
58 V. AMADOR, TRADEMARKS UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, 260

(1999).
59 Ibid., p. 263.
60 95 Phil. 1 (1954).
33
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 33

infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate. (G. Heilman Brewing

Co. vs. Independent Brewing Co., 191 F., 489, 495, citing Eagle White Lead
Co. vs. Pflugh [CC] 180 Fed. 579). The question at issue in cases of
infringement of trademarks is whether the use of the marks involved would
be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the mind of the public or deceive
purchasers. (Auburn Rubber Corporation vs. Honover Rubber Co., 107 F.
2d 588; x x x) (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court reiterated the dominancy test in Lim Hoa v. Director of

61 62
Patents, Phil. Nut Industry, Inc. v. Standard Brands Inc.,
63
Converse Rubber Corporation v. Universal Rubber Products, Inc.,
64
and Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. In the 2001 case of
65
Societe Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explicitly rejected the holistic test in this wise:
[T]he totality or holistic test is contrary to the elementary postulate of the

law on trademarks and unfair competition that confusing similarity is to be
determined on the basis of visual, aural, connotative comparisons and
overall impressions engendered by the marks in controversy as they are
encountered in the realities of the marketplace. (Emphasis supplied)
The test of dominancy is now explicitly incorporated into law in

Section 155.1 of the Intellectual Property Code which defines
infringement as the “colorable imitation of a registered mark x x x or
a dominant feature thereof.”
Applying the dominancy test, the Court finds that respondents’
use of the “Big Mak” mark results in likelihood of confusion. First,
“Big Mak” sounds exactly the same as “Big Mac.” Second, the first
word in “Big Mak” is exactly the same as the first word in “Big
Mac.” Third, the first two letters in “Mak” are the same as the first
two letters in “Mac.” Fourth, the last letter in “Mak” while a “k”
sounds the same as “c” when the word “Mak” is pronounced. Fifth,
in Filipino, the letter “k” replaces “c” in spelling, thus “Caloocan” is
spelled “Kalookan.”
In short, aurally the two marks are the same, with the first word
of both marks phonetically the same, and the second word of
_______________
61 100 Phil. 214 (1956).

62 No. L-23035, 31 July 1975, 65 SCRA 575.
63 No. L-27906, 8 January 1987, 147 SCRA 154.
64 Supra note 27.
65 Supra note 39.
34

both marks also phonetically the same. Visually, the two marks have
both two words and six letters, with the first word of both marks
having the same letters and the second word having the same first
two letters. In spelling, considering the Filipino language, even the
last letters of both marks are the same.
Clearly, respondents have adopted in “ Big Mak” not only the
dominant but also almost all the features of “ Big Mac.” Applied to
the same food product of hamburgers, the two marks will likely
result in confusion in the public mind.
The Court has taken into account the aural effects of the words
and letters contained in the marks in determining the issue of
confusing similarity. Thus, in Marvex Commercial Co., Inc. v. Petra
66
Hawpia & Co., et al., the Court held:
The following random list of confusingly similar sounds in the matter of

trademarks, culled from Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade Marks, 1947,
Vol. 1, will reinforce our view that “SALONPAS” and “LIONPAS” are
confusingly similar in sound: “Gold Dust” and “Gold Drop”; “Jantzen” and
“Jass-Sea”; “Silver Flash” and “Supper Flash”; “Cascarete” and
“Celborite”; “Celluloid” and “Cellonite”; “Chartreuse” and “Charseurs”;
“Cutex” and “Cuticlean”; “Hebe” and “Meje”; “Kotex” and “Femetex”;
“Zuso” and “Hoo Hoo.” Leon Amdur, in his book “Trade-Mark Law and
Practice”, pp. 419-421, cities, as coming within the purview of the idem
sonans rule, “Yusea” and “U-C-A,” “Steinway Pianos” and “Steinberg
Pianos,” and “Seven-Up” and “Lemon-Up.” In Co Tiong vs. Director of
Patents, this Court unequivocally said that “Celdura” and “Cordura” are
confusingly similar in sound; this Court held in Sapolin Co. vs. Balmaceda,
67 Phil. 795 that the name “Lusolin” is an infringement of the trademark
“Sapolin,” as the sound of the two names is almost the same. (Emphasis
supplied)
Certainly, “Big Mac” and “Big Mak” for hamburgers create even
greater confusion, not only aurally but also visually.
Indeed, a person cannot distinguish “Big Mac” from “Big Mak”
by their sound. When one hears a “Big Mac” or “Big Mak”
hamburger advertisement over the radio, one would not know
whether the “Mac” or “Mak” ends with a “c” or a “k.”
Petitioners’ aggressive promotion of the “Big Mac” mark, as
borne by their advertisement expenses, has built goodwill and
reputation for such mark making it one of the easily recognizable
_______________
66 125 Phil. 295; 18 SCRA 1178 (1966).
35
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 35

marks in the market today. This increases the likelihood that

consumers will mistakenly associate petitioners’ hamburgers and
business with those of respondents.’
Respondents’ inability to explain sufficiently how and why they
came to choose “Big Mak” for their hamburger sandwiches indicates
their intent to imitate petitioners’ “Big Mac” mark. Contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ finding, respondents’ claim that their “Big Mak”

mark was inspired by the first names of respondent Dy’s mother
(Maxima) and father (Kimsoy) is not credible. As petitioners well
noted:
[R]espondents, particularly Respondent Mr. Francis Dy, could have arrived

at a more creative choice for a corporate name by using the names of his
parents, especially since he was allegedly driven by sentimental reasons. For
one, he could have put his father’s name ahead of his mother’s, as is usually
done in this patriarchal society, and derived letters from said names in that
order. Or, he could have taken an equal number of letters (i.e., two) from
each name, as is the more usual thing done. Surely, the more plausible
reason behind Respondents’ choice of the word “M[ak],” especially when
taken in conjunction with the word “B[ig],” was their intent to take
advantage of Petitioners’ x x x “B[ig] M[ac]” trademark, with their alleged
sentiment-focused “explanation” merely thought of as a convenient, albeit
67
unavailing, excuse or defense for such an unfair choice of name.
Absent proof that respondents’ adoption of the “Big Mak” mark was
68
due to honest mistake or was fortuitous, the inescapable conclusion
is that respondents adopted the “Big Mak” mark to “ride on the
69
coattails” of the more established “Big Mac” mark. This saves
respondents much of the expense in advertising to create market
70
recognition of their mark and hamburgers.
Thus, we hold that confusion is likely to result in the public
mind. We sustain petitioners’ claim of trademark infringement.
_______________
67 Rollo, pp. 588-589.

68 Time v. Life Television Co. of St. Paul, 123 F. Supp. 470 (1954);
69 Conde Nast Publications v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, 105 F. Supp.
325 (1952); Hanson v. Triangle Publications, 163 F.2d 74 (1947).
70 See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466 (1994).
36

On the Lack of Proof of

Actual Confusion
Petitioners’ failure to present proof of actual confusion does not
negate their claim of trademark infringement. As noted in American
71
Wire & Cable Co. v. Director of Patents, Section 22 requires the
less stringent standard of “likelihood of confusion” only. While
proof of actual confusion is the best evidence of infringement, its
72
absence is inconsequential.
On the Issue of Unfair Competition

73
Section 29 (“Section 29”) of RA 166 defines unfair competition,
thus:
xxxx
Any person who will employ deception or any other means contrary to
good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in
which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to
produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be
subject to an action therefor.
In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of unfair
competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as
to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in
which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in
any feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as
shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade,
or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any
other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is
offering the services of another who has identified such services in
the mind of the public; or
_______________
71 No. L-26557, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 544.

72 PACCAR Inc. v. Tele Scan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243 (2003).
73 Reiterated in Section 168 of RA 8293.
37
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 37

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of
trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another. (Emphasis supplied)
The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1)

confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods, and (2)
74
intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The
confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the
marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging or
presentation of the goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be
inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered
75 76
for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.
Unfair competition is broader than trademark infringement and
includes passing off goods with or without trademark infringement.
77
Trademark infringement is a form of unfair competition.
Trademark infringement constitutes unfair competition when there is
not merely likelihood of confusion, but also actual or probable
deception on the public because of the general appearance of the
goods. There can be trademark infringement without unfair
competition as when the infringer discloses on the labels containing
the mark that he manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public
from being deceived that the goods originate from the trademark
78
owner.
To support their claim of unfair competition, petitioners allege
that respondents fraudulently passed off their hamburgers as “Big
Mac” hamburgers. Petitioners add that respondents’ fraudulent
79
intent can be inferred from the similarity of the marks in question.
_______________
74 V. AMADOR, supra note 58 at p. 278.

75 Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. v. Ins. Petroleum Refining Co., Ltd., 120 Phil.
434; 11 SCRA 436 (1964); “La Insular” v. Jao Oge, 42 Phil. 366 (1921).
76 Alhambra Cigar, Co. v. Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914).
77 Co Tiong Sa v. Director of Patents, supra note 60; Clarke v. Manila Candy Co.,
36 Phil. 100 (1917).
78 See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F.Supp 845 (1952).
79 Rollo, pp. 40-45.
38

Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by
imitative devices on the general appearance of the goods, misleads
prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise under the
80
impression that they are buying that of his competitors. Thus, the
defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his
competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods
are those of his competitor.
The RTC described the respective marks and the goods of

petitioners and respondents in this wise:
The mark “B[ig] M[ac]” is used by plaintiff McDonald’s to identify its

double decker hamburger sandwich. The packaging material is a styrofoam
box with the McDonald’s logo and trademark in red with block capital
letters printed on it. All letters of the “B[ig] M[ac]” mark are also in red and
block capital letters. On the other hand, defendants’ “B[ig] M[ak]” script
print is in orange with only the letter “ B” and “ M” being capitalized and
the packaging material is plastic wrapper. x x x x Further, plaintiffs’ logo
and mascot are the umbrella “M” and “Ronald McDonald’s,” respectively,
compared to the mascot of defendant Corporation which is a chubby boy
81
called “Macky” displayed or printed between the words “Big” and “Mak.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondents point to these dissimilarities as proof that they did not

give their hamburgers the general appearance of petitioners’ “Big
Mac” hamburgers.
The dissimilarities in the packaging are minor compared to the
stark similarities in the words that give respondents’ “Big Mak”
hamburgers the general appearance of petitioners’ “Big Mac”
hamburgers. Section 29(a) expressly provides that the similarity in
the general appearance of the goods may be in the “devices or
words” used on the wrappings. Respondents have applied on their
plastic wrappers and bags almost the same words that petitioners use
on their styrofoam box. What attracts the attention of the buying
public are the words “Big Mak” which are almost the same, aurally
and visually, as the words “Big Mac.” The dissimilarities in the
material and other devices are insignificant compared to the glaring
similarity in the words used in the wrappings.
_______________
80 Suncoast Tours, Inc. v. Lambert Groups, Inc., 1999 WL 1034683 (1999).

81 Rollo, pp. 148-149.
39
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 39

Section 29(a) also provides that the defendant gives “his goods the
general appearance of goods of another manufacturer.”
Respondents’ goods are hamburgers which are also the goods of
petitioners. If respondents sold egg sandwiches only instead of
hamburger sandwiches, their use of the “Big Mak” mark would not
give their goods the general appearance of petitioners’ “Big Mac”
hamburgers. In such case, there is only trademark infringement but
no unfair competition. However, since respondents chose to apply
the “Big Mak” mark on hamburgers, just like petitioner’s use of the
“Big Mac” mark on hamburgers, respondents have obviously
clothed their goods with the general appearance of petitioners’
goods.
Moreover, there is no notice to the public that the “Big Mak”
hamburgers are products of “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.”
Respondents introduced during the trial plastic wrappers and bags
with the words “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” to inform the public of
the name of the seller of the hamburgers. However, petitioners
introduced during the injunctive hearings plastic wrappers and bags
with the “Big Mak” mark without the name “L.C. Big Mak Burger,
Inc.” Respondents’ belated presentation of plastic wrappers and bags
bearing the name of “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” as the seller of the
hamburgers is an after-thought designed to exculpate them from
their unfair business conduct. As earlier stated, we cannot consider
respondents’ evidence since petitioners’ complaint was based on
facts existing before and during the injunctive hearings.
Thus, there is actually no notice to the public that the “Big Mak”
hamburgers are products of “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” and not
those of petitioners who have the exclusive right to the “Big Mac”
mark. This clearly shows respondents’ intent to deceive the public.
Had respondents’ placed a notice on their plastic wrappers and bags
that the hamburgers are sold by “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.,” then
they could validly claim that they did not intend to deceive the
public. In such case, there is only trademark infringement but no
82
unfair competition. Respondents, however, did not give such
notice. We hold that as found by the RTC, respondent corporation is
liable for unfair competition.
_______________
82 See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 78.
40

The Remedies Available to Petitioners

83
Under Section 23 (“Section 23”) in relation to Section 29 of RA
166, a plaintiff who successfully maintains trademark infringement
and unfair competition claims is entitled to injunctive and monetary
reliefs. Here, the RTC did not err in issuing the injunctive writ of 16
August 1990 (made permanent in its Decision of 5 September 1994)
and in ordering the payment of P400,000 actual damages in favor of
petitioners. The injunctive writ is indispensable to prevent further
acts of infringement by respondent corporation. Also, the amount of

actual damages is a reasonable percentage (11.9%) of respondent
corporation’s gross sales for three (1988-1989 and 1991) of the six
84
years (1984-1990) respondents have used the “Big Mak” mark.
The RTC also did not err in awarding exemplary damages by
85
way of correction for the public good in view of the finding of
unfair competition where intent to deceive the public is essential.
The award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is also in
86
order.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We SET ASIDE
the Decision dated 26 November 1999 of the Court of Appeals and
its Resolution dated 11 July 2000 and REINSTATE the Decision
_______________
83 This provision reads: “Actions, and damages and injunction for infringement.—
Any person entitled to the exclusive use of a registered mark or trade-name may
recover damages in a civil action from any person who infringes his rights, and the
measure of the damages suffered shall be either the reasonable profit which the
complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed his said rights,
or the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the
event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable
certainty, then the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon
the amount of gross sales of the defendant of the value of the services in connection
with which the mark or trade-name was used in the infringement of the rights of the
complaining party. In cases where actual intent to mislead the public or to defraud the
complaining party shall be shown, in the discretion of the court, the damages may be
doubled.
The complaining party, upon proper showing, may also be granted injunction.”
84 TSN, (Francis Dy), 15 March 1993, p. 32; TSN (Francis Dy), 22 March 1993,
pp. 1-2.
85 Article 2229, CIVIL CODE.
86 Article 2208(1), CIVIL CODE.
41
VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 41

Salazar vs. People
dated 5 September 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,

Branch 137, finding respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. liable for
trademark infringement and unfair competition.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago

and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside. That of the

trial court reinstated.
Note.—The likelihood of confusion of goods or business is a

relative concept, to be determined only according to the particular,
and sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case. (Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 266 [2000])
——o0o——
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11/13/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MCDONALD’S CORPORATION and MCGEORGE FOOD

Remedial Law; Appeals; A party intending to appeal from a judgment

other hand, registered its trademark only in the Supplemental Register. A

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 11

McDonald’s Corporation vs. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.

similarity is to be determined on the basis of visual, aural, connotative

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

McDonald’s Corporation vs. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.

Same; Unfair Competition; Essential Elements of Unfair Competition.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 13

Petitioner McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s”) is a corporation

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

McDONALD (s); McDONALDLAND (s); McCHEESE & DESIGN (f); EGG

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 15

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

disclosed that it had acquired Topacio’s rights to his registration in a

The Trial Court’s Ruling

On 5 September 1994, the RTC rendered judgment (“RTC

Undeniably, the mark “B[ig] M[ac]” is a registered trademark for plaintiff

is a food item—a hamburger sandwich which is for immediate consumption,

18 Ibid., pp. 460-463.

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 17

the trademark “B[ig] M[ac]” has been infringed by defendant corporation

action against the defendants for trademark infringement and unfair

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision provides:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs McDonald’s

1. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on [16 August

19 Rollo, pp. 149-154.

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. Defendant L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. is ordered to pay plaintiffs

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 26 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment

Plaintiffs-appellees in the instant case would like to impress on this Court

appellees argue that defendants-appellants’ use of their corporate name is a

20 Records, pp. 1431-1432.

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 19

the other hand, what the defendants-appellants corporation is using is not a

trademark in red, bl[o]ck capital letters printed thereon x x x at a price

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

similar good, business or services, or any acts calculated to produce the

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

A. Respondents use the words “Big Mak” as trademark for

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO

21 Rollo, pp. 233-237 (Capitalization in the original).

VOL. 437, AUGUST 18, 2004 21

RESPONDENTS’ INTENT TO DECEIVE OR DEFRAUD FOR

The issues are:

1. Procedurally, whether the questions raised in this petition

2. On the merits, (a) whether respondents used the words “Big

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has merit.

On Whether the Questions Raised in the Petition are