The Journey of the ICJ: From then to now

(Project Report)

Submitted to

Mr Mohammad Atif Khan

Faculty Member in Public International Law

580945 By

Kamaljeet Meena
B. A. LL. B. (Hons.) Student
Semester – IV, Section – C, Roll No. 68

Hidayatullah National Law University

Uparwara Post, Abhanpur, New Raipur – 493661 (C.G.)

15 February, 2017
 Declaration

I hereby declare that this Project report titled “Journey of the ICJ: From then to now” is my own work

and represents my own ideas, and where others’ ideas or words have been included, I have adequately

cited and referenced the original sources. I also declare that I have adhered to all principles of academic

honesty and integrity and have not misrepresented or fabricated or falsified any idea/data/fact/source in

my submission. I accept that any suspected irregularity in my work will be dealt with strictly by the

University.

Kamaljeet Meena
Semester-IV,
Roll No.-68,
BA.LLB (Hons.)
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I feel highly elated to work on the project “The Journey of the ICJ: From then to now”. The practical

realisation of the project has obligated the assistance of many persons. Firstly I express my deepest

gratitude towards Mr Mohammad Atif Khan , Faculty of Public International Law, to provide me with the

opportunity to work on this project. Her invaluable guidance and supervision in terms of her lectures were

of extreme help in understanding and carrying out the nuances of this project.

I would also like to thank The University and the Vice Chancellor for providing extensive database

resources in the library and for the internet facilities provided by the University.

Some typography or printing errors might have crept in, which are deeply regretted. I would be grateful

to receive comments and suggestions to further improve this project.

Kamaljeet Meena,

Semester IV,

Section C,

Roll No. 68

Contents

Page
Declaration 2
Acknowledgements 3
Table of Cases 5
1. Introduction 6
1.2 Objectives of the Study 7

1.2 Methodology of the Study 7

1.3 Organization of Study 7

1.4 Scope of the Study 8

2. International Court of Justice: History 9

3. Organisation and Jurisdiction of the Court 12

4. Activity of the Court 17

5. Conclusion 20

6. References 21

Table of Cases
• Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 19; 55 ILR

• The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226,

236; 110 ILR, p. 163

 • Corfu Channel (United Kingdom/Albania), ICJ Reports (1948)

• Norwegian Fisheries case (United Kingdom/Norway) ICJ Reports (1951)

• South West Africa (Ethopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa), ICJ Reports (1961)

• North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands), ICJ

Reports (1969)

• Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), ICJ Reports (1984)

• Gulf of Maine, ICJ Reports (1984)

Introduction
The roots of the ICJ go back to an era ‐ at the beginning of the 19th century ‐ when visionaries be lieved

that war could be outlawed and that governments could settle their disputes by using an international

court. This vision is still a long way from reality.

The 1899 Hague Peace Conference was convened by the Russian Czar. He had been presented with a

dilemma: he wanted to expand domestic social welfare programme (to undercut support for left-wing

Republican Movements in Russia) but could not afford to do so while also maintaining high military

expenditure. That grand aim failed but the Conference did lead to various small ways of regulating how

international war was fought.

One of the treaties was the Hague Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Dispute.

Countries that agreed to be bound by that treaty agreed to settle their disputes by peaceful means such as

by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Permanent Court of International Justice was created in 1920

alongside the League of Nations that eventually evolved into the International Court of Justice. Initially

Communist Countries boycotted it as a club for the rich Western nations. Since the 1980s the Court has
been busier than ever before. Countries have now found more use of it and ironically about a third of

recent cases have been disputes between African Countries.1

Research Methodology

1.1 Objectives of Study

• To study the mode of International Dispute Settlement between states and international subjects

under the ICJ

• To study the evolution of the International Court of Justice

• To analyse the International Court of Justice’s organization and jurisdiction, and the law governing

it, if any.

• To study its contribution to dispute settlement and international law

METHODLOGY
The research done in this project is analytical in nature. Accumulation of the information on the topic

includes wide use of primary sources such as cases as well as secondary sources like books, e-articles etc.

The matter from these sources have been compiled and analysed to understand the concept.

Websites, dictionaries and articles have also been referred.

1
Dr. Keith Suter, The International Court of Justice,
http://www.globaldirections.com/Articles/Global%20Politics/InternationalCourtofJustice.pdf, Last Accessed on 10 Feb,
2017.
The structure of the project, as instructed by the Faculty of Public International Law has been adhered to

and same has been helpful.

Organization of the Study

1. The First part deals with how the International Court of Justice come into existence?

2. The Second part deals with the organization of this court, its Jurisdiction and the law which

governs its jurisdiction.

3. Finally, the project deals with the activity of this Court from its inception.

Chapterisation
Chapter 1 starts with the introduction of the International Court of Justice and its relevance in the process

of International Dispute Settlement. Chapter 2 has regarded the inception of this Court and its relation

with the Permanent Court of Justice. Chapter 3 has dealt with the organization and jurisdiction of the ICJ.

Lastly, Chapter 4 talks of the activity of the ICJ which has been there since its initial years to the present

times.

Mode of Citation
All the citations in the project follow the mode prescribed in the 19th Edition of Bluebook.

Scope of Study
The researcher has limited the scope of study of the concerned project to analyzing the organization and

jurisdiction followed in this court and its history of inception; activities of this Court have been studied.

However, all this has not been dealt with in an explicit form. The procedure of approaching the Court

under its two jurisdictions has not been dealt with. The researcher has gone through some cases, but the

facts and decisions have not been considered.

 Introduction2
Public International Law is considered to be a dy namic law which has been changing s ince its inception. Defined by Oppenheim to be a body of customary and treaty rules which are considered to be legally bindin g by the States in their intercourse with each other2, Public International Law is like an organ ic whole, whose concepts have never been quite s o stable. H owever, in such a n uns table facture of a form of law, it becomes increasingly important to determine its status quo, thus come into picture various modes of settlement of dispu tes. Moreover, it is fair to say that international law has alway s considered its fundamental purpose to be the maintenance of peace. Although ethical preoccupations stimulated its develo pment and inform its grow th, in ternational law has historically been regarded by the international community primarily as a means to ensure the establishment and preservation of wor ld peace and security . Adjudication procedures involve the determinatio n by a disinterested third party of the legal and factual issues invo lved, either by arbitration or by the decisio n of judicial organs. Th us, the International Court of Ju stice, which is one of the modes of settlement of international disputes. A disagr eement between two parties may
arise either on legal or political groun ds. Legal d ifferences according to Oppenheim “are those in whci h the parties to the dis pute base their respective claims and conten tions on groun ds recognized by International Law”3 Para 2 of Article 36 of the International Court o f Ju stice uses the term legal dispu te in relation to compulsory jurisdiction of the court. O ne of the purposed of the United Nations is to bring abou t by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and Internationa l Law, adjustment or settlement of disp utes or s ituaitons wh ich might lead to a breach of the peace. In order to achieve the above purpose, it was essential to establish a judicial arm of the organization. A t the San Francisco Conference it was therefore decided to establish a Court wh ich was named the International Court of Ju stice. According to Article 92 of the Charter, the ICJ is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations. The Court carries out its functions according to the Statute wh ich is an integral part of the Charter. Its main objectives are, firstly to settle disputes or situations, w hich are submitted to it by the States, i n accordance with the principles of justice and international law, and secondly , to render advis ory opinion on legal questions
to any body which has been authorized in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations .

International Court of Justice: History

The idea of peacefully settling disputes at the international level is a very old one. Systems of mediation

and arbitration were known, but not the establishment of a permanent bench of judges to settle disputes,

employing strict judicial techniques. As Malcolm N. Shaw puts it, the impetus to create a world court for

the international community developed as a result of the atmosphere engendered by the Hague

Conferences of 1897 and 1907.4 The establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, although neither

permanent nor, in fact, a court, marked an important step forward in the consolidation of an international

legal system.5 However, no lasting concrete steps were taken until after the conclusion of the First World

War.

At the end of the First World War, and with the creation of the League of Nations, under a mandate of the

Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a concrete shape was given to the idea of a Permanent

Court of International Justice (hereinafter, the Permanent Court or the PCIJ). It stimulated efforts to

2
Oppenheim, ‘International Law’, Vol. 1, (1905) pp.1-2
3
Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 3
4
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed. Cambridge University Press, p. 1057 5 Ibid
develop international arbitral mechanisms. Together with arbitration, the Permanent Court was intended

to provide a reasonably comprehensive system-serving the international community. It was intended as a

way to prevent outbreaks of violence by enabling easily accessible methods of dispute settlement in the

context of a legal and organisational framework to be made available.

The Permanent Court was established with 15 judges elected by the Assembly and the Council of the

League of Nations. They represented the main forms of civilization and the principal forms of legal

systems of the world. The Statute, which governed the operation of the Permanent Court, was however an

instrument independent from the Covenant of the League of Nations. Only States could be parties before

the Permanent Court. But it was empowered to give advisory opinions to the Assembly and the Council

of the League of Nations. The Permanent Court, which came into operation in1922 and ceased functioning

in 1940 with the outbreak of the Second World War, dealt with 29 contentious cases and gave 27 advisory

opinions. The Permanent Court was dissolved in 1946, followed by a decision at the San Francisco

Conference to create a new International Court of Justice (hereinafter, the ICJ or the Court) on the same

lines as the Permanent Court. The intention in 1946 was that there should be continuity between the new

Court and the old court, the PCIJ. The archives of PCIJ had, throughout the World War II, remained intact

in the Peace Palace at the Hague, so that the ICJ was able to take over both the premises and the archives

of the former Court. Accordingly, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to

as ICJ) was firmly based upon the final version of the Statute of its predecessor; the arrangement and even

the numbering of the Articles being largely parallel in both versions. The necessary redrafting to bring in

references to the United Nations in place of references to the League of Nations, and the incorporation of

other desired new elements was accomplished, first by the United Nations Committee of Jurists which
met in Washington in 1944, and then by Committee IV of the United Nations Conference on International

Organization in San Francisco (UNCIO) in 1945.5

The close relationship of the new Statute to the Statute of PCIJ means that it is quite often useful still to

make more or less extensive reference to the provisions and the experience of the earlier Statute. There

are very few of the more important aspects of the present Court that have not been derived from the

equivalent provisions of the former revised Statute of 1929, which amended several articles in the light of

experience and added the new Chaper IV (Arts. 65-68 of the revised Statute) on advisory opinions.

It is remarkable that this Statute has, in more or less the same terms other than the changing of references

to the League of Nations into references to the United Nations, served the two courts for over 80 years. In

drafting the ICJ Statute, the numbering of the articles in the PCIJ Statute was left unchanged. Apart from

changes that were merely stylistic or dictated by the French version of the PCIJ Statute, 24 provisions

were amended and two provisions added towards the end, Arts. 69 and 70 on amendments filling “a

regrettable lacuna in the Statute, a lacuna the disadvantage of which has made itself felt in the past”.6 The

former system of re-election was found to have “the disadvantage that, despite the reelection of some of

the judges, continuity was not maintained beyond the nine-year period” 7 and was replaced by a new

system of renewal by one-third of the judges every three years. The PCIJ was dissolved on 18th April,

1946 by the Assembly of the League and it was the same day on which ICJ held its inaugural ceremony.

In the words of the late

Sir Robert Jennings, “it was the accepted success of that Court [the PCIJ] that ensured the constitution of

its successor”.8

5
The International Court of Justice: Questions and Answers about the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations, 10th
ed. UN Department of Public Information
6
UNCIO XIV, p. 852
7
UNCIO XIII, p. 389
8
Jennings, Sir R,Y., The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years¸ AJIL 89 (1995), pp. 493-505
 Organisation and Jurisdiction of the ICJ

[2.A] ORGANISATION OF THE COURT

Article 2 of the Statute of ICJ lays down:

The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their

nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required

in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of

recognized competence in international law

The number of “members” of the Court, as the Judges are referred to in the Statute, has varied; but since

1929 Protocol for the Revision of the Statute of the PCIJ, in its revised Art. 3, and also since the 1946

Statute of the ICJ, Art. 3, para. 1, the number has remained as 15, with a quorum of nine as provided by

Art. 25, para. 3 of the Statute. The question of size is also tempered by the provisions in Art. 9 that “in the

body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of

the world should be assured”. These are not qualifications that lend themselves readily to definition.

The “members” or judges of this Court are elected by the General Assembly and Security Council

(voting separately) from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the national groups of the Permanent Court

of Arbitration, or by specially appointed national groups in the case of UN members that are not

represented in the PCA. This provision was inserted to restrict political pressures in the selection of judges.

Candidates must obtain an absolute majority of votes in both the Assembly and the Council, 9 and no two

successful applicants may be of the same nationality. The elections are staggered and take place once

every three years, with respect to five judges each time. In this way some element of continuity amongst

the Court is maintained. The members of the Court are elected for nine years and may be re-elected.10

9
Article 10, Statute of the ICJ
10
Article 13, Statute of the ICJ.
They enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when on official business, 11 and a judge cannot be

dismissed unless it is the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Court that he or she has ceased

to fulfil the required conditions. 12 These include the requirement that no member may exercise any

political or administrative function or engage in any other professional occupation. No member may act

as agent, advocate, or counsel in any case and no member may participate in the decision of any case in

which he has previously taken part as agent, advocate or counsel for one of the parties, or as a member of

a national or international court, or of a commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity. 13 The Court elects

a president and vice-president for a three-year term which can be renewed.

It is clear however that this representative function of the judges has to mean that a sitting of the full court

of all the members may be seen as carrying greater, or at least broader, authority than a chamber of a few

members.14 Maybe this is the reason why most governments minded to bring cases before the Court’s

contentious jurisdiction elect to go before the full Court rather than before chambers. And indeed the Rules

and the practice of the Court reflect this notion that a large element of the undoubted authority of the Court

is derived from its ensuring this representative capacity even in the details of its procedures and decision

making.15

It must also be borne in mind however that, if the full Court is to be the main workhouse of the Court

system, the total membership must be within reasonable limits if the Court is to be able to involve the

entire membership in carrying out the work of the Court’s decision-making. This is often far from easy to

ensure even 15 members (which may be inflated to 16 or 17 with ad hoc judges). Enlargement of the

Court’s membership, or indeed any serious extension of the use of ad hoc chambers if the Court would

11
Article 19, Statute of the ICJ.
12
Article 18, Statute of the ICJ
13
Articles 16 and 17, Statute of the ICJ.
14
Zimmermann, Andreas, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, Oxford University
Press, p.9
15
Jennings, Sir R.Y., The Internal Judicial Practice of the International Court of Justice, BYIL 59 (1988), pp. 31-47
entail a fundamental change in the basic principles governing the ways in which the Court works. Such a

change might eventually be found to be necessary and even desirable if the work of the Court continues

to expand. But the qualities that the Court’s existing procedures have brought about should not be lost

sight of when considering changes in the size or form of the Court.

[2.B.] Jurisdiction of the Court

The International Court of Justice has two kinds of jurisdictions:

• Contentious Jurisdiction

• Adversarial Jurisdiction

Contentious jurisdiction involves States that submit the dispute by consent to the Court for a binding

decision, whereas Advisory jurisdiction concerns questions referred to the Court by the

General Assembly, the Security Council or other organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations.

Those questions can only refer to legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. Advisory

opinions given by the International Court of Justice are not binding. The International Court is a judicial

institution that decides cases on the basis of international law as it exists at the date of the decision. It

cannot formally create law as it is not a legislative organ.16

[2.B.i] The Consensual Basis of Contentious Jurisdiction

The consensual basis of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction- the only jurisdiction or the

Court has to make decisions that are legally binding upon the parties- is not merely inherited from the

Statute of PCIJ but is also a concomitant of a fundamental principle of international law itself.17 Under

Article 34 of the Statute, only states may be parties in contentious cases before the Court and hence

submit cases to it. The Court cannot therefore consider disputes between a State and an international

16
Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 19; 55 ILR, pp. 238, 254
17
Dinah L. Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 537 (2009) 19 Ibid
 organization, or between two international organizations nor can it deal with the numerous written or

oral applications from private entities (e.g., corporations or non-governmental organizations) or

individuals that are received at the Registry, however meritorious or moving they may be. The ICJ can

deal with a case only if the States involved have in some manner or other consented to be made a party

to the proceedings before the Court. This is a fundamental principle governing the settlement of

international disputes, States being sovereign and free to choose the means of resolving their disputes.

[2.B.ii] The Court’s Adversarial Process

In addition to having the capacity to decide disputes between states, the ICJ may give advisory

opinions. Article 65 of the Statute declares that ‘the Court may give an advisory opinion on any

legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations to make such a request’, while article 96 of the Charter notes that as

well as the General Assembly and Security Council, other organs of the UN and specialised

agencies where so authorised by the Assembly may request such opinions on legal questions

arising within the scope of their activities. The advisory procedure is available to certain public

international organizations (namely organs and specialized agencies of the UN) and enables them

to request an advisory opinion from the Court on a legal question.19 Unlike contentious cases, the

purpose of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction is not to settle, at least directly or as such, inter-state

disputes, but rather to ‘offer legal advice to the organs and institutions requesting the opinion’. 18

This way of proceeding is different in mode, effects and feel from the political arena in which case

will probably have been dealt with hitherto. The requirement here is that the parties at various

stages present their submissions which are designed to have the effect of reducing the matter into

listed, particular disputed issues of law or fact, which particular issues the Court is invited to

18
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 236; 110 ILR, p. 163
determine. These issues henceforward become the focus of the argument of the parties and

eventually of the Court’s own deliberations.

 Activity of the Court
The measure of the successes or the failures of the ICJ is to be found primarily in the nature and importance

of the cases it has decided. The work has inevitably changed from time to time in accordance with the

changes in the international community that the Court exists to serve and of which it is a part.

[3.A] The First Decade: 1946-1956

During this period the Court was reasonably busy. Soon after its inauguration was the process of

decolonization which, in the first decades of the new Court produced a significant and increasing number

of new and independent sovereign States members of the United Nations. ICJ made a distinguished start

with its first case, the Corfu Channel case19. After the Court has rejected preliminary objections to the

jurisdictions, the parties were then able, under some pressure from a recommendation from the Security

Council, to enter into a Special Agreement. It was a very good beginning for the Court; indeed, the

principal decision of the Court was adopted as law in Art. 16, para. 4 of the 1958 Convention on the

Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

Bolder, but very influential, was the judgment in another maritime matter, the Norwegian

Fisheries case 20 . The Court’s decision was quickly accepted and adopted as Art. 4 of the Geneva

Convention on the Territorial Sea23, which was in 1982 also incorporated in the UN Convention on the

Law of the Sea. Other judgments in the first decade were also important but nothing so farreaching as the

first two.

19
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom/Albania), ICJ Reports (1948)
20
Norwegian Fisheries case (United Kingdom/Norway) ICJ Reports (1951) 23 UN
Doc. A/Conf.13/L.52-L.55
During this, the Court was also occupied with requests for advisory opinions. These included two opinions

on the Admission of States to the UN21 and an important opinion on Reservations to the Genocide

Convention22.

[3.B] The Second Decade: 1956-1966

At the beginning of this second decade there was a development in the United Nations which greatly

affected nomination of candidates for membership of the Court. For some time there had been informal

regional groupings of governments in the UN, but in 1957, the General Assembly officially recognized

their existence. The actual work load of the Court fell a little in the second decade, but included several

difficult cases; and two judgments about South West Africa, one in

1962 and other in 1966, proved very damaging to the Court (South West Africa Case23)

[3.C] The Third Decade: 1966-1976

This was crucial time for the Court and not an easy one. After the South West Africa decision, there was

a marked falling in the cases during the early 1970s, but it began to pick up again towards the end of this

third decade. There was a very promising burgeoning with what is still one of the most landmark cases at

any time: the North Sea Continental Shelf case24 with Denmark and Netherlands on one side and the

Federal Republic of Germany on the other. This is still one of the most cited decisions and was

incorporated into Art. 76 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite a bad beginning to

the third decade, it was rather splendid that the work was carried on mostly well.

21
Conditions of Admission of States to the UN (Article 4 of the Charter), ICJ Reports (1948)
22
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports (1951)
23
South West Africa (Ethopia/South Africa; Liberia/South Africa), ICJ Reports (1961)
24
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969)
[3.D] 1976 to the Present Time
Now, the Court has a very long General List of cases waiting to be dealt with. The Court can now be said

to be very busy and indeed hard pushed to cope. The geographical spread of the Court’s work amply shows

that it has already become more nearly a world court. This is paralleled by the spread of subject matter of

the cases.

Boundary disputes and maritime boundary disputes in particular, are apt to encourage neighbouring third

parties to try to intervene. A like question arose in the Continental Shelf case25 between Libya and Malta

where Italy wished to intervene and made an impressive case. The part played by the Court in the

development of the law of the sea has been impressive so far. It is true that the third UN Conference on

the Law id the Sea agreed on creation of a new court for this matter. But it took a considerable time before

the new court was established and in the meantime the ICJ had a large number of cases already made the

general international law of the sea as very much its own subject.

Also, the environment is a topic, which, at least eo nomine, has features in the work of the Court only in

the recent decades, for it is only recently that the conservation of the environment has become a separate

heading in its own right in the general system of international law. A notable judgment is the Gulf of

Maine case26 in that matter. However, advisory opinions in these recent years have been few compared

with the number of contentious jurisdiction cases. This may be noted because of the international

organizations having their own procedures for dispute resolution. So, generally speaking one can expect

a qualified organization to seek such interference only when it wants to pass to the Court the responsibility

of deciding.27

25
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), ICJ Reports (1984)
26
Gulf of Maine, ICJ Reports (1984)
27
Agarwal, Dr. H.O., International Law and Human Rights, 20th ed. Central Law Publications
 Conclusion
The hypothesis previously given can be reasonably said to be disproved by the later findings in the projects

done by the researcher. The assessment of the position of the ICJ at the present time can only be that it is

prospering as never before. Having both contentious and advisory jurisdictions, it has a vast number of

matters related many subjects in its platter. The Court possesses no express power of judicial review of

UN activities, although it is the principal judicial organ of the organisation and has in that capacity dealt

on a number of occasions with the meaning of UN resolutions and organs. One of the most heartening

features of the present resurgence of the interest in the ICJ has been the part played by some African states,

as also the continuing loyalty of the Latin American states to the Court. If one seeks reasons for these

changes, there are no doubt many. But one should certainly not forget one of the main reasons: the

influence of counsel who was encouraged their government clients to approach the Court. This powerful

and very healthy influence of what might now usefully be called the International Bar, has been of the

greatest importance to the ICJ. There is an aspect of the happy resurgence of the Court that may finally be

noted: the way the Statute of the Court has continued to serve the Court through times good and bad

through more than half a century and is still found eminently workable. One can only pay humble homage

to those who, in 1920, then in 1929, and again in 1946, produced this astonishingly successful piece of

drafting.

References
• Books
o Zimmerman, Andreas, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A
Commentary, Oxford University Press o Shaw, Malcom, International Law, 6th ed.
Cambridge University Press o Agarwal, Dr. H.O., International Law and Human Rights, 20th
ed. Central Law Publications
• Articles o The International Court of Justice: Questions and Answers about the Principal
Judicial Organ of the United Nations, 10th ed. UN Department of Public
Information o Dinah L. Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts,
9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 537 (2009)

• Websites
o The International Court of Justice, www.icj-cij.org, Last Accessed on 10 Feb, 2017.

• Statues
o Statute of the International Court of Justice