R. No. 127406.

November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and

EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered
private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated
by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding
in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at
the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August
4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil
marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of
the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. Said the appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It
does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a
judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio,
there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter
of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine
for himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed
to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree
of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the
least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed

Decision in this wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.

Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and
void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount
of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from
November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED. [2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR
THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A
JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS.

COURT OF APPEALS.
III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE
SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner
to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the
marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected
petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza[3] and People v. Aragon[4] are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases,
decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No.
227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the
provisions of law previously obtaining.[5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory
precedent for this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts
situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code,
as in the instant case.

xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]

At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,[9] under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil

Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved
the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence
of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage
during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void,
having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a
judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases,
saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
 In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13] however, we recognized the
right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their
acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for
judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the
husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to
share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.[14]
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling
was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is a need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In
1978, she married another man, Wiegel.Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the second marriage void
without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family
Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code.[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez,

Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was
void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have
known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),[22] the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.(Art.
39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family
Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). [23]

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances
of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We
held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are
not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private
respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit
from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church
ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used
three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he
wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize
the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues
that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving herdefense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs
such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid
license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the
church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could
have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial
court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although
the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted duplicitously and
craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not
adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in
the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless
complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we
grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed
partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount
of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children,
Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or
otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365 (1996); Son vs.
[1]

Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 48-52.
[3]
45 Phil 739 (1954).
[4]
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
[5]
Rollo, p. 47.
[6]
Rollo, p. 49.
[7]
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug opined that the
[8]

necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held
to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such
judicial declaration of nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance,
is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only
to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
[9]
E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
[10]
45 Phil 739 (1954).
[11]
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
[12]
33 SCRA 614 (1970).
[13]
37 SCRA 315 (1971).
[14]
See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil 88 (1943).
[15]
77 SCRA 338 (1977).
[16]
22 SCRA 525 (1983).
[17]
143 SCRA 499 (1986).
[18]
Id. at 501.
[19]
145 SCRA 229 (1986).
[20]
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
[21]
211 SCRA 7 (1992).
[22]
226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[23]
Id. at 579.
[24]
268 SCRA 47 (1997)
[25]
286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).
[26]
Rollo, p. 51.
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.1,
[27]

Manila: 1990, p. 223.

[28]
Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.