WB 2018 Japon English PDF

D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 1 8
防衛
白書 2018
Defense of Japan
防衛
白書 2018
Defense of Japan
On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2018
Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is constantly committed to crisis
management and takes on the noble mission of defending Japan’s independence, peace, and security and
securing the lives and property of the Japanese people.
Looking at the security environment surrounding Japan, North Korea, repeatedly carried out
nuclear tests and launched ballistic missiles through last year, and begun to engage in dialogue this year.
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the reality that North Korea still continues to possess and deploy several
hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan. In addressing the North Korean
nuclear and missile issue, it is essential for the international community to remain united, following results
at the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting held in June 2018, toward the realization of the dismantlement
of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and
irreversible manner. Japan needs to carefully monitor specific actions by North Korea.
China’s recent activities, including its rapid military modernization and enhancement of operational
capabilities, its unilateral escalation of actions in areas around Japan, and with the lack of transparency in
the military build-up, present a strong security concern for the region including Japan and the international
community. In addition, Russia continues frequent activities around Japan. Furthermore, global security
issues, including challenges emerging in new domains such as outer space and cyberspace, are broadening
and diversifying.
Given these circumstances, the MOD/SDF must strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities and expand
its role in order to fulfill our mission. For this purpose, we are currently reviewing the National Defense
Program Guidelines and examining the next Medium-Term Defense Program to complete them by the
end of this year under the instruction from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Concerning this process, we will
identify what defense capabilities are truly needed to protect the people, rather than simply extending the
existing capabilities.
It is also necessary to further strengthen the
Japan-U.S. Alliance. Since I was appointed as
Defense Minister last year, I have been in close
consultation with U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Mattis and pursued close cooperation between
Japan and the United States. Our two countries have
closely coordinated our understanding and policies
and taken united actions in responding to North
Korea issues. We are striving to further reinforce the
bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and strengthen the
deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance.
At the same time, initiatives to mitigate the impact
Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis shaking hands
of the bases on the local residents in Okinawa and at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (June 2018)
other areas are important and we continue to listen
sincerely to the local residents’ voices and make
further efforts.
Japan must also continue to promote security cooperation with other countries. In recent years, we
have steadily expanded a variety of cooperation, including bilateral/multilateral training, joint development
of equipment, and capacity building assistance, with many other countries that share fundamental values
and security interests. Japan intends to robustly promote strategic international defense cooperation as
part of further commitment to peace and stability in the region and the international community from the
standpoint of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
While the MOD/SDF is steadily implementing a variety of measures in this way, individuals of the
SDF, who diligently work day and night, despite the dangers, with abundant motivation and a strong sense
of responsibility in difficult environments, such as posts on remote islands, radar sites, and on-board ships
away from home, are obviously the ones who are carrying out these measures.
This year’s Defense White Paper explains the measures taken by the MOD/SDF in detail and the
opening feature introduces the front-line SDF members, who assiduously and seriously carry out their
duties as part of 24-hour, 365-day operations. By this, we aim to promote a wider understanding of how
steady implementation of these measures and daily efforts of the SDF members contribute to the peaceful
lives and securing of the Japanese people.
The MOD/SDF must gain support and trust of the Japanese people in order to fully exert our
capabilities and fulfill our mission. It is sincerely regretted that issues related to document management
and information disclosure have significantly affected the trust of the Japanese people in the MOD/SDF
in the past two years. The MOD/SDF continues to vigorously strive to prevent the recurrence so that such
issues never happen again.
Finally, we hope that many people will take the Defense White Paper in hand and deepen their
understanding of the MOD/SDF and think about the SDF members who are carrying out their missions in
various locations to protect our peaceful lives even at this moment.
2018 DEFENSE OF JAPAN Contents
Defense Chronology …………………………………………………………………………………… 1
The past year’s major events relating to the defense of Japan are explained with photos and commentaries for a clearer understanding.
Special Feature
1 Protection Ballistic Missile Defense …………………………………………………………… 9
2 Working Duties carried out 24 hours a day, 365 days a year ………………………… 13
3 Preparation Advancement in defense capabilities ……………………………………… 19
Digest ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
PartⅠ Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Chapter 1 Overview Chapter 3 Issues in the International Community

Section 1 Asia Pacific Security Environment …………………………………… 45 Section 1 Trend in International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts …………… 171
Section 2 Global Security Environment ………………………………………… 50 1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 171
2 Trends surrounding International Terrorism …………………………………… 173
Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries 3 Current Situation of Regional Conflicts and the International Response
Section 1 The United States ……………………………………………………… 53 (mainly in the Middle East and Africa) ……………………………………… 178
1 Security and Defense Policies ……………………………………………… 53 Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ……… 185
2 Military Posture …………………………………………………………… 60 1 Nuclear Weapons ………………………………………………………… 185
Section 2 Korean Peninsula ……………………………………………………… 63 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons …………………………………………… 186
1 North Korea ……………………………………………………………… 64 3 Ballistic Missiles and other missiles ………………………………………… 187
2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea …………………………… 85 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and
Section 3 China…………………………………………………………………… 89 Other Technologies ………………………………………………………… 188
1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 89 5 Iran’s Nuclear Issues ……………………………………………………… 189
2 Military Affairs……………………………………………………………… 90 Section 3 Maritime Trends …………………………………………………… 190
3 Relations with Other Countries ……………………………………………… 115 1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”
4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan ……………………………………………… 120 in the East and South China Seas …………………………………………… 190
Section 4 Russia ……………………………………………………………… 124 2 Trends in the Arctic Ocean ………………………………………………… 191
1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 124 3 Maritime Security Efforts of Countries ……………………………………… 192
2 Security and Defense Policies ……………………………………………… 125 Section 4 Outer Space and Security …………………………………………… 196
3 Military Posture and Trends ………………………………………………… 127 1 Outer Space and Security …………………………………………………… 196
4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan ……………………………………… 131 2 Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives ……………… 197
5 Relations with Other Countries ……………………………………………… 134 Section 5 Trends in Cyberspace ……………………………………………… 201
Section 5 Australia …………………………………………………………… 141 1 Cyberspace and Security …………………………………………………… 201
1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 141 2 Threats in Cyberspace ……………………………………………………… 201
2 Security and Defense Policies ……………………………………………… 141 3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks …………………………………………… 203
3 Relations with Other Countries ……………………………………………… 142 Section 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology
Section 6 Southeast Asia ……………………………………………………… 147 as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases…………… 207
1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 147 1 Military Science and Technological Trends …………………………………… 207
2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country ……………………………… 147 2 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases ……………… 208
3 Military Modernization in the Region ………………………………………… 154
4 Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea …… 155
5 Regional Cooperation ……………………………………………………… 157
Section 7 South Asia …………………………………………………………… 158
1 India ……………………………………………………………………… 158
2 Pakistan …………………………………………………………………… 161
Section 8 Europe ……………………………………………………………… 163
1 General Situation…………………………………………………………… 163
2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks ………………………… 164
3 Security / Defense Policies of European Countries …………………………… 167
Part Ⅱ Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense 2 Responses to Situations that will Have an Important Influence ………………… 242
Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security ……………………………… 211 3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount
to an Armed Attack ………………………………………………………… 243
Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy ……………………… 212
4 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others ……………………………………… 247
1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense …………………………………… 212
5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community … 248
2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution ……………………… 212
6 Other Amendments in the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security … 252
3 Basic Policy ……………………………………………………………… 214
Section 3 The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after
Section 3 Outline of the National Security Strategy …………………………… 216
1 National Security Council …………………………………………………… 216 the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security ………… 254
2 National Security Strategy ………………………………………………… 217 1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based
on the Legislation for Peace and Security …………………………………… 254
Chapter 2 About the National Defense Program Guidelines 2 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO ………………………… 255
Section 1 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines ……………… 218 3 The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment
1 Basic Approach …………………………………………………………… 218 of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries
2 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy ……………………………………………… 219 (SDF Law Article 95-2) ……………………………………………………… 256
3 Future Defense Force Japan Should Achieve ………………………………… 220 4 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) … 257
4 Future Considerations ……………………………………………………… 223 Chapter 4 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Section 2 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program …………………… 225
Section 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements …………… 258
1 Program Guidelines ………………………………………………………… 225
1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security ………………………………… 258
2 Authorized Number of SDF Personnel and Quantities of Major Procurement ……… 225
2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan ………… 259
3 Expenditures ……………………………………………………………… 226
3 Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment ………………… 259
Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018 ………………………… 227
Section 2 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance …… 260
Section 4 Defense-Related Expenditures ……………………………………… 229 1 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance ……………………………… 260
1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures …………………………………… 229 2 Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines ……………………………… 261
2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures ………………………………… 229 3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance ……………………………… 265
3 Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement ………………………… 231 4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States …………………… 273
4 Comparison with Other Countries …………………………………………… 232
Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan ……………………………… 281
Chapter 3 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security 1 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan ……………………………………… 281
and the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement 2 Deployment of New U.S. Forces Assets (F-35B) to Japan ……………………… 283
3 Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan ……………………… 284
Section 1 Background to the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security … 234
4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa …………………………………… 284
1 Background to the Development of Legislation ……………………………… 234
5 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa ………………… 299
2 Background and Significance of the Development of Legislature ……………… 234
6 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan… 304
Section 2 Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others after 7 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas ………………… 305
the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security ………… 237
1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations … 237
Ⅲ
Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing
Part the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Chapter 1 Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, Section 2 Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation
and Effective Deterrence and Handling of Female Personnel ………………………………………………… 400
Section 1 Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) … 309 1 Working Style Reform ……………………………………………………… 400
1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability ……………………… 309 2 Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care …… 401
2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces ………………………… 310 3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel ……………………… 402
3 Central Organization Reform of the Ministry of Defense ……………………… 312 Section 3 Enhancement of Medical Functions ………………………………… 404
Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response ………………………………… 314 1 SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions …………………… 404
1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan …………………… 314 2 Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College …………… 404
2 Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands ………………………………………… 320 3 Enhancement of Education of Medical Officers and Nurses …………………… 404
3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks ………………………………………… 322 4 Enhancement of First Aid Capabilities on the Frontline ………………………… 405
4 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others ……… 327 5 Improving the Capabilities to Deal With Infectious Diseases …………………… 405
5 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security………………………………… 329 Chapter 4 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology
6 Responses in Space ……………………………………………………… 329
7 Response to Cyber Attacks ………………………………………………… 332 Section 1 Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority … 407
8 Response to Large-Scale Disasters ………………………………………… 334 1 Necessity of Ensuring Technological Superiority ……………………………… 407
9 Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc. ……… 339 2 Defense Technology Strategy and related documents ………………………… 408
10 Readiness against Invasion ………………………………………………… 340 3 Initiatives regarding Research and Development ……………………………… 409
11 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians ……………………………… 343 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology ……………………………………… 410
12 Response to Other Events ………………………………………………… 343 Section 2 The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases,
and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases …… 413
Chapter 2 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation 1 The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases …… 413
Section 1 Towards Strategic International Defense Cooperation ……………… 345 2 The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases ………………… 413
1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, Section 3 Efforts toward Project Management, etc. …………………………… 418
and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges …………………………………… 345 1 Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle ……………………………… 418
2 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives ……………………… 346 2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters …………………… 419
3 Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and 3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement,
Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives …………………… 351 and Other Related Initiatives ………………………………………………… 421
4 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges …………………………… 356 Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ………………… 423
Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security ………………………………………… 377 1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology …………… 423
1 Counter-Piracy Operations ………………………………………………… 377 2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense
2 Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety and Order Equipment and Technology Cooperation ……………………………………… 424
on the Seas through Maritime Training ……………………………………… 381 3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ………………… 426
3 Initiatives in the Asia-Pacific Region ………………………………………… 381 4 Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use ………………………………… 429
Section 3 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities ……… 382 5 Technology Control ………………………………………………………… 429
1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities …………………… 382 6 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions …………………… 430
2 Initiatives to Support UN Peacekeeping Operations, etc. ……………………… 383 7 Public-Private Defense Industry Forum ……………………………………… 430
3 International Disaster Relief Operations ……………………………………… 388
Chapter 5 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens
Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation …… 389
1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities ……………………………… 431
and Non-Proliferation ……………………………………………………… 389 1 Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society …………………………… 431
2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 390 2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF… 431
3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of
Chapter 3 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Municipal Governments and Local Residents ………………………………… 432
Force, and Active Participation of Female SDF Personnel 4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas … 432
Section 1 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force … 391 5 Other Initiatives …………………………………………………………… 434
1 Recruitment and Employment ……………………………………………… 391 Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities … 435
2 Daily Education and Training ………………………………………………… 395 1 Various Public Relations Activities …………………………………………… 435
3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources ……………… 397 2 Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Document Management ……………… 437
4 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline, etc. ………………………………… 398 3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation ……………………………………………… 441
Reference
Contents
Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Reference 41 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements ………………… 495
Reference 42 Exchange Student Acceptance Record
Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means
(Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016) …………………… 495
of Delivery by Country …………………………………………… 443
Reference 43 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense …… 496
Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions
Reference 44 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues ……………………………… 497
(Approximate Numbers) …………………………………………… 443
Reference 45 Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN … 498
Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions
(Approximate Numbers) …………………………………………… 443 Reference 46 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years) ……………… 499
Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan …………… 444 Reference 47 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia
(Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 501
Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK
(Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 502
Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline) ………………………………… 444 Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India
Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond … 447 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 503
Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) ………………… 454 Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China
Reference 8 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned …………………… 460 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 503
Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications …………… 460 Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia
Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service ………………… 461 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 503
Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications ……………………………………… 461 Reference 52 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries
Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)……… 462 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 504
Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific
(Original Budget Basis) …………………………………………… 462 Countries (Past Three Years) ……………………………………… 507
Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries
(Original Budget Basis) …………………………………………… 463 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 508
Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries …………………… 463 Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries
Reference 16 Outline of “Cabinet Decision” and Legislation Development…………… 464 (Past Three Years) ………………………………………………… 510
Reference 17 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces ………………………… 465 Reference 56 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace
Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use Cooperation Activities ……………………………………………… 511
of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units ………………………… 467 Reference 57 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities ………… 511
Reference 19 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015) … 469 Reference 58 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel
Reference 20 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation ……… 473 to International Organizations ……………………………………… 513
Reference 21 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee ……………… 475 Reference 59 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel ………… 514
Reference 22 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2017 ………………… 475 Reference 60 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF
Reference 23 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects ……………… 478 Personnel (FY2017) ……………………………………………… 514
Reference 24 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2015) ……………… 478 Reference 61 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel ……………………… 515
Reference 25 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee ……………… 481 Reference 62 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2017 ……………………………… 516
Reference 26 Joint Statement …………………………………………………… 482 Reference 63 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch
Reference 27 Outline of 23 Issues ……………………………………………… 483 of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2017) …… 516
Reference 28 The SACO Final Report …………………………………………… 484 Reference 64 Main Measures for Re-employment Support ………………………… 517
Reference 29 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report ………………………… 486 Reference 65 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel
Reference 30 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility …………………… 488 in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government ………… 517
Reference 31 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South Reference 66 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology…… 518
of Kadena ………………………………………………………… 489 Reference 67 Activities in Civic Life ……………………………………………… 519
Reference 32 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces ……………… 490 Reference 68 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues”
Reference 33 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office) ………………… 520
of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan ………………… 490 Reference 69 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2017) … 521
Reference 34 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government Reference 70 The Results of the Special Defense Inspection (outline) ……………… 521
of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to
Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of
the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to
the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between Japan and the United States of America,
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed
Forces in Japan (signed on January 16, 2017) ……………………… 491
Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People
as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Reference 35 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan …………………… 492
Reference 36 Regarding fundamental enhancement of ballistic missile
defense capabilities ……………………………………………… 493
Reference 37 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity …… 493
Reference 38 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years) ………………………… 493
Reference 39 Record of Participation by the MOD and SDF in Joint Exercises
for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and
Local Governments (FY2017) ……………………………………… 494
Reference 40 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues
(Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years) ……………………………… 494
Defense Chronology ………………………………………………………………………… 523
Insert ………………………………………………………………………………………… 536
Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces
Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2018)
Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2018)
Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2018)
Column COLUMN
Part Ⅰ Part Ⅲ
Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries Chapter 1 Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan,
and Effective Deterrence and Handling
Commentary View of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles ..............................65
Commentary North Korea’s ICBM development situation .............................................76 VOICE 24-hour surveillance activities in the East China Sea
Commentary Modernization of China’s sea and air military capabilities (Destroyer crew member) ....................................................................317
(update ship volume in the diagram) ....................................................102 VOICE Staff sergeant working at an alert waiting station ..................................319
Commentary Cutting-edge technologies and Chinese military....................................103 Commentary Land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) .............................................326
Commentary Modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces ..............................................129 VOICE Strengthening cyber collaboration with the United States
(liaison officer activities) ......................................................................334
Chapter 3 Issues in the International Community VOICE Rescue activities for people isolated in Fukuoka prefecture....................337
Commentary Diffusion of the ISIL threat ...................................................................176
VOICE Disaster relief for heavy snowfall in Fukui Prefecture .............................337
Chapter 2 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation
Ⅱ Working as an Australian Department of Defence Exchange

VOICE
Part
Official in the Japan Ministry of Defence ..............................................355
Commentary Operation Christmas Drop ...................................................................358
Chapter 2 About the National Defense Program Guidelines Commentary Participation in the Raisina Dialogue ....................................................361
Commentary Deployment of stand-off missiles .........................................................228 VOICE Participation in the International Fleet Review
for the ASEAN 50th Anniversary...........................................................367
Chapter 3 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security VOICE Participation in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) ..........................371
and the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement VOICE UNMISS Headquarters activities ...........................................................385
Commentary Enhanced deterrent through peace and security legislation....................236 VOICE Dispatch as a gender instructor to the Ethiopian Peace Assistance
Commentary The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security Training Center ..................................................................................387
and the Constitution ............................................................................236
Chapter 3 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense
Commentary Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security
Force, and Active Participation of Female SDF Personnel
Operations and Maritime Security Operation .........................................244
Commentary Risk of Being Dragged into a War.........................................................252 VOICE Companies Supporting Self-Defense Force Reserve Personnel
Commentary Duties of the Self-Defense Forces .......................................................253 and Others (Cooperating Site for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others) ....393
VOICE Participation in Training (Overseas) of Rescue VOICE Feelings about working again as a Ground Self-Defense Force member....401
of Japanese Nationals Overseas in FY2017 (domestic) ..........................254 VOICE Certified as a Frontline Medics (Sergeant Major Takayanagi)
After completing the education mission of the first-year Frontline
Chapter 4 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Medics group education (Major Koiwai) ................................................406
VOICE Participation in the exercise with the U.S. Marines Corps
Chapter 4 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology
in the United States (Iron Fist 18) ........................................................268
Commentary Land return and site utilization in Okinawa ...........................................295 VOICE Development of consumer products using the security
VOICE Message from the Iwakuni Mayor (Yamaguchi) ....................................302 technology research promotion program ..............................................412
Commentary Exchanges between Local Residents and the U.S. Forces ......................306
Commentary Technology interaction with the US Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) ....................................................................412
VOICE Defense industry supporting development of defense capabilities ..........417
Commentary Improvement of FMS related issues .....................................................422
Chapter 5 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Commentary Initiatives taken by local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities ....434
VOICE Self-Defense Force Athletes Aiming for the Tokyo Olympics ...................436
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Defense Chronology
Events related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development
Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military activities by North Korea pose an
unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and international community.
Sixth nuclear
test
July August September November
2017 2017 2017 2017
Landed in Japan’s EEZ Flew over Japan Flew over Japan Landed in Japan’s EEZ
in the Sea of Japan and landed and landed in the Sea of Japan
in the Pacific Ocean in the Pacific Ocean
* EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
Collaboration with related countries
Japan-China-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting

(May 9, 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office) (June 7, 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office)
1 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Security Situation
Surrounding Japan
While appreciating the significance of another clear promise by Chairman Kim Jong-un in a written document to work toward complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula in the joint declaration from the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, it is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea
to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.
Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well
as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches
to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.
Picture of suspected illegal “ship-to-ship transfer” of goods by a North Korean-related vessel (confirmed multiple
times since January 2018)
March April May June

2018 2018 2018 2018
China-North Korea Inter-Korea Summit Meeting Japan-China-Republic Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
Summit Meeting (also held in May) of Korea Trilateral U.S.-North Korea Summit
(also held in May and June) Summit Meeting Meeting
Current status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

Nuclear development
● Possibility that the September 2017 nuclear test was a hydrogen

bomb test
● Possibilityof having achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons
and developed nuclear warheads
Ballistic missile development
● Deployment of several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching

Japan
● Possessing and enhancing capabilities for a surprise ballistic missile
attack
Special Feature 2
Security Situation
Surrounding Japan
Further expansion of operational areas of China’s sea and
air power
China’s sea and air power is expanding its operational areas surrounding Japan, including the area around Senkaku Islands.
China’s recent activities surrounding Japan (for illustrative purposes)
Legend
Ships, etc.
Aircraft, etc.
Cases confirmed for the first time
Frequent advancements
Bomber advances all the way to the into the Pacific Ocean
area off the Kii Peninsula (August 2017) passing between Okinawa
and Miyako Island
Tokyo Carrier-based fighter

(presumed) flights in the
Pacific Ocean (April 2018)
Amami
Island Okinawa
Sea of Japan Miyako Island
The PLA Navy and Yonaguni

Air Force’s Senkaku Island
activities in the Islands
East China Sea Taiwan
Chinese Air Force fighters’
China-Russia joint exercise advancements into the Sea Underwater submarine
“Joint Sea 2017” of Japan (December 2017) and destroyer’s intrusions
Ningbo into the contiguous zone
off the Senkaku Islands
(January 2018)
Qingdao
*Locations and paths are for illustrative purposes; includes estimates
First advancement of Chinese Air Force fighters into the Sea of Japan (December 2017) Chinese Navy submarine navigation through contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands
(January 2018)
The number of Japan’s press releases on China’s military aircraft’s flights

through the strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
(Times)
20 18
5
10 5 5 6
Navigation by the Chinese Navy aircraft carrier "Liaoning" in waters near Okinawa (April 2018)
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (FY)

Defense Chronology
Military activities by Russia are generally becoming more active

Russia tends to increase its military activities in areas around Japan, including the Northern Territories.
Deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (for illustrative purposes)
Announcement of deployment of coastal Legend

(surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu Island
Cases confirmed for the first time
and Kunashiri Island (November 2016)
Surface-to-ship missile Bal

[Jane’s by IHS Markit]
Civilian airport designated

Bal range (130 km) as joint use with military
(January 2018)
Etorofu Island
New Su-35 fighter

redeployed on Etorofu Island Bastion range (300 km)
(March 2018)
Kunashiri Island
Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

* Missile deployment locations, ranges are for illustrative purposes
Russian Navy missile cruiser navigating the Soya Strait (September 2017)
Trends in the number of scrambles against Russian planes

(past 10 years)
(Times)
600
473
359 390
264 288 301
300 247 248
193 197
Russian military bombers flying over the Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan
0 (February 2018)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (FY)
Special Feature 4
Strengthening the Japan-U.S.
Alliance
Close cooperation at Summit and Minister levels
Japan and the United States have closely coordinated their understanding
and policies, and worked in close cooperation by repeatedly holding Summit
Meetings, “2+2” meetings, Defense Ministerial Meetings, etc. about regional
situations including the North Korea issues and East and South China Seas.
Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office)
Main Japan-U.S. consultations and other contacts over the past year
2017
July August September October
Summit/Ministerial meeting
Summit
Telephone talks
Defense
Ministers
Japan-U.S. Security
Japan-U.S. Japan-U.S. Defense Japan-U.S. Summit Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial
Consultative Committee
Summit Meeting Ministerial Meeting Telephone Talk Telephone Talk
(Japan-U.S. “2+2”) Meeting
Strengthening cooperation through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises

The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces strive to enhance
bilateral exercises between Japan and the United States on a regular
basis. These bilateral exercises aim to bolster Japan-U.S. cooperation.
Demonstration of this bond improves deterrence and response capabilities
for the overall Japan-U.S. alliance, thereby showing Japan’s robust
capabilities to promote regional stability.
Bilateral exercise by Ground Self-Defense Force and U.S. Marine Corps in Japan (Northern Viper)
(August 2017)

Defense Chronology
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) Meeting (August 2017) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (April 2018)
2018
November December January February March April May June
* Prepared using materials released by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Bilateral exercise by Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy in the Sea of Japan Bilateral training by Air Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps in airspace
(November 2017) in the vicinity of Kyushu (August 2017)
Special Feature 6
Defense Cooperation and
Exchanges with Other Countries
Active promotion of security cooperation
Security challenges in today’s international community cannot be resolved just by a single country on its own and require cooperation with other countries.
Promotion of defense cooperation and exchanges with other countries is highly important in building face-to-face relationships to deal with various security issues
in the region and international community in cooperation with each other.
Track record of high-level interactions (June 2017 to June 2018)
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono and UN Joint Staff Chief of Staff participating in a Chief of Staff-level meeting among Japan, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto having a meeting with
Under-Secretary General for Field Support Khare at the U.S., and the Republic of Korea (third person from the left) (September 2017) Brazil’s Defense Minister Silva e Luna (May 2018)
a preparatory meeting for the Ministers’ Meeting on
UN PKO activities (August 2017)
At least five times
At least three times
Two times
One time
* NATO (three times)
Norway
Finland
United Sweden Russia
Kingdom Estonia
Belgium Latvia Canada
Germany Ukraine
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Then; on the Czech Kazakhstan
France Mongolia
Austria
left) shaking hands with United Kingdom Minister of Spain Serbia
State for Defence and Deputy Leader of the House of Italy Montenegro United States
Lords Curzon (on the right) (February 2018) Jordan
Egypt Laos Republic of Korea
India
UAE Myanmar Vietnam
Bahrain Thailand
Cambodia Philippines
Sri Lanka Brunei
Djibouti Malaysia
Singapore
Brazil
Fiji
Australia
Chile
Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force with New Zealand
G7 Naval Chiefs of Staff at the Regional Sea Power
Symposium (October 2017)
Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense Fukuda and Philippines Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force participating Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs participating as the chair of the 9th
Minister of Defense Lorenzana at the ceremony for the transfer in the 10th Pacific Armies Chief Conference (in the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum held in Fukuoka (sixth person from the left)
of a MSDF TC-90 (March 2018) center) (September 2017) (September 2017)
Defense Minister Onodera giving a speech at the IISS Shangri-La Chief of Staff, Air Self-Defense Force having a meeting with
Dialogue (June 2018) Chief of Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force (March 2018)

Defense Chronology
The ability of countries to handle natural disasters and maritime problems on their own should substantially contribute to the improvement of the global security
environment. Capacity building assistance is an initiative that aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries. The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense
Forces are engaging in cooperation programs to build such capabilities utilizing the abilities that they possess.
Recent programs of capacity building assistance (April 2017 to May 2018)
Uzbekistan Myanmar Mongolia Laos Vietnam ASEAN
Military medicine Aviation meteorology, humanitarian Civil engineering, Humanitarian assistance Aviation medicine care, air rescue, Humanitarian assistance
assistance and disaster relief military medicine and disaster relief cyber security and disaster relief
Thailand Philippines
Vessel maintenance, medical

Aviation safety, PKO and engineering
program (*)
Djibouti Brunei
Disaster response Humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief, search and rescue
Cambodia Sri Lanka Malaysia Indonesia Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea
Civil engineering Search and rescue Humanitarian assistance International law of the sea Vehicle maintenance,
civil Military band development
and disaster relief engineering (*)
* Includes collaborative projects with other countries providing assistance
Special Feature 8
Protection
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018
Special Feature
1 Ballistic Missile Defense

Mid-course stage
ry
cto
raje
le t
issi
ic m
list
Bal
Boost stage
1
Ballistic missile launch
4
Interception in
the upper tier by
Aegis-equipped
destroyers
What is a ballistic missile?

A ballistic missile is a missile propelled by a rocket engine. It can strike against long-distance targets.
The following chart shows the general ranges.
Inter-continental
ballistic missile
Medium range ballistic missile
Intermediate range ballistic missile
Short range ballistic missile Note: The Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has six Aegis-
equipped destroyers, five of which possess ballistic missile
defense capabilities (as of the end June 2018). It is scheduled
0 1,000 km 3,000 km 5,500 km
to expand this capability to a sixth destroyer within this year.

Refer here for the latest information on Ministry
▲
of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces initiatives
Image of interception of a ballistic missile related to ballistic missile defense (Ministry of

Defense and Self-Defense Force website)
The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are constantly gathering information and conducting surveillance in order to resolutely protect the lives
of Japanese people and defend Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace from the threat of ballistic missiles. Currently, Japan utilizes multi-tier defense
via an automatic warning and control system (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment; JADGE) that effectively coordinates 1) upper-tier interception
by Aegis-equipped destroyers and 2) lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3 to deal with ballistic missiles that fly toward Japan.
Terminal stage
5
2
Detection, identification, and
Interception in
the lower-tier by
PAC-3
tracking by warning and

control radar
3
Coordinated by JADGE
(Japan Aerospace Defense
Ground Environment)
JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as
communication functions. It centrally processes the information
regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and
it provides fighters with instructions required for scrambling
against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and
air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and
radar, etc. in responses to ballistic missiles.
Special Feature 10
Protection
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018
Ballistic Missile Defense

Special Feature
Preparation from Peacetime
Maintaining surveillance and response capabilities

The Self-Defense Forces members work vigorously 24 hours a day and 365 days a year throughout the country to protect Japan against the threat of ballistic missiles.
Deployment of main ballistic missile defense-related troops nationwide (image)
VOICE
Destroyer Myoko,
Maritime Self-Defense Force
Lieutenant Masanori Matsuo
I work hard for the mission of surveillance and
training with sufficient alertness day and night in
order to protect Japan from ballistic missile threats.
Waters where Aegis-equipped

destroyers are deployed
VOICE (image)
Destroyer Myoko,
Petty Officer Second Class
Kenichi Iwamiya
I am in charge of maintenance of radar that
detects ballistic missiles. I put my fullest efforts
into maintaining an ideal state at all times.
Air Self-Defense Force BMD radar site (FPS-5)

Air Self-Defense Force BMD radar site (FPS-3 Upgraded)
Air Self-Defense Force Air Defense Missile Group
Maritime Self-Defense Force Aegis-equipped destroyer port
VOICE VOICE
42nd Air Warning Group, 5th Air Defense Missile Group,
Air Self-Defense Force, Air Self-Defense Force,
Staff Sergeant Kengo Matsumoto Staff Sergeant Kazuya Iwakiri
I take pride in working on the frontline, being vigilant I work as a maintenance crew member of a PAC-3
against foreign aircraft and ballistic missiles unit, which is considered the “last defense against
approaching Japan. ballistic missiles.” I’m honored to contribute to
protecting our citizens.

Preparation from Peacetime
Nationwide PAC-3 maneuver deployment training

The Self-Defense Force has been steadily implementing
VOICE
PAC-3 maneuver deployment training nationwide 2nd Air Defense Missile Group
Air Self-Defense Force
since June 2017. (The training has been conducted in
First Lieutenant
20 locations through the end of June 2018.) Akinori Omori (left side in the photo)
I am committed to conducting missions and training
as a BMD goalkeeper. PAC-3 is all set for the defense
of Japan.
Enhancement of ballistic missile defense capabilities

Resolutely securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people of the country is the most important responsibility for the government. The current circumstance
indicates that the enhancement of Japan’s defense capability against ballistic missiles is an urgent issue, considering the fact that North Korea still holds a number
of various types of ballistic missiles, which cover Japan within their range. Amid such a situation, the installation of Aegis Ashore missile defense systems will
drastically improve Japan's defense capability for ensuring the seamless security of the country on a 24 hours a day and 365 days a year basis.
“New Shield” in ballistic missile defense: Aegis Ashore
Warhead
(ballistic missile)
Aegis-equipped destroyer
(equipped with ballistic
Aegis Ashore
missile defense capabilities)
Aegis system test facilities in Hawaii (US)
What is Aegis Ashore?

Aegis Ashore is a ground-based interception system for ballistic missiles flying in space outside of the Earth’s atmosphere (mid-course stage). It is a piece
of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fixed position.
Refer to Section III, Chapter 1, Sub-section 2 (Effective deterrence and response) for details.
Special Feature 12
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018
Special Feature
2
Working
Duties carried out 24 hours a day, 365 days a year
Surveillance in the Sea of Japan
46th Air Warning Group, Air Self-Defense Force ................................................... 1
VOICE
46th Air Warning Group,
Staff Sergeant Takeshi Suzue
I work with pride at a key site protecting airspace on the Sea
of Japan side in extreme cold and am involved in surveillance
activities that take place 24 hours a day.
Sado Island’s Air Self-Defense Force radar site
Surveillance in the East China Sea

Takeshima
Self-Defense Fleet, Maritime Self-Defense Force ................................................. 2
Tanker of unknown nationality
Destroyer 2
North Korean tanker Senkaku Islands
Picture of an activity that is strongly suspected to be a so-called “ship-to-ship transfer” involving a North-Korean-flagged vessel, Yonaguni Island
which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions, observed by Destroyer Umigiri in international waters in the East China
Sea (May 2018)
VOICE
Destroyer Abukuma,
Leading Seaman
Raika Maruyama
My job is conducting surveillance with my
own eyes. I carry out my duties on the front
line even on rainy and windy days.
Destroyer Umigiri

1 Surveillance in waters and airspace around Japan
Constant surveillance activities
The Self-Defense Forces constantly monitors waters and airspace around Japan with 24 hours a day operations to respond rapidly and seamlessly to various situations.
Surveillance in the area around Hokkaido

301st Coast Observation Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force ....................... 4
Rebun Island Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp
VOICE
301st Coast Observation Unit,
Ground Self-Defense Force
Master Sergeant
Makoto Ashizaki
I carry out surveillance of ships passing
through the La Perouse (Soya) Strait with
high alertness as part of operations that take
place 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.
Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force .................................. 3
Ground Self-Defense Force Coast Observation Unit, etc.
Air Self-Defense Force radar site (FPS-5 BMD)
Air Self-Defense Force radar site (BMD)
Surveillance facility Air Self-Defense Force radar site

Post on the western side located on a hill
of Yonaguni Island * These locations show an image of the scope of surveillance
activities and do not clarify the actual precise scope.
Special Feature 14
Working
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018

Special Feature
2 Measures against airspace violations

60 years of promoting peace in the skies
The Air Self-Defense Force detects and identifies aircraft flying in areas around Japan’s
airspace. When the ASDF finds an aircraft that might violate Japan’s airspace, fighters and Scramble!!
other aircraft embark on an emergency scramble to confirm the subject aircraft and monitor
the situation. If the aircraft vilolates Japan’s airspace, the ASDF issues a warning to leave.
Japan began measures against airspace violations in 1958 and has conducted a total of
27,144 scrambles so far as of the end of FY2017.
Trend in the number of scrambles from FY 1958 to FY 2017

(Times)
1,200
Total: 4,698 times (past 5 years)
Average: 2.57 times/day
Scramble order issued by the air defense command
1,000
800
600
400
200 Board the interceptor
0
1958 1965 1975 1985 1989 1998 2008 2017
(FY)
* Refer to Section III, Chapter 1, Sub-section 2 for “Number of scrambles since the Cold War period and breakdown”
VOICE
304th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 9th Air Wing, Air Self-Defense Force
First Lieutenant Shohei Taguchi
When I was a child, I admired my

Pilot and maintenance personnel
father, who was a F-15 pilot, so I
conduct inspection before takeoff
aimed to become a fighter pilot. Our
mission is becoming more complex
in the southwestern area with an
increase in the number of scrambles
and diversification of target aircraft.
I train every day to be capable of
handling any situation.
Interceptor taking off in a scramble
Cカliチ
ckッ!
1st Lt. Taguchi's childhood

with his father Take off!!

3 Disaster Relief
Prompt and appropriate responses to large-scale disasters, etc.
The Self-Defense Forces collaborates and cooperates with local governments etc. when natural disasters and other disasters occur. We work on various activities,
such as search and rescue for afflicted people and vessels/aircraft in distress, flood prevention, medical care, infectious disease control, water supply, and
transportation of people and goods.
Response to natural disasters
Torrential rains Bird flu outbreak

in Northern Kyushu in Kagawa Prefecture
Search and rescue activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (Jul-Aug 2017) Infectious disease prevention measures by Ground Self-Defense Force (January 2018)
VOICE Heavy snowfall

103rd Engineer Equipment Unit, 5th Engineer Brigade,
Ground Self-Defense Force in Fukui Prefecture
Staff Sergeant Hideyuki Sasakawa
While keenly feeling the danger of torrential rain disasters, I advanced through blocked
roads to isolated areas along with local firefighters and carried numerous afflicted
people to safety.
Writer involved in
coordination at the local site
for rescue activities (center
of the picture)
Nighttime snow removal activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (February 2018)
Landslide Torrential rains

in Oita Prefecture in July 2018
Search and rescue activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (April 2018) Search and rescue activities by Maritime Self-Defense Force (July 2018)
Special Feature 16
Working
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018

Special Feature
Transport of emergency patients, processing of unexploded

4 shells, and other activities to protect the lives and safe living
of Japanese people
The Self-Defense Forces handles emergency transport of emergency patients from outlying islands and other areas. Depending on the circumstances, we provide
wide-area medical transport via the Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron to transport seriously ill patients using Air Self-Defense Force C-130H transport planes
(401 emergency transports took place in fiscal 2017).
Emergency patient transport and other activities
Emergency patient being transported by 15th Helicopter Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron, Air Self-Defense Force during wide-area medical transport
VOICE
71st Air Corps, Maritime Self-Defense Force
Airborne Rescue Personnel, Petty Officer Second Class
Teppei Maeda
Only rescue flight boats,

which are capable of landing
on the ever-changing sea
surface, can save lives on
the sea at distant rescue
locations. I work with pride on
my mission that only we can
perform.
71st Air Corps, Maritime Self-Defense Force on sea rescue activities
Processing of unexploded shells and other activities

The Self-Defense Forces removes and processes unexploded shells, mines, and other devices (1,611 cases of unexploded shells and 15,500 mines and other
explosive objects handled in fiscal 2017).
Members of the 101st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force processing Members of the Okinawa Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Maritime Self-Defense Force preparing
unexploded shells for disposal of explosive dangerous materials

5 Training and exercises for various situations
Enhancement of effective deterrence and response capabilities
Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises and Self-Defense Forces joint exercises are conducted in a visible manner in order to respond to various situations effectively and
enhance deterrence capability. Various plans are continuously reviewed and updated in light of lessons learned from these training activities and exercises.
Japan-U.S. bilateral training
Bilateral training by Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the Sea of Japan Bilateral training by Air Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps in airspace in
(November 2017) the vicinity of Kyushu (August 2017)
Joint exercises by Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces
Joint exercise on the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas at Air Self-Defense Force Iruma Air Remote island joint disaster prevention exercise in Okinawa Prefecture (September 2017) (doctor
Base (Saitama Prefecture) (December 2017) helicopter having transported injured people by air onto the sea-based Ise Destroyer)
Joint exercises with local public entities
VOICE
Nagasaki Prefecture Crisis Management Section, Councilor
Koji Aoki (second person from the right in the photo) (in charge of
protecting Japanese citizens)
I directly support the
Governor in matters related
to protecting Japanese
citizens and other crisis
management, including
disaster prevention and
ballistic missile response,
utilizing my experience and
knowledge as a commander
and staff in the Ground Self-
Defense Force.
Japanese citizen protection training in Nagasaki Prefecture (November 2017)
Special Feature 18
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018
Special Feature
3
Preparation
Advancement in defense capabilities
The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are continuously implementing measures to build highly effective and comprehensive defense capabilities.
1 Strengthening defense presence in the southwest area
The following initiatives are undertaken to strengthen defense presence in

the southwest area, with a large sea area and many remote islands.
Enhancement of remote island defense

Deploying Self-Defense Force in blank areas
Reorganization into units capable of responding

promptly to a crisis or other event
Reorganizing units into rapid deployment division/brigade capable of
quick deployment by transport aircraft and other equipment
Reinforcement of air defense

Strengthening air defense operations with additional fighters and
deployment of airborne early warning aircraft
Preparation for remote island defense

Establishing an amphibious operation specialized unit to defend
remote islands
Reinforcement of air defense
Establishment of capabilities for quick transportation
of troops to further locations Naha (Okinawa)
Establishing Southwestern Air Defense Force
Acquiring aircraft and other equipment to transport a larger number of Strengthening the fighter unit (from about 20 aircraft to roughly 40 aircraft)
personnel and supplies to further locations quickly Establishing airborne early warning aircraft unit
Enhancement of remote
island defense
Yonaguni Island (Okinawa)

Senkaku Islands
Establishing a coast observation
unit on Yonaguni Island (Japan’s
westernmost point)

Preparation for remote island defense Establishment of new unit to support quick
response in a crisis or other event
Ainoura (Nagasaki)
Establishing the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Kita Kumamoto, Kumamoto 8th Division
Zentsuji, Kagawa 14th Brigade
Reorganizing units into rapid deployment division/brigade capable
of quick deployment by transport aircraft and other equipment
Establishment of capabilities for quick

transportation of troops to further locations
Procuring V-22 Ospreys with Procuring C-2 transport aircraft

improved speed, traveling distance, with improved traveling distance
and other features compared to and loading capabilities
existing helicopters
Enhancement of remote island defense

Amami Island (Kagoshima), Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island (Okinawa)
Security unit
Surface-to-ship missile unit
Medium-distance surface-to-air missile unit
Already deployed
Planned deployment
Special Feature 20
Preparation
DEFENSE of
JAPAN 2018
Advancement in defense capabilities

Special Feature
2 Procuring new equipment
Stand-off missiles capable of attacking invading force from locations outside of adversary’s threat envelope
● Missiles capable of attacking invading force to Japan from
locations where their attacks are unreachable (stand-off)
and secure personnel of the Self-Defense Forces
JSM (image) LRASM (image) * Refer to page 228 in the main text for details on stand-off missiles
F-35A cutting-edge fighter that possesses better stealth capabilities and high-performance sensors
● Robust stealth capability to evade opponent’s radar
● Equipped with high-performance sensors
● Possible to discover and attack opponents without being
discovered (deployments started at the Misawa Air Base
(Aomori Prefecture) in January 2018
F-35A
E-2D new airborne early warning aircraft (flying radar) with superior precise detection capability of further targets
● Airborne early warning aircraft are equipped with a circular
radar device on the plane which are able to discover
opponents quickly. They are also called “flying radar.”
● E-2D are able to detect further targets than existing
airborne early warning aircraft
E-2D
Constructing compact new destroyers that are able to handle a variety of duties and high-performance submarines
New destroyers (image) ● Constructing new destroyers that are able to handle a
variety of duties and submarines with higher performance
● Future goals for the number of destroyers and submarines
Current volume Future volume
Destroyers 47 vessels 54 vessels
Submarines 18 vessels 22 vessels
New submarine (image)

Most signiﬁcant reforms since the establishment
3 of the Ground Self-Defense Force
Establishment of Ground Component Command as the “command center for action”
The GSDF established the Ground Component Command (GCC) for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nationwide operation of its units
under the joint operation.
Unit operation following establishment

of the Ground Component Command Defense Minister
Chief of Staff
Ground Component Command Self-Defense Fleet Air Defense Command
Northern Army North Eastern Army Eastern Army Middle Army Western Army
* Ground Component Command commands GSDF units when integrated operation is necessary.
VOICE
Creation of Ground Component Command
A new unit (Ground Component Command) has been formed as an

organization to handle the integrated operation of Ground Self-Defense Force
units nationwide. This should enable quicker and more flexible nationwide
operation of Ground Self-Defense Force units and facilitate efficient and
First commander of
effective collaboration with the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, the U.S.
the Ground Component
military, and others. I intend to engage in my duties to defend Japan’s peace
Command and security and bring reassurance and security to the Japanese people
General within a framework of civilian control.
Shigeru Kobayashi
(right side in the photo)
Establishment of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade as a “key tool in the defense of remote islands”
The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is a new unit equipped with amphibious vehicles and other related equipment, possessing amphibious
tactical capabilities to protect remote islands.
Self-Defense Force personnel reaching land in an amphibious vehicle Amphibious vehicle being loaded onto a Maritime Self-Defense Force transport ship
Special Feature 22
Ⅰ
Ⅰ Security Environment
Part
Part
Surrounding Japan
Overview See
more
!
Chapter 1
P. 45
The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors
becoming more tangible and acute.
Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region P. 45
1 In the area surrounding Japan, there is a concentration of nations with large-scale military capabilities, and a regional cooperation framework
on security has not yet to be fully institutionalized, leading to the existence of uncertainty and unclarity, including the persistence of territorial
disputes and unification issues.
2 Meanwhile, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations; that is, neither pure
peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests.
3 There has also been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their
military activities. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are characterized below:
● North Korea’s military development such as nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development represents an unprecedentedly serious and
imminent threat.
● The unilateral escalation of China’s military activities poses a strong security concern for the region including Japan and international community.
● Russia has tendency to intensify its military activities, including in areas surrounding Japan, and this trend needs to paid due attention.
4 Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.
Recent Security Related Issues around Japan
North Korea’s provocative Intensification of Russian military activities

military rhetoric and behavior
North Korea’s nuclear weapon

and missile development
China’s broad and rapid

reinforcement of military forces
China’s rapid expansion/

intensification of activities
in the East China Sea
Sea lanes leading to Japan
Normalization of advancements
Changes in the China-Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean by the China’s military
military balance
(in favor of the Chinese side)
Tendency toward increase in and
China’s rapid expansion/ intensification prolongation of gray-zone situations
of activities in the South China Sea
Based on the GTOPO30 (USGS) and ETOPO1 (NOAA) models.
Global Security Environment P. 50
● Emerging global security challenges include regional conflicts growing in complexity, international terrorism becoming more serious, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime space, cyberspace, and outer space.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
United States See

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!
Chapter 2
P. 53
The Trump Administration’s Security Policy P. 53
1 The Trump Administration released its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review, clarifying its policy on
security and national defense strategy.
2 Within these documents, the Trump Administration cites the following three types of main challengers competing with the United States and
states the main security concern of the United States is not terrorism, but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.
● China and Russia: Revisionist powers
● Iran and North Korea: Rogue states
● Jihadist terrorists: Transnational threat organizations
3 Given this recognition, the United States emphasizes maintaining military superiority, its commitments to the Indo-Pacific Region, and
strengthening relations with allies.
Nuclear Strategy and Missile Defense Policy P. 58
1 In terms of nuclear posture, in the near term the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield
option, and in the long term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.
2 As for the country’s missile defense posture, the United States plans to reinforce both mainland defense and regional defense as well as work
on the development of cutting edge technologies, in order to respond the threat of not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and other
weapons systems.
Indo-Pacific Strategy P. 55
1 The United States champions a vision of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific in the Indo-Pacific Region.
2 This vision calls for the following U.S. policies:
● North Korea’s nuclear and missile development: while maintaining negotiations with North Korea on denuclearization, keep sanctions until
denuclearization becomes apparent, and continue to maintain presence of the United States Forces Korea.
● China’s maritime advances: remain involved in the free and lawful use of the seas through the Freedom of Navigation Operations, while not
tolerating unilateral changes in the status quo.
U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis testifying at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Armed U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz
Services on the National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review on February 6, 2018 conducting a joint exercise with MSDF destroyers in the Western Pacific Ocean (November 2017)
(Photo: U.S. Department of Defense) (Photo: U.S. Navy)
Digest 24
Part
Surrounding Japan
North Korea See

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Chapter 2
P. 63
1 Since 2016, North Korea has willfully conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military trends in North
Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security, and significantly damage the peace and security of the region
and the international community.
2 In the joint declaration at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, North Korea gave a commitment to work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and confirmed that it plans to continue the negotiations between the two sides. It is highly
significant that Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his intension for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and made a clear
promise to do so in a written document.
3 It is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.
4 Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea appears to possess and deploy several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost
every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated
nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea's nuclear
weapons and missiles.
Development of WMD and Ballistic Missiles P. 66
1 North Korea willfully conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. The yield of the weapon is estimated at around 160kt, making it the
largest yielding test to date. It is difficult to deny the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb test.
2 Considering the technological maturity estimated to have been achieved through these six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has
already achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads so that nuclear weapons can be loaded into
ballistic missiles.
3 As for whether North Korea has demonstrated warhead reentry technologies, while detailed analysis is necessary, North Korea can be accumulating
related technologies through its repeated missile launches.
4 North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North
Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is
able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on ballistic missiles.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
5 In terms of ballistic missiles, North Korea appears to be aiming to (1) advance long-range ballistic missiles' technological reliability, (2) enhance
the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks, (3) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks, and (4) diversify the
forms of launches.
6 If North Korea advances further in development of ballistic missiles and other activities and overconfidently and wrongly believes that it has
obtained strategic deterrence against the United States, there is possibility of increased and more serious military provocations in the region and
could lead to circumstances that raise strong concerns for Japan.
10,000 km New York

Taepodong-2 Variant
New type of intercontinental-range Washington D.C.
ballistic missile “Hwasong 15” Chicago
(Range: more than 10,000km*)
London
*Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.
5,500 km
Paris Denver
5,000 km
Moscow 4,000 km Anchorage San Francisco
1,500 km Los Angeles

1,300 km
Beijing
Pyongyang Tokyo
Intercontinental-range ballistic Hawaii
missile “Hwasong 14” 1,000 km
(Range: more than 5,500km) Okinawa
Guam
IRBM “Hwasong 12”
(Range: approx. 5,000km)
Musudan (range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km)
Nodong (range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km)
Scud-ER (range: approx. 1,000km)
Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.
Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.
Digest 26
Part
Surrounding Japan
China See
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!
Chapter 2
P. 89
Rapid modernization P. 90
1 Underpinned by high level of increases in defense budget, China is considered to reinforce its military capabilities broadly and rapidly with a focus
on nuclear and missile force, as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of this China has been strengthening its so-called A2/AD capabilities.
2 Besides this type of strengthening military capabilities from past years, China is pursuing new types of practical operational capabilities, such as
those of electronic and cyber warfare, in recent years.
3 Considering Xi Jinping’s further consolidation of authoritative power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, China’s military
modernization to improve practical operational capabilities can be accelerated more strongly in the future.
4 China aims to realize fundamental modernization of its military forces, namely the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by 2035 and transform the PLA
into one of the world’s top militaries by the middle of the 21st century, intending to rapidly enhance its military capabilities in accordance with
its increasing national strength.
Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget

(100 million yuan) (%)
11,500 40
11,000
10,500
10,000 35
9,500
9,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)
8,500 Year-on-year growth rate (%) 30
8,000
7,500
7,000 25
6,500
6,000
5,500 20
5,000
4,500 15
4,000
3,500
3,000 10
2,500
2,000
1,500 5
1,000
500
0 0
89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 17 18
(FY)
Note: This basically shows the defense budget within "the central government's general public budget," which had been named as "the central fiscal expenditures" prior to
FY 2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the budget of the previous year. Note that FY2002 defense budget was calculated
based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY 2016 and FY2018,
the amount of "the central government expenditures," which are part of the central government's general public budget, are used because only the central
government expenditures were announced.
Shang-class submarine navigating the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands
(The submarine flew the Chinese flag in open waters. January 2018)
Unilateral escalation of China’s activities around Japan P. 104
1 China’s sea and air power is expanding its operational areas, including the area around Senkaku Islands, undertaking further activities which are
seemingly based on its own claim regarding the islands.
2 China is considered to attempt to routinize its naval ships’ navigation in waters close to Japan and its presumable sea and air power’s training
activities which accompany entry into the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, the quality of its activities is showing continuous improvement,
including a pursuit of developing practical joint operational capability.
3 Sufficient attention should be paid to issues regarding China’s offshore platforms.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
China’s attempts to change the status quo by coercion P. 115
1 China, over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’ continues to act in a way which can be considered assertive, such as
attempts at changing the status quo by coercion.
2 China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation on seven features in the Spratly Islands, installing military facilities such as
artillery batteries, and transforming these features into military installations. Furthermore, China is promoting militarization of the Paracel Islands
too, as bomber takeoff and landing exercises are pointed out to be implemented, for example. China’s military activities in South China Sea are
expanding, and the expansion itself is to change the status quo by coercion and to promote the changed status as an accomplished fact.
3 The United States is conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the waters such as South China Sea to cope with over-claiming of maritime
interests, including one by China.
4 However, China is exhibiting interest in initiatives to avoid and prevent unexpected contingency in the sea and airspace. For example, in May
2018, Japan and China officially agreed to implement “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of
Japan-China.”
5 Nevertheless, China’s rapid modernization of the PLA, enhancement of operational capabilities, and unilateral escalation of activities in
areas close to Japan, without sufficient transparency, are generating strong security concerns in the region and international community,
including Japan.
6 It is probable that the PLA plays a backing role in Belt and Road Initiative through its activities such as sea lane protection. In addition,
development of infrastructure under the initiative can lead to further expansion of the PLA’s activities in the area such as the Pacific Ocean
and the Indian Ocean.
An image of the PLA’s recent activities in the sea and airspace around Japan
Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) Legend
Sea power
Air power
Shang-class submarine Luyang III-class destroyer H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter
Frequent advancements into the

Bomber advances all the way to
Pacific Ocean passing between
the area off the Kii Peninsula
Okinawa and Miyako Island
(August 2017)
Carrier-based fighter
Tokyo (presumed) flights in
the Pacific Ocean
(April 2018)
Amami Oshima
Island Okinawa
The PLA Navy Yonaguni Island

and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands
activities in the
Air power actively advances
China-Russia joint exercise into the Sea of Japan Underwater submarine
(Joint Sea 2017) and destroyer’s
Ningbo intrusions into the
contiguous zone off
the Senkaku Islands
(January 2018)
Qingdao
*Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates.
Digest 28
Part
Surrounding Japan
Russia See
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Chapter 2
P. 124
1 President Putin, who has called for Russia to become a strong and influential nation, was re-elected in March 2018. With regards to Russia’s
future, he emphasized to further bolster its defense capability, while stating his commitment to pursue constructive relations with other countries
without the intention of starting an arms race.
2 With regards to Europe, Russia is negative about the expansion of NATO, and has deployed three divisions near the border with Ukraine etc, and
conducted the large-scale training exercise Zapad-2017 in September last year.
3 As for Syria, Russia announced naval and air bases in Syria will continue to operate on a permanent basis. Attention will continue to be paid to
Russia’s moves to expand its influence in the Middle East.
4 In the Far East, Russia has been developing its newest class of frigate (Steregushchiy class) and fighter jets (Su-35 and Su-34). In 2018, Russia
also plans on holding a large-scale military exercise called Vostok-2018.
5 Russia announced deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (Etorofu and Kunashiri islands), and it is also intensifying
activities in Etorofu island, including designation of a civilian airport to both civilian and military use and deployment of fighters.
6 Russia tends to increase its military activities, including in areas near Japan, and it is necessary to closely observe this trend.
Trends in Regional Conflicts and

International Terrorism
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Chapter 3
See
P. 171
1 ISIL has lost nearly all of the territory it once controlled as a result of military operations by the U.S.-led coalition and local forces. However, ISIL-
affiliated groups continue to actively carry out terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
2 The threat for terrorism is spreading globally, including “homegrown” terrorism perpetrated by individuals or groups who are inspired by extremist
ideologies and foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin after fighting for ISIL.
3 It is essential for Japan to once again address the threat of international terrorism head-on in light of ISIL’s repeated reference to Japanese people
as targets of attack and the attack in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in 2016.
4 In the Syrian theater, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concluded that the Assad regime used chemical weapons and carried
out attacks on Syria’s chemical weapon facilities. Related countries and various forces remain in conflict, as seen in strong criticism of this action
by Russia, a key supporter of the Assad regime. There is still no end in sight to military clashes in Syria.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda
(AQIM) the Levant (ISIL)
Taliban
Hezbollah
Several ISIL states
Syria
Hamas Lebanon Afghanistan
Iraq
Palestine ISIL Khorasan
Province Pakistan
Algeria Libya Egypt
Saudi Arabi
ISIL Algeria Province
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Mali ISIL Sinai Province
Yemen Multiple ISIL

provinces
Multiple ISIL provinces
Nigeria
Somalia
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa ISIL West Africa Province

al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) (Boko Haram)
: ISIL affiliated group Al-Shabaab (AS)

: Al-Qaeda affiliated group
: Group with suggested involvement with Al-Qaeda
Source: Worldwide Threat Assessment 2018 and country-specific reports on terrorism
: Other major Islamic extremist terrorist groups for 2017 prepared by the U.S. State Department.
Outer Space See

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Chapter 3
P. 196
1 Major countries are making efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR* functions.
(*The term “C4ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.)
2 Countries are rapidly developing capabilities in outer space for securing their own military superiority in outer space. It is pointed out that China
and Russia have been developing anti-satellite weapons such as killer satellites.
3 It is pointed out that China could threaten U.S. information superiority in outer space in the future.
Cyberspace Chapter 3
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See
P. 201
1 As military dependence on information communication networks grows further, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable
of exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. Many foreign militaries develop their capability to execute cyber attacks.
2 It has been pointed out that China and Russia are reinforcing their military’s cyber attack capabilities in order to disrupt networked units and
destroy infrastructure.
3 Cyber attacks are frequently carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of
various countries. It is suggested that government organizations of countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea are involved in those attacks.
Digest 30
Part
Ⅱ Japan’s Security and Defense Policy
and the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The National Security Strategy See

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Chapter 1
P. 216
Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation P. 217
● The National Security Strategy (NSS) developed in December 2013 sets forth Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and
Japan's fundamental principle of national security, which is that Japan will the fiscal year budget
continue to adhere to the course that it has taken as a peace-loving nation, and Basic Policy on National Security, centered
NSS around diplomatic and defense policies
contribute even more proactively to security peace, stability, and prosperity in the (approx. 10-year time frame)
international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and Based on NSS
stability in the Asia-Pacific region as a proactive contributor to peace based on NDPG

Prescribes future defense force and target
levels of defense force that Japan should
the principle of international cooperation. Achieve target defense achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)
capabilities prescribed
Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures
MTDP and quantity of major equipment
Appropriate budget,
develop specific projects
Examine based on the current situations,
Annual budget appropriate annual budget as necessary
The National Defense Program Guidelines

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Chapter 2
See
P. 218
The National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium Term Defense Program P. 218, 225
1 The current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), developed in December 2013 being based on the NSS, emphasize the following:
Effective Means of Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

(1) Ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan (2) Respond to an attack on remote islands (3) Response to ballistic missile
attacks (4) Responses in outer space and cyberspace (5) Responses to major disasters
Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment
(1)Holding training and exercises (2) Promoting defense cooperation and exchange (3) Promoting capacity building assistance
(4) Ensuring maritime security (5) Implementing international peace cooperation activities
(6) Cooperating with efforts to promote arms-control, disarmament, and nonproliferation
2 The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)(FY2014-FY2018) developed in December 2013 based on the NDPG specifies the review of major
units, major projects concerned with the capability of the SDF, the maintenance scale of main equipment, and required expenses.
Review of the National Defense Program Guidelines, etc. P. 222
1 As 2018 marks the final fiscal year for the current MTDP, a new NDPG is also be discussed towards the end of 2018.
2 This is based on the necessity to identify what defense capabilities are truly needed to protect the people, rather than simply extending existing
capabilities, looking squarely at the reality of the increasingly severe security environment.
3 Concerning this process, it is essential to secure necessary and sufficient defense capabilities qualitatively and quantitatively. Given that it is
especially vital to utilize capabilities in new domains such as space and cyberspace, it would be no longer inadequate to consider problems in
the conventional domains - i.e, land, sea, and air, and it is necessary to develop capabilities in these areas.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018

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Chapter 2
See
● Japan will steadily build up its defense capability through programs that include the following in FY2018, which is P. 227
the final fiscal year for the current NDPG and the current MTDP.
Major Programs for Building up Defense Capability in FY2018
Research on element technologies of a HVGP

Aegis Ashore Warhead Rocket motor (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for
Begin introduction of Aegis Ashore, a land-based the defense of remote islands (image)
Aegis system (conducting basic design and Conduct research on element technologies of a
geological and other surveys). HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands,
which can glide at high velocity and attack a target
in order to enable island-to-island firing.
Research on element technologies of a new
Standoff missile (JSM) (image) anti-ship missile intended for the defense of
Deploy a missile that can be launched from a remote islands (image)
significant standoff range (outside the target’s Conduct research on element technologies of a
threat range). new anti-ship missile intended for the defense of
remote islands in order to improve the range and
survivability of existing anti-ship missiles.
SM-3 Block IIA

FY2018 FFM (3,900t class) (image) Acquire SM-3 Block IIA missiles, which have the
Construct a new type of frigates more compact and necessary performance for, ballistic missiles that
with improved multi-task capability. travel in a lofted trajectory and for extension of
defense range.
Defense-Related Expenditures
● In FY2018, in order to strengthen the posture for protecting the life and property of the Japanese people as well as Japan’s territorial land, sea,
and airspace in light of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan has increased defense-related expenditures following on from
FY2017 (increased 0.8% from the previous year to 4.9388 trillion yen).
Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years

(100 million) 50,000
49,388
48,996
49,000 48,760
48,607
48,297 48,221
48,000 47,815 47,838

47,903 47,426
47,028
47,000 46,826
46,804
46,625
46,453
46,000
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 (FY)
Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) and expenses
for the introduction of new government aircraft. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: ¥4,902.6 billion in FY2004, ¥4,856.0 billion yen in FY2005,
¥4,813.6 billion in FY2006, ¥4,801.3 billion in FY2007, ¥4,779.6 billion in FY2008, ¥4,774.1 billion in FY2009, ¥4,790.3 billion in FY2010, ¥4,775.2 billion in FY2011, ¥4,713.8 billion
in FY2012, ¥4,753.8 billion in FY2013, ¥4,884.8 in FY2014, ¥4,980.1 billion in FY2015, ¥5,054.1 billion in FY2016, ¥5,125.1 billion in FY2017, and ¥5,191.1 billion in FY2018.
Digest 32
Part
Establishment of the Legislation for Peace

and Security, and SDF Activities
Following the Enactment Chapter 3
!
more
See
P. 234
The Legislation for Peace and Security, consisting of the Act for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the
International Peace Support Act, was passed and enacted in September 2015 and entered into force in March 2016.
Framework for the Activities of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security P. 237
● The following provides an overview of the framework for the government's response to various situations as laid out in the Legislation for Peace
and Security, including new potential situations, as well as the main activities of the SDF
Main activities of the SDF (Red text denotes revisions made in the process of developing the Legislation for Peace and Security)
Category Types of SDF Activities

Armed attack situations and survival-
Defense operations
threatening situations
Situation that will have an important
Support activities (including logistic support), search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations
influence
Public security operations, maritime security operations, antipiracy activities, interception measures for ballistic missiles,
Maintaining public order and
measures against airspace invasions, rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, provisions for the
responding to infringements that do
protection of weapons and other equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces, provision of supplies and services to the U.S Armed
not amount to an armed attack
Forces , etc.
Respond to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively
Contribution to peace and stability of addressing (cooperation and support operations, search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations)
the international community The international Peace Cooperation Assignments (UN PKO and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security)
International disaster relief operations
The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security P. 254
Implementation of Training Pertaining to the Legislation for Peace and Security

● After the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has conducted a range of training sessions that pertained to new
duties. The main sessions conducted over the past year are as follows:
● Training in protecting American warships in accordance with the
stipulatin on the protection of weapons and other equipment of
the U.S. and other countries armed forces. (July, 2017)
● Training in conducting UN Peacekeeping Operations as part of
Khaan Quest 17, a multilateral joint exercise (July-August, 2017)
● Joint training concerning rescue of Japanese nationals overseas
(September-October. December, 2017)
● Joint training concerning rescue of Japanese nationals overseas
as part of Cobra Gold 18, a multilateral joint exercise (January-
February, 2018)
Protection of Weapons, etc. of U.S. and Other Armed Forces

● The SDF conducted asset protection missions for a U.S. military
vessel and its aircraft individually in 2017.
Joint training concerning rescue measures for Japanese nationals in Japan

(December, 2017)

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements See

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Chapter 4
P. 258
1 The Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is centered on bilateral security arrangements,

functions as a “public good” that contributes to the stability and prosperity not only
of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.
2 As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe
and the United States meanwhile maintains and strengthens its engagement and
presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to
strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. President Donald Trump shaking hands
at the Japan-U.S. summit (November 2017)
<Photo: Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office>
Core Efforts to Strengthen the Alliance See

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Chapter 4
P. 260
Main Initiatives to Strengthen the Alliance P. 265
1 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 2015) set forth policy concerning initiatives such as “seamlessly ensuring Japan's
peace and security,” “cooperation for regional and global peace and security” and “space and cyberspace cooperation.”
2 In accordance with the guidelines, both countries will continue to conduct more joint training and exercises, joint intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and jointly utilize both countries' facilities and areas of operation for these activities.
Policy Discussions between Japan and the U.S. P. 273
U.S.‐Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2 meeting)

● During U.S.-Japan “2+2” talks held in Washington DC on August 17, 2017, the
two countries reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening their alliance
and to the alliance continuing as a foundation for peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting

● Discussions at Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings to date have focused
mainly on the following areas: From left: Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro
● Close Japan-U.S. cooperation towards North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and Kono, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Secretary of Defense James
irreversible abandonment of any capability of launching any type of weapon of Mattis at the “2+2” meeting (August 2017)
mass destruction or ballistic missile of any range
● Continued scrutiny of conditions in the East China Sea and Japan-U.S. cooperation
on ensuring peace and stability in this region
● Defense cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and Southeast Asian nations to
address conditions in the South China Sea
● Cooperation in ensuring the safe operations of U.S. Armed Forces and efforts to
promote understanding in local regions, including Okinawa
● Continued Cooperation for making improvements in challenges regarding
FMS (Foreign Military Sales)
U.S. Vice President Pence and Defense Minister Onodera reviewing the Air Self
Defense Force PAC-3 unit deployed in Ichigaya (February 2018)
Digest 34
Part
Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan See

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Chapter 4
P. 281
Importance of Stationing U.S. Forces in Japan P. 281
1 In order for the U.S.-Japan Alliance to function sufficiently as a Changes in the Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas
deterrent that contributes to the defense of Japan and peace and (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to have a USFJ 400
353
presence and to be prepared to respond to emergencies with speed 350 Area (km²)
Facilities/Areas
and agility. 300 278
249 242
250
2 For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan
200 185
allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. 150 144
Security Arrangements. 100 83
46 43
50 31
0
Just before May 1972 End of End of As of
reversion (reversion) FY1980 FY1990 January 2018
Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa P. 284
1 Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa
Prefecture, occupying approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to
continue to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact.
2 A number of steps have been taken to mitigate the impact on Okinawa while maintaining security in
the region, including releasing of land areas south of the Kadena Air Base, reducing troop numbers in
Okinawa and relocating to Guam, and training relocation of tilt-rotor/rotary-wing aircraft such as U.S.
Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey aircraft.
Training relocation : Osprey aircraft landing
3 The relocation of MCAS Futenma is the only solution to eliminate its danger as quickly as possible at a maneuver area in Miyagi Prefecture as
while simultaneously maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. Thus, the Government part of field training (Forest Light 02) with the
U.S. Marine Corps in Japan (February 2018)
of Japan is making all-out efforts to realize the relocation. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)
4 The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land:
● March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran ( Camp Foster) (about 51 ha) was returned. This land was returned to the
owner in March 2018 after soil pollution surveys, etc.
● December 2016: The return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area, was achieved, the largest of
its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland. This land was returned to the owner in December 2017 after soil pollution
surveys, etc.
● July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (about 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned
● March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area(Camp Kinser) (about 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned
Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa P. 299
● In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to consolidate facilities and areas
of USFJ and to proceed with the realignment of USFJ. Such measures are aimed at securing the stable
presence of the U.S. Forces while maintaining its deterrence capabilities and trying to mitigate the
impact on local communities. The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air
FA-18 relocated to MCAS Iwakuni
Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni began in August 2017 and was completed in March 2018.
Measures to Mitigate the Impact Posed by Facilities and Areas Used by USFJ P. 305
● Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations. The two countries cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring
the safety so that accidents or incidents will not occur.

Ⅲ
Initiatives to Protect the Lives and
Part Property of the People as well as Securing
the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Effective Deterrence and Response See

more
!
Chapter 1
P. 314
In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to ensure the protection of the lives
and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence
of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense system. If a contingency does occur, it is
required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. The MOD/SDF take the following initiatives.
Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan P. 314
● The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the water and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that
it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. Information gathered through these activities are shared with other
relevant government agencies.
GSDF personnel conducting warning and Warning and surveillance activities in the vicinity Onboard ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control aircraft
surveillance activities of a maritime platform in the East China Sea conducting warning and surveillance activities
(photo taken onboard MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft)
Suspicion Illegal Transfer of Goods at Sea (Ship-to-ship Transfer) by North Korea-related Vessels
1 As part of its warning and surveillance activities in the water surrounding Japan, the SDF
gathers information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolutions.
2 Up to the end of June 2018, the SDF has confirmed and made public 9activities that were Rye Song Gang-1
highly likely to be illegal transfers of goods at sea (so-called “ship-to-ship transfer”) by
North Korea-related vessels.
3 In order to conduct warning and surveillance by aircraft and such against illegal activities
at sea including “ship-to-ship” transfer, Australian and Canadian patrol aircraft were
deployed to Japan for about a month from the end of April in 2018. British Royal Navy’s Wan Heng-11
frigate HMS Sutherland engaged in information gathering operations in the high seas
surrounding Japan in early May. North Korea-related vessel (right) highly suspected of being
engaged in “ship-to-ship transfer” observed by a MSDF patrol
Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against aircraft on warning and surveillance duty on the high seas in
the East China Sea (February 2018)
Intrusion of Territorial Airspace
1 The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War
the airspace surrounding Japan using warning (Times)
and control radars as well as early-warning 1,200 1,168
and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft 1,000 943

944 904
heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are 812 810
873
800
detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to 464 851
567 500
approach them in order to confirm the situation 600
415 571
425
and monitor them as necessary. 400
386
306
311 299 156
96
2 In 2017, the ASDF scrambled 904 times. Among 200
220
158 38
359
473
390
264 247 248 288 301
these, 500 were against Chinese aircraft, and 124
197
0
390 were against Russian aircraft. 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(FY)
Note: The peak during the Cold War Russia China Taiwan Other Total
Digest 36
Part
Ⅲ Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as
well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Response to Attacks against Japan’s Remote Islands P. 320
● In order to respond to attacks on remote islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and
also to detect signs at an early stage through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF as well as obtaining and
securing maritime and air superiority. Initiatives taken by the MOD/SDF include the following.
Enhanced Defense Posture in the Southwestern Region

1 GSDF: Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was newly established in March 2018.
(Security units will be positioned on Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island.)
2 MSDF: Acquired equipment including fixed wing patrol aircraft P-1 and SH-60K rotary wing patrol
helicopters.
3 ASDF: The Southwestern Air Defense Force was formed in July 2017.
Securing Capabilities for Swift and Large-scale Transportation and Deployment GSDF personnel getting off the amphibious vehicle and
Enhanced rapid deployment capabilities through the improvement of transport LST and the introduction rolling out in Iron Fist 2018 (January 2018)
of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.
Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks P. 322
1 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is based on an effective multi-tier defense system with upper tier interception with Aegis-equipped
destroyers and lower tier with Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).
2 In order to defend Japan, at all times, it is necessary to drastically improve ballistic missile defense capabilities. Therefore, the National Security
Council and the Cabinet approved in December 2017 the introduction of two land-based Aegis System (Aegis Ashore) to be operated by the GSDF.
3 The introduction of Aegis Ashore will reinforce upper tier interception Aegis-equipped destroyers.
Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)
Mid-course phase
In this phase, the rocket engine burns
out and the missile is flying in outer
space (exoatmosphere) inertially
Boost phase Detection/Discrimination/

In this phase, the Tracking
Terminal phase
rocket engine is
burning and This phase covers the
accelerating the part from atmospheric
missile re-entry to the impact
ASDF Air control and

ASDF
warning radar
Patriot PAC-3
(FPS-5, FPS-3
Ballistic missile Upgraded, FPS-7)
GSDF
Aegis Ashore
JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense

MSDF Aegis Ground Environment)
BMD destroyer Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD
Commander, Air Defense Command

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Response in Outer Space P. 329
1 There is a growing threat against the stable use of outer space such as the rapid increase of space debris.
2 The MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017, and another one named Kirameki-1 in
April 2018, to be used for the information communications of extremely important command and control in unit operations.
Response in Cyber Space P. 332
1 With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations in FY2016 reached approximately
7,110,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.
2 In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks, the MOD has increased the number of personnel in the SDF units responsible for responding to
cyber attacks approximately from 350 to 430.
Response to Large-scale Disasters P. 335
● When natural disasters occur, the SDF works

in collaboration with local governments,
engaging in various activities such as the
search and rescue of disaster victims or
missing ships or aircraft, offering medical
treatments and preventing epidemics. There
were 501 disaster-related dispatches in 2017.
SDF personnel building a bathing facility following an earthquake Search and rescue activities by the Ground Self Defense
whose epicenter was in Northern Osaka (June 2018) Force following torrential rains in July 2018
Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others P. 339
● The SDF stands ready to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains
operational readiness by which the GSDF designates units including a helicopter unit,
the MSDF designates vessels such as transport ships, and the ASDF designates airlift
units. In addition, the SDF strengthens its joint operational capability through exercises
in and outside Japan.
ASDF personnel on duty in the exercise of rescue of Japanese nationals

overseas during Cobra Gold (Thailand) (February 2018)
Efforts for Civil Protection P. 343
● With cooperation from relevant government organizations, the MOD/SDF has held training with participation of local governments, etc. In addition,
the MOD/SDF also actively participates and cooperates in civil protection training implemented by local governments.
Digest 38
Part
Active Promotion of Security Cooperation See

more
!
Chapter 2
P. 345
The MOD/SDF will enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and will more actively promote United
Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace cooperation activities, and other relevant
missions to address global security issues.
Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogues P. 346
1 Initiatives under the multilateral framework such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
which is a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady progress and serve as an important foundation for
cooperation and exchanges in the areas of security and defense.
2 Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region, for example, by annually holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense
Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum.
Capacity Building Assistance P. 351
1 Through the capacity building assistance program launched in 2012, Japan has provided assistance
in various areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, PKO, maritime security, and
international law to 14 countries and 1 organization mainly in the Asia-Pacific region.
2 Between January and March, and October and December 2017, Japan provided assistance programs for
the Djiboutian Armed Forces to help strengthen its disaster response capability, including training on the
operation of facilities and equipment.
ASDF personnel providing capacity building

assistance (in the area of cyber security) in
Vietnam (December 2017)
Multilateral Joint Training P. 355
● In the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF actively participates in multinational training in non-
traditional security fields, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as Non-
combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to conventional training conduct in preparation
for combat situations.
U.S. and Indian liaison officers aboard JS Izumo at

Malabar 2017
Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries P. 356
1 As for defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan will continue its effort to alleviate any
conditions of confrontation and tension, as well as fostering a collaborative and cooperative
atmosphere through bilateral dialogues and exchanges.
2 In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has
recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper
cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint
exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation,
and establishing institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between
the Defense Authorities of Japan and China
Agreements (ACSA).

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Ensuring Maritime Security See

more
!
Chapter 2
P. 377
1 For Japan, a maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on fundamental rules,
such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime
transport, is the foundation for peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.
2 In cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF engages in counter-piracy
operations and promotes various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in
this field for those coastal states alongside the sea lanes, and makes the most of various
opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the
immediate vicinity of Japan.
3 For counter-piracy operations, the SDF surface force and air force have participated in the
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) and conducted its missions in cooperation with other Units from Japan, the U.S., Germany and Spain engaged in counter-
countries. Furthermore, the SDF dispatched a CTF 151 commander from March to June 2018. piracy operations. (December 2017)
Efforts for International Peace

Cooperation Activities
more
!
Chapter 2
See
P. 382
The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including
the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism, and other problems.
International Conferences etc. with regard to UN Peacekeeping Operations P. 383
1 The MOD hosted the Tokyo preparatory meeting for the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting in August 2017.
2 At the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Canada in November 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto announced that
Japan would further contribute to the “UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities” and take initiatives to increase the
number of female PKO personnel.
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) P. 384
1 Japan continues to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMISS Headquarters although the SDF
engineering unit was withdrawn at the end of May 2017.
2 Japan will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.
Personnel dispatched to UNMISS Headquarters checking

on the condition of the living environment at an Ethiopian infantry
battalion barrack. (Logistics staff)
Dispatch of MOD personnel to UN Secretariat P. 386
1 The uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to PKO centers overseas as instructors, and
administrative officials as well as the uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Field Support.
2 GSDF personnel have been dispatched as instructors to the UN Project for African Rapid
Deployment of Engineering Capabilities. So far, until last year the dispatched GSDF
personnel here provided 6 training sessions on the operation of heavy equipment for about
170 personnel participants from 8 countries in Africa.
GSDF personnel dispatched as an instructor for gender education to the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Centre.
Digest 40
Part
Human Foundation and Organization that

Supports the Defense Force, and Active
Participation of Female Personnel Chapter 3
!
more
See
P. 391
Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force P. 391
Establishing a New Benefit to Ensure Understanding and Cooperation for Duties of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.
● A new system was introduced in FY 2018 in order to gain understanding and
cooperation from the companies that employ SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF
Ready Reserve Personnel for their duties. In the new system, a special benefit is
provided to the companies in case the employed SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF
Ready Reserve Personnel: 1) responds to orders such as defense operation, civil
protection or disaster relief dispatch orders; 2) must miss their civilian jobs due to
injuries sustained while on duty.
Safety Management Initiatives

● Any incident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the
loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF makes
a united and full effort to prevent the same incidents from happening again by
conducting a thorough investigation as to the cause of incidents and ensuring each
SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in duties in response to a call for
SDF personnel is committed to safety management.
assistance following the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel P. 400
Working Style Reform

● The MOD/SDF is going forward with working style reform to promote work-life
balance through initiatives such as holding “Competition for initiatives to promote
Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” in 2017, and also taking full effect
of telework in the Internal Bureau of the MOD head office.
Reform to Realize a Successful Career with Childrearing and

Nursing Care.
1 A workplace nursery was newly opened at Ichigaya district where the MOD is
located in April and within National Defense Medical College in October 2017.
2 As for the re-employment of SDF personnel who left the SDF mid-career, the system
was reassessed in January 2017 to welcome back personnel who retired mid-career
due to childrearing and nursing. Their re-employment began in January 2018.
SDF personnel who is re-employed after having retired mid-career for childrearing.
Enhancement of Medical Functions P. 404
Establishment of High-quality Medical Care System

● Establish an efficient and high-quality medical care system through measures such as improving operation of the National Defense Medical
College Hospital, etc., as well as promoting consolidation, upgrade, etc. of SDF hospitals.
Secure and Train Personnel, Enhance Capabilities

● More emphasis will be placed on securing and training medical officers and nurses, etc. Further, strengthen the first aid capabilities on the
frontline as well as the abilities to respond to infectious diseases.

Digest
2018
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Measures on Defense Equipment and

Technology more
!
Chapter 4
See
P. 407
Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority P. 407
1 The MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presents a specific direction for various measures that should
be implemented strategically. This aims to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, develop advanced equipment in an effective and efficient
manner, and deal with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies.
2 Additionally, the MOD formulated the Medium-to Long-term Defense Technology Outlook for future technologies expected to be established in
the next 20 years and the Research and Development Vision that presents the concept of future equipment and the R&D roadmaps. The MOD
promotes a variety of measures based on these documents.
3 33 proposals have been selected by the end of JFY 2017 in the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (funding program), which
aims to discover inventive and promising research at research organizations and corporations.
Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation P. 423
● Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,

Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other
countries in order to contribute to the national security of Japan, the promotion
of peace and international cooperation, and the maintenance and enhancement
of defense production and technological bases. The most recent initiatives
include the following:
● Five MSDF TC-90 training aircraft were granted to the Philippine Navy.
● Japan decided to grant the GSDF UH-1H spare parts and maintenance
equipment to the Philippine Air Force.
● The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was displayed and gave the first demonstration
flight at ILA Berlin 2018.
● Bilateral Defense Industry Forum began (with the participation of Indonesia,
P-1 patrol aircraft at ILA Berlin 2018
India, Vietnam and Australia in FY2017).
● The MOD has been carrying out technology cooperation with the U.K. and started the very first cooperative research with France.
Interaction with Local Communities

and Japanese Citizens more
!
Chapter 5
See
P. 431
Collaboration with Local Communities P. 431
● The MOD/SDF conducts a variety of cooperation activities such as the disposal of unexploded ordnance and mines to support civilian life. Such
activities further deepen the trust between local communities/people and the SDF, as well as significantly contribute to the maintenance and
vitalization of local communities.
Various Public Relations Activities P. 435
● The MOD/SDF widely publicizes current circumstances of the SDF both at home and abroad through various information communication platforms
including Social Networking System (SNS) and events such as the SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review.
Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Management of Public Documents P. 437
● In light of the issue of the daily reports related to the PKO in South Sudan and the daily reports in Iraq, the MOD/SDF is committed to regaining
trust of the public by thoroughly implementing measures pertaining to information disclosure and management of public documents to prevent
similar incidents.
Digest 42
Part
Ⅰ
Security Environment
Surrounding Japan
Chapter 1
Overview
Chapter 2
Defense Policies of Countries
Chapter 3
Issues in the International
Community
A North Korean tanker that is strongly suspected of engaging in the act of ship-to-ship cargo
transfer, which is prohibited by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (June 2018)
Chapter
1 Overview
Chapter 1
The security environment surrounding Japan has Russia has been modernizing its forces including
become increasingly severe, with various challenges and its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but
destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. in the periphery of Japan. It has increased its military
While nations with large military forces are concentrated activities such as enhancement of military deployment in
in this region, a regional cooperation framework in the the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands and close
Overview
security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. attention needs to be paid to its development.
Opaque and uncertain factors such as territorial disputes In addition, emerging global security challenges
and reunification issues remain. There has been also include regional conflicts growing in complexity,
a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of international terrorism becoming more serious,
so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime,
and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has outer space and cyber space.
been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries The security challenges and destabilizing factors
to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities in the international community which has these
and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, characteristics are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging,
security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia- and it is becoming ever more difficult for a single
Pacific region including the area surrounding Japan are country to deal with them on its own. In this context, it is
becoming more serious. increasingly important for countries which share interests
In particular, North Korea has conducted three in regional and global stability to cooperate and actively
nuclear tests including the biggest by far since 2016. It also respond to security challenges. Cross-cutting government
launched 40 ballistic missiles including those that flew efforts are also critical to overcome these challenges.
over Japan and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.
North Korea’s military development such as its nuclear
and missile development constitute unprecedented, KEY WORD
serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.
China has reinforced its military capabilities without “Gray-zone” situations
transparency. It also continues its unilateral attempts to
So-called “gray-zone” situations concisely describe a broad range
change the status quo in the East and South China Seas
of situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies. For
with the backdrop of power based on its unique assertions example, conflicting assertions between states, etc., over territory,
which are incompatible with the existing order of sovereignty, economic interests including maritime interests, etc.,
international law. In addition, China has been unilaterally and at the least one party showing physical presence frequently, or
escalating its operations in the periphery of Japan. These attempting or making changes to the status quo in an area related to
the dispute by using armed organizations or other means to the extent
trends have become serious security concerns to the region
that it does not constitute an armed attack, in order to appeal a party’s
including Japan and to the international community and
assertion or demand or to force acceptance of it.
continued attention needs to be paid.
Section 1 Asia Pacific Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific is a unique region with a concentration in power of China and other nations is also having an
of large-scale military forces. Recently, the shift in the influence in the region. Under this situation, countries in
global balance of power stemming from the increase the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen

Asia Pacific Security Environment Section 1
specific and practical intra-regional coordination and through technological verification conducted by
collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional launching a series of ballistic missiles. Recently, North
security fields such as humanitarian assistance and Korea has not only engaged in research and development
disaster relief. of ballistic missiles, but has also intensified activities
Opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges to increase their operational capabilities, including
between countries in the region have increased in surprise attack. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests
recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including in defiance of calls of restraint from the international
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN community. As for the sixth nuclear test conducted in
Chapter 1
Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), September 2017, the possibility can’t be denied that it
conferences hosted by nongovernmental institutions was a hydrogen bomb test as it was estimated to have been
with the participation of relevant defense ministers, about a 160-kiloton yield. Considering the technological
and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises are held. maturity reached through the past six nuclear tests, it is
Promoting and developing such multilayered approaches possible that North Korea has successfully miniaturized
Overview
among countries is also important to ensure stability in nuclear weapons for warheads and enabled them to be
the region. equipped on ballistic missiles. With the passage of time,
Also, views on security and perceptions of threats are there will likely be a growing risk that North Korea
different by country. Therefore, a regional cooperation would deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear
framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently warhead that have ranges covering Japan. North Korea
institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against
rights and reunification continue to remain in the region. related countries including Japan. In 2013, North Korea
In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have emphasized that Japan is within the range of its missiles,
been divided for more than half a century, and the referring to specific Japanese cities, and in March 2017,
faceoff continues between the military forces of the North Korea announced that it had launched four ballistic
Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are missiles as part of the exercise for striking the bases of the
issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. U.S. military forces in Japan. North Korea has repeatedly
Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes shown its intention to attack Japan using nuclear weapons
over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of as seen in the recent statement of “using nuclear weapon
which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain to sink Japan” released by Korean Central Television.
unresolved. On top of this, recent years have seen a Such North Korean military trends, coupled with its
continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray- provocative words and actions such as threats to missile
zone” situations, raising concerns that they may develop attack against Japan, constitute a serious and imminent
into more serious situations in the absence of a clear path threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the
towards the resolution of the situations. entire region and the international community. North
In North Korea, it is deemed that following the Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, a grave issue
change of regime that made Chairman of the State concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and
Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un the leader of the security of the Japanese people, is yet to be resolved. A
country, the regime continues to strengthen and tighten solution will require concrete actions by North Korea.
its grip to make Chairman Kim Jong-un the sole leader. Today, China has significant influence in the
North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive international community. Accordingly, there continues
military force. It is also furthering its development and to be strong expectations on China to recognize its
operational capabilities of weapons of mass destruction responsibility in the international community, accept
(WMDs), including nuclear weapons and ballistic and comply with international norms, and play an
missiles, and it maintains a large-scale special operations active role in a more cooperative manner in regional
force. Through these activities, North Korea is believed and global issues. In the meantime, China has been
to continue to maintain and strengthen asymmetrical trying to establish unique international order, has been
military capabilities.1 In particular, it is regarded that continuously increasing its defense budget at a high level,
North Korea has further advanced its entire ballistic and has been rapidly reinforcing its military capabilities
missile program, including new type ballistic missiles, in a wide range of areas, without sufficient transparency.
1 Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to
compensate for disadvantages in conventional weapons and troops. Examples include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorism, and cyber-attacks.
Defense of Japan 46
In particular, China is believed to be making efforts to Line,” and found that China’s activities including land
strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to reclamation are illegal. However, China has made it clear
prevent military activities by other countries in the region, that it does not intend to follow this decision. Even today,
denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to China is developing, in addition to military facilities such
its surrounding areas (“Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/ as artillery, various infrastructures that can be used for
AD”] capabilities), and recently, rapidly materializing military purposes including runways, ports, hangars,
large-scale military reforms designed to build its joint and radar installations among others, moving ahead with
operations structure with actual combat in mind. In making these features military outposts. In addition, in
Chapter 1
addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its July and August 2016 after the verdict, Chinese Air Force
activities both in quality and quantity in the maritime and H-6K bombers conducted “combat patrol flight” in the
aerial domains in the region, including in the East and airspace near Scarborough Shoal, and China’s Ministry
South China Seas. In particular, China has continued to of National Defense announced that these flights would
take assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts be “regularized” in the future. This shows that China’s
Overview
of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its military is expanding activities in the seas and airspace of
attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and has the South China Sea.
signaled its position to realize its unilateral assertions These Chinese activities represent serious security
without making any compromises. concerns of the region encompassing Japan, and of
As for the seas and airspace around Japan, Chinese the international community, and need to be watched
government ships have routinely and repeatedly intruded out for with intense interest. China is urged to further
into Japan’s territorial waters, and Chinese naval vessels increase transparency regarding its military and enhance
and air forces has further expanded its operations in its compliance with international norms. It is a key task
areas including the waters surrounding and airspace to further strengthen mutual understanding and trust
over the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China, and
I-class frigate became the first Chinese naval combatant make further progress on measures to build trust, such as
vessel to enter the contiguous zone off the Senkaku measures to avoid and prevent unintended consequences
Islands and in January 2018, a Shang-class submarine in the maritime domain.
navigating underwater and a Jiangkai II-class frigate each In Russia, President Vladimir Putin, who has been
entered the same contiguous zone. This marked the first seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential
confirmed case in which a submerged submarine entered power, achieved reelection to his fourth term in March
into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands. These 2018. It is deemed that Russia has promoted the
activities by the Chinese Navy represent an attempt strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and
to change the status quo unilaterally using force and the development and acquisition of new equipment, while
escalate the situation one-sidedly. Moreover, they pose a continuing to give priority to its nuclear force.
serious concern to Japan. In addition, China has engaged Even as expenditure cuts are thus made in a wide range
in dangerous activities that could cause unintended of areas, Russia has striven to secure defense spending and
consequences, such as its naval vessel’s direction of fire has continued to modernize its Armed Forces. Recently,
control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Russia has intensified its military activities not only in
(MSDF) destroyer, the flight of fighters abnormally close the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the Arctic, the Europe
to SDF aircraft, and its announcement of establishing
the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
KEY WORD
(ADIZ)” based on its own assertion, thereby infringing
the freedom of overflight.
“Anti-Access/Area-Denial”
In the South China Sea, China has continued large-
[“A2/AD”] capabilities
scale and rapid reclamation of multiple features based on
China’s unique assertions which are incompatible with Anti-Access (A2) is a concept introduced by the United States. It refers
the existing international order. The verdict handed down to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to
capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing
July 2016 with regard to the case involving China and
force’s freedom of action within the operational area. Weapons used for
the Philippines rejected the rights claimed by China in A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons,
the sea included in the “Nine-Dash Line,” including air-defense systems, submarines, and mines.
“historic rights” used as the basis for the “Nine-Dash

Asia Pacific Security Environment Section 1
region, the periphery of the United States, and the Middle Islands, and thus continued attention needs to be paid to
East, and has been expanding the area of activities. Russian military development in the Far East, including
Specifically, from the perspective of Europe and the Four Northern Islands.
the United States, Russia is believed to be changing the As seen above, in the Asia-Pacific region, where the
status quo using force by engaging in so-called “hybrid security environment has increasingly grown severe, the
warfare”2 in Ukraine which Russia regards as a part of presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important
its sphere of influence. This is recognized as not only a in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan
strong concern for European countries, but also a global and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have
Chapter 1
issue that could potentially engulf the entire international established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the
community including Asia. Russia is also appearing to be United States, and allow the stationing and rotational
expanding its influence internationally, including through deployment of the U.S. Forces in their territories. In regard
its involvement in the Syria Civil War as a supporter of to the responses to the unilateral changes in the status
the Assad regime. quo by force or coercion based on unique assertions, it
Overview
In the Far East, the Russian Armed Forces have is important for the international community centered
conducted large-scale exercises. Russia has unveiled the around countries in the region to make concerted efforts
deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles in the to protect the existing international order based on law.
Northern Territories and has referred to a plan to deploy See Fig. I-1-1-1 (Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region
a division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima (Approximate Strength))
2 While various explanations have been offered for so-called “hybrid warfare,” in this white paper, the term is used to mean “aggression conducted by methods that are difficult to identify definitively as
an ‘armed attack’ based on its outward appearance, involving a combination of non-military means, such as sabotage and information manipulation, and military means which are utilized covertly.”
Defense of Japan 48
Fig. I-1-1-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)
80,000 troops (12) 260 vessels - 640,000 tons 400 aircraft

Russian Far East
China 1,100,000 troops (33) 780 vessels - 550 aircraft

North Korea 111,000 tons
980,000 troops (207)

15,000 marines (3) ROK
Chapter 1
490,000 troops (54)

750 vessels - 29,000 marines (3)
1,787,000 tons 240 vessels -
215,000 tons
640 aircraft
Overview
2,850 aircraft Japan

U.S. Forces in the ROK
140,000 troops (15)
15,000 troops (5)
135 vessels -
80 aircraft 488,000 tons
400 aircraft
U.S. Forces in Japan
Taiwan 21,000 troops (1)

150 aircraft
130,000 troops (15)
10,000 marines (3)
U.S. 7th Fleet
390 vessels -
205,000 tons 30 vessels -
500 aircraft 400,000 tons
50 (carrier-based)
aircraft
The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1
Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2018,” documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc.
2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of 2017; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding
transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined.
4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft.
5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of
Taiwan includes military police as well.
6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam.
7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters.
Legend
Ground forces Naval vessels Combat aircraft
(200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft)

Global Security Environment Section 2
Section 2 Global Security Environment

The current global security environment has two aspects. They could become new factors that affect the global
Firstly, the United States, which remains the world’s security environment.
most powerful nation, is thought to play an ongoing Amidst this backdrop, in the Middle East and
role in ensuring global peace and security. Meanwhile, Africa, there are many examples where geographic blind
Chapter 1
due to change in the power balance caused by further spots without government control in vulnerable nations
advancement of China, India and other countries, and with unstable political situations and weak governance
the relative change of the United States influence, the capabilities have become a hotbed for the activities of
international community is becoming increasingly international terrorist organizations.2
multi polarized. Terrorist organizations are carrying out activities
Overview
Secondly, globalization and rapidly advanced across national borders while obtaining personnel,
technological innovation have further expanded and weapons and financial resources by taking advantage of
deepened mutual dependence among countries. As a vulnerable border controls. Also, in European and North
result, a conflict or other security issue in a country or American countries, there is growing concern over the
region is likely to soon grow into a destabilizing factor threat of terrorism posed by persons who sympathize with
that could affect the entire international community. extremist thoughts propagated by international terrorist
In relation to this, the rapid spread of information organizations or by persons returning to their home
communication networks, such as the Internet and social country after fighting in conflict zones. The extremist
media that serve as a major factor behind globalization, organization ISIL has repeatedly cited that Japanese
has greatly expanded the ability of non-state actors to nationals are a target of its terrorist attacks. Taking into
disseminate and mobilize their views and claims; and account that Japanese nationals died in the terrorist attack
in the process increased their influence over nations on a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh that occurred in
and the international community. Examples include July 2016, the threat of international terrorism must be
the explosive propagation or spread of individual considered a problem facing Japan, too.
criticism of nations or international terrorist groups In this manner, there is a growing risk that the impact
disseminating their extremist views, leading in some of regional conflict and threat of terrorism will spread as
cases to worldwide circulation.1 a factor of instability affecting the entire international
Given this situation, emerging global security community, not just a single country or single region.
challenges include regional conflicts growing in It is important for the international community to
complexity, international terrorism becoming more review approaches to international frameworks and its
serious, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and involvement based on the character of each and to seek
securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime out appropriate responses. As for regional conflicts, the
space, outer space, and cyber space. mission of UN peacekeeping operations has expanded
to a wide range of fields including civilian and policing
(1) Regional Conflict and International Terrorism activities: supervision of disarmament, security force
There are underlying differences in the nature of conflicts reforms, election and government monitoring, and
occurring around the world. In the case of prolonged humanitarian assistance for refugee repatriation. In
conflicts, it is believed there is a rising possibility that particular, there is growing importance placed on
human rights violations, refugees, starvation, and poverty missions for protecting civilians and women and for
occurring as a result of conflict will affect a much broader peace building. Additionally, there are examples in which
area than the countries involved. Furthermore, climate multinational forces and regional institutions authorized
change and competition to secure resources and energy by the UN Security Council are working to prevent
could become more tangible, and cause regional disputes. conflict, maintain peace and build peace.
1 Controlling such actions is becoming more difficult even for authoritatian states with strong control of their people and for the international community working to contain the activities of terrorist
organizations. As a result, even authoritarian states have been forced to give more consideration than normal toward public opinion with regard to domestic governance and the management of
national politics. Also, for the international community, problems that should be resolved become more complicated, making it even more difficult to address them.
2 As noted above, the weakening of government structures can create a hotbed for the activities of international terrorist organizations and also make it more difficult to combat risks posed by the
explosive spread and propagation of large-scale disasters or infectious disease.
Defense of Japan 50
In terms of international counterterrorism, there is the world, and there have been cases where countries
growing importance for international cooperation due to unilaterally assert their rights and take actions based on
the spread of activities by terrorist organizations across their own assertion that is inconsistent with the existing
international borders. At present, in addition to the use international order, thereby unduly infringing the
of military means, the entire international community freedom of navigation on the high seas and of overflight.
is working to block sources of financing for terrorist China’s continued militarization such as large scale
organizations and taking initiatives to prevent the and rapid land reclamation in the South China Sea,
international transfer of terrorists. and developing batteries and other military facilities
Chapter 1
and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used

(2) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction for military purposes constitutes acts that unilaterally
The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, change the status quo and further advances its efforts to
and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles create a fait accompli. In response to these situations,
that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs is still viewed the international community has been taking various
Overview
as a significant threat to the international community, measures such as continuing to conduct antipiracy
including East Asia. As for chemical weapons, the operations in relevant waters including off the coast of
Malaysian police announced that VX, a chemical whose Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, collaborating to protect
production and use is banned under the Chemical Weapons the existing international order based on law including
Convention (CWC), was detected from the body of Kim a free and open maritime order, and implementing
Jong-nam following his assassination that occurred in initiatives designed to avoid and prevent unintended
Malaysia in February 2017. Additionally, U.K. Prime consequences in the maritime domain and airspace.
Minister Theresa May made a statement which says it is
clear that Novichok, a Russian-made military nerve agent, (4) Cyberspace and Outer Space
was used. It is very likely that Russia is responsible for Recently, securing the stable use of new domains such as
the attack, with regard to the attack on a former Russian outer space and cyberspace, in addition to the conventional
intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom domains of the ground, sea and air, has become an
in February 2017. Concerning the situation in Syria, in important challenge for the security of the international
April 2017 the United States determined that the Assad community. The further advancement of military science
regime used chemical weapons in an attack on a region and technology along with significant advancements in
controlled by anti-government forces in the south of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has
Idlib Governorate in northwest Syria, and in response increased the dependence of social infrastructure and
launched a missile strike on Shayrat Airbase, the base of military activities on outer space and cyberspace. On the
the planes used in the Assad regime’s attack and which is other hand, the development of anti-satellite weapons by
believed to be housing chemical weapons. Furthermore, countries and the diversification of cyber attacks with
in April 2018 the United States, United Kingdom and suspected government involvement have exacerbated the
France determined that the Assad regime used chemical risks to the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. In
weapons against civilians once again in Eastern Ghouta recent years, countries are moving ahead with specific
on the outskirts of Syria’s capital of Damascus, and in efforts aimed at reinforcing a nation’s ability to combat
response they launched a missile strike on three chemical cyber attacks, including private sector companies, and
weapons-related facilities, demonstrating resolve to stop acquiring the capabilities to monitor threats to space
the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. assets such as satellites. There are also moves seen in the
In addition, there are continuing concerns about the international community to promote the rule of law in
acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors, such outer space and cyberspace by establishing certain codes
as international terrorist organizations. In this regard, the of conduct.
international community continues to pursue efforts to
counter terrorism activities that utilize nuclear materials (5) Technology
and other radioactive substances. Rapid advancements in technological innovation are
now spreading into military fields. Major powers such
(3) Maritime Domain as the United States, China and Russia are believed to
With regard to the maritime domain, which has been be focusing on research and development of precision
regarded as a foundation for supporting international guided technologies, unmanned technologies, artificial
trade, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of intelligence (AI) technologies, and stealth technologies,

Global Security Environment Section 2
among others. Such progress in military science and As seen above, the international community today
technology relies heavily on the development of civilian faces complex, diverse, and broad security challenges
technologies. It is believed that the development and and destabilizing factors. Along with deterrence and
international transfer of civilian technologies will handling of armed conflicts, the roles of military forces
have a major impact on improvements in the military in responding to these challenges are becoming so
capabilities of each country. Meanwhile, countries diverse that they include a broad spectrum of activities
without advanced technologies and non-state actors from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance,
appear set to develop and acquire means for asymmetrical and military forces are now playing such important roles
Chapter 1
attack such as WMDs and cyber capabilities, along with more frequently. Meanwhile, for military forces to play
obtaining through illicit means the technologies of their roles, comprehensive responses are required that
developed countries. Such trends in the development of combine military capacity with other capacities such as
military technologies are believed to have a significant diplomacy, law enforcement and justice, intelligence, and
impact on the military strategies of each country and the the economy.
Overview
power balance between countries.
Defense of Japan 52
Chapter
2 Defense Policies of Countries
Section 1 The United States
1 Security and Defense Policies

Chapter 2
It has been pointed out that the Trump administration,

which was inaugurated in January 2017, has significantly
changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world
amidst the formation of a new security environment,
including a shift in the global balance of power,

attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in
Ukraine and the South China Sea, the development and
improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles which have become
an unprecedentedly serious and urgent threat, and the
intensification of the activities of international terrorist
organizations. On the other hand, it can be considered that
while the United States is focusing on global competition,
the United States has been continuing to play a role for U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis testifying at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Armed
world peace and stability with its comprehensive national Services on the National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review on February 6, 2018.
[Photo: U.S. Department of Defense]
power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the
values and influence of the United States, bolstered by
its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more urgent, unpredictable threat to the United States and
prosperous. its allies, it has maintained sanctions and continues its
The Trump administration, under the “America efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North
First” vision for governance, has set forth a policy for Korea. In addition, taking into account China’s current
rebuilding the U.S. Forces and placing importance on movements in the South China Sea, the United States
allies under the banner of peace through strength. In has expressed its stance that it will continue “Freedom of
addition, in less than a year since the inauguration, the Navigation Operations,” and during his November 2017
Trump administration unveiled its policies on security trip to Asia, President Trump emphasized the importance
and national defense by publishing the National Security of freedom of navigation when he revealed the vision for
Strategy (NSS),1 followed by the National Defense a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (see 1-3 of this Section).
Strategy (NDS)2 and the National Posture Review (NPR). The United States has also been dealing with security
Regarding regional security, the United States has issues outside of the Indo-Pacific region. In response
clarified its stance that it will emphasize the security to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the
of the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, under the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria
recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is an since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led
1 The NSS comprehensively indicates political, economic, military and diplomatic policies aimed at protecting and achieving goals.
2 The NDS affords the president and secretary of defense the utmost strategic flexibility, decides the force structure to meet needs, and supports the latest national security strategy.

The United States Section 1
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the
against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In addition, following international order and are acting in a manner that
its assessment that the Assad administration of Syria had threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions
used chemical weapons in April 2018, together with the that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are
United Kingdom and France, the United States carried out becoming imminent threats.
missile strikes3 against Syria’s chemical weapons-related On the other hand, the NSS released in December
facilities, and clarified its stance of developing powerful 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power
deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests.
weapons of mass destruction. In August 2017, the United It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the
States announced its strategy on Afghanistan and South United States and its allies and partners, which are the
Asia which made clear its continuous involvement with “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue
Afghanistan, and in September 2017, Defense Secretary states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat
Chapter 2
Mattis disclosed that reinforcements of over 3,000 U.S. organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of
military personnel would be sent to Afghanistan. In these, China and Russia are said to challenge American
light of Russian actions concerning Ukraine, in order to power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode
strengthen involvement in NATO security and deterrence, American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and
the investment for the European Deterrence Initiative4 is Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States

being increased from US$4.8 billion in the previous fiscal and its allies.
year to US$6.5 billion in the FY2019 Department of In addition, the NDS published in January 2018
Defense budget request. On the other hand, in its security points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not
policies, the United States considers that certain allies terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with
which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia
of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United are undermining the free and open international order
States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is
Under such a perception, the United States has requested increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a
NATO member states to swiftly meet their commitments world consistent with their authoritarian model.
to increase their national defense spending to 2% of GDP. Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried
One year has passed since the inauguration of the out in Syria in April 2018, President Trump stated that
Trump administration, and amidst the indicated direction establishing strong deterrence against the production,
of security and defense policies in strategies such as the proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important
NSS, specific security and defense policy trends advanced interest for the national security of the United States.
under the aforementioned strategy will draw attention. In consideration of this recognition, the United
In addition, it should also be noted how the changing States deems as security threats nations and organizations
situations in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its
the EU, as well as the November 2018 mid-term election, allies and threaten the international order. While the
will affect the U.S. security and defense policies. Trump administration has fundamentally accepted the
threat perception of the previous Obama administration,
1 Perception about security environment it is addressing threats posed by China and Russia with
particular emphasis as priority issues and appears to be
The National Military Strategy (NMS) released in July continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North
2015 during the former Obama administration explicitly Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production,
cites Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.
3 At 21:00 on April 13 Eastern Standard Time (10:00 on April 14 Japan time), the United States together with France and the United Kingdom conducted strikes against three chemical weapons-related
facilities of the Syrian administration. The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it believed that all 105 cruise missiles used hit their targets. Of these, the U.S. Forces fired 30 tomahawk missiles
from two destroyers, 30 missiles from one cruiser, and six missiles from one nuclear submarine, as well as 19 JASSMs from two B-1B strategic bombers.
4 This initiative reassures allies and partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the United States is committed to their security and territorial integrity by increasing the presence of
the U.S. Forces in Europe, conducting further bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with NATO allies and other countries, and strengthening the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe.
Until recently it was called the European Reassurance Initiative, but the name was changed to the European Deterrence Initiative in the FY2019 Budget Blueprint.
Defense of Japan 54
2 Security and National Defense Strategy by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression
elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures
The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the and force deployment that have mobility, resilience,
America First policy and realism in which power plays a and modernize key capabilities such as nuclear forces,
central role in international politics, and stresses the need space and cyberspace, C4ISR, missile defense, advanced
to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its
on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the
inclusion in the international community would turn them stance that dynamic military force employment, military
into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability
NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests to adversary decision-makers. For 2. Strengthening
in this competitive world: 1. Protect the American people, alliances, the following three matters are emphasized:
the homeland, and the American way of life, 2. Promote i. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility,
Chapter 2
American prosperity, 3. Preserve peace through strength, priorities, and accountability, ii. Expand regional
and 4. Advance American influence. consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning,
Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. and iii. Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there
military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening are expectations that allies and partners contribute an
capabilities in many areas including space and equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security,
cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage including effective investment in modernizing their
the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and defense capabilities.
the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies
and partners are a great strength of the United States 3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region
and close cooperation is necessary, the United States
has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate While the Trump administration has stopped using the
the will to confront shared threats and contribute the key phrase “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region” set
capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United forth by the Obama administration, it has shown a stance
States is responding to the growing political, economic, of placing importance on the region through the United
and military competition throughout the world, by States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its
ensuring American military power is second to none and presence since the inauguration of the administration.5
fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, In particular, under the policy to continue sustaining
the United States will seek areas of cooperation with maximum pressure on North Korea, which is continuing
competitors from a position of strength. its nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Trump
The NDS drawn up by Secretary of Defense Mattis
based on the NSS considers the long-term competitions
with China and Russia as the principal priorities of
the Department of Defense because of the magnitude
of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity
and the potential for the threats to increase. Moreover,
to expand the competitive space, the following three
lines of effort are raised: 1. Building a more lethal Joint
Force, 2. Strengthening alliances and attracting new
partners, 3. Reforming the Department of Defense for
greater performance and affordability.
U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz
Among these, 1. Building military power prioritizes conducting a joint exercise with MSDF destroyers in the western Pacific Ocean on
preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression November 12, 2017. [Photo: U.S. Navy]
5 At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting on February 4, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis who was visiting Japan at the very early timing of just two weeks after the inauguration of the
new Trump administration, emphasized that the Asia-Pacific region remains a top priority for the United States and that the United States would strengthen its commitment by maintaining the presence
of the U.S. Forces in the region. Also, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, he stated that the Asia-Pacific region is positioned as a priority region and that the United States would strengthen
alliances, empower regional countries, and strengthen the U.S. Forces capabilities in the region. He also stated 60% of all U.S. naval warships, 55% of the army, and about two thirds of the Fleet
Marine Forces were assigned to the Pacific Command area of responsibility, and soon 60% of overseas tactical aviation assets would be assigned to the theater.

administration is exhibiting its recognition that a military held on June 29, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that
option plays an important role in backing up diplomatic the decision was taken to create space for their diplomats
efforts, and also is clearly showing its readiness to to negotiate strongly, and increasing the prospects for a
respond with overwhelming power in retaliation to any peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula, and that the
attack by North Korea. United States maintains a strong, collaborative defensive
To show military presence against North Korea, stance to ensure its diplomats continue to negotiate from
following on from the deployment in the Sea of Japan of a position of unquestioned strength. On the other hand,
two carrier strike groups, the Carl Vinson Strike Group the United States showed a clear stance that it would
and the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group in June 2017, maintain sanctions until North Korea took concrete,
three carrier strike groups, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS verifiable measures for ending its nuclear development,
Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz strike groups were and that it would keep the U.S. Forces in the ROK. (See
deployed in the Sea of Japan in November 2017. The 1-5 of Section 2.)
Chapter 2
nuclear submarines USS Tucson and USS Michigan also During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in
made port calls in the ROK in October 2017. In addition, consonance with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
during the joint U.S.-ROK regularly-held aviation Strategy,” President Trump expressed his intention to
exercise Vigilant Ace in December 2017, F-22 and F-35 emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting
aircraft participated for the first time ever in the exercise. the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he

Furthermore, between May and December 2017, B-1B would promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as
strategic bombers flew over the Korean Peninsula every well as strengthen alliances in the region.
month. In addition, following the deployment of 62 In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China
launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific
(THAAD) system6 by the U.S. Forces in the ROK in April region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having
2017, in September 2017 four launchers were added and mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to
a total of six sites commenced operation. limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer
In March 2018, responding to North Korea’s hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region
statement of intent for denuclearization and other strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom
developments, President Trump indicated his forward- of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and
looking intent to hold a U.S.-North Korea Summit maritime disputes in accordance with international law,
Meeting, which resulted in the holding of the first-ever the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral
historic summit on June 12, 2018. Both leaders clearly cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop
indicated willingness for jointly making efforts to build a a strong defense networks with its allies and partners.
lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, In the same way, the NDS points out that China is
and based on the reaffirmed commitment expressed by leveraging military modernization, influence operations,
Chairman Kim toward complete denuclearization of the and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries
Korean Peninsula, both leaders confirmed that follow- to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and
on negotiations would continue. Responding to this is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free
discussion, on June 18 and 22, 2018, the U.S. Department and open Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security,
of Defense announced the suspension of all planning for and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and
the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi- partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security
Freedom Guardian scheduled for August, and two the architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining
Korean Marine Exchange Program7 training exercises stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.
scheduled to occur in the following three months. Furthermore, regarding China’s maritime expansion,
Regarding this point, at the joint press conference at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, Secretary of
following the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting Defense Mattis stated that the scope and effect of China’s
6 A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. It tracks and intercepts targets at high altitude in the upper
atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense systems.
7 The Korean Marine Exchange Program (KMEP) is an annually-held joint exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa and the ROK Marine Corps. 19 exercises were planned under
the KMEP in 2018, and 11 exercises had been carried out as of June 22, 2018.
Defense of Japan 56
construction activities in the South China Sea differ from to Guam, and in place of the amphibious assault ship USS
those in other countries in several key ways, including Bonhomme Richard, the amphibious assault ship USS
the nature of its militarization, China’s disregard for Wasp that is capable of carrying F-35B fighters arrived in
international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, Sasebo. Furthermore, in March 2018 the aircraft carrier
and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft
issues; and that the United States cannot and will not carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam.
accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo.
Moreover, while committing to protecting the rights, 4 Innovation Initiatives in the National Defense Field
freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea, and the ability of
all countries to exercise those rights in the strategically In November 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel
important East and South China Sea, Secretary of announced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) that
Defense Mattis stated that the United States would aimed to achieve military superiority through innovation,
Chapter 2
continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international and stated the expectation that this would develop into
law allows, and demonstrate resolve through operational the Third Offset Strategy.9 Also, in 2015 as a part of DII,
presence in the South China Sea and beyond. It is then-Secretary of Defense Carter established Defense
reported that in May, July, August, and October 2017, as Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley
well as January, March, and May 2018, the U.S. Forces to be a bridge between the Department of Defense and
conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within civilian groups, in order to introduce innovative civilian
12 nautical miles of the islands and reefs in the South technologies into military fields.
China Sea that are claimed by China.8 Also, in May 2018, The Trump administration stopped using the
the U.S. Department of Defense stated that China had names DII and Third Offset Strategy, but in August
deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles 2017 Secretary of Defense Mattis visited DIUx and IT
to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out companies and discussed utilization methods of new
that the placement of these weapon system was only technologies for the Department of Defense. To the
military use. As an initial response to China’s continued accompanying press corps, he stated that Department of
militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United Defense innovation initiatives are a matter of maximum
States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim priority and pointed out the importance of DIUx. Also,
of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018. the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must
Based on such a perception of China and regional harness innovative technologies that are being developed
strategy, it can be considered that the United States is outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The
advancing efforts rooted in the concept of free and open NDS also states that the Department of Defense needs
Indo-Pacific region. innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for
In addition, as part of its activities around extensive investment in military application of autonomy,
strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, in artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including
January 2017, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to
specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni. In gain competitive military advantages. In view of these
October 2017, 12 Air Force specified F-35A fighters were circumstances, it can be considered that the United States
deployed at Kadena Air Force Base for the first time ever will continue to place emphasis on innovation in the
in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, in January 2018, nuclear- national defense field.
capable B-2 bombers and B-52 bombers were deployed
8 It is regarded that the Trump administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Dewey
in May 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Stethem in July 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer
USS John S. McCain in August 2017, surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Chafee in October 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal by the destroyer USS Hopper in
January 2018, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef by the destroyer USS Mustin in March 2018, within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Higgins and the cruiser USS
Antietam in May 2018.
The Obama administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Lassen in October 2015,
within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur in January 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer
USS William P. Lawrence in May 2016, and surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Decatur in October 2016.
9 The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were
two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft technologies of the 1970s.

5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability
onto the forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35
The NPR released in February 2018 stated that, although as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable
the United States had reduced the role and number of aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its
nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if
States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability
states would follow, the global threat conditions have with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside
worsened markedly since the most recent NPR10 released Europe, including Northeast Asia.
in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and On the other hand, there has not yet been an official
uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their announcement on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of (BMDR) that President Trump had directed to be
nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these formulated alongside the NPR. Regarding this, in March
Chapter 2
circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of 2018, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood
U.S. nuclear forces: 1. Deterrence of nuclear and non- testified in Congress regarding missile defense that while
nuclear attacks, 2. Assurance of allies and partners, 3. the review work was still being advanced, the new review
Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and 4. would be decided on as the Missile Defense Review
Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future. (MDR) based on the existing threats of missile strikes

Also, while the United States would only consider by cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, other
the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme than ballistic missiles. Moreover, in order to deal with
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United threats to the U.S. mainland by rogue nation missiles,
States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states he set forth strengthening the mainland’s missile
that extreme circumstances could include significant defense through additional deployment of 20 ground-
non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States based interceptor missiles, strengthening the capability
and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified of ground-based interceptor missiles by Redesigned
today. It also indicates that the United States remains Kill Vehicles (RKV),12 and deployment of new missile
the policy to retain some ambiguity regarding the tracking and identification sensors in Alaska, Hawaii,
precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear and the Pacific. Regarding missile defense in Europe, the
response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region, he mentioned
States would apply a tailored approach to deter across strengthening readiness through additional deployment
a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in of Patriot missiles, THAAD, and SM-3. Also, together
addition to that, it would ensure effective deterrence with ensuring the missile defense capabilities of allies
by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear and partners, he also indicated a policy to strengthen
capabilities through nuclear modernization and the cooperation for improving interoperability with the U.S.
development and deployment of new capabilities. missile defense system. Furthermore, regarding advanced
Specifically, in addition to sustaining and replacing the technologies, he stressed commitment in such areas as
nuclear triad,11 as new capabilities, in the near-term, the improving identification capability of missile defense
United States would modify a small number of existing system sensors, boost phase missile interception lasers,
SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in new sensors deployed in space, and Multi-Object Kill
the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea- Vehicles (MOKV).13
launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing
10 The NPR released in 2010 called for a world without nuclear weapons, with goals that included reducing the role of the U.S.’s nuclear weapons and maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at
reduced nuclear force levels.
11 The nuclear triad consists of Minuteman III ICBM, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) armed with Trident II D5 SLBM, and strategic bombers B-52 and B-2.
12 The RKV is an improved counterattack vehicle in terms of reliability, manufacture, examination, and cost efficiency.
13 Together with increasing object identification capability, the MOKV development program improves interceptor missile performance by developing the capability to destroy multiple objects through
enabling one interceptor missile to load multiple kill vehicles.
Defense of Japan 58
Fig. I-2-1-1 Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget
Defense budget (in $1 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%)

($1 million) (％)
800,000 20
700,000
(*Estimate)
15
600,000
10
500,000
400,000 5
300,000
0
200,000
–5
100,000
0 –10
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (FY)
Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on historical tables (outlays).
Chapter 2
2. The amount for FY2018 is an estimate.
6 FY2019 Budget military end strength and procurement were represented

in the FY2019 budget request, such as securing 1,338,100
As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is personnel, adding 24,100 more troops to the services’
deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act end strength, and procuring 135 upgraded M-1 tanks
enacted in August 2011 stipulated a significant cut in (56 tanks in the previous year), 10 battleships (8 in the
government spending by FY2021.14 Also, in March previous year), and 77 F-35 fighters (70 in the previous
2013, the sequestration of government spending year). In addition, regarding ballistic missile defense,
including defense expenditure was started based on additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor
the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, missiles in Alaska, other than 40 missiles in Alaska and 4
after this, sequestration was eased for the budgets from missiles in California, are to be completed by the end of
FY2014-FY2017 due to the bipartisan acts passed 2023, in light of the threat of the ICBMs posed by North
twice.15 Furthermore, amid the Trump administration’s Korea and Iran.
policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in In January 2018, Secretary of Defense Mattis pointed
order to rebuild the U.S. military, the Bipartisan Budget out that the U.S. military competitive edge has eroded in
Act was passed in February 2018, and a defense budget every domain of warfare and that the defense expenditure
framework was approved that drastically raised the limit cap was causing a negative effect. He stated that there
set by the sequestration for FY2018 and 2019.16 was a need for a stable, predictable budget, and that while
In these circumstances, the defense budget request in both capability and capacity are important for building
the Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February the military, currently, building the capacity is being
2018 allocated US$617.0 billion for the base budget,17 emphasized. For this, the Trump administration can be
representing about a 7% increase over the previous considered to be pursuing ensuring a sufficient and stable
year. For the overseas contingency operations budget, a defense budget, emphasizing keeping a force of sufficient
total of US$69.0 billion would be appropriated per the size in the short-term, and aiming for a budgetary measures
request, including budget escalation in the OIR and the to expand capability in the mid- and long-term.
European Deterrence Initiative.18 Also, the goals for See Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget)
14 In January 2012, the Department of Defense announced that the specific national defense annual expenditure reduction based on the enacted act would amount to roughly US$487 billion over the
10 year period between FY2012 and FY2021 (roughly US$259 billion during the five year period between FY2013 and FY2017).
15 Through the passing of the 2013 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was lowered by US$22 billion and US$9 billion in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. Through the passing
of the 2015 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$25 billion and US$15 billion in FY2016 and FY2017 respectively.
16 Through the passing of the 2018 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$80 billion and US$85 billion in FY2018 and FY2019 respectively.
17 An increase of about US$35 billion from the FY2018 enacted budget level.
18 The total sum of the FY2019 national defense budget request was roughly US$716.0 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$30 billion (such as the
Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$686 billion of Department of Defense budget request.

2 Military Posture
1 General Situation The U.S. maritime forces have about 940 vessels
(including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.36
The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East
individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th
is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest
Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th
of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the
consist of three commands with functional responsibilities 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
and six commands with regional responsibilities. Of The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,570 combat
Chapter 2
these, Secretary of Defense Mattis announced that the aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In
name of the Pacific Command would be changed to the addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of
Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the
The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.
soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward- In regard to strategic offensive weapons including

deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama
other countries. Along with a shift from the Obama administration proceeded with its reduction based on a
administration’s policy reducing soldiers to a policy of new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force
increasing them, in order to deter enemies and achieve in February 2011. In February 2018, it announced that
battle victories when necessary, the Army has been its deployed strategic warheads19 stood at 1,350, while its
making efforts to maintain the world’s leading ground deployed delivery platforms stood at 652.20 The United
force capability through necessary investment in ensuring States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt
readiness. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the
capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.21
force,” bridging the seam between smaller special Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in
operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command was founded
in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S.
Fig. I-2-1-2 Structure of the Unified Combatant Command Cyber Command achieved Initial Operational Capability
President : Functional command (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in
: Geographic command November in the same year. Furthermore, in May 2018,
U.S. Secretary
of Defense the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated
統合参謀本部議長
of Staff
to a unified combatant command.22
U.S. Special U.S. Strategic U.S. Transportation U.S. Cyber
Also, in June 2018, President Trump instructed the
輸送軍
Operations Command Command Command Command Department of Defense to immediately start the necessary
processes to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch
U.S. Africa U.S. Central U.S. European U.S. Northern U.S. Indo-Pacific U.S. Southern of the Armed Forces.
Command Command Command Command Command Command
See Fig. I-2-1-2 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command)
19 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted
as one nuclear warhead).
20 The figure as of February 5, 2018.
21 The concept is designed to cripple the A2 capabilities of an adversary and promptly strike a target anywhere in the world using non-nuclear long-range guided missiles that hit targets with high accuracy.
22 In August 2017, President Trump announced the elevation of the Cyber Command to a unified combatant command.
Defense of Japan 60
Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region
European Region
Army: approx. 26,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 28,000 personnel U.S. Forces
Marines: approx. 4,000 personnel Army: approx. 466,000 personnel
Total: approx. 66,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 318,000 personnel
(Total in 1987:
Marines: approx. 184,000 personnel
approx. 354,000 personnel)
U.S. European Command
Total: approx. 1,288,000 personnel
(Total in 1987:
approx. 2,170,000 personnel)
U.S. Central Command
Asia-Pacific Region U.S. Northern
Command
Army: approx. 35,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnel
Chapter 2
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

U.S. Africa Command Marines: approx. 26,000 personnel
Total: approx. 110,000 personnel U.S. Southern
Command
(Total in 1987:
approx. 184,000 personnel)
Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2017), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.
[Japan]
• Deploys F-22 and RQ-4 (Global Hawk)
• Deploys MV-22 Osprey, P-8, F-35A
• Deploys second TPY-2 radar
• Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015)
• Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer (March 2016)
• Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already deployed in October
[Singapore] Seoul 2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017)
• Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat ROK • Deployed amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, capable of carrying F-35Bs.
Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by
end of 2017. The first ship started Japan
rotation in April 2013, the second ship [Guam]
in December 2014 and the third ship • Rotationally deploys submarines
Okinawa
in October 2016) • Rotationally deploys bombers
• Rotationally deployed P-8 (December • Established a facility for aircraft carriers’
2015) temporary port of call
Guam • Deploys unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4) Hawaii
• Signed enhanced defense cooperation Philippines
agreement (December 2015) Manila
[Philippines]
• Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence
of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014)
• Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey
vessel (November 2015)
Singapore
• Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–)
Indonesia
• Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing
Jakarta defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016)
• Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–)
Darwin [Australia]
At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives:
• Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia
• Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia トンガ
Australia
In June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army,
and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the Pacific
ブリズベーン
Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets will be deployed there.
Canberra
* Based upon a map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (for illustrative purposes)

2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region Head quarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.24
The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet,
The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the
important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East
Asia-Pacific region by placing the Indo-Pacific Command, Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total
a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists
Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations
Command is a geographic combatant command which in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial
is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical
subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan national interests of the United States and its allies. An
and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and
of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of destroyers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.
Chapter 2
the U.S. Forces from allies, the Indo-Pacific Command The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one
headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland
Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia and Japan. Of this force, about 18,000 personnel are
are currently serving in the Indo-Pacific Command as in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft
deputy director level-officials. Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other

The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning
Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are
Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces,23 which are deployed in the Western Pacific.25 The U.S. Pacific Air
all headquartered in Hawaii. Force has three air forces, of which three air wings
The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft)
the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and
the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air
in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Force stationed in the ROK.
Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,600 personnel to See Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Development Status and the Recent
commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region)
23 As of June 2018, it is unknown whether the names of the subordinate Component Commands changed along with the name change from Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command.
24 The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2017), and could change
according to unit deployment.
25 See footnote 19.
Defense of Japan 62
Section 2 Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under
have been divided into two—north and south—for more such security environment is an extremely important
than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region
pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each of East Asia.
other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). See Fig. I-2-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)
Chapter 2
Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

Orang
General Staff Department

Navy Headquarters Toksan Chaho
Pyongyang Defense Headquarters Mayangdo
Kaechon
Air Force Headquarters Taejo
Pyongyang
Chunghwa
Nampo Hwangju
U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Uijongbu

Command Headquarters Mukho
Sagot Seoul
Suwon U.S. 2nd Infantry Division
Osan
U.N. Command Headquarters Pyeongtaek U.S. 7th Air Force Headquarters
Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea
Kunsan
Taegu
Kwangju
Busan
Mokpo Chinhae
North Korea ROK U.S. Forces in Korea

Total armed forces Approx. 1.28 million personnel Approx. 625,000 personnel Approx. 24,000 personnel
Ground troops Approx. 1.1 million personnel Approx. 490,000 personnel Approx. 15,000 personnel
Army T-62, T-54/-55, etc. M-48, K-1, T-80 etc.
Tanks M-1
Approx. 3,500 Approx. 2,510
Naval vessels Approx. 780; 111,000 tons Approx. 240; 215,000 tons Supporting corps only
Destroyers 12
Navy Frigates 4 13
Submarines 20 14
Marines Approx. 29,000 personnel
Combat aircraft Approx. 550 Approx. 640 Approx. 80
Air Force Mig-23 x 56 F-4 x 60

3rd and 4th
Mig-29 x 18 F-16 x 163 F-16 x 60
generation fighter aircraft
Su-25 x 34 F-15 x 60
Population Approx. 25.25 million Approx. 51.18 million
Reference Army: 21 months

Men: 12 years
Term of service Navy: 23 months
Women: 7 years
Air Force: 24 months
Note: Data from “The Military Balance 2018,” etc. Data for the troop strength of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) from U.S. DoD information (December 2017).

Korean Peninsula Section 2
1 North Korea
1 General Situation ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation

capabilities, including conducting six nuclear tests so far
North Korea has been advocating the building of a and repeatedly launching as many as 40 ballistic missiles
strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, since 2016, and by maintaining and strengthening large-
military affairs, and economy,1 and it adopts “military- scale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea
first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military- repeatedly uses provocative rhetoric and behavior against
first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form relevant countries, including Japan.5
of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of Such military trends in North Korea pose an
socialism to victory by giving priority to the military unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the
Chapter 2
forces in all activities under the principle of military security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and
first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the security of the region and the international community.
revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear
as the central and main force.2 In fact, leader Kim Jong-un, weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient
Chairman of the State Affairs Commission,3 who is in a attention needs to be paid to the development and

position to control the military, noted the importance of deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation
military power: “It is necessary to uphold the military- on the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs
first revolutionary path as the constant strategic path, and ballistic missiles by North Korea.
and strengthen the might of the military power in all
of its dimensions.”4 He also regularly visits military
KEY WORD
organizations. In this light, it is conceivable that the
Chairman will continue to attach importance to and rely
Ballistic missiles
on the military forces.
Although North Korea has been facing serious A ballistic missile is a rocket engine-propelled missile that flies on a
economic difficulties and has depended on the international parabolic trajectory. It is capable of attacking distant targets. Ballistic
community for food and other resources, it seems to be missiles are generally categorized according to the following table.
maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and Category Range

Under approx. 1,000 km
combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
or less
to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its Approx. 1,000 km –
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
military forces along the DMZ. According to the official Under approx. 3,000 km
Approx. 3,000 km –
announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Under approx. 5,500 km
April 2018, the proportion of the defense budget in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Approx. 5,500 km or more
the FY2017 national budget was 15.9%. However, it is
Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred
believed that this represents only a fraction of the real
to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic
defense expenditures. missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary
Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship
reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities ballistic missile (ASBM).
by continuing to promote the development of WMDs and
1 North Korea used to insist that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim
Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).”
2 Written decision of the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016).
3 At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, presided over by Chairman Kim Jong-un. For consistency purposes
“Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper.
4 “Report on the Work of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee” at the Seventh Congress of the KWP in May 2016.
5 In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of
its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specific cities. For example, it has stated that “not only Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa, and Guam but also the U.S. mainland are within our range” (March
31, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), “none of Japan’s territories shall be spared from being the target of our retaliatory attack (listing the names of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto in this context)”
(April 10, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), etc. More recently, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station stated on September 13, 2017, that, “the Japanese archipelago will be sunk into the sea by a nuclear
bomb,” and the October 9 edition of the Rodong Sinmun stated that, “If the flames of war break out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan can never be safe. Everything in Japan that is mobilized for war
will be pulverized to pieces, to say nothing of the bases in Japan for U.S. invasion.”
Defense of Japan 64
Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is
closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.
Commentary View of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles COLUMN

North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched 40 ballistic missiles since 2016. During 2017, it carried out a nuclear
test with an estimated yield roughly 10 times the scale of the Hiroshima-type atomic bomb, launched a new intercontinental-range
ballistic missile into Japan’s EEZ, and launched two ballistic missiles that flew over Japan. These military developments by North
Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security and undermine peace and security of the region
and the international community.
Chapter 2
Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, expressed interest in North-South dialogue in his New Year’s
address given on January 1, 2018. This was followed by a summit meeting between the Republic of Korea and North Korea in
April 2018 at which Chairman Kim Jong-un expressed his intention to work toward denuclearization. Furthermore, at the United
States-North Korea summit meeting held in June 2018, North Korea has made clear its intention to work toward the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. It is significant
that Chairman Kim Jong-un has made another clear promise in a written document to work toward the complete denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula.
It is important to carefully assess specific actions by North Korea to dismantle nuclear and missile capabilities.
At the same time, taking into consideration the fact that North korea possesses and deploys several hundred Nodong missiles
capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear
weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, etc., there is no change in our basic
recognition concerning the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles.
The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces continue to do their utmost in gathering intelligence, monitoring the situation,
and implementing other activities to be ready for any circumstances, while also collaborating closely with the United States and
Republic of Korea, in order to carry out the responsibility of protecting the lives and peaceful existence of the Japanese population.
United States-North Korea Summit Meeting (June 2018) [AFP/JIJI] Nodong missile [JIJI]

2 Military Posture missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model
Romeo-class submarines, about 70 midget submarines,
(1) General Situation and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter
North Korea has been building up its military capabilities two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and
in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive transportation of the special operations forces. The Air
training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of
arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire which are out-of-date models made in China or the former
country).6 North Korea’s military forces are comprised Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft
mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also
roughly 1.28 million. While North Korea’s military forces included. North Korea has a large number of outdated
are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be
their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its used for transportation of special operations forces. In
Chapter 2
equipment is outdated. Meanwhile, North Korea has addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military
forces such as largescale special operations force that capabilities, namely, special operations force whose
can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.8 In recent years,
gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and
North Korea seems to have many underground military- strengthening its cyber forces.9

related installations across its territory.
3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles
(2) Military Capabilities
The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million While North Korea continues to maintain largescale
personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to military capabilities, its conventional forces are
be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S.
is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors,
including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea including decreases in military assistance from the
is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War
the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and regime, limitations placed on North Korea’s national
170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the
bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It
city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts
that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to
conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as compensate for this shortfall.
main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers.7 North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles
The Navy has about 780 ships with a total is considered to have made further strides through going
displacement of approximately 111,000 t and is chiefly ahead with the sixth nuclear test and repeating ballistic
comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile launches. Coupled with its provocative rhetoric
6 The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962.
7 According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch’onma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. Furthermore,
the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the
significant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession. North Korea allegedly fi red several rounds from the 300 mm multiple rocket
launcher on three instances in March 2016 and launched a new short-range surface-to-air missile in April 2016. In addition, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted test launches
of a new type of surface-to-air missiles and a new type of surface-to-ship cruise missiles on May 28 and June 9, 2017, respectively.
8 It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the KWP. However, it has been reported that these organizations
were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013
when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces
Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White
Paper 2016 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.”
9 The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 notes, “North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks
to support its political objectives.” The annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (2015) submitted to Congress by the U.S. DoD also
in February 2016 states, “North Korea probably views OCO [offensive cyber operations] as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence and cause disruption in South Korea and other
adversaries including the United States.” According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016, North Korea has trained approximately 6,800 cyber warfare personnel and carries out various forms of
cyber warfare provocations. Regarding North Korean cyber attacks, see Chapter 3, Section 5.
Defense of Japan 66
and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, extraction on several instances.11 Moreover, in June 2009,
North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles poses North Korea announced that it would weaponize all of its
an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the newly extracted plutonium.12 In April 2013, North Korea
security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and announced its policy to readjust and restart all nuclear
security of the region and the international community. facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor, the
Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge disablement of which was agreed upon at the sixth round
to the entire international community with regard to the of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007. In November
non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs. 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of opined that while lack of inspection makes it impossible to
the Central Committee of the KWP held on April 20, determine conclusively, multiple activities were observed
2018, decisions were made to discontinue “nuclear from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor
test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” and was restarted.13 Furthermore, in September 2015, North
Chapter 2
to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground. In the Korea stated that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon
subsequent inter-Korean summit meeting held on April including the nuclear reactor and the uranium enrichment
27, North Korea expressed its intention to work towards plant were readjusted and started normal operation.
denuclearization. Then, on May 24, international press Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the
representatives were invited to witness the destruction of production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea,
the northern nuclear test ground. Looking to the future, it such developments are causes of great concern.
will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor moves As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used
by North Korea, including what kind of concrete actions for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced
it will take towards realizing the dismantlement of all that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a
weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missiles in uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later
a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement
of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010,
(1) Nuclear Weapons North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to
a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program American nuclear specialists and later announced that
Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped
weapons program are largely unclear, partly because with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this
North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August
light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased
and considering North Korea has already conducted six its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean
nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2017, behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the
it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using
progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.14
plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear With regard to the development of nuclear weapons,
weapons,10 North Korea has suggested its production and North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October
10 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic
material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium.
This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).
11 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional
8,000 used fuel rods.
12 Then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several
nuclear weapons.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2016 estimates that North Korea has more than 50 kg of plutonium, up from the 40 kg estimate in the ROK Defense White Paper 2014.
13 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2016 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon
enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough
plutonium (approximately 6 kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year.
14 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 states, “the North’s disclosure (of a uranium enrichment facility) supports the U.S. longstanding
assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium-enrichment capability.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2016 assesses that North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program “has reached a
significant level.”

2006,15 May 2009,16 February 2013,17 January 2016,18 the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted
September 2016,19 and September 2017.20 It is highly that the test was of a hydrogen bomb. Although North
likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear Korea asserted that the fourth nuclear test conducted in
weapons program, collecting the necessary data through January 2016 was a hydrogen bomb test, given that the
these nuclear tests. estimated yield was 6-7kt, it is doubtful that a general
It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize hydrogen bomb test was conducted at that time.23 In
nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads any case, it is believed that with the passage of time,
that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying
nuclear weapons program. On September 3, 2017, it a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that
was announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had visited includes Japan in its range.
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a In this regard, related developments need to be
hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM,21 monitored carefully. North Korea’s nuclear weapons
Chapter 2
in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth development, considered in conjunction with North
nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities,
North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out including extending the range of ballistic missiles that
a test of H-bomb for ICBM.” In general, miniaturizing could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses
a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the

ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree security of Japan, and seriously undermine peace and
of technological capacity. However, considering, for security of the region and international community.
example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, Therefore, it can never be tolerated.
the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in b. Background of the Nuclear Program
acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear
well as the technological maturity that is estimated to development, North Korea is deemed to be developing
have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for
nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has achieved maintaining the existing regime in light of the following:
the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance
nuclear warheads.22 of the existing regime;24 North Korea considers that it
Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear
test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a threat of the United States25 and is in no position at least
maximum yield of approximately 160kt. Given the size of in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional
15 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and ROK analyses, the Japanese Government
arrived at the judgment that the probability of North Korea conducting a nuclear test was extremely high.
16 The Japanese Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on this day, given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had
successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the Japan Meteorological Agency’s detection of seismic waves with a waveform that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake.
17 On February 12, 2013 at around 11:59 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely
those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the Government of Japan
verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. Based on a comprehensive consideration of the aforementioned information, the Japanese
Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test,” “the test was conducted in a safe and perfect
way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” “physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear
deterrence that has become diversified.”
18 On January 6, 2016 at around 10:30 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely
those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. Based on a comprehensive
consideration of this and other information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
19 On September 9, 2016 at approximately 9:30 a.m., the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were
unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on a comprehensive consideration of all the information including this, the Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
20 At around 12:31 p.m. on September 3, 2017, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were
unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on comprehensive considerations, including the information from the JMA, the Government determined that the earthquake occurred as a result of a
nuclear test by North Korea.
21 On September 3, 2017, in a report on a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that North Korea is able to
conduct an “ultra-powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack over a wide area.”
22 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology
development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear
weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons
seems to have reached a considerable level.”
23 In regard to North Korea’s nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016) states, “Although we are continuing to evaluate
this event, the low yield of the test is not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device.” Furthermore, in January 2016, the ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the
National Assembly that because the power and seismic waves of the fourth nuclear test do not match up to those of the previous three nuclear tests, the test was unlikely a hydrogen bomb test.
24 U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” February 2016.
25 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North
Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.
Defense of Japan 68
forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK; North first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on
Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed June 12, 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un made clear his
and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in April 2017 intention to work towards the complete denuclearization
due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;26 and North Korea of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations
reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away would continue with the United States. Based on the
at negotiations. outcomes of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting it is
In fact, North Korea has repeatedly claimed to the now necessary to work closely with the United States and
international community that it was a “nuclear weapons the ROK and cooperate with the international community,
state.”27 In March 2013, North Korea adopted the “new including China and Russia, to elicit concrete actions
strategic line” (so-called “Byungjin line”) policy of from North Korea towards the dismantlement of all
simultaneous economic and nuclear development, alleging weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all
that even if it does not increase defense spending, it would ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.
Chapter 2
be able to concentrate on its economic development and

on improving the people’s livelihood as long as nuclear (2) Biological and Chemical Weapons
deterrence is robust, and thereby increases the effectiveness North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition,
of its war deterrent and defense force. At the Seventh KWP most materials, equipment, and technology used for
Congress and also in the “New Year’s Address” of January manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for
2018, it made clear that it would remain steadfast to this both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates
policy. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North
of the KWP in April 2018, in addition to declaring the Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development
“Byungjin line” was successfully carried out, North Korea and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical
declared that among other things, it had determined to weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several
“concentrate all efforts on building a powerful socialist facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already
economy and markedly improving the standard of people's a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also
living through the mobilization of all human and material thought to have some infrastructure for the production of
resources of the country.” biological weapons.28 Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and
With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development other chemical weapons, and of anthrax, smallpox, pest
of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have and other biological agents that could be used as biological
been held since August 2003, aimed at taking peaceful weapons have been pointed out.29 The possibility cannot
measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization on be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/
the Korean Peninsula. At the sixth round of the Talks or chemical weapons on warheads.
in September 2007, the parties reached an agreement,
which included completion of the disablement of nuclear (3) Ballistic Missiles
facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North
declaration of all (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing
the end of the year. However, the implementation of the to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears,
agreement has not been completed, and the Six-Party however, that North Korea gives high priority to the
Talks has been suspended since December 2008. At the development of ballistic missiles out of political and
26 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S.
preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the
Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017 states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “Swaggering as a superpower,
the US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons and the Trump administration is no exception.”
27 North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In April 2013, after conducting its third
nuclear test in February, North Korea adopted the Law on Consolidating the Position of Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State. During the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, KWP Chairman
Kim Jong-un delivered a report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, setting out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and stating, “We will consistently take hold on the strategic
line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity.”
28 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2016 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 t of various
chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pest. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military
and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of February 2016 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a
variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
29 In principle, the ballistic missile defense system is also used to handle ballistic missiles carrying biological or chemical weapons. With regard to the damage on the ground in the case where a ballistic
missile carrying a biological or chemical weapon is destroyed by a Patriot missile PAC-3, etc., there is no single answer to the question since the damage varies according to the various conditions
such as the type, performance, intercepted altitude and speed of the ballistic missile, and the weather. However, in general terms, the biological or chemical weapon will likely be neutralized by the
heat, etc. at the time of the destruction of the ballistic missile, and even if it retains its potency it will disperse during the freefall stage. Thus, it is believed that the ballistic missile will be unable to
demonstrate its prescribed effectiveness.

diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of images released by North Korea show that the ballistic
earning foreign currency,30 in addition to enhancing its missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and
military capabilities. The ballistic missiles currently had what appears to be small wings34 on its warhead,
deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud
are the following.31 missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are
See Fig. I-2-2-2 (Ballistic Missiles developed/Possessed by North Korea) similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is
Fig. I-2-2-3 (Image released by North Korea picturing the launch of that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line
a ballistic missile with ICBM range (estimated) (November 2017))
Fig. I-2-2-4 (Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date) exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine.
It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped
a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV).35 Given
North Korea that North Korea announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un
(a) Toksa
Chapter 2
Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range
KEY WORD
estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is mounted on
a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It is deemed that
Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)
Toksa is the first ballistic missile possessed or developed
by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.32 The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary

(b) Scud to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was
The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic developed mainly by the former Soviet Union among others in order
to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase
missile and is transported and operated on a TEL.
survivability. According to the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security
Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of
range, are short-range ballistic missiles with ranges May 2018, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scuds,
estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. 50 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans).
It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and The type of TEL differs according to the length and weight of the
deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle ballistic missile. The Scud, Nodong and Musudan are mounted on a
four-, five-, and six-axle wheel drive TEL respectively. The new type
East and other countries.
of intercontinental-range ballistic missile launched on July 4 and 28,
The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile
and the KN-08/14 are mounted on an eight-axle wheel-drive TEL, and
that has an extended range due to the extension of the the intercontinental-range ballistic missile believed to be a new type
Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the that was launched on November 29 appears to have been mounted
warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER and transferred on a nine-axle wheel-drive TEL. The ballistic missile
is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km,33 and it launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 appears to have been
launched from a continuous track TEL. Generally, a continuous track
appears that a part of Japan falls within this range.
TEL is adapted to operating on uneven ground but is not adapted to
In addition, North Korea is developing a ballistic
long distance transportation compared to the wheel-drive TEL.
missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to
missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed
2017, and is presumed to have flown approximately location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being
400 km and fallen into Japan’s exclusive economic zone mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related
underground facilities are thought to exist nationwide. Along with
(EEZ). A day after the launch, North Korea announced
activities related to the development of ballistic missiles, developments
that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly
related to the building of TELs require close watch as they concern the
developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision operational capabilities of ballistic missiles by North Korea.
navigation guidance system. In addition, while the
30 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign
Ministry spokesperson on December 13, 2002) At the same time, it is pointed out that North Korea’s ballistic missile exports have been set back by increasing pressure from the international
community.
31 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in April 2018) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to
be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.
32 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic
missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fi red the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea
will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.”
33 “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” published by DoD in May 2018.
34 It is generally said that small wings on the warhead have the functions of stabilizing aerodynamics, navigating during flight, and enhancing precision.
35 For example, according to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in April 2018), the launch on May 29, 2017, was presumed to have been the first launch of a
short-range ballistic missile based on a Scud missile, equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV), suggesting that North Korea has made advances in its precision guidance systems.
Defense of Japan 70
Fig. I-2-2-2 Ballistic Missiles developed/Possessed by North Korea

(m)
30 Made by MOD based on Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, etc. Note: North Korean names
given in blue.
Hwasong-15
20 Hwasong-14 08
Hwasong-12
14
Modified
ER
Modified
B, C
Pukkuksong-2
Chapter 2
10 Pukkuksong
SLBM
Scud B, C, ER, Rodong modified IRBM- ICBM- New type, Taepodong-2
Toksa Musudan SLBM KN-08/KN-14
Modified Modified for ground class class ICBM-class variant
launch
Approx. 300 km/
Approx.
approx. Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,300 km/ 1,000 km 1,000 km Approx. 5500 km 10,000 km 10,000 km 5,500 km or more
Range 2,500-
120 km Approx. 1,000km/ Approx. 1,500 km or more or more 5000 km or more or more* or more (ICBM reportedly)
4,000 km
Under analysis
Fuel Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid
Operation
TEL TEL TEL submarine TEL TEL TEL TEL TEL launch site TEL
platform
* Based on warhead weight, etc.
Fig. I-2-2-3 Image released by North Korea picturing the launch of a ballistic missile with ICBM range (estimated) (November 2017)
10,000 km New York

Taepodong-2 Variant
New type of intercontinental-range Washington D.C.
ballistic missile “Hwasong 15” Chicago
(Range: more than 10,000km*)
London
*Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.
5,500 km
Paris Denver
5,000 km
Moscow 4,000 km Anchorage San Francisco
1,500 km Los Angeles

1,300 km
Beijing
Pyongyang Tokyo
Intercontinental-range ballistic Hawaii
missile “Hwasong 14” 1,000 km
(Range: more than 5,500km) Okinawa
Guam
IRBM “Hwasong 12”
(Range: approx. 5,000km)
Musudan (range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km)
Nodong (range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km)
Scud-ER (range: approx. 1,000km)
Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.
Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

Fig. I-2-2-4 Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date

2015 and earlier
Number of
Date Presumed type of missile Location Flight distance
launches
1993/5/29 Nodong (possible) Unknown Unknown Approx. 500 km
1998/8/31 Taepodong-1 1 Taepodong Area Approx. 1,600 km
2006/7/5 Scud and Nodong 6 Kittaeryŏng Area Approx. 400 km
2006/7/5 Taepodong-2 1 Taepodong Area Unknown, presumed to have failed
2009/4/5 Taepodong-2 or variant 1 Taepodong Area 3,000 km or more
2009/7/4 Scud or Nodong 7 Kittaeryŏng Area Maximum approx. 450 km
2012/4/13 Taepodong-2 or variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Area Unknown, presumed to have failed
2012/12/12 Taepodong-2 variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Area Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)
2014/3/3 Scud 2 Near Wonsan Approx. 500 km
2014/3/26 Nodong 2 Near Sukchon Approx. 650 km
2014/6/29 Scud 2 Near Wonsan Approx. 500 km
Approx. 100 km south of
2014/7/9 Scud 2 Approx. 500 km
Chapter 2
Pyongyang
2014/7/13 Scud 2 Near Kaesong Approx. 500 km
2014/7/26 Scud 1 Approx. 100 km west of Haeju Approx. 500 km
2015/3/2 Scud 2 Near Nampo Approx. 500 km
2016
Number of

launches
2016/2/7 Taepodong-2 variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)
2016/3/10 Scud 2 Near Nampo Approx. 500 km
2016/3/18 Nodong 1 Near Sukchon Approx. 800 km
2016/4/15 Musudan (indicated) 1 East coast area Unknown, presumed to have failed
2016/4/23 SLBM “Pukkuksong” 1 Off the coast of Sinpo Approx. 30 km (ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff)
2016/4/28 Musudan 2 Wonsan Unknown, presumed to have failed
2016/5/31 Musudan (possible) 1 Wonsan Unknown, presumed to have failed
First: Approx. 100 km (maximum);
2016/6/22 Musudan 2 Wonsan
Second: Approx. 400 km
2016/7/9 SLBM “Pukkuksong” 1 Off the coast of Sinpo A few kilometers (ROK media reports)
2016/7/19 Scud and Nodong 3 Near Hwangju First: Approx. 400 km; Third: Approx. 500 km
Approx. 1,000 km
2016/8/3 Nodong 2 Near Unnyul
(the first exploded right after launch)
2016/8/24 SLBM ”Pukkuksong” 1 Oear Sinpo Approx. 500 km
2016/9/5 Scud ER 3 Near Hwangju Approx. 1,000 km
2016/10/15 Musudan 1 Near Kusong Unknown, presumed to have failed
2016/10/20 Musudan 1 Near Kusong Unknown, presumed to have failed
2017
Number of
launches
Ground-launched ballistic missile
2017/2/12 1 Near Kusong Approx. 500 km
modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”
2017/3/6 Scud ER 4 Near Tongch’ang-ri Approx. 1,000 km
2017/3/22 Under analysis 1 Near Wonsan Exploded within seconds of launch, presumed to have failed
2017/4/5 Under analysis 1 Near Sinpo Approx. 60 km
2017/4/16 Under analysis 1 Near Sinpo Exploded right after launch, presumed to have failed
2017/4/29 Under analysis 1 Near Pukchang Fell inland approx. 50 km away, presumed to have failed
IRBM-class ballistic missile
“Hwasong-12”
Ground-launched ballistic missile
2017/5/21 1 Near Pukchang Approx. 500 km
modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”
Ballistic missile modified from Scud
2017/5/29 1 Near Wonsan Approx. 400 km
missile
Intercontinental-range ballistic missile
“Hwasong-14”
Intercontinental-range ballistic missile
2017/7/28 1 Near Mupyong-ri Approximately 1,000 km
“Hwasong-14”
2017/8/29 1 Near Sunan Approximately 2,700 km
“Hwasong-12”
2017/9/15 1 Near Sunan Approximately 3,700 km
“Hwasong-12”
New type of Intercontinental-range
2017/11/29 1 Near Pyongsong Approximately 1,000 km
ballistic missile “Hwasong-15”
* North Korean names in parentheses)
Defense of Japan 72
Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the

shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach
approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of
the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this
type of ballistic missile was confirmed for the first time
in the images published by North Korea a day after the
launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19,
2016. Thus, it is necessary to continue to pay attention to
related developments.
(d) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an
SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry
Chapter 2
the SLBM (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong”).

Since it announced in May 2015 through its media that it
conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM, it has
made public SLBM launches on four occasions.36 Judging
from the images and footage that it has made public so far,
North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold

launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is
ejected into the air. Moreover, in the launches in April
and August 2016, it appears, based on observations such
as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and
the color of the smoke, that the militarily superior solid
fuel propellant system was adopted.37
A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM has
been confirmed in flight in the direction of Japan,
launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, on the east coast
of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. The SLBM flew
had ordered the development of ballistic missiles capable approximately 500 km. Considering that this was its
of precision attacks on enemy ships and other individual first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the possibility
targets, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy cannot be denied that North Korea had striven to solve
of ballistic missile attacks. the problems through the preceding launches and
(c) Nodong achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore,
The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage it is predicted that the ballistic missile presumed to
ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a be the SLBM that was launched at this time flew on
TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, a somewhat higher than nominal trajectory. If it were
reaching almost all of Japan. launched on a nominal trajectory the firing range is
Although the details of Nodong’s performance have expected to surpass 1,000 km.38 It is also thought that
not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy North Korea’s SLBM launches are conducted from a
to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, Gorae-class submarine (displacement 1,500 t). North
as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud Korea is believed to have one such submarine. It is also
technology. However, it has been suggested that North pointed out that North Korea seeks to develop a larger
Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In submarine to launch SLBMs.39
this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of It is deemed that through developing the SLBM
36 On May 9, 2015, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in a test launch of an SLBM. On January 8, 2016, it released footage of an SLBM test launch that appears to be different from the one
unveiled in May 2015. On April 24 and August 25, 2016, it again announced that it had succeeded in SLBM test launches. Moreover, the MOD predicts that North Korea also launched one ballistic
missile presumed to be an SLBM on July 9, 2016, although North Korea has not made an announcement about the launches.
37 It has been pointed out that North Korea’s SLBM is an improved version of the former Soviet Union’s liquid fuel propelled SLBM “SS-N-6,” similar to the Musudan.
38 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station on August 25, 2016, North Korea announced that this test launch “was successfully conducted without any negative effects on the safety of
nearby countries” based on the “high-angle launch system,” which presumably means a “lofted trajectory.”
39 Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2017-2018

and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends May 14, 2017 and is presumed to have reached a height
to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and of over 2,000 km and flew a distance of approximately
improve survivability. 800 km for about 30 minutes. Based on this flight
(e) Ballistic missile modified from the SLBM pattern, it is presumed that the ballistic missile was
North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both launched on a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched
February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared on a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is
to be a modified version of the SLBM for ground launch expected to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In
(referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a
This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the
approximately 500 km on both occasions, on somewhat images released by North Korea a day after the launch,
higher trajectories than nominal. If it were launched suggesting that the ballistic missile uses liquid fuel. On
on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is expected to August 29 and September 15, 2017 single missiles of
Chapter 2
surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on February this class were launched and flew over Japan’s territory
12, North Korea named the ballistic missile that was in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo.
launched “Pukguksong-2” and announced that it was The ballistic missile launched on August 29 flew at an
developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based altitude of approximately 550 km over Japanese territory,
on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also and is presumed to have flown a total distance of 2,700

announced a day after the launch on May 21, 2017 that km. The ballistic missile launched on September 15 is
it had again successfully conducted the test launch of presumed to have flown over Japanese territory at an
the Pukguksong-2 and that Chairman Kim Jong-un had altitude of between 700 and 800 km, flying for a total
authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the distance of approximately 3,700 km. These launches
launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile were the first cases of North Korea launching what it
is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous calls ballistic missiles that flew over Japan’s territory.
track TEL, and the characteristic radial exhausts of In view of their flight paths, these missiles appear to
solid fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed from demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also,
each of the images that North Korea released. It has the the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched
characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch in succession in a short time period would suggest that
system” and solid fuel propellant engines in common North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile
with the SLBM. Given that North Korea has made capabilities. Furthermore, although at the time of launches
references to its deployment for operational deployment, in May and August 2017 the missiles were confirmed to
there is a possibility that North Korea will newly deploy have been launched after being separated from the wheel-
a solid fuel propellant engine that includes Japan within drive TEL, at the time of the September launch the missile
its firing range. was confirmed to have been launched while still attached
(f) Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) to the wheel-drive TEL. Considering this point, together
To date North Korea has launched three liquid fuel- with North Korea’s claims at the time of the launch
propelled IRBMs (referred to by North Korea as that it was for the purposes of “confirming practical
“Hwasong-12”). This ballistic missile was launched on operational procedures” and “realize the potential of the
Defense of Japan 74
‘Hwasong-12’” there is a possibility that North Korea is line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed.
improving its practical operational capabilities. Based on these facts and the respective ranges that can be
In 2016 North Korea conducted repeated launches estimated for the missiles, the possibility can be deduced
of an IRBM that is presumed to be the Musudan,40 but that the intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that were
although the missile launched in June flew for a certain launched on July 4 and 28 were developed on the basis of
distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were the new-type IRBM that had been launched on May 14.
two successive launch failures in October would Also based on images published by North Korea, it can
suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining be confirmed that the ballistic missiles that were launched
towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that on July 4 and 28 had been mounted on the wheeled eight-
North Korea may be concentrating on the development axle TEL similar to KN-08/14 (see (j) below). However,
and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the
IRBM instead. launches that they were launched from simplified launch
Chapter 2
(g) Intercontinental-range ballistic missile pads, not TELs. Furthermore, the images suggest that the
(Launched on July 4 and 28, 2017) missile was of two-stage construction.
To date North Korea has launched two intercontinental- (h) New type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile
range ballistic missiles (referred to by North Korea as (Launched on November 29, 2017)
“Hwasong-14”). One such ballistic missile was launched On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a single
on July 4, 2017, reaching a height well over 2,500 missile that is presumed to have been a new type of
km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 40 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (referred to by
minutes. It flew approximately 900 km and is estimated North Korea as “Hwasong-15”) different to the missiles
to have fallen into Japan’s EEZ. Another missile that described in (g) above. The missile reached a height
was launched on July 28 reached a height of well over of well over 4,000 km, and is estimated to have flown
3,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately approximately 53 minutes, covering a distance of
45 minutes, covering a distance of approximately approximately 1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ.
1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ. From this From this flight pattern it is presumed that the missile was
flight pattern it is presumed that the two ballistic missiles launched on a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch,
were launched on a lofted trajectory. If they were to have North Korea made an “government statement,” declaring
been launched on a normal trajectory it is estimated that that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the
they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with
On July 4, the day of the launch, North Korea made an the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland, and
“important announcement,”41 announcing that it had asserting that it had now completed development of its
successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of
ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28
launch, North Korea announced that the “nuclear bomb
detonation device” had functioned normally, emphasizing
that the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry
environment had been made maintained. This suggests
that North Korea is aiming to operationalize long-range
ballistic missiles.
Based on images released by North Korea, the
ballistic missiles launched on July 4 and 28 have the
following in common with the IRBM launched on May
14: (1) the engine system consists of one main engine
and four auxiliary engines, (2) the shape of the lower part
of the propulsion system is conical, and (3) the straight-
40 With a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, it has been suggested that all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within the Musudan’s firing range. Similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts,
it is liquid fuel-propelled and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North Korea acquired in the
early 1990s.
41 In addition to this announcement, the announcement that North Korea had succeeded in its first hydrogen bomb test (January 6, 2016) and the announcement that it had succeeded in the launch of
the earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 (February 7, 2016) have been issued as “important announcements.”

Commentary North Korea’s ICBM development situation COLUMN

North Korea launched an intercontinental-range ballistic missile twice in July 2017 and once in November 2017 and asserted that
“all of the mainland United States is within range for nuclear attack” in the New Year’s address given in January 2018.
Generally, realization of an ICBM as a weapon requires (1) a range of at least 5,500km, (2) miniaturization of nuclear weapon
and acquisition of nuclear warhead, and (3) atmospheric reentry technology.
Regarding range (1), the intercontinental-range ballistic missile launched twice in July 2018 (referred to by North Korea as
Hwasong-14) appears to have a range of at least 5,500km based on the flight distance, altitude, and other points. Additionally,
the new intercontinental-range ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as Hwasong-15) launched in November 2018 might
exceed 10,000km depending on the warhead weight and other aspects.
Regarding development of miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquisition of nuclear warhead (2), North Korea might have
reached this level in light of the more than 10 years elapsed since conducting the first nuclear test in 2006 and the technological
Chapter 2
maturity estimated to have been reached through a total of six nuclear tests.
Regarding atmospheric reentry technology (3), heat protection technology that prevents deformation, destruction, and other
damage to the nuclear warhead on reentry into the atmosphere after the ballistic missile has been launched and leaves the
atmosphere is particularly important. While North Korea has repeatedly claimed to have verified this technology, it is still necessary
to carefully analyze whether North Korean has actually verified

this technology.
North Korea is deemed to accumulate related technologies
through repeated launches of ballistic missiles. Given this
reality, it is necessary to establish even further readiness in
order to protect the lives and property of the Japanese people
and defend Japan’s territories, seas, and airspace.
If North Korea made further progress in the development
of ballistic missiles and demonstrated the atmospheric
reentry technology, etc., could unilaterally gain recognition
of having strategic deterrence against the United States.
Overconfidence or misperception of this deterrence by North
Korea might lead to increased and more serious military
provocations in the region. Japan thinks this situation could
warrant substantial concern.
Some observers suggest that North Korea could obtain
the ability to attack the United States with a nuclear-armed
ballistic missile within a few months. The Japanese government
needs to carefully monitor North Korea’s nuclear and missile
development situation. Image of reentry into the atmosphere
state nuclear force. the TEL prior to launch and that its straight-line exhausts
The following points would suggest that this missile are characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine.
is a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile, Furthermore, based on the flight altitude, distance
different from the two intercontinental-range ballistic flown and released images, it can be assumed that this
missiles launched in July 2017: (1) its flight distance missile could have a range in excess of 10,000 km,
and altitude, (2) the fact that North Korea announced depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc.,
the successful test launch of a new type of ICBM, the thus renewing concerns over the increasing ranges of
“Hwasong-15,” (3) the fact that the missile was deployed North Korea’s ballistic missiles.
on a previously unseen nine-axle wheel-drive TEL, In addition, although the wheel-drive TELs
and (4) that the nose of the warhead was more rounded possessed by North Korea are thought to be modified
than previous missiles. In addition, according to images versions of Russian and Chinese TELs, given that North
released by North Korea, the missile was of a two-stage Korea has claimed to have developed its own TEL, future
design, and it can be confirmed that it was removed from developments will continue to be monitored.
Defense of Japan 76
(g) Taepodong-1 and 2 range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had

Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that
missiles launched from fixed launch pads. Taepodong-1 (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic
is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same
ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit
a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range around the Earth.
of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 was Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches
launched from the Taepodong district on North Korea’s of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the
northeastern coastline in 1998, and it is presumed that part development of shorter-range missiles in such ways
of it flew over Japan and fell in to the Sanriku offshore as increasing the range and payload capability and
waters. Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also,
for the development of Taepodong-2. related technology such as the separation technology
Chapter 2
Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile which uses of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology
in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range
based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and
of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly
be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while developing. Therefore, the launch may lead not only to
the range of its three-stage variant can be more than the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles
approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of including Nodong but also to the advancement of North
the warhead is not over approximately 1 t. Taepodong-2 Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the
missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five development of new ballistic missiles and diversification
times so far. of attack measure.
Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea North Korea continues to claim that it will keep
conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” conducting “satellite launches” and will develop and
from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is
coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant, possible that North Korea will further develop its long-
a type similar to that of the previous ballistic missile range ballistic missiles by repeating similar launches
launch in December 2012, after notifying international under the name of “satellite” launches, in order to carry
organizations.42 It is assessed that North Korea’s long- out further technical tests to operationalize its long-range
ballistic missiles. It has been suggested that North Korea
is carrying out modification for upsizing its launch tower
in Tongch’ang-ri district.43 While the missile launched
in February 2016 was similar in size to the Taepodong-2
variant launched in December 2012, North Korea may
launch larger long-range ballistic missiles in the future.
Furthermore, as launches from fixed launch pads are
vulnerable to external attacks, North Korea may seek
resiliency and survivability through building underground
or silo launch facilities and launching from TELs.
(j) KN-08/KN-14
The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was
showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July
42 In June 2016, what appears to be a part of the fairing of the Taepodong-2 variant launched in February 2016, based on its appearance and other features, washed ashore and was discovered in the
coast of Tottori Prefecture. The MOD has received it from Shimane Prefecture and was analyzing the details as of the end of June 2018.
43 Articles dated October 1 and July 29, 2014 published on the website (38 North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States point out that analyses of satellite images
of the Tongch’ang-ri district show that the launch tower was raised to 55 m, enabling launches of rockets up to 50 m in height, larger than the Taepodong-2 variant (total height approx. 30 m) which
was used in December 2012.

2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be announcements such as the one in November 2017 on the
an ICBM.44 At the military parade in October 2015, a new day of the launch of what is believed to have been a new
missile thought to be the “KN-08” was showcased with a type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile, claiming
different-shaped warhead from the previous version.45 The that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry
U.S. DoD reportedly calls the new missile, considered environment,49 North Korea is displaying an intention
a variant of the “KN-08,” the “KN-14.” Whereas the to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the
Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles.50 This
“KN-08” and “KN-14” are carried by a TEL, making it has become a serious concern for relevant countries
difficult to detect signs of their launch in advance, and is including Japan.
likely intended to increase survivability. Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance
b. Trends in Recent Ballistic Missile Launches the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for
North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of saturation attacks with regard to ballistic missiles already
Chapter 2
ballistic missiles. In particular, since 2016 it has conducted deployed. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already
as many as 40 ballistic missile launches, including launches deployed, launches had been confirmed when Kim Jong-il
of what appear to be new types of missiles. was the Chairman of the National Defense Commission.
As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile Since 2014, they have been launched eastward from
launches, firstly, it appears that the country seeks to increase unprecedented locations in western North Korea, cutting

the firing range of ballistic missiles.46 In February 2016, across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late
it launched a long-range ballistic missile (a Taepodong-2 hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers.
variant) which was disguised as a “satellite,” and in the This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching
same year repeatedly launched the Musudan, considered Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from
to have Guam in its range. As for the IRBM that was which it is deemed that it has increased confidence in the
launched in 2017, it is expected to reach a maximum performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.
firing range of approximately 5,000 km. Furthermore, As for Scuds and Nodongs, since 2016, there have
in July intercontinental-range ballistic missiles were been launches where it is presumed that warheads fell in
launched, followed by another intercontinental-range Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s security. The
ballistic missile launch in November, which is considered ballistic missile launched on August 3, 2016 that appears
to have been a new type of missile that could have a to be a Nodong flew approximately 1,000 km, with its
range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight warhead predicted to have fallen into the Japanese EEZ
of the warhead deployed,etc.47 Although it is considered for the first time. The three ballistic missiles launched
necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic on September 5 of the same year, apparently Scud ERs,
missiles to further verify technology for protecting the were launched simultaneously and are all estimated to
re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh temperature that is have fallen in more or less the same place in Japan’s
generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead EEZ after flying approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the
part, North Korea announced in March 2016 that it four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on
had successfully conducted a “mock ballistic missile March 6, 2017 were launched simultaneously, three of
atmospheric re-entry environment test”48 and announced which are predicted to have fallen within Japan’s EEZ
that it had demonstrated atmospheric reentry technology and the other near the EEZ, after flying approximately
for warheads on the July 4 launch. In addition, with 1,000 km. It is possible that through these launches, North
44 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of February 2015 notes that, “[North Korea] has publicly displayed its KN-08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that
North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.”
45 Jane’s Defence Weekly dated October 13, 2015 notes that the “KN-08” showcased at the military parade on October 10, 2015 had a larger third stage than the earlier version, and therefore, could
have an extended range. It also suggests that low quality ablative materials cannot withstand high temperatures during re-entry, and thus, a blunter shape warhead may have been developed to
reduce speed to protect the warhead.
46 North Korea is thought to have started developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong.
47 KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un's January 2017 New Year's Address announced that the test launch of an ICBM had entered the final stage of preparation. In North Korea, a New Year’s Address by
President Kim Il-sung had been given every year on January 1 up to 1994. Since the death of the president, from 1995 to 2012, a New Year’s Joint Editorial by the KWP bulletin Rodong Sinmun, the
Korean People’s Army bulletin Joson Inmingun, and the Kimilsungist Youth League bulletin Youth Vanguard had been published in its place.
48 According to images released by North Korea, the aim of the test appears to be to conduct a test that simulates the high temperature that occurs during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by
firing the engine of the ballistic missile at the test object installed on a fixed platform. Generally, it is difficult to recreate the circumstances of the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by the emission
from the engine alone. It is necessary to conduct technology verification by flight tests to conduct an accurate demonstration including the impact of the airflow, etc.
49 Further analysis is necessary to determine whether North Korea was able to demonstrate the warhead protection technology during atmospheric re-entry necessary for the operationalization of long-
range ballistic missiles by the July 4, 2017 launch.
50 North Korea announced the implementation of the ground test for a “new type of large-output generator (engine) for ICBMs” in April 2016, the implementation of the ground test for a new type of
large-output generator (engine) for satellite-launch rocket launchers in September 2016, and the ground test for a new type of “large-output engine” in March 2017.
Defense of Japan 78
Korea’s intentions are not only research and development that at the June 22, 2016 Musudan launch and the May
of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their 14, July 4, July 28, and November 29, 2017 launches
operational capabilities. Since Chairman Kim Jong-un of the ballistic missile, so-called lofted trajectories,
has repeatedly instructed the military troops to reject in which missiles are launched at higher angles than
formality and conduct practical training, it can be nominal to high altitudes, were utilized. Generally, when
considered that these instructions underpin the launches a launch is made on a lofted trajectory, interception is
of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed. considered to be more difficult.
North Korea also has claimed that a new type of Should North Korea make further progress in
ballistic missile which appears to have been modified the development of ballistic missiles, including the
from the Scud missile launched on May 29, 2017 is a verification of reentry technologies, it may come to have
“ballistic missile that incorporates a precision navigation a one-sided understanding that it has secured strategic
guidance system,” and it has also been noted that this deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea
Chapter 2
missile is equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle have such a false sense of confidence and recognition
(MaRV). It is deemed that North Korea is aiming to regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases and
enhance the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic the escalation of military provocations by North Korea
missiles that have already been deployed. in the region and could create situations that are deeply
Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to worrying also for Japan.
improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by c. Future Outlook for Ballistic Missile Development
enhancing secrecy and instantaneity to make it difficult In his “New Year’s Address” in January 2018, Chairman
to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a Kim Jong-un declared the historic accomplishment of
ballistic missile can be launched from any point, making perfecting the national nuclear forces, and called for
it difficult to detect signs of a launch in advance. North “mass-production of nuclear warheads and ballistic
Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from missiles, the power and reliability of which have already
TELs and SLBMs. In addition, the SLBMs repeatedly been proved to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for
launched in 2016 and the ballistic missile presumed to deploying them for action.” North Korea’s development
be modified from the SLBM as a ground-launched type of long-range ballistic missiles has also been covered in
and launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 appear other publications, including the 2018 Nuclear Posture
to use solid fuel. It is thus possible that North Korea is Review (NPR) of the United States announced in February
proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic 2018, in which it was noted that “North Korea may now
missiles.51 Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles be only months away from the capability to strike the
are pre-loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.”
launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more However, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central
difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman
more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of ICBM test
handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In launches. Then, at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting
this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. in June, he clearly expressed the intention to work
From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming towards denuclearization. Given these developments it
to enhance its surprise attack capabilities. will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor trends
Fourthly, North Korea may be attempting to in North Korea’s ballistic missile development program.
diversify the forms of launches. It has been confirmed
51 In addition, in images released together with reports by North Korean media about the visit of Chairman Kim Jong-un to the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science, a panel
could be seen featuring the name “Pukguksong-3,” which, in view of the name “Pukguksong,” has led some people to speculate that North Korea is developing a new type of solid fuel-propelled
ballistic missile.

4 Domestic Affairs reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of

the KWP and Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North
(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime Korean media began to report the activities of Chairman
After the demise of Chairman of the National Defense Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior
Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Jong-un became member of the KWP.53 These developments suggest that
the de facto head of the military, party, and the state by a generational change in the leadership may be taking
assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the place among the Kim dynasty.
KPA, First Secretary of the KWP, and First Chairman of At the KWP Congress held in May 2016, Kim
the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The Jong-un was named to the new post of KWP Chairman.
framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in In his report on the work of the KWP Central Committee,
a short period of time. Since the transition to the new the Chairman set out that North Korea was a “nuclear
regime, there has been a number of announcements of weapons state,” and said the country would consistently
Chapter 2
party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, uphold the “Byungjin line” policy of economic
the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time development and the building of nuclear force as well
since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. as further boost its self-defensive nuclear force both
These developments suggest that the state is run under in quality and quantity. In this manner, the Chairman
the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, Chairman Kim demonstrated, both to those in and outside of the country,

Jong-un underscores the importance of military strength North Korea’s readiness to continue with its nuclear and
and makes frequent visits to military organizations. In missile development. Prior to the Congress, North Korea
this light, the Chairman is anticipated to continue to conducted provocations at unprecedented frequency and
attach importance to military strength. content, including the launch of ballistic missiles.
Following the change in regime, Chairman Kim The holding of the KWP Congress may be an
Jong-un has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by
including reshuffles of the top three military posts of establishing the state-run governance system centered on
the Director of the General Political Bureau, the Chief the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms
of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions,
Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom Chairman Kim both in name and in substance.54 At the Supreme People’s
Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military, Assembly session convened in June 2016, it was
and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang decided that the National Defense Commission would
Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense be turned into the State Affairs Commission, and KWP
Commission and Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was Chairman Kim Jong-un was named Chairman of the
executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed State Affairs Commission, the new “highest position”
that through such measures, the Chairman endeavors of the “state” replacing First Chairman of the National
to strengthen and consolidate a monolithic leadership Defense Commission. These changes are also likely to be
system.52 In 2014, the North Korean media stopped manifestations of the governance system moving into full
52 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system”
and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North
Korea’s single-minded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. The ROK National Intelligence
Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that the Minister was executed in late April 2015. In July 2015, the North Korean media introduced Pak Yong-sik, previous Deputy Director of the
General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, with the title, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Additionally, since February 21, 2016, the North Korean media has introduced Ri Myong-su,
previous Minister of People’s Security, as Chief of General Staff Department instead of Ri Yong-gil. Ri Yong-gil was announced as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo at the KWP Congress in
May 2016.
53 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Kim Yo-jong was elected a member of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress held in May 2016. The media has also shown her
supporting KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un on the podium during the celebration parade following the KWP Congress. In addition, at the Second Plenum of the Seventh KWP Congress in October 2017,
Kim Yo-jong was elected as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.
54 Elections for members and alternate members of the KWP central leadership agencies (e.g., KWP Central Committee and KWP Politburo) were held during the KWP Congress. Pak Pong-ju, Premier,
and Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary, were newly elected as KWP Politburo Standing Committee members to form a five-member Standing Committee including: Kim Jong-un, KWP Chairman; Kim
Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and Hwang Pyong-so, Director of the General Political Bureau. All five members of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee
are not genuine military personnel. Furthermore, the ranks of military personnel have fallen within the KWP Politburo, and Premier Pak Pong-ju has been added as a member of the KWP Central
Military Commission. It is pointed out that these aspects show that a KWP-led governance system is shifting into high gear.
Defense of Japan 80
swing.55 However, with senior officials unable to dispute sanctions an even more severe economic situation could
the decisions of Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy beset North Korea.
effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North
dismissals of senior officials, it is believed that there is Korea has made attempts at limited improvement
growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of measures and some changes to its economic management
North Korea turning to military provocations without systems,57 and promotes the establishment of economic
making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition, development zones58 and the enlargement of the
it has been suggested that there is declining social control discretion of plants and other entities over production and
caused by widening wealth disparities and information sales plans.59 Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the
inflow from other countries. In this regard, attention will Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, in addition
be paid to the stability of the regime. to declaring the “Byungjin line” was successfully carried
out, North Korea declared that among other things, it
Chapter 2
(2) Economic Conditions had determined to “concentrate all efforts on building a

In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing powerful socialist economy and markedly improving the
chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in standard of people’s living through the mobilization of
recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist all human and material resources of the country.” These
planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation all suggest that North Korea is placing importance on
with the former Soviet Union and East European rebuilding its economy. Nonetheless, North Korea is
countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could
for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system,
rely on food assistance from overseas.56 Following North and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental
Korea’s various provocations including the nuclear test in improvement of its current economic situation.
January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised In addition, the possibility has been noted that North
as a “satellite” in February 2016, the ROK decided to Korea could be evading the UNSC sanctions by engaging
completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial in smuggling operations, and since the beginning of 2018,
Complex, which makes up over 99% of inter-Korean MSDF assets patrol aircraft including have confirmed
trade. Furthermore, the strengthening of sanctions by numerous cases in which North Korean-flagged tankers
countries including Japan and the United States, and the have drawn alongside foreign tankers in international
sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions waters. After comprehensive analysis, the Government of
in response to the implementation of nuclear tests and Japan has determined that there is a strong possibility that
missile launches by North Korea can be assumed to have these vessels have been conducting ship-to-ship transfers
had a certain effect, when considered together with the in the high seas, which is forbidden under the terms of
severe economic situation of North Korea. Accordingly, UNSC resolutions.60
if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner, and other See Fig. I-2-2-5 (Sanctions against North Korea based on UN
relevant countries continue to rigorously implement Security Council Resolutions)
55 After the Supreme People’s Assembly session in June 2016, the media introduced the “Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,” who is considered equivalent to the minister of defense, as the “Minister
(Secretary) of the People’s Armed Forces,” raising the possibility that the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces has been reorganized into the Ministry (Department) of the People’s Armed Forces.
56 In June 2017, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) designated North Korea as a country requiring external assistance for food.
57 For example, North Korea conducted a so-called currency revaluation ( decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The currency revaluation is said to have led to economic
disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest.
58 During the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee on March 31, 2013, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant
to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. To date, 21 economic development zones have been established.
59 While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside
the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefits based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be
introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m2) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural products going to the state and
60% going to individuals.
60 For details of these cases and information about Japan’s response, please refer to Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2.

5 Relations with Other Countries On June 12 the historic first-ever U.S.-North Korea
summit meeting was held and both sides confirmed
(1) Relations with the United States that they would join their efforts to build a lasting and
The U.S. Trump administration announced that it would stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Chairman
deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue based Kim Jong-un made clear his intention to work towards
on the concept of “all options are on the table,” and the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
increased its presence in this region by means such as three and confirmed that negotiations would continue with
carrier strike groups, including a Ronald Reagan carrier the United States. Furthermore, in a press conference
strike group conducting joint training in the Western following the summit meeting, President Trump stated
Pacific Ocean in November 2017. In addition, in the that North Korea had agreed to destroy a missile engine
Joint Statement by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, testing site. Based on the outcomes of the U.S.-North
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and Director of Korea summit meeting it is now necessary to work closely
Chapter 2
National Intelligence Dan Coats released in April, 2017, with the United States and the ROK and cooperate with
it was declared that the U.S. policy towards North Korea the international community, including China and Russia,
aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, to elicit concrete actions from North Korea towards the
ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and
economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable

with its allies and regional partners. In August 2017, then- and irreversible manner.
Secretary of State Tillerson and Defense Secretary Mattis
issued a joint statement, in which they reiterated that the (2) Relations with the Republic of Korea
United States would apply pressure towards achieving The administration of President Moon Jae-in inaugurated
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that an in May 2017 has expressed its position on North Korea
immediate cessation of nuclear and missile tests would that, while putting emphasis on inter-Korean relations
be required in order for the United States to enter into through dialogue, it also indicated a stance of responding
negotiations with North Korea. resolutely through sanctions and pressure to provocations
In response, North Korea repeated its previous by North Korea. In fact, based on the policy of responding
assertions that developing its own nuclear deterrent resolutely to provocations, in December 2017 the Moon
capability was necessary in order to respond to the administration announced a new set of ROK sanctions
nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued against North Korea. North Korea also continued to
to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior.61 In engage in repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior
addition, North Korea reacted sharply to such actions against the ROK, including a statement in October that if
as U.S.-ROK combined exercises, alleging that such war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, the entire
activities were a manifestation of the “hostile policy” ROK would be reduced to ashes. These events caused
of the U.S. towards North Korea and repeatedly voicing inter-Korean tensions to rise.
strong criticism against the United States, coupled with On the other hand, in his “New Year’s Address” in
military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.62 January 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un indicated North
On the other hand, in a meeting with a delegation headed Korea’s desire to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang
by a special envoy from the ROK in March 2018, Winter Olympic Games and demonstrated a willingness
Chairman Kim Jong-un was reported as having expressed to improve inter-Korean relations. Following this, on
understanding for U.S.-ROK joint exercises and noted January 9, a North-South High Level Officials’ Meeting
that he would be open to holding a U.S.-North Korea was held, and through frequent inter-Korean consultations
meeting.63 The United States also indicated that it would thereafter preparations were made for North Korea to
be prepared to hold a meeting with North Korea on the participate in the Winter Olympic Games. During the
condition that North Korea would move to denuclearize. Games, Kim Yo-jong visited the ROK, which was followed
61 For example, on August 8, 2017, a spokesperson for the KPA Strategic Rocket Forces announced that North Korea was carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire in the
areas around Guam with its “medium- to long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12.” In addition, in a statement by the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission on September 22, Chairman
Kim Jong-un noted that he was “giving serious consideration to exercising the highest level of hardline countermeasures in history.”
62 On this point, Rodong Sinmun dated March 24, 2017 states that “our Strategic Forces have also routinized ballistic rocket launch exercises” in response to the U.S.-ROK joint exercise.
63 According to an announcement by the ROK, in the meeting North Korea agreed to hold an inter-Korean summit meeting at the end of April and establish a hotline between the two leaders. In addition,
it was reported by the ROK that North Korea had indicated that it would have no reason to keep nuclear weapons if the military threat to the North was eliminated and its security guaranteed, that it
was prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States towards denuclearization and with a view to normalizing relations, and that while dialogue is ongoing it would not resume provocations such
as nuclear or missile tests. North Korea was also reported as expressing understanding for the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.
Defense of Japan 82
Fig. I-2-2-5 Sanctions against North Korea based on UN Security Council Resolutions
Main content
Items Sanction content Related resolution

No. 2397
Crude oil Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons
(December 2017)
No. 2397
Petroleum refined products Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels
(December 2017)
No. 2371
Coal Total ban on imports from North Korea
(August 2017)
No. 2375
Ship offloading Banned
(September 2017)
Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea
Date Resolution Catalyst event Main content

2006.7.16 No. 1695 Seven ballistic missile launches (2006/7/5) Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans
Chapter 2
Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and
2006.10.15 No. 1718 First nuclear test (2006/10/9)
large weapons
Taepodong 2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test
2009.6.13 No. 1874 Adoption of financial regulations
(2009/5/25)
2013.1.23 No. 2087 Taepodong 2 launch (2012/12/12) Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions
Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods on ships

2013.3.8 No. 2094 Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)
suspected of transporting banned goods within one’s own territorial waters
Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North
Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong 2 launch
2016.3.3 No. 2270 Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear
(2016/2/7)
and missile plans)
Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports to North Korea (roughly $400
2016.11.30 No. 2321 Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)
million/7.5 million tons a year)
2017.6.3 No. 2356 Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9 Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions
Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of
Intercontinental-range ballistic missile launch
2017.8.6 No. 2371 an upper limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the
(2017/7/4 and 7/28)
first time
Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the
2017.9.12 No. 2375 Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)
import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers
New type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/
2017.12.23 No. 2397
launch (2017/11/29) imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea
by a meeting in March between a delegation headed had agreed to visit Pyongyang in the autumn of 2018.
by a special envoy from the ROK and Chairman Kim Future developments in inter-Korean relations will be
Jong-un, which served to facilitate preparations for the closely watched.
inter-Korean summit meeting. The inter-Korean summit
meeting was held on April 27, resulting in the issuance (3) Relations with China
of the Panmunjom Declaration, which confirmed among The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship,
other matters that the two countries agreed to completely Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was
cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, concluded in 1961, is still in force.65 In addition, China
and confirmed the common goal of realizing, through is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In
complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean 2016, trade volume between China and North Korea
Peninsula. In addition, in a second inter-Korean summit was very large, accounting for approximately 90% of
meeting held on May 26, Chairman Kim Jong-un North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between
reiterated his desire for the complete denuclearization North Korea and the ROK),66 suggesting North Korea’s
of the Korean Peninsula. The Panmunjom Declaration dependence on China.
also notes that the two countries will aim to declare an With regard to the situation in North Korea and
end to the Korean War64 and that President Moon Jae-in its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for
64 The Korean War began in June 1950 and in July 1953 an armistice agreement was concluded. In the Panmunjom Declaration, the two countries announced that they would engage in consultations
with a view to declaring an end to the War by the end of this year, which is the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, and turning the armistice into a peace treaty.
65 It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and
other assistance.
66 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).

denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, for peace and (4) Relations with Russia
stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving problems Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along
through dialogue and consultations. While it has endorsed with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization
the series of UNSC Resolutions, which strengthen on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-
sanctions on North Korea.67 It has also stated that Party Talks. Following the sixth nuclear test conducted
sanctions alone will be unable to achieve a fundamental by North Korea in September 2017, Russia condemned
solution to the nuclear issue and that a solution should North Korea’s nuclear test for violating UNSC
be found through dialogue and consultations. On this Resolutions, but also stated that measures that would
point China has repeatedly referred to “dual suspension,” escalate tensions should be avoided. Nonetheless, Russia
by which it means that North Korea should temporarily approved UNSC Resolution 2375, which was adopted in
suspend nuclear and missile test activities and that the September 2017. Furthermore, although Russia endorsed
United States and the ROK should temporarily suspend UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, it
Chapter 2
joint military exercises. emphasized that pressure on North Korea should make
China is a vital political and economic partner for way for dialogue and negotiations.
North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the Following the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting
country. Although it has been noted that China-North in June, Russia has continued to demonstrate an active
Korea relations had deteriorated due to North Korea’s stance in supporting political and diplomatic processes

repeated nuclear and ballistic missile tests, in March 2018 in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and has called on
the first-ever China-North Korea summit meeting under relevant countries to give consideration to consultations
the leadership of Chairman Kim Jong-un was held,68 in in a multilateral format.
which the two leaders agreed to further develop bilateral
relations and also for President Xi Jinping to make a visit (5) Relations with Other Countries
to North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un made another Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish
visit to China in May and held a second meeting with relations with a series of West European countries
President Xi, in which it is reported that issues such as the and others, including the establishment of diplomatic
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were discussed. relations with European countries69 and participation in
Chairman Kim Jong-un made a third visit to China in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been
June, and is believed to have explained the outcomes of reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships
the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting to President Xi with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar,
and engaged in an exchange of opinions. On the other and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and
hand, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions military technology transfer.
which are in line with the position of China over nuclear In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be
and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, China has strengthening its relations with African countries, with
opposed the implementation of excessive sanctions on North Korean senior officials paying visits to African
North Korea that could lead to destabilizing the Korean countries.70 The underlying purposes for enhancing
Peninsula. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations with these countries include the usual objective
relations and China’s influence on North Korea require of deepening political and economic cooperation. In
continued attention. addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire
foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military
67 On January 5, 2018, the Ministry of Commerce of China announced that based on UNSC Resolution 2397, China would implement measures from January 6, including restrictions on export of crude
oil to North Korea and restrictions on export of refined petroleum products.
68 According to a statement released by China, in the China-North Korea summit meeting Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be realized if
the ROK and the United States would take phased measures in step with North Korea in order to realize peace and reconciliation. This visit to China was the first overseas visit made by Chairman Kim
Jong-un since assuming the leadership of North Korea.
69 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
70 For example, in May 2016, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of Equatorial Guinea. He held talks with
the President, as well as with the leaders of the Republic of Chad, the Gabonese Republic, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali who
were attending the inauguration ceremony.
Defense of Japan 84
cooperation with African countries – activities which are Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia
becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on are reviewing their diplomatic and economic relations
UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in with North Korea.72
the Middle East. In February 2017, a North Korean man was murdered
It is actually the case that transactions that violate in Malaysia and the Malaysian Government later
the terms of UNSC Resolutions have been observed,71 confirmed that the man was Kim Jong-nam. The Malaysia
and the possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities police also announced that VX, whose production and
could provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic use are banned by the Convention on the Prohibition of
missile development is a cause for concern. At the same the Development , Production, Stockpiling and Use of
time, however, following the adoption of the series of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical
UNSC Resolutions in 2017, various countries in Europe, Weapons Convention), was detected from his body.
Chapter 2
2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea
1 General Situation 2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

In May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration was The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital
inaugurated in the ROK. With regard to its North Korea Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10
policy, while on the one hand the administration announced million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set
that it would put emphasis on improving inter-Korean the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the
relations through dialogue, it also indicated a stance of country from external military threats and invasions, to
responding resolutely through sanctions and pressure to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional
provocations by North Korea. How the North Korea policy stability and world peace.” As one of the “external
of the Moon administration will impact inter-Korean military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper,
relations will continue to require close attention. used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.”
The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the
stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain
War. The ROK has established very close security as our enemies.”73
arrangements with the United States primarily based on The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of
the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces its national defense.74 In recent years, in August 2012,
Korea have been playing an important role in securing in light of the sinking of the ROK patrol boat and the
peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, the Defense
role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict Reform Basic Plan (2012-2030) was released by the
on the Korean Peninsula. Ministry of National Defense of the ROK,75 which
included enhancing deterrence capabilities against North
Korea and making the military even more efficient. In
March 2014, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-
71 The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in March 2018 makes references to the export of weapons and related military
equipment to Eritrea, the export of surface-to-air missiles to Mozambique, and the repair and renewal of surface-to-air missile systems and air defense radar in Tanzania.
72 For example, in September 2017, Spain recalled its ambassador to North Korea, and Italy followed suit in October. In September the Philippines announced that it would cease trading with North
Korea. Furthermore, in November Sudan announced that it had ceased all transactions with North Korea and in October Uganda announced that it had expelled all persons related to the North Korean
military or weapons-related companies.
73 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 describes North Korea as follows: “[T]he constant military threats and provocations from North Korea are the primary security threats the ROK faces today. In
particular, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear weapons and missiles, cyber-attacks and terrorism pose major threats to our national security. As long as these threats
persist, the North Korean regime and its military will remain an enemy insofar as they are the agents carrying out these threats.”
74 Under the Act concerning National Defense Reform passed in 2006, the Defense Reform Basic Plan must analyze and evaluate changes in the situation and the results of the promotion of national
defense reform and be revised and supplemented, even after its establishment.
75 The ROK Ministry of National Defense states that in order to convert the ROK Forces into an “order-made military structure” that matches the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula, it
will significantly expand response capabilities in the Northwestern Islands area, reorganize the senior command structure in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational command, gradually
proceed with the reduction and reorganization of the troops, and significantly expand response capabilities against missiles and cyberwarfare, etc. In order to build a “high-efficiency developed
country-type national defense operation structure,” it will also promote efficiency, reorganize the human resources control structure, enhance the welfare of the military, and improve the military
service environment of the troops.

2030) was unveiled,76 which included in its scope the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision
long-term development of defense capabilities in order included the elimination of warhead weight limit
to respond to potential threats after the unification of the restrictions on ballistic missiles, in order to enhance the
Korean Peninsula while securing response capabilities deterrence against military provocation by North Korea.77
against the threat from North Korea. In February 2017, Furthermore, to address North Korean nuclear and missile
it announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014- threats, in addition to expanding the missile capabilities
2030) (rev.1), which, while maintaining the objectives of the ROK Forces,78 the ROK is engaging in efforts to
and underlying tone of Defense Reform Basic Plan build a Korean-type three-axis system, comprised of the
(2014-2030), emphasizes having readiness capability for following elements: a system known as “Kill Chain” to
simultaneous local provocations and all-out war, while conduct swift preemptive strikes using missiles and other
giving top priority to bolstering the organization and assets,79 the indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air
military power for responding to nuclear, missile and and Missile Defense [KAMD]),80 and the Korea Massive
Chapter 2
other asymmetrical threats from North Korea. Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) concept.81
In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted
3 Military Posture of the ROK equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.2
billion on a contract value basis in 2015. Since 2006, the
The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground amount has increased by nearly 13-fold in 11 years. It

forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, is reported that export items have diversified to include
totaling 520,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.82
240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately Defense spending in FY2018 (regular budget)
215,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy increased by about 7.0% from the previous fiscal year
combined) consist of approximately 640 combat aircraft. to nearly KRW 43.1581 trillion, marking the 19th
The ROK has been modernizing its military forces— consecutive year of increases since 2000.
not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in See Fig. I-2-2-6 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget)
order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to
deal with future potential threats, not least threats from 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea
North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines,
large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. The United States and the ROK have taken various steps
The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years.
installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with While regularly confirming the strengthening of
stealth property. the U.S.-ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specific
In November 2017, the ROK Government announced undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK
a revision of its missile guidelines, which stipulate the Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s
76 The ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to introduce an additional three Aegis-class cruisers, develop next-generation destroyers and submarines, and introduce medium- and high-altitude
reconnaissance drones and multipurpose satellites in order to secure response capabilities against existing and potential threats.
77 The missile guidelines were established to restrict the range and warhead weight of ballistic missiles possessed by the ROK and were agreed by the governments of the United States and the ROK in
1979. They were subsequently revised in 2001 and 2012. In the previous guidelines, which were last revised in 2012, provisions included, for example, that ballistic missiles with a maximum range
of 800 km should have a maximum warhead weight of 500 kg.
78 In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fielded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea. In
February 2013, the ministry indicated that it would accelerate the development of 800 km-range ballistic missiles, possession of which was made possible by the revision of the missile guidelines in
October 2012, and announced that it has fielded cruise missiles to be launched from vessels or submarines and capable of attacking the entire area of North Korea. Also in October, during an event
commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces, the ROK Forces displayed to the public for the first time the “Hyeonmu 2” ballistic missile, which is said to have a 300 km
range, and the “Hyeonmu 3” surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is said to have a 1,000 km range. The ROK conducted successful test launches of a new ballistic missile with a range of 500 km
in April 2014 and a new ballistic missile with a range of 800 km in June 2017.
79 The ROK Ministry of National Defense explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously. In the ROK’s
Defense White Paper 2016, it is explained that in order to construct the “Kill Chain,” in addition to enhancing monitoring and surveillance capabilities through the use of high-altitude reconnaissance
unmanned aerial vehicles and military reconnaissance satellites, the ROK is enhancing strike capacity by securing extra surface-to-surface missiles, long-range air-to-surface missiles, and Joint
Attack Direct Munitions (JADM).
80 The ROK Ministry of National Defense has denied participation in the U.S. missile defense system, and has underscored that the ROK was creating its own indigenous systems. The reported reasons
include differences in threat perceptions between the United States and the ROK, concern over Chinese backlash, and cost effectiveness.
81 The ROK Ministry of National Defense website states that “KMPR, the third axis, is a Korean-type massive retaliation concept, a system in which counterattacks are conducted by directly aiming at
the North Korean leadership including its war command headquarters, in the case where North Korea threatens with its nuclear weapons,” and “missile and other strike forces capable of delivering
simultaneous and massive precision strikes and elite professional special operation forces, etc. will be operated for this purpose.” In December 2017 it was reported that a 1,000 personnel “special
duties brigade” had been newly formed, which would be tasked with the duty of eliminating the North Korean leadership, and was expected to form a major element in the KMPR concept.
82 As for recent examples, in 2012, the ROK concluded an agreement to export three Type 209 submarines to Indonesia as well as an agreement to export four of the new Military Afloat Reach and
Sustainability (MARS) vessels to the United Kingdom. In 2014, the ROK concluded an agreement to export 12 FA-50 light attack aircraft to the Philippines. Most recently, in 2017 the ROK exported
K-9 self-propelled artillery to Finland, in the first-ever example in the ROK defense industry of sales of second-hand weapons.
Defense of Japan 86
Fig. I-2-2-6 Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget
Defense budget (in 100 million won)

Year-on-year growth rate (%)
(100 million won) (%)
450,000 20
400,000
350,000
15
300,000
250,000
10
200,000
150,000
100,000 5
50,000
Chapter 2
0 0
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (FY)
Notes: 1. ROK Defense White Paper 2016 for FY2009 to FY2016.
2. The Ministry of National Defense website for FY2017 to FY2018.
provocations in March 2013,83 and approved the Tailored and around 23,700 U.S. Forces personnel participated, as
Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence well as amphibious assault ships and F-35B fighters. In
against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at June the U.S. Department of Defense announced that the
the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October U.S.-ROK joint military exercise “Freedom Guardian”
of the same year.84 At the 46th SCM in October 2014, planned for August had been suspended, along with two
the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles U.S.-ROK Marine Exchange Program training exercises
of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile scheduled to occur within the next three months.
Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North At the same time, the two countries have worked to
Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in deal with such issues as the transition of OPCON to the
November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D ROK87 and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For
Operational Concept was approved.85 Additionally, after the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for
North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established
2016, the United States and the ROK began formal talks in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by
regarding deployment of THAAD86 to U.S. Forces Korea December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the
in February 2016 and officially decided in July to deploy approach of transitioning from the existing combined
them. At the end of April 2017 part of the THAAD defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a
system was deployed to the designated site for operations new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces
and in September four additional launching pads were and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based
deployed, concluding the temporary deployment of on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear
THAAD. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th
also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to
strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing
basis was agreed. Furthermore, it was reported that in the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’
the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercise conducted enhanced capabilities are met. The three-axis system,
in April 2018, around 300,000 ROK Forces personnel which is deemed to be the central challenge for enhancing
83 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint
responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.
84 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and
wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public.
85 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats including nuclear and biochemical warheads.
However, the details have not been made public. Furthermore, according to the “Strategic Digest 2015” of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, the “Concepts and Principles” apply from peacetime to war, and
will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions.
86 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes
outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system.
87 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and
to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea
Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency.

the capabilities of the ROK Forces, is scheduled for overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ.
completion in the early 2020s. At the 49th Security Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas
Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2017, it was surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock),
decided that the United States and the ROK would jointly regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting
supplement the conditions-based OPCON transfer plan claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive
by the time of the next meeting. Future developments will economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK
continue to be monitored. Government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ
With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month.
Korea,88 an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the In addition, China has protested that the deployment of
relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea would undermine China’s
in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of strategic security interests. On this point, in October 2017
Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed the governments of China and the ROK announced that
Chapter 2
north of the Han River to the south of the river. they had agreed to utilize military channels to reach a
Subsequently, however, the agreement has been mutual understanding relating to China’s concerns about
partially revised, due to various factors, including: the THAAD. In December 2017 President Moon Jae-in
relocation to the Pyeontaek area being delayed due to made his first visit to China since his inauguration and
logistical reasons such as increases in relocation costs; in the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline and continue

relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, to maintain close communication, as well as vitalizing
it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to high-level strategic dialogue.
remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the
counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain (2) Relations with Russia
in their location north of the Han River to counter the Military exchanges have been under way between the
threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges
2017 the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the among high-ranking military officials. The two countries
Pyeontaek area, and in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military
Forces Korea and United Nations Command also relocated technology, defense industry, and military supplies. In
to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to
could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012,
postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense
necessary to follow future developments closely. strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue.
In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the
5 Relations with Other Countries ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two
sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics
(1) Relations with China and security.
China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment
strengthen their relations. Meanwhile, outstanding issues of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is
have emerged between China and the ROK. part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the
The “East China Sea Air Defense Identification strategic stability of the region.
Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013
88 The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and
a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK include: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003);
and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements.
However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2008, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since then, the two countries have continued to affirm
that maintaining this troop level would be appropriate.
Defense of Japan 88
Section 3 China
1 General Situation
China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast

landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with
14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a
nation with various races, religions, and languages. China,
with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining
a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its
Chapter 2
unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after

the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation
and fueling its nationalism.
In recent years, China has increased its presence
in the international community. For example, China
takes a proactive stance towards efforts in non-

traditional security areas, making personnel and
financial contributions to UN PKOs and sending its
ships continuously for counter-piracy activities off the
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, the government administration expand and diversify.
China has participated proactively in humanitarian However, it is suggested that controlling activities of the
assistance and disaster relief activities. These activities masses becomes increasingly difficult with the spread
have been highly appreciated by the international of the Internet, coupled with other factors. Additionally,
community. There continues to be high expectations for China confronts issues concerning ethnic minorities in
China to recognize its responsibility in the international the country, with their staging protests and carrying out
community, accept and comply with international campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence
norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur
manner on regional and global issues. Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. In the meantime,
China faces various problems domestically since 2014, China enacted laws that covers not only
including human rights issues. The spread of bribery security from external threats, but also includes culture
and corruption among the central and local leadership and society as a part of security. Those laws include
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become a the Anti-Spy Law in November 2014, a new National
significant political problem. Furthermore, China’s rapid Security Law in July 2015, an Anti-Terrorism Law in
economic growth has brought with it emerging problems January 2016 to strengthen state control, a strengthened
such as regional disparities between urban-rural and Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas
coastal inland regions, the issue of the tax system that Non-governmental Organizations in January 2017, and
facilitates these disparities, wealth gaps among urban the National Intelligence Law in June 2017 to strengthen
residents, inflation, environmental pollution, and lack of domestic espionage prevention mechanisms under its
agricultural and industrial water. More recently, China “holistic view of national security.”
has tended to slowdown1 in its economic growth. In the The “anti-corruption” movement following the
future, China is also expected to face issues associated launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under
with the rapid aging of the population, including pension the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,”
and other issues related to the social security system. with severe charges of corruption on people including
The Chinese Government has been tightening its control prominent leaders of the Party and military, such as
over society as these potentially destabilizing factors to Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang,
1 According to an announcement by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the full year of 2017 was 6.9% compared to the previous year.
The figure exceeded the target of “around 6.5%” set by the Chinese government, but remained low, similar to the previous year 2016 when the growth rate marked 6.7%.

China Section 3
former CPC Politburo member Sun Zhengcai, former KEY WORD

CMC Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, and
former CMC members Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui. In Central Military Commission (CMC)
his remarks at the 19th National Congress of the CPC in
The guidance and command institution of the PLA. Formally, there are
October 2017, General Secretary Xi spoke about “strict two CMCs—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both
governance over the Party,” stating that “corruption is the commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both
greatest threat our Party faces” as well as suggesting that are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the
he will continue to crack down on corruption within the military forces.
Party and the military.
Through these developments, the Party has
demonstrated its intention and made unprecedented leader had their name in a guideline before retirement.
efforts in recent years to further bolster the power Moreover, at the first plenary session of the 13th National
Chapter 2
foundations of General Secretary Xi in the CPC. For People’s Congress held in March 2018, a resolution was
example, it was decided at the 19th National Congress adopted to revise the constitution and abolish term limits
to incorporate the “thoughts,” namely the political for China’s presidents, which indicates that Xi Jinping is
philosophy, under the name of General Secretary Xi further consolidating power as president. Impacts on the
Jinping into the Party constitution as a guideline. This military of these actions and future relevant developments

was the first time since Chairman Mao Zedong that a are to be watched for.
2 Military Affairs
1 General Situation and ensure law-based governance on the military.

The Chinese military leadership has emphasized to
For over the past 25 years, China has sustained large continue to improve the Chinese militery’s operational
increases in its defense budget, and has broadly and capabilities, exhibiting the results of its recent 5-year
rapidly reinforced its military forces, mainly its nuclear activities such as the “struggle” against the Senkaku
and missile forces as well as its Navy and Air Force. Island, which is an inherent territory of Japan, the
Along with such efforts, it is understood that China is establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense
strengthening its so-called “A2/AD” capabilities. Identification Zone (ADIZ),” and its Navy and Air Force’s
In addition to traditional strengthening of military “regular patrols.”2 Although it is not necessarily clear
capabilities, over the past few years, in particular, China what specific activities these examples indicate, there is a
has been trying to develop a new form of practical high probability that it is not only planning to make such
operational capabilities. The military reforms with a activities routine, but also further expand and intensify
goal of creating a practical military, have been steadily them both qualitatively and quantitatively, given that the
and rapidly making progress since its beginning at the Chinese military is rapidly expanding and intensifying
end of December 2015. Among them, China emphasizes activities in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East
information warfare to securely obtain information China Sea and western Pacific Ocean. The policy stated
superiority as one of its asymmetric military capabilities. at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 to speed
China is considered to be rapidly developing its up by 15 years the achievement of the third stage of the
capabilities in electronic warfare and cyberspace with the “three-stage development strategy” was declared in the
aim of confusing enemy command systems in conflict past, can be considered a decision based on development
situations. In addition, China is working to improve joint exceeding China’s own assumptions on the pace of the
operational capabilities, enhance capabilities for distant modernization of the military and military activities. It is
power projection, conduct practical training, cultivate and possible that military modernization efforts to strengthen
acquire personnel for operations of informatized forces, the practical operational capabilities of the military will
improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry, be further accelerated, considering General Secretary Xi
2 The article published in the People’s Daily November 14, 2017 by CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang.
Defense of Japan 90
Jinping’s strengthening of his power foundation within affairs and warfare. It has incorporated the concept of
the CPC and further strengthening of his authority as “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological
the head of the Military Commission of the Central Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the
Committee of Communist Party of China. political work of the military. In addition, China has set
China, particularly over maritime issues where its forth a policy of close coordination of military struggle
interests conflict with others, continues to act in an assertive with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal
manner3 based on its own assertions incompatible with the endeavors.
existing international order, including attempts to change China has employed a policy to ensure to establish
the status quo by coercion, where there is a potential the “system of modern military power with Chinese
danger to lead to unexpected situations. Additionally, as characteristics,” aiming at informatizing the military
for the acts to change the status quo by coercion, China based on its military strategy to follow the development
remains poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without trend of the military all over the world observed in the
Chapter 2
compromise, including making steady efforts to turn its Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and so on, and
acts into faits accompli. to win informatized local wars. Dealing with a Taiwan
At the same time, China recently has also shown contingency is believed to be a top priority in China’s
interest in efforts to avoid and prevent unexpected efforts to strengthen the military forces; more specifically,
contingencies in sea areas and in airspace. improving its capabilities to hinder the independence of
Considering these situations, there is a strong Taiwan and foreign military support for it. Furthermore,
concern, in international society including Japan, over in recent years, China is working actively to acquire
the issues including the rapid modernization of the capabilities for missions other than dealing with a Taiwan
military capabilities and improvement of the operational contingency, and is steadily enhancing operational
capabilities as well as the following China’s unilateral capabilities in more distant waters.
escalation of activities surrounding Japan, together As for future indicators of the modernization of the
with the lack of transparency in its military and security military, in his remarks to the 19th National Congress in
affairs. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay close attention October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping proclaimed
to the issues. the goals of seeing that mechanization is basically
achieved, IT application has come a long way and
2 Defense Policies strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement by the
China regards that the buildup of strong defense capabilities

KEY WORD
and powerful military forces constitutes a strategic mission
to modernize the state, and that it ensures the security of
Three Warfares
the state under “peaceful development.” China considers
the main goal and mission of national defense policies China amended the Regulations of the PLA on the Political Work in
as: to adapt to the new changes in security environment; December 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the
to accomplish the strategic guideline of active defense4 PLA’s mission. They are collectively referred to as the “Three Warfares.”
U.S. DoD explains these warfares as follows: (1) Media Warfare is
to realize the CCP’s goal of building a strong military; to
aiming at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build
accelerate the modernization of national defense and the public and international support for China’s military actions and to
military forces; to firmly protect its national sovereignty, dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse
security, and interests as a result of development; and to China’s interests; (2) Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an
to provide strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological
dream” of the great revival of the peoples of China. China operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy
military and supporting civilian personnels; and (3) Legal Warfare
contends that these defense policies are defensive in
uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and
nature.5 Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only manage possible repercussions of China’s military actions.
physical means but also non-physical means in military
3 For example, regarding the so-called “nine-dash line” asserted by China in the South China Sea, “historic rights” claimed by China were rejected by the Philippines-China arbitration (July 2016). Also,
in recent years, China continues to use its own interpretations, such as those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It has been noted that China is developing arguments
that attempt to restrict reportedly military activities of other countries in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For instance, the Chinese government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on November 26, 2010 that it opposed to unsanctioned military activities by any country in China’s EEZs.
4 The strategic concept of active defense is seen as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic concept. It upholds the principles of defense, self-defense, and “post-emptive strike” (suppress the
adversary after it attacks), and maintains that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”
5 See the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015).

China Section 3
year 2020, that by 2035 the modernization of its national transparency is declining, China has not yet achieved the
defense and its forces is basically completed, and that levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in
by the mid-21st century the people’s armed forces have the international community.
been fully transformed into world-class forces. These Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns
goals are said to be ahead of the target of the third stage over China’s military decision-making and actions,
of the “Three Stage Development Strategy,” namely including Chinese explanations different from the actual
the basic modernization of the national defense and the facts. For example, details have yet to be disclosed
forces by the middle of the 21st century, and it appears regarding the causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered
that on further acceleration of military power is to be submarine’s submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial
seen as China’s power grows. waters in November 2004 although it constitutes a breach
of international law. Furthermore, with respect to the
3 Military Transparency incidents such as that of a Chinese naval vessel directing
Chapter 2
its firecontrol radar at an MSDF destroyer in January
China has not disclosed specific information such as 2013, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
possession of weapons, procurement goals and past and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which
procurements, organization and locations of major units, were inconsistent with the facts; in this case they have
records of main military operations and exercises, and denied the use of the radar itself. With regard to the

a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget. incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally close
Moreover, China has neither set out a clear and specific to MSDF and ASDF aircraft (May and June 2014), the
future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations
adequate transparency of its decision-making process in that were contrary to the truth; it claimed that Japanese
relation to military and security affairs. aircraft “entered the airspace for the Chinese drills
China has released defense white papers including without reporting to China and conducted dangerous
“China’s National Defense” nearly every two years acts.” Particularly in 2016, China repeatedly made claims
since 1998. China also conducts numerous dialogues that are contrary to the fact. In the case where SDF aircraft
with national defense authorities of other countries.6 A scrambled against Chinese aircraft, China claimed that
spokesperson at the Chinese Ministry of National Defense the SDF aircraft “conducted interference at close distance
has been giving monthly press conferences since April and shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese
2011. In November 2013, the position of spokesperson aircraft and its crew.”9 The submerged transit of a Chinese
was newly established at seven departments, including Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around
the Navy and Air Force.7 Such moves can be perceived on the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but
the one hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement China did not acknowledge this.10 In recent years, amid
of the transparency of military forces, but on the other the significant changes in the environment surrounding
hand as efforts to strengthen “Media Warfare.” the China’s military, including advances in military
However, China has not provided a detailed specialization and diversification of missions associated
breakdown of its national defense spending.8 Moreover, with military strengthening, some see that relations
in China’s defense white papers released after 2013, the between the CCP leadership and the PLA have become
contents have included limited topics. The papers has increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s
made no reference to national defense spending that influential power on foreign policy decisions has been
was described in previous defense white papers, and changing. Attention is to be paid to such situations also in
the overall description has decreased. In this respect, as terms of crisis management.
6 See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 for examples of dialogue with Japan.
7 The seven departments are: then PLA General Political Department; then PLA General Logistics Department; then PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; then PLA Second
Artillery Corps; and People’s Armed Police.
8 The defense white papers “China’s National Defense in 2008” and “China’s National Defense in 2010” provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment
costs for the active force, reserve force, and militia, limited to the FY2007 and FY2009 defense budget expenditures, respectively, but has not offered an explanation of them recently.
9 For example, on December 10, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced, “When Chinese Air Force aircraft mobilized for regular blue water training in the Western Pacific
and passed through the Miyako Strait (sic) airspace, the Japanese SDF mobilized two F-15 fighters and conducted interference against the Chinese aircraft at close distance and shot IR flares,
endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.” On October 28 of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made a similar announcement. See
Part 2-6 (3) of this section.
10 When asked about the submarine’s transit at a regular press conference held by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 16 2018, the spokesperson replied, “I do not have information about
the circumstances of submarines.”
Defense of Japan 92
Chinese false explanations are also evident in It is believed that China continues to invest resources in
China’s coercive, as well as rapid and large-scale the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem
development on features in the South China Sea.11 with its economic development. Attention is to be paid
At the press conference after the U.S.-China Summit to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects
Meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping China’s national defense budget.
stated, “China does not have any intention to pursue In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the
militarization” in the South China Sea, but has been defense budget announced by China is considered to
advancing militarization. be only a part of its actual military expenditures.15 For
See Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (4) “Situation of Activities in the South example, it is believed that the announced defense budget
China Sea” does not include foreign equipment procurement costs
As China’s influence in the international community and research and development (R&D) expenses.
has risen politically, economically, and militarily, other See Fig. I-2-3-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget)
Chapter 2
countries are closely following China’s moves. In order

to allay their concerns over China, it is becoming more 5 Military Posture
important for China to explain its military activities
according to the facts and improve the transparency of China’s military forces are composed of the PLA, the
its national defense policy and military capabilities. It People’s Armed Police Force (PAP),16 and the militia.17
is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency It is provided that these bodies be instructed and
concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC).
specific and accurate information on its defense policies The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by
and military capabilities. the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Rocket Force, etc.
4 National Defense Budget
(1) Military Reform
China announced that its national defense budget China is currently carrying out reforms of the PLA which
for FY2018 was approximately 1,107 billion yuan.12 are seen as the largest in the country’s history.
This initial budget amount represented a growth of In November 2015, President Xi unveiled China’s
approximately 8.3% (approximately 84.4 billion yuan)13 official position on a specific direction of the military
compared to the initial budget amount for the previous reforms for the first time, announcing that the military
fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget reforms would be carried out by 2020, which would
has increased at a rapid pace every year since FY1989.14 include: establishment of “theaters” and a command
The nominal size of China’s announced national defense structure for joint operations as well as reduction of
budget has grown approximately 51-fold in the 30 years troops by 300,000 personnel.
since FY1989 and approximately 2.7-fold in the 10 years Military reforms have rapidly taken shape in recent
since FY2008. China positions the buildup of defense years. By the end of 2016 from what are called the “neck
capabilities as important a task as economic development. up” reforms, namely the center of the military level
11 See Section 2-6(4), Chapter 2-Section 6-4, Chapter 3-Section 3-3-6 and 3-3-7.
12 While converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency simply by applying currency exchange rates does not necessarily reflect an accurate value due to differences
in price level, China’s national defense budget for FY2018 is equivalent to approximately 17,711.2 billion yen when it is converted using a rate of 16 yen per yuan (FY2018 rate that the Japanese
Government uses for official purposes).
13 Calculated for FY2018 from the basic expenditures of the central government for FY2017 and FY2018, since China released only the national defense budget amount as part of the basic expenditures
of the central government, which do not include local transfer expenditures among other expenses.
14 China’s announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit growth on the initial-budget basis every year from FY1989 to FY2015 except in FY2010. For
FY2015, FY2016 and FY2018, the defense budget was announced within the basic expenditures of the central government. However, since the local transfer expenditure amount, etc. for FY2015
were released separately, this was added to calculate the national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures.
15 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) estimates China’s military-related spending as having been at
least US$180 billion in FY2017.
16 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002,” “it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.” Missions of the
PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. In January 2018, the guidance and command system of the PAP was centralized under the
CMC. Under the CCP Party and State Institutional Reform Plan released later in March that year, it revealed that as a goal by the end of the year it would reorganize the PAP based on the principle of
“the military is the military, police are the police, and civil is civil.”
17 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistics support for combat operations in wartime. The defense white paper “China’s National
Defense in 2002” explains, “[u]nder the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat
support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social
order.” According to a PLA Daily article dated October 9, 2012, “China now has six million primary militia members” as of 2010.

China Section 3
Fig. I-2-3-1 Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget

(100 million yuan) (%)
11,500 40
11,000
10,500
10,000 35
9,500
9,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)
8,500 Year-on-year growth rate (%) 30
8,000
7,500
7,000 25
6,500
6,000
5,500 20
5,000
4,500 15
4,000
3,500
3,000 10
2,500
2,000
Chapter 2
1,500 5
1,000
500
0 0
89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 17 18
(FY)
Note: This basically shows the defense budget within “the central government’s general public budget,” which had been named as “the central fiscal expenditures” prior to
FY 2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the initial budget of the previous year. Note that FY2002 defense budget was

calculated based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY 2016 and
FY2018, the amount of “the central government expenditures,” which are part of the central government’s general public budget, are used because only the central
government expenditures were announced.
up, are reported to be basically complete. Specifically,

they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions18 and
created five new theaters responsible for command of
operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater,
Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater.
In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA)
Headquarters,19 Rocket Force (PLARF),20 Strategic
Support Force (PLASSF),21 and Joint Logistics Support
Force.22 Moreover, the four general departments that were
the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15
functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint
Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistic
Support Department, and Equipment Development
Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been
making steady progress with the start of what are called March 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
full-scale “neck down” military reforms, namely the field announced that a reduction of 300,000 personnel had
level. For example, the expansion of the organization been basically completed.
of the Navy Marine Corps, whose mission include It is considered that these series of reforms are
amphibious landing operations, the unification of designed to build military forces that can fight and win
PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, wars by improving their joint operational capabilities
the reorganization from 18 Group Armies to 13, and and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the
reform of military schools was confirmed after 2017. In development of military capabilities and organizational
18 Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region.
19 The PLA was considered a large organization of the Army, and therefore, a headquarters of the Army as a service did not exist. The ongoing reforms have given the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force
the same status as the Army.
20 The establishment of PLARF is seen as a de facto elevation of the Second Artillery Force.
21 PLASSF is identified as a new force for maintaining national security. Reportedly it is in charge of cyber, outer space, and electronic warfare capabilities.
22 The Joint Logistics Support Force is considered to be the first Chinese command dedicated to joint logistics support for the armed forces.
Defense of Japan 94
management from peacetime.23 In addition, it has been (SRBM). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces
noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant
means of tackling corruption at the center of the military system is improving their survivability and readiness.28
by strengthening the direct leadership of the CMC and Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase
its Chairman and decentralizing the leading organs. The performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy,
total number of members of the CMC has continued to employing maneuverable warheads and multiple ones,
be reduced in recent years24 with seven newly elected and by other means.
members at the 19th National Congress in October 2017, China’s main ICBM strategic nuclear asset had been
including President Xi. Since it has been noted that many the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missile.29 However, it
people who have deep connections to President Xi were has been suggested that China has in recent years deployed
appointed,25 it is thought that President Xi’s command of the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid
the CMC, and thus the PLA, is to be further strengthened. propellant system mounted onto a transporter-erector-
Chapter 2
While China is expected to continue these reforms, launcher (TEL), as well as the DF-31A, a model of the
there are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the DF-31 with extended range, and that China will increase
military because of the rapid military reforms.26 Attention the number of DF-31A in particular. China is also viewed
is to be paid to the progress of the reforms as well as their as developing a new ICBM known as DF-41. With regard
outcomes, including their effects on the security of Japan to SLBM, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered
and the rest of the region. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the JL-2,
whose range is deemed to be approximately 8,000 km,
(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces are currently operational. If the Jin-class SSBNs begin
China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear nuclear deterrence patrols, it is believed that China’s
capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the mid- strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly.30
1950’s, seemingly with a view to ensure deterrence, Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China is also
supplementing its conventional forces, and maintain its developing an extended-range SLBM, also called JL-3,
voice in the international community. It is regarded that and a new SSBN to carry it.
China’s nuclear strategy is to deter a nuclear attack on its As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific
territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-
conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number of propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported
targets such as cities in the adversary’s country, should and operated on a TEL. These are capable of carrying
China be subject to nuclear attack.27 The PLA Rocket both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses
Force was newly established with equal status as the ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads
Army, Navy, and Air Force as part of the ongoing military with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and
reforms, suggesting that China will continue to attach deploys the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
importance to its nuclear and ballistic missile forces. carrying conventional warheads, which could be used to
China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic attack ships at sea including aircraft carrier.31 The DF-
missiles: ICBM; SLBM; IRBM/medium-range ballistic 26,32 which has a range including Guam, is considered
missile (MRBM); and short-range ballistic missile a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of
23 The report “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” (February 2015) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the RAND Corporation identifies the weaknesses of the
PLA as the following: (1) organizational structure (e.g., party-military relations); (2) organizational culture (e.g., corruption); (3) force structure (size of the PLA, recruitment system, veteran’s benefits);
(4) command structure (e.g., military regions); and (5) human capital (e.g., decline in the quality and mindset of new soldiers stemming from the one-child policy, etc.).
24 There were 11 members in both the 17th (2007-2012) and 18th (2012-2017) CMC.
25 For example, it has been noted that Miao Hua, newly elected to the CMC, has close connections to President Xi having worked under him when Xi was part of the government of Fujian Province.
26 Veterans and others held demonstrations in front of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in October 2016 and near the building that houses the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
in February 2017. Some view that these demonstrations and dissatisfaction with the military reforms are interrelated.
27 In February 2018, in response to the announcement of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States, the Chinese Defense Ministry stated that “China adheres to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear
weapons at any time and under any circumstance. Under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”
On the other hand, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that there is some ambiguity over the
conditions under which China’s “no first use” policy would or would not apply.
28 For differences between the liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see Chapter 2, Section 2-1-3 (3).
29 The DF-5B is thought to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
30 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) indicates that “China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN,
with four commissioned and others under construction” and that the SSBNs, which are equipped with JL-2 SLBMs, “are the country’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent.”
31 DF-21D is called the “carrier killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]).
32 DF-26 is called the “Guam killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]).

China Section 3
Fig. I-2-3-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)
Washington D. C.
11,200 km
12,000 km
7,200 km
13,000 km London
Paris 5,400 km North Pole
San Francisco
Moscow 4,000 km
2,800 km
2,500 km
Beijing Hawaii
New Delhi
Chapter 2
Guam
1,500–2,500 km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C/D

Jakarta
2,400–2,800 km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A

4,000 km Maximum range of DF-26
5,500 km Maximum range of DF-4

Canberra
7,200–11,200 km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A
12,000–13,000 km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B
* The figure above is for illustrative purpose, showing the range of each missile from Beijing.
the DF-21D, and it was announced in April 2018 that it These weapons are said to travel at ultra-high speed
had “formally joined the order of battle.” In addition to and be difficult to intercept by a missile.
IRBM/MRBM, China possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a China announced that it conducted tests on midcourse
cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well missile interception technology in January 2010, January
as the H-6, a bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise 2013, July 2014 and February 2018.35 Attention is to be
missile. It is deemed that these missiles will complement paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense.
ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region See Fig. I-2-3-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing))
including Japan. China is likely operating these ASBMs
and long-range cruise missiles to strengthen its “A2/
AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a H-6 bomber
large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-

11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan.
It is believed that their ranges also cover a part of the
Southwestern Islands including the area surrounding the
Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan. [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
Furthermore, in order to acquire strike capability that <Specifications, performance>
will be able to penetrate layered missile defenses, China Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h
is considered to be rapidly developing the hypersonic Main armament (H-6K): Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing
range 1,500km)
vehicle WU-14, which is launched by a ballistic missile.33
<Description>
Moreover, it has also been pointed out that progress is Indigenous strategic bomber. The H-6K, its latest version, can carry
being made on the development of the DF-17 missile cruise missiles (DH-10) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads.
capable of carrying hypersonic weapons.34
33 China reportedly conducted flight tests of its WU-14 in January, August, and December 2014, June, August, and November 2015, and April 2016 (total: 7 times). Some reports refer to it as DF-ZF.
34 DF-17 flight tests were reported to have been conducted on November 1 and 15, 2017.
35 In addition to these four tests, China claims that the test conducted in July 2014 was another missile interception technology test. However, it is pointed out that this was actually an anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) test. (See Chapter 3, Section 4-2-4.)
Defense of Japan 96
(3) Ground Forces (4) Naval Forces

China has the third largest ground forces in the world, The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet;
next to India, with approximately 980 thousand personnel. East Sea Fleet; and South Sea Fleet. The Chinese Navy
Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize has approximately 750 ships (including approximately 70
its military by curtailing the number of personnel submarines), with a total displacement of approximately
and streamlining organizations and systems through 1.79 million tons. China’s naval forces are rapidly
reforms, including those currently under way, in order modernizing, and the Chinese Navy promotes the mass
to improve the capability while pursuing the downsize, production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with
multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. superior quietness, as well as surface combatant ships with
Specifically, it is believed to be improving mobility using improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities.
measures such as switching from the past regional-defense The Navy is also developing Renhai-class destroyers, the
model to a full mobile model, and working to motorize largest in the Navy, indicated to be equipped with vertical
Chapter 2
and mechanize its infantry. China is also believed to be launch systems (VLSs) capable of launching the latest
strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile.37 It has also been noted
Force), amphibious forces,36 special operations forces, that its submarines are being developed to be capable
and helicopter units. China is undertaking efforts to build
a command system for improving its joint operational Yuan-class submarine
capabilities and operational efficiency, and is carrying

out reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities.
China has annually conducted mobile exercises that
cut across multiple regions such as Stride, Firepower, [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
and Sharp Sword. They are aiming at verifying and <Specifications, performance>
improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army Water displacement: 3,600 tons
troops to remote areas, such as long-distance mobility Speed: Unknown
capabilities of the army, and logistical support capabilities Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),
torpedoes
that include mobilizing militias and public transportation.
<Description> New type of domestic submarine adopting air
Furthermore, the Army and Air Force reportedly took independence propulsion (AIP) technology, which provides long-
part in the joint exercise, Southern Land 2017, and since distance submerged navigation and high degree of quietness. More of
2014, have conducted combined military branch and this type of submarine are under construction.
service exercises under Joint Action. These suggest that
China intends to improve its joint operational capabilities Renhai-class destroyer
as well.
See Fig. I-2-3-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s
Liberation Army)

<Specifications, performance>
Full load displacement: 12,000 tons
Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)
Main armament: Ship-to-surface cruise missiles, ship-to-ship missiles
(maximum firing range of approximately 540 km), ship-to-air missiles
(maximum firing range 150 km)
<Description>
Because it is the largest 10,000 ton-class destroyer in the Chinese
Navy, it is also referred to as a cruiser. It is currently being developed
and its production expanded.
36 Army units belonging to the Northern Theater, believed to possess amphibious operation capabilities, are said to have been transferred to the Navy in February 2017. However, no movements of
amphibious troops belonging to the Army in the Eastern Theater have been disclosed.
37 It was reported in June 2017 that China launched the first Renhai-class destroyer, the largest in the Chinese Navy at 10,000 tons, and had launched a total of four vessels by July 2018. The U.S.
DoD’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (June 2017) calls this destroyer a cruiser.

China Section 3
Fig. I-2-3-3 Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army
Central Theater
(Headquarters: Beijing)
Northern Theater
(Headquarters: Shenyang)
(Shijiazhuang)
(Jinan)
(Lanzhou)
Western Theater
Chapter 2
(Headquarters: Chengdu)
(Fuzhou)
Southern Theater Eastern Theater

(Headquarters: Guangzhou) (Nanning) (Headquarters: Nanjing)

Notes: 1. ● Theater headquarters Theater Army organization
2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc.
China Taiwan (Reference)

Total military forces Approx. 2 million troops Approx. 220,000 troops
Group troops Approx. 0.98 million troops Approx. 130,000 troops
Ground Type-99/A, Type-98/A, M-60A, M-48A/H and others
forces Tanks, etc. Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others
Approx. 7,400 vehicles Approx. 1,200 vehicles
Warships Approx. 750 vessels / 1,787,000 tons Approx. 390 vessels / 205,000 tons
Aircraft carriers,
Maritime Approx. 80 vessels Approx. 20 vessels
destroyers, and frigates
forces
Submarines Approx. 70 vessels 4 vessels
Marines Approx. 15,000 troops Approx. 10,000 troops
Combat aircraft Approx. 2,850 aircraft Approx. 500 aircraft
J-10 x 370
Su-27/J-11 x 329
Su-30 x 97 Mirage 2000 x 55
Air
Modern fighters Su-35 x 14 F-16 x 144
forces
aircraft J-15 x 20 Ching-kuo x 128
J-16 x 16 (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 327)
J-20 x 6 (under tests)
(Fourth-/fifth-generation fighters (total): 852)
Population Approx. 1.39 billion Approx. 24 million

Reference 1 year*
Term of service 2 years
*For those born in 1994 or later, the term is 4 months
Defense of Japan 98
of carrying anti-surface cruise missiles. In addition, the is China’s armed force other than the military the so-
Navy is increasing the number of large landing ships called maritime militia is playing the role of the advance
and supply ships. In September 2017, a supply ship guard for supporting China’s maritime interests.41 The
was commissioned with a mission to supply the aircraft maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea,
carrier group. etc.42 and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated
With regard to aircraft carriers, following the islands. However, the details of the maritime militia
commissioning of the first aircraft carrier Liaoning in have not been revealed. Given the China’s emphasis on
September 2012, it appears that China is continuing to the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the
train carrier-based aircraft pilots using domestic J-15 military, police and militia” on the seas,43 attention is to
carrier-based fighters and conducting takeoff and landing be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too.44
tests mainly in the Bohai and Yellow Seas.38 In December
2016, the Liaoning participated in its first comprehensive (5) Air Forces
Chapter 2
live action, live fire exercise in the Bohai Sea with other The Chinese Navy and Air force have approximately
vessels, including live firing by carrier-based fighters. 2,850 combat capable aircraft in total. As for the fourth
Furthermore, later in the same month, it was confirmed generation fighters, China has imported from Russia the
that the carrier advanced, together with multiple vessels, Su-27 fighter and the Su-30 fighter having anti-surface
to the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. It was and anti-ship attack capabilities. In November 2015,
announced that the “Liaoning” advanced to the Pacific China reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian
Ocean and conducted opposing trainings including carrier- state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fighters,
based fighters after its participation in a naval review in considered the newest fourth generation fighter, and has
the South China Sea from March to April 2018. These received the delivery of total 14 fighters by December
activities are believed to indicate a further expansion of 2017. China is also developing its own domestic modern
the distant deployment capability of the Chinese Navy.
In April 2017, a launching ceremony was held for an
J-15 carrier-based fighter
indigenous aircraft carrier with “a conventional power-
generating facility and a displacement of 50,000 tons”
and “a ski-jump takeoff style.” The carrier conducted
initial sea trials before its commissioning in May 2018.
Furthermore, China is reportedly building its second
indigenous aircraft carrier, and it is suggested that this [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
carrier is possibly equipped with an electromagnetic <Specifications, performance>
catapult system.39 Speed: Unknown
Main armament: Air-to-air missiles, air-to-ship/surface missiles
In view of these developments concerning the
(estimate)
naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up
<Description>
capabilities for conducting operations in more distant Carrier-based aircraft on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. It has many
waters in addition to near sea defense.40 features in common with the J-11 and Su-33 fighters.
It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status
38 In November 2013, the “Liaoning” advanced to the South China Sea for the first time and conducted test navigation there. The carrier is said to have advanced into the South China Sea between June
and July 2017 and January 2018.
39 It is suggested that China is conducting research on the electromagnetic aircraft launch system in order to overcome the limitations of the ski-jump configuration, namely, few weapons and little
fuel can be carried on the carrier-based fighter and fixed-wing early warning aircraft cannot be operated. Additionally, in February 2018, major Chinese conglomerate China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation announced for the first time the construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in its development strategy outline on its website, but later deleted the text.
40 China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Navy.
According to the white paper, “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and China will aim to “develop a modern maritime military force structure.” As implied by these
references, it is deemed that China attaches importance to its maritime strategy.
41 In April 2013, when President Xi Jinping visited the maritime militia of Hainan Province to give encouragement, he reportedly gave instructions to the maritime militia to collect information on distant
seas and actively conduct island construction activities and stated, “you are playing the role of the vanguard in protecting our maritime interests.”
42 For example, when Chinese naval and other vessels obstructed the U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable on the high seas on the South China Sea in March 2009, maritime militia were said to be
aboard the fishing boat that tried to take away a sonar from Impeccable. It is also pointed out that when the deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 conducted prospective drilling to the south of
the Paracel Islands from May to July 2014, steel-hull fishing boats maned by maritime militia also arrived as an escort fleet.
43 In August 2016, when Defense Minister Chang Wanquan (at that time) made an observation tour of the maritime militia equipment in Zhejiang Province, he gave instructions on the necessity of “fully
exerting the overall power of the military, security and militia from the perspective of ensuring the requirement to ‘win the battle’.”
44 The status of China’s maritime militia under international law is said to be unclear. In November 2015, Admiral Scott H. Swift, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (at that time), emphasized on the
occasion of his meeting with then Admiral Wu Shengli, the former Commander of the PLA Navy, the importance of China’s forces including maritime enforcement agencies and maritime militia acting
professionally according to international law.

China Section 3
fighters. China also has started the mass production of

the J-11B fighter, which is allegedly a copy of the Su-27
fighter, and the domestic J-10 fighter. China’s domestic
J-16 fighter, thought to be a copy of Russia’s Su-30
fighter, has started test flights at operational units. China’s
domestic J-15 carrier-based fighter thought to be modeled
on Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fighter is carried on the
aircraft carrier Liaoning. Additionally, China is considered
to have started deploying the J-20 fighter, said to be a
next-generation fighter, to operational units, and is also
developing the J-31 fighter.45
China is also continuing the modernization of its
Chapter 2
bombers said to have ground attack capabilities, and the
H-6K bomber advanced to the point off the Kii Peninsula in August 2017.
J-10 fighter
Chinese Air Force has increased the number of H-6K
bombers that are considered to be able to operate anti-
surface cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The

Chinese Air Force is also developing a new strategic
bomber called the H-20.
China is also making continuous efforts to improve
capabilities which are essential for operations of modern
air forces by introducing the H-6U tanker and KJ-500
Maximum speed: Mach 1.8
Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 70 km), air- J-20 fighter
to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 120 km)
<Description>
China’s first main fighter produced domestically. First deployed in
2003, and it is reportedly in mass production.
Aircraft carrier “Liaoning”

Maximum speed: 3,063 km/h
<Description>
A fifth-generation stealth fighter jet. The Chinese Ministry of National
Defense announced in February 2018 that the J-20 has started to be
delivered to operational units.

KJ-2000 AWACS
Full load displacement: 59,439 tons
Onboard aircraft: 24 fighters etc.
Main armament: Ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 9 km)
anti-submarine rockets
<Description>
China’s first aircraft carrier, purchased from Ukraine as unfinished [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
carrier and refurbished. In December 2016, it was first confirmed <Specifications, performance>
passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and Details unknown
advancing to the Pacific Ocean. The flying (including takeoffs and <Description>
landings) of aircraft presumed to be carrier-based fighters in the Airborne early warning and control (AWAC) aircraft. A Russian IL-76
Pacific Ocean was first confirmed in April 2018. strategic airlifter mounted with a radar dome.
45 It is suggested that in the future, the J-31 fighter could be turned into a carrier-based fighter or be exported.
Defense of Japan 100

and KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control System.46 strategic competition among all parties,” and established
Furthermore, in July 2016, China started the deployment the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) at the end of 2015
of the indigenously developed Y-20 large cargo aircraft in with a mission pointed out to be responsible for outer
order to enhance its transportation capability. China is space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare.
also rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned China is said to have developed its space program in
aerial vehicles (UAV),47 including those capable of long- the shortest time in the world. In December 2016, China
duration flights at high altitude for reconnaissance and published the white paper China’s Space Activities,
other purposes (high-altitude long endurance [HALE]) which emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space but
and those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons does not deny its use for military purposes.51 In addition,
for attack purposes. Some of these are deployed and are it has been pointed out that administrative organizations
actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of space
Air Force has created an unmanned aerial vehicle unit in China have close ties with the Chinese military,
Chapter 2
with an attack role. In addition to the frequent use of UAVs and in fact, it is considered that China is planning to
for reconnaissance and other purposes in its surrounding improve its military capabilities in space.52 Examples of
sea areas and airspace, domestically, it is noted that China projects being advanced by China include the launch of
is working to improve “Swarm” technology48 to operate a the positioning satellites called “BeiDou,” also known
large number of low-cost UAVs. as the Chinese version GPS, to develop global satellite
Judging from the modernization of the Air Force, it positioning system by 2020. Another example is an Earth
is believed that China is not only improving its air defense observation satellite that is suggested to possibly have
capabilities for its national territory, but also making a role as a military reconnaissance satellite. Moreover,
steady efforts to build up capabilities for air superiority China is thought to be developing weapons including
and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in further distant laser weapons, anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellites
areas and for long-range transportation.49 satellites,53 in order to restrict and interfere with the use of
space-based assets by adversaries in wartime. China has
(6) Information operations capabilities50
Information gathering and command and communication Y-20 large cargo aircraft
in the military sector, which are vital for swift and
efficient exercise of military strength, increasingly
rely on satellites and computer networks. As such,
China seems to recognize the importance of taking an
information mastery in wartime, when it must protect [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
its own information systems and networks while <Specifications, performance>
neutralizing those of its adversaries at the same time. Maximum cruising speed: 796 km/h
Maximum payload: 66,000 kg (estimate)
China is considered to be emphasizing information
<Description>
operational capabilities for these operations. In fact,
Large multipurpose cargo aircraft independently developed by China.
China stated that “outer space and cyber space have Deployed to military units in July 2016.
become new commanding heights (capture point) in
46 The AG-600, which China is developing indigenously with the first flight in January 2018, will be the largest amphibious aircraft in the world. Although it is claimed that it will be used for civilian
purposes such as natural resource research, the possibility of its conversion to military use has been pointed out. It has also been reported that China and Ukraine signed an agreement for
consultations concerning the large transport aircraft An-225 for export to and production in China.
47 UAVs being developed by China include the HALE UAV “Xianglong” (Soar Dragon), considered the “Chinese Global Hawk;” the BZK-005, a UAV that can be used for multiple purposes, such as
reconnaissance, communications relay, and signals intelligence; the GJ-1 “Wingloong” attack UAV; and the CH-4 “Caihong.”
48 State-owned enterprise China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) announced in November 2017 that it demonstrated “Swarm” technology using 119 UAVs, breaking the U.S. record. It
is said that the use of “Swarm” technology with low-cost UAVs makes attacks on aircraft carriers and fighters possible.
49 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “building airspace capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations” as a strategy for enhancing the military
capabilities of the Air Force.
50 While the definition of information operations differs depending on the country, the definition of “actions using comprehensive electronic war, computer and network operations, psychological
operations, and other means to attack an enemy’s behavior or counter attack with resistance” has been used internally by the Chinese military.
51 “China’s Space Activities 2016” states the objective of space exploration as utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes to promote human civilization and social progress and provide benefits to all
humankind. At the same time, it also includes references to the demands of national security.
52 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (May 2017) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that China is continuing to improve its military and intelligence capabilities in space.
53 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (May 2017) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that “its [China’s] ground-launched ASAT missiles might be nearing operational service within
the PLA.”

China Section 3
Commentary Modernization of China’s sea and air military capabilities COLUMN

(update ship volume in the diagram)
新型駆逐艦・フリゲート
（隻数）
China is rapidly
60
modernizing military capabilities with fast-growing national defense budgets. Modernization of maritime military
capabilities aims to establish the ability to conduct operations in more distant waters. Specifically, China continues to reinforce new
50
naval vessels and new submarines. The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, went on its first excursion in the Pacific Ocean in
December402016, and the first home-built aircraft carrier launched in April 2017 and conducted its first sea trial in May 2018 and
will reportedly
30 begin service within the next 2-3 years. In modernization of air force capabilities, China hopes to improve air defense
for the mainland
20
and establish an ability to engage in combat at greater distances. Specifically, it has increased 4th-generation
fighters and has announced the start of deployment for the J-20, a next-generation fighter plane, in operational forces. China is
10 2018年
also developing, producing, and deploying a wide range of military planes, including fighters,
Su-27(J-11): 329機bombers,第４・第５世代戦闘機
AWACS, and cargo aircraft.
While China0 explains that its advances do not
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
pose a threat to any country, its rapid
Su-30: modernization
97機 of military capabilities
年、 is、taking
J-10 : 370機試験配備開始
place without a detailed future image or clarification of necessity and1000 this is aJ-15:
security concern for the region including Japan and
Chapter 2
※1 ﾙﾌ・ﾙｰﾊｲ・ｿﾌﾞﾚﾒﾝﾇｲ・ﾙｰﾔﾝ・ﾙｰｼﾞｮｳの各級駆逐艦及
びｼﾞｬﾝｳｪｲ・ｼﾞｬﾝｶｲの各級ﾌﾘｹﾞｰﾄの総隻数 20機
年、
the international community as a whole.
※2 この他中国は32隻（18年）のｼﾞｬﾝﾀﾞｵ級小型ﾌﾘｹﾞｰﾄを保有
800 J-16 16機配備開始
J-20 （試験中） 6機
Naval Forces 600 Air Forces
計 838機年、
配備開始
New Submarines
In 2017, test deployment began
4th and 5th - Generation Fighters
400
for J-16 and J-20 fighters
1000
852
2018
年、 In 2016, deployment
began for J-15 fighters
(Number of Vessels) 年、 Su-27 (J-11): 329 800

調達開始
Su-30: 97
50 200 調達開始 Su-35:
J-10 :
14
370
600
In 2005, deployment
began for J-10 fighters
400 In 1992, In 2001,

J-15: 20 procurement began procurement began In 2018,
空母「遼寧」
deployment began
J-16 16 for SU-27 fighters for SU-30 fighters
200 for SU-35 fighters
40 0 J-20 (conducting test flights) 6

Total number of fighters : 852 0
0
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
Jin-class nuclear submarine

30 [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
20
10
年
年月
月日
日
J-20 fighter
0 Su-35 戦闘機
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18 Shang-class nuclear submarine [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
【Jane’s by IHS Markit 】
*Total number of submarines in the following each class: [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
Jin-class, Shang-class, Song-class, Yuan-class and Kilo-class.
New Destroyers and Frigates

(Number of Vessels)
60
50 J-16 fighter
40
Luyang III-class destroyer
30 [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
20
10 2018 年
Su-27(J-11): 329機第４・第５世代戦闘機
0 Su-30: 97機 Su-35 、 fighter
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18 年、
J-10 : 370機 [Jane’s
試験配備開始by IHS Markit]
*1 Total number of destroyers in Lufu-class, Luhai-class, 1000
Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class, and of frigates J-15: 20機
in Jiangwei class and Jiangkai class. 年、
*2 In addition, China possesses 32 Jiangdao-class light frigates as of 2018. 800 J-16 16機配備開始
Renhai-class destroyer (Not
J-20in（試験中）
service) 6機
[Jane’s600
by IHS Markit]計 838機年、
配備開始
新型潜水艦 400
（隻数）年、
年、
調達開始
50 200 調達開始
空母「遼寧」
40 0
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 18
30
announced that it will “improve capabilities in support of electronic warfare aircraft frequently flying near Japan,
the 20awareness of the state of cyberspace, cyber defenses, but also some of upgraded J-15 fighters and H-6 bombers
national
10 cyberspace warfare.” Indeed, major military have electronic warfare capabilities. Furthermore, some
training since 2008 has been noted to always contain 年月 have
年月日
日 speculated that China is reinforcing its “A2/AD”
0
elements 91 93such as03cyber
95 97 99 01 05 07 09 11strategy,
13 15 17 18 including both attack and capabilities by using cyber attacks to destroy adversary’s
※ ｼﾞﾝ・ｼｬﾝ・ｿﾝ・ﾕｱﾝ・ｷﾛの各級潜水艦の総隻数
defense. Recent training has reportedly been successful networks in the entire region.
in interfere with the command and communication See Chapter 3, Section 4 (Outer Space and Security); Chapter 3,
system of the adversary force. It is said that not only Y-8 Section 5 (Trends in Cyberspace)

Commentary Cutting-edge technologies and Chinese military COLUMN

“Smart technologies” are steadily taking hold in Chinese society, such as facial recognition ticket gates and unmanned stores in
urban areas. This trends include the Chinese military. At the National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October
2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping commented, “China intends to deter and win wars...by advancing new operational and logistics
capabilities, accelerating advances in intelligentization of the military, and enhancing joint operational and inter-theater operational
capabilities based on networked information systems.” As indicated in this comment, China is deploying cutting-edge technologies
in the military field under the banners of “building information capabilities” and “intelligentization of the military.”
Drone “swarm” technology is an example of cutting-edge technology being developed in China that could be used for military
purposes. China Electronics Technology Group unveiled swarm technology with 119 units in June 2017, breaking the US record.
Various observers have cited the significant military implications because of the possibility of artificial intelligence identifying changes
in enemy behavior and battlefield conditions and flexibly carrying out operations with drones when swarm technology is combined with
Chapter 2
artificial intelligence. China wants to strengthen manufacturing through cultivation of the semiconductor industry and other activities
and is making large-scale investments. However, since semiconductors help bolster the performance of military technologies, the
US decided in September 2017 to block acquisition of a US-based semiconductor manufacturer by a Chinese-affiliated manufacturer
due to concerns about outflow of military and security technologies.
China is promoting civil and military integration in the science and technology field as a national strategy. Technology
developments in non-military areas hence might be applied for military purposes.

Technology advances are changing the nature of war and every country is focusing on developing and applying cutting-
edge technologies. In particular, the US and China are engaged in fierce competition in artificial intelligence and other new fields.
Technology developments in China should be closely monitored with an awareness of the possibility of military use.
(7) Establishment of Joint Operational Posture the Eastern Theater, and the military parade with the
In recent years, organizational reforms have been under 90th anniversary of the PLA consisting of theater-based
way to improve joint operations capability. The CMC structure with a strong emphasis on the practical military.
Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have These exercises are believed to be geared toward building
been established as part of this reform for the CCP to the forces of each military branch for joint operations
carry out decisionmaking at the highest strategic level. and implementing joint operations based on the theater
These actions have been continuing during the current command.
military reforms, and five new theaters, joint operation
headquarters were established in February 2016. As for 6 Waters and Airspace Activities
assignment of senior military officers, in January 2017,
Vice-Admiral Yuan Yubai became the first non-army (1) General Situation
theater commander. As only army officers had been Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up
appointed commanders of military regions or theater capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters
of operations until then, it is assumed that progress is and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its
being made towards joint operations from the viewpoint waters and airspace activities using its sea and air powers
of human resources. As General Secretary Xi Jinping both in qualitative and quantitative ways. Specifically in
spoke about creating “strong and effective command the sea and airspace areas surrounding Japan, Chinese
institutions in theaters for joint operations” and enhancing naval vessels, and navy and air force aircraft have been
joint operation capabilities at the 19th Party’s National observed conducting training and information gathering
Congress in October 2017, China is thought to continue activities, as well as naval vessels heading for distant
to prioritize the development of joint operations systems waters such as Indian Ocean. A large number of Chinese
and will make further development. government ships that belong to maritime law enforcement
In recent years, China has been conducting exercises agencies and their aircraft have been observed engaging
with the aim of developing joint operations systems, in monitoring activities for the protection of its
such as the three services’ joint exercise (July 2017) in maritime rights and interests.54 These activities include:
54 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to
desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report).

China Section 3
intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters by exhibiting the results of its recent 5-year activities such
Chinese government vessels; intrusions into Japan’s as the “struggle” against the Senkaku Island, which is an
airspace; and dangerous acts that could cause unintended inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East
consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s direction China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” and
of a fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer, the flight its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols.” At the same
of Chinese military fighter jets abnormally close to an time, it appears that China continues to improve the
SDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon quality of its activities, and efforts can be seen to build
the freedom of overflight over the high seas, such as joint operation capabilities to develop a practical military.
the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense a. Military Activities in the East China Sea (including the
Identification Zone (ADIZ).” China is urged to act on the areas around the Senkaku Islands)
basis of the principle of the rule of law. Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in
See Chapter 3, Section3 (Maritime Trends) the East China Sea continuously and actively.56 Stating its
Chapter 2
own position regarding the Senkaku Islands, China alleges
(2) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas
Waters and Airspace under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful.
Chinese Navy vessels and Air Force and Navy aviation Chinese naval vessels have recently tended to expand the
have recently escalated their activities in the surrounding sea area of their regular activities to the south, and are

sea areas and airspace of Japan. For instance, they are continuously operating in the area near Japan’s Senkaku
conducting activities based on unilateral claim on the Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate of the
Senkaku Islands, and are expanding their areas of Chinese Navy entered Japan’s contiguous zone off around
operations including the area surrounding the Senkakus. the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a Chinese Navy
These raise a great concern to Japan. The number of combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone around
scrambles by the ASDF against Chinese aircraft has kept the Senkakus. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang-class
high, reaching a new high55 in FY2016. The Chinese submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the
military leadership has emphasized to continue to contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. This was the
improve the Chinese militery’s operational capabilities, first time a submerged Chinese submarine was identified
and announced as transiting through these contiguous
KEY WORD waters off the Senkakus.57
In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering
Chinese government ships that belong vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting multiple
to maritime law enforcement agencies
Surveillance and other activities at sea used to be conducted by Shang-class submarine
“Maritime Police” (Haijing) of the Ministry of Public Security, “China
Maritime Surveillance” (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration
of the Ministry of Land and Resources, “China Fisheries Law
Enforcement Command” (Yuzheng) of the Bureau of Fisheries of the
Ministry of Agriculture, “Maritime Safety Administration (Haixun)” of
the Ministry of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of
the General Administration of Customs, all of which were under the [Jane’s by IHS Markit]
State Council. In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four <Specifications, performance>
agencies, excluding “Maritime Safety Administration,” into the new Water displacement: 6,096 tons
“State Oceanic Administration” and that the new organization would Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)
carry out surveillance and other activities under the name of “China Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),
Coast Guard” (Zhongguo Haijing) under the guidance of the Ministry of torpedoes
Public Security. From 2018, these maritime security units were placed <Description>
under the command of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and ultimately A new type of nuclear-powered attack submarine. In January 2018,
the Central Military Commission as the People’s Armed Police Coast one passed submerged through Japan’s contiguous zone around
Guard, but maintained the original name of China Coast Guard. Miyako Island and the Senkaku Islands.
55 In FY2016, the number of times that ASDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft hit a record of 851 times.
56 For example, a China Military Online article (October 21, 2015) reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that all major combatants in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy
conducted operations exceeded 150 days.
57 In June 2018, a Japan Coast Guard patrol ship confirmed that the Chinese Navy Anwei-class hospital ship navigated the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands.

activities. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly Changes in the Number of Scrambles against
Fig. I-2-3-4
navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone Chinese Aircraft
south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015. In June
(Times)
2016, the same type of AGI sailed in Japan’s territorial 900
waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island, 850
800
and then sailed within Japan’s contiguous zone north 750
of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly 600
550
conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous
500
zone south of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first 450
navigation in Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese 400
350
Navy vessel in approximately 12 years.58 300
China’s air forces are also actively conducting 250
Chapter 2
activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. Their 200

150
activities include warning and surveillance, Combat 100
Air Patrols (CAP), and training. The area of the activities 50
of PLA aircraft has tended to expand eastward and 0
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
southward in recent years. As a result of this incremental (FY)
expansion, PLA aircraft have recently been confirmed

conducting activities actively in airspace closer to the ASDF aircraft that were conducting normal warning and
main island of Okinawa and the rest of the Southwestern surveillance activities in the East China Sea. In July 2017,
Islands. The intent of the expanded activities of PLA two PLA J-10 fighters reportedly intercepted a U.S. Air
aircraft may be to operate the “East China Sea ADIZ.”59 Force EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft.60 And in
In May and June 2014, incidents occurred where two April 2018, an unmanned aerial vehicle presumed to be a
PLA Su-27 fighters came abnormally close to MSDF and Chinese BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance vehicle was
confirmed to have flown over the East China Sea.
Dongdiao-class AGI
Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the
Senkaku Islands, territorial airspace intrusion by a fixed-
wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Association (SOA)
in December 2012 marked the first such instance by a
Chinese aircraft. Subsequently, fixed-wing aircraft of the
SOA were frequently observed flying near the airspace
up through March 2014.61 Recently, it has been confirmed
that the scope of the activities of PLA aircraft near the
[Jane’s by IHS Markit] Senkaku Islands has tended to expand in the southward
direction. In June 2016, ASDF fighters scrambled against
Water displacement: 6,096 tons
PLA aircraft that flew southward closer to the Senkaku
Main armament: 37 mm and 14.5 mm autocannons Islands. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense
<Description>
In June 2016, one navigated through Japanese territorial waters near
the Kuchinoerabu and Yakushima Islands, subsequently navigated KEY WORD
the contiguous zone to kitadaitojima Islands, and finally navigated
back and forth east-west outside the contiguous zone to the south Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
of the Senkaku Islands. It also navigated back and forth outside the
contiguous zone to the southeast of the Boso Peninsula in February CAP refers to a mission where interceptors patrol or stand by in a
2016 and other occasions. designated airspace as a precaution.
58 In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine conducted “submerged passage through the territorial sea of another country” in Japanese territorial waters in violation of international law.
59 In November 2016, a spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the PLA Air Force had been continuously conducting patrols of the “East China Sea ADIZ” for the past three years. See Chapter 3,
Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).
60 See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).
61 For example, on March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA fl ew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above water around the Japanese
destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 50 m
and as low as approximately 50 m above water around the destroyer Asayuki.

China Section 3
released an official announcement stating that SDF 2016, the aircraft carrier Liaoning navigated the East
aircraft conducted provocations against PLA aircraft.62 China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea
However, SDF aircraft conduct scrambles in accordance area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
with international law and the SDF Law, and it is never Island to advance to the Western Pacific for the first time.
true that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against On that occasion, a surveillance helicopter took off from
PLA aircraft. Chinese announcements concerning a Jiangkai II-class frigate accompanying the carrier and
the Japanese response have been one-sided, and it is flew in airspace approximately 10 to 30 km southeast of
extremely regrettable that the Chinese side is unilaterally the territorial airspace over Miyako Island. In April 2018,
making explanations contrary to the fact, as doing so the aircraft carrier Liaoning and a number of vessels
undermines the Japan-China relationship. participated in a naval review and training in the South
b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean China Sea, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the announced that they passed through the Bashi Channel
Chapter 2
waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and and conducted confrontation exercises that included
return to base with high frequency.63 The advancement carrier-based fighters. At that time, the MSDF conducting
routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have warning and surveillance confirmed aircraft presumed to
transited the sea area between the main island of Okinawa be carrier-based fighters taking off and landing, and it
and Miyako Island, and have been found passing through was the first time what are presumed to be carrier-based

the Osumi Strait, sea area between Yonaguni Island fighters were confirmed flying over the Pacific Ocean. The
and Nakanokami Island near Iriomote Island, the sea activities are worthy of attention as an indicators of the
area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces,
Island, Tsugaru Strait, and Soya Strait. By diversifying including aircraft carriers, and enhancement of its force
routes in this manner, China appears to be aiming to projection capabilities to distant areas. With a Chinese
enhance its deployment capabilities to the open ocean, Navy Shang-class submarine passing submerged from
and considering remarks from high-ranking government the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea from Japan’s
officials, it is thought that China is planning to make contiguous zone northeast of Miyako Island in January
deployments to the Pacific Ocean sailing through waters 2018, it is thought that submarines also conducted some
near Japan regular activities.64 Furthermore, considering activities in the western Pacific. In addition, in July 2017,
the nature of the activities it is conducting in distant a Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI sailed through
areas, China is presumably aiming to enhance operation Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Matsumae-kojima
execution capabilities on the open ocean. In December Island in Matsumae, Hokkaido, and subsequently sailed
eastward through Tsugaru Strait and advanced to the
Pacific Ocean.
Regarding the advancement of air forces into the
Pacific Ocean, the advancement of a Chinese Navy Y-8
early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013.
The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific
was also confirmed in 2015. In 2017, advances into the
Pacific Ocean via this airspace became more active,
especially after July, with flights totaling 18 passages
over the course of a year.65 This is a significant increase
Chinese submarine sailing with the national flag of China hoisted (January 2018).
62 Regarding the scramble by ASDF fighters against PLA aircraft that flew southward towards the Senkaku Islands on June 17, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released the following
announcement: “Chinese fighter jets were approached by two Japanese F-15 fi ghter jets in high speed. They conducted provocations and used fire-control radars against us. The PLA responded
decisively and took measures such as tactical maneuver. Consequently, the Japanese fighter jets flew away after firing infrared jamming shells.”
63 The number of times Chinese Navy combatant vessels have been active in the waters around the Southwestern Islands, Soya Strait and Tsugaru Strait since 2008 is: 3 times (2008), 2 times (2009),
4 times (2010), 5 times (2011), 13 times (2012), 21 times (2013), 14 times (2014), 12 times (2015), 15 times (2016), 12 times (2017), and 4 times (as of the end of May 2018).
64 In March 2017, when Japan announced the transit of Chinese naval vessels between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, a Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson said, “Japan
needs to get used to the fact that we will pass through many more times in the future.”
65 In 2017, Chinese military aircraft passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island once in March, 3 times in July, 5 times in August, 3 times in November, and 6 times in December for
a total of 18 times.

from the five flights confirmed in 2016.66 The types of the past, and air units have also started activities in the
aircraft passing through the airspace are also increasing area recently. “Confrontation exercises” in the Sea of
in variety year by year. The newest H-6K bombers and Japan by Chinese Navy forces were announced for the
Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the first Y-8 first time in August 2016, during which time three aircraft
EW aircraft in July 2016 were confirmed by sight that at participated in the exercise, including two H-6 bombers
least one of the H-6K bombers that flew in September that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of
2016 carried objects in the form of missiles.67 Flight Japan. In January 2017, naval vessels and aircraft were
patterns have also been changing. In November 2016, said to have carried out joint confrontation exercises in
H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed to the same area, in which eight aircraft, including six H-6
have flown from the south of the Sakishima Islands to bombers passed through the Tsushima Strait to the Sea
the East China Sea, passing between the main island of of Japan.
Okinawa and Miyako Island, and made frequent flights The Chinese Air Force flew through the Tsushima
Chapter 2
toward the Bashi Channel from the East China Sea via Strait for the first time in December 2017 to advance to
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. the Sea of Japan. This passage included the simultaneous
Upon the flight in December 2017 being confirmed, a transit of the latest H-6K bomber and Su-30 fighter, and
spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the aircraft were the first Chinese fighter aircraft to advance into the
were “cruising around an island (Taiwan).” In August Sea of Japan. In addition, the Y-9 intelligence gathering
2017, H-6K bombers advanced to airspace off the Kii aircraft that entered the Sea of Japan in February 2018
Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via passage flew through the Western Channel (the strait between
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture and the Korean
Through the conduct of frequent long-distance flights of Peninsula) of the Tsushima Strait, and was the first time
bombers and other aircraft, and the advanced flight paths for a flight through the channel.70 The activities of the
and composition of military units, China is thought to Chinese military in the Sea of Japan are considered to
be demonstrating its presence around Japan and so on, continue to expand and be intensified futher.71
and planning further enhancements to more practical
operational capabilities. With regard to SDF aircraft (3) Activities of Chinese Government Vessels Especially
scrambles against PLA aircraft advancing into the Pacific Around the Senkaku Islands
Ocean in October and December 2016, the Chinese In December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels
Ministry of National Defense made false announcements hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial waters
that SDF aircraft shot IR flares, endangering the safety around the Senkaku Islands. These are not permitted
of the Chinese aircraft.68 However, there is absolutely under international law. Since then, China Maritime
no truth to these announcements; SDF aircraft conducted Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement
scrambles in accordance with international law and the Command vessels have intensified their activities in the
SDF Law. aforementioned territorial waters. Such activities have
Additionally, activities considered to be planned been intensified greatly after September 2012, when
to improve the capability to carry out joint sea and air the Japanese Government acquired property rights to
operation execution capabilities, such as activities like air and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri
to-ship attack drills when entering the Pacific Ocean, have Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island).
also been seen in recent years,69 and continued attention Since October 2013, Chinese government vessels have
has to be paid for related trends. repeatedly intruded into these territorial waters, and the
c. Activities in the Sea of Japan form of the intrusions have become more reinforced.72
It is thought that the Chinese Navy has had vessels deployed China is seen to be steadily strengthening an
in the Sea of Japan for training and other occasions in operational posture intended to use Chinese government
66 Since 2013, air forces have passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Pacific Ocean 5 times (2013), 5 times (2014), 6 times (2015), and 5 times (2016).
67 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) states that the H-6K bomber’s ability to carry the DH-10 (CJ-10) land attack cruise missile, which
allows for more long-distance attacks, allows China to target as far as the second island chain including Guam.
68 See footnote 9 of this section.
69 For example, in December 2017, when H-6 bombers advanced into the western Pacific Ocean, naval vessels reportedly conducted anti-aircraft and anti-missile training in the same area. It is possible
that the training between the bombers and naval vessels was to improve joint anti-ship attack abilities.
70 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the Chinese military aircraft carried out “unusual reconnaissance activities” within South Korea’s ADIZ.
71 In December 2017, a PLA Air Force spokesperson stated after the Air Force entered the Sea of Japan for the first time, “The Sea of Japan is not Japan’s sea.”
72 While with some exceptions, Chinese government vessels often intrude into Japan’s territorial waters two to three times a month from around 10 a.m. for about two hours. The number of vessels had
been two to three until August 2016. Since then, four vessels often intrude into territorial waters in a group.

China Section 3
Fig. I-2-3-5 Image of recent activities by Chinese military forces in seas and airspace around Japan
Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) Legend
Sea power
Air power
Shang-class submarine Luyang III-class destroyer H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter
Frequent advancements into the

Bomber advances all the way to
Pacific Ocean passing between
the area off the Kii Peninsula
Okinawa and Miyako Island
(August 2017)
Carrier-based fighter
Tokyo (presumed) flights in
the Pacific Ocean
(April 2018)
Amami Oshima
Chapter 2
Island Okinawa
The PLA Navy Yonaguni Island

and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands

activities in the
Air power actively advances
China-Russia joint exercise into the Sea of Japan Underwater submarine
(Joint Sea 2017) and destroyer’s
Ningbo intrusions into the
contiguous zone off
the Senkaku Islands
(January 2018)
Qingdao
*Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates.
vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. For intruded into territorial waters. It was confirmed that
example, since December 2015, Chinese government the government vessels that advanced into those waters
vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons have included many armed vessels.74 This case appears to
begun to repeatedly intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. indicate that China has the capability to simultaneously
Additionally, government vessels deployed to seas near inject a large number of government vessels including
the Senkaku Islands are increasingly larger in size, with at armed vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands.
least one of the government vessels intruding into Japan’s These activities of Chinese government vessels in
territorial waters being a 3,000 t or larger-class vessel the sea area around the Senkaku Islands are an attempt
since August 2014. Since February 2015, three 3,000 t to unilaterally change the status quo by force. Japan
or larger-class government vessels have been confirmed finds China’s actions which escalate the situation totally
entering Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously unacceptable.
multiple times. China is also presumed to operate two of In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that
the world’s largest 10,000 t-class patrol vessels.73 appeared to be a small drone was flying above a Chinese
It appears that the operation capabilities of Chinese government vessel intruding into Japanese territorial
government vessels in the sea areas around Japan are also waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also
improving. In early August 2016, approximately 200-300 represents a unilateral escalation of the situation and
fishing boats advanced to the contiguous zone off the constitutes an invasion of territorial airspace.
Senkaku Islands. At that time, a maximum of 15 Chinese Besides the waters around the Senkaku Islands,
government vessels navigated the contiguous zone Chinese government vessels were confirmed to have
simultaneously, and later for five days a large number of passed through the territorial waters of Japan around
Chinese government vessels and fishing boats repeatedly Tsushima (Nagasaki Prefecture), Okinoshima Island
73 “China Coast Guard 2901.” and “China Coast Guard 3901” are also reportedly conducting test navigation. These government vessels allegedly carry a 76 mm cannon.
74 Since then, from mid-August, confirmed cases have not included the intrusion of government vessels into territorial waters following Chinese fishing boats. The frequency of intrusions into territorial
waters, etc. has returned to about the same level as before early August.

(Fukuoka Prefecture) and the Tsugaru Strait in July

2017. The same vessels were also confirmed to have
sailed in Japan’s territorial waters from Sata Cape to the
Kusagakiguntou Islands (both in Kagoshima Prefecture)
in August that year.
Retired Navy vessels are believed to have been
handed over to the China Coast Guard,75 that was formally
launched in July 2013. It was reported that the Navy
and the China Coast Guard conducted a coordinated
drill. It appears that the Navy is supporting maritime
law enforcement agencies on both the operations and
equipment fronts. In July 2018, the Chinese Coast Guard
Chapter 2
was incorporated into the People’s Armed Police (PAP) of the features.78 During the 19th National Congress in
under the leadership and command of the Central Military October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping reported
Commission. The way of the military and the Coast the progress of the land reclamation work in the South
Guard cooperation in the future is worthy of attention. China Sea as one of the accomplishments of economic
See Fig. I-2-3-4 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against development.
Chinese Aircraft) In Fiery Cross Reef, a large harbor capable of

Fig. I-2-3-5 (Image of recent activities by Chinese military
forces in seas and airspace around Japan) receiving surface combatants is being constructed. In
January 2016, China declared completion of a 3,000
(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea m-long runway which fighters and bombers can take off
China has also been intensifying its activities in the from and land on, and aircraft test flights were conducted
South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly willfully against the protests from countries in the area.79
Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial In April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the
disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN South China Sea landed at Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate
member states. emergency patients. At Subi and Mischief Reefs, in July
Since 2014, on seven features in the Spratly Islands,76 of the same year, China conducted aircraft test fights
China has pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land willfully for two straight days on a runway where large
reclamation works.77 The Philippines-China arbitration aircraft can take off and land.80 In January 2018, two Y-7
award issued in July 2016 denied the rights claimed transport aircraft were reported over Mischief Reef, and
by China in the waters surrounded by the “nine-dash Y-8 special mission aircraft were confirmed over Sui Reef
line” including the “historic rights” as the basis of the later in April that year. It has been noted that batteries
“nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the capable of being equipped with anti-aircraft guns, missile
illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. shelters, underground facilities which are pointed out to
However, China has made it clear that it would not comply be ammunition storages, are being built on these features.
with the award and is currently continuing to develop It has also been noted that the construction of this
military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds infrastructure has been completed. Additionally, in April
of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and
including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities. anti-surface cruise missiles were deployed in each feature
It can be said that China is advancing the militalization as part of a military training, and that radar jamming
75 It has been suggested that three Jiangwei I-class frigates belonging to the Chinese Navy were repaired to be handed over to the China Coast Guard. Similarly, it has been suggested that two Luda-
class destroyers will be handed over from the Chinese Navy to the China Coast Guard.
76 The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef.
77 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) notes that China added over 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly
Islands by late 2015 and completed the land reclamation.
78 The international community has repeatedly suggested that China is militarizing its activities in the South China Sea. For example, in October 2017, Harry B. Harris Jr., Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command stated, “We also want Beijing to do more to stop provocative actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where the Chinese are building up combat power and positional
advantage in an attempt to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features … where they are fundamentally altering the physical and political landscape by creating and militarizing
man-made islands...where they are using its military and economic power to erode the rules-based international order.”
79 China is believed to have conducted three test flights at Fiery Cross Reef on January 2, 3, and 6 of 2016. In response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam expressed strong
opposition on January 2, and the Philippines protested in writing on January 8.
80 On July 14, 2016, the spokesperson of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that it was an infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty.

China Section 3
systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. On the other etc. In July and August 2016, after the Philippines-China
four features, it is pointed out that the construction of arbitration award was rendered, a PLA Air Force H-6K
facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, is making bomber conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace
progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft in the periphery of the Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese
guns and close in weapon systems (CIWS) may have Ministry of National Defense announced that this patrol
already been deployed. If these features are used for would “become normal.”82 In September of the same
full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change year, the China-Russia joint exercise Joint Sea 2016
the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. was conducted for the first time in the South China Sea.
In the Paracel Islands, China has similarly carried out A field training exercise by naval vessels including the
land reclamations and promoted their use for military aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony,
purposes. China has extended the runway on Woody regarded as the largest since the founding of China, was
Island since 2013. In October 2015 and October 2017, conducted in the same area from the end of March until
Chapter 2
China was reported to deploy J-11 and other fighters, April 2018. It is also reported that Chinese government
and in February 2016 and January 2017, the existence vessels fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring
of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was countries, and that Chinese naval vessels are active in
confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing some waters of the South China Sea at all times.83 In this
training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea manner, it appears that China seeks to expand its military

announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense presence and enhance its military operation capabilities
in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island. In recent in the South China Sea.84
years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting Such activities by China unilaterally change the
what are likely to be survey activities in the Scarborough status quo and further advance its efforts to create a
Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these
Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed activities, and the concern is shared with the international
out that new land reclamations in the shoal might be community, including the United States.85 In response to
started in the future,81 and that if China conducts land the growing international concerns over the development
reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and on the features, China asserts that a number of ASEAN
other infrastructure in the Scarborough Shoal, it could member states including the Philippines and Vietnam
possibly increase its ability to track the situation and are illegitimately occupying features of the Spratly
strategic capabilities in the surrounding sea area and Islands and carrying out large-scale construction work
ultimately enhance its capabilities in all areas of the to build fixed facilities such as airstrips.86 However,
South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid to China’s development work on the features is of a scale
the situation going forward. incomparable to the activities carried out by other
The activities of the PLA in sea areas and airspace are countries and is being conducted at a rapid pace.87
expanding as well. In March 2009 and December 2013, In any case, the issues over the South China Sea
Chinese naval vessels and other vessels approached and are of concern to the entire international community
intercepted a U.S. Navy vessel navigating in the South due to their direct implications for peace and stability of
China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, the Asia-Pacific region. Countries concerned including
a PLA fighter allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces aircraft, China are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that
81 In March 2016, with regard to China’s activities near the Scarborough Shoal, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation John Richardson stated, “I think we see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things,
survey type of activity, going on. That’s an area of concern...a next possible area of reclamation.”
82 There are reports that Chinese H-6 bombers flew along the “nine-dash line” in March 2015 and December 2016. Also, in December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that
the Air Force aircraft carried out “flight training and other activities around the islands.”
83 In November 2017, Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines was reported in a local newspaper to have said that Chinese warships were constantly active near Sandy Cay in
the Spratly Islands. In addition, in April of 2018, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) pointed out that the Chinese Navy and Coast
Guard Ships regularly visited the artificial islands in the Spratly Islands.
84 China is reportedly constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point
out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea as well as the western Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base
to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carrier.
85 As a concern from the United States, for example, in May 2018, the Pentagon canceled the Chinese military’s invitation to Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) stating, “China’s continued militarization
of disputed features in the South China Sea only serves to raise tensions and destabilize the region.” As regards the concerns of the international community, for example, at the G7 Taormina Summit
held in May 2017, the Leaders’ Communique stated that “[w]e remain concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and strongly opposed to any unilateral actions that could
increase tensions.”
86 Remark by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on April 29, 2015.
87 The U.S. DoD’s “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” (August 2015) states, “As of June 2015, [China] had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land” and “China has now reclaimed 17 times
more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 95% of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.”

Fig. I-2-3-6 China’s development on the features of the Spratly islands
Example of militalization
Image of the South China Sea
February 2010 February 2016
Paracel Islands Philippines
Woody Island
Thailand
Scarborough Reef
Hughes Reef
Vietnam
Radar and Artillery
Cambodia Spratly Islands communications facilities batteries
Subi Reef
Gaven Reefs
Chapter 2
Aircraft hangars
Fiery Cross Reef Mischief Reef and runway
Hughes Reef
Cuarteron Reef
Johnson South Reef
Brunei
“Nine-dash line” August 2014 March 2017
Indonesia
Malaysia Fiery Cross Reef
* image (Photo sources) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Digital Globe
heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of and September of 2017, a Song-class submarine and
the rule of law. Yuan-class submarine called at a port in Kota Kinabalu,
See Fig. I-2-3-6 (China’s development on the features of the Malaysia. Besides the Indian Ocean, in September 2015,
Spratly islands) five Chinese vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas in
Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia);
Chapter 3, Section 3 (Maritime Trends) the Bering Sea and sailed in U.S. territorial waters near the
Aleutian Islands.88
(5) The State of Activities in the Indian Ocean and Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to
other seas secure overseas bases such as harbors, which would help
The Chinese Navy is thought to be shifting its naval
Song-class submarine
forces towards “offshore waters defense and open seas
protection,” and is steadily increasing its capabilities to
conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian
Ocean in recent years. For example, since December
2008, Chinese Navy vessels sail in the Indian Ocean to
the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to take part in
international counter-piracy efforts. Activities of Chinese
Navy submarines are also beginning to be confirmed <Specifications, performance>
continuously in the Indian Ocean. In 2014, a Song-class Water displacement: 2,286 tons
submarine reportedly called at a port in Colombo, Sri Speed: 22 knots (approximately 41 km/h)
Lanka, twice in the same year. This marked the first time Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),
torpedoes
that a Chinese submarine entered a port overseas. It is
<Description>
reported that in May 2015 and May 2016, a Yuan-class
Conventional submarine. Surfaced near U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty
submarine and a Shang-class submarine respectively Hawk in the seas near Okinawa.
called at a port in Karachi, Pakistan, and in January
88 According to the United States, the coastal state in this case, the Chinese vessels’ navigation did not violate international law.

China Section 3
in waters and airspace as far as possible from China

in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and
territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in
effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress
in science and technology.
The second is to develop military capabilities to deter
and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that
it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the
Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To
ensure that they can prevent foreign intervention into
Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea in all directions,
China needs to enhance its military operational
Chapter 2
capabilities at sea and airspace.
support its operations in far seas. For example, in August The third is to weaken the control of other countries
2017, China began construction of “security facilities” and to strengthen the claim through various surveillance
for logistics support of the Chinese military in Djibouti, activities and use of force, at sea and in airspace
a strategic point in East Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. In surrounding the island to which China claims territorial

recent years, China has been promoting89 its “Belt and Road” sovereignty.
Initiative whose main purpose is establishing an economic The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its
zone centered on the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas
military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the
the concept through the defense of sea lanes. Furthermore, East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that
while it is thought that the concept includes a strategic in addition to the existing 4 platforms, China is building
intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible 12 new offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the
that the construction of infrastructure based on the same Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since
concept will further promote the activities of the PLA in the June 2013.90 In late June 2016, the installment of an
Indian Ocean, Pacific ocean and elsewhere. For example, anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was
by supporting the construction of port infrastructure in confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other Indian Ocean countries, to developments of the platforms by China, including the
it is possible that China attempts to secure ports to call, purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged
strengthen the defense of sea lanes, and further improve protests against such unilateral development by China
the operation execution capabilities of the PLA Navy in and demanded the termination of such work.91
the Indian Ocean. The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications.
(6) Objectives of Water and Airspace Activities KEY WORD

Taking into consideration such factors as the development
of Chinese naval and air forces, activities in sea areas and “Belt and Road” Initiative
airspace, statements in defense white papers, China’s
geographical location and globalizing economy, the A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping.
The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century
water and airspace activities of the Chinese Navy, Air
Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September
Force and other organizations are considered to have the and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are
following objectives. collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative.
The first is to intercept operations by adversaries
89 China is collaborating on port development projects and other programs with local governments at such ports as Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong Port in
Bangladesh.
90 On November 1, 2016, Foreign Minister Kishida (at that time) revealed that new gas field drilling was taking place in that sea area and stated that “it is extremely regrettable that [China] is continuing
with acts towards unilateral development.”
91 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan
for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas fi eld
(Tianwaitian in Chinese) and elsewhere. Meanwhile, China’s SOA announced that the “Haiyangshiyou 981” oil rig succeeded in its fi rst drilling in the South China Sea in May 2012.

Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown

interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected
situations at sea areas and airspace. For example, in April
2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan
and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards
of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member
states have unexpected encounters. Also, in May 2018,
Japan and China signed a formal agreement to start
implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication
The seventh and tenth offshore platforms (East China Sea Gas Field)
Mechanism between the Defence Authorities of Japan-
Chapter 2
China to prevent accidental clashes between SDF and

In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including PLA vessels and aircraft.92
its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are
essential for the globalizing Chinese economy. The areas 7 International Military Activities
of its sea lanes which the Chinese Navy deems it should
defend depend on such factors as the international situation In recent years, the PLA has been emphasizing
at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping,
the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue, and
have been developing a capacity to defend areas past counterpiracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has
China’s near seas to more distant seas. actively dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that
Given these objectives and recent trends in China’s in the background of the PLA’s stance on international
water and airspace activities, it is believed that China military activities is the expansion of China’s national
plans to further expand the sphere of its water and interests beyond its national borders, which in turn
airspace activities, and further intensify its operations increased its necessity to protect and promote its national
in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China interests overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its
Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea and the stature by demonstrating its will to fulfil its responsibilities
airspaces over these sea areas, and the Indian Ocean. to the international community.
China vows to consistently support and actively
participate in UN PKOs. According to the Ministry
of National Defense of China, it has sent more than
35,000 military personnel to them.93 According to the
United Nations, as of the end of May 2018, China has
a total of 2,514 troops engaged in UN peacekeeping
activities, including United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
China has also contributed civilian police and
military observers, and has dramatically increased its
budget allocation for peacekeeping.94 In addition, in
September 2017, China announced that it registered
approximately 8,000 troops in the UN Peacekeeping
Capability Readiness System (PCRS).
Signing the memorandum on the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between
Japan-China Defense Authorities” (May 2018). In this manner, China has actively made personnel
92 See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 (4 Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation)
93 According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense website. (last viewed May 2017)
94 China’s share of the UN PKO budget was approximately 6.6% in 2015, ranking it sixth. It then increased signifi cantly in 2016, exceeding Japan and ranking China second after the United States. Its
share in 2018 is approximately 10.2%.

China Section 3
and financial contributions and has a growing presence in implementation of more practical exercises. The new
UN PKO. It is deemed that underlying China’s proactive military training regulations in effect since January 2018
attitude towards UN PKOs is China’s wish to strengthen referred to the implementation of joint and full-spectrum
its relations with the regions where PKOs are conducted, operational capabilities based on network information
particularly with African nations, by way of these activities. systems, in addition to the implementation of practical
Moreover, China has been actively participating in training as a rule.
counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to
in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance train soldiers who have the ability to implement joint
and disaster relief activities. In view of the deteriorating operations. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy
situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation project to develop human resources capable of directing
operation of Chinese nationals from Libya from February joint and informatized operations, and of building
to March 2011 for the first time. In this operation, China informatized armed forces. It was reported in 2017 that
Chapter 2
dispatched a Navy vessel and Air Force transportation the PLA National Defense University began training
aircraft to Libya. Moreover, From March to April 2015, to develop human resources capable of directing joint
based on the worsening situation in Yemen, the Chinese operations. On the other hand, in recent years, a variety of
Navy’s counter-piracy forces docked at the ports of Aden, issues have been raised in relation to benefits, including
Al Hudaydah, and elsewhere for the evacuation of Chinese remuneration, the personnel development system, and the

nationals and foreign nationals, including one Japanese treatment of veterans.95
national, living in Yemen. In May 2017, when Sri Lanka China outlined the promotion of “rule of law” at
was hit by flooding and landslides, the Chinese Navy the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central
carried out disaster relief activities, such as providing Committee in 2014, and is proceeding to develop various
material support and medical rescue activities, while it was related laws, and it is thought that the military will also
on a long-range cruise. China’s humanitarian assistance be required to implement the “rule of law.” One specific
and disaster relief activities have received international action is Chairman of the CMC Xi Jinping’s comment at
praise. It has been pointed out, however, that through such the 90th anniversary commemorating the formation of the
activities, China aims to build a pacifist and humanitarian PLA held in August 2017 that the “military be controlled
image of its military forces and demonstrate, both by law.” Additionally, in October of the same year, Miao
domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and
on military operations other than war. It is also suggested Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Commission
that China hopes to test its ability to promptly project its for Discipline Inspection, were selected as members
military power to distant locations. of the 19th Central Military Committee, the supreme
decision-making body in the military.
8 Education and Training China has been developing wartime mobilizations
systems in order to effectively utilize private resources
In recent years, the PLA has conducted practical exercises in case of emergencies, including wars. In 2010, China
including large-scale ones such as joint exercises led enforced the National Defense Mobilization Law, which
by theaters, joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air is the basic law for wartime mobilization into effect. In
Force, confrontation exercises, landing exercises, and fact, while it appears that military weapons have recently
exercises that cut across military regions and theaters, as been transported by commandeered civilian vessels,96
well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other such a development is thought to be in line with the
countries in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. fusion of military and civilian personnel currently being
The goal of “being able to fight and winning battles” was promoted, and it is possible that this will be actively
repeatedly mentioned in statements by President Xi. This implemented going forward.
is construed as evidence that the military is promoting
95 See footnote 26 in this section.

96 Chinese Ministry of National Defense website, April 2017.

9 National Defense Industry Sector economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed
for a buildup of national defense. As a result, specifically,
While China imports highly sophisticated military the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to
equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation
from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to industry, and the shipbuilding industry.
place emphasis on their indigenous production. In recent years, the “military-civil fusion” strategy,
In recent years, reform in the Chinese defense which is said to have been upgraded to the national
industry has progressed. Under the State Administration strategy, is also being promoted in the field of defense
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense technology.97 Furthermore, China encourages and
(SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information supports international cooperation and competition
Technology, a department of the State Council, China has in dual-use industries. China is thus thought to have
formed 12 group corporations to develop and produce interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-
Chapter 2
nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft, vessels, and use industries. By proactively introducing advanced
other conventional weapons. In doing so, China promotes, technologies from overseas in this way, the modernization
in particular, two-way technological exchanges where of the PLA can be further advanced.98
military technologies are utilized for developing the national
3 Relations with Other Countries
1 General Situation and stable international environment is necessary for

maintaining sustainable economic development and
China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such
conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive recognition, in its relationships with other countries,
manner based on its own assertions incompatible with China proactively carries out military exchanges
the existing international order, including attempting to including reciprocal visits by senior military officials and
change the status quo by coercion. China remains poised joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been
to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise, engaged in dynamic military exchanges not only with
which has included making steady efforts to turn its major powers such as the United States and Russia and
acts into faits accompli. It has advocated building a with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian
“community of shared future for mankind” and, while countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin
referring to promoting the building of a “New Model America. At the same time, the objectives of China’s
of Major Country Relations” based on mutual respect, promotion of military exchanges are thought to include
equitable justice, cooperation, and “win-win,” it has been alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by
noted99 that China has tried to influence political decisions strengthening its relations with these countries, creating
in other countries through efforts such as putting pressure a favorable security environment for China, enhancing
on foreign educational institutions and winning over China’s influence in the international community,
politicians.100 There have also been movements toward securing stable supplies of natural resources and energy,
creating their own international order, including the and building foreign bases. China is believed to consider
construction of a China-led multilateral mechanism.101 military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard
On the other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful its national interests, and as such, to position military
97 As a specific example, in the field of engine development and manufacturing for military and civilian aircraft, where the progress of proprietary development is limited, when a state-owned enterprise
specializing in engines was established in August 2017, President Xi Jinping emphasized the “close fusion of military and civil development.”
98 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual foreign Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that China uses various means including cyber
theft in order to acquire foreign military and dual-use technology.
99 The General Secretary Xi, at a Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in June 2018, underlined “thought on socialism with Chinese characteristic for a new era,” specifically, the
enforcement of the building of ”a community with a shared future for humanity,” the progress of “Belt and Road Initiative,” the development of global partnerships and leading the reform of global
governance systems.
100 In submitting an amendment to national security legislation to the Parliament of Australia in December 2017, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said in his speech, “Media reports have
suggested that the Chinese Communist Party has been working to covertly interfere with our media, our universities and even the decisions of elected representatives right here in this building.”
101 China seeks to implement its own initiatives in the security realm; at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China criticized military alliances and proposed
“the security of Asia by the people of Asia.” In the international finance domain as well, China plays a leading role in establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

China Section 3
exchanges as an element in China’s overall diplomatic administration, which explicitly referred to the application
strategy. Moreover, China has set forth the “Belt and of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. The
Road” Initiative as its foreign policy. In the international same interpretation is reiterated in the “Annual Report to
finance domain, China plays a leading role in the Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS the People’s Republic of China” published in June 2017
Development Bank) and AIIB. by the U.S. DoD. China has shown strong protest to
these views. With regard to the issues over the South
2 Relations with Taiwan China Sea, the United States is concerned about such
dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation
See 4-1 of this section (Relations with China) in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces,
and the worsening security situation in the entire region.
3 Relations with the United States The United States has requested China to comply with
Chapter 2
international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s
There are various issues between the United States and unilateral and assertive actions.104 And the United States
China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, also implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation105
and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China in the South China Sea to counteract excessive claims to
relationship is essential for China to develop its economy, maritime interests by other countries such as China. In

it is believed that China will continue to aspire to maintain May 2018, DoD announced that they disinvited China to
stable relations with the United States. China is trying to RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) that is held every
further develop relations with the United States through year because of “China’s continued militarization of
mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation, respecting its islands in the South China Sea.”106
“core interests and major concerns.”102 On the other hand, a hotline between the defense
The United States has made frequent statements on departments of the two countries was set up in April
the necessity of cooperation between the United States and 2008. In November 2014 and September 2015, the
China on issues such as North Korea since the start of the United States and China announced that they agreed
Trump administration. At the same time, it also called on on confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the
China to uphold international rules and norms on global risk of unintended encounters. China has also dispatched
issues, including maritime security and international observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have
trade. Furthermore, the United States regards China as been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on
a “revisionist state” trying to shape the world along its mutual port visits. For example, the U.S. and Chinese
own authoritarian model, and has indicated it recognizes militaries have engaged in annual humanitarian and
that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo- disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the
Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries
military and other efforts, and sees the re-emergence of a frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military
long-term strategic competition from China’s revisionist exchanges, and several new dialogue frameworks were
influence as a central issue in the prosperity and security launched. In April 2017, it was decided at the U.S.-
of the United States.103 China has strongly opposed such China Summit Meeting that the U.S.-China Diplomatic
a perspective by the United States. and Security Dialogue would be established as part of
Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue, and
has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies the first meeting was held in Washington, D.C. in June
to the islands. This was confirmed in a document between of the same year.107 Also in 2017, the U.S.-China Joint
the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the first time in February Staff Dialogue Mechanism was established and the
2017, in the joint statement from the first Japan-U.S. first dialogue was held in November of the same year.
Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump There were instances in the past, when the DoD notified
102 Then Vice President Xi Jinping first used “New Model of Major-Country Relations” in talks with then President Obama when during his visit to the United States in 2012. China explains that the concept
is based on: (1) no conflict, no-confrontation; (2) mutual respect; and (3) win-win cooperation. However, when President Xi Jinping made no mention of it when he met with U.S. President Donald
Trump in April and November of 2017.
103 United States National Defense Strategy (January 2018).
104 See Section 3, footnote 85.
105 See Section 2-1-1 for the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” conducted by the U.S. in the South China Sea.
106 Chinese naval vessels participated in the same exercise conducted in 2014 and 2016.
107 It was reported that consultations were held on the issue of North Korea, the South China Sea, U.S.-China military exchanges, among other matters.

Congress of the sale of weapons to Taiwan in October purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in
2008 and January 2010, where China notified the United 2014, with delivery of the missiles beginning in 2018. At
States to cancel the major military exchanges with them. the same time, it is pointed out that Russia, which shares
However, when notice was given in December 2015 and a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying
July 2017, although China vigorously protested, it made sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat
no remarks about canceling military exchanges. In 2017, to Russia and of differentiating the performance of the
it made no mention of any measures against the United weapons it exports. It is also suggested that Russia has
States, and took a more restrained approach than in the concerns about competing with China in arms exports.110
past. Although both China and the United States have China and Ukraine have deep ties in the field of arms
their differences, progress in military exchanges seems to procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the
be relatively stable. Ukrainian unfinished Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier
“Varyag,” which was the basis of the aircraft carrier
Chapter 2
4 Relations with Russia “Liaoning.” In this regard, attention will also be paid to
the relationship with Ukraine.111
Ever since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in Military exchanges between China and Russia take
1989, China and Russia have placed importance on place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior
their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the military officers and joint exercises. For example, the two
deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its countries have held the large-scale joint military exercise
establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China- of navy “Joint Sea” every year112 since 2012, and held
Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly it in the Sea of Japan and, for the first time, the Baltic
Cooperation108 was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing Sea and Sea of Okhotsk in 2017. From 2016, the two
issue of border demarcation between the two countries countries started “Aerospace Security,” a joint missile
came to a settlement. The two countries have a common defense computer-simulated exercise. These exchanges
view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and will likely enable China to not only deepen mutual
the establishment of a new international order, and have understanding and confidence-building between their
further deepened their relations. militaries, but also learn about the operation methods
On the military front, since the 1990s, China has of Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine
purchased modern weapons from Russia, including of the Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, China holds
fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the joint counter-terrorism exercise “Peace Mission”
the largest supplier of weapons to China.109 Meanwhile, China and Russia or among the Shanghai Cooperation
their trade amounts are said to be declining in recent Organization (SCO) member countries including China
years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon and Russia.113
production in China, however, it is suggested that
China has shown strong interest in continuing to import 5 Relations with Other Countries
Russia’s advanced equipment. For example, in November
2015, China reportedly signed an agreement to purchase (1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries
24 of the newest fourth generation Su-35 fighters, and As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia,
received 14 aircraft at the end of 2017. It was also reciprocal top-level visits and other activities continue
reported that an agreement was reached regarding the to be carried out actively. In 2017, the heads of seven
108 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation,
and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.
109 According to SIPRI, Russia accounts for 65% of China’s arms imports from 2013 to 2017.
110 It is suggested that China is plagiarizing, copying, and reverse-engineering military science technologies, including redesigning its own J-11B fighter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fighter. Feeling
strong discontent and casting doubts over China, it is suggested that Russia is cautious about supplying state-of-the-art equipment to China, such as the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 surface-to-air
missile. For example, Russia has allegedly requested that the agreement regarding the supply of Su-35 fighters requires the payment of a vast amount of compensation if China copies and produces
the fighter. It has also been noted that Russia may supply only the S-400 missiles with relatively short ranges.
111 China and Ukraine agreed on the export and joint production of four Zubr-class air-cushioned landing craft for China in 2009, of which two were delivered to China between 2013 and 2014. In 2011,
the two countries entered into a contract for the sale of three IL-78 aerial refueling tankers. It was reported in 2016 that they signed an agreement to hold consultations concerning the export and
production in China of the massive cargo aircraft An-225.
112 Joint Sea was held in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, May and August 2015, and September 2016 in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China Sea, the
Mediterranean Sea, the Peter the Great Gulf, and the South China Sea, respectively.
113 The Peace Mission exercise was held among China and Russia in August 2005, July 2009, and July to August 2013, and among the SCO member countries including China and Russia in August
2007, September 2010, June 2012, August 2014, and September 2016.

China Section 3
ASEAN member countries visited China on the occasion those concerns went unmentioned since the Chairman’s
of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation statement at the ASEAN summit in May 2014. At the
in May 2017 that included State Counsellor and Foreign same time, in July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese
Minister Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, President government reportedly made foreign companies engaged
Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, and President Joko in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission
Widodo of Indonesia. President Xi Jinping also visited of the Vietnamese government cancel the drilling under
Vietnam in November later that same year. China is also the pressure from China. This is regarded as an example
actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as of China flexing its muscles with its unilateral demands.
ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, Moreover, it is reported that in December 2017 the then
China, the ROK) and the ASEAN Regional Forum candidate for commander of Indonesia’s army referred to
(ARF). In November 2017, Premier Li Keqiang attended the “rise of China as a superpower” as one of the threats to
multilateral meetings in Philippines including the ASEAN Indonesia’s security. These issues will be points to watch
Chapter 2
Plus One Summit. Furthermore, China has developed for in future developments of China-ASEAN relations.
bilateral relations through infrastructure development
support, etc. under the “Belt and Road” Initiative. (2) Relations with Central Asian Countries
On the military front, China has made efforts toward The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the
military confidence building, such as goodwill visits of western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia.

Southeast Asian countries between April and October It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan,
2017 by the Chinese naval fleet. In September 2017, a Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has ethnic minorities
submarine identified to be a Yuan-class submarine also settled in the areas straddling borders, and there are
visited Malaysia. These efforts can also be considered to lively exchanges between the people of those countries.
have the objective of securing bases for the activities of Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political
the PLA Navy in the distant sea areas of the Indian Ocean. stability and security situations, such as terrorism by
Some ASEAN countries are likely to have Islamic extremists in Central Asian states. Such concerns
concerns114 about China’s advance into the South China of China appear to be reflected in China’s engagement
Sea, but in 2017, any conflicts between China and these in SCO, which was established in June 2001. Moreover,
countries over territorial rights in the South China Sea China is strongly interested in the abundant energy and
have not surfaced. The Philippines instituted arbitral natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to diversify
proceedings115 against China regarding their disputes its supply source and procurement methods of these
over the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field
and Second Thomas Shoal, in accordance with the United with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central
July 2016, a final arbitration was made where most of the Asian nations.
content of the allegations were accepted. However, since
China provides the Philippines with substantial economic (3) Relations with South Asian Countries
support, the Philippines is said to have refrained from China has traditionally maintained a particularly close
referring to the ruling.116 The statement at the 31st ASEAN relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their
Summit in November 2017, when the Philippines held leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in
the chair, mentioned improved relations between China the military sector, including exporting weapons and
and ASEAN, and did not express any concerns about the transferring military technology, is also considered to be
situation in the South China Sea. This was the first time deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for
114 The Chairman’s statement at the ASEAN Summit held in April 2018, expressed the concerns of leaders of some ASEAN countries about the land reclamation activities, etc. in the South China Sea,
although no names were mentioned.
115 See Chapter 2, Section 6-4.
116 It had been pointed out that over the last several years China had been dispatching maritime law enforcement vessels appearing to belong to the Chinese Coast Guard around Scarborough
Shoal to interfere with Philippine fishing boats approaching the Shoal. According to CSIS/AMTI, it was confirmed that Philippine fishing boats were operating around Scarborough Shoal after the
PhilippinesChina Summit Meeting in October 2016. In November of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the matter of Philippine fishermen
conducting fishing was dealt with appropriately based on friendship.”

China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is exporting arms.120

rising for China, partly because of the geopolitical features With regard to military exchanges, China has
of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean.117 The China- conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a development India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue
plan for power facilities and transportation infrastructure exercises and counter-terrorism exercises.
in the region stretching from the Port of Gwadar, where
China is assisting construction, to Kashgar in the Xinjiang (4) Relations with EU Countries
Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a flagship project of For China, the European Union (EU) countries are
Belt and Load Initiative, and progress of the project is now as an important partner as Japan and the United
expected to increase China’s influence in Pakistan. States, especially in the economic field. China, through
China and India have undemarcated border areas,118 diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries
and in January 2018, an Indian newspaper reported an to lift their arms embargo against China which has been
Chapter 2
incident of the Chinese military “crossing the border.” imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.121
Additionally, even in the Doklam Plateau where Bhutan Regarding information technology, avionics,
has close relations to China and India both of which and AIP systems for submarines and other areas, EU
ownership of the highlands, a standoff occurred between member countries possess more advanced technologies
the two countries that lasted from June to August 2017. On than China or Russia which exports weapons to China.
the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted,
relationship with India, while also paying consideration the weapons and military technologies of EU countries
to maintaining balance with Pakistan.119 And because would transfer to China and would be utilized as a
China identifies the relationship with India as a strategic bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions
partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively with Russia. Although it was explicitly stated in the EU’s
conduct mutual visits. As a background to progress the strategy against China, which was adopted for the first
relations with India, there seems to be an emphasis on time in 10 years in July 2016 that the position concerning
economic growth of the two countries, and a response to the arms embargo against China remained unchanged
closer US-India relations. and continuous attention will need to be paid to future
In recent years, China has also been deepening its discussions within the EU.
relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office,
President Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned (5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific
to shift from a diplomacy oriented towards China to a Islands, and Central and South American Countries
diplomacy oriented towards all countries and won the China has been enhancing its relations with Middle
election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port
City development projects financed by China. However,
KEY WORD
he subsequently announced their resumption in January
2016, and new development projects with China are
Arms embargo against China
also showing progress. In July 2017, an agreement
was reached to lend interests to Chinese enterprises at EU countries announced the suspension of arms sales to China as a
the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed measure against the suppression of human rights in China during the
with Chinese loans. It has also been noted that India, Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. However, the actual embargoed
items are ultimately left to the interpretation of the individual member
traditionally closer to Sri Lanka, is concerned about
countries. China continues to seek the lifting of the arms embargo
these developments. Additionally, China is deepening against China, and there are movements towards reconsideration
its relations with Bangladesh, such as by developing the within the EU.
harbor in Chittagong where a naval base is located and
117 China identifies CPEC, a ground transport route that starts from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan and announced that China would invest US$46 billion in CPEC.
118 They include the Kashmir region and the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
119 At the meeting with Prime Minister Mohdi of India in September 2017, President Xi Jinping is reported to have stated that China and India have an opportunity to develop together and must adhere
to the basic judgment that they will not pose a threat to each other. Including these talks, President Xi has visited with Prime Minister Modi three times between September 2017 and June 2018.
120 According to SIPRI, Bangladesh accounts for 19% of China’s arms exports from 2013 to 2017, which is the second largest share.
121 For example, in November 2010, then Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the
arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China.

China Section 3
Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, such as Argentina and Brazil. Since 2015, China and the
including providing active assistance for their Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
infrastructure development and investment in their (CELAC) held the ministerial meeting. In June 2017,
resource and energy development, and has been further Panama severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan,
expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not followed by the Dominican Republic and previously stated
only interactions among state leaders and senior military in May 2018, while establishing relations with China.
officials but also arms exports and exchanges between
military forces are actively conducted. Underlying these 6 International Transfer of Weapons
movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable
supply of energy and natural resources and to secure The total of China's arms exports have surpassed the total
overseas bases in the future. China has actively dispatched of imports since 2013. China has expanded provision
personnel to UN PKOs in Africa. In December 2016, São of weapons such as small arms, tanks, aircrafts, and
Chapter 2
Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAVs) to developing
Taiwan, followed by Burkina Faso in May 2018, while countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. Specifically,
re-establishing relations with China. it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan,
As regards China-Australia relations, a Chinese Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also
company’s agreement with the Northern Territory being exported to African countries such as Algeria,

Government of Australia to lease Darwin Port raised Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya, to Central
debates over security.122 China has also been boosting its and South American countries including Venezuela,
relations with the Pacific islands. It has been developing and to Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran.
oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in
and has signed an agreement on military cooperation order to strengthen its strategic relationships with allies,
with the country. Though proactive and continuous enhance its influence in the international community,
economic assistance has also been implemented in other and secure energy and natural resources. China does not
islands, Australia and other countries have also expressed participate in some of the frameworks of international
their concerns over China’s infrastructure projects.123 arms export control, and some observers point out that
Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted there is proliferation of missile-related technology.124
with Fiji and Tonga. Attention will be paid to whether China will increase
China has striven to further deepen its relations with the transparency of international weapons transfer in
Central and South American countries. Chinese senior response to the concerns of the international community.
military officials have continuously visited countries,
4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan
1 Relations with China to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to

protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly
China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of
and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. China as well as any move towards the independence of
The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is Taiwan, and on this basis, China has repeatedly stated
the underlying premise and foundation for discussions that it has not renounced the use of force. “The Anti-
between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out
would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unification, the nonrenunciation of the use of force by China.125
and expresses that it would take up policies and measures Tsai Ing-wen (Democratic Progressive Party) won
122 In November 2015, at the U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting in Manila, then U.S. President Obama reportedly told his counterpart that the United States would have liked a “heads up” about Australia’s
lease of Darwin Port to a Chinese company and to “Let us know next time.”
123 In January 2018, Australia’s Minister for International Development and the Pacific, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, was reported to have said that China’s investments in infrastructure in several Pacific
island nations were “basically white elephants” and that “we don’t know what the consequences are when [nations] have to pay back some of these Chinese loans.”
124 For example, China does not participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and some observers point to proliferation of Chinese missile-related technology to Pakistan and
other countries.
125 The law stipulates, “[in] the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other
necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

a landslide victory over Zhu Lilun (Kuomintang) in

the presidential election in January 2016, and the Tsai
administration was inaugurated on May of the same year.
President Tsai has not outlined a clear stance regarding
the “1992 Consensus,” which positions China as the
political foundation of cross-Strait relations and which
exemplifies the “One China” policy.126 Furtermore,
President Tsai has upheld the “maintenance of dialogue
and communication of intent” and the “maintenance of
the promotion of the peaceful and stable development of
cross-Strait relations.”127 Furthermore, President Tsai has
upheld the “maintenance of dialogue and communication
Chapter 2
of intent” and the “maintenance of the promotion of the

peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations”
since taking office, though comments, “we cannot return
to past tensions but also cannot succumb to pressure.” Secretary Xi Jinping stated at the 19th National Congress
Under the former administration of Ma Ying-jeou in October 2017 that China was “ready to share the
(Kuomintang) that championed policies to maintain the development opportunities on the mainland with our
status quo over independence, the relationship between Taiwan compatriots,” while emphasizing that the “one-
Taiwan and China developed mainly in the economic China principle” is the political foundation of cross-Straits
field. While they managed to hold the first summit relations. In February 2018, the Taiwan Affairs Office
meeting128 after the two countries split, following the of the Chinese State Council announced 31 preferential
inauguration of the Tsai administration, China announced treatment measures including enrollment in schools and
that it has already suspended exchanges with Taiwan.129 support of employment from Taiwan. Even after China
Also, before and after the inauguration of President announced its suspension of cross-Strait exchanges with
Tsai, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance Taiwan, President Tsai called for dialogue with China.
to or had their invitations ignored to meetings held by At the reception marking the 30th anniversary of cross-
international organizations.130 In December 2016, São Strait exchanges, President Tsai, looking for a way to
Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with open up relations between the two countries, stated that
Taiwan, followed by Panama doing so in June 2017 and “governance has entered a new stage” and “the present
the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso in May 2018, presents an opportunity for change,” just as the 19th
while they established relations with China.131 Taiwan National Congress had wrapped up. As President Xi
is strongly protesting, citing these actions as “Chinese enters his second term, China’s attitude toward Taiwanese
acts that shrink the international space of Taiwan.” In policy and the future of cross-Strait relations will be
addition, China announced in January 2018 that it would issues to watch.
begin operation of new commercial flight routes near the Both countries have put forth their own assertions
Taiwan Strait without prior consultation with Taiwan.132 regarding the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan has a negative
Under these circumstances, China’s General attitude toward cooperation with China.133
126 On May 2016, President Tsai stated in her inaugural address: “In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived
at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect
this historical fact.”
127 In her inauguration address on May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen stated that she would “work to maintain current mechanisms concerning dialogue and communication of intent” and that “the two
sides should maintain the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations on the existing political foundations.”
128 President Xi Jinping and then President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, held the first summit after the China-Taiwan split in November 2015. Both sides reaffirmed “One China” and agreed to establish a
cross-Strait hotline.
129 In June 2016, a Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council spokesperson announced that the exchange mechanism had already been suspended.
130 Recently, in May 2018, in addition to an invitation letter to the World Health Organization (WHO) annual meeting not being delivered, the director of Taiwan’s Ministry of Environmental Protection was
also said to have been refused entry to the 23rd annual Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 23). Taiwan claims that these are due
to Chinese demands and urgings. According to an announcement by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after a request from China, Nigeria forcibly closed Taiwan’s mission in July 2017, and the
governments of Ecuador, Bahrain, Papua New Guinea, Jordan and other countries asked Taiwan to remove “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” from the name of its missions and replace it with “Taipei.”
131 Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with 18 countries.
132 In January 2015, Taiwan protested China’s announcement that it had set four new flight routes close to the Taiwan Strait saying that it was overcrowding the airspace. Following that, China and
Taiwan agreed to negotiate some of the flight routes, but when both parties were about to agree to preliminary talks on the pros and cons of operating the other routes in January 2018, China began
operation of the four routes without any prior consultation with Taiwan.
133 Taiwanese vessels intruded Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012. Taiwan’s foreign minister issued a statement on the Senkaku Islands in February 2013 titled
“Our Position on Not Cooperating with Mainland China.”

China Section 3
2 Military Capabilities of Taiwan amount Taiwan spent.137 In the “Nation Defense Report
2017,” Taiwan acknowledged rapid growth in China’s
Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth a military capabilities along with significant advances
national defense development plan of “resolute defense, in military reforms, integrated operations, weapons
multiple deterrence” “Cultivate a Professional Military,” development, and overseas base construction and
and “Strengthen information, communications, and pointed out “threat is growing to to Taiwan.” It also
electronic warfare capabilities.”134 In December 2017, mentions that Chinese military fighters and destroyers
Taiwan published its first national defense report under the routinely circle Taiwan and exhibit the country’s
Tsai administration. The report changed the existing force military capabilities to Taiwan.138
concept from “victory on beach areas,” to “preservation While the PLA proceeds to enhance its missile,
of warfighting capability, pursuing decisive victory in naval, and air forces, the Taiwan’s military still struggles
the littoral area, and annihilating the enemy in the beach to modernize its equipment. The U.S. DoD has notified
Chapter 2
area,” and made its first mention of military cooperation Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the
with the United States and insisted that their cooperation Taiwan Relations Act.139 Taiwan has announced that it
made a progress both qualitatively and quantitatively. will continue to purchase advanced weapons.140
Taiwan, for improving the expertise of its military At the same time, Taiwan is also making progress in
personnel and other purposes, aims to reduce the total developing its own equipment. In the first Quadrennial

forces from 215,000 personnel at the end of 2014 to Defense Review (2017QDR) released under the Tsai
170,000-190,000 by 2019, while transforming its armed administration in March 2017, the review emphasized
forces consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into progress, such as in the development of its defense
all-volunteer forces.135 industry, particularly with the domestic production of
With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, weapons and equipment. For example, in June 2016, the
ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a Taiwan Navy announced a policy to switch over major
total of approximately 140,000 personnel. It is believed
that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the Ching-kuo fighter
air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of
war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kiddclass
destroyers which were imported from the United States,
Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other
vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses
F-16 A/B fighters,136 Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo
fighters, and other assets.
Speed: 1,296 km/h
3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan Main armament: 20 mm Vulcan cannons, air-to-surface missiles
(maximum firing range 60 km), air-to-ship missiles (maximum firing
While China has continued to increase its defense budget range 150 km)
by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has <Description>
Taiwan’s indigenous fighter. Designed and developed with technical
remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s
cooperation from the United States, it conducted its maiden flight in 1989.
official military budget in 2017 was roughly 15 times the
134 According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan released on March 2017, “resolute defense…protect the homeland” and “achieving multi-domain
deterrence, comprehensive strategy” are listed in the military strategy. In July 2017, the Taiwanese Army added a new Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command to its general staff
aimed at improving cyber warfare capabilities.
135 Originally, the Ministry of Defense had aimed to transition to all-volunteer forces by the end of 2014, but in September 2013 announced that this would be postponed until the end of 2016. Later, in
October 2017, Minister of National Defense of Taiwan announced the policy that “a draft would not be conducted in 2018 and beyond.”
136 In November 2016, the Taiwan Air Force announced that it would begin the upgrade of its F-16A/B fi ghters to F-16V fi ghters with enhanced radar performance, etc. beginning on January 2017. It
states that the project will be completed by 2023.
137 This figure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2016 defense budget of approximately 1,044.397 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2015 defense budget of approximately
319.3 billion Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2015 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.7588 yuan = 30.439 Taiwan dollars). China’s
actual defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater.
138 At a press conference in December 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen showed caution toward China, saying that Chinese military aircraft were becoming more active around Taiwan.
139 On June 29, 2017, (Eastern Standard Time in the United States), the Trump administration announced to Congress that it would sell approximately $1.4 billion (about ¥157 billion) in weapons,
including interceptor missiles, to Taiwan. This was the first time for the Trump administration to sell weapons to Taiwan. However, it is reported that this does not include the F-35 and other high-
performance weapons.
140 It is said that Taiwan has sought the sale of F-16C/D fi ghters and conventional submarines from the United States but they have not been achieved. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025” published by CSIS
notes on January 2016, “Taiwan has stopped requesting F-16C/Ds and probably hopes that the United States will eventually make available F-35s, perhaps in a decade.”

ships including submarines, to an indigenous ship- the overall military balance between China and Taiwan
building program. In April 2018, it was reported that the is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be
U.S. government granted permission to U.S. companies to growing year by year. Going forward, attention is to be
negotiate with Taiwan on the construction of submarines. paid to trends such as the strengthening of Chinese and
The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are Taiwanese forces, the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the
generally characterized as follows: United States, and Taiwan’s development of its own main
1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an military equipment.
overwhelming number of troops, their capability of See Fig. I-2-3-7 (Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget);
landing and invading the island of Taiwan is limited Fig. I-2-3-8 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft
of China and Taiwan)
at this point in time.141 However in recent years, China
has been steadily improving its landing and invasion
capabilities, such as building large landing ships.
Chapter 2
2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which

overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been
rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in recent Fig. I-2-3-7 Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget
years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority
over China.142 Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars)
(100 million
3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been Taiwan dollars)
Year-on-year growth rate (%)
(%)
strengthening its ballistic missile defense, including 4,000 30
upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly inducting PAC- 3,500 25
3. China possesses numerous short-range ballistic 3,000 20
missiles and other assets with ranges covering 2,500 15

2,000 10
Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to have few effective
1,500 5
countermeasures.
1,000 0
Comparison of military capabilities should be made
500 –5
based not only on the performance and quality of the
0 –10
military capability and equipments, but also on various 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
(FY)
factors such as the purpose and aspects of the assumed Source: Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan’s “National Defense Reports” and
military operations, the operational status, the skill the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics,
Executive Yuan
level of the personnel, and the logistics. Nevertheless,
Fig. I-2-3-8 Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan
(Number of Aircraft)
850
800
750 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20)
700
650 Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage2000)
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
(Year)
Source: “The Military Balance” (of respective years)
141 In August 2017, it was reported that the unofficial annual report on China’s military power sent by the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense to the Legislative Yuan stated that the Chinese military did
not have the proper operational capabilities for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.
142 China has 852 fourth or fifth-generation fighters, whereas Taiwan has 327. In addition, China has 74 destroyers and frigates and 65 submarines, whereas Taiwan has 24 and four, respectively.
Furthermore, China commissioned the aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012 and launched an indigenous carrier in April 2017, and conducted sea trials for the first time in May 2018.

Russia Section 4
Section 4 Russia
1 General Situation
President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the At that same presidential address, President Putin
revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment,
successfully achieved reelection to his fourth term in including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized
March 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same that Russia would be developing new nuclear weapons
year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active as a measure in response to the deployment of missile
and influential participant in international life, and that defense systems by the United States domestically and
Chapter 2
the country’s security and defense capability are reliably abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition
assured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic
security and health were his main goals, and that Russia parity in the world, and made remarks to the effect that
has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of
history and would achieve a breakthrough again. a new system for international security and sustainable

At the annual presidential address to the Federal development of civilization.
Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of
prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of
“Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and
powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” After strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through
it became certain he would win reelection, President such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
Putin also called for the further strengthening of Russia’s the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
defense capabilities, while on the other hand, also making and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.
remarks to the effect that Russia has no intention of With regard to the situation in Ukraine, ever since
starting an arms race, and that Russia seeks constructive the efforts to implement ceasefire agreements (Minsk
relations with other countries.1 Agreements)2 in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine
following the illegal “annexation” of Crimea by Russia,
there have been no major developments in particular. The
West has alleged that Russia attempted to change the status
quo by force by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” and it is
increasing its sense of caution toward Russia.3
In addition, Russia has been conducting military
intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has
indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly
deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring
bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that
Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to
test and demonstrate its equipment. In December 2016,
Syrian government troops seized Aleppo, which is a
1 President Putin made this statement at a meeting that he invited other presidential candidates to after it seemed certain that he would win the election (March 2018).
2 The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of
the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area
in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection
with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in
Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the
territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants
of the consultations.
Then, the Minsk Memorandum was signed in September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement was signed on February 2015. These are collectively
called the Minsk Agreements.
3 See Chapter 2, Section 4, footnote 2. Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid
warfare will drive closer cooperation between NATO, which is a military alliance, and the EU, which is reinforcing its security and defence initiatives.

strategic location in Syria, and at the end of the month a

ceasefire agreement entered into force between the Assad
Government and opposition forces led by Russia and
Turkey. Since January 2017, Russia has been increasing
its presence in the Middle East, including the hosting of
Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran,
while continuing the fight against ISIL and Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front).
Furthermore, Russia concluded an agreement with the
Government of Syria for its continued use of bases in
Syria in the future. Focus of attention will be the extent to
which Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East
Chapter 2
including Syria.
See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Conflict and Under these circumstances, attention is being paid
International Terrorism) on how President Putin, while maintaining his power
While Russia faces severe economic conditions, base, will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation from
forecasts indicate that following the recovery in oil Europe and the United States, and economic situation,
prices, a major export product, the country will maintain as well as promote economic structural reforms and
positive economic growth in 2018.4 Even after the modernization of Russia’s military forces, and its effort
collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed to have to expand international influence. Furthermore, although
cooperated on the maintenance of Russia’s ICBMs. It is attention was focused on the improvement of Russia-U.S.
said that the suspension of Ukraine’s technical support relations immediately after the inauguration of the Trump
following the deterioration of the bilateral relation administration, stance toward Russia in the United States
could impair the operations of Russian equipment that remains severe and the outlook is unclear.
rely highly on Ukraine.
1 Basic Posture level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF.

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised
Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including in December 2014 as a document substantiating the
the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in principles of the National Security Strategy in the military
Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities sphere, states the existing view that while the probability
of domestic and foreign policies in the “National of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of
December 2015. NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders
The National Security Strategy construes that Russia including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment
has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the
world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following
and expansion of its member states as threats to national as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the
security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global
deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in
and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening
regional stability. Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social,
In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to and religious confrontations in Russia.
giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an
military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear
preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It states that
4 The IMF predicted that Russia’s GDP growth rate for 2017 would be 1.8% but would decrease to 1.6% in 2018.

Russia Section 4
Russia will maintain a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent Russia reorganized its six military districts into four
capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in military districts (Western, Southern, Central and
response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a
used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein joint strategic command in each military district and is
conventional weapons are used against it and where the carrying out integrated operations of its entire military
survival of the country itself is imperiled. forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force
Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic under the control of the Military District Commander. In
was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime. December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command
As for Russia’s defense budget, the executed FY2017 in charge of the Arctic became operational.9
budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25% Regarding the modernization of the military forces,
compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while Russia is working to increase its percentage of new
the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year- equipment up to 70%, and it announced in December 2017
Chapter 2
on-year double-digit growth. Although Russia faced that it had increased said proportion to approximately
a difficult fiscal situation in 2015 and 2016, including 60%. Within the State Armaments Program (GPV:
declines in economic growth, it is said that the country has Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2018-2027
worked to secure a budget for national defense in order to that appears to have been approved by President Putin, it
achieve the goals of the State Armaments Program (GPV: is said that Russia will continue to invest 19 trillion rubles

Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) by 2020 over ten years to update equipment and an additional
and other targets. However, having used up the reserve 1 trillion rubles to develop infrastructure needed for the
fund5 set aside for fiscal replenishment, it is expected deployment of that equipment. It is expected that Russia
that in 2018, as it was the case in 2017, Russia’s national will continue modernization efforts in the future.
defense budget will continue to be allocated based on the Regarding the professionalization of the military
amount of economic growth achieved.6
See Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget)
Fig. I-2-4-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget
(100 million rubles) (%)
2 Military Reform 40,000 50.0
35,000 40.0
Russia has implemented full-scale military reform
since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: 30,000 30.0
downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. 25,000 20.0

Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future
20,000 10.0
Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”
that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in 15,000 0.0
September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including 10,000 –10.0

troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-
5,000 –20.0
based command structure to a brigade-based one),7
strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization 0 –30.0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
of the RAF such as the development and introduction of (FY)
new equipment. Defense budget (in 100 million rubles) Year-on-year growth rate (%)
Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, Note: The Information on Excecution of Budgets of the Russian Federation announced by
it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one the Russian Federal Treasury (figures for FY2009-FY2017 are expenditures and
figures for FY2018 are the budget amount).
million personnel as of 2016.8 Since December 2010,
5 In order to replenish funds for the government budget lost due to a fall in oil prices, Russia set aside a portion (the surplus) of governmental income received from oil production and exports.
6 According to the Russian Federal Treasury, the initial FY2018 defense budget increased by 4.1% from the initial budget of the previous fiscal year to 2.9530 trillion rubles, marking a 3.5% increase
compared to the budget spent in the previous fiscal year.
7 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade. Although
this was said to be completed in December 2009, in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had been reorganized into
brigades under then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were reactivated and participated in a victory parade. Furthermore, in the January 25, 2016 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a
newspaper of the military, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, Ground Forces Commander, stated that four divisions were scheduled to be established in 2016 based on the existing brigades.
8 It was decided that the total military force would be one million personnel as of 2016 by an executive order of December 2008 (the strength was approximately 1.13 million as of 2008). According
to TASS, an Executive Order issued by the President of Russia in July 2016 calls for the number of military personnel to be kept at one million.
9 The Northern Joint Strategic Command is a unified force led by the Northern Fleet and consists of fleets, ground forces, and air forces. Its area of operation covers the seas and remote islands
extending from the Barents Sea to the East Siberian Sea, and the Arctic coast.

forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the of contract servicemen is set to increase further.10
permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes In the context of the gradual increase in difficulties
the introduction of a contract service system (for in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe
noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends
personnel who would serve under contracts from the related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of
conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence
contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted capability provided by nuclear weapons.
personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage
3 Military Posture and Trends

Chapter 2
Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels
the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future.
Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal In October 2017, firing training took place using an
National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The ICBM “Topol” from Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as
RAF consists of three services and two independent SLBMs from a SSBN in the Okhotsk Sea and a SSBN
forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic from the Barents Sea. Cruise missile firing training also
Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces. took place using long-range bombers. President Putin,
See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military) at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board
held in December 2017, noted that the share of modern
1 Nuclear Forces weapons in Russia’s nuclear triad had reached nearly 80%,
and stated that Russia would increase that percentage to
Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global 90% by 2021. He also stated that Russia could overcome
position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces both existing and future missile defense systems.
of the United States and to supplement its inferiority
in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia Borey-class submarine
is making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear
forces unit.
Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long
range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks)
comparable to the United States in scale.
Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms
[Jane’s By IHS Markit]
pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
concluded with the United States.11 Russia is working Water displacement: 19,711 tons
on accelerating the development and introduction of new Maximum speed: 25 knots (approximately 46 km/h)
weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization Main armament: SLBM Bulava (maximum firing range 8,300 km)
of nuclear forces based on its GPV. torpedoes
In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of <Description>
Russian Navy’s new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine
RS24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the
carrying ballistic missiles, the first ship being commissioned in 2012.
“Topol-M” ICBM.12 Since December 2012, three Borey- It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacific Fleet
class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) since 2015.
vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were
10 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008,
the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2016, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel
strength adequacy was around 93% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 384,000.
11 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February
2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. The United States
announced that as of February 2018 Russia had 1,350 deployed strategic warheads and 562 deployed delivery platforms, while Russia announced that as of February 2018, it had 1,444 deployed
strategic warheads and 527 deployed delivery platforms.
12 In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM “Sarmat”(RS-28) that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight mobile solid-fuel
ICBM “Rubezh,”(RS-26) as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing the capability to penetrate MD.

Russia Section 4
Fig. I-2-4-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military
Northern Joint Strategic Command
Baltic Fleet
Kaliningrad
Northen Fleet
Severomorsk
Black Sea Fleet

Sevastopol
(in Ukraine)
Western Military District
(Western Joint Strategic Command)
(HQ: Saint Petersburg)
Eastern Military District
Chapter 2
(Eastern Joint Strategic Command)
Caspian Flotilla
(HQ: Khabarovsk)
Astrankhan Central Military District
(Central Joint Strategic Command)
(HQ: Yekaterinburg)
Southern Military District

(Southern Joint Strategic Command)
(HQ: Rostov-on-Don)
Pacific Flotilla
Vladivostok
The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center: ETOPO1
Russia
Total military forces Approx. 900,000 troops
Ground troops Approx. 330,000 troops
Ground T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,800
forces Tanks (Not including mothballed tanks.
Approx. 13,000 including mothballed tanks)
Warships Approx. 1,090 vessels Approx. 2,042,000 tons

Aircraft carriers 1 vessel
Cruisers 4 vessels
Maritime
Destroyers 14 vessels
forces
Frigates 13 vessels
Submarines 73 vessels
Marines Approx. 35,000 troops
Combat aircraft Approx. 1,470 aircraft
142 MiG-29 aircraft 120 Su-30 aircraft

124 MiG-31 aircraft 17 Su-33 aircraft
Modern fighter aircraft 200 Su-25 aircraft 98 Su-34 aircraft
Air forces 139 Su-27 aircraft 70 Su-35 aircraft
(4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 910)
16 Tu-160 aircraft
Bombers 60 Tu-95 aircraft
63 Tu-22M aircraft
Population Approx. 142.26 million
Reference
Term of service 1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)
Source: “The Military Balance 2018,” etc. Ground troops include 280,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel.
As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them
ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles onshore in the following year. Russia, however, still
with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces. In the
accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces midst of this, in December 2017, the U.S. Department
(INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical of State concluded that Russia had deployed Ground-

Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in violation of the 2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues
INF Treaty, and that the U.S. Department of Defense had
begun review of military concepts and options including Russia is considered to be developing and procuring
ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. On the conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close
other hand, Russia has criticized the U.S. as well, saying attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development,
that it is in effect in violation of the INF treaty, calling the procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as
Aegis Ashore system a potential platform for the launch the “PAK FA” (Su-57)13 currently under development as
of Tomahawk missiles. Different assertions about the the so-called “fifth generation fighter” and the T-14 Armata
treaty still exist between Russia and the U.S.
KEY WORD
Fifth generation fighter

Chapter 2
While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter

generations, it is pointed out that a fifth generation fighter has
more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by
combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic
equipment and stealth.
Commentary Modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces COLUMN

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (announced in December 2014) asserts that Russia retains the right to strike with
nuclear weapons not only if nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction are used but also in the case of an invasion involving
conventional weapons that threatens the country’s survival. In this way, Russia is placing priority on modernization of nuclear capabilities
from the standpoint of a nuclear equilibrium with the US and supplementation of weaknesses in conventional forces.
Strategic nuclear force initiatives are promoting multiple warheads, increased nuclear output, and other improvements, including
the new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for mobile and silo use and deployment of new Borei-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In non-strategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons, Russia is moving forward with deployments of the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (land-to-land) that
can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and the Kalibr cruise (ship-to-land) missile.
Additionally, Russia has stated that it is pursuing nuclear capabilities to destroy the missile defense system being installed by
the US domestically and abroad on the basis that it undermines the balance of nuclear forces with the United States. At the State of
the Union Address given in March 2018, President Putin introduced a variety of new weapons, including the Sarmat large silo-type
ICBM, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, a nuclear-powered unmanned submarine weapon, the Kinzhal hypersonic missile for fighter
planes, and the Avangard strategic missile with winged aircraft in the warhead.
Japan needs to continue to closely monitor activities by the Russian military, including modernization of nuclear forces and
developments, including in light of Russia’s deployments of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles and strategic bombers
in the Far East region.
President Putin’s State of the Union speech (March 1, 2018)

[SPUTNIK/JIJI Press Photo] [EPA/JIJI]
13 According to various reports, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation President Yuri Slyusar stated in January 2015 that test versions of Russia’s fifth generation PAK-FA (“Prospective Aviation Complex
of Frontline Aviation”) fighter jet had started to be handed over to the Russian Air Force. However, he also indicated that mass production is scheduled for 2020.

Russia Section 4
tank,14 in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter has been intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which
and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.” include not only such deployment and exercises of naval
Along with carrying out a range of exercises,15 since vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but
February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and
inspections designed to validate the combat readiness patrol flights by long-range bombers.
of the military districts, etc. for the first time since In addition, in April 2017, Russian Tu-95 long-
the collapse of the Soviet Union.16 These inspections range bombers flew as far as the coast off Alaska, and
are contributing to the improvement of long-distance in December that year, Tu-95 bombers also visited Biak
mobilization capability of the RAF.17 Furthermore, Airport in Indonesia. In addition, in January 2018, Tu-
outside of Russia, the RAF have been deploying 160 long-range bombers flew to the Barents Sea, the
vessels mainly formed of the Black Sea Fleet to the Norwegian Sea, and the North Sea.
Mediterranean Sea.18 In addition, from October 2017 to The RAF has thus intensified activities not only in
Chapter 2
January of the following year, Steregushchiy-class frigates the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, areas
belonging to the Baltic Fleet navigated the long distance near the U.S., and the Middle East. In particular, Russia’s
from the North Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean vessels and aircraft tend to expand their area of activity.20
Sea and Indian Ocean. A plan is underway to construct As for the future of RAF, there are uncertain
or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in August and elements which may be influenced by Russia’s future

October 2017, a flotilla mainly comprising Northern economic and social development and trends in Russia’s
Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers took part in a landing drill diplomatic relations with European and other countries;
while navigating the long distance from Severomorsk on therefore, it is necessary to keep our attention on future
the Kola peninsula to the Novosibirsk islands.19 The RAF developments.
Su-35 fighter T-14 Armata tank

<Specifications, performance> [Jane’s By IHS Markit]
Speed: Mach 2.25 <Specifications, performance>
Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 200 km), Maximum speed: 80 km
air-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 285 km) Armament: 125 mm smooth-bore cannon
<Description> <Description>
New type of multipurpose fighter of the Russian Air Force, it has been Main next-generation tank, displayed at the 2015 parade and
deployed in the Far East since 2014. reportedly currently under development.
14 A new tank fitted with an unmanned turret that was unveiled for the first time during the Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2015. In addition to this tank, Russia is currently developing a family of crawler
and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and so on. A contract for 100 tanks was concluded in 2016, with the delivery of the tanks scheduled to
occur in 2020.
15 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verification and other purposes in recent years. Among these, Zapad 2017 was held in September 2017 as a
command and staff exercise held in a round-robin format involving all military districts. Taking part in this exercise were around 12,700 troops, 70 aircraft and helicopters, and 250 tanks. The purpose
of this exercise is believed to be enhancing the mutual operating capabilities of each joint strategic command and the coordination of advanced command and control systems. (Exercises from the
previous four years included: Vostok 2014 [East Military District], Tsentr 2015 [Central Military District], Kavkaz 2016 [South Military District], and Zapad 2016 [West Military District].)
16 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and
Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a surprise inspection of
the Eastern Military District was conducted, which transitioned to the Vostok 2014 large-scale exercise.
17 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the surprise inspections held five times a year on average would enable the
commanders of every military district and military service as well as staff to mobilize long distances and execute tasks in unknown regions.
18 Russia’s naval fleet in the Mediterranean which is said to have completed its formation on June 1, 2013, is considered a permanent operational force.
19 Among the military installations being developed in the Arctic, it is believed that the bases under construction on Alexandra Island in the Franz Joseph Land and Kotelny Island in the Novosibirsk Islands
will house 150 and 250 personnel each and have enough supplies to continue operations without assistance for a period of 18 months. In addition, the Northern Fleet has conducted long distance
navigation to the Novosibirsk Islands every year since 2012.
20 It is deemed that the RAF intends to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, as well as use diversionary approach towards the West and other countries in connection with the situation in
Ukraine, and expand Russia’s influence.

4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan
1 General Situation Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range

bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing
Russia newly established the Eastern Military District the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence
and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared
Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it
Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific
District Commander, who conducts unified operation of Fleet by 2020.
these services.
The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region (2) Ground Forces
Chapter 2
is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be
a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear reorganizing the command structure from a division-
forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all
in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, of its combat forces into permanent readiness units.
including the trend related to deployment of new units The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven
and military facility development. brigades and one division with approximately 80,000
Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped
maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern
units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater Military District has introduced new equipment, such as
mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal”
necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400”
trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also surface-to-air missile system.
keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.
(3) Naval Forces
(1) Nuclear Forces The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet is comprised
three Delta III-class SSBNs and two Borey-class SSBNs of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement
equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the in the region of approximately 640,000 tons, including
approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately
20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear
Steregushchiy-class frigates
powered submarines) with a total displacement of
approximately 320,000 tons. Additionally, it plans on
deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates
Tu-95 long-range bomber

Full load displacement: 2,235 tons Speed: 26 knots
Main armament: Anti-ship missiles (with a maximum range of [Jane’s By IHS Markit]
130 km (or 260 km for the improved version), ship-to-air missiles <Specifications, performance> Speed: 924 km
(maximum firing range 60 km) Maximum radius of action: 6,398 km
On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27) Main armament: Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing range
<Description> 4,500 km)
The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the first of which was <Description>
commissioned in 2007. The Russian Ministry of Defense is scheduled Produced between 1956 and 1994, the final version is currently under
to deploy Sovershennyy (fourth ship), Gromkiy (seventh ship), Aldar refurbishment for modernization. Capable of carrying eight air-to
Tsydenzhapov (11th ship), and Rezkiy (12th ship) to the Pacific Fleet. surface cruise missiles (conventional or nuclear warhead).

Russia Section 4
(the first of these, the Sovershennyy, was commissioned inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop
in July 2017, and the second, the Gromky, is expected to strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times,
be commissioned in October 2018.) one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu
Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various
(4) Air Forces types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.22
In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri
approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Air Force Island for the first time as head of state in November
and Navy combined. Existing models are being 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated
modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters visits to the Northern Territories.23 Between July and
and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced21 to September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six
improve their capabilities. minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island,
among other areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with
Chapter 2
2 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories the development of military facilities in the Northern
Territories.24 In November 2016, Russia announced that
Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu
has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and and Kunashiri Islands.25 Although in February 2017,
Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu stated at a meeting

Anti-air Missile S-400
Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

Maximum firing range: 250 km (anti-aircraft), 60 km (anti-ballistic missile)
[Jane’s By IHS Markit] Maximum height: 27 km
<Specifications, performance> <Description>
Maximum firing range: 300 km This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and act as
<Description> an air-defense missile. It was deployed in the Eastern District in 2012.
Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., It has been pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400
it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2014. km also exists (the 40N6).
21 According to Military Balance 2018, in addition to 34 Su-35 fighters, 24 Su-34 fighter-bombers have been deployed to the Eastern Military District (11th Army of Air and Air Defence Force).
22 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to
military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere
in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence
Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov
visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February
2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions
into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Surovikin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new
airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.
23 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by then First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January
to February 2011, followed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands
in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, then Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgakov, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and
Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika
Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District
Yury Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galushka, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture
Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Maksim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island.
24 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility
areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was
one of the priorities for 2016.
25 In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ship missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the
year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacific Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “Bal” coastal missile unit
to Kunashiri Island using an artillery squadron.

of the State Duma (lower house) that the deployment of a In September 2014, the strategic command and staff
division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands exercise Vostok 2014, considered the largest and the most
would be completed before the end of the year, details important of the RAF exercises and drills conducted that
such as location of the deployment and the type of service year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District.
are unknown. In January 2018, a government decree Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles,
was issued to allow for joint military and civilian use of approximately 80 vessels, and approximately 630
the new airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island besides aircraft participated in the exercise.27 It is regarded
Tennei military airfield. Concerning military exercises that its purpose was to verify the combat readiness and
and trainings, in February 2018, over 2,000 military mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic
personnel participated in an anti-terrorism exercise in the front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units
Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands, and it was from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the
announced in March of that same year that a new Su-35 Western and Central Military Districts. The various units
Chapter 2
fighters jet would be redeployed to Etorofu Island from its conducted long-distance maneuvers covering a distance
home base as part of a training exercise. of 12,000 km at most. For Vostok 2018, which will be
As described above, Russia continues to station RAF held in Siberia and the Arctic sometime in August and
in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories September 2018, there are plans for participation of units
of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s not only in the Eastern Military District, but also the
activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Central Military District and the Northern Fleet.
Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian The number of exercises carried out by the Russian
people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased
due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military from the peak. However, its activities are generally
importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea increasing.
of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.26 With regard to naval vessels, their activities are
During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense generally increasing in recent years. For example, various
Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in March 2017, Japan exercises and long distance voyages have been carried
expressed it was regrettable that Russia had deployed out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions
surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories and involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-
that Russia may deploy a new division to the islands powered submarines.28 In September 2011, 24 naval
including the Four Northern Islands. Closer attention vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser
must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far passed through the Soya Strait in succession. This was
East, including the Northern Territories. the first time since the end of the Cold War that such a
major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels was
3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan confirmed.29 In recent years, ten or more Russian naval
vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one to three
In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally times a year. Additionally, survey activities have taken
increasing its activities, including exercises and drills place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle
which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying
verifying the results of the military reform. the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there
26 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former
Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacific region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that regular long-term
patrols of SSBN, which were greatly curtailed since the former Soviet Union, would be restarted in 2012.
27 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range
bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills
were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches
of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the
Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted.
28 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2017 is as follows:
12 cases in the Soya Strait (18 in FY2016, 22 in FY2015, 10 in FY2014); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (1 in FY2016, 0 in FY2015, 1 in FY2014); and 3 cases in the Tsushima Strait (7 in FY2016, 4
in FY2015, 8 in FY2014).
29 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.

Russia Section 4
in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160.31
completed on that island as well.30 There are also reports Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014
that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the
as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize,
Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy unusual flights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers
Bal and Bastion surface-to-air missiles there. Attention conducting flights around Japan on four occasions in one
must be paid to movement towards the construction month. On two of these occasions, a total of six Tu-95
of a coastal defense system covering the Northern flew on the same day.32
Territories and Chishima Islands. Russian aircraft activities continue to be active, as
Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol shown by the higher number of scrambles against Russian
activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia aircraft compared to the previous year, and the flights by
has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, Tu-95 long-range bombers around Japan in August 2017.
Chapter 2
there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled See Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against
in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft Russian Aircraft)

1 General Situation based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages
in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect
Russia considers the realization of its national interests as its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional
a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring
multipolarization of international relations, the shift of as many partners as possible around the world.34
global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing
importance of force in international relations.33 Moreover,
Surface-to-ship missile Bal
Changes in the Number of Scrambles against

Fig. I-2-4-3
Russian Aircraft
(Times)
500
450
400
350
300 [Jane’s By IHS Markit]
250 <Specifications, performance>
200 Maximum firing range: 130 km
150 <Description>
100 Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it
50 has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2016. An improved missile
0 with a maximum range of 260 km also exists (the 3M-24U), but it is
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
(FY) unclear if it has been deployed.
30 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an
expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacific
Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacific Fleet vessels and over
200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was
to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacific Fleet base in the future. Furthermore, Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced that three ships of the Pacific Fleet and around 100 personnel arrived on
Matsuwa Island in June 2017 in order to conduct a secondary survey. Sakhalin.info reported in October 2017 that a new runway had been completed on Matsuwa Island, and that it was accepting
aircraft landings around the clock. The Russian military newspaper Red Star reported that Russia’s Pacific Fleet is currently developing a military airport on the island that has the capacity to receive
military light transport aircraft and rotorcraft.
31 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance flights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fighters and A-50 airborne early
warning and control aircraft.
32 The number of times Russian military aircraft flew around Japan since FY2013 was: one time in FY2013; six times in FY2014; two times in FY2015; one time in FY2016; and one time in FY2017.
33 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016).
34 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign
policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.”

For this reason, Russia has been working Under this policy, Russia has participated in various
on deepening its economic partnerships with the frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.41 Since 2015, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).35 Eastern Economic Forum has been held in Vladivostok
Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations for accelerating the economic development of Eastern
with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the Russia and expanding international cooperation with the
global economy,36 and in recent years, has attached Asia-Pacific region.
importance to China and India as countries with which to Russia continues to advance close military
strengthen bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russian efforts cooperation with China. Export agreements on new
to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile and
still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since
with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the 2012, China and Russia have been conducting joint
possibility of cooperation with other countries towards naval exercise “Joint Sea.” Russia also continues broad
Chapter 2
stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist military cooperation with India. Export agreements
organizations, including ISIL. were concluded in 2016 for new armaments such as
Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its the S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Grigorovich-class
posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign frigates, and both countries have been conducting joint
policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including development of the fifth generation fighter and the
security, and develop its relations with other countries. “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile. Additionally,
both Russia and India continue to conduct the joint
2 Relations with Asian Countries exercise “INDRA” involving the armies and navies of
both countries.42 Regarding the relationship with Japan,
Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial
region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many
and considers it strategically important to strengthen its fields including politics, economy and security.
status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic
development in Siberia and the Far East,37 and security.38
In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in
May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate
in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in
order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the
East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia
would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan,
the ROK, and other countries, along with China,39 India,
and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal
strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis
on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship
and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key
factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and
also intends to assign an important role for the privileged
strategic partnership with India.40
35 In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement.
36 Press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov following the Russia-China-India foreign ministers’ meeting (April 2016).
37 Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.
38 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed
his recognition that the importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region was rising.
39 See Chapter 2, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China.
40 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative
relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership
with the Republic of India.”
41 Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the APEC, the ARF, the SCO, and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011).
42 Aside from this cooperation, it has been reported that in March 2015, India requested Russia to lease another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in addition to the one already on lease.

Russia Section 4
3 Situation in Ukraine open to question whether this should be assessed as the

operational capability of the aircraft carrier.
As antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has continued In December 2016, Syrian government troops gained
since 2014, Ukraine has shifted away from non-alignment control of strategically located Aleppo, where fighting
policy that Ukraine once held and is pursuing efforts to has continued involving Syrian government troops,
join NATO. In March 2018, President Poroshenko stated opposition forces, Kurdistan troops, and ISIL fighters.
that Ukraine would participate in a NATO Membership At the end of the same month, a nationwide ceasefire
Action Plan (MAP).43 Sporadic clashes between agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect
Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continue in between the Assad administration and opposition forces.
the eastern part of the country, with over 10,000 people While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay'at
reported to have died since April 2014. Furthermore, the Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”)
political processes set out in the Minsk agreements seem since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in
Chapter 2
to have stalled, including the holding of local elections Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran. Russia
and allowing more autonomy in the areas controlled by has been increasing its presence in the Middle East by
separatists. The unstable situation in eastern Ukraine and promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions
the Russian “annexation” of Crimea have taken on aspects in the future, such as the establishment of a ceasefire
of being entrenched. A proposal has been put forth to monitoring organization and de-escalation areas.

establish a United Nations mission with peacekeeping In December 2017, President Putin visited a base in
force in eastern Ukraine. Russia asserts that this force Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism
should only work along the contact line, while the United in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia
States and others argue that the forces work within the would continue to operate two permanent bases within
entire occupied territory, including along national border Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian
between Ukraine and Russia. Developments related to forced in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia. It
this issue will be paid attention in the future. is expected that Russia will prioritize a process towards
political resolution while reducing its military campaign
4 Situation in Syria in Syria. Attention will continue to be paid to movement
Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov
Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in
Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing
using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as
fired cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines
deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean.44 Russia’s
Ministry of Defence announced in November 2016 that
the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed to
the eastern part of the Mediterranean launched aircraft Full load displacement: 59,439 tons
and conducted airstrikes on land-based targets for the Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)
first time in Russia’s naval history. These aircraft from the On-board aircraft: Maximum 20 fighters and attack aircraft
aircraft carrier are reported to have flown 420 sorties over Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range
a two-month period, bombing a total of 1,252 terrorist 550 km)
<Description>
facilities. It has been pointed out, though, that most of
Commissioned in 1990, it is currently the only aircraft carrier that the
these sorties were flown from Khmeimim Air Base since Russian Navy possesses. Carrier-based aircraft take off by the ski
the aircraft was moved from the aircraft carrier to the jump method. Scheduled to begin refurbishment in 2017.
Air Base soon after the airstrike began. It is therefore
43 The NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO program to offer advice and support to countries wishing to join NATO. However, participation in a MAP does not mean that the country will decide
to participate in NATO in the future.
44 In December 2017, at an Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, it was announced that since the start of its military operation in Syria, Russian air units have launched approximately 34,000
strikes, damaging or eliminating approximately 8,000 armored vehicles, 718 weapons and ammunition production facilities, and 60,318 combatants.

to enhance the influence of Russia in the Middle East,

Relations with Commonwealth of
including Syria. 5 Independent States
See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Conflict and
International Terrorism) Russia positions the development of bilateral and
The objectives of Russian military intervention may multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign
include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are
is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests concentrated in the territories of the CIS,45 and deploys
including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the its troops in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria46),
threat of international terrorist organizations including Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South
ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in
far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of August 2009.47 Through the conclusion of an alliance and
the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November
Chapter 2
Russian interests. Additionally, the use of cruise missiles 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia
and strategic bombers in the attacks has demonstrated in 2015, and other efforts,48 Russia has been working to
Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. ensure its military influence.49
Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed
intervention on the course of the Assad administration, insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia
coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on
and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized
Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001
political settlement process cannot be neglected. within the framework of the CIS Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO).50 Furthermore, in June 2009,
a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established
to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid
Deployment Force.51
45 In August 2008, following the conflict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged
interests.
46 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the
international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone
conference between President Putin and then President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately
1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.
47 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian
territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia
Russia relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,”
was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his
intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia.
48 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense and
security.
49 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. In addition to Georgia which has already
withdrawn from CIS and Ukraine which is announcing plans to withdrawal, countries such as Azerbaijan and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic
dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in
2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian
naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time.
50 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was
reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.
51 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June
2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member
state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), has been implemented every
year since 2009.

Russia Section 4
In addition, out of concern that the worsening not help to bring an end to the conflict in Ukraine.
security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of In regard to the situation in Syria, there were some
Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support positive developments, including the recognition of the
Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen importance of U.S.-Russia cooperation to eliminate ISIL, a
the security of the Afghan border.52 U.N.-led political resolution to the conflict, and provisional
safe zones as shown in a joint statement released at the U.S.-
6 Relations with the United States Russia Summit Meeting held in November 2017. However,
antagonism between the two countries is ongoing, with
President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative both the U.S. and Russia criticizing each other over the
relations with the United States in the economic domain, alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in
while opposing the United States on any action Russia April 2017, and also the missile strikes against Syria by
considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s the U.S., the U.K., and France in April 2018. At the U.S.-
Chapter 2
strategic interests.” Russia summit meeting held in July 2018, disarmament
Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of issues as well as international affairs including North
the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating Korea and Syria were discussed with the recognition to
that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear improve the deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations; however,
deterrent capabilities. Following the start of operations of its outlook on improvement remains unclear.

a U.S. MD system in Romania in May 2016, President See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Conflict and
Putin noted that the deployment of MD systems in International Terrorism)
Europe was continuing despite the end of the threat posed

by Iranian nuclear weapons and missiles, and stated 7 Relations with Europe and NATO
that Russia would do everything necessary to maintain
strategic military force parity. Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council
Russia feels that the deployment of the U.S. MD (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal
system in Europe and the Asia-Pacific undermines global partner in the areas of common interest, such as by
and regional security. While expressing its concerns participating in certain decision-making processes.
over the U.S. MD system, Russia is also seeking the However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and
enhancement of its strategic nuclear forces, including European countries suspended their practical cooperation
missiles that can reliably breakthrough MD systems. with Russia, including that in the military domain, except
However, following Russia’s actions in connection for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings.55 Additionally,
with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced NATO and European countries have maintained a severe
suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in diplomatic stance towards Russia while working together
March 2014.53 In addition, the United States dispatched with the Ukrainian Government.
a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non- At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November
lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government.54 In March 2010 prior to the suspension of working level cooperation,
2018, the U.S. Department of State approved the sale of Russia and NATO would work towards building a true and
anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of modernized strategic partnership. They have continued
Foreign Affairs criticized this move, stating that it would searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in
52 At the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element
not only to Afghanistan but also to Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia.
53 Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then U.S. DoD Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with Russia,
including joint exercises with the RAF, consultations, and port calls.
54 The United States provided non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents,
counter mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment, and other related items to Ukraine.
55 NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies
among NATO’s member states in their responses to Russia.

of its collective defense.57

Russia revealed that it has deployed two army
divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army
division near its border with Belarus, and Russia
conducted the strategic command and staff exercise
Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus
in September 2017.58 That exercise was brought up at the
NATO-Russia Council meeting held in October of that
same year, where it was pointed out that the number of
actually participating soldiers and the area used for the
exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement
made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there
Chapter 2
were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no

Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise,
fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter- which were points of concern.
terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in
cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO November 2016 states that containment policies of the
relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC United States and its allies undermine regional and
defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative
difference in position between NATO advocating MD perspective towards NATO expansion.
cooperation in which only information and data would be
exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO 8 Exportation of Arms
and Russia, and Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which
both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not
country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry
NATO and Russia. and to make economic profit, but also to help promote
Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been
Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed increasing in recent years.59 In January 2007, the Russian
Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.56 Government granted the exclusive authority to export
Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has represented arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part
existing threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In
time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral
member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor part of the nation’s military organization and is committed
national security concerns. For this and other reasons, to improving and further developing the military industry
NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft
56 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE
Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfied with the fact that despite its ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the
grounds that the RAF were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this
treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving
the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.
57 See Chapter 2, Section 8 for more about NATO’s initiatives.
58 Russia’s strategic command and staff exercises are held under the command of its joint strategic commands. Management of the military exercises are handled by each military district each year in
a round robin format. In 2017, Zapad 2017 was held in the Western Military District and Belarus. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 12,700 personnel, 10 ships,
70 aircraft and helicopters, and 250 tanks participated in this exercise.
59 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2013 and 2017 increased by 7% compared to that of the period between 2008 and 2012. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports
in the world (22%) after the United States.

Russia Section 4
companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. delivered to China by 2018. It has been pointed out that
Russia exports equipment such as fighters and vessels this deal was made possible because the interests of China
to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous
member states, and Venezuela.60 Russia concluded an weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for
agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fighters and the state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid
S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries of the diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to
Su35 fighters61 have already begun at the end of 2016, gain economic profit through arms exports.62
and plans call for a total of 24 of these aircraft to be
Chapter 2
60 Russia has delivered to Indonesia 5 Su-27 fighters and 11 Su-30 fighters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia signed an agreement to sell 11 Su-35 fighters to Indonesia. To date, Russia
has delivered 18 Su-30 fighters to Malaysia and 12 Su-27 fighters and 36 Su-30 fighters to Vietnam. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam for Kilo-class submarines. All six of these
submarines were delivered to Vietnam by January 2017. With regard to India, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS
Vikramaditya in November 2013, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, to date, Russia has delivered to Algeria 52 Su-30 fighters and to Venezuela 24 Su-30 fighters. Russia’s exports to
China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some
point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With
regard to Iran, Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016.
61 According to reports, contracts have been concluded to export 24 Su-35 fighter jets for approximately USD 2 billion and to export 32 S-400 missile launchers for approximately USD 30 billion. A total
of 14 Su-35 fighter jets were delivered by 2017.
62 In September 2015, President Putin responded in an interview with news agencies that, “Russian-Chinese ties have now probably reached a peak in their entire history and continue developing.”

Section 5 Australia
1 General Situation
Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with states that over the next two decades, the Australian
Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic Government will make important investments to maintain
interests, respect for freedom and human rights, and a high level of capability of the ADF, setting out a plan to
democracy. It is allied with the United States, as are continue to increase the troop strength and acquire high
Japan and the ROK. performance equipment. The white paper states explicitly
In Australia, in September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull that defense funding would be increased over the next
Chapter 2
was elected to lead the ruling Liberal Party. As a result, decade, setting a specific target to reach 2% of Australia’s
the Turnbull administration from the conservative GDP by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international
coalition was formed. In July 2016, both the upper and relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia
lower houses were dissolved simultaneously for the first would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement
time in 29 years. Turnbull continues to be prime minister with partners across the Indo-Pacific, including Japan,
of a conservative coalition that controls the lower house.1 while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance
The former Abbott administration criticized the defense with the United States. To achieve its strategic defense
spending cuts of the previous Labor Party administration, objective of contributing military capabilities to
and signaled its intention to actively make investments coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in
which are deemed necessary for building a stronger a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive
defense force. This policy has continued under the contributions to the peace and stability of the international
Turnbull administration. community through the deployment of ADF to overseas
The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 operations, among other efforts.
The Australian Government launched its first National favorable international environment. On this basis, the
Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013.2 The Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next
Strategy provides a blueprint for national security five years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacific
over the next decade, presenting the recognition that region;3 (2) integrated cyber policy and operations;4 and
responding to the economic and strategic changes in (3) effective partnerships.5
the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security The Defense White Paper released in February 2016
of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for presents6 an outlook of Australia’s security environment
the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe over the next two decades. It then outlines the direction
and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this
Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, environment, and the development of the defense force
infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a pursuant to this strategy.
1 In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won a majority 76 out of the 150 lower house seats, resulting in Prime Minister Turnbull continuing on
as leader, although the coalition lost a large number of seats from its initial total of 89. In the upper house, the coalition aimed to capture seats from minority parties through election reform but failed
to obtain a majority, and may continue to encounter difficulties with government administration going forward. Actually, the Turnbull coalition briefly fell into the minority in the Australian parliament in
November 2017 following a resignation by a parliament member due to a dual-citizenship issue. However, currently, Turnbull’s coalition holds a narrow majority.
2 This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National
Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every five years.
3 Specifically, this includes: 1) deepening the Australia-U.S. Alliance; 2) enhancing bilateral cooperation with influential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and 3)
promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums.
4 The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of
the Australian Crime Commission.
5 This includes sharing information securely and quickly with domestic and international partners and strengthening information sharing between government and business.
6 The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke
Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration),
and 2016 (Turnbull Liberal Party administration) a total of seven times.

Australia Section 5
Specifically, the white paper maintains that while will acquire high performance equipment, including
there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian 12 new submarines,9 3 air warfare destroyers (Aegis
territory in the period to 2035,7 Australia will face new vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and 7 MQ4C
complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will
three strategic defense interests are identified, namely: a seek to strengthen ISR capabilities, electronic warfare
secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea capabilities, and cyber security capabilities, as well as
lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacific strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia
region and a rules-based global order. Additionally, and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the
three strategic defense objectives are given, which are: white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing
(1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.
and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions In addition, with North Korea continuing to make
to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and repeated, provocative actions unlike any seen in the past,
Chapter 2
support the governments of South Pacific countries to Prime Minister Turnbull announced in October 2017 that
build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute Australia would be equipping nine of the future frigates
military capabilities to coalition operations that support of the Royal Australian Navy with a missile defense
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To system (the Aegis system) that can intercept long-range
maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to ballistic missiles, stating, “A number of states, notably

achieve these objectives, the Government will make of course, North Korea, are developing missiles with
important investments. In addition to increasing the troop advanced range and speed. We must have the capability
strength by approximately 4,400 personnel,8 Australia to meet and defeat them.”10
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribes Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and
to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity China, while continuing to give the highest priority to
are directly linked to the development of the nearer its alliance with the United States. On November 2017,
region, the Indo-Pacific region, and the global strategic Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White
environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and Paper, Australia’s first such white paper in 14 years. This
maintain international security relationships to achieve document too, emphasized this policy.11
its strategic defense objectives. In particular, Australia See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense
will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement Cooperation and Exchanges)
with partners across the Indo-Pacific region, including
7 The white paper identifies six factors that will shape the security environment of Australia over the next two decades: (1) the roles of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region and the
relationship between them; (2) challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; (3) the threat of terrorism to Australians at home and abroad; (4) state fragility caused by uneven economic
growth, crime, social, environmental and governance challenges, and climate change; (5) the pace of military modernization and the development of more capable regional military forces; and (6) the
emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats (e.g., cyber threats). With regard to (5), the white paper notes that in the Indo-Pacific region, half of the world’s submarines and at least half of
the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating and more countries may acquire ballistic missile technology.
8 According to the white paper, over the next decade, the number of active duty ADF personnel would be increased to approximately 62,400 personnel from the current approximately 58,000 personnel.
If this is realized, the ADF would return to its largest size since 1993.
9 The Defence White Paper refers to the submarines to be acquired as “regionally superior submarines.” It explains that Australia would select the submarine classification by the end of 2016, and
that the first submarine would begin entering service in the early 2030s. Japan, Germany, and France participated in the submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. In April 2016, the Australian
Government announced that the French company DCNS was chosen as the partner for building the submarines. In August 2016, it was found that confidential DCNS documents on its submarine
order for the Indian Navy had leaked, resulting in rising calls in Australia for a review of the deal. Prime Minister Turnbull emphasized that the submarines being built for Australia are a different type
than the one leaked, refuting the need for a review.
10 Following statements made by Foreign Minister Bishop in April 2017 to the effect that “the United States Administration did say that all options are on the table” and suggesting that Australia supports
this. In regard to North Korea, a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry repeated the threat of nuclear attack against Australia, saying, “If Australia persists in following the US' moves to
isolate and stifle North Korea … this will be a suicidal act of coming within the range of the nuclear strike of the strategic force of North Korea.”
11 The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper recognizes that it is in the national interest of China to increase its influence, and concludes that there are instances in which Chinese influence is indeed greater
than U.S. influence in parts of the Indo-Pacific. Beyond that, it points out that Australia will expand strategic relations with democratic states that share similar aspirations with Australia, while also
ensuring the deepening of the Australia-U.S. Alliance. The White Paper also emphasizes that Australia will strengthen relationships, keeping in mind the “quad” states (Japan-U.S.-India-Australia) with
the aim of ensuring stability and growth from Asia to Africa in particular.

1 Relations with the United States rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From
October 2014, the ADF has been participating in the
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against ISIL.
alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security In July 2015, the two countries conducted a training in
Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United which B-52 strategic bombers of the U.S. Forces were
States of America (ANZUS)12 is based on shared values flown from the U.S. mainland to drop bombs on an air
and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s weapons range in Australia and then returned to the
defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, United States.18 Under the Turnbull administration, at
which remains the pre-eminent global military power the 30th AUSMIN in October 2015, the two sides signed
over the next two decades, will continue to be its most a joint statement on defense cooperation to serve as a
important strategic partner, and the active presence of the guideline for future defense cooperation, and reaffirmed
United States will continue to underpin the stability of their strong bilateral cooperation. In October 2016, cost-
Chapter 2
the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and sharing negotiations for the Force Posture Initiatives
supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring were concluded in principle.
stability in the Indo-Pacific region. AUSMIN was held in June 2017 where they decided
Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly to further expand defense and security cooperation. As
convening the Australia-United States Ministerial a result, the detailed progress of these efforts will be a
Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic focus of attention in the future.

and security issues. On the operational front, the two
countries have made efforts to increase interoperability 2 Relations with China
through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman
Saber.13 Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that
conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia.14 its relationship with China is crucial in different ways
On the equipment front, the two countries have been from its relationship with the United States, and that
simplifying the export procedures associated with it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and
equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and
Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say
2013. In addition, the two countries are considering the Australia is committed to continuing the development of
joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to
cooperation.15 Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency,
advanced in areas such as ISR, space,16 and cyber.17 In and build trust.
August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Based on such a policy, Australia and China
Agreement which provides a legal framework for the continuously hold dialogues among their defense
12 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand
due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.
13 Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined U.S.-Australia training designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 33,000 U.S. Forces and ADF personnel
participated in the exercise held from June to July 2017.
14 By way of the Force Posture Initiatives of November 2011, the United States and Australia announced that the U.S. Marine Corps would conduct rotational deployments approximately every six months
to Darwin and northern Australia. Accordingly, approximately 200 U.S. Marines were deployed in 2012 and 2013, 1,150 Marines in 2014 and 2015, approximately 1,250 Marines in 2016 and 2017,
and approximately 1,600 Marines in 2018. The Defence White Paper 2016 sets out that the size would be increased to approximately 2,500 Marines by 2020. In addition, under this same initiative,
access to Australian military facilities and areas in northern Australia by U.S. Air Force aircraft was set to be expanded, together with opportunities for joint exercises and training. Accordingly, in
February 2017, 12 F-22 fighter aircraft were deployed to Australia.
15 While Australia considers that the threat of an ICBM attack on Australia is low, it deems there is a possible threat of an attack on Australian territory by a long-range or submarine-launched ballistic
missile or cruise missile, as well as attack on the deployed ADF by a short-range ballistic missile or cruise missile. To counter such threats, Australia and the United States have launched a working
group to study options that could contribute to missile defense in the region.
16 Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band ground-
based radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia.
17 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would
consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the
United States.
18 The statement envisions that greater competition for resources and territorial disputes will increase the possibility of miscalculation and the potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions, and states that the two countries would further deepen their defense relationship to deal with this. Specifically, the statement sets forth: deeper interoperability; strengthened policy and
intelligence cooperation; increased collaboration in science and technology, capability development, and defense industry engagement; and coordinated multilateral engagement.

Australia Section 5
authorities,19 along with exchanges to develop the expresses particular concern with the unprecedented pace
cooperative relations between their defense forces, and scale of China’s land reclamation activities in the
including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.20 South China Sea. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy
During the Australia-China summit meeting held White Paper contains statements to the effect that China
in April 2016, an announcement was made about is challenging the position of the United States in the
connecting China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative with the Indo Pacific, the most important region for Australia.
development of infrastructure in northern Australia, and In October 2015, the Government of the Northern
similar cooperation was brought to light also during the Territory leased to a Chinese company the rights to
Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue held in operate the commercial wharfs of the Darwin Port, also
February 2017. utilized by ADF and U.S. Force vessels.22 After it became
Meanwhile, like the previous Abbott administration, clear that the Australian federal government did not lodge
the Turnbull administration has been showing its wariness objections,23 saying there were no security concerns,
Chapter 2
toward China, by, among other ways, making Australia’s people expressed uneasiness within and outside of
position on China very clear. The Joint Statement of the Australia.24 Later, deals involving Chinese companies
AUSMIN in October 2015, referring to China by name, seeking to acquire Australian facilities continued to
expresses strong concerns over recent land reclamation emerge. In January 2017, the federal government of
and construction activity in the South China Sea, and Australia announced the establishment of a dedicated

calls on all claimant states to halt militarization. When center within the Attorney General’s Department, which
the United States conducted the Freedom of Navigation will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully
Operation in the South China Sea in the same month, manage the risks for advising related institutions in order
Minister for Defence Marise Payne of Australia issued to block the sale of important infrastructure related to
a statement expressing strong support for rights to national security, including specific ports and harbor
freedom of navigation and overflight under international facilities, to companies from other countries.
law. In July 2016, Minister for Foreign Affairs Bishop With China’s perceived influence on Australia
announced, with regard to the final ruling by the Arbitral growing larger,25 in December of that year, Prime
Tribunal on the case between the Philippines and China, Minister Turnbull submitted a bill to the Australian
that Australia would support the rights of all countries Parliament meant to prevent interference in domestic
that resolve disputes peacefully following international affairs by foreign actors. That bill was passed into law in
law, including the UNCLOS, and that Australia would June 2018.26
continue to exercise its rights related to the freedom of
overflight and the freedom of navigation pursuant to 3 Relations with India
international law.21 In the Defence White Paper 2016,
Australia asserts that it will be important for regional In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that
stability that China provides reassurance to its neighbors it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the Indo-
by being more transparent about its defense policies, and Pacific region, and that it sees India as a key security
19 In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, visited Australia, and held talks with then Prime Minister Abbott, then Minister for
Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened a Defence Strategic Dialogue
since 1997. At the 20th Dialogue held in August 2017, Australian officials, including Vice Admiral Raymond James Griggs of the Royal Australian Navy and Rebecca Skinner, Deputy Secretary of
Strategic Policy and Intelligence of the Department of Defense, held talks with Major General Shao Yuanming, deputy chief of the Joint Staff of the PLA.
20 In January 2016, three PLA Navy vessels visited Brisbane, Australia to take part in navigation training together with RAN vessels. In August 2017, following on the previous year, KOWARI 2017, the
fourth survival training among the United States, China, and Australia, was conducted in northern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country. In September 2017, Exercise Pandaroo
designed to build teamwork, friendship, and trust between the Australian and Chinese forces was carried out in southeastern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country.
21 In response to China’s announcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop issued a statement saying Australia has made clear its opposition to
any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.
22 In addition, opposition parties and think tanks raised concerns over the fact that this Chinese company is thought to have close ties with the Communist Party of China and the PLA, and over the fact
that the U.S. Forces that utilize Darwin Port were not consulted in advance. According to press reports, then President Barack Obama requested Prime Minister Turnbull to provide advance notice.
Additionally, the Chinese company in question is currently expressing interest in a port near Adelaide where future submarines are slated to be built, raising further concerns.
23 The Government of Australia has struck down the acquisition of a farming company, S. Kidman & Co., which owns land equivalent to about 1% of Australia’s landmass and the acquisition of major
power company Ausgrid by Chinese companies due to reasons of national security.
24 The newly established Critical Infrastructure Centre is viewed as supporting the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) which screens individual projects and advises the Government.
25 According to Australian media reporting, it is clear that China has meddled in domestic affairs through large-scale political contributions and bribes from at least five Chinese people.
26 The law requires the registration of the representatives of foreign governments or foreign companies doing lobbying activities in the Australian parliament, and imposes imprisonment in the event that
someone does make calls to action or influence the policymaking process without registering.

partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the
defense relationship with India in support of their shared governments of South Pacific and other countries to build
strategic interests. and strengthen their security.
The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a Australia has been deepening its relations with
strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two Indonesia in the security and defense fields following
countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November
mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a strategic
among military services, and mutual dispatches of partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the
students to military educational organizations. More Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012.28
recently, in November 2014, Prime Minister of India However, issues have emerged, including differences
Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit in their responses to stowaways from Indonesia, the
to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and
Chapter 2
The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to others by Australia’s intelligence agency, and the issue
cover research, development, and industry engagement, of the execution of Australian nationals in Indonesia.29
to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and
Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to defense fields stalled intermittently between the two
convene talks between each of their military services. countries. Subsequently, in the second half of 2015,
Accordingly, in June 2015, two Indian Navy vessels mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials
made a goodwill visit to Australia, and in September resumed, including the visit to Indonesia by Prime
2015, the first bilateral joint naval exercise AUSINDEX Minister Turnbull. The Foreign and Defense Ministerial
1527 was conducted off the east coast of India. Mutual Meeting (2+2) was held in November 2016, and the
exchanges between the two countries are steadily bilateral relationship is seeing further improvements.
progressing, including the holding of AUSINDEX 17 With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries
off the west coast of Australia in June 2017. out regular joint combined exercises in the South China
See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs of India) Sea and other areas under the framework of the Five
Power Defence Arrangements.30, 31 Australia considers
that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and
4 Relations with Southeast Asia and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime
South Pacific Countries
trading environment. Defense cooperation is also
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of
secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast understanding concerning military training and training
Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In area development in Australia under the comprehensive
particular, Australia considers that instability and strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards
conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian
Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes
Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with to maintaining regional security and stability through
Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern
Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that Indian Ocean.32
the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New
freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacific countries in
Australia seeks to make military contributions to support fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural
27 From Australia, three RAN vessels including a submarine and one patrol aircraft participated. From India, three Indian Navy vessels and one patrol aircraft participated.
28 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense field. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement
covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security.
29 In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and
others. The Indonesian Government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian Government. The Government
also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia for helping to smuggle drugs, and the
Australian Government strongly protested to Indonesia.
30 See Chapter 2, Section 6, Footnote 5.
31 In Exercise Bersama Shield held in April 2016, more than 200 personnel, vessels including a submarine, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. In October 2016, Exercise Bersama Lima was held
in Malaysia, Singapore and South China Sea in which approximately 400 personnel, vessels, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated.
32 See Chapter 3, Section 3, Footnote 17.

Australia Section 5
disasters, and maritime patrol.33 In particular, in the field U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began
of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and
assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. In participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from
addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace October 2014. In addition, Australia has been advising
the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the and assisting, as well as providing capacity building
past. In May 2018, Australia announced its largest ever aid assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military
package for Pacific Island countries of AUS$1.3 billion, front since May 2015. Since August 2014, in addition
with the intent of further strengthening relations. to about 780 personnel (of which, approximately 400
With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance personnel are engaged in assistance in the United Arab
pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold Emirates), Australia has dispatched six F/A-18 fighter/
regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers, attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control
and have maintained close cooperative relations in the aircraft, and one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other
Chapter 2
security and defense fields through joint exercises and assets, for activities in Iraq. Following the Declaration
joint activities in the region. of victory over ISIL by the Prime Minister of Iraq in
See Chapter 2, Section 6 (Security and Defense Policies of December 2017, that same month, Australia announced
Countries in South East Asia) that it would be halting air strikes.35
In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately

5 Overseas Activities 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually
in reconstruction assistance activities and the training of
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the
the following strategic defense objective: to contribute International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the
military capabilities to coalition operations that support completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line 300 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist NATO-
with this objective, as of late June 2018, about 2,404 of led Afghan forces. In July 2016, Australia announced
Australia’s approximately 57,800 force strength34 are that it would extend its support in the region until 2020
deployed and are conducting operations overseas. in order to solidify the progress that has been made in
In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the Afghanistan to date.
33 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the
International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands,
the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when
the military activities of RAMSI were completed.
34 According to “Military Balance (2018).” The breakdown by service is as follows: approx. 29,000 Army personnel; approx. 14,400 Navy personnel; and approx. 14,400 Air Force personnel.
35 Accordingly, the Australian Government withdrew six F/A-18 fighter jets back to Australia on January 2018. However, the E-7A early warning and control aircraft and refueling aircraft remain stationed
in the Middle East.

Section 6 Southeast Asia
1 General Situation
Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, there is a
linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits concern about increases in terrorism in the region as the
of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for in the Middle East slow down. In May 2017, an Islamist
many of the supplies needed for economic activities and extremist group pledging loyalty to ISIL took over a
the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast town in the Philippines, and Malaysian and Indonesian
Chapter 2
Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and nationals are said to have joined this organization. In order
steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia
economic development to varying degrees. Such economic are working to build military forces for national defense
development has deepened interdependence within the and maintenance of domestic public security, as well
region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism
the establishment of the ASEAN Community was declared and piracy. Recently, against the backdrop of economic
as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation development, the countries have been modernizing
towards its integration. their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces,
Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement
including the territorial disputes over the South China capacities.
Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence See Fig. I-2-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense
movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2017)
there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe
2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country
1 Indonesia capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force

(MEF).” However, Indonesia has indicated that its
Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still
with the world’s largest Muslim population, vast land and very much inadequate.1 Accordingly, Indonesia has
territorial waters, and strategic importance for maritime announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy
traffic. Although Indonesia does not confront any immediate to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands
external military threats, it faces internal concerns, including in the South China Sea and other locations.2 Indonesia
the activities of Islamic extremists, such as supporters of ISIL is concerned that the “nine-dash line” claimed by China
and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence overlaps with its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
movements in Papua Province. the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, and in July 2017,
Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, Indonesia announced that it was changing the name of
President Joko Widodo who took office in October 2014 the northern part of its EEZ in the South China Sea to the
strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial “North Natuna Sea.” Indonesia emphasizes cooperation
disputes through maritime diplomacy, and strengthen with other Southeast Asian countries, and adopts an
maritime defense capabilities. independent and active foreign policy. With the United
As part of its military force reform, Indonesia States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship
aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense in such fields as military education and training and
1 In July 2015, prior to his retirement, then Commander of the National Armed Forces of Indonesia Moeldoko said that Indonesia had achieved 34% of its MEF goals.
2 It is believed that on December 15, 2015, Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu unveiled a plan to deploy a fighter squadron and small vessels to the Natuna Islands as well as increase the
number of troops stationed there from the current 800 to around 2,000, including the special operations force of the Air Force, for the purpose of “being prepared for a range of threats such as illegal
operations and illicit intrusion.” Furthermore, in June 2016, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Luhut announced a concept to build a submarine base on the Natuna Islands.

Southeast Asia Section 6
Fig. I-2-6-1 Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2017
ROK
Ground forces
0.975 million troops Combat aircraft Ground forces
approx. 2,850 aircraft 490,000 troops Combat aircraft
approx.
640 aircraft
National Defense Budget

Vessels approx. U.S.$ 34.8 bn
Vessels National Defense Budget 215,000 tons
1.787 million approx. U.S.$ 158.1 bn (43.1581 trillion won)
China
Chapter 2
tons (1107 billion yuan)
Ground Combat
forces aircraft
140,000 approx.
troops 400 aircraft

Vessels
All of Southeast Asia 488,000
approx. U.S.$ 44.1 bn
tons
(4.9388 trillion yen)
(135 vessels)
Ground forces
1.655 million troops Japan
Combat aircraft
approx.
820 aircraft

Vessels approx. U.S.$ 39.2 bn
678,000 tons
Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2018,” etc. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size. There are limits to the comparisons of national defense
budgets which have simply been converted into U.S. dollars when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country’s exchange rate fluctuations and
price levels. However, as the purchasing power parities of Southeast Asian countries are not published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(except Indonesia), this figure intentionally represents the national defense budgets of Japan and other countries that have been converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange
rate published by the Ministry of Finance of Japan.
2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2016; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the
ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).
The Japanese national defense expenditures are the initial budget excluding SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for
mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft.
3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister’s Budget Report to the National People’s Congress in 2018.
4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from ROK Ministry of National Defense sources from 2018, etc.
5. The national defense budget for all of Southeast Asia represents the sum of the 2017 figures for each country according to “The Military Balance 2018.” However, the sum uses
2014 figures from “The Military Balance 2016” for Laos.
6. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2018 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 112 yen to 1 dollar,
16 yen to 1 yuan, and 95 yen to 1,000 won.
7. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2018 figures using the FY2018 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 112 yen to 1 dollar.
military equipment procurement, and is carrying out Indonesia is carrying out bilateral coordinated
joint training, including “Cooperation Afloat Readiness patrols and maritime training exercises with India.
and Training (CARAT)”3 and the “Southeast Asia Moreover, in May 2018, President Joko and Indian
Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)”4 exercises. counterpart, Prime Minister Modi, signed the Defence
With China, president Joko visited China in March Cooperation Agreement.
2015, and affirmed with President Xi Jinping that they See Chapter 2, Section 5-3-4 (Relations with Southeast Asia and
would deepen bilateral relations under the framework of South Pacific Countries); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6
((1) Indonesia)
comprehensive strategic partnership.
3 A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.
4 A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

2 Malaysia part of fiscal reconsolidation efforts. This has resulted in the

announcement of the cancellation of a long-range railway
Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast construction project, which had started with Chinese
Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests cooperation in August 2017. The administration has
with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia shown a stance of seeking renegotiations with the Chinese
does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at Government on projects supported by China that were
present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level actively advanced by the previous Najib administration.
of readiness for dealing with all military threats, and As for North Korea, following the murder of Kim
therefore, places importance on “Independence,” “Total Jong-nam at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in
Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power February 2017, relations between the two countries have
Defence Arrangements (FPDA),”5 “Cooperation to the deteriorated. However, Prime Minister Mahathir showed
UN for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and his willingness to “establish a good relation” with North
Chapter 2
“Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. On the other Korea and said that Malaysia will reopen its embassy
hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring in Pyongyang, which the previous administration had
of Chinese government vessels around the South considered to permanently close.
Luconia Shoal over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((9) Malaysia)
Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime
law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the- 3 Myanmar

clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would defend its
sovereignty. Along with these strengthening its maritime Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which
defense force, Malaysia also has striven to bolster its are steering the changing balance of power in the
defense posture in eastern Malaysia, constructing a new international community, and is located on the border
naval base in April 2017 in Bintulu close to the James of South Asia and Southeast Asia. In light of these
Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal. factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance.
Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the
such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military government following the collapse of the socialist regime
cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused
security field. by the economic sanctions imposed by the West against
Despite competing claims over the sovereignty of the the military government, coupled with isolation from the
South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China international community, transition to civilian rule based
have strong ties, especially their economic relationship, on the road map to democracy was completed.6 Later, in
and mutual visits by dignitaries take place frequently. In the general elections in November 2015, the National
November 2016, Prime Minister Najib visited China and League for Democracy (NLD) led by President Aung San
reached an agreement on economic cooperation and the Suu Kyi secured a victory, and in March 2016 the new
purchase of naval vessels. Htin Kyaw administration was started. Having relatives
Furthermore, in November 2015, when the who are foreign nationals, Aung San Suu Kyi is unable to
Commander of the Chinese Navy visited Malaysia, it is become president under the provisions of the constitution.
said that the two countries agreed on making use of the Therefore, she was appointed Foreign Minister and to the
Port of Kota Kinabalu for port calls by Chinese Navy newly created post of State Counsellor, and in these roles
vessels. In January 2017, a Chinese submarine made a she is exercising leadership in the administration.
port call at the Kota Kinabalu naval base for the very Since the previous Thein Sein administration,
first time, and a second port call was made by a Chinese the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps
submarine in September of that same year. towards democratization, including the release of
On the other hand, the new Mahathir administration political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic
started in May 2018, has been pushing forward minorities.7 The international community has shown
reconsiderations of large-scale infrastructure projects as a some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West,
5 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat
of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.
6 Consists of seven steps: reconvening of the National Assembly; stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization; drafting a new constitution; a national referendum on the
constitution; general election; convening of the House of Representatives; and the establishment of a new government.
7 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1960s, the Government of Myanmar implemented oppressive
policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities.

With regard to individual foreign relations, China is

thought to be an important partner to Myanmar since its
period of military rule. With economic support from China,
a gas pipeline and a port, among other infrastructure,
are being built. On the military front, China is regarded
as a major supplier of equipment. In August 2016, State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi visited China, where she
announced the promotion of a comprehensive strategic
cooperative partnership. Furthermore, Myanmar has
maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in the
military field, including during the military regime, and
Displaced people from Myanmar to Bangladesh Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar
(©UNHCR/Andrew McConnell)
Chapter 2
and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India,
including the United States successively easing economic since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened
sanctions on Myanmar. cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and
With regard to the efforts for a ceasefire agreement military, which has developed into defense cooperation
with ethnic minorities, peace consultations with ethnic and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and

military groups started from 2011. The Government friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels.
signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight Cooperative relations with North Korea, including
armed ethnic minority groups in October 2015 and weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s
with two more parties in February 2018 respectively. military regime. Following the transition to democracy,
Furthermore, in August 2016, the inaugural 21st Century although Myanmar denies that it has military ties to
Panglong Union Peace Conference was held for peace North Korea, there are sometimes still reports suggesting
and reconciliation. This was followed by the second doubt about the relationship between the military and
Peace Conference in May 2017, and the third Peace North Korea.
Conference in July 2018. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((7) Myanmar)
On the other hand, concerns are increasing in the
international community related to the situation in western 4 The Philippines
Rakhine State. Following attacks on police posts by the
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August The Philippines perceives that it confronts new security
2017, over 600,000 mostly Muslim refugees fled into challenges, including non-traditional threats, such as
neighboring Bangladesh over the course of two months transnational crime. At the same time, it identifies that
since Myanmar military and other security forces launched long-standing issues, such as the territorial disputes
large-scale operations. The international community has over the South China Sea and terrorism perpetrated by
expressed concern over this incident on the grounds that domestic anti-government armed groups, constitute major
there were mass killings and violations of human rights. security concerns. President Duterte has announced his
With regard to this issue, Myanmar does not recognize that policies that emphasize combating crime, illegal drugs
the Muslims living in northern Rakhine State, so-called the and corruption, fighting against Abu Sayyaf Group
Rohingya people, as its citizens, and thus, their legal status (ASG), and forging peace in Mindanao since the time he
as stateless people complicates the issue. took office in 2016.
In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to As regards domestic security issues, over the last
uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while approximately 40 years, armed conflicts have repeatedly
for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize broken out between the Government of the Philippines
the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). With the
Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and support of the activities of the International Monitoring
Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling Team (IMT),8 the peace process has made progress,
foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters. including the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement
8 Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, and the EU are the member states of the IMT. (As of March 2015)

had launched a trilateral maritime patrol in the region of

the Sulu sea. Air patrols were also started by each country
in October of that year.
The Philippines, with a historically close relationship
with the United States, has maintained a cooperative
relationship with the United States under their mutual
defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even
after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.11 The
two countries are conducting joint exercises including the
large-scale military exercise Balikatan.
In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five
locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the
Chapter 2
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)12

they signed in April 2014 for strengthening their
cooperation on such areas as the capacity enhancement of
on the Bangsamoro and the partial decommissioning of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief.13
MILF forces and weapons.9 On the other hand, military It is expected that concrete steps will be taken, including
clashes have occurred between the government army and the development of facilities in the Philippines for the
National Police, and armed forces opposing the peace rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in accordance
talks.10 It is deemed that time will be required to achieve with the EDCA.
practical peace. The Philippines and China have competing claims
In May 2017, security forces clashed with the Maute over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and the
group, an Islamic extremist organization that pledges Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking
allegiance to ISIL, which had occupied the city of a settlement under international law, in January 2013,
Marawi by taking hostages. The enduring battle resulted the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings
in fatalities and injuries, causing public safety in the city pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a
to deteriorate. As a result, martial law was declared in final award was rendered accepting nearly all of the
Mindanao. The military operations resulted in the killing Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the
of core members and fighters of the Maute group, leading Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the
President Duterte to declare liberation of Marawi City award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirms its
from terrorists in October of that same year. On the other respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in
hand, the declaration of martial law was extended until the his State of the Nation Address held in the same month
end of 2018, to quell the continuing rebellion in the region. that the Philippines would strongly affirm and uphold the
ASG, an Islamic extremist group, has orchestrated award handed down for the arbitration case between the
a number of kidnappings for ransom in the Sulu Sea Philippines and China. However, when President Duterte
and Celebes Sea. Given this situation, in June 2017, the visited China in October 2016, a joint statement was
Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia announced that they announced that included infrastructure investment, drug
9 In October 2012, the Framework Agreement for the realization of a final agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed. In January 2014, the Government of the Philippines and MILF
signed the Annex on Normalization. The goal of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014 was to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority (BTA).
10 In January 2015, in Mindanao, an exchange of fire occurred between the Philippine National Police that were mobilized to arrest JI suspects, and the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF). This incident reportedly left casualties on both sides.
11 In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in
1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991.
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal
status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.
12 The EDCA is designed to enable the U.S. Forces to utilize and develop facilities in the Philippines, preposition equipment, among other activities. It was agreed that the bases in the Philippines to
be utilized by the U.S. Forces would be decided through consultations after the EDCA was concluded and would be stated in an annex to the agreement. After the signing in 2014, the consultations
regarding the annex had been suspended as litigation procedures were instituted in the Philippines on the grounds that the EDCA was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines
handed down a ruling in January 2016 that the EDCA is indeed constitutional.
13 At the 2+2 talks held on January 12, 2016 (EST), the ministers welcomed the decision that the EDCA was constitutional, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue strengthening their alliance in
terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. On March 17-18, 2016 (EST), a strategic dialogue
among foreign and defense authorities was held in Washington, D.C. The two sides agreed on the following five EDCA Agreed Locations: Antonio Bautista Air Base; Basa Air Base; Fort Magsaysay;
Lumbia Air Base; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base.

enforcement cooperation, coastal security cooperation Jinping visiting Singapore in November 2015, and
and military cooperation but did not make reference to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visiting China in
the tribunal’s award in the case involving the Philippines September 2017.
and China. Also, in May 2017, President Duterte toured See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((3) Singapore)
a PLA Navy vessel that made its first port call at the port
in Davao, where the president grew up, and announced 6 Thailand
an agreement concerning joint military exercises with the
PLA. In this regard, attention will be paid to developments Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense
in the future. cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations,
See Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive
Other Issues over the South China Sea) use of political, economic, and other national strengths;
Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((4) The Philippines)
and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness
Chapter 2
of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing
5 Singapore the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by
Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence
Given its limited land area, population, and resources, have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand.
Singapore’s existence and development depend on the The Government identifies the swift restoration of peace

peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. and security of the lives and property of the people
Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In addition,
defense spending accounting for about one-fifth of its undemarcated border issues exist between Thailand and
national budget. neighboring countries including Myanmar and Cambodia.
Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as The submission of an amnesty bill intended to pave the
twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is way for the pardon and return of former Prime Minister
a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make Thaksin Shinawatra by ruling parties to the National
use of the training facilities of other countries, including Assembly in 2013 exacerbated domestic disorder. In May
the United States and Australia, while continually 2014, then Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan-o-Cha
dispatching military personnel to take part in training of the Royal Thai Army issued a declaration of martial
exercises overseas. law nationwide, and then seized power via the National
Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative Council for Peace and Order, which mostly comprises
relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,14 and has concluded the Thai military. Currently, under the administration
defense cooperation agreements with countries within led by former Commander-in-Chief Prayuth, who was
and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to selected as interim Prime Minister, the Government
peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. is aiming to hold general elections and transition to a
presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military new administration under a new constitution in order
facilities in Singapore. In 2013, U.S. littoral combat to facilitate a transition to civilian rule. The new
ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments.15 constitution was promulgated and entered into force in
In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. April 2017. Next general election is expected to be held
Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week in 2019.
for the first time. The two countries have committed to Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic
continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely.16 policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast
In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the Asian countries and coordination with major countries,
United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT. including Japan, the United States, and China. Since the
As for China, in May 2015, the two countries conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950,
conducted their first bilateral naval joint exercise China- Thailand and its ally, the United States,17 have maintained
Singapore Cooperation 2015. Active mutual visits by a cooperative relationship. They have conducted the
dignitaries have also taken place, with President Xi lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold since 1982, as well as
14 See this Section, Footnote 5.

15 Based on an agreement reached in April 2013. In October 2016, LCS USS Coronado arrived in Singapore for the third rotational deployment.
16 In December 2015, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen of Singapore visited the United States. The two sides signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and concurred that in accordance
with this Agreement, they would strengthen their defense cooperation in the five areas of military, policy, strategy, technology, and the non-traditional security area of piracy and terrorism.
17 Thailand and the United States have an alliance based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 1954 and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962.

the CARAT and SEACAT joint exercises.18 visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries,
Thailand and China have also promoted military and an agreement was reached on the deepening of
exchanges, conducting joint exercises such as Blue defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port
Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike among call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam since the end of
their air forces.19 the Vietnam war.
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((5) Thailand) Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen
cooperation in the area of national defense. In March
7 Vietnam 2013, Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited
Vietnam, and the two sides agreed to jointly construct
Vietnam perceives that it confronts diverse and complex vessel replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. In
security challenges. It considers that the issues in the 2014, Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at
South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime Cam Ranh International Airport for the first time for the
Chapter 2
activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as refueling flights for Russia’s Tu-95MS strategic bombers.21
piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern. As these examples demonstrate, the two countries have
During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union been carrying out new military cooperation. In recent
provided the most significant assistance to Vietnam. Until years, the two countries have also promoted cooperation
2002, Russia had a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation.
the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly Vietnam is mostly on Russia for its defense equipment.
expanded its diplomatic relations with other countries, See Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries)
including establishing diplomatic ties with the United Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive
States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively
diplomatic policy and seeks to actively participate in conduct exchanges among their senior government
international and regional cooperation in order to build officials. However, the two countries have competing
friendly relations with all countries. In March 2016, an claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over
international port opened in the key strategic position of the South China Sea. In November 2015, President Xi
Cam Ranh Bay, and since then a number of navy vessels Jinping visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed that
from not only Japan but also the United States and China differences in opinion regarding maritime issues would
have made calls to the new port. be dealt with appropriately. They also signed a joint
In January 2016, the Congress of the Communist statement noting that the two countries would refrain from
Party of Vietnam (CPV) was held after five years since the actions that further complicate the issue. Furthermore,
previous Congress.20 The Congress decided that Nguyen in January 2017, General Secretary of the Communist
Phu Trong would remain CPV General Secretary, among Party of Vietnam Trong visited China, where the bilateral
other decisions, and a new leadership was established. agreements of past summit meetings, including the basic
General Secretary Trong in his second term identified principles concerning the South China Sea finalized in
that his focal missions for the next five years would 2010, were reaffirmed and it was agreed that they would
include the following: enhance party building; carry out advance cooperation aimed at joint development.
political reform; accelerate national modernization; and Vietnam and India have been deepening their
maintain the country’s independence, sovereignty, unity, cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas,
and territorial integrity. including security and economy. In the area of defense
Vietnam and the United States have strengthened cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces
their military relations in recent years. This has taken support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine
such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels
calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, when then
18 In May 2014, following the coup d’état in Thailand, the United States announced it would suspend joint exercises and freeze military assistance. However, the lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold was
held in February 2015, and the bilateral joint exercise CARAT was held in August 2015.
19 From November 12 to 30, 2015, the first joint exercise between Chinese and Thai air forces, Falcon Strike-2015, was held at the Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. From China, six J-11B
fighters participated, and from Thailand, five JAS-39 Gripen fighters participated. In addition, in the air show of the closing ceremony of the exercise, from China, seven J-10 fighters of the August
1st Aerobatics Team participated, and from Thailand, two F-16 fighters participated.
20 President Truong Tan Sang, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Minister of National Defence Phung Quang Thanh, among others were not reelected and retired from office. In April 2016, President Tran
Dai Quang, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Minister of National Defense Ngo Xuan Lich, and others were appointed at the Vietnamese National Assembly.
21 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. DoD authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior official of the U.S. Pacific
Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative flights. In January 2015,
the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that Russian aerial refueling tankers (IL-78) used Cam Ranh Bay in 2014, enabling the refueling of strategic fighters.

Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening
India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision defense cooperation. Cooperation in the area of energy
Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 2015- between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint
2020.22 In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became development program for oil and natural gas in the South
the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years. China Sea.
During the visit an agreement was reached on raising See Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and
the status of the bilateral relationship to comprehensive Other Issues over the South China Sea)
Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((2) Vietnam)
strategic partnership, while an announcement was made
3 Military Modernization in the Region
Chapter 2
In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased jets from Russia. In addition, that same year, Malaysia
their defense spending against the backdrop of economic introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly
development and other reasons, and are modernizing their developed by France and Spain) as its first submarines.
military forces focusing on inducting equipment such In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly concluded
as submarines and fighters including fourth-generation an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the ROK.

modern fighters. The underlying factors noted are Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous
increases in defense spending, the relationship between littoral combat ships (LCSs). The first of these vessels
Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, in November
neighboring states’ development of military capabilities, 2016, Malaysia concluded an agreement with China to
response to the expansion of China’s influence, and the purchase four littoral mission ships (LMS).
inadequate role of regional security organizations to The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to
nurture relationships of trust.23 Many Southeast Asian modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of
countries procure much of their defense equipment from conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea.
a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived After the F-5 fighters were decommissioned in 2005,
difficulties in achieving consistent operations and the Philippines did not have any fighters for some length
maintenance in the respective countries. of time. However, between November 2015 and May
Indonesia has introduced a total of 16 Russian 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-
Su-27 fighters and Su-30 fighters by 2013. In 2011, an 50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK.
agreement was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 As for naval forces, the Philippines received three
F-16 fighters, and these have been successively delivered Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016.
since July 2014. In addition, in August 2017, Indonesia The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing
announced plans for an additional procurement of 11 dock vessels by 2017.
Su-35 fighters from Russia. With the ROK, Indonesia Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces.
concluded an agreement in December 2011 to purchase It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2012
three ROK-made 209-class submarines, and one was and also participates in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
delivered on August 2017. The two countries also (JSF) Program.
discussed joint development of the 4.5 generation KF-X/ As for naval forces, Singapore introduced two
IF-X fighter, and they concluded an agreement which Archerclass (Västergötland-class) submarines from
sets forth the details of their cost sharing and bilateral Sweden by 2012. Also, in December 2013, Singapore
cooperation in January 2016. In addition, Indonesia is concluded an agreement to purchase two German
domestically building two frigates based on the Dutch 218SG-class submarines (with plans to introduce them
Sigma-class Frigate 10514 vessel. The first of these from 2021). With regard to Singapore’s current plans to
vessels was delivered in January 2017, and the second build eight indigenous patrol vessels, the first such vessel
was delivered January 2018. came into service in May 2017, and the country aims to
As of 2009, Malaysia had purchased 18 Su-30 fighter have all vessels in operation by 2020.
22 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. While the content
of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, the two sides also
signed an MOU on strengthening the cooperation between their coast guards.
23 Based on IISS’s “The Military Balance” and other sources.

As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established first one. In addition, by 2013, Thailand has introduced
the Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and started 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters.
evaluation work to procure submarines. In April 2017, the By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced
Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan- six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February
class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made
the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel.24 Gepard-class frigates. As for its air force capabilities,
With regard to frigates, in September 2012, the Cabinet Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made
approved a plan to introduce two frigates, and concluded Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of
an agreement to purchase an ROK-made frigate as the delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36.
4 Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea
Chapter 2
1 Background permission from the relevant departments under China’s

State Council. In January 2016, China set out a maritime
In the South China Sea, ASEAN countries and China have policy for the next five years beginning from 2016,
competing claims to such areas as the Spratly Islands25 which stated that China would build a “Spratly Islands
and the Paracel Islands.26 China is pursuing unilateral, ecosystem protection zone.”
large-scale, and rapid land reclamation and the building On the other hand, ASEAN countries as well have
of facilities. The international community is expressing been bolstering their claims to territory in the South China
deep concern over the unilateral changes in the status quo Sea. In March 2009, the Philippines passed the so-called
and China’s creation of a fait accompli. Archipelagic Baselines Law, stating that the Philippines
Since the enactment of the Act on the Territorial has sovereignty over part of the Spratly Islands and the
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic Scarborough Shoal pursuant to UNCLOS.28 In May
of China in 1992, which stated that the Spratly Islands 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly requested to the
and the Paracel Islands are the territories of China, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
the country has only strengthened moves intended to (CLCS) an extension of the continental shelf of the sea
emphasize its territorial claims. For example, China area that includes part of the Spratly Islands.29 In June
attached a map of the “nine-dash line”27 to a verbal note 2012, Vietnam adopted the Maritime Law (effective
addressed to the UN in 2009, in which it made claims January 2013) that asserts its sovereignty over the Spratly
to the parts of the South China Sea that purportedly and Paracel Islands.
came under China’s “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and Some of the countries concerned in the South China
jurisdiction.” Furthermore, in 2012, China announced the Sea have reportedly resorted to the use of force on the
establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which opposing country’s vessels, including seizing vessels and
claims to have jurisdiction over the islands of the Spratly firing warning shots, and the concerned countries have
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and mutually lodged protests against these actions.
their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan Between Vietnam and China, in May 2014, China’s
Province amended its regulation on the implementation unilateral commencement of oil drilling in waters near
of China’s fishing law, stipulating that foreign fishing the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations between
vessels that wish to carry out fishing activities in waters Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. In July 2015, a
under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province must obtain Vietnamese fishing vessel was rammed by a Chinese
24 The plan to purchase Chinese-made submarines for the Royal Thai Navy approved by Thailand’s cabinet on April 18, 2017 first calls for purchasing one vessel in installments appropriated over the
budgets from 2017 to 2023, and then procuring a total of three vessels over the next 11-year period. On May 5, a contract was concluded on the purchase of one of these three submarines.
25 The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is expected to have offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. The area is also a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishery resources.
26 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.
27 Concerning the “nine-dash line,” although this has given rise to conflicting claims about territory in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries, China has not offered any concrete
explanations regarding the relationship between the “nine-dash line” and relevant international norms.
28 According to the Republic Act No. 9522. This law gives the location of the baselines of the archipelago in terms of latitude and longitude, including of Luzon Island, Palawan Island, and Mindanao
Island. However, for the Spratly Islands (Filipino name: Calayan Islands) and the Scarborough Shoal (Filipino name: Bajo de Masinloc), the law states that the baseline is based on the “Regime of
Islands” under Article 121 of UNCLOS and does not give the geographical location of the baseline.
29 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a body established under UNCLOS (Article 76 and Article 1 of Annex II). Coastal states (signatories) submit information concerning the
continental shelf to CLCS when establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and then CLCS issues a recommendation based on scientific and technical guidelines.
The limits of the continental shelf based on the CLCS recommendation is final and binding for coastal states. CLCS consists of 21 members serving a term of five years. Members must be experts in
the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography, and serve in their personal capacities.

vessel and sunk near the Paracel Islands.30 In May 2016, a to install military facilities such as batteries, as well
high-speed Chinese vessel followed a Vietnamese fishing as develop various types of infrastructure that can be
boat and intimidated it with its guns near Cuarteron used for military purposes, including runways, hangars,
Reef in the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, in January harbors and radar, continuing to make the features
of the same year, a dispute occurred over oil resource military bases.
development in which Vietnam, alleging that China’s oil See Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5 ((4) Situation of Activities in the South
drilling rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” conducted activities China Sea)
in an area north of the Paracel Islands where Vietnam

and China have overlapping claims to the continental 2 Recent Developments
shelf, requested31 China to suspend its operations and
withdraw the rig. Some countries with claims on territory in the South China
Between China and the Philippines, in November Sea are making efforts to resolve the issue peacefully in
Chapter 2
2015, a Chinese vessel allegedly appeared several accordance with international law. In January 2013, the
kilometers off the coast of Thitu Island of the Spratly Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to
Islands, an island occupied by the Philippines, and UNCLOS for the dispute over China’s assertions and
anchored there for approximately ten days.32 In April 2017, actions in the South China Sea, and in July 2016, an
Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana indicated his arbitral tribunal rendered a final ruling in which it ruled

intention to protest to China through diplomatic channels in favor of nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions.33 In
concerning an incident that occurred in March 2017 in response, China issued a statement noting that the ruling
waters near the Spratly Islands when China Coast Guard was invalid and had no binding force and that China
vessels fired warning shots across the bows of Filipino opposed and refused to accept it. Pursuant to UNCLOS
fishing vessels. Furthermore, the Secretary landed on provisions, the award of the arbitral tribunal is final and is
Thitu Island, effectively controlled by the Philippines, in legally binding on the parties to the dispute, and therefore,
a military aircraft where he stated his intention to push it is necessary that the parties adhere to the award.
forward with repairs of the runway. As for ASEAN, the issues surrounding the South
Between Malaysia and China, in March of that year, China Sea have been discussed repeatedly at ASEAN-
in an incident occurred in which it is said that China related meetings and other fora, with a view to achieving
Coast Guard vessels and around 100 Chinese fishing their peaceful resolution. A Chairman’s Statement from
boats together made an incursion into the area around the an ASEAN Summit in May 2014 repeated concerns over
Luconia Shoals within Malaysia’s EEZ. the situation in the South China Sea. Following that,
Between Vietnam and Taiwan as well, in January the Chairman’s Statement from the November 2017
2016, a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the ASEAN Summit did not express such concerns, but
Spratly Islands reportedly collided with a Taiwanese instead drew attention to the recognition that Chinese and
coast guard vessel. ASEAN relations were improving. However, within the
Some of the countries concerned in the South Chairman’s Statement from the ASEAN Summit held
China Sea conduct land reclamations and build facilities in April 2018, yet again concerns were expressed by a
on the features they respectively occupy, including the portion of the leaders about land reclamation activity in
Spratly Islands. However, under these circumstances, the South China Sea.
since 2014, China has pushed forward with rapid and Also, in 2002, ASEAN and China signed the
large-scale land reclamation activities and continued Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
30 Incidents involving the collision and sinking of Vietnamese fishing vessels by Chinese vessels near the Paracel Islands are believed to have taken place in September 2015, January, March, and July
2016, August 2017, and April 2018.
31 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, on January 16, 2016, China’s oil rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” was found 21.4 nautical miles east of the assumed median line where the
Vietnamese and Chinese continental shelves overlap. It is believed that notices were sent to China about this matter on January 18. It is reported that a similar incident occurred in April of that
same year.
32 Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island) is a feature located near Subi Reef where China is building a runway. The mayor with jurisdiction over the island spotted the China Coast Guard vessel. This
was reportedly the first time that a vessel anchored for as long as ten days.
33 With regard to the “nine-dash line” and China’s claim to historic rights, the arbitral tribunal found that China’s claims to historic rights with respect to the maritime areas encompassed by the “nine-
dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the limits of China’s maritime entitlements under UNCLOS. With regard to the legal status of features, the
arbitral tribunal found that all of the features in Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands (including Itu Aba Island [Taiwanese name: Taiping Dao]) have no EEZ or continental shelf. With regard to the
legality of Chinese activities, the tribunal found that China has unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal, violated its obligations to protect the
marine environment through its largescale land reclamations, artificial island-building, and other activities, violated its obligations pertaining to navigation safety by virtue of the dangerous navigation
by its law enforcement vessels, breached the Philippines’ sovereign rights through its land reclamations at Mischief Reef, and violated its obligations by aggravating and extending the disputes through
its dredging, artificial island-building, and other activities following the commencement of arbitral proceedings.

ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August

2017, the start of the negotiations on the COC was
formally announced at the 20th ASEAN-China Summit
in November of the same year. Although the progress
being made in discussions should be appreciated, care
must be taken to ensure that COC does not invalidate the
decision of the arbitral tribunal between the Philippines
and China, or is not used as a pretext for excluding the
involvement of countries outside the region.
The issues surrounding the South China Sea are a
matter of concern for the whole international community,
and are directly related to the peace and stability of the
Chapter 2
Asia-Pacific region. As such, attention will continue to be

Sea (DOC)34 aimed at peacefully resolving the issues paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the
over the South China Sea. Official talks are now ongoing direction of dialogues aimed at the resolution of the issues.
for establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of
the South China Sea (COC), which goes into further the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China
Seas); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 (Promotion of Defense

detail than the DOC and is deemed to have legal binding Cooperation and Exchanges)
force. Following the adoption of the COC framework at
5 Regional Cooperation
The ASEAN Community established on December 31, multilateral security framework of the region that it has
2015 is comprised of three pillars, namely, cooperation been over the years. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as
by the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN the ARF and ADMM, which provide opportunities for
Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has
Community. The first of these, the ASEAN Political- made efforts to improve the security environment in the
Security Community (APSC), adopts the principle of region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding
building on what has been constructed over the years in the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and
the field of political and security cooperation through Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition,
ASEAN’s initiatives, and of aiming to ensure a peaceful ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations
life in a democratic and harmonious environment. The with countries outside of the region. It holds the ASEAN
APSC Blueprint 2025 identifies the four characteristics Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), a
of (1) aiming to become a rules-based, people-oriented, platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including
people-centered community; (2) aiming to become a Japan to ADMM, and holds HA/DR exercises. Moving
peaceful, secure, and stable region; (3) aiming for dynamic forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further
and outward-looking ASEAN centrality; and (4) aiming for develop such initiatives as dialogues, HA/DR exercises,
strengthened ASEAN institutional capacity and presence. and expansion of relations with non-ASEAN countries,
ASEAN member states also utilize ASEAN as the in accordance with the principle and concepts of APSC.
34 The DOC includes commitments to resolve territorial and other disputes by peaceful means, and to reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct would further promote peace and stability in the
region and work towards the attainment of this objective, based on the principles of international law.

South Asia Section 7
Section 7 South Asia

1 India
1 General Situation under the “Make in India” initiative and promoting the
domestic production of equipment through enhancing
With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast technological cooperation with other countries. Moreover,
land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It the administration has deepened collaboration with other
has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation.
has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also,
Chapter 2
it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of 2 Military Affairs
strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines
of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacific region India’s security environment is directly linked to its
with the Middle East and Europe. neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia,
India shares borders with many countries, and has Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian

non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic
India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and factors impose upon them an increasingly larger
languages,1 and there are concerns about the activities of responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security
ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges,
as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed India has strengthened cooperative relations with other
across the India-Pakistan border. countries and has long been actively participating in
On the diplomatic front, the Modi administration UN PKOs. In order to respond rapidly and effectively to
that was inaugurated in May 2014 has maintained diversified security issues, the Government and defense
the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges.
strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India
expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear
relations to the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with deterrence, the no-first-use nuclear policy, no use against
the “Act East” policy.2 In addition, the administration has non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the
carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced
on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes
among other areas. In the defense domain, maintaining the development and deployment of various ballistic
preparedness at its land borders and addressing the threat missiles. India conducted the sixth test launch of “Agni
of terrorism remain major concerns. At the same time, 5” in June 2018 and reportedly started developing “Agni
the administration has also recently attached importance 6,” which is alleged to have a range of up to 10,000
to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the
Ocean. Furthermore, the administration has made efforts ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance
aimed at modernizing its military by expanding foreign improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India jointly
companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry develops “BrahMos” with Russia and deploys them. India
1 The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu.
2 It is regarded that based on the progress of the “Look East” policy intended to strengthen India’s relations with ASEAN, the “Act East” policy which advocates a more practical approach has been
adopted since the inauguration of the Modi administration.

is also developing a ballistic missile defense system.3 FA being developed by Russia. With the United States,
In recent years, India has been injecting efforts India has concluded an agreement in 2010 to purchase
into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular. ten C-17 transport aircraft and has inducted all of these
As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement aircraft by 2014.
of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear
development with them, and has emerged as the world’s submarines, India undertakes the development and
largest arms importer.4 indigenous production of tanks and light combat aircraft.
With respect to its naval capabilities, India However, delays in their development present challenges
decommissioned one aging British-built aircraft carrier INS for India’s domestic production of equipment.
Viraat in March 2017. India introduced the Russian-built See Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate))
conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya
in November 2013, and is also building one indigenous 3 Relations with Other Countries
Chapter 2
conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.5

With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian- (1) Relations with Pakistan
built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty
INS Chakra in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. It of Kashmir,7 and have had three armed conflicts of
reportedly placed into service its first indigenous ballistic significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir
missile and nuclear submarine INS Arihant in August has long been in contention between India and Pakistan,
2016. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement
with the United States to purchase eight P-8I patrol aircraft. Fig. I-2-7-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)
India has so far deployed all eight aircraft to a base in
Approx. 560,000 troops
southern India facing the Bay of Bengal, and in July 2016
Approx. 70 vessels
it concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four Approx. 94,000 tons
Approx. 450 aircraft
P-8I patrol aircraft.
Pakistan
With respect to its air force capabilities, India is Approx. 1.20 million troops
refurbishing its existing fighter aircraft. Moreover, it Approx. 320 vessels
Approx. 478,000 tons
signed an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale fighter aircraft Approx. 950 aircraft
from France in September 2016 as part of India’s plan to

India
induct medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).6 [Legend]
With Russia, India has concluded an agreement in Ground forces (200,000 troops)
The United States Geological Survey:
December 2012 to purchase 42 additional Su-30 fighters. Naval vessels (100,000 tons)
GTOPO30; and the United States National
Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
India has also been deepening military technological ETOPO1
cooperation with Russia, including the joint development Notes: 1. Figures based on “The Military Balance 2018,” etc.
2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.
of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft based on the PAK
3 Regarding missiles that India possessed, the following have been indicated:
“Prithvi 2”: a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 250-350 km
“Agni 1”: a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 700-1,250 km
“Agni 2”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,000-3,500 km
“Agni 3”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 3,000-5,000 km
“Agni 4”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 4,000 km
“Agni 5”: a mobile, three-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000-8,000 km
“Agni 6”: a three-stage solid/liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000-10,000 km
“BrahMos”: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300-500 km
Ballistic missile defense system: India is developing a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude
interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude
4 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
5 The indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is 262.5 m long, has a standard displacement of 40,642 t, and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2018.
6 Since 2007, India has been implementing a project to induct 126 MMRCA. In 2012, India announced that it selected the French Rafale aircraft. In April 2015, during his visit to France, Prime Minister
Modi expressed India’s intention to swiftly purchase 36 Rafale aircraft. It is believed that a purchase agreement was signed in September 2016 and discussions are still ongoing regarding the model
of the remaining 90 aircraft.
7 India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends
that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military
forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN
resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute.

with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending.8 agreed that they would expand technology cooperation
More recently, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to include co-development and co-production of
of Pakistan was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s equipment. The leaders also affirmed that they would
swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. In December 2015, deepen cooperation in the field of maritime security,
on his return from visiting Afghanistan, Prime Minister and agreed that cooperation between their navies
Modi made a surprise informal visit to Pakistan. In this would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral
regard, both countries have demonstrated readiness to naval exercise Malabar. Furthermore, at the Defense
improve their relations. Meanwhile, it remains uncertain Ministerial Meeting in December 2015, the two sides
whether bilateral dialogues would be sustained, with the held talks on strengthening various defense cooperation,
postponement of their vice foreign ministerial meeting and confirmed the progress made in the technology
in both August 2014 and January 2016.9 Armed clashes cooperation consultations related to aircraft carriers
between the two militaries have repeatedly taken place and jet engines conducted by their joint working group.
Chapter 2
in the Kashmir region. The large-scale armed clashes In such ways, their cooperation in the field of security
in October 2014 reportedly killed and injured civilians. has expanded. In addition, when Prime Minister Modi
Furthermore, in January 2016, armed forces intruded visited the United States in June 2016, the United States
into an Indian Air Force base adjacent to the Kashmir recognized that India is a “Major Defense Partner.” In
area, killing and wounding security personnel and others, August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S. and Indian

and also in September 2016, armed insurgents attacked defense ministers, the United States agreed to elevate
an Indian military base on the Indian side of Kashmir, defense trade and technology sharing with India to a
reportedly killing and injuring a number of troops. In level commensurate with its closest allies and partners.
the same month, the Indian Army announced that India’s Also, a memorandum was signed concerning logistics
military crossed the Kashmir Line of Control to carry support cooperation.
out a localized attack on a terrorist camp located on the In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United
Pakistani side. In this manner, the Kashmir issue remains States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump,
a concern for both countries. the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic
partnership. In the area of security, they underscored the
(2) Relations with the United States importance of Malabar, and furthermore, the United States
India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations proposed the sale of unmanned aerial systems.
with the United States. The United States is also promoting
engagement with India in line with the expansion of (3) Relations with China
the relationship derived from the economic growth of See Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian
India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such Countries)
as Malabar,10 on a regular basis. In addition, in recent

years, the United States has become one of India’s major (4) Relations with Russia
equipment procurement destinations.11 See Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries)
At the Summit Meeting in January 2015, two leaders
8 Dialogue between the two countries was suspended due to the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, but it resumed following the February 2011 talks by their Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, both
countries affirmed the importance of peacefully settling all outstanding issues between the two countries through dialogue. Pakistan then decided to grant India most-favored nation status.
9 In December 2014, Minister of State for External Affairs Vijay Kumar Singh attributed the postponement of the meeting in August that year to the meeting between Pakistan’s High Commissioner and
Kashmiri leaders of organizations which seek Kashmir’s secession from India. The meeting was ultimately held in March 2015. It is suggested that the meeting in January 2016 was postponed due
to the attack on the Indian Air Force base that occurred in the same month.
10 The Malabar was initially a bilateral naval exercise between the United States and India. Then, Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined Malabar 07-2, and Japan participated in Malabar 09, Malabar
14, Malabar 15, and Malabar 16.
11 According to SIPRI.

2 Pakistan
1 General Situation 2 Military Affairs
Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear
India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is
borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a essential to ensure national security and self-defense.
geopolitically significant and complex position. In In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved
particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across in the proliferation of nuclear-related materials and
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude technologies.12
towards the war against terrorism draws much attention Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the
Chapter 2
from the international community. development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles
While supporting the United States’ war against capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted
terrorism in Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015,
has been struggling as its domestic security situation Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic
has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test
sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in
Although then Prime Minister Sharif conducted peace January 2016. Pakistan also conducted its first test launch
consultations maintaining a policy of dialogue with of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which is capable of
armed forces, in June 2014, the Pakistan Armed Forces delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independent
also launched a military operation against these forces. Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, in January 2017.
Following a school attack in Peshawar in the same Same as the previous year, it conducted another test fire
year, upon revising the Constitution, Pakistan developed of submarine launched cruise missile “Babur” in March
the National Action Plan that includes establishing a 2018. It is deemed that Pakistan is steadily increasing
special military tribunal to try terrorist suspects, and military capabilities of its missiles.13
announced that the Armed Forces would continue with Pakistan is the world’s ninth largest importer of
and step up its mop-up operation. Subsequently, it weapons, and it is pointed out that 70% of its weapons are
appears that terrorist attacks have decreased considerably. imported from China.14 Pakistan purchased four Sword-
However, for example, in January 2016, an attack class frigates from China, while at the same time it has
targeting a university in Charsadda in northeast Peshawar engaged in the joint development of the JF-17 fighter
occurred, killing and injuring many students and others, aircraft with China and has inducted 69 aircraft through
and terrorist attacks have continued to occur sporadically indigenous production. Pakistan is also considered to
since then. have recently conducted negotiations with China to
newly purchase four frigates and eight submarines.
Although Pakistan introduced 18 F-16C/D fighter jets
received from the United States by 2011, due to the recent
degradation of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, it has been
pointed out15 that weapon imports into Pakistan seem to
be on the decline.
12 Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to
light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear
program in Pakistan.
13 Regarding missiles that Pakistan possessed, the following have been indicated:
“Nasr” (Hatf 9): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 70 km
“Ghaznavi” (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290 km
“Shaheen 1” (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750 km
“Ghauri” (Hatf 5): a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 1,300-1,800 km
“Shaheen 3” (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km
“Ababeel”: a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km
“Raad” (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km
“Babur” (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km

3 Relations with Other Countries Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to
immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists
(1) Relations with India in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has
See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-3 ((1) Relations with Pakistan) protested repeatedly.16
The United States, on the other hand, has condemned
(2) Relations with the United States Pakistan for allowing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan
Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in to have safe havens, which pose threats to the United
Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by States. In August 2017,“No partnership can survive a
launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target
in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the U.S. Service members,” President Trump said. That same
efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a month, the government announced the suspension of
“major non-NATO ally” in 2004. $255 million in Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan.
Chapter 2
The two countries conducted strategic dialogues Following this, in January 2018, it also announced the
from 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with suspension of security assistance to Pakistan. These
military support. However, these were suspended after measures will not be lifted until the Pakistani Government
U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of takes decisive action against terrorist groups, including
the then Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted the Afghan Taliban. Attention will be paid to further

by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May action by the two countries moving forward.
2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after
summit meetings were held between then President (3) Relations with China
Obama and then Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, and See Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian
in January 2014, Pakistan and the United States held their Countries)
first strategic dialogue in three years.
16 In November 2011, NATO forces conducted airstrikes on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground
supply route for ISAF. Additionally, it is reported that at an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the Government adopted a resolution
asserting that the U.S. drone attacks were a clear violation of international law.

Section 8 Europe
1 General Situation
With the end of the Cold War, many European countries has sought to further strengthen and expand2 multilateral
now recognize the need to address diverse security frameworks, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time,
challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflict within it is working to contribute to the security and stability of
and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation the international community by proactively participating
of WMDs, and an increasing number of cyberspace in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps
threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized are taken at the national level by reviewing security and
Chapter 2
that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries defense strategies, reforming national defense systems,
had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of and strengthening bilateral3 and multilateral4 defense and
tensions in Ukraine in February 2014, there is a growing security cooperation
need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts Further, in light of changes in the security
in order to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo environment, the downward trend of defense expenditure,
with force in the background and “hybrid warfare.” and the drastically expanding gap of defense expenditure
With regard to international terrorism, the incidents of between the United States and other member states, in
terrorism occurring within European nations, including 2014 NATO member states agreed on the goal to allocate
the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the terror 2% or more of their GDP to national defense spending
attacks in Brussels in March 2016, has made counter- until 2024.5 On this goal, at the NATO Summit held in
terrorism efforts an urgent task.1 In addition, the number May 2017, President Trump strongly urged countries that
of refugees and migrants crossing into Europe since 2015 had not yet done so to increase their national defense
has soared due to turmoil in the Middle East, including spending by more than 2% of their GDP. Also, at a press
the prolonged civil war in Syria. Although there has been conference held after the NATO Summit of July 2018, he
a downward trend in the number recently, ensuring border said he believed their national defense spending should
security remains a challenge. rise to 4% of their GDP.
To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe See Fig. I-2-8-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States)
1 Recent terrorist incidents in Europe include an ISIL sympathizer driving a truck into a crowd of people in Nice, France in July 2016, a truck being driven into a Christmas market in Berlin, Germany
in December 2016, a vehicle being driven into a crowd of pedestrians in London, United Kingdom in March 2017, a suicide bombing in Manchester in central United Kingdom that occurred in May
2017, and a vehicle being driven into a crown of pedestrians in the center of Barcelona, Spain in August 2017. European countries are now reviewing their security systems and tightening immigration
controls, among other measures. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1.
2 NATO has continued expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire European and Atlantic regions. In December 2015, at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting,
Montenegro was invited to begin accession talks. In June 2017, Montenegro acceded to NATO. Currently, two countries—Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—have been approved to participate
in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a program that provides support to future member states in their preparation to enter NATO (conditionally for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The participation
in the MAP of six other countries—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—is currently undecided, as these countries support initiatives for integration into the European
and Atlantic regions through frameworks such as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is a program offered to countries that have the intent to deepen political cooperative relationships
with NATO.
3 For example, the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty between the United Kingdom and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation and the Treaty between the United
Kingdom and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities at a summit meeting held in November 2010. In addition, at the United Kingdom-France Summit
Meeting in January 2018, the defense ministers of both countries agreed on the establishment of the United Kingdom-France Defence Ministerial Council as a permanent forum for discussions
on defense cooperation.
4 For example, in September 2010, the four European countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly deploy transport
aircraft of the respective countries such as C-130 and A-310, as well as approximately 150 aerial refueling aircraft. Luxemburg joined EATC in 2012, Spain in July 2014, and Italy in December 2014.
5 As of August 2018, only five (the United States, Greece, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Latvia) out of 29 member states had achieved the appropriate standard. On the other hand, at a news
conference ahead of the NATO Summit in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the outlook that eight countries would achieve allocating 2% of GDP to national defense
spending in 2018. Furthermore, the declaration adopted at the NATO Summit held in Brussels in July 2018 cited some two-thirds of Allies have national plans in place to spend 2% of theirs
GDP on defense by 2024.

Europe Section 8
Fig. I-2-8-1 Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States
Current members Expansion situation of the member states
NATO (29 countries)
U.K.(Note) France
Germany Italy
Belgium
Netherlands U.S.
Austria Luxembourg Canada
Finland Spain Portugal Norway
Sweden Greece Czech Republic Iceland
Ireland Hungary Poland Turkey
Malta Denmark Slovakia Albania
Cyprus Lithuania Estonia Montenegro
Latvia Romania
Chapter 2
Bulgaria Slovenia
Croatia
Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in May 2004

EU (28 countries) Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the EU in July 2013
(*As of May 2018)
Original NATO members Joined NATO by 1982 Joined NATO in 1999

Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in April 2009
Joined NATO in June 2017
Note: The United Kingdom officially notified the EU of its intention to leave on March 29, 2017.
2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks
1 NATO arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” over Ukraine
Founded for the core task of collective defense among as well as the frequent “unusual fights” of Russian Armed
member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its Force aircraft over the European front, including three
activities to conflict prevention and crisis management Baltic states, NATO and member states reaffirmed the
since the end of the Cold War. threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended
In the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps,
2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept6 for the including expanding its Baltic air policing mission, which
first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next had taken place from 2004 when the three Baltic nations
decade for the creation of a more efficient and flexible joined NATO.7 Additionally, at the NATO Summit held
alliance. The document cites major threats such as in Wales in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint
proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation”
conflict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber- of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP)
attacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows: for enhancing existing readiness forces.8 This plan was
(1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of created in order to deal with the influence of Russia and
the NATO Treaty, the basic treaty of NATO; (2) crisis threats from the Middle East and North Africa. Based on
management including conflict prevention and post- this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in
conflict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and eastern allies, while steps have been taken to significantly
(3) cooperative security including active contribution to improve the readiness of the existing multinational
6 The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949,
1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).
7 NATO has conducted air policing on a rotational basis since 2004. The missions involved patrolling the skies of a single country with four aircraft, but since the crisis in Ukraine, the missions were
enhanced, shifting to patrolling the skies of four countries with 16 aircraft. In September 2015, the missions were reduced to patrols above two countries with eight aircraft. Similar air policing by
NATO has been conducted over Slovenia, Iceland, Albania, and Bulgaria in addition to the three Baltic nations.
8 RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states.
Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint drills among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology.

NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High of missions including counter-terrorism and capacity-
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized building assistance, among others.
within two to three days.9 Furthermore, the declaration Since August 2003, NATO had been leading ISAF in
adopted at the NATO Summit held in Warsaw in July Afghanistan. Its mission was completed in December 2014.
2016 cited Russia’s aggressive actions and terrorism by In place of this mission, since January 2015, NATO has
ISIL as threats. At the meeting, a decision was reached been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose
to deploy four battalions to the three Baltic nations and primary tasks are to provide training, advice, and assistance
Poland on a rotational basis. Specifically, at the defense to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ministers meeting held in October 2016, it was decided (ANDSF). At the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting held
that the battalions would be multinational in nature in November 2017, it was decided to strengthen support in
with more than 20 countries participating, including the Afghanistan, including reinforcements of 3,000 personnel,
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, and the number of essential personnel in Afghanistan
Chapter 2
which would be leading the battalions, and became fully expanded to 16,000 personnel.
operational in 2017. Member states view Russia in varying Besides Afghanistan, NATO is also carrying out
ways due to differences in their geographic distance from missions in Kosovo, Somalia, and other countries.11 Since
Russia and other factors. While measures are being taken October 2008, NATO had dispatched ships from the
to counter Russia’s influence, member states are also permanent maritime forces to the Gulf of Aden and Indian
maintaining opportunities for dialogue with Russia.10 Ocean to take part in Operation Ocean Shield to combat
The declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels piracy, but these activities ended in December 2016.
in July 2018 cited as follows: (1) establishment of the With regard to ISIL, NATO has taken the stance of
Joint Force Command Norfolk in the United States, the emphasizing prevention over intervention. In addition,
headquarters aimed at strengthening defense of Atlantic in the fight against ISIL, the Wales Summit Declaration
Ocean sea lanes that link the United States and Europe, of September 2014 strongly condemned ISIL’s violent
(2) establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling acts and affirmed that NATO would activate its
Command in Ulm, Germany, the headquarters aimed collective defense if any member state were attacked by
at expediting transport of troops and equipment within ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué
or outside Europe (3) arrangement of the Readiness of July 2016 set forth the decision to dispatch early
Initiative called the “Four Thirties” by 2020 to maintain warning and control forces to fight against ISIL, with
a situation in which 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air surveillance and reconnaissance missions taking place
squadrons, and 30 combat vessels can be ready to use since October 2016.
within 30 days or less.
In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force 2 EU
has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February
2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the The EU seeks to enhance its security initiatives under
Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),12
and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation and in June 2016, Global Strategy for the European
Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held Union’s Foreign and Security Policy detailing the EU’s
since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, fundamental approach to foreign and security policy
focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array was adopted by the European Council for the first time
9 The NRF consists of 40,000 personnel, and the VJTF is a multinational force consisting of approximately 20,000 personnel from the NRF (including 5,000 land force personnel).
10 For example, France held talks with President Putin of Russia following the terror attacks in November 2015, and the two sides agreed to exchange intelligence between their military forces. The
United Kingdom, in its strategy document SDSR2015, states that the issues of Ukraine would significantly change the rules-based international order, while it also states that the country would seek
ways to cooperate with Russia on the issues of ISIL topping the list. Germany, too, has stated the need for deterrence and dialogue with Russia in its white paper on national defense published in
July 2016. Additionally, in April 2016, NATO held the dialogue framework of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels for the first time in almost two years, which was followed by meetings in July and
December 2016, March, July, and October 2017, and again in May in 2018.
11 In Kosovo, NATO has carried out its mission within the framework of the Kosovo International Security Force since 1996. Today, NATO provides recommendations, training, and capacity-building
assistance to the Kosovo Security Force. In Somalia, NATO takes part in transport operations and dispatches expert personnel to tactical divisions as support for the AU Somalia Mission.
12 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took
effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict
areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

Europe Section 8
in approximately 10 years. This document calls for member states expressed their support to France.15
initiatives towards enhancing the EU’s internal and In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia
external resilience against threats to order in Eastern conducted by European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
Europe, and the threat of terrorism or other events in the (EUNAVFORMed) due to the surge of refugees and
Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the principles migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.
of rules-based order and democracy. In November 2016, The first phase focusing on the monitoring of smuggling
an agreement was reached on the execution of this and human trafficking networks was completed in
strategy, with priority given to responding to conflict and October 2015. The operation has entered the second phase
crises outside of the EU, capacity building of partners, and involving the search, seizure, and diversion on the high
protecting EU citizens from terrorism and other threats. It seas of vessels suspected of being used for smuggling and
also required assigning priority to necessary capabilities human trafficking. Furthermore, at the Foreign Affairs
and deepening relations among member states. In the same Council meeting held in June 2016, agreement was
Chapter 2
month, the European Commission released an action plan reached to add two tasks to Operation Sophia: training
for reinforcing defense cooperation in Europe, including of the Libyan Navy Coast Guard; and providing support
the establishment of the European Defence Fund. In for implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas.
addition, in December 2017 Permanent Structured Also, in October 2016, the European Border and Coast
Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense Guard was established, with its own equipment and at

cooperation framework participated by 25 countries least 1,500 personnel ready at any time for emergency
among the member countries. Under this framework, the deployment in order to crack down on the inflow of
participating countries finance joint projects including refugees and immigrants.
joint development of equipment and infrastructure that In June 2016, the United Kingdom conducted a
will contribute to developing readiness. It is expected that national referendum to decide whether or not the country
the framework would strengthen the EU’s defense, so its should leave the EU. Following the victory of the pro-
future movements will be the subject of attention. Brexit camp, the United Kingdom gave official notice in
In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has March 2017 to the EU of its intention to exit the EU. In
condemned the military measures of Russia and December 2017, the EU and the United Kingdom reached
implemented economic sanctions against Russia.13 In a basic agreement on the terms of the United Kingdom’s
addition, to support the economic and political reforms exit from the EU, and the negotiations moved into the
in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in non- “second phase,” including trade negotiations. In March
military affairs, including the provision of large-scale 2018, the EU and the United Kingdom tentatively agreed
financial assistance to Ukraine. on the introduction of a “transition period” of about one
To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds year and nine months to avoid an upheaval because of the
to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. economic environment following the United Kingdom’s
Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such exit from the EU.
as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacity- In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the
building assistance in counter-terrorism measures, among first time in Macedonia by using NATO’s equipment and
other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed
request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the to the operations in crisis management and maintenance
EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance of peace and order16 by, for example, sending troops to
clause”14 stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the
13 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, along with asset freezes and travel bans, and extends its expiry date every six months.
14 Article 42, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual defense obligation, where if a EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member
states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
15 On November 17, 2015 after the terror attacks, then Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian of France requested the application of the “mutual assistance clause” at the EU Foreign Affairs Council
meeting. The application was agreed upon unanimously. Based on the application of the clause, France requested other EU member states to: (1) contribute to counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and
Syria; and (2) help reduce the military burden of France by contributing to France’s counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Central Africa, and other areas. Nevertheless, the extent of cooperation has
remained relatively small, except for that from the United Kingdom and Germany.
16 These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: (1) humanitarian assistance and rescue mission; (2) peacekeeping mission; and (3) combat mission in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Congo, Chad, Mali, and Central Africa. For example, in 3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU
January 2014, the EU decided to dispatch security forces
to Central Africa, where the situation had been of constant Advancements have been seen in cooperation between
tumult. The forces commenced operations in April 2014 NATO and the EU. At the NATO Summit held in July
and completed its mission by March 2015. In the same 2016, a joint declaration was released citing fields which
month, the EU launched the European Union’s Military NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation, and at
Advisory Mission (EUMAM) to support preparations the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting and the EU Council
for security sector reform in Central Africa. Since July meeting in December 2016, 42 recommendations in
2016, the European Union’s Training Mission (EUTM) seven fields were adopted for implementing the joint
has succeeded the mission, which continues to modernize declaration. At the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting
military forces in Central Africa. Also, the EU has been in December 2017, 32 cooperation items in three fields
conducting Operation Atalanta, the first maritime mission were added. Based on these recommendations, NATO’s
Chapter 2
to combat piracy off the Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia
since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and are now mutually collaborating in the Mediterranean,
aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in the and NATO and the EU are also advancing cooperation
area and conduct surveillance in these waters.17 in fields of responding to hybrid threats, cybersecurity,
and capacity development.
3 Security / Defense Policies of European Countries
1 The United Kingdom
After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom,

perceiving that there is no direct military threat
against the country, has advanced national defense
reform with particular focus on improving its overseas
deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal
with new threats such as international terrorism and
proliferation of WMDs.
Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the
Cameron administration released the National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS-
SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization in the Middle
East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis in Ukraine, HMS Queen Elizabeth, U.K.’s new class of aircraft carrier commissioned in December 2017
[Photo: Royal Navy]
and the threat posed by cyber-attacks. Recognizing that
the United Kingdom confronts threats from both states
and non-state actors, the NSS-SDSR2015 sets out the the rules-based international order. While the previous
challenges that the United Kingdom should address in SDSR2010 committed to cutting the troop strength,
the coming decade as follows: terrorism and extremism; reducing key equipment, and reviewing procurement
resurgence of state-based threats; technological plans due to pressure to decrease defense spending,18 the
developments including cyber threats; and the erosion of NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the defense spending
17 To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission-Somalia” and “European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia,” in addition to Operation
Atalanta. Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial system capabilities.
18 The SDSR2010 committed to decreasing defense spending by 8% by FY2014, including at least 4.3 billion pounds in non-front line savings, excluding spending for operations such as in Afghanistan.
The SDSR2010 decided to decrease, by 2015, Royal Navy personnel by 5,000, Army personnel by 7,000, and Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, along with reduction of the holdings of main battle
tanks by 40%. In the Army realignment plan “Army 2020” released later in July 2013, the United Kingdom was to reduce the Army’s active military personnel from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020, while
increasing reservists from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018.

Europe Section 8
cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force the South China Sea and making it clear that the Royal
in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of Navy has a right to do that. In early May 2018, in order
expanded threats.19 The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the to contribute to international efforts to monitor prohibited
United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the trading at sea by North Korea, the HMS Sutherland
international community, and promote procurement of conducted information gathering activities regarding
equipment and formation of units with high readiness and ships suspected of conducting “ship-to-ship transfers” in
mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism the waters surrounding Japan. Further, in April 2018, the
and cyber security.20 In December 2017, the aircraft Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom announced
carrier Queen Elizabeth was put into commission. that the Royal Navy’s landing ship HMS Albion, along
Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has with the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll in the latter half
conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it of 2018, would be dispatched to the Asia-Pacific region.
carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial vehicles, The deployment of these three ships means that the Royal
Chapter 2
provides education and training to forces engaged in Navy would have an almost unbroken presence in the
ground warfare such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Asia-Pacific region throughout 2018.
Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan In March 2017, the United Kingdom officially
Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian informed the EU of its intention to leave the union. While
assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the the United Kingdom will continue to be a NATO member

terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in state, some have noted that the United Kingdom’s exit
December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from from the EU would reduce the EU’s military capacity by
Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the around one-fourth. Therefore, attention will be given to
day after the Parliament gave its approval.21 various trends, including the EU’s security initiatives and
With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, the NSS- relations with NATO.
SDSR2015 presents the view that the region offers
significant economic opportunities for the United 2 France
Kingdom, and has considerable influence on the future
integrity and credibility of the rules-based international Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on
order. It then expresses commitment to attaching maintaining independence of its defense policies, while
importance to working with the United Kingdom’s having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and
security partners including Japan. In particular, it capability in Europe. It has worked on the development
considers Japan as the United Kingdom’s closest security of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating
partner in Asia. In the National Security Capability military bases, dealing with operational requirements to
Review (NSCR) issued in March 2018 as well, Japan strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing
and the ROK are considered to be strong partners for its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment
security, prosperity, and working on global issues. Based required in the future.
on this view, in this region, the United Kingdom conducts The Defence and National Security Strategic
Operation Patwin, a natural disaster assistance mission Review announced by the Macron administration in
to the Philippines, participates in the multilateral joint October 2017 states that the threats that France faces,
exercise RIMPAC, and conducts goodwill trainings including domestic terrorism, the refugee issue, and
with Japan.22 In addition, in February 2018, the Rt Hon the Ukraine crisis, are diversifying, increasing in
Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Defense of the complexity, and rapidly becoming more violent, and
United Kingdom clearly referenced that the British Royal amidst the increasingly multipolar international system,
Navy Frigate HMS Sutherland would be sailing through competition is intensifying among major military powers
19 The “NSS-SDSR2015” will maintain the size of the Armed Forces personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers,
introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fleet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure
amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending.
20 The NSS-SDSR2015 is to add two Typhoon squadrons, establish a F-35 squadron capable of operating from new aircraft carriers, create two strike brigades of up to 5,000 personnel, and have a
system that can deploy an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel overseas by 2025.
21 Since 2014 and as of February 2018, the United Kingdom has conducted over 1,600 aerial bombings, held training for over 60,000 Iraqi military soldiers, and dispatched over 1,400 United Kingdom
military personnel.
22 From October to November 2016, Typhoon fighters visited Japan to take part in Japan-U.K. joint exercises. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-4 regarding the maritime security strategy of the United
Kingdom. In April 2018, the British Navy frigate HMS Sutherland conducted a joint exercise with JMSDF, including JS DD SUZUNAMI.

and the danger of escalation is growing. Under these frigate Vendémiaire make a port call in Japan and conduct
conditions, France will continue to fulfill its duties within joint exercises with the MSDF, and has proactively
NATO including for collective defense and contributing organized the multilateral exercises Exercise Croix du
to security, and will take a leading role in efforts to Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific.
strengthen the EU’s defense. In addition, in the Military
Planning Law for 2019-2025 announced in February 3 Germany
2018, a total of approximately 300 billion euros will be
allocated for defense expenditure by 2025, and there was While Germany has been implementing a large-scale
confirmation of President Macron’s commitment to the reduction of its military personnel since the end of the
goal of allocating 2% of France’s GDP to its defense Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch
budget by 2025. of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany
France has been conducting airstrikes against has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable
Chapter 2
ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing
September 2015.23 Following the terror attacks in Paris conflict prevention and risk management in the context of
in November 2015, France declared a state of emergency multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and
domestically, and decided to deploy 10,000 military the UN. However, following a worsening in the security
personnel to maintain domestic security and suspend environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and
troop reductions. Outside of France, the country enhanced announced that it would increase military personnel by
its airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and deployed mobile around 7,000 by 2023.24
units including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle The country’s defense white paper released in July
to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, France has 2016 for the first time in about 10 years explains that
continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Germany’s security environment has grown more complex
Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing
assistance for refugees. specific threats such as international terrorism, cyber-
Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, attacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and
it places importance on its commitment to the region. The immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany
Strategic Review issued in October 2017 points out the would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation
potential for a threat to benefits, such as the freedom of and cross-government approaches, while striving to
navigation, due to the worsening strategic situation in the realize rules-based international order. Furthermore,
Asia-Pacific region, and clearly states that France will with regard to the number of military personnel, the
maintain its stance of protecting its sovereignty of its white paper notes that although an upper limit was in
overseas prefectures and territories in the Pacific Ocean place following the end of the Cold War and Germany
and the Indian Ocean. Further, France has indicated its has continually worked to reduce personnel, it would
policy to continue strengthening its worldwide partnership shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform regular
network, from Africa to the Middle East to the Asia- reviews of its military force plan to adjust the number of
Pacific region. In May 2018, during his visit to Australia, personnel flexibly.
President Macron stated that the Paris-Delhi-Canberra In Iraq, Germany has thus far provided education
axis is absolutely key for the Indian-Pacific region. In and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga,
addition, in February 2018, France had the Floréal class supplied equipment and ammunition, extended financial
23 As of January 2018, France has mobilized 1,100 personnel, 10 Rafale fighters, 1 frigate, among other assets.
24 Germany decreased its military personnel strength which was once more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. In 2016, personnel were cut further back to 177,000.
However, since July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and
NATO was constitutional, Germany has gradually expanded dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities
in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Europe Section 8
assistance for humanitarian assistance, as well as With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany
conducted training of Kurdish troops in Germany. In considers it to be important from the standpoint of its
December 2015, following the terror attacks in Paris in large population and economic strength, and expresses the
November 2015, the Cabinet approved plans to provide view that the region plays a central role in international
logistics support to the Coalition that is conducting politics, while on the other hand, the region faces issues
counter-ISIL military operations. This expanded German such as being home to two-thirds of the world’s poor.
engagement in counter-ISIL military operations, albeit Germany’s military engagement in the region is limited
the commitment is limited to logistics support missions, to disaster relief missions and goodwill visits, and does
such as reconnaissance and aerial refueling.25 not include joint training.
Chapter 2
25 The decision was made on the following commitment during the 12-month period from early January to end of December 2016: (1) dispatch the frigate Augsburg to escort the French aircraft carrier
Charles de Gaulle; (2) deploy Tornado fighters (up to six fighters) and aerial refueling aircraft to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; and (3) deploy up to 1,200 personnel to areas of ISIL’s operations in Syria,
their airspace, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea to collect intelligence using reconnaissance satellites and share this intelligence with relevant countries. This decision also
added the dispatch of personnel to NATO’s AWACS (airborne warning and control system) unit to the mission. Furthermore, Germany strives to reduce the operational burden of France by increasing
the number of German personnel participating in the UN PKO in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA]) and training personnel in Iraq.

Chapter
3 Issues in the International
Community
Section 1 Trend in International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts
1 General Situation
In a global security environment, there is a growing risk Furthermore, in developed countries, such as
that unrest or a security problem in a single country or the United States and European countries, there has
region could immediately develop into a destabilizing been an increasing number of cases of young people
factor that could affect the entire international community. who are inspired by the extreme ideology spread by
Chapter 3
The conflicts occurring in recent years in various international terrorist organizations against the backdrop
parts of the world are not necessarily of the same nature. of dissatisfaction over estrangement from society,
In addition to an array of problems, which is at the root discrimination, poverty, and disparities, resulting in
of conflicts, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and joining the international terrorist organizations as fighters
Issues in the International Community
resources, the impacts of climate change and other global or conducting “homegrown” terrorism activities in their
issues have also been suggested as causes of conflicts.1 home countries.
There are also cases where the political turmoil Regarding Japan, during the terrorist incident
accompanying regime change leads to conflicts between regarding the murder of Japanese nationals in Syria in
ethnic groups, religious sects, or political factions that early 2015, ISIL explicitly announced that Japanese
can become prolonged against a background of public nationals would be the targets of terrorist attacks. ISIL
dissatisfaction over economic and social disparities and/ also issued a statement claiming responsibility for the
or high unemployment rates. The human rights violations, murder of Japanese in Bangladesh in October of the
refugees, hunger, poverty, and other consequences of same year, and later referred to the incident in its official
conflicts can have impacts on not only the parties of
the conflicts but also a wider area. States with weak
KEY WORD
governance are also finding it difficult to tackle risks such
as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. “Homegrown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism
Furthermore, in the Middle East and Africa, there
are prominent cases where power vacuums in some “Homegrown” terrorism in which residents are inspired by the
extremism espoused by Al Qaeda or ISIL and conduct terrorist attacks
states with political instability and weak governance
at home has become a threat in European countries and the United
have become hotbeds of the activities of international
States. In particular, there are concerns that their nationals would
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL. accumulate combat training and combat experience in conflict-torn
These organizations are leveraging inadequate border regions such as Iraq and Syria, become indoctrinated into extremism,
controls to expand and step up their operations and then return to their countries and conduct terrorist attacks.
across national borders while securing the personnel, In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism is also seen as a threat
because it is difficult to detect signs in advance and prevent it. “Lone-
weapons, and drugs that serve as a source of funding.
wolf” terrorism is planned and committed by individuals or groups who
There also exists organizations that have the ability to
become influenced by extremist ideology through information found on
carry out terrorist acts in places far from their bases, the Internet and elsewhere, without having any official relations with
continuing to pose imminent security challenges to the terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL.
international community.
1 The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as one of key factors that will shape the future security environment. It
claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water scarcity, sharp increases in food costs, and other effects.

Trend in International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts Section 1
Fig. I-3-1-1 List of Peacekeeping Operations
13
10
12
9
11
8
14 1
6
2 4
7 5
3
Chapter 3
Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of May 2018).

Africa Middle East
Mission Date Established Mission Date Established
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
1 Apr 1991 8 May 1948
Western Sahara (MINURSO) (UNTSO)
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation United Nations Disengagement Observer
2 Jul 2007 9 Jun 1974
in Darfur (UNAMID) Force (UNDOF)
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
3 Jul 2010 10 Mar 1978
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (UNIFIL)
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
4 Jun 2011
(UNISFA) Asia
United Nations Mission in the Republic of
5 Jul 2011 Mission Date Established
South Sudan (UNMISS)
United Nations Military Observer Group in
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 11 Jan 1949
6 Apr 2013 India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
7 Europe/CIS
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic Apr 2014
(MINUSCA)
Mission Date Established
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
12 Mar 1964
(UNFICYP)
United Nations Interim Administration Mission
13 Jun 1999
in Kosovo (UNMIK)
The Americas
Mission Date Established
United Nations Mission for Justice Support
14 Oct 2017
in Haiti (MINUJSTH)

bulletin when it listed Japanese nationals as their targets. In addition to the UN PKO framework, multinational
Bearing in mind the terror attack at a restaurant in Dhaka, forces and regional organizations authorized by the UN
Bangladesh in July 2016, we Japanese must face up to Security Council have engaged in conflict prevention,
the threat of international terrorism as our own problem.2 peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In Africa, regional
It has become increasingly important that the organizations such as the African Union (AU)4 undertake
international community should examine the shape their activities based on UN Security Council resolutions,
of tailored international frameworks and involvement and their activities are sometimes handed over to UN
measures, and seek out appropriate responses to these PKOs later. The international community also offers
complicated and diverse destabilizing factors. recommendations and training assistance and supplies
Amid these situations, in recent years, mandates equipment, from a long-term perspective, prompting
of the UN PKO3 have come to include a wide range African nations self-help efforts to enhance local
of areas, including not only traditional roles like the government organizations and improve the capabilities
monitoring of a ceasefire or military withdrawal but also of their military and security organizations.
activities by civilians and police such as the monitoring Concerning international counterterrorism measures,
of disarmament, security sector reform, the monitoring of the proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained
elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian momentum while its perpetrators are increasingly diversified,
assistance (e.g., return of refugees to their homeland). making it even more difficult to prevent terrorist attacks. For
Chapter 3
This also suggest that the importance of the roles related this reason, international cooperation on counterterrorism
to the protection of civilians and peace-building, in measures has become even more important. Currently, the
particular, has been growing. international community as a whole is taking various steps,
See Fig. I-3-1-1 (List of Peacekeeping Operations) including military means as well as measures to cut off the
funding sources for terrorist organizations and prevent the

international movement of terrorists.5
2 Trends surrounding International Terrorism
destabilized the situation there. Beginning in January

Trends in ISIL-related International Terrorist
1 Organizations 2014, they invaded northern Iraq and in June took control
of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Following
(1) Activities in Iraq and Syria this, ISIL unilaterally declared the establishment of the
The objective of ISIL as an organization is to outright “Islamic State” with its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
reject the conventional system of national governance in as “caliph,”6 and effectively controlled certain areas
the region and claim the establishment of the caliphate spanning Iraq and Syria through its well-developed
based on its own interpretation of Sharia law and the organizational structure and the issue of its own currency.
protection of Sunni Muslims. Participating in ISIL are members from the former
ISIL gained strength in Syria from 2013 on by Iraqi regime and former Iraqi military officers and soldiers,
seizing the opportunity in Syria when clashes between as well as foreign fighters who migrated to Iraq and Syria
the government and rebel forces occurred in 2011 and in response to calls from ISIL. ISIL used social media
2 The seventh issue of the ISIL propaganda magazine Dabiq published in February 2015 included descriptions of the murder of two Japanese nationals in Syria and renewed a call for terror attacks on
Japanese nationals and interests. Furthermore, the 11th issue (published in September 2015) called for terror attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The 12th issue
(published in November 2015) described the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh and warned again that Japanese nationals and Japanese interests would be the targets of terror attacks.
3 As of the end of April 2018, 14 UN PKOs were operating globally, including about 89,905 military and police personnel and about 15,000 civilian personnel (as of the end of August 2017) from 124
countries. Out of these UN PKOs, there were 10 operations in the Middle East and Africa. (See Fig. I -3-1-1)
4 The world’s largest regional organization comprised of 55 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 by reorganizing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (established in May
1963). Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and
stability in Africa. In January 2017, the AU General Assembly approved the accession of Morocco, the only non-member in Africa.
5 In September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. The resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the
purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories of any
individual about whom that state has credible information that demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for the purpose of
participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to effectively implement the established international framework
for the freezing of terrorists’ assets.
6 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary
dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title.

(2) Progress in Military Operations against ISIL and the

Current Situations of ISIL
In response to the expansion of ISIL’s reach since January
2014, the Coalition forces led by the United States
have been conducting air strikes in Iraq and Syria since
August and September of the same year respectively.10
The coalition forces have also engaged in education and
training of local forces, supply of weapons, and rescue of
hostages by the special forces.
In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (including
paramilitary troops and the police, in addition to Iraqi
U.S. Marine Corps personnel conducting training on the methods of safe and final disposal of government forces) and the Peshmerga, the military
IEDs in Iraq [Photo: U.S. Marine Corps]
organ of the KRG, cooperated with the Coalition to
recapture key cities in Iraq including Kirkuk,11 Ramadi,12
and other elements of cyberspace under a sophisticated and Fallujah. In particular, in July 2017, the Iraqi Security
public relations strategy to issue propaganda for the Forces recaptured Mosul which is important as the symbol
organization, recruit fighters and call for terrorist acts. As of the expansion of ISIL’s influence. Subsequently, the
Chapter 3
a result, they appear to have gained many supporters, and ISIL strongholds remaining in northern and western
it has been noted that more than 40,000 foreign fighters Iraq such as Tal Afar, Hawija, Al-Qaim and Rawa were
actually travelled to Iraq and Syria. also recaptured, and the Iraqi Government announced in
As for obtaining weapons and ammunition, ISIL December 2017 that all Iraqi territory had been liberated

is believed to engage in looting in addition to utilizing from ISIL.
illegal trafficking networks. In particular, when they In Syria, meanwhile, in addition to air strikes by
invaded northern Iraq in the first half of 2014, they the Coalition, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
managed to pillage a variety of equipment from the Iraqi composed mainly of local Kurd and Arab forces, have
military facilities that they occupied. Furthermore, it conducted operations against ISIL in northern Syria with
has been noted that ISIL has also begun producing and support from the United States and others. As the result,
modifying weapons. It has been pointed out that they are in October 2017, they recaptured Raqqa, the putative
manufacturing IEDs from chemicals obtained through capital of “Islamic State,” and also conquered Syria’s
legal channels and using them in suicide bombings.7 It largest oil field, situated in Deir Ezzor in eastern Syria.
has also been confirmed that they are using tactics such Russia launched its military operation in Syria
as modifying small commercial drones so that they can in September 2015 with the purpose of the survival of
carry hand grenades and the like and attacking enemy the Assad administration and protection of Russian
vehicles by dropping bombs loaded on them.8 Regarding bases in Syria.13 It carried out air strikes and launched
the use of drones, it has been noted that ISIL attempted to cruise missiles from the sea, dropped precision satellite-
expand the damage by using camera-equipped drones to guided bombs from strategic bombers, and temporarily
skillfully guide suicide-attack vehicles.9 It is believed that deployed the aircraft career Admiral Kuznetsov to
ISIL is using these new tactics in recent fighting. conduct air strikes.14 With this support from Russia,
the Assad administration conquered ISIL strongholds,
7 It has been noted regarding the IEDs that ISIL used between July 2014 and February 2016 that parts and components manufactured and/or exported by approximately 50 firms in 20 countries fell
into the hands of ISIL, who used them within a year after it acquired them.
8 ISIL has published videos in which it attacks tanks and the like with explosives dropped from drones. It has been noted that the purpose is to destroy some vehicles and force them out of the frontlines
through such attacks.
9 It has been noted that ISIL has been amplifying the effect of its attacks by using drones to find targets from the air and providing instructions to suicide bombers at the ready on the ground and
instructing optimal paths for them.
10 As of August 2017, the Coalition had conducted 13,331 and 11,235 air raids in Iraq and Syria respectively.
11 The Peshmerga remained stationed in Kirkuk after recapturing it from ISIL and effectively controlled it. However, when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) implemented a referendum on
independence in September 2017, the Iraqi Government dispatched security forces and subdued the city the following month.
12 After the recapture, new problems have emerged, including confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis.
13 Tartus is the only Russian naval base facing the Mediterranean Sea in Syria, reportedly having a dockyard that can provide fuel and food to and repair military ships.
14 Regarding the series of military activities by Russia, it has been noted that they have been displaying their military capabilities and to demonstrate those capabilities through operations, while others
have noted that the target of the military operations is not ISIL but the opposition forces confronting the Assad administration.

citizens in Baghdad and Damascus, respective capitals of

Iraq and Syria, and elsewhere in both countries. In other
words, the threat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria has not been
eliminated completely. It is important for the international
community to continue to engage towards the stability
of the two states in order to prevent ISIL forces from
expanding again.
(3) Dispersion beyond Iraq and Syria

After ISIL declared the establishment of the “Islamic
State,” multiple “provinces” have been established
mainly in southern and eastern Syria such as Palmyra outside of Iraq and Syria as the “Islamic State” territories
and Deir Ezzor. In December 2017, Russia declared (see figure), and these “provinces” have been conducting
that Syria’s entire territory had been liberated from ISIL terrorist acts in each place. On the Sinai Peninsula in
and announced that it would pull out some of its troops Egypt, an organization claiming to be the Islamic State-
deployed in Syria while maintaining its bases there. Sinai Province has been conducting a series of terrorist
It is believed that the number of ISIL fighters and acts against the military and police as well as Christians.16
Chapter 3
ISIL revenue have declined significantly as a result of the In Afghanistan, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province has
progress in these operations against ISIL. At the same conducted sporadic terrorist acts in its capital Kabul and
time, it is believed that approximately 3,000 ISIL fighters elsewhere.17 Terrorist attacks claimed by ISIL “provinces”
remain in hiding, mainly near the Iraq-Syria border,15 who have also been confirmed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya
are conducting terrorist acts against security forces and and elsewhere. It is believed that the threat of terrorist
Fig. I-3-1-2 Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda
(AQIM) the Levant (ISIL)
Taliban
Hezbollah
Several ISIL states
Syria
Hamas Lebanon Afghanistan
Iraq
Palestine ISIL Khorasan
Province Pakistan
Algeria Libya Egypt
Saudi Arabia
ISIL Algeria Province
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Mali ISIL Sinai Province
Yemen Multiple ISIL

provinces
Multiple ISIL provinces
Nigeria
Somalia
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa ISIL West Africa Province

al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) (Boko Haram)
: ISIL affiliated group Al-Shabaab (AS)

: Al-Qaeda affiliated group
: Group with suggested involvement with Al-Qaeda
Source: Worldwide Threat Assessment 2018 and country-specific reports on terrorism
: Other major Islamic extremist terrorist groups for 2017 prepared by the U.S. State Department.
15 In a December 2017 tweet, the spokesperson for the Coalition expressed the understanding that the number of ISIL’s foreign fighters remaining in Iraq and Syria was under 3,000.
16 For example, suicide bombing and shooting attacks aimed at police vehicles occurred in September 2017 on the Sinai Peninsula, for which ISIL-Sinai Province claimed responsibility.
17 For example, three suicide bombing attacks occurred in December 2017 at a Shiite cultural facility in Kabul, for which ISIL-Khorasan Province claimed responsibility.

acts by such organizations will continue in the future. (4) Foreign Fighters
Furthermore, organizations claiming to be ISIL in Many foreign fighters flowed into Iraq and Syria with the
countries where no “provinces” have been established rise of ISIL since 2014. However, as the strength of ISIL
exist and have conducted terrorist attacks targeting ebbed, it is believed that that number of foreign fighters
security forces and citizens. Particularly in the travelling to Iraq and Syria is declining.19
Philippines, in May 2017, an Abu Sayyaf Group (ASF) Meanwhile, a major concern has been raised that
faction and the Maute group pleading allegiance to ISIL foreign fighters acquiring combat training and combat
occupied part of the city of Marawi on the island of experience in Iraq and Syria would return to their
Mindanao. The Philippine Government declared martial countries and conduct terrorist attacks there. It is believed
law and launched military operations, and the fighting that at least 5,600 foreign fighters had returned from Iraq
continued for around five months. In October of the and Syria to their home countries by October 2017.20
same year, the Philippine Government took control of Amid such circumstances, it has been pointed out that
Marawi and declared an end of the fighting. However, the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous attacks in
the search for individuals connected to the organizations Paris in November 2015 included ones who mingled with
supporting ISIL continues and security has yet to be refugees and immigrants in entering Europe.21
firmly established. Elsewhere, there is concern that Like the terrorist act that occurred in Belgium in
the threat posed by ISIL is permeating Southeast Asia August of the same year, there is also the possibility
Chapter 3
with the existence of organizations supporting ISIL in that ISIL has made foreign fighters return to their home
Indonesia for one.18 countries where they are ordered to conduct terrorist
attacks.22 The international community is required to
continue to take various initiatives going forward in order

to prevent such terrorist acts by foreign fighters.
Commentary Diffusion of the ISIL threat COLUMN

While ISIL, which rapidly emerged in Iraq and Syria from 2014, has considerably lost influence in these countries recently, related
organizations operating in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions continue to actively engage in terrorist efforts and there are also
organizations in Southeast Asia that claim allegiance to ISIL.
Furthermore, ISIL continues to encourage terrorism in areas outside of Iraq and Syria with propaganda over the Internet and
other efforts. Individuals and groups inspired by ISIL’s thinking have recently conducted terrorist attacks in Western countries. ISIL
supporters in various regions worldwide might carry out terrorist attacks considering encouragement by ISIL in its journals and other
materials to target large-scale outdoor gathering and other venues with large numbers of people using vehicles, knives, and other
readily available means. More than 5,600 fighters with battle experience in Iraq and Syria have returned to their home countries,
and it is thought that these fighters returned to 33 countries. Terrorist threats have been diffused worldwide via returning fighters.
The international community hence needs to closely cooperate and promptly implement effective countermeasures of the
ongoing threat of terrorism by ISIL-related organizations and ISIL supporters in various regions around the world.
18 In Indonesia, a series of bombing and shooting attacks occurred in Jakarta in January 2016, and an organization supporting ISIL claimed responsibility. It is also believed that Indonesians and
Malaysians participated in an organization supporting ISIL in the fighting in the city of Marawi.
19 In an October 2017 press conference, the spokesperson for the Coalition expressed the understanding that there were virtually no foreign fighters flowing into Iraq and Syria at the time.
20 According to the Soufan Center, the number of foreign fighters returning to their home countries are approximately 800 in Tunisia, 760 in Saudi Arabia, 425 in the United Kingdom, approximately 300
in Germany, 271 in France, and so on.
21 Since the series of terror attacks in Paris, the French forces deployed 10,000 troops in France to guard domestic transportation systems, tourist spots, and the like. Although the number of troops
was reduced to 7,000, they continue security activities domestically and otherwise engage in protecting the public.
22 The perpetrator is reported to have received military training in Syria in May 2015, then instructed by ISIL to return to Europe to conduct the terrorist act.

(4) Al-Shabaab
Trends in Al Qaeda-related International Terrorist
2 Organizations “Al-Shabaab,” a Sunni extremist organization based in
Somalia, mainly conducts terrorist acts against Somali
(1) Al Qaeda military forces and police as well as the African Union
With regard to Al Qaeda, which is believed to have Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the peacekeeping forces
directed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, it is believed to have stationed for the purpose of stabilizing the situation
been weakened as the group’s previous leader Osama in Somalia after the civil war. In September 2017,
Bin Laden as well as many executives were killed in U.S. suicide bombing and shooting attacks against Somali
operations. However, it is considered that it continues military bases occurred, for which Al-Shabaab claimed
its activities as a core organization such as issuing responsibility. The Somali authorities concluded that the
instructions and recommendations to its affiliates in car-bomb attacks in December of the same year in which
North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, its current more than 500 people were reportedly killed was carried
leader Zawahiri has repeatedly issued statements calling out by Al-Shabaab, although no one claimed responsibility
for terrorist acts against the West.23 The possibility of Al for it. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab has conducted terrorist
Qaeda attacks has not disappeared. acts in Kenya and Djibouti, posing threat not only to
Somalia but also to its neighboring countries.
(2) Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Chapter 3
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Sunni 3 Trends of Other International Terrorist Organizations
extremist organization based in Yemen, is mainly active
in south Yemen, continuing their fight against the Yemeni (1) Taliban
security forces and the opposition insurgent group Houthis. The Taliban is an organization based in Afghanistan
The United States has continued air strikes using UAVs24 with the objective of establishing a state governed by
and killed many AQAP leaders. However, AQAP has taken Sharia law. Its forces were diminished significantly
advantage of the instability in Yemen to maintain a certain for a while by the mop-up operations launched by the
level of force there. It also spreads extreme ideology United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the
utilizing propaganda videos and magazines. United States. However, with the end of the mission of
the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force
(3) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (ISAF) in December 2014, the Taliban has been stepping
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),25 a Sunni up its offensive again and expanding the control areas
extremist organization based in Algeria and also active in within Afghanistan.26 It also continues suicide attacks
Mali, Tunisia, and Libya has mainly conducted terrorist and shootings as well as rocket attacks targeting the
attacks and kidnapping against Algerian security forces government and foreigners.
and Europeans and U.S. nationals. Although the strength The Taliban held its first peace talks with the Afghan
of AQIM has declined due to the French-led military Government in July 2015. However, it has hardened its
intervention that started in 2013, the group is still confrontational posture since then and has not shown a
continuing its terror attacks in Algeria and Mali, while willingness to take part in peace talks even after a new
organizations under the AQIM umbrella are instigating supreme leader was appointed in May 2016.27
terrorist attacks in states such as Burkina Faso and Mali.
23 Recently, it published a statement criticizing the Trump administration in the United States for its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and calling on Muslims to attack the interests of the
United States and its allies.
24 In 2017, the U.S. Central Command announced that it conducted more than 120 air raids in Yemen in one year.
25 The January 2013 terrorist attack in Algeria resulting in victims of Japanese nationals is believed to have been executed by the “Masked Brigade,” which had broken away from AQIM. In 2015, the
Brigade merged with other organizations to form “Al-Murabitoun” and returned to the AQIM fold. Furthermore, in 2017, this merged with yet other organizations to form Jama Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin (JNIM; literally, protector of Islam and Muslims).
26 After occupying Kunduz in the northeast for several days in September 2015, the Taliban has been expanding its area of control, mainly in the north and south.
27 In July 2015, the death of Mullah Mohammad Omar, founder of the Taliban and its former supreme leader, was confirmed. Akhtar Mansour was elected as supreme leader but died in in May 2016
in an air raid by U.S. forces using a drone. Hibatullah Akhundzada, Mansur’s deputy, succeeded him as supreme leader.

(2) Boko Haram have occurred. The terrorist act in November 2017 when a
In Nigeria, Boko Haram, a Sunni extremist organization, truck ran through a bicycle path in New York is considered
has repeatedly carried out terror attacks targeting mainly a “lone-wolf” terrorist act. ISIL and Al Qaeda have been
citizens. It is believed that its influence is declining due using propaganda magazines and other means to introduce
to the mop-up operations that the Nigerian military is specific methods for terrorist acts to supporters who want
mounting together with neighboring countries. However, to conduct such “lone-wolf” terrorist acts. For example,
it continues its activities, mainly in northeast Nigeria, ISIL gives detailed examples of specific methods and
and a suicide bomb attack that is believed to have been targets for terrorist acts using knives and vehicles in its
conducted by Boko Haram occurred at a mosque in the magazine Rumiyah. Al Qaeda also has used its magazine
northeast in January 2018. to publish how to make a bomb using material close at
hand. “Lone-wolf” terrorism is also seen as a threat to the
4 The Threat of “Home-grown” Terrorism international community because it is difficult to detect
signs in advance and prevent it.
As Al Qaeda and ISIL call for terrorism attacks around More recently, terrorist acts have been confirmed
the world, “home-grown” terrorism, in which residents that are conducted in an organized manner by fighters
are inspired by the extremism espoused by these sent in by terrorist organizations or by local individuals
organizations and conduct terrorist attacks at home, or organizations under instructions from terrorist
Chapter 3
continues to be a threat. organizations. These incidents indicate that the forms
In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism, planned and of terrorist acts are becoming diversified and that the
committed by individuals or small groups who do not capacity of terrorist organizations to execute operations
have any official relations with international terrorist is improving, raising concern that the threat of terrorism

organizations but have become influenced in some way, is growing.
3 Current Situation of Regional Conﬂicts and the International Response (mainly in the Middle East and Africa)
1 Situation in Syria same year, an agreement was reached on the creation of

“safe zones” in four locations within Syria where fighting
The violent clashes in Syria since March 2011 pits four and air strikes would be forbidden while Russia, Turkey,
parties, the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, and Iran would dispatch troops to Syria to monitor the
Islamic extremist forces, and Kurdish forces against each ceasefire. Later, in January 2018, the Syrian National
other. However, government forces have gained the upper Dialogue Congress was held in Sochi, Russia, where
hand overall, as they recaptured Aleppo, which was once it was agreed to establish a constitutional committee
a stronghold of rebel forces, in December 2016 with towards the enactment of a new constitution. However,
support from Russia. the main opposition forces and Kurdish forces did not
Against this backdrop, UN Security Council participate in the congress. It will draw attention whether
Resolution 225428 adopted in December 2015 established talks towards the enactment of a new constitution will
a road map for the peace process, and peace talks have make progress.
been taking place since January 2016 between the In this manner, various efforts towards peace and
government and opposition forces under UN auspices. stability are being made. However, large-scale clashes
However, fighting did not abate on either side and there occurred in what are supposed to be “safe zones” in
was no progress to be seen in the initiative towards peace. Idlib province in northern Syria and in Eastern Ghouta
Under these circumstances, peace talks sponsored on the outskirts of the capital Damascus.29 Particularly in
by Russia, Turkey, and Iran began in Astana, Kazakhstan Eastern Ghouta, Syrian forces intensified their offensive
in January 2017. In the fourth meeting held in May of the with support from Russian forces, resulting in many
28 UN Security Council Resolution 2254 calls for establishing an inclusive and non-sectarian government and setting a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution within six months, and
expresses support for the holding of free and fair elections within 18 months pursuant to the new constitution.
29 It is believed that the ceasefire has largely held in Homs and the two places where it was put in place near the Syria-Jordan border.

casualties among citizens. In September 2017, Hamas announced its intent to

Under these circumstances, the United States, the accept the administrative control of the Gaza Strip by Fatah.
United Kingdom, and France determined that the Assad In October of the same year, direct consultations were held
administration had used chemical weapons in eastern through the mediation of Egypt, in which the two parties
Ghouta and showed the determination not to allow the agreed on the handover of administrative authority by
proliferation and use of chemical weapons, conducting December. However, subsequent negotiations encountered
missile attacks on Syrian facilities related to chemical difficulties, while the Trump administration announced
weapons in April 2018. Russia and Iran, who support the on December 6 of the same year that the United States
Assad administration, are pushing back at the attack by would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. After
the three states. that, the security situation deteriorated temporarily as
Furthermore, as the influence of ISIL wanes in Syria, demonstrations and other protest activities took place
a confrontation over the status of Kurds is emerging. day after day in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and
The Kurds exhibited movement towards the expansion people were injured or killed in clashes with the Israeli
of autonomy such as the unilateral announcement in security forces. Tensions rose as rockets were fired from
March 2016 led by Democratic Union Party (PYD), the the Gaza Strip at Israeli territory and as a response to that,
Kurdish political party, to introduce a federative system Israel intercepted rockets fired from the Gaza Strip and
in northern Syria, and implementation of their own local conducted air strikes on the Gaza Strip. In May 2018,
Chapter 3
elections in September 201730 and the like. Turkey, which immediately after the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in
deems PYD to be a terrorist organization, invaded Afrin Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, protest activities in
in northeastern Syria in January 2018 and announced in the Palestinian Autonomous Area were activated again,
March of the same year that it had taken control of the which resulted in many casualties particularly in the
city center of Afrin. Gaza Strip. Future movements in the Middle East peace
In this manner, the military clashes between the process including engagement by the United States
forces within Syria still do not show signs of ending, and the future direction of negotiations towards the
and peace talks are also stalling. Further initiatives from transfer of administrative authority over the Gaza Strip
the international community towards the stabilization of bears watching.
Syria is required.
3 Situation in Yemen
2 The Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace
In Yemen, anti-government protests occurred from
Since the foundation of Israel in 1948, there have been February 2011 and international pressure led to a
four wars between Israel and Arab countries. The 1993 transition from then President Ali Abdullah Saleh to new
Oslo Agreement was signed between Israel and Palestine President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi through election.
and a peace process made temporary progress but has Meanwhile, the confrontation between the government
fallen short of achieving peace.31 In the Palestinian and the opposition insurgent group Houthis,32 based in
territories, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West northern Yemen, intensified. In September 2011, the
Bank of the Jordan River, and the Islamic fundamentalist Houthis occupied the capital Sana and President Hadi
Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza district, are evacuated to the city of Aden in the south.
in conflict, splitting the area. Later, as the Houthis invaded the city of Aden,
30 In September 2017, elections were held in the areas controlled by Kurdish forces in which each commune, the smallest administrative district, elected two representatives, one man, one woman,
each. In December, assembly elections were held at the municipal level. However, the election for the equivalent of a parliament that was scheduled to be held in January 2018 was postponed in the
wake of the attack on Afrin by Turkish forces that month.
31 Between Israel and Palestine, a peace process through full-fledged negotiations started through the 1993 Oslo Agreement. In 2003, both Israel and Palestine accepted a roadmap for realizing a peace
initiative featuring the peaceful coexistence of two countries. However, its implementation has made little progress. Later, following rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces launched
large-scale military actions from late 2008 to early 2009 that included airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of ground forces. In November 2012, Israeli forces again conducted airstrikes
on the Gaza Strip. By 2012, Israel thus conducted two major military operations against the Gaza Strip. In both cases, fighting ceased under mediation by Egypt and others.
32 The Houthis are followers of the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam and are based in Saada governorate in northern Yemen. From 2004 to 2010, the Houthis staged an armed uprising as an anti-government
group, and an armed conflict broke out with the Yemeni military.

President Hadi sought assistance from Arab countries. In Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi among other efforts have reportedly been reducing the
Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. Taliban’s assault capabilities to a certain degree. However,
A series of peace talks intermediated by the United around the time that ISAF withdrew in December 2014
Nations took place between April and August of the same after completing its mission and the NATO-led “Resolute
year, but a final peace agreement has yet to be reached.33 Support Mission (RSM)” started to train, advise and assist
Military operations by Saudi-led coalition forces against the ANDSF as its core mission, the Taliban intensified
the Houthis and the launching ballistic missiles into their offensive resulting in security deterioration.
Saudi Arabia and other attacks by the Houthis continue.34 Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges with logistics,
The coalition launched operations to recapture Houthi- morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership,
controlled Hodeidah, Yemen’s second-largest port city, and the Taliban is expanding its own areas of control in
and announced that they had occupied the airport there. Afghanistan amidst these circumstances. According to a
Meanwhile, regarding the ballistic missile attacks by the report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for
Houthis, which have mainly targeted the Saudi south, the Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in October 2017,
Houthis have announced that they have launched ballistic the areas controlled by or under the influence of the
missiles at Riyad, the Saudi capital, since November Afghan Government was approximately 57% of Afghan
2017. In response, Saudi Arabia is claiming that it has territory, the lowest since December 2015, when the
Chapter 3
intercepted the ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis. survey started.
The United States and Saudi Arabia also claim that the Furthermore, in addition to the Taliban, ISIL has
missiles launched at Riyad were provided by Iran. established “Khorasan Province” in eastern Afghanistan
Under these circumstances, in December 2017, and expanded its activities. Suicide bomb attacks and

former President Saleh, who had joined forces with the rocket attacks that the Taliban and ISIL are believed to
Houthis to fight against the Saudi-led coalition forces, be involved have occurred one after another around the
extended an offer for a ceasefire and talks with the Saudi- country. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis visited
led coalition forces. The Houthis rejected this and killed Afghanistan in September 2017, several rockets hit
the former president. Meanwhile, inside the government- Kabul International Airport and the surrounding area,
aligned forces, the Southern Transitional Council, which and both the Taliban and ISIL claimed responsibility.
seeks independence for south Yemen, clashed with the In January 2018, a suicide bomb attack occurred in the
Hadi administration and overran a military base and center of Kabul killing more than a hundred people with
government buildings in Aden. These situations have the Taliban claiming responsibility while ISIL attacked
added further confusions in Yemen. an NGO office in Jalalabad in the east in the same month.
Instability continues in the security situation nationwide.
4 Situation in Afghanistan In June 2018, Afghanistan and the Taliban both announced
a ceasefire unilaterally. However, the Taliban abandoned
In Afghanistan, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks the ceasefire after three days and reopened its attacks. It
in the United States, the U.S. Forces launched mop- is unclear whether the security situation may stabilize.
up operations against the Taliban and other groups in The first peace talks between the Afghan Government
November 2001. Furthermore, the security duties by the and the Taliban were held in May 2015 but has not been
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the resumed since after the subsequent change in the supreme
33 The first round of peace talks under the mediation by the UN took place in Geneva. Both the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces participated in the talks and had indirect consultations
but fell short of reaching any final agreement. In Switzerland in December 2015, the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces held the second round of peace talks, realizing their first direct
negotiations. Although a ceasefire was put into force before the second round, repeated ceasefire violations occurred, leading the second round to be suspended without any major achievement.
34 In June 2015, the Houthis and Yemeni forces units supporting former President Saleh red a Scud missile at Khamis Mushait in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces red two Patriot missiles to intercept
the Scud and identified and destroyed the Scud launching site in southern Saada governorate. Since then, multiple similar incidents have occurred. It has been suggested that the Yemeni Scud missile
was purchased from North Korea and that Yemeni forces units supporting the Houthis were involved with its ring.

leadership. Although the Afghan Government called out 6 Situation in Egypt

to the Taliban for dialogue, the Taliban has been silent
on peace talks, and there are yet to be prospects for In Egypt, where then-President Mubarak, who had
reopening the talks. been serving as the president for approximately three
decades, resigned in 2011, and then-President Mursi,
5 Situation in Libya who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,35
was inaugurated. However, in June 2013, large-scale
In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime protests of the people occurred amidst the poor economic
in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were situation and the deterioration of security. The military
held in July 2012, establishing a congress consisting intervened in response and dismissed the president. In
mainly of Islamists. In June 2014, elections for a May 2014, former Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi
Council of Representatives were held to establish a was inaugurated as president. In the three years since
new congress to replace the General National Congress. its inauguration, the el-Sisi administration undertook
However, since secularists became the majority, the economic reforms including a shift to a floating exchange
confrontation between Islamic and secular groups rate system and the abolition of subsidies. However,
intensified, and consequently, Libya became fragmented enhancing domestic security measures is still a major
between east and west with two assemblies existing challenge. In November 2017, an armed group assaulted
Chapter 3
in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National a mosque in the northern Sinai Peninsula leaving more
Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the than 300 people dead. Countermeasures against terrorism
secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in are urgently required.36
Tobruk in eastern Libya. In December 2015, the UN President el-Sisi was reelected in presidential
mediated a political agreement for Libya and a national election held in March 2018 with approximately 97% of
consensus government was established in March 2016. the votes. In the election, a former prime minister, a former
However, as Islamic groups took control of the new parliament member, and former military chief of staff
government, secular groups turned their back and who were seen as strong candidates declined one after
refused to join the national consensus government. As another to run or were detained by the authorities, leaving
a result, Libya remains divided between the East and only one opponent for the president. Approximately 41%
the West. In addition, militias supporting the east and voted, a figure lower than in the previous election.
west respectively continue sporadic military clashes.
Under these circumstances, there are no prospects for 7 Situation in South Sudan
establishing domestic governance and security yet.
In addition, ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist (1) Political Turmoil
organizations are gaining ground in these unstable The North-South civil war that had continued since 1983
circumstances and clashing with militias around the between the Sudanese Government consisting mainly
country. ISIL in particular is believed to be divided into of Arab Muslims in the north and the anti-government
small groups and in hiding, mainly in the desert regions group consisting mainly of African Christians in the
in southern Libya. In October 2017, car bomb attacks south came to an end in 2005 with the entry into force of
targeting the militias occurred for which ISIL claimed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brokered by
responsibility. Further terrorist acts will likely occur in neighboring countries, the United States, and others. In
the future. July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was separated and
gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan as the
35 A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as an organization targeting the general public to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the
assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, extremist
organizations were derived, with Muslim Brotherhood serving as the parent organization.
36 Although no one claimed responsibility for this incident, it has been noted that it was conducted by ISIL-Sinai Province.

result of the referendum held in January 2011 according

to the provisions of the CPA. On the same day, the UN
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was
established as the result of the independence.37 Salva Kiir
Mayardit, a Dinka, became president while Riek Machar,
a Nuer, became vice president. However, political turmoil
continued even after the independence.
The political conflict between the pro-Kiir faction
(mainstream) and the pro-Machar faction (anti-mainstream
group)38 was brought to the surface after President Kiir had
dismissed Vice President Machar and all the other cabinet
ministers in July 2013. Following this, in December of the
same year, clashes that broke out between the government
and the pro-Machar faction in the capital city of Juba (3) Recent Trends
and violent acts targeting specific ethnic groups spread In July, 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba between
to different areas of the country in a short span of time, the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice
resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and President Machar. Following this, Machar left Juba
Chapter 3
internally displaced persons (IDPs). and fled the country, and President Kiir dismissed
Machar from the office.
(2) Beginning of Peace Building Given this harsh situation, the international
With the establishment of UNMISS in July 2011, the community has joined forces for peace and stability. The

“Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)39 nation-building process for South Sudan is now entering
assisted by the UN and the AU initiated efforts to start a new stage.
dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable In August 2016, the UN Security Council created
their reconciliation. In January 2014, the IGAD helped the Regional Protection Force (RPF)40 for the purpose of
the government and the pro-Machar faction to sign an maintaining security in Juba and surrounding areas. In
agreement on ceasing hostile activities in South Sudan. April 2017, an advance party of Bangladesh’s construction
Having partly boosted by these initiatives, in August engineering company arrived in South Sudan as the first
2015, the government, the pro-Machar faction and others unit of the RPF.
reached the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict More troops continue to be dispatched. In December
in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), including the of the same year, the first High-Level Revitalization
establishment of a transitional government. In response Forum41 was held under the leadership of IGAD,
to the agreement, the UN Security Council also added where cessation of hostilities was agreed between the
support for the implementation of the agreement to government, the pro-Machar faction and others.
the UNMISS mandate. Later, efforts to implement the In December 2016, the South Sudanese Government
agreement were made, and on April 29, 2016, Transitional announced the initiation of the national dialogue42 in
Government of National Unity was established in which order to promote national reconciliation and advance
Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar were the president and the first the progress of consensus. In May 2017, a swearing-in
vice-president respectively. ceremony of the national dialogue steering committee
37 The initial mandate period was one year, with UNMISS comprised of up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. UNMISS was designed to fulfill the roles of: (1) supporting peace
consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development; (2) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict
prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protection of civilians; and (3) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule
of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.
38 From here on, the anti-mainstream faction formed around Machar is referred to as the pro-Machar faction.
39 IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are the eight East African nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, and South Sudan.
40 According to UN Security Council Resolutions 2304 and 2406, the Regional Protection Force (RPF) is responsible for providing a stable environment for Juba and neighboring areas, and also in other
areas in South Sudan, as necessary. The RPF is authorized to use all necessary means to achieve the following three mandates: (1) facilitation of conditions for safe and free movement both in and
outside of Juba; (2) Protection of the airport and key facilities; (3) Engaging to any actor that is credibly found to be preparing attacks on UN protection-of-civilians sites or civilians, etc.
41 It was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bringing together the various factions in South Sudan, to revitalize the 2015 Agreement on The Resolution of The Conflict.
42 An initiative that the government started in order to promote national reconciliation through consultations on the causes of domestic clashes and ways to resolve them.

was held to launch the national dialogue. Since then, some the central south which had served as the bases of Al-
progress in the initiatives towards domestic stability, Shabaab. In the following month, Al- Shabaab‘s leader
including the commencement of grass-roots level was killed by the attacks of the U.S. Forces.
dialogues nationwide, has been confirmed. In June 2018, Al-Shabaab has been weakened to some degree as
President Kiir, former First Vice President Machar and a result of these operations, but it still exists as a threat.
others signed “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on It frequently stages attacks against the bases of Somali
South Sudan,” under which a permanent ceasefire came and AMISOM forces and terrorist attacks within Somalia
into force. However, the details of the political system and in AMISOM member countries.46 It has been pointed
and security arrangements have not been specifically out that ISIL fighters have been flowing into Somalia in
determined, so the situation bears watching. recent years.47 In these circumstances, counterterrorism
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.1 (United Nations Mission in the operations by U.S. forces have been intensified since
Republic of South Sudan) March 2017, when President Trump approved the
intensification of the operations in certain areas by U.S.
8 Situation in Somalia forces deployed in Somalia.
Additionally, in Somalia, especially in the north
(1) Establishment of an Integrated Government eastern part, there are believed to be outposts of pirates
Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf
Chapter 3
government collapsed in 1991.43 It continues to face a of Aden. The international community implements a
serious humanitarian crisis to this day as a large number series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities
of refugees are generated. After 14 years, in 2005, the of Somalia based on the perception that instability
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated of Somalia triggers piracy issues. The international
through the intermediation of the neighboring countries. community has continued to implement initiatives off the
In 2012, when the period for provisional governance by coast of Somalia, which have contributed to steadily low
TFG ended, a new cabinet was inaugurated, and a unified level of the reported number of pirates attacks.
government was established for the first time in 21 years. In See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.1 (Counter-piracy Initiatives)
February 2017, a presidential election was held, in which
Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed Farmajo, a former prime 9 Situation in Mali
minister in the TFG defeated then-incumbent President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to become president. President (1) Anti-government Insurgents
Farmajo is currently rebuilding the Somali National In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg48 insurgent group,
Armed Forces with support from other countries.44 the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), raised a rebellion in January 2012. Other
(2) The Rise of Al-Shabaab and the Piracy Issue groups, including “Ansar Dine,” an Islamic extremist
Somalia faces two issues, terrorism and piracy. Al- group joined the rebellion. The MNLA conquered some
Shabaab, a Sunni extremist organization based in the northern cities and declared the independence of the
central south, has repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks northern region in April 2012. Subsequently, Islamic
against the government and other targets. In 2007, the extremist groups, including Ansar Dine that expelled the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)45 was MNLA, “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa”
established with the approval of the UN Security Council (MUJAO), and “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”
to stabilize the situation. (AQIM),49 started to govern the northern region based on
In August 2014, AMISOM, jointly with the Somali the Sharia law, aggravating the humanitarian and security
National Armed Forces, launched “Operation Indian situations in northern Mali.
Ocean” and successfully recaptured some of the cities in
43 “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence in 1991. “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government in 1998.
44 In May 2017, the United Kingdom hosted the “London Somalia Conference,” where cooperation by the international community towards strengthening Somali National Armed Forces was confirmed.
45 Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia supply most of the troops. Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 2017) determined that the troops would be reduced from 22,126 members to
21,626 by December 31, 2017 and further reduced to 20,626 by October 31, 2018.
46 In October 2017, a terrorist attack using Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIED) occurred in Mogadishu, killing more than 500 people.
47 In November 2017, U.S. forces conducted air strikes in Somalia targeting ISIL.
48 The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in conflict with the Government of Mali seeking for autonomy in northern Mali.
49 In March 2017, these forces merged to “Jama Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM; literally, protector of Islam and Muslims).”

(2) Initiatives to Build Peace des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA)” respectively.

In response to this situation, in December 2012, the In February 2017, the Mali Government and the armed
UN Security Council approved the deployment of the groups began joint patrols based on the Agreement.
African-led International Support Mission to Mali However, little progress has been seen on the execution
(AFISMA),50 whose tasks included revitalizing the of the Agreement and there is concern over the delay in
capabilities of Malian troops and security organizations its implementation. Thus, in September of the same year,
and supporting the Malian authorities. The Malian a UN Security Council resolution was adopted for the
provisional government recaptured major cities in the first time to impose sanctions on individuals and others
northern part of the country, assisted by the sending who obstruct progress on the Agreement.
of troops by France and the deployment of AFISMA. The UN Security Council decided in June 2016 to
In April 2013, the UN Security Council decided to increase the strength of MINUSMA by approximately
establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 2,500 members and adopted a resolution in June 2017 to
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose tasks give the political support of the UN Security Council to
included the stabilization of densely-populated areas the deployment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force52 consisting
and support for the reconstruction of national functions of up to 5,000 members. In addition, in December of
throughout Mali. In July 2013, MINUSMA, which had the same year, the UN Security Council requested the
its authority delegated by AFISMA, became operational. Secretary-General to provide specified support for the G5
Chapter 3
With the support of MINUSMA, a presidential election Sahel Force through MINUSMA in support of initiatives
was held in a peaceful manner, and a new government to counter terrorism by the countries in the region. At the
was established in September of the same year.51 same time, 42 MINUSMA personnel died53 as the result
In May and June 2015, the Mali Government of terrorist attacks and other causes in 2017 alone. The

signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation unstable security situation continues and there is a need
with the armed groups “Platform” and “Coordination for further progress in the peace process.
50 AFISMA receives troops from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria.
51 In June 2013, the provisional government and MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Mali
troops to northern cities.
52 The Joint Force consists of the following five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mari, Mauritania, and Niger.
53 This is the largest number of annual deaths for any mission in UN Peacekeeping Operations in 2017.

Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there
destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including
chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less
deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant effectively, could acquire and use WMDs.
1 Nuclear Weapons
During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Additionally, regarding the New Strategic Arms
raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear Reduction Treaty which was signed by the presidents of
war between the United States and the Soviet Union. the United States and Russia in April 2010, and took effect
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in February 2011, the Trump administration expressed its
(NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other intention to continue to implement this Treaty. Similarly,
Chapter 3
than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other the United Kingdom also stated in the Strategic Defence
nuclear explosive device in or before 19661 from having and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 that
nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and the country would decrease the number of its nuclear
disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through warheads, and the NSS-SDSR 2015 released in November
two-way negotiations.2 2015 confirmed that there is no change in this policy to

The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries reduce the number of nuclear warheads.6
and regions.3 While some countries that had previously In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses
possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this terrorist activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive
treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning materials, the Nuclear Security Summit that commenced
these weapons,4 India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to at the proposal of then President Obama has been held
accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There on four occasions. The fourth Nuclear Security Summit
are other countries that have declared the development that was held in Washington, D.C. in March-April 2016
and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, adopted a Communiqué, which shared the recognition
which announced that it conducted nuclear tests in that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains an imminent
October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016, challenge to the international community, and which
September 2016, and September 2017.5 outlined the need for continuous efforts to prevent nuclear
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors
the Trump administration in February 2018 states that even after the summit.7 The Trump administration has
the United States “remains committed to its efforts in indicated it will promote cooperation with allies, partners
support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear, and international institutions to combat nuclear terrorism.
biological and chemical weapons.” It also confirms that The Trump administration indicates concerns in
NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation the 2018 NPR that Russia is improving its delivery
regime and that the United States continues to abide by capabilities, including ground-launched cruise missiles
its obligations under the NPT and will work to strengthen in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
the NPT regime. (INF) Treaty. It also criticizes Russia for rebuffing United
1 The United States, the then Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992.
2 Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.
3 As of June 2018
4 South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
5 After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it pledged that it would remain a contracting state to the NPT. However, North Korea again declared its withdrawal from the NPT in
January 2003. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently announced
the implementation of six nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.
6 The treaty stipulates that both countries would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty’s
entry into force. The United States reported that it had 1,350 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 652 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia reported that it had 1,444 deployed strategic
nuclear warheads and 527 deployed delivery vehicles. These numbers are as of February 5, 2018.
7 At the Nuclear Security Summit, it was confirmed that the IAEA would play a central role in international nuclear security initiatives. Accordingly, the IAEA hosted the International Conference on Nuclear
Security in Vienna, Austria in December 2016, which was attended by more than 2,000 people from 130 countries and 17 international organizations and groups.

Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Section 2
States’ efforts to follow New START with another round deployed their means of delivery,9 and thereby, continued
of negotiated reductions.8 to enhance the capability of its nuclear forces. It has been
Meanwhile, China is deemed to have increased its pointed out that initiatives for reducing nuclear weapons
inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and involving China will be needed in the future.
2 Biological and Chemical Weapons
Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture management of pathogens and toxins.14
at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used
materials, equipment, and technology needed to mustard gas, tabun, and sarin15 in the Iran-Iraq War. In
manufacture these weapons can be used for both military the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress
and civilian purposes. For example, water purification Iraqi Kurds.16 It is believed that other chemical weapons17
equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent,
extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.18 In August 2013,
and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where
can be abused for the production of chemical weapons.10 Syrian troops clashed with anti-government groups.19 The
Chapter 3
Biological and chemical weapons are attractive to Syrian Government denied using chemical weapons, but
states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
asymmetric means of attack.11 in line with an agreement between the United States
Biological weapons have the following characteristics: and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts were

(1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there undertaken for the overseas transfer of chemical agents
is usually an incubation period of a few days between and other measures based on the decisions made by the
exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (OPCW)20 and a UN Security Council resolution.21 In
(5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending August 2014, the operation to destroy Syria’s sarin,
on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.12 VX gas, and other chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy
As has been pointed out, advancements in life transport vessel Cape Ray was completed.22
science could be misused or abused for the development In August 2015, in order to identify users of chemical
of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in weapons in Syrian civil war, the UN Security Council
November 2009, the United States established guidelines13 adopted a resolution that establishes a Joint Investigative
on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons Mechanism of the UN and OPCW, and investigations
and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the under this mechanism have been carried out. In November
United States would take measures to ensure the thorough 2016, the term of this investigative mechanism was
8 With regard to negotiations for reducing the number of nuclear weapons, in December 2017 Russian Foreign Ministry Director of Nonproliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov indicated his intent
to discuss with the United States the possibility of extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by five years and stated Russia’s position that all countries with nuclear weapons, not just the
United States and Russia, should participate in future treaties on reducing or restricting nuclear weapons.
9 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 for China’s ballistic missile development
10 The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including
Japan, pursuant to an agreement of the Australia Group, a framework for international export control.
11 They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks
12 Then Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002).
13 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists.
In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, then President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and
infectious diseases.
14 U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010)
15 Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents
16 In particular, it has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once.
17 A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the firing
of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle
than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset.
18 Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention CWC) in February 2009
19 “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final Report” (December 12, 2013).
20 (The 33rd and 34th) meeting of the Executive Council of OPCW.
21 UN Security Council Resolution 2118.
22 According to OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In January
2016, OPCW reported that destruction of all of the chemical weapons reported by the Syrian Government was completed.

extended for one more year, and efforts have continued had used chemical weapons.26
to be made to ensure that chemical weapons would not North Korea is an example of a country that is still
be used ever again by identifying those responsible for presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which
the use of chemical weapons. This joint investigation has not entered into the CWC. In addition, the Tokyo
mechanism has specified persons responsible for six subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of
incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. It has been bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the
reported that four of these are attributed to the Syrian United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained
Army, while the remaining two incidents were initiated in a mail item in February 2004, showed that the threat
by ISIL.23, 24 of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these
In particular, the report published in October 2017 weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.
finds that the Syrian government was responsible for the Furthermore, the Malaysian police announced that a VX
use of sarin once again in Khan Sheikhun, Syria in April nerve agent whose production and use are banned by the
2017. This investigative mechanism ended its activities CWC was found on the body of Kim Jong-nam who was
after the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution assassinated in February 2017.
to renew its mandate. The United Kingdom criticized Russia over its
Meanwhile, even after this, there continues to be highly likely involvement in the use of Novichok, a
incidents where chemical weapons were used in Syria, as military-grade chemical weapon developed by Russia,
Chapter 3
suspicions have been pointed out that chemical weapons in the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that
were used in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018.25 In the same occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. As
month, the United States, United Kingdom and France punishment, countries including European countries and
launched missile strikes on chemical weapons related the United States expelled Russian diplomats.
facilities in Syria after they determined the Assad regime
3 Ballistic Missiles and other missiles
Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic
over long distances and can be used as a means of missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise
delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for
chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which
follow an orbital flight trajectory and fall at a steep angle has the potential for proliferation.27 Because cruise missiles
at high speed. As such, effectively countering them are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and
requires a highly accurate interceptor missile system. are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either
The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it
armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target
or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in
further heightening tension in a region where military flight.28 Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic
confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to
that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat if
means of attacking from a distance or threatening another they carry WMDs in their warheads.29
country that has superior conventional forces.
23 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 for ISIL.

24 In a report by the joint investigation mechanism (JIM) involving the UN and OPCW, it was determined that the Syrian Government used chlorine gas in Talmenes (April 2014), in Sarmin (March 2015),
and in Qmenas (March 2015), and also used sarin in Khan Sheikhun (April 2017). The report also found that ISIL used mustard gas in Marea (August 2015) and in Umm Hawsh (September 2016).
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 referred to ISIL’s contribution to this incident, and assessed that non-state actors are using chemicals in
warfare in Syria.
25 The draft Security Council resolution to establish a UN independent investigative mechanism for identifying users of chemical weapons, proposed by the United States on April 10, 2018, was vetoed
by Russia.
26 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3 for general information about the Syria situation, including military actions taken by the United States, United Kingdom and France.
27 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six
anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection.
28 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (July 28, 2005)
29 The United States is concerned that the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles by countries including China and Iran could pose a threat to U.S. forward-deployed forces.

Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Section 2
4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies
Even weapons that were purchased or developed for other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and
self-defense purposes could easily be exported or regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan.
transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and
successful. For example, certain states that do not heed Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable
political risks have transferred WMDs and related number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In
technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles
resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset are believed to be based on North Korea’s Nodong
this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs missiles. Further still, it has been suggested that North
do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and Korea conducted ballistic missile-related trade with Syria
furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist and Myanmar.33
organizations are active in their countries. Therefore, it North Korea has made rapid strides in the
is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual development of its ballistic missiles with only a few
use of WMDs would increase. test launches. It is believed that an underlying factor of
Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials
effectively manage the related technology and materials, and technologies from outside of the country. It is also
Chapter 3
there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances noted that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic
will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with missile airframes and related technologies, and that it
high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even promotes the further development of missiles using funds
terrorists who do not possess related technologies would procured by such transfer and proliferation.34 Some also

use a dirty bomb30 as a means of terrorist attack so long as point out that North Korea conducts ballistic missile tests
they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across at its export destination and make use of its results.
the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and The international community’s uncompromising and
use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.31 decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of
The proliferation of WMDs and other related WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure
technologies has been noted in numerous instances. on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of
For example, in February 2004, it came to light that them to accept inspections by international organizations
nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether.35
technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states
Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. of proliferation concern have sustained their proliferation
It has also been suggested that North Korea supported activities by averting international monitoring, through
Syria’s secret nuclear activities.32 illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies
Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying
proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies
of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and and intermediaries. Additionally, intangible transfer of
30 Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials.
31 Based on these concerns, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all UN member states would refrain from providing support to non-state
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for
prohibiting these activities. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.
32 DNI “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s
proliferation activities.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to
the IAEA.
33 The March 2018 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee points out the activities of North Korean ballistic missile
technicians in Syria and the transfer to Syria of special tiles used at chemical weapons manufacturing facilities. It also discusses North Korea’s ongoing military relationship with Myanmar, including
ballistic missile systems.
34 In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out
that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007,
illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.” Moreover, in the report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was published by
the U.S. DoD in March 2014, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, including
sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries.
35 Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 among Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to accept
inspections by an international organization. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military campaign against Libya by a multinational force, in March
2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya, saying that attacking after disarmament was an “armed invasion.”

technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, via their nationals—researchers and students who have
states of proliferation concern have obtained advanced been dispatched to leading companies and academic
technologies which could be adapted for the development institutions in developed countries.36
and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies
5 Iran’s Nuclear Issues
The nuclear issues of Iran are a serious challenge to other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of
the international non-proliferation regime. In 2002, it previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S.
was revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions.38
been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and The JCPOA reached its adoption date on October
other activities potentially leading to the development of 18, 2015, 90 days after the Security Council resolution
nuclear weapons. Since 2003, Iran has continued with its was adopted. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released
uranium enrichment activities despite resolutions adopted a report confirming Iran’s completion of the necessary
by the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council urging preparatory steps to start the implementation of the
Iran to stop its uranium enrichment and other activities. JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended
Chapter 3
However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition,
presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions the EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the
with the E3+3 (U.K., France, Germany, U.S., China, and sanctions imposed by previous UN Security Council
Russia) were advanced, resulting in the announcement resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended,
of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution
comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2231. Subsequently, the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed
2013. The execution of the first step measures of the that Iran is complying with the agreement. However in
JPOA commenced in January 2014.37 May 2018 President Trump stated that with the current
On April 2, 2015, consultations held in Lausanne, agreement, Iran can still be on the verge of a nuclear
Switzerland resulted in an agreement regarding the key breakout in a short period of time even if Iran fully
parameters of the final agreement. On July 14, 2015, the complies with the agreement, and also the agreement
final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, fails to address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles.
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was He then announced that the United States will withdraw
announced in Vienna. Following this, on July 20, 2015, from the agreement and start work aimed at re-imposing
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the sanctions. President Trump has said he will work with
JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided allies to find a real, comprehensive and lasting solution
that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and to Iran’s nuclear threat. Thus, the future moves of the
number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons United States will be closely monitored.
grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among
36 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee states that over the past 20 years since 1996, North Korea has dispatched more than 30
engineers to the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, which receives technical support from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. These engineers participate
in research programs concerning topics such as satellite communications, space science and atmospheric chemistry, and satellite navigation systems. The report notes that such knowhow regarding
space science and satellite systems contributes to improving North Korea’s ballistic missile technology.
37 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the E3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its existing uranium enriched to approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes
the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium over 5%; (3) does not advance activities at uranium enrichment facilities and heavy water reactors; (4) accepts enhanced monitoring
by the IAEA.
38 The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less,
keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak
heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing
facilities. According to then U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to manufacture nuclear fuel for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from
90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. Furthermore, the JCPOA is an agreement pertaining to nuclear issues and does not suspend or lift sanctions related to international terrorism,
missiles, human rights, among other issues. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, strongly criticized the Iranian
nuclear agreement for making war more likely. In the United States, while the Republican Party that makes up the majority of Congress had been opposed to the agreement, the motion of disapproval
was not supported by two-thirds majority vote of both the House of Representatives and the Senate necessary to override the President’s veto. Thus, the disapproval of the agreement was avoided.

Maritime Trends Section 3
Section 3 Maritime Trends

Maritime security is of critical importance to Japan, of the global commons, the “maritime domain,” is a
a maritime nation surrounded by sea. For example, key security issue for the international community. In
Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources. recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned
Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the are drawing attention, including their compliance with
survival of the nation. Securing the stable use of one relevant international norms.
1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply
provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high concerned about such measures, which are profoundly
seas and freedom of over flight. Nevertheless, in the waters dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in
and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may
Chapter 3
and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea.
for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom
based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with of over flight. Japan is demanding China to revoke any
the existing international order. This has caused situations of measures that could go against the principle of freedom

undue infringement upon such principles. of over flight. The United States, the Republic of Korea
Numerous cases of acts which go against the (ROK), Australia, and the EU, too, have expressed
principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of concern about China’s establishment of such zone.
overflight have been recently seen in the East China Sea. Increased activities by Chinese military aircraft have
For example, there was the case in January 2013,when a been confirmed in recent years in the airspace close to the
Chinese naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at an various southwestern islands of Japan, including the main
MSDF destroyer navigating on the high seas (30th), and island of Okinawa, and the expansion of these activities
another case in which a Chinese naval vessel is suspected may be an attempt to enforce “the East China Sea Air
to have directed its fire-control radar at a helicopter Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” Moreover, in May
carried onboard an MSDF destroyer (19th). The directing and June of 2014, fighters of the People’s Liberation
of a fire-control radar is generally an act carried out prior Army (PLA) of China flew abnormally close to aircraft
to using firearms, and directing it at an opponent is a of the MSDF and Japan Air Self-Defense Force, which
dangerous act that may have unintended consequences.2 were flying over the East China Sea.3
On November 23, 2013, the Chinese Government Such actions have also been seen frequently in the
declared “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification South China Sea. Chinese naval vessels have obstructed
Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands as if they the navigation of U.S. naval vessels4 and Chinese aircraft
were a part of China’s “territory.” China’s Ministry of have also obstructed the flight of U.S. military aircraft.5
National Defense announced that it would enforce rules In December 2016, an unmanned underwater vehicle
it set on any aircraft flying in the ADIZ and that the PLA belonging to the U.S. Navy was momentarily seized in
would take “defensive emergency measures” if aircraft the South China Sea by a vessel of the PLA Navy. These
1 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan concluded it in 1996).
2 Regarding this issue, the U.S. issued statements saying “actions such as this escalate tensions and increase the risk of an incident or a miscalculation, and they could undermine peace, stability, and
economic growth in this vital region (February 5, 2013, Department of State Daily Press Briefing)” and that “we were briefed by our Japanese allies on the incident and we’ve satisfied ourselves that
it does appear to have happened (February 11, 2013, Department of State Daily Press Briefing).”
3 Other than that, there were multiple incidents in March 2011 of Chinese helicopters and other aircraft apparently of the State Oceanic Administration flying close to Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea. Moreover, in June 2016, a Chinese fighter is speculated to have conducted a dangerous act by
approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea, and in May 2017 an incident allegedly occurred where Chinese fighters obstructed the route of an
aircraft of the U.S. Forces.
4 In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries’ patrol ship, and fishing vessels, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research
ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations, while in December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel cut across the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South China Sea at point
blank range.
5 In August 2014, a Chinese fighter is speculated to have flown abnormally close to and obstructed a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over the South China Sea. Furthermore, in May 2016, Chinese fighters
are speculated to have flown abnormally and dangerously close, to within around 15 m, of a reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Navy over the South China Sea.

cases are dangerous acts that could cause unintended prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies.
consequences. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held on May 9,
Additionally, China has gone ahead with land 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and
reclamation on seven features on a massive and rapid Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China
scale on the Spratly Islands since 2014. In July 2016, Defense Authorities” with the aim of avoiding unintended
the rights asserted by China in the sea area enclosed confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft
by the “nine-dash line,” including “historical rights” of the SDF and PLA. As for multi-national initiatives,
as the basis of the “nine dash line” were denied in the in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the
arbitration award between the Philippines and China, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including
and the illegality of China’s reclamation activities was Japan, the United States, and China, reached agreement
acknowledged. However, China has clearly stated its on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).6
intention not to comply with the award, and continues CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and
militarization of the features by developing batteries communication method to ensure safety for unexpected
and other military facilities and various infrastructure encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each
that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, country. In November 2014, the United States and China
harbors, hangars and radar facilities. Moreover, in July agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification
and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the of military activities, together with rules of behavior to
Chapter 3
Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6 bomber of avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with
the PLAAF conducted combat air patrols in the airspace CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two
around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of countries announced an agreement concerning an additional
National Defense announcing that it would conduct these annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters.
patrols regularly from now on. This shows the PLA has Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have
been intensifying its operation in the South China Sea. been held between on the establishment of the Code of the
Under these circumstances, a further increase in China’s Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC).
aerial presence in the area could lead to the establishment It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed
of a “South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the
in the future. seas and skies will supplement the existing international
Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have order, and that the countries concerned, including China,
obstructed fishing and other vessels of countries refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and
approaching the features, etc. by ring warning shots and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.
water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the Moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of the UN
international community including the United States have Security Council Resolution regarding the North Korea
repeatedly said they are deeply concerned about China’s issue, the international community has been cooperating
unilateral changes of the status quo, further advancement in the bolstering of measures to prevent the evasion of
of efforts to create a fait accompli, and assertive and sanctions by North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers
dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. of goods (the offshore transfer of goods from or to ships
Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to registered to North Korea), which has been prohibited by
securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent the UN Security Council Resolution.7
years progress has been made on efforts to avert and See Chapter 2, Section 3 (China); Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia)
2 Trends in the Arctic Ocean
The Arctic Ocean, which covers most of the Arctic sea ice has increased the potential for utilization of the
Region, borders Russia, the United States, Canada, Northern Sea Route and exploration of natural resources.
Denmark, and Norway.8 In recent years, decrease in For these reasons, the Arctic states have been more
6 This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.
7 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1-1
8 The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region – the five countries that border the Arctic Ocean and
Finland, Sweden, and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the
involvement of the indigenous communities and other inhabitants on common Arctic issues (e.g., sustainable development and environmental protection).

proactively promoting efforts to secure their interests in In the Arctic Strategy released by the U.S. DoD in
resource development and use of the sea route. From the 2013, the United States expresses its desire for the Arctic
perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national
been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected,
and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.
in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided
longer period of time and more extensively than before. to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority
It is therefore considered that the region could be used of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine
for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military resources, showing a negative stance towards resource
forces in the future, increasing its strategic importance. development. However, the U.S. President Trump signed
In this situation, there are unresolved issues among an executive order repealing this decision of then U.S.
the Arctic states over the demarcation of maritime President Obama in April 2017.10
boundaries based on UNCLOS and extension of the Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13
continental shelf. Some of these Arctic states including countries including Japan and China have observer status
Russia are promoting efforts to deploy new military in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active
capabilities for the purpose of securing their interests and involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar
defending their territories. research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for eight
Chapter 3
In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy times since 1999.11 In January 2018, they published a
revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy ” in which
that it would secure its interests in resource development they claimed to be one of the geographically closest
and use of the sea route. Russia has been actively involved states to the Arctic Circle with rights pertaining to the

with the Arctic, underpinned by Russia’s possession of development of resources. They also announced their
the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) among the intention to build a “Polar Silk Road.” In September 2015,
coastal states, the potential abundance of resources in the it was reported for the first time that five Chinese naval
waters of the Arctic Ocean, the geographic and security vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean
importance of the Northern Sea Route located off the and the Pacific and sailed in the U.S. territorial waters near
coast of Russia, and Russia’s military superiority ensured the Alewtian Islands. Focus will be on whether or not such
by the deployment of military forces directly facing the activities would have any relation to the PLA Navy’s future
Arctic Ocean.9 advancements into the Arctic Ocean.
3 Maritime Security Efforts of Countries
With regard to oceans, not only for economic development prosperity of the international community as a whole. In
but also for the national security of each country, it has this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with
become even more important to promote appropriate others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels,
rulemaking and to make concerted efforts by the illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime
international community to address risks and ensure disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for
freedom of navigation while respecting such rules. maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.
“Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and
9 Russia is said to have a fleet of around 40 icebreakers, while an additional three nuclear-powered icebreakers and two multipurpose icebreaker patrol ships are currently under construction. See
Chapter 2, Section 4 (Russia) regarding the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic, the deployment and training of the Northern Fleet vessels, the development of military facilities,
strategic patrols by strategic nuclear submarines, and patrol flights by long-range bombers.
10 As regards activities of other coastal nations, Canada states that the Arctic is a priority region under its policies in Canada’s Northern Strategy (released in 2009), and similar to the United States,
in December 2016 Canada announced a moratorium on the development of oil and natural gas in its territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark and Norway have also developed the Kingdom
of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (released in 2011) and the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (released in 2006), respectively, which outline their stances of attaching
importance to the Arctic, including the perspective of security.
11 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, a cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean.
Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of
Canada). Currently, China is believed to be building its second polar research vessel.

1 United States areas of the world and takes actions to combat piracy,
organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of
Regarding China’s maritime advances, U.S. Secretary of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
Defense Mattis declared at the Shangri-La Dialog, held
in June 2017, that the United States cannot and will not 2 NATO • EU
accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo due
to the scope and scale of China’s construction activities NATO, which identifies acts of terrorism as a threat to
in the South China Sea, which differ from those of other its member countries, has conducted Operation Active
countries in several key ways. They include the nature of Endeavour as a maritime initiative since October 2001
its militarization, China’s disregard for international law, following the terrorist attacks in the United States of the
its contempt for other nations’ interests, and its efforts to same year. Regarding this operation, a decision was made
dismiss non-adversarial resolution of the issues. In stating to transition to Operation Sea Guardian, whose mission
this, he also stated that the U.S. remains committed to is crisis management, and a wide range of operations
protecting the rights, freedom and lawful uses of the sea, has been carried out since November 2016, including
and the ability of countries to exercise those rights in counter-terrorism and capacity building assistance,
the strategically important East and South China Seas. among others, while collaborating with Operation Sophia
Moreover, he stated that the U.S. will continue to fly, of the European Union (EU).
Chapter 3
sail and operate wherever international law allows, and To deal with the pending issue of the large influx
demonstrate resolve through operational presence in of refugees and migrants, NATO decided to deploy the
the South China Sea and beyond. In May, July, August Standing NATO Maritime Groups, which is multinational,
and October of 2017, and January, March and May integrated force made up of vessels from member
of 2018, it has been reported that the U.S. military countries that provide offshore deterrence for member
actually conducted Freedom of Navigation operations, countries through routine exercises and maintenance
navigating vessels in surrounding waters and within 12 of rapid deployment capabilities, to the Aegean Sea in
nautical miles of maritime features in the South China February 2016, and notify Greek and Turkish authorities
Sea claimed by China.12 Japan supports these Freedom as well as the European Agency for the Management
of Navigation operations conducted in the South China of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
Sea by the United States, and believes in the importance the Member States of the EU of information regarding
of cooperation within the international community to refugee boats.
protect the free, open and peaceful seas. In response to the threat of piracy, NATO was
The United States deems that its safety and economic deploying vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime
security depend upon the secure use of the world’s Groups to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of
oceans, and that the United States has a vital interest in Aden. NATO was carrying out Operation Ocean Shield
maritime security. Based on this recognition, the United since August 2009, and it engaged in counter-piracy
States leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)13 to activities by vessels as well as helped countries build
counter piracy and advance maritime safety, including up their capacities to counter piracy if requested. NATO
tackling terrorism in waters surrounding the Middle ended these activities in December 2016. With many
East and Africa, such as the Gulf of Aden, the Persian of its member states facing the ocean, the EU has high
Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. In waters surrounding maritime traffic and economic activity in the sea, and
Central America, the United States conducts operations since December 2008, it has conducted the counter-
to counter illicit trafficking, primarily drug trafficking piracy operation known as Operation Atalanta in this
with European and Western Hemisphere countries.14 The area, which became the EU’s first maritime mission. This
United States thus dispatches vessels to the various sea operation aims to monitor the waters around the area and
12 The Freedom of Navigation Operations are operational activities conducted by the U.S. Forces for countering excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states to protect the rights,
freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all states under international law. It is deemed that the Operations have been conducted on an ongoing basis since 1979.
13 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 32 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF
Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime
security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan
Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151.
14 European and Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, conduct Operation Martillo to combat illicit trafficking, including the trafficking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, bulk cash,
and weapons, as well as organized crime along the sea areas surrounding Central America.

escort ships using naval vessels and aircraft dispatched 5 Australia

from various countries, and it has been decided that these
operations will continue until the end of 2018. Australia’s Defence White Paper unveiled in 2016 considers
the security of sea lanes as a strategic defense interest, along
3 United Kingdom with the security and resilience of Australia. Especially as
Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asia
The United Kingdom is an island nation surrounded by and maritime trade transiting Southeast Asia, Australia sees
sea, and has a heritage of engaging actively in maritime a need to ensure the security of trade routes in the country’s
activities, including maritime trade. Furthermore, the proximate waters and in Southeast Asia.
United Kingdom has many overseas territories and Based on this policy, the Australian Defence Force
has an EEZ which extends about 25 times the U.K. (ADF) has a outpost in Royal Malaysian Air Force
terrestrial extent. Due to these factors, the United (RMAF) Base Butterworth and conducts patrol and
Kingdom proactively contributes to NATO-and EU-led surveillance activities called “Operation Gateway” using
multinational forces and the U.S. led CMF in order to patrol aircraft in the North Indian Ocean and the South
ensure the maritime security of the sea areas surrounding China Sea.17 The ADF also engages in expanding naval
the United Kingdom, including its overseas territories, cooperation with India, providing patrol vessels to South
and by extension, the seas of its neighboring countries. Pacific countries,18 and conducting coastal patrols by
Chapter 3
Specifically, the headquarters of Operation Atalanta, mobilizing ADF assets.
the EU-led counter-piracy operation is located at the In relation to China, there were reports of Australian
Northwood Maritime Command Headquarters in the patrol aircraft operating in the area around the South
U.K. In addition, the U.K. navy engages in initiatives to China Sea being subjected to PLA aircraft interference

maintain a presence in the Asia-Pacific region, in order to on a regular basis. Moreover, there were reports in April
ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.15 2018 of three Australian naval vessels heading toward
Vietnam being provoked by the PLA Navy. In response
4 France to this, the Ministry of National Defense of The People’s
Republic of China stated that the “reports were not true,”
France, with its many overseas territories, possesses one while Australian Prime Minister Turnbull declared that
of the largest EEZs in the world. The strategic review Australia will exert and practice its right of freedom of
announced in October 2017, pointed out the possibility navigation throughout the world’s oceans, including
of the benefits of freedom of navigation being threatened South China Sea.
as the result of deterioration in the strategic situation in
the Asia-Pacific region, and simultaneously clarified the 6 China
country’s intention to continue protecting its overseas
sovereignty and overseas territories in the Pacific and China relies on sea transport for over 90% of its trade
Indian Oceans. As such, France has deployed forces cargo.19 Accordingly, ensuring the security of China’s sea
in French Polynesia and New Caledonia, including the lanes constitutes a critical part of the “basic safeguards for
deployment of frigates and patrol boats. Moreover, the ensuring sustainable economic and social development,”20
Floréal-class frigate, Vendémiaire, made a port call in one of China’s “core interests.”
Japan in February 2018 to hold joint exercises with the With regard to counter-piracy activities, as a member
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). France has also of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
been hosting multilateral exercises such as Croix du Sud Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
and Equateur in the South Pacific.16 (ReCAAP),21 China shares information and participates
15 See Chapter 2, Section 8-3-1

16 See Chapter 2, Section 8-3-2 for more information about French ships calling on ports and France’s involvement in exercises. As for humanitarian assistance activities, France carried out activities
in the Philippines, Vanuatu, and Fiji following the damaging typhoons and cyclones that struck these countries in November 2013, March 2015, and February 2016.
17 In December 2015, the Australian Department of Defence admitted that as part of these activities, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducted patrol activities in the South China Sea from
November to December. This was preceded by BBC’s release of the content of the radio communications that allegedly took place between RAAF aircraft and the PLA Navy, claiming that Australia
was carrying out “freedom of navigation” flights in the South China Sea.
18 See chapter 2, Section 5-3-4
19 According to the website of the Central People’s Government of China, over 90% of China’s export and import cargo, such as crude oil, iron ore, food, and container, are transported by sea.
20 Then State Councilor Dai Bingguo, “China will unswervingly follow path of peaceful development” (December 7, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website)
21 As of June 2018, the contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands;
Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Kingdom; United States; and Vietnam.

in cooperative arrangements related to piracy in Southeast on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)
Asia. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval aimed at peacefully settling the issues over the South
vessels to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden China Sea. Currently, official consultations have been
and has been involved in international efforts to repress held with a view to establishing the COC, which is
piracy. Through such activities, China has contributed to deemed to contain more specific content than the DOC
ensuring maritime security. Commitment to ensuring the and to be legally binding.
security of its sea lanes is also considered to be connected Furthermore, there have been developments related
to the PLA Navy’s objective of building up capacity for to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in
continuous operations in more distant waters. In this UNCLOS. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted
respect, since August 2017, China has begun operating arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute
a security base for providing support for the activities between the Philippines and China over its assertions
of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic key point in East and actions in the South China Sea. In July 2016, a final
Africa facing the Gulf of Aden, where the PLA Navy’s award was rendered in which nearly all of the Philippines’
vessels involved in counter-piracy activities return to. submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines. This
The objective of these overseas bases, including ports, is award will be final and legally binding on both parties.
believed to be to build up China’s capacity for continuous Moreover, Vietnam, another claimant, has requested the
operations in more distant waters. tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions
Chapter 3
Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China and over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a
ASEAN member states have conflicting assertions over trend among some countries concerned to work towards
the sovereignty of such areas as the Spratly Islands and the a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with
Paracel Islands. In recent years, the countries concerned, international law.
including China, have stepped up their activities to assert With regard to counter-piracy measures, Indonesia,
their sovereignty. Developments associated with the Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca
freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to Strait Patrols.22 Efforts have also been under way to share
increasing international concern. information related to piracy and build a cooperation
arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP. Additionally,
7 Southeast Asia in recent years, the cases of abduction for ransom has
been confirmed in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea.
Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traffic, In order to respond to this, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Philippines began sea patrols in the area in June 2017,
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region, and air patrols in October of the same year.
however, has maritime security issues, including disputes See Chapter 2, Section 6- 4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and
over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy. Other Issues over the South China Sea)
In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration
22 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004; aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing activities which
commenced in 2006.

Outer Space and Security Section 4
Section 4 Outer Space and Security
1 Outer Space and Security
Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched spread across the satellite’s orbit, and came to be seen as
into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind. a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by
In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has countries.4 Furthermore, countries including China and
been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own Russia are thought to be also developing anti-satellite
outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major weapons (ASAT) that do not directly hit and destroy a
countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space.1 satellite by a missile, thus creating less space debris.
For example, observation satellites such as meteorological For example, it has been noted that ASATs under
satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and development include an ASAT that brings a “killer
waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are satellite” to maneuver itself close to target and utilize a
used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning robot arm to capture it to disable its functions. In this area,
satellites are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These China has carried out experiments in outer space in which
Chapter 3
satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, they have mobilized satellites close to other satellites to
scientific, and other areas as essential infrastructure for simulate the movements of a killer satellite. It has been
the public and private sectors. noted that Russia too, has launched killer satellites.5
In the security field, military forces in major countries Furthermore, it has been pointed out that both China and

are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize Russia are developing ASATs that disable the functions
a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national of the target satellite by using a jammer to interfere with
borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of communications between the target satellite and the
satellites enables the observation of, communication ground station.
at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, major As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use
countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of of outer space has become one of the critical security
a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose challenges for countries, thus it has become necessary
of enhancing C4ISR functions.2 Such satellites include to deal with this risk effectively in an effort to ensure
imagery reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military stability in the use of outer space.
facilities and targets, early warning satellites that detect Against this backdrop, the existing framework such
the launch of ballistic missiles, satellites gathering as the Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles
radio wave information for military communications, Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
communication satellites for military communication, and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and Celestial Bodies) that prescribes the exploration and use
aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems. of outer space, do not have provisions on prohibiting the
In outer space, the various countries are also rapidly destruction of space objects and refraining from actions
developing their capabilities to ensure their military triggering space debris. International efforts have been
superiority. As various countries launch military satellites, under way recently for the creation of the International
China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the
a ground-launched missile. The resulting space debris3 guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space
1 The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in
October 1967 defines such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of
ownership. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space, though according to one of the concepts, outer space is considered space located 100 km
or further away from the Earth’s surface.
2 The term “C4ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the first high-tech war conducted in outer
space in the history of mankind.”
3 Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, upper stages parts, and fragments of launch vehicles.
4 According to an April 2018 issue of the Washington Times (National Digital Edition) of the U.S., Russia carried out an experimental launch of an anti-satellite missile in March 2018. Moreover, it was
noted that China also carried out an experimental launch of an anti-satellite missile in February 2018.
5 According to the U.S. online news site, The Washington Free Beacon, in January 2018.

Activities.”6 Moreover, countries are working on the meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by monitoring the anti-satellite weapons and space debris to space assets.
solar activity with a potential impact on satellites and See Part III, Chapter 1, Section2-6 (Responses in Space)
electronic equipment on Earth, and threats caused by
2 Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives
1 United States that the United States needs to prepare for the possibility
of conflict extending into outer space.
The United States launched its first satellite, Explorer From an organizational perspective, the National
1, in January 1958, following the satellite launches by Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
the former Soviet Union. The country has since then responsible for non-military space development in
proceeded with a variety of space activities in fields the United States, while the U.S. DoD works on space
including military, science, and resource exploration, development from national security perspective, and
such as launching the world’s first reconnaissance satellite the Joint Force Space Component Command under the
and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the control of the U.S. Strategic Command oversees the
Chapter 3
world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly activities in space from a military perspective.
recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, Major satellites used for military purposes include
and in this regard, actively utilize outer space for security satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning,
purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the electronic / signals intelligence, communication, and
National Space Policy that presents the country’s basic global positioning, and their operations are wide-ranging.
guidelines for space policy.7
The National Security Strategy (NSS) revealed in 2 Russia
December 2017 points out that many countries are said
to have purchased satellites to back up their strategic Russia’s space activities have been continuing since
military activities, and some countries even pursuing a the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union
variety of ASATs on the basis of belief that the capability successively launched multiple satellites after it launched
to attack assets in outer space will give them asymmetrical the first satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in
advantages. But having noted that, the United States October 1957, and had the largest number of launched
indicated that unlimited access to and freedom in activities satellites in the world until the collapse of the former
in outer space were vital interests of the United States, Soviet Union. The satellites included many military
and that the long-term goals in outer space were given satellites, and progress was made in the use of space
consideration by the newly established National Space for military purposes by the U.S. and the former Soviet
Council (NSpC) in an effort to develop strategies. The Union during the Cold War era. Russia’s space activities
National Space Strategy was announced in March 2018, have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed
which demonstrated its recognition that their adversaries in 1991. However, the country has recently started to
had turned space into a warfighting domain, and that the expand its activities once again.
United States would seek to deter, counter, and defeat Regarding the country’s trends in security, the
threats in the space domain that are hostile to the national National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,
interest of the United States and its allies. Based on these approved in December 2015, states that the U.S.
strategic guidelines, the U.S. Department of Defense deployment of weapons into outer space constitutes one of
(DoD) has set the goal of maintaining and strengthening the factors undermining global and regional stability. The
U.S. space superiority for security purposes, recognizing Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, a document
6 In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil
space activities, for the purpose of defining risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UN
COPUOS set up a working group, which carries out discussions every year for establishing the guidelines. In June 2016, an agreement was reached on a part of the guidelines that included details on the
promotion of gathering and sharing of data information on space debris monitoring. Negotiations are currently being continued with the aim of arriving at an overall agreement within 2018.
7 In December 2017, a signing ceremony was held for the Space Policy Directive 1, which was the first policy on space to be announced after President Trump’s inauguration. In his speech, he
mentioned the relationship between space and its military use, and noted the importance of the U.S. space policy, indicating new developments within the U.S. government.

created in April 2014 to specifically define the principles established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979.
of the National Security Strategy in the military field, In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries
mentions the development and maintenance of a group of are promoting their own unique space activities and
orbiting spacecraft to support Russia’s military activities are cooperating with each other to implement space
in space as being one of the main missions. activities.12 The ESA signed a “framework agreement”
From an organizational perspective, the Roscosmos with the EU in May 2004 to prescribe that they will
State Corporation for Space Activities is in charge coordinate on proceeding with space development and
of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and hold regular minister-level council meetings. The joint
economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in May
is involved in space activities for security purposes. 2007 approved the “European Space Policy.”13 This
The Russian Aerospace Forces8 conducts actual space “European Space Policy” mentions improving synergy
activities for military purposes, manages facilities for effects between space activities for civil and defense
launching satellites, among other activities. purposes, and the importance of implementing space
Major satellites launched by Russia are satellites activities based on coordinated efforts among member
for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, radio wave states and ensuring an internationally competitive space
information gathering, communication, positioning, and industry. The Policy identifies security as one of its areas
others, all of which are presumed to be used for security of priority.
Chapter 3
purposes. Currently, Russia is developing a new Angara It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite
carrier launch vehicle,9 along with building a new launch positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA;14
site in Vostochny in the Far East.10 “Copernicus,” an Earth observation program;15 and the
Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS),16

3 Europe a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the
European Defence Agency (EDA),17 will be utilized for
Regarding European outer space activities, France security in Europe.
succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first
time in 1965, following the former Soviet Union and 4 China
the United States, and the United Kingdom succeeded
in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1971. China began working on space development in the 1950s,
Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by and in April 1970, the county launched its first satellite
the United States to own satellites in December 1964 “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation
and July 1965, respectively. Meanwhile, the European launch vehicle “Long March 1,”18 using technology
Space Agency (ESA)11 Convention signed in May 1975 enhanced through its missile development.
8 According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Aerospace Forces were created by merging the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces, and started performing its tasks in August 2015. The
tasks of the Aerospace Forces include: (1) providing focused combat command to the air force; (2) conducting aerial and missile defense; (3) launching and controlling satellites; (4) warning about
missile attack; and (5) monitoring outer space.
9 In July 2014, the first launch of “Angara-1.2PP” was conducted successfully. In December 2014, “Angara-A5” successfully put a dummy satellite into orbit for the first time. The Angara launch vehicle
is considered as the first large launch vehicle that Russia developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is expected that the vehicle will be launching commercial as well as military satellites.
10 The new launch site is being built to replace the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and Russia aims to have the site fully operational by 2020.
11 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and
application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980.
12 In September 2000, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Strategy for Space that committed to pursuing Europe’s coherent and effective space activities. The strategy
envisioned that the EC would make political and strategic decisions on space policies and that ESA would function as the implementing organization. For the satellite positioning system “Galileo”
currently in operation and the environmental and security monitoring program “Copernicus,” the EU and ESA are complementing each other in carrying these projects forward, with the former mainly
taking charge of the policy dimension and the latter the technical dimension.
13 The EC released the European Strategy for Space in October 2016.
14 In December 2016, initial services were launched with 18 satellites. Galileo is set to offer the services in conjunction with GPS because of the insufficient number of satellites. The system is expected
to be fully operational by 2020 when all 30 satellites are in place.
15 New observation satellites called “Sentinels” are being launched to collect imagery necessary for conducting Earth observations. Sentinels are classified according to their purpose into: 1) all-weather
satellite that takes images of land and ocean; 2) all-weather satellite capable of high-resolution land monitoring to provide imagery of vegetation, inland waterways, and coastal areas; and 3) satellite
measuring land-and sea-surface temperature and topography. Six Sentinels are said to be in orbit as of January 2018.
16 The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies.
17 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as
“Helios 2” (a French military reconnaissance satellite), “Pleiades” (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), “SAR-Lupe” (a German group of military radar satellites),
“COSMO-SkyMed” (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites), and “Ingenio” (a Spanish optical satellite).
18 The number of cargo rocket launches in 2016 was 22 in the United States, 22 in China, 17 in Russia, 11 in Europe, 7 in India, 4 in Japan, and 1 in Israel. In terms of the number of rocket
launches, China overtook Russia for the first time to equal the U.S. Moreover, the number of rocket launches in 2017 were 29 in the U.S., 19 in Russia, 18 in China, 11 in Europe (France), 7 in
Japan, and 5 in India.

China has thus far conducted activities such as

manned space flight and lunar rover launches. It is
speculated that China’s space development is intended to
enhance national prestige and develop space resources.
With regard to the organizational setup, the State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology of the State Council,
oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology,
aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space
Administration enforces the administrative control of
the space area for civil and commercial purposes and
represents the Chinese Government externally.
China’s defense white paper “China’s Military as being in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic
Strategy” (May 2015) states that outer space is a warfare. Also, in addition to the continuation of the
commanding height in strategic competition among all launch of Long March series cargo rockets,22 China has
nations. Meanwhile, China asserts that its activities in announced the plan for developing a cargo rocket capable
Chapter 3
outer space constitute “peaceful use of outer space,” and of carrying extra heavy payloads. Carrier launch vehicles
underscores that China is “opposed [to] the weaponization are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned
of and arms race in outer space, and [will take] an active enterprises, which are thought to be also developing
part in international space cooperation.” China also and manufacturing ballistic missiles. It is expected that
commits to “[keeping] abreast of the dynamics of outer China will pursue space development through close
space, deal with security threats and challenges in that collaboration between the public sector, military, and
domain, and secure its space assets.” In addition, “China’s private sector. Moreover, it is regarded that China is
Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space focusing also on the development of satellite ground
activities released in December 2016, presents a vision to stations and opened China’s first satellite data receiving
“build China into a space power” and for “the realization station outside of China, near Kiruna in Sweden in
of the Chinese Dream.” It also presents a schedule of December 2016.23 Furthermore, the country has launched
launches19 up to 2020, and emphasizes international a manned space program with the aim of constructing its
cooperation and the peaceful use of space. On the other own space station.24 The first unmanned cargo spacecraft,
hand, the white paper also notes that China will satisfy Tianzhou 1, was launched in April 2017 from Wenchang
its needs for security, which does not deny the country’s Space Launch Center on the carrier rocket, Long March-7
military use of space. Y2. After that, Tianzhou 1 succeeded in being docked
China is indeed actively using space for information with Tiangong-2, a space laboratory. Other than that, the
collection, communications,20 and positioning for Hainan Sheng Institute of Remote Sensing is planning to
military purposes.21 While the details of the tasks and launch a series of 10 satellites between 2019 and 2021.
organization of the Strategic Support Force, established Also, China is considered to have become one of the space
in January 2016, have not been revealed, it is pointed out powers through investments, research and development,
19 In addition to lunar exploration, it also cites the launch of worldwide services for the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Mars exploration, asteroid exploration, and Jupiter exploration.
20 In August 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum science satellite called Mozi that will be carrying out a proof-of-concept mission for quantum communication between space and a
ground station
21 By December 2012, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System officially started its services covering most of the Asia-Pacific region. It is reported that the BeiDou system has already started to be
mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, fishing boats, among other vessels. BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive
short message features. It is suggested that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share, in real time, the position and other data related to vessels of other countries that Chinese
navy vessels have detected, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas.
22 In September 2015, China succeeded in its first launch of Long March-6 (for launching small satellites) and Long March-11 (solid-fuel propellant, for instantaneous launching of small satellites). China
also succeeded in launching Long March-7 (for launching “Shenzhou” manned spacecraft) in June 2016 and Long March-5 (for launching large satellites) in November 2016. On the other hand, the
launch of their Long March 5 rocket in July 2017 ended in failure. It also announced plans to launch Long March-9 (for launching ultra-large satellites), which aims to achieve capability to launch
100-ton payload into low orbit, by around 2030.
23 It is noted that this receiving station located in the Arctic Circle offers many security advantages, such as ease of receiving data obtained by Earth observation satellites in sun-synchronous orbits
(including photo reconnaissance satellites).
24 The National Medium and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development published by the State Council of China in February 2006 positions space station construction, lunar
exploration and high-resolution Earth observation systems as specific critical projects in the aerospace area.

and introduction of technologies from the United States an Earth observation satellite, which are supposedly
and other countries. It has been suggested that China used also for security purposes. In February 2017, India
could threaten U.S. information superiority in outer space successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded
in the future.25 Furthermore, as described earlier, China with 104 satellites,30 marking the largest number ever
continues to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China carried on a single rocket in the world. In the future, the
conducted a test using a ground-launched missile that country plans to implement planetary explorations and
destroyed its own satellite. In July 2014, China tested conduct manned space flight.31
an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of
a satellite.26 It is also suggested that China is developing 6 Republic of Korea
directed-energy weapons,27 including “killer satellites,”
jammers, and laser beams. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to have
started full-scale space development from the latter
5 India half of the 1990s. The ROK carries out space activities
based on the three key plans it established in November
India’s space development promotes space programs 2013, namely: the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space
aimed at social and economic development in line with Development (2014-2040),”32 which plans to move up the
the five-year national plan. The country’s 12th Five- first launch of launch vehicles manufactured by the ROK33
Chapter 3
Year Plan28 focuses on non-military projects including to June 2020;34 the “Space Technology Industrialization
communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g., Strategy,” which prompts the private sector to lead space
disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather development; and the “Revision of the Korean Rocket
observation), transportation systems, space science, and Development Plan,” which outlines the use of ROK-

spinoff promotions. made launch vehicles and the ROK’s own development
The Space Commission (SC) determines the country’s of planetary and space exploration satellites and high
space policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister orbit satellites.
and assumes responsibility for securing space development On the organizational front, the Korea Aerospace
budgets and implementing space development programs. Research Institute leads research and development as an
The Space Agency, managed by the SC, oversees the Indian implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency
Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which implements for Defense Development is engaged in the development
space development policy following the country’s space and use of various satellites.
policy, develops and launches launch vehicles, and Major satellites used by the country include imagery
develops and manufactures satellites. reconnaissance and communication satellites. The ROK
In April 2016, India operated a positioning satellite relies on other countries to launch its satellites.
that can position itself around India29 as well as launched
25 According to the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of November 2015.
26 The February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of a satellite.
In addition, it states that China has satellite jamming capabilities and is making progress on an anti-satellite system.
27 According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” published by the U.S. DoD in June 2017, China continues to develop
directed-energy weapons, electronic countermeasure systems (jammers), and a variety of capabilities including capability to counter satellite, designed to limit or block the use of space assets by
adversaries during a crisis or conflict.
28 The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017. The 13th Five-Year Plan has yet to be announced.
29 In April 2016, India succeeded in launching the seventh satellite constituting the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which completed the deployment of the constellation.
30 All 104 satellites were launched and placed into polar orbit at the same time. They comprised India’s roughly 700 kg Cartosat-2D Earth observation satellite and 103 small satellites weighing less
than about 10 kg each (1 each from Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UAE, 2 from India, and 96 from the United States).
31 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule.
32 In January 2013, for the first time on its third attempt, the ROK successfully launched the space launch vehicle “Naro (KSLV-1)” that was developed based on the first stage of the Russian Angara rocket.
33 The ROK had planned to launch a test space rocket in December 2017, but has postponed this launch until October 2018 due to technical issues.
34 The Mid- and Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development (1996-2015) released in 1996 is considered to be the ROK’s first space plan.

Section 5 Trends in Cyberspace
1 Cyberspace and Security
Owing to the advancement of information and and communications networks. Furthermore, military
communications technology (ICT) in recent years, forces rely on various critical infrastructures, including
information and communications networks such as the electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber
Internet have become essential components across all attacks against such critical infrastructures could become
facets of life. Meanwhile, cyber attacks1 against critical a major impediment to their missions. For this reason,
infrastructures, namely, information and communications cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy
networks, have the potential to seriously impact the lives capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by
of individuals. exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is
Types of cyber attacks include functional disruption, believed that many foreign military forces are developing
data falsification and data theft caused by unauthorized offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has been pointed
access to information and communications networks or out that China and Russia in particular are bolstering
Chapter 3
through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, functional the cyber attacking capabilities of their militaries for
impairment of the networks through simultaneous the purpose of obstructing the networking of military
transmission of large quantities of data, as well as attacks forces and destroying infrastructure.3 In addition, actors
intending to shut down or take over a system belonging (including non-state actors) attempting to cause harm
to critical infrastructure, such as power systems. Also, to nations, etc. are likely to have realized that attacking
Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, through cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly
with cyber attacks2 becoming more and more advanced using physical means.4 Moreover, it is said that the
and sophisticated by the day. information and communications networks of countries
For military forces, information and communication are being compromised for the purpose of gathering
capability form the foundation of command and control, intelligence. As more confidential information becoming
which extend from central command to ground-level to be stored in cyberspace, cyber espionage through cyber
forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further attacks is causing more serious damage.
enhancing the dependence of units on information
2 Threats in Cyberspace
Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently forces of various countries.5
been carried out against information and communications Some of these cyber attacks are said to involve
networks of government organizations and military a range of organizations including China’s PLA,6
1 The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from global-level targets, including interstate targets, as well as nations and government institutions, local
communities, business communities and infrastructures, companies, and individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target.
2 In the Japanese MOD’s “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace” of September 2012, cyber attacks are characterized as follows: (1) diversity: cyber attacks involve diverse actors, methods,
objectives, and context; (2) anonymity: actors can easily conceal and disguise their identity; (3) stealth: some cyber attacks are difficult to identify and can take place without causing any realization
of damage; (4) offensive dominance: attack tools are easy to acquire depending on the tool, and it is difficult to completely eliminate software vulnerabilities; and (5) the difficulties of deterrence:
retaliatory strikes and defensive measures have minimal deterrence effect.
3 According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (March 2018).
4 According to the “Cybersecurity National Action Plan” unveiled by then U.S. President Obama in February 2016.
5 According to the annual report presented to Congress by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget based on the Federal Information Security Management Act, the number of cybersecurity incidents
reported to federal offices in FY2017 in the U.S. was 35,277. Moreover, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2018 names Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea as being the main countries that pose the greatest cyber threat to the U.S. It also indicates that (1) Russia is continuing its spying on critical infrastructure of the U.S. as well as that of
its allies, while also targeting the U.S., NATO and allies in trying to obtain information on U.S. policies, (2) China is continuing its engagement in cyber espionage while also enhancing its cyber attack
capabilities to address its priority issues in national security, (3) Iran is continuing infiltration efforts in countries allied to the U.S and the West for the purpose of espionage and in preparing for future
cyber attacks, and (4) North Korea is engaging in cyber activities to acquire funds, gather information and launch attacks against the ROK and the U.S. See Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 1 regarding ISIL’s
use of cyberspace.
6 “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concludes that the most active cyber attack group targeting the
United States and other countries is Unit 61398 under then Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department. The report also states that then Third Department of the General Staff Department,
which constituted the cyber unit, had 130,000 personnel.

Trends in Cyberspace Section 5
intelligence agencies, security agencies, private hacker agencies for carrying out cyber attacks to affect the
groups, and companies.7 According to the defense white outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.14 In
paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015),8 China March 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice announced
will expedite the development of a cyber force and that it indicted four hackers, including two officers of the
enhance its cyber capabilities. Furthermore, it has been Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), for computer
pointed out that cyber warfare units have been formed hacking in order to steal information from at least 500
under the Strategic Support Force that was created as million user accounts of a major U.S. Internet company.
part of China’s military reforms9 in late December 2015. It is believed that the Russian military, intelligence and
In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management security agencies, and other organizations engage in
(OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as cyber attacks. Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian
it later came to light, personal information of about military has its own cyber command.15 This cyber
22 million people including U.S. federal employees command is believed to be responsible for conducting
and U.S. Forces personnel were stolen. While Chinese offensive cyber activities,16 including inserting malware
involvement in this attack has been suggested,10 China into command and control systems of adversaries.17 It
denies its involvement and explains that it was a “crime” has been indicated that such Russian activities reflect
involving Chinese hackers. objectives including intelligence gathering to support
Moreover, it was pointed out that in April 2017, two Russian decision-making, operations to support military
Chapter 3
groups of hackers associated with Chinese governmental and political objectives, and continuing preparation of the
organizations carried out cyber attacks on the government, cyberspace environment for future contingencies.18
military and defense companies of the ROK.11 It has been It was reported in May 2017 that the ROK Ministry
pointed out that China is using cyber attacks to obtain of National Defense had concluded that the September

sensitive information concerning critical infrastructure, 2016 cyber attack on the internal network of the ROK
national security decision-making processes, and plans Armed Forces was conducted by an entity which was
of military tactics of other countries.12 believed to be a North Korean hacker group.19 Moreover,
Russia’s involvement has been pointed out in the it has been pointed out that documents containing military
cyber attack that caused a large-scale power outage in secrets were stolen as the result of this cyber attack. In
Ukraine in December 2015.13 As for the cyber attack the Wannacry Malware cyber attack in May 2017, the
caused by ransomware in many countries centered on malware encrypted and rendered unusable hundreds of
Ukraine in June 2017, both the U.S. and U.K. governments thousands of computers in hospitals, schools, businesses
announced in February 2018 that it was initiated by the in over 150 countries. Regarding this incident, the United
Russian military. States announced that it has publicly attributed the cyber
Government has also criticized Russian intelligence attack to North Korea in December of that same year.20
7 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2016) notes that China carries out cyber espionage led by the Ministry of State Security and military
organizations as well as cyber espionage led by China’s many non-state actors targeting the United States. These actors include hackers contracted by the government, civilian “patriotic hackers,”
and criminal organizations.
8 The defense white paper notes that, “Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security,” “As international strategic competition in
cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces,” and China is “one of the major victims of hacker attacks.”
9 Since September 2015, China has publicized a series of its decisions on military reforms, and in January 2016, announced the establishment of the Strategic Support Force and other units. While
the details of the Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare.
10 See the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). In addition to this attack, the report states that a U.S. airline company was attacked by the
same method used in the attack against the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
11 According to the report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of July 2017.
12 According to the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released in November 2017.
13 In February 2016, the New York Times reported that there were doubts about the involvement of the Russian military with which Ukraine is in a standoff over the annexation of Crimea and other matters.
14 According to the joint statement issued in October 2016 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence of the United States, and the joint report issued in
December of the same year by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI concerning Russian cyber attacks on the U.S., as well as the U.S. intelligence community report on Russia’s cyber
attacks on the U.S. presidential election released in January 2017. Moreover, during the 2017 presidential campaign in France, Macron, known as a hardliner on Russia, was reportedly a target of a
cyber attack, as well as a widespread fake news story about having hidden assets in a tax haven. After being appointed president, in a joint press conference of the French and Russian presidents,
Macron criticized Russian media outlets by name, referring to them as organs of lying propaganda.
15 The incident occurred in 2014. Other than that, there was another cyber attack on this Internet company in 2013, resulting in leaking of information on 3 billion people.
16 According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing for lower house members in February 2017. According to this statement, the Russian military has a cyber
command. Minister Shoigu emphasized that the command was “for opposing political propaganda activities” since there was an information war taking place between Russia and the West, indicating
the purpose of the command was for defense. Also, it is pointed out that the number of Russia's cyber troops comes to approximately 1,000.
17 According to then U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.
18 According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (May 2017).
19 According to the digital ROK National Defense Report in May 2017. Furthermore, the report revealed that IP addresses (Internet addresses) used in the attacks were traced back to the Shenyang
region of China, known to have been used by existing North Korean hackers.
20 According to a press release by Homeland Security Adviser Bossert of the United States Moreover, according to JPCERT/CC, over 2,000 devices in 600 locations are said to have been infected.

It has been pointed out that this cyber attack succeeded defense and aerospace industries, allegedly conducted by
in collecting 140,000 dollars in Bitcoins. In addition, state-sponsored hacker groups. In addition, supply chain
according to the ROK National Intelligence Service, risks, including products embedded with deliberately
North Korea has repeatedly hacked the ROK exchanges and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence
for the purpose of stealing cryptocurrency, and it has of advanced malware designed to attack industrial
succeeded in acquiring the equivalent of several dozen control systems are cause for concern.23 Cyber attacks
billion won (several billion yen). These cyber attacks exploiting insecure IoT devices, including the massive
were believed to be for raising money. cyber attack by the Mirai malware in 2016, are becoming
It has been pointed out that North Korean government conspicuous, and this kind of threat is expected to grow
institutions are involved in such cyber attacks,21 and as a in the future.24 Cyber attacks on telecommunication
national project, the North Korea is training hackers for networks of a government and military forces, or on
cyber attacks.22 critical infrastructure25 could have a serious effect on the
Meanwhile, in Japan, the Japan Pension Service was security of states, and it has been pointed out that state-
hacked in May 2015, which led to the theft of the personal sponsored cyber attacks have been on the rise in recent
information of pension recipients and policyholders. years. Given this situation, there is a need for continuous
Other than this incident, there are many reports about monitoring of trends in the threats in cyberspace.
cyber attacks on governmental agencies and businesses in
Chapter 3
3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various and Japan calling for maintaining a free cyberspace,27
initiatives are under way at the whole of government level while Russia, China, and most emerging countries call
and the ministry level, including defense ministries.26 for strengthening national control of cyberspace. Against
A number of issues have been raised that need to be this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the
dealt with to enable an effective response to be taken to rule of law in cyberspace in the international community.
cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge The Fifth UN Group of Governmental Experts failed to
in recent years. For instance, it is regarded that the submit a conclusive report, however, discussions are being
international community has diverging views concerning held on the establishment of international rules within the
the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how framework of global conferences on cyberspace.28
international law applies. It is suggested that countries See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-7 (Response to Cyber Attacks)
have clashing claims, with the United States, Europe,
21 In November 2013, ROK media outlets reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service made revelations about North Korean cyber warfare capabilities in the national audit of the Information
Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party of North Korea, stated that, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled
with nuclear power and missiles.” In the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,”
introduced in Congress in February 2016, it is stated that North Korea has an offensive cyber operations capability. The 2016 Defense White Paper published by the ROK in January 2017 notes that
North Korea has concentrated on boosting its cyber units to nearly 7,000 personnel.
22 For example, “NK Intellectual Solidarity,” a North Korean defector association in the ROK, held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and
presented material entitled “North Korea’s cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by government agencies employing
superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities.
23 In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications
Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment
manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well
as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the central government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the PLA augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move has been taken by
other countries, including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan. Some countries, including the United Kingdom and the ROK, have issued warnings.
24 According to the “Cybersecurity Strategic Mid-Term Review: What Is Expected of Cybersecurity in 2020 and Beyond” prepared by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in July 2017.
25 In “North Korean Actors Spear Phish U.S. Electric Companies” published in October 2017 by FireEye, the U.S. cybersecurity company, multiple U.S. electric companies are said to have been attacked
through spear phishing emails from cyber threat actors likely affiliated with the North Korean government, in September 2017.
26 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cybersecurity that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being
integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such
functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense
ministry, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with cyber attacks as an important
strategic objective.
27 These countries have called for the free flow of information and multi-stake holder approach including business and civil society as well as governments.
28 Global conferences on cyberspace have been held since being proposed by the then U.K. Foreign Secretary Hague in 2011, and the series of conferences has been called the “London Process.”
The conferences have been attended by the governments, international organizations, groups from the private sector, NGOs, etc., of over 100 countries, and comprehensive discussions are held on
various issues regarding cyberspace. They are high-level, large-scale global conferences, and the most recent one was held in November 2017.

1 The United States military operations. Additionally, the DoD states that
the aforementioned cyber capabilities include cyber
In the United States, the Department of Homeland operations to disrupt an adversary’s military-related
Security is responsible for protecting Federal government systems.
networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, U.S. Cyber Command's mission is to “direct,
and the Department’s Office of Cybersecurity and synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning
Communications (CS&C) works to protect the networks and operations.” The Command consists of the Cyber
of government agencies.29 Protection Teams that manages the cyber forces of the
According to the National Security Strategy U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and
announced by the United States in December 2017, operates and defends the information infrastructure of
many countries regard cyber capabilities as being a the DoD, the National Mission Teams that support U.S.
measure to influence other countries, and cyber attacks defense against national-level threats, and the Combat
have become a crucial aspect of modern-day warfare. As Mission Teams that supports the operations conducted by
such, the United States intends to deter, defend, and if unified combatant commands on the cyber front (these
necessary, defeat other countries with cyber capabilities. three Teams are collectively referred to as the Cyber
To ensure this, the United States came up with a strategic Mission Force).32 U.S. Cyber Command ,which had been
policy to streamline integration of the U.S. government’s a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command,
Chapter 3
authorities and procedures to (1) improve its capabilities was elevated to a unified combatant command in May
in identifying cyber attacks and responding quickly to 2018, allowing the Cybercom commander to report
them, (2) improve cyber measures for protecting the directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense as is the case
assets, critical infrastructure, information, etc., of the with other unified combatant command commanders.33

U.S. government, and boosting expertise, and (3) enable The United States deems that China continues to
the launching of cyber operations against adversaries conduct cyber-enabled theft targeting a broad set of U.S.
when necessary. In January 2018, the U.S. Department interests ranging from information related to national
of Defense (DoD) announced the 2018 National Defense security, to sensitive economic information and U.S.
Strategy, which props up the National Security Strategy. intellectual property.
It described a policy of investments in cyber defense, In September 2015, then U.S. President Obama and
resilience, and the continued integration of cyber Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed at their summit
capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. meeting that the two countries will not conduct cyber-
Moreover, the DoD Cyber Strategy30 released in April espionage of intellectual property.34 Then in November
2015 under the Obama administration states that the 2017, President Trump and President Xi Jinping agreed
DoD has set out the following three primary missions31 to continue upholding the terms of the agreement at
in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD networks, systems, and the summit meeting in 2015. Nevertheless, it has been
information; (2) defend the United States and its interests pointed out35 that cyber espionage by China continues
against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and unimpeded as before.
(3) provide integrated cyber capabilities to support
29 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced a cybersecurity strategy in May 2018. More than 20 billion devices are expected to become connected to the Internet by 2020, and this is also
said to increase the risks.
30 The DoD Cyber Strategy states that Russia and China have acquired advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. It goes on to say that Russian activities are carried out stealthily and their intentions are
difficult to discern. The Strategy notes that China steals intellectual property to benefit Chinese companies. Furthermore, it states that while Iran and North Korea have less developed cyber capabilities,
they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests.
31 In order to execute these missions in cyberspace, the DoD presents the following five strategic goals: (1) Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations; (2) Defend
the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions; (3) Establish arrangements to defend the United States and its interests from cyber attacks of significant
consequence through collaboration with relevant departments and companies; (4) Use cyber options to control conflict; and (5) Build close cooperative relations with allies and partners.
32 According to a statement made in April 2015 by the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, and other sources, the three forces are made up of several
teams, and dozens of them are currently operating. Employing the National Guard and reserve units, the Cyber Mission Force is set to have 133 teams (National Mission Teams [13 teams], Cyber
Protection Teams [68 teams], Combat Mission Teams [27 teams], Support Teams [25 teams]) and 6,200 personnel by September 2018.
33 In announcing the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a combatant command, the U.S. DoD has stated that the domain of cyberspace is just as important for military operations as land, sea and air,
and that operational capabilities in cyberspace are indispensable for military success. They indicated that the future issues will be the bolstering of cyber weapons, cyber defense, and the scale and
capabilities of cyber personnel.
34 During the summit meeting, then President Obama allegedly expressed deep concerns over China’s cyber attacks and stated that the United States would exercise all possible tools, hinting at the
application of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that they would hold U.S.-China ministerial dialogues on fighting cybercrime. Moreover, Australia has agreed for both countries
not to engage in cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property at the high-level security dialog with China in April 2017.
35 According to the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released in November 2017.

2 NATO 3 The United Kingdom
The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Policy The United Kingdom, in its “NSS- SDSR2015” released
on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which were in November 2015, committed to investing £1.9 billion
adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and over the next five years in increasing its cyber defense
operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying
attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016,
to member states to develop their cyber defense, and the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy”
provide assistance to member states if they are subject to that presented a vision for the United Kingdom, which
cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous
with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in and con dent in the digital world. To achieve this vision,
September 2014, agreement was reached that NATO’s the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to possess
collective defense applies to cyber attacks against the means to effectively “defend” from cyber threats,
member states. to “deter” through having the means for offensive cyber
As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council action, and to “develop” cutting-edge technologies.
(NAC) provides political oversight on policies and In terms of the Government’s overall cybersecurity
operations concerned with NATO’s cyber defense. In policy, the Office of Cyber Security and Information
Chapter 3
addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division Assurance (OCSIA) has been set up to present strategic
formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber policies and to coordinate cybersecurity planning for the
defense.Furthermore, in November 2017, an agreement overall government. In October 2016, the National Cyber
was reached on creation of a new Cyber Operations Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the
Center to help integrate cyber into NATO planning and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
operations.36 Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber to promote public-private partnerships for responses to
defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten national cyber incidents.
the defense capabilities of its servers. In addition, NATO
has expanded cooperation with EU in the fields of 4 Australia
cybersecurity and cyber defense.37
In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence In its first “National Security Strategy” published In
Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to January 2013, Australia positions integrated cyber
serve as NATO’s cyber defense-related research and policies and operations as one of the top national
training institution,38 and was established in Estonia’s security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security
capital of Tallinn. CCD COE carries out research on the Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides
relationship between cyber activities and international that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that
law, and created the “Tallinn Manual.”39 In February private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and
2017, “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as the second that threat information will be shared.
edition of the previous manual based on a review of broad In terms of organization, the Australian Cyber
discussion points, from peacetime legal regimes, such Security Centre (ACSC) that brings cybersecurity
as laws on state responsibility, human rights, aviation, capabilities from across the government into a single
space, and maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, location was established in November 2014 to respond
such as the use of force and laws on armed conflict. to major cybersecurity issues related to government
36 According to the press conference after the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting in November 2017.
37 In July 2016, NATO and the EU signed a Joint Declaration with the aim of expanding cooperation in dealing with new issues, such as those in terrorism, refugees and immigrants, including the
cybersecurity issues. They have been strengthening cooperation, for example, by exchanging information on cyber defense.
38 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber
defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013.
39 The “Tallinn Manual” and the “Tallinn Manual 2.0” are both considered independent outputs of the members that participated in the project (Professor Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War College
served as project leader; members included professionals, scholars on international law, and experts in cyber technology in the West and other areas), and not the official view of NATO.

agencies and critical infrastructures.40 In July 2015, the on strengthening the following five areas: prevention,
ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity,41 which detection, response,44 systems, and security base. In the
contended that the number, type, and sophistication of national defense sector, the Cyber Measures Technology
cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. Moreover Team was established by the Ministry of National Defense
cyber forces were established within the military in July to respond to cyber and hacking threats.45 It also created
2017 to strengthen the Department of Defence’s cyber the “National Cybersecurity Crisis Response Manual”
capabilities and systems.42 that stipulates rapid response procedures to cybersecurity
crises after drawing up the “National Cyber Security
5 Republic of Korea Strategy.” In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff centralized
the cyber attack tactical system mainly around the Joint
The ROK formulated the “National Cyber Security Master Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the Cyber Tactics
Plan” in August 2011, which clarifies the supervisory Department, assigning control authority concerning
functions of the National Intelligence Service43 in cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis and publishing a field manual on “joint cyber tactics.”
Chapter 3
40 The ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, analyzes cyber threats
and responds incidents in both private and public sector.
41 According to the report, malicious actors in cyberspace targeting Australia are: (1) foreign government-sponsored adversaries; (2) serious and organized criminals; and (3) groups motivated by certain
issues and individuals with personal grievances.
42 According to Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy announced in October 2017, the country’s offensive cyber capability in support of military operations will be deployed through the
Australian Signals Directorate in cooperation with the Australian Defence Force.
43 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a
national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders.
44 In February 2014, the ROK Ministry of National Defense reportedly briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries.
45 According to the ROK National Defense Report in April 2017.

Section 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology

as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases
1 Military Science and Technological Trends
Recent developments in science and technology, Furthermore, there is the possibility that a revolution
as represented by the dramatic advancement of in military logistics will occur due to the 3D printing
Information and Communications Technology (ICT), technology, for example by allowing the procurement
has impacted a variety of areas, triggering significant of parts that does not rely on inventory. For instance, in
and revolutionary changes in many areas such as August 2017, the U.S. Navy announced that they carried
economy, society, and lifestyle. out a demonstration experiment on mobile 3D printer
The military sphere is no exception. Developed equipment capable of manufacturing replacement parts2
countries, including the United States, consider that in forward-deployed regions.
transformations driven by advances in ICT can dramatically Major countries with sophisticated and modernized
improve combat and other capabilities, and therefore, military forces, place emphasis on improving the
continue to pursue a variety of ICT research and policies. destructive capabilities of weapons, precision guidance
Chapter 3
For example, if information on enemy forces collected technology, information- related technology including
by using information-gathering systems, including C4ISR, unmanned technology (e.g., drones),3 artificial
reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is intelligence (AI) and big data analysis,4 and hypersonic
shared on a network, command and control can be technology5 to be able to carry out more precise and
exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters, effective attacks. Recently, reports have been published
and offensive power can be directed swiftly, precisely, of successful tests of railguns6 and high energy laser
and flexibly against targets. weapons7 that are expected to provide effective repower
Additionally, new ICT technology has been developed compared to existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms
in recent years. For instance, in August 2016, China of their cost per ring, range, precision, promptness, and
launched a satellite called “Mozi” to perform the world’s other aspects. Furthermore, there have been reports about
first quantum cryptographic communications1 testing. the development of high speed strike weapons (HSSW)
Then in January 2017, it was said that they succeeded that can strike even long-range targets with conventional
in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic weapons, quickly and with pinpoint accuracy.8
communication between China and Australia. Going Recent research of the Defense Advanced Research
forward, new technologies such as quantum cryptography Projects Agency (DARPA) of the U.S. Department of
communications could potentially be applied to the Defense (DoD) has pointed out a variety of advanced
military field in various countries in the future. research and development in small unmanned aircraft
1 Quantum cryptographic communication is a method of communication that relies on quantum cryptographic technology, an encryption technology that makes use of quantum properties, and it is said
that third parties cannot decode it.
2 Associated equipment that includes 3D printers is stored in a container, allowing some parts to be manufactured immediately and on the spot.
3 Drones for military use such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), and unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) have been developed (UMVs may be classified into unmanned
surface vehicle (USV) and unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)). It is suggested that these drones could shift from human-operated types to fully autonomous types, as known as Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS). Furthermore, within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussions are taking place on the operation of systems
that automatically kill enemies without human judgment from the perspectives of their characteristics, human intervention and international law.
4 In the “Third Offset Strategy,” the United States has given the example of “deep-learning machine” technology using AI, which can analyze big data to detect signs of cyber attacks, issue alerts, etc.
5 For example, in the United States, DARPA and the Air Force are engaged in joint research and development of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), aiming to apply the
technology to hypersonic missiles, etc. in the future. HAWC uses the technology of scramjet engine, which enables hypersonic flight by taking in air at hypersonic speed and burning it without
reducing the speed to below the speed of sound. Furthermore, Russia is developing Zircon, an anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, which has been attracting attention for its performance and
naval vessel it will be deployed on.
6 A railgun is a weapon that shoots bullets by using the magnetic field generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces are developing a railgun with a range of about 370 km, or
about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile.
7 The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities against small ships and drones, and firing tests have been carried out. It is considered that these high
energy laser weapons systems will be miniaturized, with a possibility for placing the weapons on light mobility vehicles. In addition, tests have been conducted on integrating the high energy liquid
laser area defense system (HELLADS) with the ground-based laser weapons system, since 2017. Tests have also been carried out to bring down unmanned aircraft by using lasers in efforts to put
the technology to practical use.
8 Said to fly at lower orbital altitudes than ballistic missiles with the aim of greatly reducing the time required for conventional weapons attack.

Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases Section 6
capable of airborne launch, recovery, and reuse,9 difficulty possessing advanced technologies and non-
unmanned vessels to detect submarines,10 long-range state actors including terrorist organizations will carry
anti-ship missiles available under electronic warfare out research and development on weapons and other
environment, spacecraft capable of rapidly launching equipment that will enable them to gain superiority in
satellites,11 and space monitoring telescopes capable of fighting against countries with state-of-the-art technology,
discovering even small objects. and illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other
Recent advances in military science and technology means.12 For instance, ISIL seemed to have started using
are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil unmanned aircraft for both reconnoitering and attacking,
technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing therefore research and development of technology
equipment are improved and new equipment is developed, for countering these threats13 is also recognized as an
dual-use technology has been leveraged frequently. important challenge in the future.
In general, it is expected that countries which have
2 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases
Recently, Western countries in particular have continued all countries participating in joint development and
Chapter 3
to face difficulties when they try to increase defense production, (3) mutual complement of technologies, and
budgets significantly. On the other hand, the sophistication (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the
of military science and technology and the greater latest technology.
complexity of equipment have escalated development For example, the joint development and production

and production costs and have raised unit prices for of the F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the largest
equipment procurement. Under these circumstances, joint program. At present, there is anticipated demand for
many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in around 3,200 aircraft.14 This project will have impacts
order to maintain and enhance their national defense on the defense production and technological bases of the
production and technological bases. countries involved, through the operation, sustainment
Western countries have set a target to increase and maintenance stages of the aircraft.
competitiveness through realignment of their defense Additionally, there is an increasing number of
industry, based on the aforementioned situation related cases where governments are providing funding for
to national defense budgets. The United States has national defense-related research and development
experienced repeated mergers and integrations among conducted by the private sector. In the United States,
domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced for example, approximately US$3.17 billion in research
cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense and development funding was requested for FY 2018
industry, especially in Germany, France, the United to DARPA15 whose mission is to make investments in
Kingdom, and Italy. breakthrough technologies that will contribute to national
In response to the escalation of development and security. The defense authorities have long provided
production costs, Western countries are promoting substantial funding for the research conducted by
joint development and production and technological companies and universities. The EU has also promoted
cooperation related to equipment among their allies and a gradual process on the framework to fund research
partners. This move aims for (1) splitting development related to defense technology, against the backdrop of the
and production costs, (2) expanding demands in consistent decline in national defense research expenditure
9 DARPA has announced plans to carry out flight tests in 2019 with the aim of testing the airborne launch and recovery of unmanned aircraft.
10 The Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (“Sea Hunter”) is capable of navigating several thousand kilometers for months without crewmembers on board through
constant remote supervision by humans. In August 2016, this vessel allegedly completed its initial sea trials ahead of its deployment by the U.S. Navy slated before the end of 2018.
11 In May 2017, DARPA announced the development of the spaceplane, “XS-1,” capable of launching satellites quickly and at low cost.
12 It has been reported in the media that the report released by the Combating Terrorism Center of the United States Military Academy has pointed out the possibility of improved performance in
unmanned aircraft used by terrorist organizations, including increased loading capacity and boosted flight range.
13 It has been reported that the DoD launched a 700 million dollar project as a measure against drone attacks by terrorist organizations such as ISIL.
14 There are nine countries involved in the joint development and production of the F-35 Fighter jets, which are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Countries acquiring them include Israel, the ROK, and Japan, and the defense production and technological base of these countries is involved in their production and
sustainment.
15 DARPA is the DoD agency. Approximately 100 program managers, who are hired for limited stints, generally three to five years, oversee around 250 research and development programs. It does not
have its own research and development facilities.

Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional
Fig. I-3-6-1 Fig. I-3-6-2
Arms Export (2013-2017) Arms in the Asia-Pacific Region (2013-2017)
Global shares in Import values Comparison with

Comparison with
defense equipment Country ($ as billion), 2008–2012 import
Country 2008–2012
export (%), 2013–2017 values (%)
export values (%)
2013–2017 1 India 18.048 +24
1 United States 34 +25 2 China 5.786 -19
2 Russia 22 -7 3 Australia 5.559 +7
3 France 7 +27 4 Pakistan 4.147 -36
4 Germany 6 -14 5 Indonesia 4.014 +192
5 China 6 +38 6 Viet Nam 3.990 +81
6 United Kingdom 5 +37 7 Republic of Korea 3.239 -49
7 Spain 3 +12 8 Taiwan 2.847 +260
8 Israel 3 +55 9 Bangladesh 2.239 +540
9 Italy 2 +14 10 Singapore 2.150 -60
10 Netherlands 2 +14 Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by import
Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by export value between 2013–2017 are listed.
value between 2013–2017 are listed (decimals are rounded).
Chapter 3
by member states over the past 10 years. In 2017, the ROK have expanded exports of affordable equipment
EU commenced Preparatory Action on Common Security due to the development of the infrastructure required
and Defence Policy (CSDP) - related research in which it for production of equipment with the past imports of
will provide €90 million over three years to more than 12 equipment and the improvement of capabilities in science
national defense research programs, with the European and technology.

Defense Agency as the implementing body of this Importing countries adopt offset policies17 in order
framework.16 to keep a good balance between improving defense
Countries have exported equipment overseas since the capabilities through imports and developing domestic
Cold War era, and even today, many countries are taking defense production and technological bases, including
measures to promote exports. setting requirements that domestic companies would
Exports of equipment to the Asia-Pacific region have be involved in parts manufacturing as a condition for
increased in recent years. This has been underpinned by procurement of equipment and services from abroad.
economic growth in the region as well as the growing See Fig. I -3-6-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional
influence of China, the existence of territorial disputes, Arms Export (2013-2017));
Fig. I -3-6-2 (Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional
and responses to the enhancement of military buildup in Arms in the Asia-Pacific Region (2013-2017))
neighboring countries. Countries such as China and the
16 The EU has launched a funding program called “Horizon 2020” for research and innovation to which it has committed 80 billion Euros over the seven-year period from 2014 to 2020. However, the
provision of funds is limited to research for civilian or dual-use technology. In the United Kingdom, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) has a budget of £6 million in FY2017 and
regularly solicits conceptual demonstration research topics in order to fund research with a novel, high risk and high potential earning rate to develop capabilities for U.K. defense and security.
17 The definition of offset in defense trade encompasses a range of industrial and commercial benefits such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, purchasing,
and credit assistance, technology transfer, assistance in purchase and payment, to “Offsets in Defense Trade Version Twenty-First Study” by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry
and Security.

Part
Ⅱ
Japan’s Security
and Defense Policy
and the Japan-U.S.
Alliance
Chapter 1
Basic Concepts of Japan’s
Security and Defense
Chapter 2
About the National Defense
Program Guidelines
Chapter 3
Development of Legislation for
Peace and Security and the SDF
Activities since Legislation’s
Enforcement
Chapter 4
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance
FY2017 Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises (November 2017)
Chapter
1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s
Security and Defense
Chapter 1
Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order United States, which shares basic values and interests
for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, with Japan. This underlines that the peace and security
Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense
and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense
and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities
essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
for Japan to continue to prosper . However, peace, safety, Moreover, from the perspective of improving the
and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing security environment surrounding Japan and preventing
for them. The essence of national security can be found the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of
in creating an international environment that is stable and the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in
predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats cooperative efforts as a member of the
before they occur, through diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities,
reality of the current international community suggests Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing
that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from peace and safety to the Asia-Pacific region, and eventually
the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a
diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were variety of fields.
to be invaded it would not be able
to remove such a threat. Defense
capabilities are the nation’s
ultimate guarantee of security,
expressing its will and capacity to
eliminate foreign invasions, and
they cannot be replaced by any
other means.
For this reason, Japan is
striving to develop appropriate
defense capabilities to protect the
life and properties of its nationals
and to defend the territorial land,
sea, and airspace of Japan. At the
same time, it is strengthening the
Japan–U.S. Alliance1 with the
Prime Minister Abe and Minister of Defense Onodera inspecting the Special Guard of Honor
1 In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate
closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics.

Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy Section 2
Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy
1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense
Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign
to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a
Chapter 1
a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces
peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the
Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as
of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-
of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and

Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.
2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution
1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against

Japan; (2) When there are no appropriate means to deal
Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the with such aggression other than by resorting to the right
required minimum self-defense capability. The specific of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force is
limit is subject to change according to the prevailing confined to be the minimum necessary level. However,
international situation, the level of military technologies, it has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made
and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security
through annual budget and other deliberations by the Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its
Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability People,”1 that “the use of force” should be interpreted
constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for
Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be self-defense when the following “three new conditions”
considered within the context of Japan’s overall military are met: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has
strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign
to possess certain armaments depends on whether country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs
such possession would cause its total military strength and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a
to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to
armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is
to be used only for the mass destruction of another no appropriate means available to repel the attack and
country is not permissible under any circumstance as ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use
it would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary of force to the minimum extent necessary. The following
level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess is the interpretation of the measures for self-defense
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution defined in
strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. the abovementioned Cabinet decision.
The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears
to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in
Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under
2 Article 9 of the Constitution all forms. However, when considered in light of “the
right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in
In the past, the Government had interpreted Article 9 the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of
of the Constitution to mean that armed force could be Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their
used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
following three conditions were met: (1) When there is of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in
1 See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1-1

governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot logic of the Government’s view to date.
possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be
measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace carried out while observing international law. At the same
and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional
for self-defense are permitted only when they are interpretation need to be understood separately. In
inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force”
where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit permitted under the Constitution is, under international
of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The
Chapter 1
armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding Government has reached a conclusion that although this
these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an
minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they
is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view are permitted under the Constitution, only when they are
consistently expressed by the government to date with taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable
regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in
Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the other words, for defending Japan.
document “Relationship between the Right of Collective
Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the
Geographic Boundaries within which the Right
Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of 3 of Self-Defense may be Exercised
Councillors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must
be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution. The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan
To date, the Government has considered that “use under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined
of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory,
an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to
light of the situation in which the security environment give a general definition of the actual extent to which it
surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed may be used, as this would vary with the situation.
and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as
balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed
and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of
in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas
foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the
depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. minimum necessary level of self-defense.
Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost
diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful 4 Right of Belligerency
settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance
with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes
based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be
still required, however, to make all necessary preparations recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does
in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a
Under such recognition and as a result of careful general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has
examination in light of the current security environment, under international law, including the authority to inflict
it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force
against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan
a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary
occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties
poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished
there is no other appropriate means available to repel the from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though
attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation
use of force to the minimum extent necessary should of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum
be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.
measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic

Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy Section 2
3 Basic Policy
Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a 4 Securing Civilian Control
highly effective and joint defense force in line with the
basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense- Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the
oriented policy and not becoming a military power that military in a democratic state or democratic political
poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened
Chapter 1
the principle of civilian control of the military, observing until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. civilian control system that is entirely different from the
one under the former Constitution. Civilian control aims
1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in
accordance with the will of the people.4

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals,
defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such
that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and
minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) /
capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of
limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general
policy including these matters refers to the posture of a administrative function, entirely falls under the executive
passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the
the Constitution. Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute
the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf
2 Not Becoming a Military Power of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme
command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of
There is no established definition for the concept of a Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense,
military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a exercises general control and supervision over the SDF
military power that could threaten other countries means duties. In addition, the National Security Council of
that Japan will not possess and maintain a military Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on
capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, national security.
beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense. At the MOD, the Minister of Defense is responsible
for issues concerning national defense, and as the head
3 Non-Nuclear Principles of the MOD also controls and manages the SDF. The
Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the
not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the
and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.5
adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed In addition, the Special Advisers to the Minister of
line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on
manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under important issues under the jurisdiction of the MOD based
the Atomic Energy Basic Law.2 In addition, Japan on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council
ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and
Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, uniformed SDF personnel of the MOD deliberates on
has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire basic principles concerning administrative affairs under
nuclear weapons.3 the Ministry’s jurisdiction.
Through these ways, the MOD aims to further
2 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed
independently under democratic management.”
3 Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”
4 The Cabinet’s control over military matters was limited.
5 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1

enhance the operation of the civilian control system.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system
is well established. However, in order to ensure that
the system achieves good results, it is necessary to
continue making practical efforts in both political and
administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in
national defense taken by the people.
Chapter 1
Prime Minister Abe delivering an address aboard JS Myoko (September 30, 2017) (Photo
courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office)

Outline of the National Security Strategy Section 3
Section 3 Outline of the National Security Strategy
1 National Security Council
As the security environment surrounding Japan grows important matters with regard to foreign and defense
increasingly severe, Japan faces mounting security policies pertaining to national security. Administrative
Chapter 1
challenges it needs to address. Under such circumstances, organs that are deeply involved in policies support the
it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to Secretariat with both personnel and information. The
national security from a strategic perspective under strong Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel
political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For of the MOD with concurrent posts, who are engaged
this reason, the National Security Council was established in the planning and designing of policies, as well as

in the Cabinet in December 2013 to provide a platform to the utilization of respective specialized knowledge. In
discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security. addition, information such as global military trends are
Since its establishment, the Council has met 179 times (as shared in a timely manner.
of the end of June 2018) and has been serving as a control The enhanced ability to plan and design national
tower for foreign and defense policies. The National security policies has led to systematic alignment of
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Japan’s national security, and to providing a direction
Guidelines (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in for policies with regard to new security challenges.
this National Security Council. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated
The National Security Secretariat established and efforts to expedite decision-making are made based
within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security
to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved
Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing, planning and execution of policies within the MOD.
and overall coordination of basic guidelines and See Fig. II-1-3-1 Organization of the National Security Council
Fig. II-1-3-1 Organization of the National Security Council
Structure to Support the National Security Council (Image)

National Security Council
Emergency Situations
4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Minister Meeting
Serves as a control tower for Maintains the civilian control Strengthens the response to
foreign and defense policies function of the former Security serious emergencies
concerning national security Council
Support
Other Agencies within
National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat
the Cabinet Secretariat Situation response /
Close crisis management
Functions as a secretariat to provide constant support
to the National Security Council coordination
Planning and designing, and overall coordination of National Center of
basic guidelines and important matters pertaining to Incident Readiness and
foreign and defense policies with regard to national Strategy for Cybersecurity
security
Provides necessary advice when responding to Cabinet Intelligence
contingencies from a national security viewpoint and Research Office
etc…
Provide data,
information
and personnel
Related Ministries and Agencies

Ministry of Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc…
A scene from a National Security Council meeting held upon North Korea’s launch
of ballistic missile (Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office)

2 National Security Strategy
1 Japan’s National Security Policy Framework meaning as the definitive statement of the Government’s
basic policy on national security, with a focus on
The NSS approved by the National Security Council and diplomatic affairs and defense policy.
the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s first
ever basic policy on national security with a focus on
Outline of the National Security Strategy:
diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defines 2 Proactive Contribution to Peace based on
Chapter 1
approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term the Principle of International Cooperation
view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy
on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed
Japan’s defense policies theretofore. to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in
The NDPG, which was established based on the NSS, international politics and business, it also seeks its own
defines basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role security as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific
of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF region from its stance as a Proactive Contribution to Peace
equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a medium- based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will
to-long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace,
equipment and the establishment of troop operational security and prosperity of the international community.
systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires In achieving the aforementioned fundamental
many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly principle of national security, the NSS stipulates national
designed for the next decade or so. interests and goals, and presents a strategic approach that
The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) needs to be employed.
specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay See Reference 5 (National Security Strategy [Outline])
defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent
five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability KEY WORD
targets defined in the NDPG. The fiscal year budget
is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and Proactive Contribution to Peace
the necessary expenses for each fiscal year will be
A fundamental principle of national security introduced in the NSS,
appropriated based on relevant situations.
which refers to Japan’s commitment to contribute to ensuring
To date, the NDPG has contained mention of
international peace, stability and prosperity even more proactively and
nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense in a manner proportional to Japan’s national power.
policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries it with great

Chapter
2 About the National Defense
Program Guidelines
Section 1 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines

Since it was first developed in 1976, the National Defense and the level to achieve based on the security environment
Chapter 2
Program Guidelines (NDPG) has been established five and the changes in military situation surrounding Japan.
times. The current National Defense Program Guidelines Therefore, the NDGP must squarely face the reality of
FY2014 and beyond was introduced in 2013.1 The NDPG security environment all the time and set forth the defense
is a “grand design” to ensure peace and security of Japan, forces which are truly needed to protect the Japanese people.
which establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces See Fig. II-2-1-1 (Changes in the roles of defense force)
About the National Defense Program Guidelines

1 Basic Approach
The NDPG is the first of its kind to be developed based for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as
on the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and
Fig. II-2-1-1 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability

[Background]
1976 NDPG Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG
Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community
Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and • The concept of Basic Defense Capability
(October 29, 1976 the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan • Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation
the National Defense preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping
Council/Cabinet Meeting) Need to show the target of defense force buildup
with a direct military threat to Japan
19 years
[Background]
The end of Cold War
International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty • Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability
(November 28, 1995 • “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing
the Security Council/
National expectations to international contribution
Cabinet Meeting) to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense
capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”
9 years
[Background]
New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic
missile attacks • Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international
(December 10, 2004
Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and
Cabinet Meeting) Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on diverse contingencies
deterrence to handling the situation • Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of basic defense capability
6 years
[Background]
Change in global power balance
Complex military situation surrounding Japan • Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic
(December 17, 2010
Diversification of the military role in global society Defense Capability)
Cabinet Meeting) • Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and
making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security
3 years
environment in a dynamic manner
[Background]
Security situation surrounding Japan has become
increasingly severe • Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
(December 17, 2013 U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region
the National Security • Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which
Council/Cabinet Meeting) Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security
of the Great East Japan Earthquake environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime
supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly
1 Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2013

security in light of Japan’s geographical characteristics2 adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin
under the new security environment.3 various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted
Amid the increasingly severe security environment capability assessments based on joint operations in
surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in
situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations order to identify the functions and capabilities that should
(see Part 1, Chapter 1, Section1), which require the Self be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great
Defense Forces (SDF)’ commitment are both increasing. significance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-
Among these situations, the qualitative and changing security environment surrounding Japan, and
quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability
the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient. The build-up, based on the results of these capability
NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the assessments. Additionally, it requires the build-up of the
enhancement of deterrence and response capability by most effective operational posture, by further strengthening
Chapter 2
pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission- a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.4
capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct See Reference 6 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for
activities, as well as developing defense capabilities FY2014 and beyond)
2 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy
1 Basic Policy 2 Japan’s Own Efforts
In light of the NSS, Japan will build a comprehensive Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan
defense architecture, and actively promote bilateral and will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense
multilateral security cooperation with other countries force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of
while strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, thereby flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. In
seeking to establish an infrastructure necessary for fully the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately
exercising its defense capabilities. and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to
Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government
a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the approach, in coordination with local governments, private
basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense- sectors, and others.
oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various
a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect
of civilian control of the military and observing the Three its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the
Non-Nuclear Principles. safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an
Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear emergency situation.
weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the United In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan
States is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster
the United States, and take appropriate responses through response posture by systemizing various related plans
its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive
and active role in international nuclear disarmament and training, and exercises.
non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up
a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above,
in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive
defense architecture.
2 The NDPG discusses that Japan’s geographical characteristics make it a maritime state, therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. It also
states that Japan faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas.
3 The NDPG describes new trends in the global security environment and the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the new trends in the global security environment, it
mentions: 1) expanded and deepened interdependence among countries; 2) increase in the number of gray-zone situations; 3) change in the power balance; 4) undue infringement upon freedom of
the high seas; and 5) securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. With regard to the trends in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, it lists general situations, including that
gray-zone situations tend to linger and could develop into more serious situations. In addition, the NDPG discusses military trends in North Korea, China, Russia and the United States.
4 Specifically, the NDPG calls for the strengthening of various fields as the basic foundation for the SDF in areas such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education,
medical care, defense production, technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, communication capabilities, intellectual
base, and the promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense (MOD).

Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines Section 1
3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance expand the range of countries receiving support as well
as its scope.
The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation
Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the United
national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions States and Australia, will proactively contribute to
as public goods that contribute to the stability and building cooperative relationships in the region, and
prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint
region and the world at large. From this perspective, training and exercises.
Japan will place emphasis on: strengthening deterrence
and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; (2) Cooperation with the International Community
strengthening and expanding of cooperation in a broad It is very difficult for a single country to respond to
range of fields; and steady implementation of measures global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the
Chapter 2
relating to the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. roles of military forces have diversified, such forces
play an important role in building peace and promoting
4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation confidence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue
and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms
(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity

Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation
in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of with the international community. Specifically, Japan
confrontation and the sense of curiosity towards one will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union
another in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, with (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and
and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will
dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia. actively promote various international peace cooperation
Additionally, with regard to capacity building activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular,
assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the
coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including SDF’s capabilities.
Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will
3 Future Defense Force Japan Should Achieve
1 Roles of the Defense Forces Japan will implement an effective response tailored to
each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur
(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various in a consecutive or concurrent manner.
Situations In particular, the following points will be emphasized:
Japan will achieve intelligence superiority5 through (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands;
(ISR) activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer
any signs of development at an early stage. Through such space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.
activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to
tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby (2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and
preventing various situations from occurring. Improvement of the Global Security Environment
At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding
respond to situations from an early stage, including gray- Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation
zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan
continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, will ensure the stability of the security environment in
5 Intelligence superiority refers to having an advantage over the other party in terms of quick and correct identification, collecting, processing and conveying of intelligence.

the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with in relation to various potential contingencies, the SDF
its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure
initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense maritime superiority and air superiority, which is the
cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in
and capacity building assistance. various situations, including defense posture buildup
In order to respond appropriately to global security in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF
issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment
on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-
well as actively promote international peace cooperation ranging logistics support foundation.
activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building At the same time, in terms of preparation for an
assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces,
particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of
Chapter 2
defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts
building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.
(5) implementing international peace cooperation
activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms (2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized
control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The SDF will selectively strengthen the following
functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention

to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the
Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of
2 the SDF U.S. Forces.
See Fig. II-2-1-2 (Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and
(1) Basic Approach Their Content)
Based on the results of the capability assessments

conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations
Fig. II-2-1-2 9 Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and Their Content
Functions and Capabilities Contents

● Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a flexible approach for boosting its ISR posture
ISR capabilities
according to the developments of situations.
● Japan will strengthen its system for collecting and processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the
SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions.
● The SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent
Intelligence capabilities
ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles.
● The SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities and establish a framework for retaining and developing of personnel in
information gathering and analysis.
● In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with
Transport capability
the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.
● In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central
Command and control,
headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures.
and information and
● The SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link
communication capabilities
functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.
● The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an
effective response.
● The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop sufficient
Response to an attack on amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote
remote islands islands.
● The SDF will enhance its logistics support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the
southwestern region.
● The SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.
● To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will comprehensively improve its response capability against ballistic
missiles.
● With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to
Response to ballistic missile
strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.
attacks
● Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response
capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities.
● While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities,
Response in outer space and the SDF will improve the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.
cyberspace ● As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and
secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.
Responses to major ● The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately
disasters, etc. sized units.
Responses focused
● The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units.
on international peace
● The SDF will enhance transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and logistics and medical service structure.
cooperation activities and
● Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.
other similar activities

As for Fighter Units, the 13th squadron will be

Architecture of Each Service of
3 the Self-Defense Forces newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be
abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to
(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-
In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands squadron architecture.
and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air
rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for
with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities (rapid Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the
deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem
armored division). In addition, the GSDF will maintain with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.
mobile operating units capable of effectively performing See Fig. II-2-1-3 (NDPG Comparison Tables)
amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain
Chapter 2
half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in 4 Basic Foundation for the SDF
Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment.
The GSDF will implement rationalization and To ensure that the defense force can function as
streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen
and rockets, and review the organization and equipment the foundations underpinning the defense force.

of units. See Fig. II-2-1-4 (Basic Structure to Maximize defense Capability)
The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at
around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of 5 Additional Points
FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel availability
to respond to major disasters or other situations. The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense
capabilities over the next decade or so. The National
(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Security Council will conduct regular, systematic
The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 review over the course of implementation of the various
(14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer measures and programs. In addition, smooth, swift and
improved response capabilities for various missions accurate transition to the future defense capabilities
and have more compact designs, and will maintain will be facilitated through validations based on joint
ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the operational capability assessment. When major changes
defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of in the situation are anticipated during the review and
maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Destroyers equipped verification process, necessary examination considering
with the Aegis Weapon System will be added, bringing the security environment at that time will be implemented
the fleet to eight. and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light
Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will
information gathering, and warning and surveillance strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the
activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters6 defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with
and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an other national initiatives.
augmented submarine fleet and patrol aircraft units.
(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) KEY WORD

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units
in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space Destroyers equipped
over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating with the Aegis Weapon System
warning and control operations at air defense command
Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high
centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups
performance computers to automatically process series of operations
into warning squadrons as well as establish one new such as target search, detection, identification and attack
squadron in the air warning unit.
6 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

4 Future Considerations
The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming the world, the international community today faces broad
increasingly severe at a pace much faster than when the and diverse security challenges. Of all these challenges,
current NDPG was set forth. As exemplified by North new areas of activities such as cyberspace and outer
Korea’s nuclear and missile development, China’s space require particular attention. With that being said,
military build-up lacking transparency as well as forceful Japan’s security policy rests on our own effort, and it is
and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the required of Japan to boost its defense capabilities and try
East and South China Sea, the proliferation of weapons to expand its roles.
of mass destruction, and escalating terrorism throughout Prime Minister Abe announced in his Policy Address
Fig. II-2-1-3 NDPG Comparison Tables

Chapter 2
Category 1976 NDPG 1995 NDPG 2004 NDPG 2010 NDPG 2013 NDPG
Authorized Number of personnel 180,000 160,000 155,000 154,000 159,000
Active-Duty Personnel 145,000 148,000 147,000 151,000
Reserve-Ready Personnel 15,000 7,000 7,000 8,000
Regionally deployed units in 12 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 5 divisions
peacetime1 2 combined brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 2 brigades
Rapid Deployment Units 1 armored division 1 armored division 1 armored division Central Readiness Force 3 rapid deployment
divisions
1 artillery brigade 4 rapid deployment
brigades
1 airborne brigade 1 airborne brigade Central Readiness Force 1 armored division 1 armored division
GSDF 1 training group 1 airborne brigade
Major units
1 helicopter brigade 1 helicopter brigade 1 amphibious rapid
deployment brigade
1 helicopter brigade
5 surface-to-ship
Surface-to-Ship Guided
guided missile
Missile units
regiments
Surface-to-Air Guided 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery
Missile Units groups groups groups groups/regiments groups/regiments
Major Tanks2 (approx. 1,200) approx. 900 approx. 600 approx. 400 (approx. 300)
equipment Artillery (Main artillery)2 (approx. 1,000/vehicle) (approx. 900/vehicle) (approx. 600/vehicle) (approx. 400/vehicle) (approx. 300/vehicle)
Destroyer units 4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas (8 divisions)
4 divisions 6 divisions
for mobile operations 4 flotillas 4 flotillas 4 flotillas (8 divisions)
regional deployment (Regional units) 10 units (Regional units) 7 units 5 divisions
Major units
Submarine units 6 divisions 6 divisions 4 divisions 6 divisions 6 divisions
MSDF Minesweeper Units 2 flotillas 1 flotilla 1 flotilla 1 flotilla 1 flotilla
Patrol aircraft units (Land-based) 16 (Land-based) 13 9 squadrons 9 squadrons 9 squadrons
squadrons squadrons
Destroyers approx. 60 approx. 50 47 48 54
Major
Submarines 16 16 16 22 22
equipment
Combat aircraft approx. 220 approx. 170 approx. 150 approx. 150 approx. 170
Air Warning & Control Units 28 warning groups 8 warning groups 8 warning groups 4 warning groups 28 warning squadrons
20 warning squadrons 20 warning squadrons 24 warning squadrons
1 squadron 1 squadron 1 AEW group 1 AEW group 1 AEW group
(2 squadrons) (2 squadrons) (3 squadrons)
Fighter Aircraft Units 12 squadrons 12 squadrons 13 squadrons
Fighter-interceptor units 10 squadrons 9 squadrons
Major units Support fighter units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons
ASDF Air Reconnaissance Units 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron
Aerial refueling/ 1 squadron 1 squadron 2 squadrons
transport units
Air transport units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons
Surface-to-Air Guided 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups
Missile Units
Major Combat aircraft approx. 430 approx. 400 approx. 350 approx. 340 approx. 360
equipment (Fighters) (approx. 350)2 approx. 300 approx. 260 approx. 260 approx. 280
Aegis-equipped destroyers 4 ships 6 ships4 8 ships
Major equipment/units that 7 warning groups 11 warning groups/
Air Warning & Control Units
may also serve for BMD 4 warning squadrons units
missions3 Surface-to-Air Guided 3 groups 6 groups
Missile Units
Notes: 1. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG.
2. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010.
3. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG
and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided
missile units in the 2013 NDPG.
4. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as
the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.

to the 196th Session of the Diet in January 2018 that the targeting to revise it by the end of December 2018.
Government would, while maintaining the exclusively In reviewing the current NDPG, it is critical to
defense-oriented policy as given, revise the NDPG. In secure necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity”
the background is the imperative to identify defense of defense capability. Given that the utilization of new
capabilities that are truly needed to protect the Japanese domains, such as cyberspace and outer space is especially
people, and in doing so, the Government must squarely vital, the conventional method of categorization, namely
face the harsh reality in Japan’s surroundings rather than land, sea, and airspace is no longer relevant, and Japan
simply extending the existing capabilities. must fully commit itself to improve capabilities in these
As the current Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) new areas.
ends in FY2018, the Government is reviewing the NDPG
Fig. II-2-1-4 Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability
Chapter 2
Category Main measures
● Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve
relevant agencies and the civilian sector.
Training and Exercises
● Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a
good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities.

● Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as
well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to
ensure readiness.
Operations Infrastructure ● Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in
response to situations that arise.
● Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families.
● Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment.
● Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches
of the service.
● Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources
including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and
secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with flexibility based on a broad view and experience gained
Personnel Education
through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure.
● Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as
enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies.
● Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staffing rate of
Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops.
● Establish an efficient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced
functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital.
Medicine
● Secure and train such medical staff as medical officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve first aid
capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.
● Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole;
Defense Production and
promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use.
Technological Bases
● Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc.
● In order to carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project
management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts.
Efficient Acquisition of Equipment
● Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian
capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize to the contract system.
● Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup,
while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF.
● In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and
Research and Development (R&D)
development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective.
● Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research
institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities.
● Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities
Collaboration with Local aimed at local governments and residents.
Communities ● Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation
of camps and so on have on local economies.
Boosting Communication Capabilities ● Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks.
● Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions.
Enhancing the Intellectual Base ● Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote
various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad.
● Foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole;
Promoting Reform of the MOD
enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions.

Section 2 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program
1 Program Guidelines
Based on the NDPG, the Mid-Term Defense Program

(FY2014-FY2018) (MTDP) states that an appropriate
defense buildup is to be achieved under the following six
basic program guidelines.
See Fig. II-2-2-1 (6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense
Program)
Chapter 2
In reinforcing the structure of the SDF, Japan

will prioritize the improvement of the 9 functions and
capabilities which the NDPG specifies as those that
should be emphasized, and aim to build highly effective
integrated defense forces in an efficient manner.
See Fig. II-2-1-2 (9 Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda at the launching ceremony of JS Shoryu
Reference 7 (Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)) (November 2017)
2 Authorized Number of SDF Personnel and Quantities of Major Procurement
The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the The authorized number of SDF personnel of the MSDF
end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the
approximately 151,000 being SDF Regular Personnel, same levels as at the end of FY2013.
and approximately 8,000 being Ready Reserve Personnel. The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of
Fig. II-2-2-1 6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program
6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program Following the New NDPG
● Place particular emphasis on the following functions and capabilities, while focusing on further enhancement of
joint functions:
(1) ISR Capabilities
(2) Intelligence Capabilities
(3) Transport Capabilities
1 Focus on 9 functions and capabilities (4) C3I Capabilities
(5) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands
(6) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
(7) Response to Outer Space and Cyberspace Threats
(8) Response to Large-Scale Disasters
(9) International Peace Cooperation Efforts
● The SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority as well as
Development of capacities to
rapid deployment capabilities, so as to effectively deter and respond to various situations.
ensure maritime superiority and
2 ● To prepare for invasions such as the landing of a large-scale ground force, the SDF will have capacities to
air superiority as well as rapid
the extent necessary to establish a minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to
deployment capabilities
unforeseen changes in the security situation in the future.
● Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new equipment,
Efficiently secure defense
with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense
3 capabilities adequate both in quantity
capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the MOD will strive to improve cost effectiveness
and quality
by reducing life cycle costs through the strengthening of project management and other means.
● Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent
Promote measures to reform the years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement
4
personnel management system measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its
personnel management system.
Strengthen the deterrence and ● Initiatives for the smoother, more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan will be promoted proactively by
5 response capabilities of the Japan- further expanding various cooperation and discussions, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
U.S. Alliance Defense Cooperation.
Achieve greater efficiencies and ● Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan’s public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater
6 streamline the buildup of the defense efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other
forces measures taken by the Government.

Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program Section 2
Fig. II-2-2-2 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program
Service Equipment Quantity

Mobile Combat Vehicles 99
Armored Vehicles 24
Amphibious Vehicles 52
Tilt-Rotor Aircraft 17
GSDF Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) 6
Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles 9 companies
Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles 5 companies
Tanks 44
Howitzers (excluding mortars) 31
Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) 5 (2)
Submarines 5
Other Ships 5
MSDF Total (Tonnage) 15 (approx. 52,000 t)
Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) 23
Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) 23
Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based) 9
Chapter 2
New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft 4
Fighters (F-35A) 28
Fighter Modernization (F-15) 26
ASDF
New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft 3
Transport Aircraft (C-2) 10
Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) 2 groups & education

Joint units Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 3
Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.
major procurement. Japan aims to develop the defense See Fig. II-2-1-3 (Transition of Annex from the NDPG)
forces described in the Annex Table of the NDPG over a Fig. II-2-2-2 (Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program)
10-year time frame.
3 Expenditures
The expenditures required to implement the defense streamlining and rationalization through efforts such
force developments described in this program amount as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense
to approximately 24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. budgets for the implementation of this program will be
For the duration of this program, in harmony with other allocated within a limit of approximately 23,970 billion
measures taken by the Government, approximately yen over the next five years.
700 billion yen will be secured by means of further

Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018

Japan will steadily build up its defense capability joint defense force.
during FY2018, which is the final fiscal year under In doing so, Japan will place particular emphasis
the MTDP based on the NDPG, to establish a dynamic on the following measures: ensuring security of sea
Fig. II-2-3-1 Main Projects in Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2018
Category Main Programs

Ensure security of ● Acquire unmanned aerial vehicle (Global Hawk); ● introduce stand-off
the sea and airspace missile; ● build new type of destroyers; ● build a submarine; ● procure new
Chapter 2
surrounding Japan type of AEW&C aircraft (E-2D), etc.

● Procure fighter aircraft (F-35A); ● Establish a new F-35A squadron at
Misawa Air Base; ● conduct research on underlying technologies for high-
speed glide bombs for island defense; ● conduct research on underlying
technologies for new anti-ship missiles for island defense; ● acquire new
Standoff Missile (JSM) (image)
Response to attacks aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A); ● procure type-03 middle-range
on remote islands surface-to-air guided missiles (improved); ● develop type-12 surface-to-
ship guided missiles (advanced) and new air-to-ship guided missiles for
reconnaissance aircraft; ● acquire tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22); ● procure transport
aircraft (C-2); ● acquire type-16 maneuver combat vehicles; ● develop
infrastructure for the Southwestern Area Security Unit; etc.
Effective
deterrence and ● Introduce the land-based version of the Aegis system (Aegis Ashore);
Response to ballistic
response to ● procure SM-3 block IIA and SM-3 block IB, develop next-generation warning
missile attacks
various situations aircraft control radar system; etc.
Response in outer ● Strengthen efforts on space surveillance; ● utilize satellite communication; FY2018 FFM (3,900 t class) (image)
space ● utilize commercial imagery satellite and meteorological satellite information, etc.
● Strengthen information collection and analysis system concerning
Response in cyberspace threats; ● strengthen analysis system concerning cyberattacks Warhead Rocket Motor
cyberspace against the Ministry of Defense and the SDF; ● strengthen response system
concerning cyberattacks against organizations; etc.
● Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve
Response to large-
as hubs during a disaster; ● carry out training on large-scale and special
scale disasters
disasters, etc. Research on Element Technologies of a HVGP
(Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for
Strengthening
● Strengthen the Defense Attaches management system; ● enhance capability the Defense of Remote Islands (Image)
intelligence
to collect and analyze intelligence, etc.
capabilities
● Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacific
Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region
region, and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate.
and improvement of the global security
More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc. in
environment
order to respond appropriately to global security and other issues.
● While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, steadily carry out
Measures for the strengthening of the
specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan to
Japan-U.S. Alliance
mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.
● Along with securing talented personnel who will take a role in national defense, Research on Element Technologies of a New
carry out a comprehensive study on necessary measures and ensuring those Anti-Ship Missile Intended for the Defense of
measures are appropriately taken, including strengthening recruiting operations Remote Islands (Image)
Measures for personnel and education
and re-employment assistance, raising the staffing rate of SDF reserve
personnel in order to ensure the robustness of the SDF, while also implementing
measures to support female personnel to achieve their potentials.
● Proceed with various initiatives and save approx. 204 billion yen to greater
Initiatives for greater efficiency
efficiency in all areas of the procurement of equipment.
● Promote strategic initiatives, etc. including enhancing research and
development in light of the Defense Technology Strategy and expanding the
Innovative Science and Technology Initiative for Security program (funding
program); ● steadily proceed with the procurement program of the project
management focused equipment, etc., while also implementing measures Aegis Ashore
in accordance with joint operation and categorization; ● work closely with
Initiatives for policies regarding defense
the private sector, reinforce effective defense equipment and technology
equipment and technology
cooperation posture through intelligence gathering such as the needs of
its counterparts, providing comprehensive support including assistance for
maintenance and repair of equipment, and sending out information; ● promote
measures for maintaining and reinforcing the base by initiatives such as
discovering and utilizing outstanding technology held by small and medium
sized enterprises and carefully assessing the reality of the supply chain.
Other (projects pertaining to the structure ● Deploy troops to Amamioshima Island and Miyakojima Island; ● Reorganization
and the strength of the organization) into mobile division and mobile brigade (Sixth Division, 11th Brigade), etc.
SM-3 Block II-A

Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018 Section 3
and airspace surrounding Japan; response to attacks on united and make efforts to ensure the complete, verifiable
remote islands; response to ballistic missile attacks, while and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass
also focusing on ensuring technological superiority, and destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North
the maintenance and enhancement of defense production Korea, and we must watch North Korea’s future concrete
and technological bases to steadily build-up defense actions closely. It is no surprise that the MOD, whose
capabilities for a dynamic joint defense force. responsibility is to protect the lives and property of the
Furthermore, considering the increasingly severe nationals, needs to be fully ready to be able to respond to
situation in Japan’s public finance, Japan will strive to any contingencies or situations. The MOD will continue
achieve greater efficiencies and streamlining through to carry forward various programs, including the initiative
efforts such as longer-term contracts, while harmonizing to introduce Aegis Ashore, which is allocated in the
these efforts with other measures taken by the Government. FY2018 budget.
In light of the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea See Fig. II-2-3-1 (Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities
for FY2018)
Chapter 2
Summit Meeting held in June 2018, Japan believes it
is important for the international community to stay
Commentary Deployment of stand-off missiles COLUMN

Japan introduces stand-off missiles to effectively defend our country ensuring the safety of Self Defense Forces (SDF) personnel and
in light of the increasingly severe national security environment.
Given significant expansion of radar coverage and anti-aircraft missile range due to significant advances in military technologies
in various countries, S D F jets are currently compelled to respond within the range of these threats. Deployment of stand-off missiles
enables SDF to respond from outside the range. As a result, SDF will be able to respond to invading forces while protecting the safety
of SDF personnel.
Stand-off missile, which is vital to Japan’s defense while protecting the safety of SDF personnel, is necessary to take out hostile
forces when Japan is armed-attacked by the forces and is minimum necessary equipment for self defense.

Section 4 Defense-Related Expenditures
1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures
Defense-related expenditures include expenses for Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. Forces realignment-
improving defense capabilities and maintaining and related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating
managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the impact on local communities) and expense for the
the implementation of measures against neighborhood introduction of new government aircraft, defense-related
affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities. Defense- expenditures were increased by 66 billion yen from the
related expenditures have been on a hike for 6 years previous fiscal year to 5.1911 trillion yen.
Chapter 2
in a row since FY2014, including the duration of the Additionally, the supplementary budget for FY2018
current MTDP under which defense expenditures are set contains an appropriation of 234.5 billion yen as necessary
to increase by 0.8% in real average over the course of expenses for securing stable operations of the SDF, which
five years. includes responding to ballistic missile attacks.
In comparison with the previous fiscal year, defense- See Fig. II-2-4-1 (Comparison Between FY2017 Budget and FY2018
related expenditures for FY2018 were increased by Budget)

Fig. II-2-4-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial
39.2 billion yen to 4.9388 trillion yen. When including Budget] Over the Past 15 Years)
expenses related to Special Action Committee on
2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures
Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay
“personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers expenses,”1 which are paid based on contracts concluded
items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,”
and “material expenses,” which finance the repair which are paid under current-year contracts. Material
and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and
the education and training of SDF personnel and the since general material expenses include repair costs for
procurement of equipment and the others. Material equipment, education and training expenses for personal,
Fig. II-2-4-1 Comparison Between FY2017 Budget and FY2018 Budget

(100 million yen)
FY2017
Category FY2017 Fiscal YOY growth
( ▲ indicates negative growth)
Annual expenditure (note) 48,996 49,388 392 (0.8%)
Personnel and food
21,662 21,850 187 (0.9%)
provisions
Material expenses 27,334 27,538 205 (0.7%)
Future obligation (note) 46,589 49,221 2,632 (5.6%)
New contracts 19,700 19,938 238 (1.2%)
Existing contracts 26,889 29,283 2,393 (8.9%)
Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and expense for the
introduction of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these
are included, the figures are 5,125.1 billion yen for FY2017 and 5,191.1 billion yen for FY2018; and for future obligation, 4,872.6 billion yen for FY2017 and 5,076.8 billion yen for
FY2018. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.
1 In the build-up of defense capabilities, there are things that span multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to
the contractor is made. Therefore, the future maximum obligation is allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in Treasury obligation (type of budget that only grant an authority to incur obligations.
The contracts can be concluded, although the payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in principle in the fiscal year the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, expenses
necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure (type of budget that grant authorities to incur obligations and make payment. The contracts can be concluded and the payment can be
made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for the future fiscal years is termed
“future obligation concerning new contracts.”

Defense-Related Expenditures Section 4
Fig. II-2-4-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years

(100 million) 50,000
49,388
48,996
49,000 48,760
48,607
48,297 48,221
48,000 47,815 47,838

47,903 47,426
47,028
47,000 46,826
46,804
46,625
46,453
46,000
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (FY)
Chapter 2
Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) and expenses
for the introduction of new government aircraft. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: ¥4,902.6 billion in FY2004, ¥4,856.0 billion yen in FY2005,
¥4,813.6 billion in FY2006, ¥4,801.3 billion in FY2007, ¥4,779.6 billion in FY2008, ¥4,774.1 billion in FY2009, ¥4,790.3 billion in FY2010, ¥4,775.2 billion in FY2011, ¥4,713.8 billion
in FY2012, ¥4,753.8 billion in FY2013, ¥4,884.8 in FY2014, ¥4,980.1 billion in FY2015, ¥5,054.1 billion in FY2016, ¥5,125.1 billion in FY2017, and ¥5,191.1 billion in FY2018.

Fig. II-2-4-3 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Amount of future obligation

When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement
of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years.
Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple
years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the
time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future.
Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond
under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion
Personnel yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years
and food FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021
provisions Contract Payment
expenses
Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Remaining sum paid
expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part (6 billion yen)
(1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen)
General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay
(44.2%) expenses expenses expenses expenses
2014 Contract
Future obligation (9 billion yen)
Amount of contract (10 billion yen)

2015 Contract
Obligatory
outlay
2016 Contract expenses
Existing
contracts
Future
2017 Contract obligation
(35.6%)
Structure of Defense-related Expenditures Contract General

New
Annual expenditure material contracts
Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses
expenses and material expenses (program expenses). (activity Material expenses on contract basis
Personnel and
food provisions
Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement expenses)
expenses allowance, meals in barracks, etc.
Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of (20.1%)

equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff;
facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting,
Material expenses
heating, water and supplies; technological research and
(program expenses)
development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and
expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local
communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan FY2018
Obligatory
outlay expenses
Expenses paid in FY2018 based on contracts made before
FY2017
Defense-related
General material
expenditures
expenses Expenses paid in FY2018 based on contracts made in FY2018
(activity expenses)
and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related
“activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classification budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes
method as “classification by expenses.” spending for repairing equipment and for implementing
Personnel and food provision expenses as well as measures to alleviate the impact on local communities
obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage

Fig. II-2-4-4 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2018)

R&D 2.1%
Other 1.6%
Facility development
3.5%
Base measures Personnel and
9.0% food provisions
44.2%
Procurement of By purpose
equipment, etc. of use
16.6%
Other
General materials Maintenance, etc.
16.2% (7,982) GSDF
20.1% (9,949) 23.0%
[ 0.2%] 37.1% (18,310)
Personnel and By
By expense
Chapter 2
food provisions organization

44.2% (21,850) ASDF
[0.9%] 23.6% (11,663)
Obligatory outlays
35.6% (17,590)
MSDF
[1.3%]
23.1% (11,433)
Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen.

2. The above figure does not include SACO-related expenses (5.1 billion yen), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the
impact on local communities) (216.1 billion yen), and expense for the introduction of new government aircraft (31.2 billion yen).
3. Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year-on-year growth rate (%).
of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. common to take multiple years from contract to delivery
For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related or completion, in areas such as the procurement of
expenditures cannot be easily altered in a significant vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well
manner on a single-year basis. as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars
See Fig. II-2-4-3 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure
Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts) is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged,
Personnel and food provision expenses were and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract
increased by 18.7 billion yen from the previous fiscal year, that payments will be made in the following fiscal year
while obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased and beyond (within five years, in principle). The sum of
by 22.6 billion yen. General material expenses decreased money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond,
by 2.1 billion yen from the previous fiscal year.2 based on such a multi-year contract, is called the “future
See Fig. II-2-4-4 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures obligation.” The amount of future obligation concerning
FY2018) new contracts arising in FY2018 increased from the
Reference 14 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related
Expenditures (Original Budget Basis) previous fiscal year by 23.8 billion yen (1.2%).
Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,3 which
In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from
amount of future obligations concerning new contracts the previous fiscal year of 21.7 billion yen (0.7%).
also indicates payments for the following year and beyond See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3 (Efforts Towards Project
(the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable Management etc.)
fiscal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is
3 Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement
In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, the based on a policy to achieve further streamlining and
MTDP specifies securing approximately 700 billion yen rationalization in the defense capability buildup.
2 The comparison with the previous year is concerning expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the
impact on local communities and expense for the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft). The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section.
3 The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (program expenses) that are to be contracted in the
applicable fiscal year and to be paid in the same fiscal year and beyond. The amount is 2.9887 trillion yen in FY2018

Defense-Related Expenditures Section 4
Fig. II-2-4-5 Amount of Reduction Achieved Through Past Streamlining Efforts
Example FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018

Procurement of equipment, etc. and
— ¥41.7 billion ¥14.8 billion ¥11.0 billion ¥5.0 billion
services using long-term contracts
Review of maintenance methods
¥8.1 billion ¥33.6 billion ¥43.2 billion ¥54.0 billion ¥68.5 billion
(Logistics reform)
Use of civilian goods and review
¥25.0 billion ¥42.3 billion ¥45.5 billion ¥58.2 billion ¥16.6 billion
of specification
Bulk purchase of equipment ¥33.1 billion ¥35.0 billion ¥46.5 billion ¥46.7 billion ¥37.1 billion
Prime cost scrutiny, etc. — — — ¥34.5 billion ¥70.1 billion
Single-year total ¥66.0 billion ¥153.0 billion ¥150.0 billion ¥204.0 billion (Note 1) ¥197.0 billion (Note 2)
Total ¥66.0 billion ¥219.0 billion ¥369.0 billion ¥573.0 billion ¥771.0 billion
Notes: 1. The 61.6 billion yen reduction from introducing the Patriot system capable of carrying and operating PAC-3MSE missiles, which was appropriated in the third supplementary budget
for FY2016, is included in the reduction amount for FY2017.
2. The reduction from projects that were moved up to be appropriated in the first supplementary budget for FY2017 is included in the reduction amount for FY2018.
Chapter 2
3. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.
For this purpose, the MOD is currently carrying out Fig. II-2-4-6 The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2017)
reviews to achieve efficiency, and has sought a reduction

(100 million USD) (%)
of approximately 573 billion yen from FY2014 to 8,000 6.0
FY2017 through the following measures: 1) utilize long- 7,000 Defense budgets
5.0
(100 million USD)
term contracts (Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3); 2) review 6,000
Defense budgets as
% of GDP 4.0
maintenance methods; 3) use of civilian goods and 5,000
review of specifications; 4) bulk purchase of equipment; 4,000 3.0
5) scrutiny of the prime cost. Furthermore, approximately 3,000

2.0
197 billion yen of cost reduction is expected in the 2,000
1.0
1,000
FY2018 budget. Concrete initiatives introduced in the
0 0.0
FY2018 budget are as follows. Japan U. S. China Russia ROK Australia UK France Germany
• A reduction of approximately 5 billion yen by making 492 5,689 2,979 1,183 460 239 498 513 475
an over five-years long-term contract of Performance 0.9 3.6 1.3 3.1 2.3 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.2
Based Logistics (PBL) (Part III, Chap.) for maintenance Notes: 1. Defense budgets are based on each country’s public documents. Dollar
equipment of the F110 engine (fighter (F-2)). conversions have been made while referring to each country’s purchasing
power parity for FY2017 as published by the OECD (official rate listed on
• A reduction of approximately 68.5 billion yen through the OECD website) (as of July 2018).
(1 dollar=99.594086 yen=3.506000 yuan=24.111166 rubles
a review of maintenance methods including extending =877.052289 won=1.472003 Australian dollars=0.713283 pound
regular maintenance intervals for the engine of F7-10 =0.796821 euros (France)=0.779292 euros (Germany))
2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP for the U.S., U.K., France, and
(fixed-wing patrol aircraft {P-1}). Germany are based on a NATO publication. The GDP figure published by
the IMF was employed to calculate defense budgets as a proportion of GDP
• A reduction of approximately 16.6 billion yen by for China, Russia, the Republic of Korea and Australia.
pursuing cost savings through the use of civilian goods
and review of specifications of equipment such as the
maintenance of the tactical network control system • A reduction of approximately 70.1 billion yen through
(TNCS). initiatives such as scrutinizing the unit cost and related
• A reduction of approximately 37.1 yen through bulk expenses of major equipment, etc.
procurement of equipment in a single fiscal year that See Fig. II-2-4-5 (Amount of Reduction Achieved Through Past
could lead to a reduction in expenses. Streamlining Efforts)
4 Comparison with Other Countries
Monolithic understanding of the defense expenditures of some countries where such data is publicly disclosed.
each country is not possible in view of differences in the Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures
socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an of each country, though there exists the method of
internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts
and breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense

Fig. II-2-4-7 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years
(Times)
4.00
Japan
3.50
U.S.
Russia Russia 2.84 times
3.00
China
ROK
2.50
Australia China 2.70 times
2.00
ROK 1.62 times
Australia 1.60 times
1.50
Chapter 2
Japan 1.04 times

1.00
U.S. 1.03 times
0.50
0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2008 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as price levels of each country,
it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.
expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect See Part I, Chapter 2 (Defense Policies of Countries)
the precise value based on each country’s price levels. Reference 15 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major
Countries)
Therefore, the results of converting Japan’s defense-
related expenditures and those of other countries officially In addition, Fig. II-2-4-7 (Changes in Defense
published by each government into dollar amounts, using Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten
the purchasing power parity4 of each country reported Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years.
Development (OECD), are shown in Fig. II-2-4-6 (The
Defense Budgets of Major Countries).
4 A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels.

Development of Legislation for Peace
Chapter
3 and Security and the SDF Activities
since Legislation’s Enforcement
Section 1 Background to the Development of Legislation

for Peace and Security
1 Background to the Development of Legislation
The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation
severe, and we are now in an era where threats could and contribute even more proactively to the peace and
easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can stability of the international community under the policy of
maintain its own security only by itself any longer. “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle
Chapter 3
Against this background, it is first and foremost of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop
important to advance vibrant diplomacy in order to domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.
maintain peace and security of Japan, and ensure its In May 2014, following a report submitted by the
survival, as well as to secure its people’s lives. However, Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis
Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement
at the same time, it is also necessary to prepare for the for Security and in accordance with the basic orientation
worst-case scenario. for the way that further deliberations would take place as
Specifically, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions were held
beforehand and prevent threats from reaching Japan by in the ruling parties and studies were also conducted by
appropriately developing, maintaining and operating the Government.1 Following this, in July 2014, a Cabinet
Japan’s own defense capability, strengthening mutual Decision was made on “Development of Seamless
cooperation with the United States which is Japan’s ally, Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and
and other partner countries, and in particular, further Protect its People,” which set forth the basic policy for
elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security the development of legislation that enables seamless
Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan- responses to any situations.
U.S. Alliance for the peace and stability of Japan and the See Reference 16 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation
Asia-Pacific region. to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People)
On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives
2 Background and Significance of the Development of Legislature
Following the aforementioned Cabinet Decision, a the Government made Cabinet Decisions on two bills,
legislation drafting team was launched under the National the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace
Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In and Security2 and the International Peace Support Bill.3
addition, the Ministry of Defense established “The Study The two bills were then submitted to the 189th ordinary
Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” session of the Diet on May 15, 2015.
with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, and These two bills enable seamless responses to
conducted the deliberations towards the development of any situations, from the protection of assets including
security legislation. The deliberations in the Government weapons of units of the U.S. Forces and armed forces
were conducted based on the discussions at a total of 25 of foreign countries during peacetime, support activities
meetings in the ruling parties, and, on May 14, 2015, to armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations
1 In February 2013, Prime Minister Abe resumed the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, which had been held during the first Abe Cabinet. Following a total of seven
meetings, the Advisory Panel submitted its report to Prime Minister Abe in May 2014.
2 Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community.
3 Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security.

that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and to the recognition of a “survival-threatening situation,”
security and situations that the international community and committed them to obtaining a conclusion on the
is collectively addressing for peace and security (to shape of a Diet organization for the constant surveillance
be discussed later), to the limited use of the right of and post—verification of SDF activities based on the
collective self-defense as a measure for self-defense to Legislation for Peace and Security, and the strengthening
the minimum extent necessary to defend Japan when the of the Diet’s involvement. The Government also made
“Three New Conditions”4 are satisfied. a Cabinet Decision to the effect that the Government
Following the longest extension of a Diet session in will respect the Five-Party Agreement and handle these
the postwar, the longest Diet debate of security-related matters appropriately. The Legislation for Peace and
bills in the postwar period was conducted, constituting Security was put into force on March 29, 2016.
about 116 hours of debate in the House of Representatives With the security environment surrounding Japan
and about 100 hours of debate in the House of Councillors, becoming increasingly severe, the enforcement of the
totaling about 216 hours. As a result, the two bills were Legislation for Peace and Security has a historical
passed at a plenary session of the House of Councillors significance. The legislation, which enables the SDF to
and enacted on September 19, 2015, upon formation of provide protection and logistic support to U.S. naval vessels
a broad consensus, with approval of not only the Liberal engaged in ballistic missile defense, helps strengthen
Democratic Party of Japan and Komeito but also the the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S.
Chapter 3
three opposition parties of the then Assembly to Energize Alliance as a whole, thereby further ensuring the peace
Japan, the then Party for Future Generations and the then and security of Japan through making more proactive
New Renaissance Party (altogether five parties out of the contributions to the peace and stability of the region and
ten political parties). the international community. The Legislation has been
Just before the passage, these five parties reached the highly appraised around the world. This fact clearly shows
“Agreement Concerning the Legislation for Peace and that the Legislation contributes to the peace and stability of
Security” (the “Five-Party Agreement”), which include the region and the international community.5
matters that should be taken into consideration in judging See Fig. II-3-1-1 (Structure of the Legislation for Peace and
the applicability of the Three New Conditions related Security)
Fig. II-3-1-1 Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security
Peace and Security Legislation Development Act

（Bundling together partial amendments to the existing laws）
* In addition to those in the left column, the 10 existing laws were revised for technical reasons.
Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security: Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for
Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community
1. Self-Defense Forces Law
2. International Peace Cooperation Act
Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations
3. Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan → Changed to Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace
and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security
4. Ship Inspection Operations Act

Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations
5. Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation
6. U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act → Changed to the U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act
Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation
7. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities

Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
8. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation
9. Prisoners of War Act

Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation
10. Act for Establishment of the National Security Council
New enactment (one)

International Peace Support Act: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International
Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security
4 See Chapter 1, Section 2

5 The Legislation for Peace and Security has been drawing understanding and support not only from Japan’s ally, the U.S., but also from Australia, countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle
East, South America, as well as ASEAN, the EU and the United Nations.

Background to the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security Section 1
Commentary Enhanced deterrent through peace and security legislation COLUMN

Peace and security legislation implemented two years ago improved content that enables broader cooperating with the United States
and other related countries than previously, such as expanding the scope of activities for which supplies and services can be provided
to US troops operating in the same theater as Self Defense Forces.
In 2017, Japan delivered supplies and services to US troops collecting intelligence and provided protection to forces from other
countries collaborating with Self Defense Force troops in activities that benefit Japan’s defense.
These activities reinforced the Japan-US alliance and bolstered Japan’s deterrence. The peace and security legislation hence
has clearly brought increased certainty to Japan’s national security. The government intends to continue to put utmost efforts into
protecting the lives and peaceful existence of the Japanese people.
Commentary The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security COLUMN
and the Constitution
The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution
Chapter 3
● When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that
is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
● When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and
protect its people; and
● Use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary,
only when the Three New Conditions above are satisfied. Even for the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions, the
basic logic of the constitutional interpretation presented in the Governmental view of 1972 (below) has not changed:
● The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the “use of force” in international
relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of all peoples of the world)
to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of
the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all of the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution
cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to
maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival.
● Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent
unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally
overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people.
Hence, the “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted.
Furthermore, the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions remains within the scope of the Supreme Court
decision on the Sunagawa Case. The Supreme Court decision states that
● “it must be pointed out that it is natural for Japan, in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to take
measures for self-defense that may be necessary to maintain its peace and security, and to ensure its survival.”
In other words, the decision can be interpreted as recognizing that Japan should be able to take “measures for self-defense”
to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival after stating that Japan has the right to self-defense, without making a
distinction between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense.
As the Legislation for Peace and Security, which reflects the Three New Conditions described above in just proportion, maintains
the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation hitherto presented by the Government and remains within the scope of the
Sunagawa Case decision by the Supreme Court, the only institution endowed with the power to finally determine the constitutional
interpretation, it is consistent with the Constitution.

Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others after

Section 2 the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security
This section gives an outline of a full picture of the framework See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)
for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use
of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units)
well as the main operations of the SDF including the new
activities the SDF can now engage in after the streamlining
of the Legislation for Peace and Security.1
1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations
The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and as unavoidable self-defense measures for Japan’s defense
Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security along with some other changes.
in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-
Threatening Situation2 specifies items that should be
Chapter 3
Armed Attack Situations, etc. and Survival-

stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the 1 Threatening Situations
Basic Response Plan) regarding responses to Armed
Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation, (1) Basic Response Plan etc.
etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations as well as the In situations such as an Armed Attack Situations, etc.,
responsibilities of national and local governments in the or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government is
event of an armed attack. required to adopt the Basic Response Plan, which includes
Previously, the aforementioned legislation stipulated the following items, and ask for approval by the Diet.
responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc. However, In addition, once the Basic Response Plan is adopted, a
considering the changes in the security environment temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc.,
surrounding Japan, a “Survival-Threatening Situation” (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet,
was newly added to the situations to which Japan is to to implement these measures.
respond as an armed attack since even if it occurs against a (1) The following items concerning situations that need
foreign country it could threaten Japan’s survival as well, to be dealt with:
depending on its purpose, scale and manner. Following a. Sequence of the event the situation, the confirmation
this, the SDF Law was also amended to define responses of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc.,
to such a situation as one of the SDF’s primary duties or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts
that support this confirmation
b. When the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack
KEY WORD
Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation,
Armed Attack Situation and

Anticipated Armed Attack Situation
KEY WORD
• An armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack
against Japan from outside has occurred or an imminent and clear Survival-Threatening Situation
danger of the armed attack against Japan is acknowledged.
• An anticipated armed attack situation means a situation where A Survival-Threatening Situation means a situation where an armed
an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with
increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated. Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s
(These situations are referred to as “Armed Attack Situation, etc.” survival and of overturning people’s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of
collectively.) happiness fundamentally.
1 In addition to the ones explained in this section, see Reference 18 for the other conditions in which inflicting injury on a person is permitted.
2 Following the addition of a Survival-Threatening Situation, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s
Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-
Threatening Situation.”

Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security Section 2
Fig. II-3-2-1 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation
Occurrence of armed attack, etc.
Creation of a draft basic response plan (1) Formulation of the draft basic response
plan by the Prime Minister
The Government
National Security Council

(2) The draft basic response plan sent to
Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation the National Security Council for deliberation
(3) Recommendation by the National Security

Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning
Recommendation Council to the Prime Minister concerning
Specialized assistance to National Security Council the draft basic response plan
Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan
Chapter 3
The Diet
Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc. (note) Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet
(Task Force Chief: Prime Minister)
Approval Rejection
• Comprehensive promotion of response measures
• Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public Terminate immediately
facilities, etc.
Response according to the basic

Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions
response plan and usage guidelines
Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against
a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival
the reason why there are no other appropriate and termination of the Basic Response Plan. See the
means available to ensure Japan’s survival and reference below for the measures to be implemented.
protect its people, and the use of force is necessary See Fig. II-3-2-2 (Measures to be Implemented by Designated
to respond to the situation Administrative Institutions, etc.)
(2) An overall plan to respond to the Armed Attack (4) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments
Situations, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation See the reference below for the responsibilities of the
(3) Important matters related to the response measures national and local Governments, etc. as defined in the Act
See Fig. II-3-2-1 (Procedures to be Taken to Respond to Armed on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance
Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations) of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack
Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation.
(2) Diet Approval See Fig. II-3-2-3 (Responsibilities of the National and Local
In principle, the prior Diet approval is required to issue a Governments, etc.)
Defense Operation order to the SDF to respond to an Armed

Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation. (5) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures
Following the adoption of the Basic Response Plan, the
(3) Response Measures Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task
In responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., or Survival- Force) will be established within the Cabinet, which
Threatening Situations during the period for which the consists of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of
Basic Response Plan is valid, the designated government States. The Prime Minister is to be appointed as the Chief,
institutions, local governments and designated public and some of the Ministers of States and to be appointed
institutions are to implement the required measures based on as the Deputy Chief.
legal provisions during the period between the formulation If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are

Fig. II-3-2-2 Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, Local Governments or Designated Public Institutions
Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by
armed attacks, in order to bring an armed attack situation, etc., to an end Survival-Threatening Situations in order to bring the situation to an end
(1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the
SDF necessary to repel an armed attack SDF necessary to repel an armed attack against a foreign country that is in
(2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures a close relationship with Japan which as a result threatens Japan’s survival
implemented so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1), actions taken and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to
by the United States Armed Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (a survival-threatening armed attack)
necessary to repel an armed attack, and actions taken by armed forces of (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures implemented
other foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel an so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1) and actions taken by armed
armed attack can be conducted smoothly and effectively forces of foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel
(3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above an armed attack against a foreign country that results in threatening
Japan’s survival can be conducted smoothly and effectively
(3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above
Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from an

armed attack, or minimize the impact of an armed attack on the people’s Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from a
lives and the national economy implemented according to changes in survival-threatening armed attack, or minimize the impact of a
armed attack situations, etc. survival-threatening armed attack on the people’s life and the national
economy implemented according to changes in a situation where an armed
(1) Measures to announce warnings, give instructions on evacuation and the attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival
rescue of injured parties, measures for the restoration of facilities and
equipment, and other measures
(2) Price stabilization and distribution of daily necessities etc., and other • Measures to ensure the security of public facilities and secure the stable
measures supply of daily necessities, etc.
Chapter 3
Responsibilities of the National and Local

to protecting the lives, bodies and properties of the
Fig. II-3-2-3
Governments, etc. people or to eliminating an armed attack, and emergency
responses are required in light of the situations, the Prime

Subject Responsibility
Minster may implement the response measures that
• Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the
homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people the local governments or designated public institutions
Government
• Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survival- have failed to implement, or may have the Ministry of
Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure
and using all organizations and functions State responsible for operations relating to the relevant
• Implement all possible measures as a whole nation countermeasures implement these measures after
• Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, notifying the relevant heads of local government or other
bodies, and properties of the residents
Local
• Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack relevant individuals.
Government
situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national
government, other local governments and other institutions
(6) Report to the United Nations Security Council
• Implement necessary measures to deal with armed
Designated
attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the UN,
Public
Institutions
mutual cooperation with the national government, local the Government shall immediately report the measures it
governments, and other institutions
has taken to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the UN
• Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the
designated administrative institutions, local governments Security Council.
Nationals
or designated public institutions implement response
measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc.
(7) Revisions to Other Relevant Legislation
a. Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others3
Before the revision, the U.S. Military Actions Related
obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the Measures Act specified measures, etc., to be taken to
people, or to eliminating an armed attack, and particularly ensure smooth and efficient operation of the U.S. Forces
when necessary response measures under comprehensive necessary to terminate an armed attack in Armed Attack
coordination are not implemented, the Prime Minister Situations, etc., based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
may instruct the head of the local government concerned In addition to support for the U.S. Forces responding
and other relevant persons to implement the necessary to Armed Attack Situations, etc., support operations
response measures. for the armed forces of foreign countries other than the
In circumstances where the necessary response United States in Armed Attack Situations, etc., as well
measures are not implemented or if there are obstacles as support operations for the U.S. Forces and the armed
3 Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with the U.S. Military Actions in
Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to “Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-
Threatening Situations.”

forces of other foreign countries in Survival-Threatening

Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack
Situations were added in the revision. 2 Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations
b. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act4
The previous Maritime Transportation Restriction Act The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and
had provided procedures for stopped ship inspections and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in
taking ship measures conducted by the MSDF to control Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening
maritime transportation of weapons, ammunition and Situations provides for appropriate and rapid response
military personnel, etc., to armed forces, etc., of foreign measures to be implemented in emergency situations
countries making armed attacks against Japan in Armed other than an Armed Attack Situation and Survival-
Attack Situations. The revision Act added the provisions Threatening Situations in order for the Government to
to control maritime transportation in Survival-Threatening ensure the peace and independence of the country, and
Situations. Furthermore, the waters in which the MSDF to maintain the security of the country and its people.7
can take these measures. According to the revised law
the MSDF can control maritime transportation in Japan’s 3 Responses of the SDF
territorial waters, territorial waters of foreign countries
(only when their consent is obtained) and the high seas, (1) Positioning as the Mission of the SDF
although it was previously restricted to Japan’s territorial The primary duty of the SDF had been to “defend Japan
Chapter 3
waters and the high seas surrounding Japan. against direct or indirect aggression.” Now since the purpose
c. Prisoners of War Act5 of the SDF’s operation in Survival-Threatening Situations
The Prisoners of War Act previously specified items stemming from an armed attack on a foreign country is also
necessary for the detention, internment and other forms to defend japan as well, the revised legislation stipulates
of treatment of prisoners of war, etc., in Armed Attack this is one of the SDF’s primary duties.
Situations in order to ensure the appropriate practice
of the International Humanitarian Law regarding the (2) Defense Operation
treatment of prisoners of war, etc. The provisions were Although an Armed Attack Situation, had been the only
added for the application of the Prisoners of War Act in situation in which a Defense Operation order may be
Survival-Threatening Situations as well. issued, the revised legislation newly added Survival-
d. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities6 Threatening Situations to this category. Following this
To ensure the appropriate and rapid operations of the revision, the Prime Minister can now issue a Defense
SDF and the U.S. Forces and measures vital to the Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it
protection of the people, the Act Regarding the Use of is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed
Specific Public Facilities provides for procedures to Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. As
be taken for comprehensive coordination of the use of it had been before the law revision, prior Diet approval is
specific public facilities (ports, airports, roads, waters, air required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The
zones and radio waves) in Armed Attack Situations, etc. SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise
The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries the use of force only when the “New Three Conditions”
other than the U.S. Forces in Armed Attack Situations, are satisfied.8
etc., were added to the scope of coordination of the use of
specific public facilities. (3) Others
Among the provisions setting forth a variety of authorities
and special measures, etc., necessary for SDF operations
4 Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Restrictions of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, and Others in Armed
Attack Situations, etc.” to “Law Concerning the Restrictions of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations.”
5 Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc.”
to “Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations.”
6 The official title of the Act is the “Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc.”
7 A contingency situation other than an Armed Attack Situation and a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in a threat to Japan’s survival that may have a significant impact
on the security of the nation and its people, including an emergency response situation (a situation where actions that may kill or injure many people by using methods equivalent to those used in an
armed attack, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state).
8 In general, the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution means the act of combat by Japanese physical and personnel organizations as part of an international armed conflict. In
contrast to this, the “use of weapons” as referred to in the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc., means the use of equipment and machinery, etc., designed to directly kill or harm people, or to destroy things
as a means of armed fighting, in accordance with their original usages. While the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution is the idea related to resorting to force, including the “use
of weapons,” all types of the “use of weapons” do not necessarily fall under the category of the “use of force” prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. The “use of force” is permitted under the
Constitution only in cases where the New Three Conditions (See Page 166) are satisfied.

Fig. II-3-2-4 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches for evacuation, relief, and response to armed attack-
induced disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies and
Municipal mayors
property of the people and to minimize influence on its
Ask for dispatch
request Communication (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) livelihood in the case of Armed Attack Situations, etc., or
emergency response situations.
Notes:
Prefectural governors Task Force Chief1 1. Armed Attack Situations, If the Minister of Defense finds it unavoidable
etc. Task Force Chief or
Ask for dispatch Emergency Response after receiving a request from prefectural governors,11
Request Notification Situation Task Force Chief
for or receives a request from the Task Force Chief, upon
dispatch
Report
approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense
(When communication
is established by can issue civil Protection Dispatch Order to the SDF units,
municipal mayors)
etc. to civil protection dispatch to conduct civil protection
Report
Minister of Defense Prime Minister measures or emergency response protection measures
Issue an order to Issue an order for civil
Approve (including assisting the evacuation of residents, providing
gather for civil
protection, etc.2, 3
protection dispatches relief to the evacuees and immediate restoration).
See Fig. II-3-2-4 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches),
Notes:
SDF Ready Reserve 2. If it is particularly necessary to respond
Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-11 (Initiatives for Civil Protection)
Personnel 3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve
SDF Reserve Personnel
Chapter 3
personnel will be called on if

Report for duty
necessary upon the approval of the
Prime Minister
(2) Relationship between Survival-Threatening
Situations and Civil Protection Measures
Units
The Civil Protection Act, stipulates necessary measures,
including issuance of warnings and measures for the
on a Defense Operation order, those whose purpose is evacuation and relief of residents from the perspective of
entirely to respond to direct armed attack on physical protection of the people and their livelihood from a direct
damage against Japan are not to be applied to Survival- attack against Japan and physical damage. A situation in
Threatening Situations.9 which the rules of Survival Threatening Situations are
applicable and warning issuance and evacuation and relief
4 Civil Protection of residents are required is nothing less than a situation
where an armed attack against Japan is anticipated or
(1) Outline of the Civil Protection Act and the Civil imminent. In such a case, it is recognized as Armed
Protection Dispatches Attack Situations, etc., and necessary measures are to be
The Civil Protection Act10 stipulates the responsibilities implemented under the Civil Protection Act.12
of the national and local governments as well as measures
9 The examples of application in Survival-Threatening Situations include the organization of special units, and the defense call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, etc., while the
examples of non-application, which mean the examples of application only in Armed Attack Situations, etc., in other words, include measures for the construction of defense facilities, the authority to
maintain public order, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, and orders to perform duties, etc.
10 The official title of the act is the Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
11 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.
12 In the case that an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is not regarded as an armed attack situation, etc., a series of measures are to be implemented to
ensure the stability of the people’s livelihood, including a stable supply of daily necessities, based on a variety of existing laws and regulations, taking thorough response measures to protect people’s
livelihood without invoking the Civil Protection Act.

2 Responses to Situations that will Have an Important Influence

Previously, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure and security as (1) logistics support activities, (2) search
the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas and rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and
Surrounding Japan had stipulated rear area support,13 rear (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that
area search and rescue operations14 and ship inspection will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and
operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection security, and added “lodging, storage, use of facilities
Operations Law) conducted by Japan as measures to and training services” as the types of goods and services
respond to situations that will have an important influence provided by the SDF in (1) logistics support activities, on
on Japan’s peace and security in areas surrounding Japan. top of the “supply, transportation, repair and maintenance,
In accordance with the changes in the security medical activities, communications, airport and seaport
environment surrounding Japan, the law revision deleted services, and base services” previously. While the
“in areas surrounding Japan” from “situations that will provision of weapons is not included, as before, the
have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security revised law allows the “provision of ammunition” and
in areas surrounding Japan” and changed the name of “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off
situations from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to for combat operations.”
“situations that will have an important influence,”15 and also The revised law made it possible to implement
Chapter 3
extended the scope of militaries that the SDF can support response measures in foreign territories, but only when
and add new types of response measures as follows. the foreign country concerned consents.
1 Militaries that the SDF supports 3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force
On top of the existing “U.S. Armed Forces engaged The revised law sets forth the following measures in order
in activities contributing to the achievement of the to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign
objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” the revised country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:
law added “armed forces of other foreign countries • The SDF does not conduct activities in “the scene
engaged in activities contributing to the achievement where a combat is actually taking place.” Regarding
of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other similar search and rescue operations, however, when stranded
organizations” on the armed forces, etc., responding to personnel have been located and rescue operations have
situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue
peace and security, which the SDF is allowed to support. search and rescue activities as long as the safety of
these units is ensured.
Response Measures to Situations that will Have an • The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order
2 Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat
operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of
The revised law sets out measures to respond to situations their activities or in the vicinity.
that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace • The Minister of Defense designates the area for
KEY WORD implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to
implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole
Situations that will have an important influence or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change
the designation of the area or order the cessation of the
Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and
activities being implemented there.
security, including situations that, if left unattended, could result in a
direct armed attack on Japan
13 Rear area support under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan means support measures, including the provision of goods,
services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in
areas surrounding Japan.
14 Rear area search and rescue operations under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan mean operations conducted by the
SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transportation of those rescued).
15 Previously, “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was understood to be an idea that focuses on the nature of situations, not a geographical idea. In light of the changes in the security environment in
recent years, however, the definition was revised since it is not appropriate to use an expression that could be interpreted as geographically limiting areas where situations that will have an important
influence on Japan’s peace and security may arise. In association with this, the title of the Law was amended from the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” to the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.”

4 Diet Approval on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate

self-defense and aversion of clear and present danger in
As before the law revision, prior diet approval is “the use of weapons of self-preservation type”).
required, in principle, and ex-post facto approval is also
allowed in emergency. 6 Ship Inspection Operations16
5 Authority for the Use of Weapons (1) Outline

Ship inspection operations mean operations to inspect
When engaged in logistics support activities or search and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding
and rescue activities in the event of a situation that will warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a
have an important influence on Japan, SDF personnel are change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the
permitted to use weapons if necessary in order to protect purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures
oneself or other SDF members who are at the same scene, concerning trade or other economic activities to which
or those under the supervision of oneself (so-called “the Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security
use of weapons of self-preservation type”). In addition, Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state.17
SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons jointly with
members of the armed forces or other organizations of (2) Authority for the Use of Weapons
Chapter 3
foreign countries in order to protect the lives and bodies The so-called “the use of weapons of self-preservation
of those stationed at the camps (however, inflicting injury type” is permitted.
3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack
1 Public Security Operations (3) Authority for the Use of Weapons

Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies
(1) Public Security Operations by Order mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF
In the event of an indirect aggression or another emergency personnel, permitting SDF personnel the use of weapons.18
situation, the Prime Minister can order the whole or Moreover, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons
part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to to the extent judged to be reasonable depending on the
maintain public security with the general police force. In situation when certain conditions are met.19, 20
principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4 (Response to Attacks by
Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others)
twenty days from the day the order has been given.
2 Maritime Security Operations
(2) Public Security Operations by Request
Upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of (1) Outline
the prefecture concerned, the governor of that prefecture When there is a special need to protect lives or property
can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units, etc., of or maintain public security at sea, the Minister of Defense
the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will can order SDF units to take necessary actions at sea upon
have a serious influence on public security. Following approval by the Prime Minister.
such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to
mobilize when a situation calls for such action. (2) Authority for the Use of Weapons
The provisions of Article 7 of the Police Duties
Execution Act apply mutatis mutandis to the execution
16 Inspection of ships in the case of a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s Peace and Security is conducted based on the “Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations
that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations (Ship Inspection Operations Act).” See Article 5 of this section (Framework for Contributing to the Peace and
Stability of the International Community) for ship inspection operations in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing.
17 The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
18 Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act (Use of Weapons) permits the use of weapons if deemed reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. However, causing harm to people is
permitted only in cases of legitimate self-defense or evasion of clear and present danger.
19 The “certain conditions” defined herein apply to cases such as when SDF personnel reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement,
or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons exist.
20 Article 16, 17-1, 18, and Article 20-2 of the Japan Coast Guard Law applied mutatis mutandis to public security operation.

Commentary Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security COLUMN

Operations and Maritime Security Operation
Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor
contingencies (the so-called gray zone situations) are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations.
In order to respond promptly to such situations of infringement that do not amount to an armed attack, and ensure seamless and
sufficient responses to any unlawful acts, the Government made cabinet decisions regarding the acceleration of procedures to issue
orders for public security operations and maritime security operations, etc., in May 2015, particularly in the following three cases:
● Responses to foreign naval vessels making maritime navigation through the territorial sea or the internal
waters of Japan that does not fall under the category of innocent passage under international law
● Responses to the unlawful landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group
● Responses to acts of infringement when SDF ships or aircraft detect foreign ships committing said acts
against Japanese private ships on the high seas
Specifically, when an urgent decision is necessary concerning the issuance of orders for public security operations, etc., but it
is difficult to promptly convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the
decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone and other means. Any Minister of State who could not be
contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto.
Chapter 3
Cabinet decision to accelerate procedures to issue orders for public security/maritime security operations in the following three cases,
referring to Cabinet Decision on Government Responses when there is a Risk of Large-Scale Terrorism (November 2, 2001):
Responses to Foreign Vessels Making

Maritime Navigation that Does Not Fall Responses to Illegal Landing on Remote Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing
under the Category of Innocent Passage Islands by Armed Groups on Japanese Commercial
under International Law Vessels on the High Seas
Responses are made by SDF units under When armed groups or groups that are When Japanese commercial vessels are
orders for maritime security operations highly probable to be armed are likely to actually subject to infringement activities,
in principle. illegally land or actually land on remote It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting
The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of islands, to issue orders for (urgent) counter-
Foreign Affairs and the Japan Coast It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting piracy operation or maritime security
Guard promptly and expeditiously share to issue orders for maritime security operation.
information, coordinate and cooperate. operations/public security operations.
It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting to
issue orders for maritime security operation.
When an urgent decision is necessary but it is difficult to promptly convene an adhoc cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister
can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers by telephone and
other means (any Minister who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto).
of duties of SDF personnel, permitting them the use of operations at sea against such acts upon approval by the
weapons. In addition, partial application of the Japan Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister
Coast Guard Law allows SDF personnel to exercise of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it
authority such as requesting nearby persons or ships to to the Prime Minister.
cooperate or boarding on other ships for inspection. The
use of weapons is also permitted in order to stop a ship (2) Authority for the Use of Weapons
when certain conditions are met. SDF personnel may use weapons in executing duties under
See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (Ensuring Security of Sea and Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act. When there
Airspace Surrounding Japan) are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means
are available to stop the passage of a ship perpetrating
3 Counter-Piracy Operations acts of piracy,21 including approaching excessively close
to a non-military ship, the use of weapons is permitted
(1) Outline to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in
When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, accordance with the situation.
the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (Counter-Piracy Initiatives)
21 Article 16, 17-1, 18, and Article 20-2 of the Japan Coast Guard Law.

4 Destruction Measures Against Ballistic Missiles may create an emergency response guideline and get
approval by the Prime Minister in peacetime. Based
In case ballistic missiles22 or other objects launched at on this emergency response guideline, the Minister
Japan as an armed attack against Japan or a Survival- of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures
Threatening Situation, and the New Three Conditions to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the
are simultaneously met, the SDF would cope with the airspace over Japan’s territory or high seas in advance
situation by a Defense Operation order. On the other for a certain period of time once they have actually
hand, if ballistic missiles are flying towards Japan, but been launched towards Japan.
the situation cannot be acknowledged as an armed attack, See Fig. II-3-2-5 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other
the Minister of Defense can take the following measures: Objects), Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic
Missile Attacks, etc.)
(1) When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles or other
objects are flying towards Japan and it is deemed
necessary to take measures to protect lives and 5 Measures Against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace
properties in Japan’s territory if they fall to the ground,
upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take
Defense may order the SDF units to take measures to necessary measures to make intruding aircraft land or
destroy the ballistic missiles in airspace over Japan’s withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding
Chapter 3
territory or high seas once they have actually been intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings,
launched towards Japan. use of weapons,23 etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes
(2) Also, besides the case of (1), the Minister of Defense Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international
may not have enough time to get approval by the Prime law, the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant
Minister when the situation unfolds rapidly such as the laws and regulations.
cases when there was no warning prior to the launch. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (Ensuring Security in the Waters
In preparation for such case, the Minister of Defense and Airspace Surrounding Japan)
Fig. II-3-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles
If armed attack is recognized Not recognized as armed attack

(Declared intent to attack,
imminent missile launch)
When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to
missiles may fly toward Japan is fly over Japan, a rapid change in circumstances
acknowledged may create an emergency situation which makes it
difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime
Minister in time
Minister of Defense orders destruction Minister of Defense orders destruction measures

An armed attack situation is
measures upon approval of in advance as provided in the emergency response
recognized and a defense operation
the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007)
order is issued
Take measures in the framework SDF takes measures on the order SDF takes measures on the order
of defense operation of the Minister of Defense of the Minister of Defense
Article 76 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 3)
(Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles)
Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military

❍ Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific
situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and
evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.
❍ In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their
responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision
in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.
22 Ballistic missiles or other objects except aircraft that are believed to cause grave damage to human lives or property when they fall to the ground.
23 Although there is no clear provision regarding the use of weapons, it is interpreted to be included in the “necessary measures.”

the permission to resort to the so-called “use of weapons

Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals
6 Overseas in defense of the mission mandate.”25 However, causing
harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-
Previously, operations to protect Japanese nationals, defense or evasion of clear and present danger.).
etc. overseas in emergency situations were limited to See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-9 (Response to Rescue and
transporting to safe places those who need protection of Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others)
their lives or bodies, and rescue of Japanese nationals,

etc. overseas involving the use of weapons was not
Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment
allowed even in cases of terrorist attacks. In light of 7 of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed
these circumstances, the newly established provisions Forces of Other Foreign Countries
enable the units of the SDF to take “rescue” that go
beyond transportation and include guarding and rescue The newly added provisions, Article 95-2 of the SDF
of Japanese nationals, etc. overseas whose lives or bodies Law, enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and
could be harmed in emergency situations when the other equipment of the units of the United States Forces
following requirements are satisfied: and the armed forces of other foreign countries that are
in cooperation with the SDF and are currently engaged
(1) Procedures in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan. In
Chapter 3
Upon a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and December 2016, the National Security Council approved
after subsequent consultations between the Minister for “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister the Self-Defense Forces Law,” which sets out the basic
of Defense issues an order following approval by the principles of the article and the Cabinet’s involvement in
Prime Minister. the operationalization of the article, etc.
(2) Requirements for Implementation (1) Coverage

When all of the following conditions are satisfied, the Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces,
rescue measures may be implemented: armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar
a. It needs to be confirmed that in the areas where the organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF and
rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities are, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the
of the country concerned are maintaining public defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding
safety and order at the time, and no act of combat activities in the scene where the combat activities are
will be conducted; actually being conducted).
b. The country concerned24 consents to the SDF taking the
rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and (2) Procedures, etc.
c. It is expected that coordination and cooperation can When a request is made by the United States Forces,
be ensured between the units of the SDF and the etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it
competent authority of the country concerned in order necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection.
to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and
safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers. (3) Authority for the Use of Weapons
In protecting weapons and other equipment described
(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons in (1) above as part of their duties, SDF personnel
In carrying out their duties to implement the rescue are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to
measures, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation
the extent judged to be reasonably necessary, depending on when there are adequate grounds to recognize the
the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize need to use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and
the compelling need to use weapons to protect the lives other equipment (however, causing harm to people is
and bodies of Japanese nationals and others or themselves, permitted only in cases of legitimate self-protection or
or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties (including evasion from present danger).
24 It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.
25 While the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type” permits the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as
oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself), the so-called “right to use weapons in defense of the mission mandate” allows the use of weapons beyond self-preservation, for example, to protect
the lives and bodies, etc., of other people or to repel obstructions of the performance of duties of SDF personnel.

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Commencement of the • Removal and disposal of mines or other explosive
Enforcement of the Protection of Weapons and Other hazardous objects
Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed
Forces of Other Foreign Countries [SDF Law Article 95-2]) • Protection measures for Japanese nationals, etc. in
emergency situations in foreign countries
• Activities to gather information by ships or aircraft
Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and
8 Services to the U.S. Forces about the movements of the armed forces of foreign
countries and other information that contributes to
Regarding the provision of supplies or services to the the defense of Japan
United States Armed Forces, the scope of the U.S. Forces b. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces participating
and the scope of supplies covered were expanded as in multilateral exercises of three or more countries,
follows with the revised legislation: including Japan and the United States, in addition to the
U.S. Forces participating in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises
(1) Scope of the U.S. Forces Covered c. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces that are in
a. The scope extended to the United States Armed Forces field sites along with SDF units temporarily staying at
that are on field sites along with the units of the SDF facilities of the U.S. Forces for day-to-day operations,
carrying out the following actions or activities and in addition to the U.S. Forces temporarily staying at
engaged in activities similar to those of the SDF units: SDF facilities
Chapter 3
• Guarding of facilities and areas of bases, etc. of

U.S. Forces Japan (2) Scope of Supplies to be Provided
• Counter-piracy operations Added ammunition (weapons remain excluded)
• Operations necessary to take measures to destroy See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-4 (Conclusion of the New Japan-
ballistic missiles, etc. U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))
4 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others
1 Disaster Relief Dispatches Earthquake Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear

2 Disaster Relief Dispatch
In principle, Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as
follows: prefectural governors or other officials ask the When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act
Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for
Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc., in the event of a Large-Scale Earthquakes27 or a declaration of a nuclear
natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special
dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
respond to the disaster.26 This procedure is based on the the Minister of Defense is authorized to order dispatching
idea that prefectural governors and other officials should units upon a request of the Director of the Seismic
grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the
disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the
to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. Prime Minister).
See Fig. II-3-2-6 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to
Dispatch and Withdrawal)
Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-8 (Response to Large-Scale
Disasters)
26 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch.
With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures (Article 4 of the Police
Duties Execution Law) such as evacuation based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be
called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be
temporarily formed as necessary
27 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency
(JMA) and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

Fig. II-3-2-6 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal
Outbreak of
a disaster
In case of particular urgency with no time to
wait for a request from prefectural governors
Ask the prefectural governor to submit a request • Prefectural governors Request for withdrawal
• Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard
• Director General of the Regional Coast Guard
Municipal mayor
Headquarters
1) Procedure for request
• Director of the Airport Administrative Office
Direct notification • Normally requested in written
(In case asking request is not possible) Request for dispatch form
• Requested verbally or by
The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister telegram or telephone in
case of emergency (a written
Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Call up1 request should later follow)
2) Content of request
Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Call up in such cases as • Conditions of the disaster and
(discretionary dispatch) disasters reasons for the request
SDF ready reserve • Desired duration for dispatch
personnel • Desired area for dispatch
SDF reserve personnel
and desired activities
• Other items for reference
Disaster relief operations
• Disbandment of call up2

• Order for withdrawal
Chapter 3
Disbandment of call up2
Withdrawal of units
Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary
with the approval of the Prime Minister.
2. Disbandment of call-up of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense.
5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community
than developing new legislation in response to every

Response to Situations Threatening the International
1 Peace and Security that the International Community emergence of a specific need in the future, the International
is Collectively Addressing Peace Support Law, enacted as general law, enables
Japan to conduct support operations more expeditiously
The International Peace Support Act was newly enacted and effectively for the military forces of foreign countries
in the recent legal revision in order to ensure peace and operating for international peace and security, making it
security of the international community, enabling Japan to possible to proactively contribute to international peace
conduct cooperation and support operations for the armed and security on Japan’s own initiative.
forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for
international peace and security in situations threatening
the international peace and security that the international KEY WORD
community is collectively addressing. Previously, the
Japanese Government has enacted special measures laws, Situations Threatening the International Peace
such as the Act on Special Measures against terrorism / and Security that the International Community
Replenishment Support Special Measures Law,28 and the is Collectively Addressing
Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and These refer to situations that threaten peace and security of
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,29 in order to conduct the international community, and the international community
operations such as at-sea replenishment activities in is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the
objectives of the UN Charter to remove the threat; Japan, as a
the Indian Ocean, and humanitarian and reconstruction
member of the international community, needs to independently and
support activities in Iraq. However, from the perspective proactively contribute to these activities
of enabling seamless responses to any situation, rather
28 The official title of the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act is the “Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to
Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning
Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations,” and the official title of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Act is the “Special Measures law Concerning
Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation.”
29 The official title is the Act on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq.

(1) Requirements (3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force
The requirement for Japan to offer cooperation and The following measures are set forth in order to avoid
support to the operations of foreign armed forces is the integration with the use of force by a foreign country and
issuance of one of the following UN resolutions (by the also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:
General Assembly or the Security Council). • Japan does not implement support activities in
a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or the scene where a combat is actually taking place.
authorize the country, which is subject to Japan’s However, when the personnel having been stranded
support operations to respond to situations that threaten have already been found and rescue operations have
the peace and security of the international community commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue
b. Other than (a), resolutions that regard the situations as search and rescue activities concerning them as long
a threat to peace or a breach of peace and call on UN as the safety of these units is ensured.
member states to respond to the situations concerned • The commanding officers of the SDF units, etc., order
a temporary suspension of support activities if combat
(2) Response Measures operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of
The following response measures can be implemented in their activities or in the vicinity.
situations threatening the international peace and security • The Minister of Defense designates the area for
that the international community is collectively addressing. implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult
Chapter 3
a. Cooperation and support activities to implement operations smoothly and safely in the
Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries whole or part of that area, must promptly change the
(supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical designation of the area or order the cessation of the
services, communications, airport and seaport services, activities being implemented there.
base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training

services and construction) are to be provided. (4) Diet Approval
While the provision of weapons is not included as Prior Diet approval required without exception, and
in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts
and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an towards decisions within 7 days (excluding any period
Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the when the Diet is in recess). In addition, re-approval is
revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” required in the case of a lapse of more than two years
and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take since the commencement of the response measures.
off for combat operations.”
b. Search and rescue activities (5) Authority for the Use of Weapons
c. Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship SDF personnel engaged in cooperation support activities
Inspection Operations Law) or search and rescue activities in a situation threatening
Ship inspection operations were only permitted to be the international peace and security that the international
performed in situations in areas surrounding Japan.30 community is collectively addressing are permitted the
However, in light of the increased cases of maritime so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation
inspection as countermeasures against global threat type.” In addition, SDF personnel are permitted to use
such as the transnational transfer of weapons of mass weapons with members of the armed forces and other
destruction and weapons for international terrorism organizations of foreign countries in order to protect the
organizations in the international community since 2000, lives and bodies of those stationed in the camps.
which is when the Ship Inspection Operations Act was
enacted, the SDF can carry out ship inspection operations 2 International Peace Cooperation Activities
in situations threatening the international peace and
security that the international community is collectively The International Peace Cooperation Act, enacted in 1992,
addressing as defined in the International Peace Act. set forth a framework to operate appropriately and quickly
in the following three operation categories namely UN
PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and
International Election Observation Operations, and urged
30 At the time when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted, the conduct of ship inspection operations in situations other than situations in areas surrounding Japan was positioned as a separate
issue on the agenda (an answer given by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono at a meeting of the House of Councillors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense on November 28, 2000).

the Japanese government to take measures to provide is now able to participate in Internationally Coordinated
contributions in kind for those operations, thereby enabling Operations for Peace and Security, when any of the
Japan to actively contribute to international peace efforts following conditions is satisfied, in addition to the
centering upon the UN. The law also stipulates a set of fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation.
basic guidelines, or the so-called “Five Principles for PKO 1. Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security
Participation” for Japan’s participation in these activities. Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN
At the time of the enactment of the Act, it was 2. At the requests of any of the following international
assumed that Japan was to cooperate with the ceasefire organizations:
monitoring in conventional conflicts between states • The UN
within the framework of UN PKOs under the control • Organs established by the UN General Assembly
of the UN. However, the nature of conflicts that the or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes
international community faces has transformed into of the UN such as the Office of the UN High
intra-state conflicts or a combination of inter-state and Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified
intra-state conflicts. Therefore, support for the nation by a Cabinet Order
building of state parties to conflict and the creation • Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article
of a safe environment necessary to achieve this end 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by
have become important tasks in international peace multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the
Chapter 3
cooperation activities. Furthermore, there is a wide range actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the
of international peace cooperation activities that have activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations
come to be implemented outside of the UN frameworks.31 for Peace and Security such as the European Union
Given the diversification and qualitative change of or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
the international peace cooperation activities, through 3. At the requests of the countries to which the areas
the recent legal revision, Japan, in order to contribute where those operations are to be conducted belong
further to peace and stability of international community (limited to only those cases that are supported by any
under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in
based on the principle of international cooperation, has Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).
expanded the scope of tasks that can be implemented in
KEY WORD
UN PKOs and reviewed the authority to use weapons,
and also introduced new provisions to allow for active
So-called “Five Principles for Participation”
participation in humanitarian and reconstruction
in PKO
assistance, safety-ensuring, and other non-UN-led
operations (“Internationally Coordinated Operations for (1) Agreements on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the Parties
Peace and Security”). to Armed Conflict; (2) Consent for the conduct of UN Peacekeeping
Operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall
have been obtained from the countries to which the areas where those
(1) Requirements for Participation operations are to be conducted belongs as well as from the Parties to
a. UN Peace Keeping Operations Armed Conflict; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and
While maintaining the framework of the Five Principles not favor any of the parties to the armed conflict; (4) Should any of the
requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the
for Participation, the new law stipulates that the consent
International Peace Cooperation Corps may terminate the International
of acceptance of countries to which the areas where Peace Cooperation Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall
these operations are conducted belong needs to be stably be limited to the minimum necessity for the protection of the lives of
maintained throughout the period of the operations if the personnel dispatched, in principle. Following the latest amendment
SDF conducts so-called “safety-ensuring” operations or of the Act, additional condition, “when the consent for acceptance is
deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of
so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations. the mission mandate is allowed for implementation of so-called ’safety-
b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and ensuring’ operations and the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (coming to
Security protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent
Besides the existing three types of operations (UN PKOs, request) operations as the use of weapons beyond self-preservation and
Article 95 of the SDF Law (the use of force for protection of weapons,
International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and
etc.)” has been added to (5) of the Five Principles for Participation.
International Election Observation Operations), Japan
31 These activities include the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), implemented at the request of the European Union, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), implemented at the
request of the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs with the support of the UN Secretary-General.

(2) Description of Tasks stationed in the camps are allowed as the use of weapons
In addition to ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian for self-preservation according to the revised legislation.32
relief operations for afflicted persons, the following tasks b. The Authority to Use Weapons in the So-Called
have been added and expanded to tasks in UN PKOs, etc. “Kaketsuke-Keigo” Operations
• Addition of monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections In carrying out so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations,
at checkpoints and security escort for the protection uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons
of safety of specified areas including prevention and to the extent judged reasonably necessary according to
suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found
and property of local population, afflicted persons for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or
and other populations requiring protection (so-called bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations
“safety-ensuring” operations) that they intend to protect (however, inflicting injury on
• Addition of protection of lives and bodies of individuals a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-
engaging in international peace cooperation operations defense or aversion of clear and present danger).
or providing support for those operations, in response c. The Authority to Use Weapons for So-Called “Safety-
to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives Ensuring” Operations
or bodies of such individuals related to operations In carrying out so-called “safety-ensuring” operations,
occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons
Chapter 3
operations) within the limits judged reasonably necessary according

• Expansion of tasks such as provision of advice or to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found
guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or
in establishing or re-establishing organizations of properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate
the Government relating to national defense or other obstructive behavior for their duties (however, inflicting
organizations injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate
• Expansion of tasks conducted at organizations for self-defense or aversion of clear and present danger).
supervision and coordination of tasks to include
planning, drafting, coordination or collection and (4) Diet Approval
updating of information in Headquarters Office Diet approval is necessary prior to the commencement
or coordination offices conducting UN PKOs and of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, in addition to
Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and ceasefire monitoring, in principle (ex-post facto approval
Security, for the implementation of tasks (of mission is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of
headquarters’ operations) Representatives is dissolved).
(3) Authority to Use Weapons (5) Ensuring the Safety of SDF Personnel
a. Expansion of the Authority to Use Weapons for Self- The provision for ensuring the safety of the personnel of
preservation (Joint Protection of Camps) the International Peace Cooperation Corps was added,
Camps of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), etc., are while the measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel
the bases where personnel of participating countries spend were incorporated into the matters to be stipulated in the
their time when not conducting operations outside camps, Implementation Procedures.
and the last bastion, so to speak, to secure the safety of lives
and bodies of those inside. Thus, in the case of unexpected (6) Other Key Points of Amendment
situations, such as attacks against camps, it is essential for • Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN
SDF personnel stationed in the camps, even if they are (dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKOs)
not the direct target of such attacks, to coordinate with the The Act was amended to make it possible to dispatch
personnel of other countries and protect each other and uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage
deal with the common danger. In light of this, the use of in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall
weapons for the purpose of protecting individuals jointly management of tasks implemented by units of the
32 The authority to use weapons for self-preservation is allowed in view of the existence of particular circumstances, whereby armed personnel, who protect camps which are the last bastions of safety,
are in the relationship of mutually dependent upon each other in dealing with situations.

SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states 3 International Disaster Relief Operations
participating in UN PKOs, at the request of the UN,
with the consent of the Prime Minister.33 When large-scale disasters occur in regions overseas,
• Provision of supplies and services to the Armed Forces especially in less-developed regions, and the governments
of the United States, etc., for their operations to cope of the affected countries or international organizations
with large-scale disaster34 request assistance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall
The Act was amended to make it possible for the SDF consult with the chief of relevant administrative agencies
to provide the U.S. Forces or the Australian Defence including the Ministry of Defense as well as the National
Force with supplies or services when they request the Public Safety Commission regarding the details of such
provision and are located in the area together with the request if dispatch is deemed appropriate.
units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to Following such consultation, the Ministry of Foreign
cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder Affairs may consult with the Minister of Defense to ask for
the performance of International Peace Cooperation cooperation with regard to operations of SDF units if there
Assignments, etc., of the SDF.35 is a special need.
The Minister of Defense can order units of the
SDF to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as
transportation of personnel and supplies based on the
Chapter 3
consultation above.36
6 Other Amendments in the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security
for deliberation, and items for deliberation regarding
1 Revision of the Act for the Establishment of “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were changed to
the National Security Council
items for deliberation regarding “situations that will have
Responses to a Survival-Threatening Situation and an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”
responses to situations threatening the international Furthermore, the following items (all items are related
peace and security that the international community to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance
is collectively addressing were added as the items of hosting countries) were specified as the items that the
Commentary Risk of Being Dragged into a War COLUMN

The “use of force” permitted as a measure for self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan must meet the very strict
requirements of the Three New Conditions. They are extremely stringent requirements not seen anywhere else in the world and serve
as a clear constitutional restraint. Furthermore, when the Minister of Defense issues a defense operation order to actually conduct
the “use of force,” the Government must seek Diet approval in advance, in principle. As such, since the SDF conducts its activities in
compliance with the Constitution and laws enacted by the Diet, it will never be the case that the “use of force” by the SDF expands
endlessly, resulting in Japan being dragged against its intention into a war of another country.
In addition, under the Legislation for Peace and Security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance will function more for Japan’s peace and
security. By sending this message out to the world, Japan’s capability to prevent a conflict from occurring, in other words its
deterrence capability, will be further enhanced, and the risk of Japan coming under an attack will be further reduced. Furthermore, it
will enable Japan to cooperate further with the international community for the maintenance of peace and development of the region
and the world, making the world more peaceful.
33 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKOs for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and
of state parties to the conflict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the conflict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKOs are to be conducted)
is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur
34 The MOD/SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, but was unable to provide supplies and services
to the U.S. Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of UN PKOs, due to the absence of necessary domestic legislation.
35 The revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act in June 2017 added the Armed Forces of the U.K. to the scope as well.
36 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is recognized to be necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations
or transport, and equipment necessary for such operations due to apparent danger in accordance with the level of security in the disaster-affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry
weapons in the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations and equipment necessary for such operations.

National Security Council must deliberate without fail.

• Regarding international peace cooperation operations, 2 Establishment of Provisions for the Punishment
of Those Who Commit Crimes Overseas
decisions on and changes in plans for the implementation
related to the implementation of the so-called safety- Since the duties of the SDF overseas are to be expanded
ensuring operations or the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” under the latest legal revisions, it is necessary to more
operations adequately ensure the discipline and control of the
• Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel (force activities of the SDF overseas.
commanders, etc.) who are to be engaged in supervisory For this reason, provisions were established for the
duties for operations conducted by units of countries punishment of those who commit crimes overseas such as
participating in UN PKOs the following: (1) Colluded defiance of superiors’ official
• Implementation of protection measures, including guarding orders and unlawful command of units, and (2) defiance
and rescue, of Japanese nationals overseas and others of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given
See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3-1 (National Security Council) defense operation orders.
Commentary Duties of the Self Defense Forces COLUMN

Chapter 3
The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces are national administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in carrying
out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense defines the administrative scope of the Ministry of
Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that the Self Defense Forces Act determines the duties, actions, and authority of the Self
Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Act hence provides a list) similar to an index) of what the Self Defense Forces are allowed
to do in accordance with specified procedures to address various situations.
Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Act divides the duties of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (Item 1 of the same article)
and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main duties, and only the
Self Defense Forces carry out these duties.
Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties
defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2).
The former includes public order actions that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime guarding actions, measures to destroy
ballistic missiles and other weapons, and measures to deal with airspace intrusions. The latter covers actions conducted in response
to important impact situations (logistical assistance), international peacekeeping activities (international peacekeeping tasks and
international emergency assistance), and activities related to international peace joint action situations (cooperative assistance, etc.).
These main and secondary duties are jointly known as “inherent duties.”
Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces on the basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and organizational
functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate from inherent duties).
These include transportation for national guests, education and training consignments, and cooperation with athletic events.
Overview of the Self Defense Forces’ duties
Defense of Japan
(Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Main duty
Japan’s peace, independence, and national security)
Sustaining public order
(Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s

public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese
Duties for the Self people (including mine removal and protection measures and
Defense Forces in transportation for Japanese people in other countries))
ensuring Japan’s
peace, independence,
and national security Responding to important impact situation
(Inherent Duties) (Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through Secondary duties
responses to important impact situations)
International peacekeeping activities
Responding to international peace joint operations
(Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in

international society, including Japan, through promotion of
international cooperation)

The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security Section 3
Section 3 The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after

the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security
1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security
1 Promotion of Various Preparations
Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace

and Security on March 29, 2016, the MOD/SDF has
undertaken various preparations for a variety of new
missions based on the Legislation for Peace and Security,
such as activities to raise awareness of legal systems
and intra-unit rules that were established, education of
SDF personnel, as well as development of educational Joint exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas and others (December 2017)
materials necessary for the actual training of various

units and the nurturing of instructors. In August 2016, 2 Implementation of Training
Chapter 3
as these preparations were all but completed, each unit
of the SDF sets out to implement necessary training in In July 2017, the SDF conducted the first exercise related to the
connection with the Legislation for Peace and Security. protection of U.S. vessels based on SDF Act Article 95-2 with
Between Japan and the United States, and other bilateral the intention to enhance the relationship with the U.S. Navy.
and multilateral joint training, Japan started to conduct In the same year from July to August, the SDF took
necessary training related to the Legislation for Peace and part in multilateral exercise, Khaan Quest 2017, to elevate
Security after coordinating with the countries concerned. various capabilities through conducting UN PKO-related
exercise based on International Peace Cooperation Act.
VOICE Participation in Training (Overseas) of Rescue COLUMN

of Japanese Nationals Overseas in FY2017 (domestic)
Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya City, Tochigi),
S3, Lieutenant Colonel, Masachiyo Hirose
Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas require close collaboration with related agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in charge of protecting overseas Japanese people as a main duty and combined units from Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense
Forces. I participated in rescue training that brings together related parties as a staff officer for the destination dispatch team with
responsibility for all activities in the dispatch country.
The training begins from the point after which team members have already deployed at an overseas location. A Ground Self
Defense Forces vehicle handles ground transportation of Japanese people and others temporarily assembled at the temporary
assembly site (Soumagahara Camp, Gunma Prefecture) to the assembly location airport (Iruma Base, Saitama Prefecture). Boarding
procedures, such as confirming identities and carry-on baggage checks, are conducted at the airport. The Japanese people and
others are then escorted onto the Air Self Defense Forces’ transport plane (C-130H) and Ground Self Defense Forces’ transport
helicopter (CH-47JA) for evacuation outside the country.
The training exercise, which consists of securing the safety of Japanese people and others jointly with the Foreign Ministry and
responding to continuously changing circumstances, provided an opportunity
to come into contact with the enthusiastic efforts of Foreign Ministry personnel
who are working for the same purpose of safely rescuing and transporting
Japanese people and others, clarified the mutual capabilities and strengths of
the Foreign Ministry and Self Defense Forces, and reinforced the importance
of close collaboration.
I hope to continue improving my capabilities to carry out this duty through
enhancement of my proficiency in regular regiment training in order to be ready
to implement the mission of immediately acting to rescue Japanese people and
others at any time and deeper mutual understanding and closer cooperation
with the Foreign Ministry and other agencies achieved through joint exercises.
Writer (center) coordinating with Foreign Ministry staff

Between September and October in Djibouti, and in operations under the International Peace Support Act as
Japan in December 2017, the SDF conducted a training on well as training for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas
rescue of Japanese nationals overseas provided in SDF Act to improve its joint operation capabilities.
Article 84-3 to improve its joint operation capabilities and Moreover, in June 2018, the SDF took part in the
to strengthen cooperation with the relevant organizations. multilateral joint exercise “Khaan Quest 18” and improved
Furthermore, between January and February 2018, various capabilities through conducting training related to
the SDF participated in a multilateral joint exercise the “joint protection of camps” and so-called “kaketsuke-
(Cobra Gold 18). In the command point exercise, the SDF keigo” as well as “safety-ensuring operations” based on
conducted training related to cooperation and support the International Peace Cooperation Act.
2 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO
1 Background (2) So-Called “Kaketsuke-Keigo”

“Kaketsuke-keigo” is to be conducted in very limited
Japan deployed engineering units to the UN Mission in the situations, such as when those engaged in NGO activities,
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 etc. are attacked in locations close to the SDF engineering
Chapter 3
to the end of May 2017. Following the enforcement of the unit and there are no UN units or others around to take
Legislation for Peace and Security, after a comprehensive prompt actions. It is conducted in response to urgent
consideration in light of the local situation and the training requests as a quick and temporary measure, within the
for the new additional mission, the Government decided to abilities of the unit in light of the humanitarian and urgent
assign the duty of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” starting with nature of such measures. In the past, when SDF units
the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed to UNMISS, as were dispatched to Timor-Leste and then Zaire (now the
well as the duty of joint protection of camps. Following the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Japanese nationals
approval obtained at the 9-Minister Meeting of the National facing contingent circumstances in those countries asked
Security Council, the Cabinet approved the revision of the for protection by SDF units. On those occasions, the SDF
Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation units, while they were not adequately trained for such
Assignment for UNMISS on November 15, 2016. protection operations and their duties and authorities under
law were limited, made every effort to protect Japanese
nationals within the limits of their means, rushing to the
2 Fundamental Concept regarding the Assignment scene and transporting them to safe locations.2
of New Duties
“Kaketsuke-keigo” is a mission entailing risks. As
In making the Cabinet Decision above, the Government long as Japanese nationals overseas have the possibility
indicated its basic concept regarding the so-called of facing contingent situations, however, the Government
“kaketsuke-keigo” and joint protection of camps.1 The believes that (1) the official assignment of the solid duty of
outline of the basic concept is as follows: “kaketsuke-keigo” and the necessary authority and (2) the
establishment of a steady structure with adequate training
(1) Premise beforehand, are conducive to not only contributing to the
The maintenance of security in South Sudan is, in safety of Japanese nationals overseas but also to reducing
principle, the responsibility of the South Sudan public risks to the SDF units.
security authorities and the South Sudan government Since SDF units have only self-protection
forces, complemented by troops of UNMISS. This capabilities, “kaketsuke-keigo” represents only responses
responsibility should be exclusively borne by the infantry that are feasible within their capabilities.
unit of UNMISS. What Japan deploys to South Sudan is The military personnel of other countries usually possess
the SDF engineering unit, and thus the maintenance of self-protection capabilities. Even then, if they are in a crisis
security there is not the duty of the unit. situation that they cannot handle by themselves, it is basically
1 “Fundamental Concept regarding the Assignment of New Duties” (announced by the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense on November 15, 2016)
2 At the Diet, Prime Minister Abe has responded as follows: “In the past, when SDF units were dispatched to Timor-Leste and then Zaire, Japanese nationals facing contingent circumstances in those
countries asked for protection by SDF units. The SDF units, while they were not adequately trained and their duties and authorities were limited, made every effort to protect Japanese nationals. If the
SDF unit is near the scene, the unit cannot just stand by and do nothing even though it has the ability to help them. (Abridged) Previously, however, a legal framework to deal with such a situation did
not exist, and as a result, the SDF personnel at the scene managed to deal with the situation by themselves. This should not happen essentially.” (Prime Minister Abe’s response, Plenary Session of
the House of Councillors, November 28, 2016)

The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security Section 3
the South Sudan government forces and the UNMISS even in the daily training.
infantry troops that are mobilized for their protection. The However, as long as the SDF unit shares the same
Government considers that the SDF engineering unit that camp with the military personnel of other countries, an
does not possess the capability needed for the maintenance injury to the personnel of other countries could lead to
of security is not assumed to conduct “kaketsuke-keigo” of SDF personnel being attacked. The military personnel of
the military personnel of other countries. other countries and the SDF personnel share a common
In view of the track record of past activities, the area destiny so to speak. If they coordinate their responses,
of activities in South Sudan is limited to “Juba and its they can better enhance the security of both of them.
surrounding area” starting with the 11th Engineering Unit Furthermore, it is believed that as SDF personnel and the
deployed in that country. The implementation of “kaketsuke- military personnel of other countries would be able to
keigo” is also limited to within this area of activities. constantly engage in joint training, this would lead to the
enhanced security of the camp as a whole.
(3) Joint Protection of Camps As seen above, the joint protection of camps is
In the field of UN PKOs, etc., it is usual practice for intended to enhance the personnel’s own safety in a
personnel of multiple countries to cooperate in their severe security situation. The Government considers
activities. In South Sudan as well, the SDF unit and units that the SDF unit is able to conduct its activities more
of Rwanda and some other countries share one camp as smoothly and safely, which would contribute to reducing
Chapter 3
their base of activities. the risks posed to the SDF unit.
Even if such a camp is attacked by an armed group, See Chapter 3, Section 2, Article 5-2 (International Peace Keeping
the SDF unit previously could not respond to the situation Operations), Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3, Article 2-2 (UN
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)
in cooperation with other units and could not participate
3 The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed
Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)
1 Background (1) Basic Principles of Implementing Article 95-2

a. Purpose of Article 95-2
Since the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very
Security, the MOD/SDF have been explaining to and passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum
coordinating with the United States and also engaged in the extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment
work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order to (“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed
ensure appropriate operation of the system for the protection forces of other countries or other similar organizations
of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and the (“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in
armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including
95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016, joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in
at the National Security Council the Government decided places where combat activities are actually occurring) in
on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do
of the SDF Law, and started applying the article to the U.S. not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc.
Forces operations. This operationalization helps to further can be regarded as an important material means which
strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and constitute the defense capability of Japan.
the U.S. Forces and also to further enhance deterrence Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article
and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. that “excluding activities conducted in places where
combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that
asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded
2 The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 as being integrated (“ittaika”) with the use of force of
of the SDF Law
the U.S. Forces, etc. and that the SDF personnel never
The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons
Law set forth the Government’s basic understanding on the pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never
article as well as basic principles on the involvement of the conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from
Cabinet and disclosure of information in implementing the evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of
article. An outline of the guidelines is as follows: weapons under the provision of the Article.

This use of weapons does not fall under “use of (3) The request is recognized as peculiarly important,
force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution. although not falling under the above two categories. In
b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan addition, in case asset protection under the situations that
“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the will have an important influence (*) is requested, the Prime
Article may include mainly the following ones, while the Minister should clearly state it in the Basic Plan and should
Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a ask for a Cabinet decision on it after deliberations in the
case-by-case basis: (1) ISR activities including ballistic NSC. (*) “Situations that will have an important influence”
missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment is provided in Article 1 of the Law Concerning Measures to
activities in “situations that will have an important Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will
influence”; and (3) joint exercises to enhance capabilities Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security,
required for defending Japan Act No. 11 of 1999. The National Security Council Board
c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection is to be held flexibly and support the full National Security
When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the Council. In addition, the relevant ministries and agencies
U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge are to share information on requests for protection and
whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S. closely cooperate with each other.
Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities
that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether (3) Disclosure of Information
Chapter 3
asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by In the implementation ofArticle 95-2, if an unusual event occurs
considering the objective and content of the activities, in conducting asset protection operation, the Government
capability of the unit, types of weapons, etc. of the unit promptly discloses such an event, and releases a basic plan
and surrounding circumstances including possibility of that specifies matters concerning the implementation of asset
combat activity as well as the impacts on performance of protection operations in a situation that will have an important
the SDF’s regular operations. influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Government
also strives for appropriate disclosure of information in light
(2) Involvement of the Cabinet of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative
Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph 2 Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999).
of the Article should be deliberated in the National Security
Council (NSC) before the Minister of Defense judges on 3 Track Record of Asset Protection Operations
conducting asset protection if the Minister receives requests
in the following cases. However, in case there is no time In 2017, during a joint exercises to improve the capabilities
for dealing with an urgent request by the U.S. Forces, etc., necessary to defend Japan, the SDF conducted asset
the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding protections for US military vessels and aircraft once
judgment of providing asset protection. (1) The U.S. individually in 2017.
Forces, etc. makes a request for the first time after the See Chapter 3, Section 2, Article 3-7 (Protection of Weapons and
operationalization of asset protection. (2) The request is Other Equipment of the Units of the United States Forces and
Other Foreign Countries)
made for asset protection in the territory of a third country.
4 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
In September, 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs a broad range of supplies and services between the SDF
and U.S. Ambassador to Japan signed the Japan-U.S. and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the levels of specific
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). on-site cooperation between them.
ACSA was approved by the Diet and took effect in 2017. Japan also signed ACSA with the U.K and Australia
The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to other than the United States in light of the Legislation for
replace the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval along
application of existing settlement procedures to the with the Japan-U.S. ACSA and took effect in the same year.
provision of supplies and services from the SDF to See Chapter 3, Section 2-3-8 (Expansion of the Provision of
the U.S. Forces that become possible under the newly Supplies and Services to the United States Armed Forces
Chapter 4, Section 2-3-2 (5) (Logistics Support)
enacted Legislation for Peace and Security. The new
ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious provision of

Chapter
4 Strengthening of
the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan- not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also
U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own functions as deterrence and response capabilities to address
efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and serves as a
The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to In this manner, the stationing of USFJ based on the
the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty not only contributes to the
the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. interests of Japan but also to the interests of the United
As the security environment surrounding Japan States, which has an interest in this region.
becomes increasingly severe, it has become more On the other hand, since the stationing of USFJ
important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance impacts the living environment of local residents,
for the security of Japan with the United States that efforts that correspond to the actual situation of each
maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence region must be made to mitigate the impact on regions
in the Asia-Pacific region. such as Okinawa.
Chapter 4
The military presence of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Section 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security
In the current international community, a robust defense Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security
system capable of responding to every contingency, Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the
ranging from all types of armed attacks including the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation
use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to
military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, confront not only the defense capability of the Self-
and sovereignty of the nation. Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military
However, it is difficult even for the United States to
guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it
would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security
solely through its unilateral efforts given its population,
land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not
necessarily contribute to regional stability.
Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and
security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the
world’s dominant military power, the United States, with
which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of
law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as
well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security
of the world, and has strong economic ties.
Specifically, Japan and the United States will take
Prime Minister Abe shaking hands with U.S. President Trump at a Japan-U.S. summit meeting
bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against (November 6, 2017) (Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office)

strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to this serves as deterrence against attacks.
defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result, Japan intends to create a seamless posture and
the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the
grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military as well as
will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, maintaining its own adequate defense capability.
2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan
Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contingencies caused by various security issues or
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of
of international peace and security in the Far East is the Japan and the United States but also providing a great
purpose of the use of facilities and areas by USFJ. This sense of security to the nations in the region and thus
provision is based on the recognition that the security of fulfilling a role as public goods.
Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on
East region to which Japan belongs. the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the
In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace
states and the like with massive military power, including and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These
some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue arrangements, complemented by the alliances established
nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension between the United States and other countries in the
caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that region such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand
Chapter 4
we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations
vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further developed with other countries, play an indispensable
aggravation of the situation. role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-
In such a security environment, the military Pacific region.
presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected
3 Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment
The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged
for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States are also playing an
between Japan and the United States, not only in defense important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to
but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, effectively respond to such challenges.
economy, and society. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security
The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working
arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen
foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to their cooperation. This close coordination lays the
implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and foundation for various forms of global collaboration such
security of the international community, including as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces,
promotion of multinational security dialogue and and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness
cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
Currently, we are confronted with global security The peace and prosperity of the international
challenges that are extremely difficult for any single community are closely linked to those of Japan.
country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States,
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the
international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the
new risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space security and prosperity of Japan.
and cyberspace, and it is important for countries to

Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance Section 2
Section 2 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening

the Alliance
1 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance
Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan
in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program
alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human for implementing specific measures for the realignment of
rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.
Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements See Reference 20 (United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment
ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal Implementation [tentative translation])
ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting
the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries
with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan. signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan
Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of and the Government of the United States of America
Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation
Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and
importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam
state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the International Agreement), which entered into force in
Chapter 4
Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was May 2009.
compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries
(SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion reviewed and revalidated their common strategic
of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous

Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime
(SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) security domain by defending the principle of freedom
approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines1 and of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation
expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas with respect to protection of and access to outer space
surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas,
environment, such as the end of the Cold War. including an expansion of information sharing and joint
In light of further changes to the security environment ISR activities.
due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that
the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United
United States held working-level and other consultations States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering
perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces
capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as
As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.
the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in See Reference 21 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative
three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common Committee (2+2) (tentative translation) (April 27, 2012)
strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines,
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) the security environment surrounding Japan has
in February 2005; the announcement of the results of become increasingly severe, and as the activities and
the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities responsibilities of the SDF have expanded, it had
of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the become necessary for the nature of the Japan-U.S.
common strategic objectives (second stage) in October defense cooperation to adapt to those changes. Against
1 The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed
attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.

Fig. II-4-2-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States
1951 The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed

1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty The treaty enters into force
1958 Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
1960 The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force
and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
1968 (Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)
1969 Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return
of Okinawa to Japan)
1972 (Okinawa is returned to Japan)
1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines (Agreement on the establishment of the Sub-Committee-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)
1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)
1991 (Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War)
1996 End of the Cold War Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)
and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines SACO Final Report
1997 Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines)
2001 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.
2003 The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11
2006 Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
terrorist attacks in the United States
The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007 Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)
2010 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2012 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)
2013 Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(1997 Guidelines)
2014 The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
(Abe-Obama Talks)
2015 New security environment Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)
Chapter 4
and the establishment of the new Guidelines Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines)
2017 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (Abe-Trump)
that background, based on the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” in the “2+2” Meeting held at the 70th anniversary of the
Meeting in October 2013 to draft recommended changes end of the Second World War.
to the 1997 Guidelines by the end of 2014, as a result See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Major Milestones concerning Japan – U.S. Alliance)
of extensive work to revise them on the part of both Reference 26 (Joint Statement (tentative translation) (February
10, 2017))
countries, new Guidelines were approved in April 2015
2 Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines
It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to environment surrounding Japan; such as more active
discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an military activities of neighboring countries, new threats
armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, including international terrorist organizations and risks
with a view to responding rapidly to such an event. against the stable use of global commons such as oceans,
The Guidelines and the various policies for ensuring outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of
their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role- the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified
sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on by anti-piracy activities, PKO, and international disaster
that framework and the changing security environment relief activities.
surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States have As a result, it had become necessary for the manner
continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these
countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the changes in the security environment and the expansion of
revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations. the SDF’s activities and missions.
Against the backdrop of these changes in the security
1 Background to the Revision of the Guidelines environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister
of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the
Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition,
issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in February 2013,
become more visible and aggravated in the security Prime Minister Abe stated to then U.S. President Obama

that, “in response to the changing security environment, 2 Content of the Guidelines
Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines
through discussions on the two countries’ views of the The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines,
roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).” update the general framework and policy direction for
Against the background described above, at the the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest
Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater
the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and
Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all
1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by phases, from peacetime to contingencies.
the end of 2014.
The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting at that (1) Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines
time identified several objectives for the revision of The Guidelines newly specified the matters to be
the 1997 Guidelines, including ensuring the Alliance’s emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The
capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with
as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation; the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.
expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global • In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under
nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies,
areas as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy; evaluating and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and
contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless defense cooperation will emphasize:
Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that • seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral
Chapter 4
includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such responses;
as space and cyberspace; and exploring additional ways • synergy across the two governments’ national
in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to security policies;

meet shared objectives. • a whole-of-government Alliance approach;

Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in • cooperation with regional and other partners, as
October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the well as international organizations; and
2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and • the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United • The two governments will maintain their individual
States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive defense postures based on their national security
work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines. policies. The United States will continue to extend
In October 2014, based on the agreement reached at deterrence to Japan through the full range of
the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in July capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United
2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report States also will continue to forward deploy combat-
on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan- U.S. Defense ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain
Cooperation.” In addition, in December 2014, the SCC the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.
(“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the significance of ensuring • The Guidelines provide the general framework and
consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and
Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and
discussions to work towards finalizing the revision of the coordination.
Guidelines during the first half of 2015, taking into account • The Guidelines promote domestic and international
the progress of Japan’s legislative process. understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S.
The Japan-U.S. SCC approved the new Guidelines Alliance.
recommended by the SDC at the “2+2” Meeting in April
2015, thereby accomplishing the objective of revising the (2) Basic Premises and Principles
Guidelines as outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches
See Reference 19 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:
Cooperation (April27, 2015)) • The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty and its related arrangements will
remain unchanged.
• All actions and activities undertaken under the

Fig. II-4-2-2 Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Item Outline
See the main text for I. “Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines” and II. “Basic Premises and Principles.”
Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound
policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.
A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism
In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that
may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and
operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to
III. Strengthened Alliance
contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and
Coordination
communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.
B. Enhanced Operational Coordination
The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed
Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.
C. Bilateral Planning
In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to
be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.
● The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to
contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will
promote further cooperation with partners.
● The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of
information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic
messaging through appropriate channels.
A. Cooperative Measures during Peacetime
• The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-
U.S. Alliance.
• The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments
will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense;
(3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.
B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
Chapter 4
• The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be
defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’
respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.
• In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance
Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited
to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue;
(5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.
C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.
1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations
necessary for the defense of Japan.
IV. Seamlessly Ensuring 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
Japan’s Peace and • Principles for Coordinated Actions
Security The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks.
The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and
supplement the SDF.
• Concept of Operations
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces
Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan
Operations to Defend
Airspace Have primary responsibility for conducting air Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF
defense operations while ensuring air superiority operations
Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan
Operations to Counter
Ballistic Missile Attacks Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF
missile defense operations to defend Japan operations
Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of
communication
Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for the protection of
Maritime Areas major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF
vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other operations
associated operations
Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or
amphibious forces
Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel
Ground Attacks ground attacks, including those against islands, Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF
and have primary responsibility for conducting air operations
defense operations while ensuring air superiority

Item Outline
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces
Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks
In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of
ISR
intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets
Cross- Space /
Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains
Domain cyberspace
Operations Special
Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate
operations
Strike May provide support, as necessary, for the strike Involve the use of strike power, to support and
operations operations of the United States Armed Forces supplement SDF
• Operational Support Activities
The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3)
IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.
Japan’s Peace and D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
Security • When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full
respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a
third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter
further attacks.
• The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign
country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn
fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
• Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter
Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.
E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
• When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in
accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities
through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.
Chapter 4
• The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate
in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.
● In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a
foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
● When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with
each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.
A. Cooperation in International Activities

• The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the
V. Cooperation for Regional
United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
and Global Peace and
• Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief;
Security
(3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support.
B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will
work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and
standards.
A. Cooperation on Space
• The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.
• The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.
• The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and
timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.
B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
• The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two
VI. Space and Cyberspace
governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces
Cooperation
depend to accomplish their missions.
• The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct
educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government
efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
• In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide
appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult
closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to
improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
VII. Bilateral Enterprise A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
C. Educational and Research Exchanges
Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two
VIII. Processes for Review
governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.

Guidelines will be consistent with international law. measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights
• All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and or obligations for either government. Since the
the United States will be in accordance with their objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an
respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two
effect, and basic positions on national security policy. governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate
Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance way the results of these efforts, based on their own
with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its judgment, in their specific policies and measures.
exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its See Reference 19 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
three non-nuclear principles. Cooperation (April 27, 2015))
Fig. II-4-2-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
• The Guidelines do not obligate either government to Cooperation)
take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other
3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance
The Guidelines define that the two countries will work that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from
on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural
missile defense, maritime security, and bilateral training disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-
and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-
disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s government coordination while ensuring the involvement
peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These
Chapter 4
countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments
Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for
activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-
cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity
are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop of coordination in the policy and operational aspects
and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The
equipment and technology cooperation for further utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct
improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of
Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.
to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan
capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism
in a variety of areas.” to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by
1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and
airspace around the Senkaku Islands.
(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination See Fig. II-4-2-3 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination
Mechanism Mechanism (ACM))
In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments

established the ACM in order to address seamlessly (2) Enhanced Operational Coordination
and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S.
and security or any other situation that may require an Governments recognize the importance of collocating
Alliance response. operational coordination functions. The SDF and the
Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-2-4, this U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust
mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to
related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. support international activities.
Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
This mechanism also contributes to timely information (3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism
sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S.
common situational awareness. Governments established the Bilateral Planning
The characteristics of the mechanism include Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose

Fig. II-4-2-3 The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)
Higher levels between the two nations including the Minister/Secretary level
As needed
Joint Committee (JC) Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)
and information exchange

Mutual coordination
Japan Side U.S. Side Director Japan Side U.S. Side
Director-General of Deputy Commander General-level Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat Representatives from the National Security
North American Affairs of USFJ (including the National Security Secretariat), Council,* Department of State,* American
Bureau of Ministry of (Representative) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Embassy in Japan, Office of the Secretary
Foreign Affairs Director-level Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States
(Representative) other relevant ministries, departments, Pacific Command (USPACOM),* U.S.
and agencies* Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant
Action Officer *Representatives may participate as needed ministries, departments, and agencies*
level *Representatives may participate as needed
Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual

Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces
consultation regarding the implementation of
To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement
Mutual coordination and information exchange
Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)
Japan Side U.S. Side
Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ
each SDF service
Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces
Mutual coordination and information exchange
Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)
Chapter 4
Japan Side U.S. Side
Representatives from each component of the SDF Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces
CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination.
As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.

of implementing the development of bilateral plans in of the activities of both countries, the two countries set
peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013
effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan
Japan’s peace and security. and the United States, which is further deepening the
In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism cooperation between the two countries.
performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level The expansion of these ISR activities will
directions and supervision and the involvement of function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure
relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as information superiority over other nations and enable the
conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all
cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral phases from peacetime to contingencies.
plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral
planning through this mechanism. (2) Missile Defense
See Fig. II-4-2-4 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, Japan-U.S.
Mechanism (BMP)) bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by
sharing operation information and establishing response
procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches
2 Cooperative Measures to Seamlessly Ensure by North Korea, Japan and the United States have
Japan’s Peace and Security
conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM.
(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative
(ISR) Activities development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD)
With regard to bilateral ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA)
and Reconnaissance) activities, from the perspective that is steadily in progress.
it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile
Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the Attacks)
United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness

Fig. II-4-2-4 The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)
Prime Minister President

Bilateral Planning Mechanism
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”
Foreign Minister State Secretary
Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
Defense Minister Defense Secretary
Interagency Coordination as necessary

Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)
Japan U.S.
Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF) DG: North American Affairs Bureau Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant
MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Secretary of Defense
Japan U.S. Joint Staff U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM
Representatives of Representatives of Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout
the Cabinet Secretariat, the U.S. Embassy JP, the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures
NSS, MOFA, MOD PACOM, USFJ and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters
Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies

(RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)
RMAs, provision of additional information etc.
Japan U.S.
Representatives of JSDF Representatives of PACOM, USFJ
Conduct Bilateral Planning
Coordination Command under the BPM JSDF/USF chain of command

Chapter 4
GSDF personnel coordinating during a field training (Northern Viper) with the U.S. Marine Corps A scene from a meeting during the MSDF Exercise FY2018
(Field exercise [Japan-U.S. joint exercise and Japan-U.S.-Canada joint exercise])
(3) Maritime Security the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other
The Guidelines allow Japan and the United States to aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication,
develop and enhance the system for sharing maritime but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each
surveillance information from peacetime and to side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that
cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which
enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and
States through ISR as well as training and exercises. greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the U.S. In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective
Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified
presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United
training and exercises. States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these
perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives
(4) Bilateral Training and Exercises to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.
Bilateral training in peacetime not only contribute greatly Bilateral training have been expanded not only within
to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF
response capabilities by improving interoperability through units there. Ongoing efforts are being made to enhance

VOICE Participation in the exercise with the U.S. Marines Corps COLUMN
in the United States (Iron Fist 18)
Western Army Infantry Regiment (Sasebo, Nagasaki),

2nd Company Commander, Major, Yasuyuki Takamura
The Western Army Infantry Regiment was formed at the end of FY2017 as a central unit of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment
Brigade prior to its creation and engages in training throughout the year to be ready for immediate action.
Over roughly a month and a half from January 2018, it had the opportunity to participate in military training with the U.S.
Marines Corps in California (Iron Fist 18).
This training was very important in preparing the regiment before creation of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and
improved proficiency beyond existing levels through bilateral joint operation by Japanese and U.S. forces and combined training of a
variety of groups. The Regiment aimed to make the fullest use of U.S. military training facilities by engaging in amphibious operations
that are difficult to carry out in Japan. It set training goals for collaboration with an Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) unit in landing
and subsequent ground battle and improvement of battle shooting proficiency on a Company scale. I believe Regiment members
were exuding confidence and returned to Japan as a more powerful unit after the training.
Leveraging this experience and confidence, I intend to put even more effort into improving my skills as a member of the Infantry
Regiment that is a core component of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and hope to contribute to the unit defending
Japanese islands.
Chapter 4
AAV joint landing exercise scene
interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response vessels including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan
capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including that extended from the waters around Okinawa to the Bashi
the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post Channel from September to October 2017. In November
exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan- the same year, the MSDF conducted bilateral exercise
U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training. in the Sea of Japan with a strike force comprising three
Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, aircraft carriers the USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Nimitz,
command post exercises and field training exercises and the USS Theodore Roosevelt and other vessels of the
have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. U.S. Navy for the first time. In conjunction with this, the
Bilateral Joint Exercise. From January to February MSDF conducted Japan-U.S. bilateral crusing exercise
2018, command post exercises were conducted at the with the strike force from October to November 2017 in the
Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya. waters and air of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and
Also, in May and June 2017 Japanese and U.S. vessels, around Okinawa, and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF)
including the destroyer JS Izumo conducted bilateral conducted tactical exercises with F/A-18, carrier-based of
maritime exercise in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as fighters from the aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan and
bilateral exercises in the waters and airspace around Japan, USS Nimitz.
the MSDF conducted cruising exercises with U.S. Navy Also in March 2018, the MSDF conducted bilateral

The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to

the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace
taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope
of application includes various occasions such as bilateral
training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief
activities, UN peacekeeping operations, international
disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding
Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the
U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or
services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested
party to do so.3 In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in
April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they would
ASDF personnel attending a meeting for a Japan-U.S. joint training (Red Flag Alaska)
expeditiously work on the negotiations on the ACSA to
operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned
exercises with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and by the new Guidelines. Subsequently, following the
other vessels of the U.S. Navy in the waters and air from passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in
the northern part of the South China Sea to the area September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed
around Okinawa. The ASDF also conducted multiple in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017,
training with U.S. Air Force B-1B, B-52 and U.S. Marine and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the
F-35B in the airspace around western Kyushu and same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such
Chapter 4
around Okinawa. as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of

The Japan-U.S. bilateral training were conducted supplies and services that had become possible under the
with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF Legislation for Peace and Security, so that by December
and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It 2017 food and fuel has been provided to U.S. Forces
is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration engaged in information collection and other activities.
and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of See Chapter 3, Section 2-3-8 (Expansion of the Provisions of
implementing these Japan-U.S. bilateral training have the Supplies and Services to the United States Armed Forces)
Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S.
effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))
capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and Fig. II-4-2-5 (Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity Agreement (ACSA))
towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe

security environment for Japan. (6) Joint/Shared Use
In recent years, USFJ have also participated in The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas
disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver
deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the
local governments. diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training
See Reference 22 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises and exercises and expands the scope and raises the
in FY2017) frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only
a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including
(5) Logistics Support Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban
Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/
through logistics support based on the Acquisition and shared use of facilities and areas of USFJ in Okinawa
Cross-Servicing Agreement2 (ACSA) signed in 1996 will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in
and revised in 1999 and 2004, as a result of increased Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training
opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. and exercises and increased interoperability between the
2 The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services
between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.
3 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications;
medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack
situations and anticipated situations) (Provision of weapons is not included)

Fig. II-4-2-5 Scope of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services
In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where
units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of
the operations.
Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
Image of the circumstances and preconditions for the situations
Japan-U.S. bilateral drills

Japan and Japanese people
Mainly matters that concern
Multilateral drills with Japan & U.S. participation Armed attack situations
Transportation of Japanese
Disaster relief nationals overseas, etc.
International disaster relief activities Situations in which an armed

U.S. Forces staying temporarily Situations that will have attack is anticipated
at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties an important influence
on Japan’s peace and security
Guarding operation Counter-piracy operations
Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc. Removal of underwater mines Survival-threatening situations
Protection of Japanese Warning and
nationals overseas surveillance activities
U.S. Forces staying temporarily
at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties
International cooperation, etc.
Peace Keeping Operation
Internationally coordinated operations

for peace and security
Situations threatening international peace
and security that the international
International humanitarian assistance community is collectively addressing
Chapter 4
From SDF conducting international
peace cooperation operations
to U.S. Forces responding to disasters
*1 : Activities that came under the scope of the agreement due to the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security.
*2 Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than armed attack situations, etc., falls under the scope of the new agreement.

SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness
and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in 3 Cooperation in Response to a large-Scale
Disaster in Japan
the case of a disaster.
Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in
posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their
and relations with local communities, Japan and the high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong
United States are proactively engaged in consultations, ties they had developed. The success of the joint response
and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation
example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training
March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the
ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation
and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force
Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000
addition, in December 2013 and between June and July personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft,
2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in
training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and
area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous
of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of
Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use appreciation and trust for USFJ.
by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. On the other hand, some issues have emerged,
such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities
of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster
within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint
guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S.

Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining resolution based on international law. The two countries
mechanisms for the sharing of information and more have been working closely together on various multilateral
effective coordination mechanism. maritime security cooperation initiatives supported by
In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response countries along the sea lanes, including participation in
Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for countering piracy
the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries since December 2013, and the Proliferation Security
conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster Initiative (PSI)4 exercise Pacific Protector 17, hosted by
prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 Australia in September 2017.
based on the scenario of an earthquake occurring in the See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)
Nankai Trough. USFJ also participated in the Wakayama Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Proliferation Security Initiative)
Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training

(October 2014) and Michinoku ALERT 2014 (November (2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises
2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern The Guidelines enable Japan and the Unites States to
Army. In this manner, the SDF and USFJ have been promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security
enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness. and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating
In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-
Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in
transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan
of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF and the United States.
personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was
utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint 5 Space and Cyberspace Cooperation
Chapter 4
Coordination Office locally established by the joint task

force organized for the earthquake response. (1) Cooperation on Space
With regard to cooperation on space, based on the
agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in
4 Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace
and Security November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of

space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-
(1) Cooperation in International Activities U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been
The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation working together to discuss how they should cooperate
with the United States and other participating countries in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S.
through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the
Special Measures Act, international disaster relief participation of relevant ministries and agencies.
activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in
Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations off the April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of
United States worked closely together at local multilateral government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling
coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole
that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond of- government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue
to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, Japan started on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been
to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command sharing information on their respective space policies and
in October 2014, coordinating efforts and collecting discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.
information with relevant countries including the United Moreover, based on the instructions given by the
States, for close cooperation. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015,
As for maritime security, both Japan and the the two countries established the Space Cooperation
United States have made efforts as maritime nations to Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the
maintain and develop “open and stable seas” according to cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the
fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety area of space. The SCWG has held four meetings in total
of navigation, and the rule of law including peaceful dispute since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent
4 See part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2, Footnote 4

meeting was in February 2018). Going forward, Japan regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports
and the United States will leverage this working group to and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the
deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military
(1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing Technologies to the United States of America.5 In 2006,
information sharing, (3) working together to develop the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms
and secure experts, and (4) continued participation to and Military Technologies to the United States of America6
tabletop exercises. was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of
Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide
(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace the United States with 20 items of arms and military
Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense technologies, including military technologies related
Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the
October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the United States consult with each other at forums such as
Department of Defense (DoD) to discuss a broad range the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct
of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing cooperative research and development regarding the
of information at the policy level, human resources specific projects agreed upon at these forums.
development, and technical cooperation. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in
The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense
CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP
cited the prompt and appropriate development of an MOU).7 The MOU promotes measures concerning the
information sharing structure and the protection of procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense
the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the authorities based on reciprocity (providing information
Chapter 4
U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other
examples of cooperation between the Japanese and country, protecting submitted corporate information,
U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the
between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of other country, etc.).

the resiliency of their respective networks and systems Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4-2 (Deepening
and the implementation of educational exchanges and Relationships with the United States regarding Defense
bilateral exercises were also cited. Japan and the United Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains
States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure
cooperation in line with the direction presented by the for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys8 deployed by the U.S. Marine
Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement. Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to be
deployed by the GSDF7 as well as initiatives for the
onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the
6 Initiatives to Further Improve the Effectiveness Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft.
of Bilateral Cooperation
See Reference 23 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development
(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Projects)
Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense

equipment and technology while bearing in mind the (2) Education and Research Exchange
maintenance of the technological and production bases The Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual
and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan- cooperation relating to security and defense, and the
U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance two governments will deepen exchanges between
Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. members of relevant organizations, and strengthen
In view of the progress in technology cooperation communication between each side’s research and
between Japan and the United States, the improvement educational institutions. To this end, the MOD/SDF has
of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided been working on education and research exchanges by
to transfer its military technology to the United States accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S.
5 Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America
6 Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America
7 The official title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement.
8 The GSDF plans to deploy 17 tiltrotors (V-22 Osprey), which are expected to supplement and enhance the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA), during the current Mid-Term Defense Plan
(five years; FY2014-2018) for responses to attacks on islands.

bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United See Reference 42 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number
States so that security and defense personnel can share of Newly Accepted Students in FY 2017))
Reference 43 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the
knowledge and enhance cooperation. Ministry of Defense)
Reference 44 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)
4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States
1 Various Policy Consultations related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense
Japan and the United States have maintained close ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of
coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary
and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened where discussions are made with a focus on the defense
and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, policies of the respective governments and defense
stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of
also the entire international community, including the Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work
Asia-Pacific region. together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative
Close policy consultations on security are conducted Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint
through diplomatic channels as well as between officials Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International
in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-
in the Governments of Japan and the United States level meetings when necessary and exchange information
Chapter 4
through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC with the U.S. DoD and others under the Japan-U.S.
(“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and Security Arrangements.
the SDC. As the framework for ministerial consultations The sharing of information and views at every
among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign opportunity and level between Japan and the United States
affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of
represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in
as an important consultative panel to discuss issues the further enhancement of close collaboration between
Fig. II-4-2-6 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues
Consultative Participants
Purpose Legal Basis
Forum Japanese Side U.S. Side
Study of matters which would Established on the basis of
promote understanding between letters exchanged between the
Security Consultative U.S. Secretary of State, the Japanese and U.S. Governments Prime Minister of Japan and
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Committee (SCC) U.S. Secretary of and contribute to the strengthening the U.S. Secretary of State on
Minister of Defense
(“2+2” Meeting) Defense1 of cooperative relations in the areas January 19, 1960, in accordance
of security, which form the basis of with Article IV of the Japan-U.S.
security and are related to security Security Treaty
Security Exchange of views on security Article IV of the Japan-U.S.
Participants are not
Subcommittee Participants are not specified2 issues of mutual concern to Japan Security Treaty and others
specified2
(SSC) and the United States
Assistant Secretary Study and consideration of Established on July 8, 1976, as
Director-General of North American of State, Assistant consultative measures to Japan a subentry under the Japan-U.S.
Subcommittee for Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Defense, and the United States including Security Consultative Committee
Defense Cooperation Director General of the Bureau of Defense Representative from: guidelines to ensure consistent joint in its 16th meeting reorganized
(SDC)3 Policy, Ministry of Defense; the U.S. Embassy in responses covering the activities of at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial
Representative from Joint Staff Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, the SDF and USFJ in emergencies consultation on June 28, 1996
PACOM
Director-General of North American Affairs Deputy Commander Consultation concerning Article XXV of the Status of
Japan-U.S. Joint Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; of USFJ, Minister at implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement
Committee Director General of the Bureau of Local the U.S. Embassy, and Forces Agreement
Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others others
Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.

the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively

engaging in these initiatives.
See Reference 24 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations
(Since FY2015))
Fig. II-4-2-6 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between
Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-
U.S. Security Issues)
2 “2+2” Meeting (August 17, 2017)
The “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington DC on

August 17, 2017. Foreign Minister Kono and Defense
Minister Onodera attended from the Japanese side, and U.S. Vice President Pence and Minster of Defense Onodera inspecting ASDF PAC-3 unit
deployed to Ichigaya (February 2018)
then U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of
U.S. Defense Mattis attended from the U.S. side. they proposed practical measures and actions to further
The following is a summary of the “2+2” Meeting strengthen the Alliance, including trough reviewing
and Joint Statement. the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the
a. Overview United States to ensure seamless Alliance responses
❍ Amidst an increasingly severe security in the across a full spectrum of situations.
Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers reaffirmed their • Japan expressed the intent to expand its role in the
commitment to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, in
Alliance, and reconfirmed that the Alliance continues anticipation of its next planning period for it Mid-
Chapter 4
to be the cornerstone of the regional peace and security Term Defense Program.
in the Asia-Pacific region. • The United States committed to deploying its most
b. Regional Strategic Environment advanced capabilities to Japan.
❍ The Ministers concurred that North Korea’s nuclear • In order to expedite work already underway in this

and missiles development is completely unacceptable, regard, the Ministers gave the following guidance
and that it is necessary to apply more pressure on North to their stance. (1) Accelerate implementation
Korea, including the strict and full implementation of of the Guidelines and pursue additional types of
the newly adopted United Nations Security Council cooperation under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and
resolution. In addition, while maintaining Japan- Security. (2) Explore new and expanded activities
U.S. and Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea cooperation in various areas such as Intelligence, Surveillance,
closely, that the Ministers urge China and Russia and Reconnaissance (ISR), training and exercises,
to play a greater role, as well as to continue taking research and development, capacity building, and
concrete measures to reinforce the defense posture of joint/shared use of facilities.
the Alliance and enhance its capabilities in order to ❍ The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’
deter the threat of North Korea. commitment to the implementation of the 2015 Guidelines.
❍ Regarding the situation in the South China Sea, • The Ministers welcomed to operationalize mutual
the Ministers agreed that Japan and the U.S. would asset protection and to bring into force the new
continue to cooperate for the peace and stability of the Japan-U.S. ACSA.
East China Sea, reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan- • The Ministers reaffirmed the critical role of the U.S.’
U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku islands, extended deterrence that is essential to ensuring the
and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to security of Japan as well as the peace and stability
undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. of the Asia-pacific region.
❍ The Ministers confirmed the significance of continued • The Ministers affirmed to enhance and accelerate of
engagement of Japan and the United States including cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air
through respective activities to support freedom of and missile defenses, Non-combatant Evacuation
navigation. Operation (NEO), cooperation on defense equipment
c. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation
❍ The Ministers shared the view to develop measures and information security.
to further enhance the deterrence and response • Aiming to enhance cooperation in outer space and
capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, cyberspace, and deepen discussions towards cooperation.

d. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation 3 Recent Major Policy Consultations

❍ The Ministers highlighted efforts to advance trilateral
and multilateral security and defense cooperation with (1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
other partners in the region, notably ROK, Australia, (August 17, 2017)
India and Southeast Asian countries. Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense
❍ The Ministers emphasized to expand Japan-U.S.-Korea Mattis took the opportunity of Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting
trilateral exercises (missile warnings, anti-submarine to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting.
warfare, and maritime interdiction operation exercises), a. General Statement
and enhance information-sharing. They affirmed the The Ministers agreed on the importance to establish a trust
intention to further enhance capacity building programs relationship between Japan-U.S. defense authorities, and
and defense equipment and technology transfers to agreed to cooperate to strengthen Japan-U.S. alliance.
the Southeast Asian countries. They confirmed the b. Response to the North Korea Issue
commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue The Ministers exchanged their views about pressing
on maritime security capacity building. issues of North Korea, and stated that it is time to increase
e. The U.S. Force Presence in Japan the pressure and also noted that they will take necessary
❍ Realignment of USFJ measures in cooperation with U.S. Forces to respond to
The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to every situation.
implementing the existing arrangements to maintain a Regarding the response to issues of North Korea,
robust U.S. Force presence in Japan, while maintaining the Ministers confirmed that close coordination between
deterrent capability of U.S. Force and mitigating their Japan and the U.S. is indispensable and agreed to work
impact on local communities, and enhancing from local on further increasing the pressure on North Korea and
Chapter 4
communities for the presence and operations of USFJ. improvement of the defense posture and capability.
• The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation of c. Enhancement of the Deterrence and Response
MCAS Futenma to the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
area is the only solution to avoid the continued use In light of increasingly severe security environment, the
of MCAS Futenma. They underscored their strong Ministers agreed to proceed with initiatives to ensure
determination to achieve relocation of facilities to effectiveness of the Guidelines and to further enhance the
Henokosaki and the return of MCAS Futenma as deterrence and response capability of Japan-U.S. alliance,
soon as possible. while advancing an effort to improve capabilities of both
• The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to Japan and the U.S.
steadily implement the existing realignment plan
(Consolidation Plan, relocation of marine corps (2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (September 21, 2017)
stationed in Okinawa to Guam, field carrier landing (Security Field)
practice, relocation of training of tilt-rotor aircraft/ Prime Minister Abe visited New York to attend the United
rotary wing aircraft, etc.). Nations General Assembly, and held Japan-U.S. Summit
❍ Host Nation Support (HNS) Meeting with President Trump.
The Ministers reaffirmed the overall level of HNS, and The two leaders discussed the situation concerning
the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding. North Korea. They once again shared the view that a
❍ Other issues series of provocative actions including North Korea’s
The Ministers reaffirmed promotion of joint/shared use. ballistic missile launch on August 29 as well as on
They welcomed supplementary arrangements of the Status of September 15 and its nuclear test on September 3
Forces Agreement regarding the environmental stewardship constitute an unprecedented, grave and imminent threat
and the civilian component, and they stressed the importance to the international community including Japan and the
of steadily implementing these arrangements. United States. They confirmed that the U.S. commitment
See Reference 25 (Japan-United States Security Consultative to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military
Committee (2+2) Joint Statement (provisional translation) capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering,
(August 17, 2017)
and that Japan and the United States are 100% together.
The two leaders welcomed the recent adoption
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375.
They affirmed the importance of continued cooperation
between Japan and the United States, trilateral cooperation

between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of dialogue in the region under the framework of ADMM
Korea, as well as to urge relevant countries including plus. Minister Onodera stated that Japan will proceed with
China and Russia to secure the full implementation of the effort to improve capability of ASEAN based on the
the resolution and to further work on maximizing the guidelines for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, “the
pressure against North Korea. Vientiane Vision.” The Ministers confirmed that Japan
and the United States will cooperate to promote defense
(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting cooperation including capacity building assistance with
(October 23, 2017) South-East Asian countries.
Minister Onodera and Secretary Mattis took the In addition, as for the accident of CH-53E, Secretary
opportunity of ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus Mattis showed recognition on the importance of flight
(ADMM plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial safety, and Minister Onodera conveyed to Secretary Mattis
Meeting from 12:45 (LT) for about 65 minutes. An that it is vital to win the support of local communities to
overview is as follows. ensure stable stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan and asked
a. Response to issues of North Korea to operate safely.
The Ministers shared information on the situation and
outlook of nuclear and missile development by North (4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 6, 2017)
Korea. Minister Onodera described the situation where (Security Field)
threats of North Korea to security of the region including Prime Minister Abe held a working lunch and Summit
Japan have become unprecedentedly major and imminent. Meeting with U.S. President Trump when he visited
Based on that fact, Minister Onodera stated the necessity Japan, and held discussions on the bilateral security
of a proper discussion with Secretary Mattis to take situation, including North Korea, the regional situation,
Chapter 4
close measures to any situation as an alliance. Secretary and Okinawa.
Mattis expressed the similar view and renewed strong a. North Korea
determination on defense of Japan including commitment ❍ Introduction
for extended deterrence. The two leaders confirmed that both countries are 100%

In light of increasing threat of ballistic missile by together on the issue of North Korea, and that the U.S.
North Korea, the Ministers agreed to ensure the best commitment to the region is unwavering, backed by the
defense posture, confirmed cooperation on introduction of U.S. presence based on the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance.
new BMD assets focusing on Aegis Ashore, and agreed President Trump also reconfirmed the ironclad U.S.
to promote closer cooperation on operational side between commitment to Japan’s defense through the full range of
assets of Japan and the U.S. assets including Aegis ship. U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.
The ministers welcomed that they are keeping a high ❍ Reinforcing Pressure to North Korea
level of communication through telephone calls on the The two leaders shared the view that now is not the time
occasion of repeated provocative acts by North Korea, and for dialogue, that maximum pressure must be applied to
confirmed that they will keep working closely together in North Korea, and the recognition that North Korea will
information sharing. Also, they confirmed that they will not see a bright future unless it changes its course of
continue to exert pressure on North Korea in a tangible actions toward denuclearization.
way, and reiterated the importance of coordinating closely Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan intends
on future measures between Japan and the United States. to take additional measures, which President Trump
In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance welcomed in response.
close trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United The two leaders welcomed deepened coordination
States, and Republic of Korea. among Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea
b. Regional Situations (ROK), and reaffirmed to further foster coordination
The Ministers agreed that they will continuously keep among three countries.
paying attention to the situation of the East China Sea Both leaders reaffirmed that the full implementation
and both Japan and the United States will cooperate for of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on North
its peace and stability. Korea is imperative and confirmed that they intend
Also, the Ministers confirmed the importance to encourage related countries including China and
of commitment to South-East Asia in light of the Russia, including through direct engagement with their
situation including the South China Sea, and welcomed counterparts, so that the international community as a
development of multilateral security cooperation and whole maximizes pressure on North Korea.

b. Regional / Global Affairs ministers to continue to follow up with these achievements.

❍ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy The two leaders reaffirmed the commitment to the
The two leaders confirmed that a free and open maritime realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan in accordance
order based on the rule of law is a cornerstone for peace with previous affirmations, maintaining operational
and prosperity of the international community and and deterrent capability of U.S. forces in Japan. Both
called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and leaders reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps
overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henokosaki is the
seas, and reiterated that both countries intend to continue only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS
to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. Futenma and called for the steady implementation of the
The two leaders stressed the importance of the Indo- construction plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility
Pacific region, which is the core of the vitality of the (FRF), noting the adverse impact of further delays on the
world with its vast population and economic dynamism. ability to provide for peace and security. Prime Minister
In addition, both leaders affirmed that Japan and the Abe stated that it is essential to be responsive to local
United States will work together to promote peace and communities’ concerns regarding incidents, accidents
prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific and other issues. Both leaders reaffirmed the importance
as free and open and directed relevant ministers and of engaging local communities about the purpose of
institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, training and of allaying concerns about safety.
in the following areas:
(1) Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (5) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 17 and 18, 2018)
(rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.) (Security Field)
(2) Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of Prime Minister Abe held Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings
Chapter 4
connectivity, etc.) with U.S. President Trump three times.

(3) Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building a. North Korea
on maritime law enforcement, etc.) The two leaders reaffirmed the close coordination
Both leaders reiterated that they will cooperate with between the two countries with respect to the actions
any country that shares this vision of a free and open to be taken on the issue of North Korea including the
Indo-Pacific. upcoming U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, and
❍ East China Sea and South China Sea expressed their intention for Japan and the US to remain
The two leaders expressed concern about the situation in fully aligned on all areas of talks with North Korea. They
the East and South China Seas and they reaffirmed their also confirmed the importance of Japan-U.S.-ROK close
opposition to unilateral coercive actions that could alter trilateral coordination.
the status quo and increase tensions. Both leaders shared the recognition that maximum
They reiterated that maritime disputes should be pressure campaign to North Korea under the close
settled peacefully in accordance with international law. cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and ROK and in
Taking note of the progress of discussion of the coordination with the international community including
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), they China, has recently driven North Korea to seek dialogue.
emphasized the importance of demilitarization of the The two leaders also commended the efforts by the ROK
disputed features in the South China Sea. Government up to this point.
❍ China The two leaders noted that concrete measures toward
The two leaders welcome China’s positive contribution denuclearization hadn't been announced yet by North
to regional and global peace and prosperity, and stressed Korea, and shared the view that they needed to continue
the importance for Japan and the U.S. to continue careful analysis of its intention.
constructive dialogue with China. Nonetheless, both leaders affirmed that they would
c. Japan-U.S. Relations maintain maximum pressure against North Korea. As
The two leaders shared the view that they intend to the US maintains the policy of “all options are on the
continue to work toward enhancing the deterrence and table,” Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed his support for this
response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance amid an President Trump’s principled position. Moreover, both
increasingly severe security environment in the region. leaders shared the recognition that North Korea must
Along with appreciating the achievements made at the not be given any reward for merely engaging with other
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan- countries, and that the international community should
U.S. “2+2”) held in August 2017, they directed relevant uphold this policy.

Both leaders reaffirmed that they are committed to operational and deterrent capability of the U.S. forces,
achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. They also Japan. The leaders reconfirmed that the relocation of
reaffirmed that North Korea needs to abandon all weapons Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the Camp
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters is the only
complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The two solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps
leaders shared the recognition that specific actions need Air Station Futenma and as such called for the steady
to be taken by North Korea to realize these goals. implementation of the construction plan for the Futenma
Prime Minister Abe requested President Trump to Replacement Facility (FRF) to ensure the Alliance's
raise the abductions issue during the upcoming U.S.- ability to provide for peace and security in the region.
North Korea Summit Meeting, and President Trump Both leaders also shared a continued commitment to
assured that he will bring up the matter in his meeting safety operations.
with Kim Jong-un and urge North Korea to promptly The two leaders shared concern regarding the
resolve its abduction of Japanese citizens, referring to the situation in the East and South China Seas, and reaffirmed
strong impression he received when he met the families that Japan and the United States would continue to
of the abductees during his visit to Japan last November. coordinate together on this issue. The two leaders also
Both leaders agreed to work towards the early resolution reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
of the abductions issue. Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku
Both leaders shared the importance of addressing Islands in the East China Sea and that they oppose any
North Korea's sanctions evasion and full implementation unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo.
of the pertinent United Nations Security Council Prime Minister Abe conveyed President Trump
Resolutions by the international community under close that it is important for Japan to continue introducing
Chapter 4
cooperation with international partners including ROK. sophisticated equipment including U.S.-made defense
In this context, President Trump commended Japan's equipment in strengthening Japan's defense capability and
effort to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by responding to the severe security environment. President
North Korea related vessels, and expressed that the U.S., Trump welcomed Prime Minister Abe’s remarks.

with other multilateral partners, would continue efforts c. Others
on this issue in coordination with Japan. Both leaders welcomed progress in discussions between
Both leaders shared the expectation that the situation Japan and the United States. toward achievement of a
will improve following the U.S.-North Korea Summit free and open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that they would
Meeting, etc. They also shared the recognition that North further advance concrete cooperation in areas that follow
Korea is situated in a truly fortunate location, adjoining international standards including development of high
the growth region of Asia and the Pacific, and it has an quality infrastructure.
industrious labor force as well as natural resources. Both Both leaders also discussed China, and agreed
leaders also shared the view that if it were to make use on the importance of urging China to make further
of those, there could be a path towards North Korea contributions to the peace, security, and prosperity of
dramatically growing its economy and improving public the region and the international community.
welfare, and reaffirmed that is where North Korea's bright
future lies. (6) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (April 20, 2018)
b. Japan-U.S. Alliance Minister of Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis
Against the backdrop of the current situation regarding North held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting at the
Korea, President Trump reaffirmed unwavering commitment U.S. Department of Defense.
of the U.S. to Japan's defense through the full range of U.S. a. North Korea
military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense
Both leaders reaffirmed that they would further agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead,
promote the Japan-U.S. security cooperation through including the meeting between leaders of United States
steady implementation of Japan’s Legislation for and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea.
Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Despite that North Korea’s attitude is changing and
Defense Cooperation. they are showing their willingness to talk, the Ministers
Both leaders expressed their intention to work noted that no concrete measures by North Korea towards
together to mitigate impact of the U.S. forces on local denuclearization has been seen and agreed to keep close
communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining watch on North Koreas’ actions. Minister Onodera

stated the necessity of maintaining maximum pressure ensure safe operations. Furthermore, Minister Onodera
against North Korea to make them abandon all weapons requested cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, and
the Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting the Ministers agreed to work together in obtaining
pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of understanding of local communities.
realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programs. (7) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (May 29, 2018)
In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense
Secretary Mattis applauded measures implemented Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
by Maritime Self Defense Forces, and noted the U.S. in Hawaii.
willingness to continue pursuing such activities in a. North Korea
coordination with Japan and other various partners. The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations
In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance close regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared
trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and
and the Republic of Korea as well as multinational policy on future response against North Korea issues.
cooperation through conducting joint exercises. Minister Onodera expressed his view that the meeting
The Ministers agreed that they will continue to between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be
maintain close communication to take concerted action an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern
as an alliance in response to any situations. such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The
b. Enhancing the Alliance Capability to Deter and Respond Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting
The Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S. cooperation in pressure and sanctions, under the common principle
Chapter 4
new areas implemented under Japan’s Legislation for of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass
Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan U.S. destruction including chemical and biological weapons
Defense Cooperation such as protection mission against and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable
U.S. Forces’ assets and provision of goods and services and irreversible way.
to U.S. Forces by Self Defense Forces, and the Ministers In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the
reaffirmed to make further improvement of Japan-U.S. Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan
defense cooperation through steady implementation in coordination with partner countries including United
of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and
In light of the build-up of Japan’s future defense reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of
capability, Minister Onodera explained that Japan is in regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.
the process to review the National Defense Program Secretary Mattis expressed U.S. renewed commitment
Guidelines and to develop the next Mid-Term Defense to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will
Program towards the end of this year, and the Ministers continue to maintain close communication to take concerted
agreed to continue to work closely and exchange action as an alliance in response to any situations.
information. Minister Onodera also stated that, in order b. Regional State of Affairs, etc.
to address the severe security environment, it is essential The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges,
for the strengthening of Japan’s defense capability that and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the
Japan continues to introduce high-performance defense status quo by force, agreed that it is important for both
equipment including U.S. made assets. The Ministers countries to continue to closely watch on the situations
affirmed that both countries will make efforts to realize in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and
Japan’s smooth and timely procurement of U.S. made stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South
assets, including Aegis Ashore, by making improvements China Sea. The Ministers noted that China has enforced
in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales. its military capability and intensified its activities in the
c. U.S. Forces in Japan, Okinawa sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to
Minister Onodera requested continued efforts to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond
ensure safe operation of U.S. Forces, including U.S. through enhancement of defense capability based on the
military aircrafts in Okinawa and the CV-22 expected close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and
to be deployed in Yokota Air Base this year. Secretary stability of the region.
Mattis expressed his recognition that it is important to

c. Free and Open Indo-Pacific will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD
The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of cooperating including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic
with the allied countries and various partners to assure missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue
and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North
coordination in the promotion of the basic principles Korea in coordination with their partner countries.
such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in Secretary Mattis explained the suspension of U.S.-
capacity building. ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers
d. U.S. Forces in Japan reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of
Minister Onodera requested efforts to ensure safe the USFK has been considered, and reconfirmed the
operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S.
obtain consent from local communities including those Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. Secretary Mattis
in Okinawa. expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan,
and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement
(8) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (June 7, 2018) of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability
(Security Field) including conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises steadily,
Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Trump held as planned. The Ministers agreed that they will continue
Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in Washington, DC. to maintain a close channel of communication to take
The two leaders closely coordinated the future concerted actions as an alliance in response to every
policy with regard to the issue on North Korea , including situation.
responses to the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting that b. Regional Affairs
Chapter 4
was scheduled for June 12, and shared the view that Japan The Ministers exchanged their views based on Secretary
and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, Mattis’s visit to China, the Ministers reconfirmed that
and the Republic of Korea (ROK), would coordinate Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to
closely to ensure that the U.S.-North Korea Summit the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any

Meeting would be a historic meeting marking progress on unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s
the issues of concern, including the abductions, nuclear, administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to
and missile issues. closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and
The two leaders confirmed that following the U.S.- to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability.
North Korea Summit Meeting, Japan and the United The Ministers also confirmed the importance to
States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the ROK, collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such
will promptly share information and coordinate policy. as rule of law and freedom of navigation.
c. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
(9) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (June 29, 2018) The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales
Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will
at the Ministry of Defense. continue to work to help Japan achieve efficient procurement.
a. North Korea d. U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady
regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in
and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and Japan, and Minister Onodera’s requested to ensure the
policy on future response against North Korea issues. The safe operations of the U.S. Forces.
Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they

Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Measures such as realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan The MOD will advance the U.S. Forces realignment and
are extremely important in mitigating the impact on other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain
local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while the understanding and cooperation of local communities
maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. Forces. hosting USFJ facilities and areas.
1 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to

Significance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces
1 in Japan defend Japan, Article 6 allows the United States to use
facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of
As the security environment surrounding Japan is Japan and international peace and security in the Far East,
becoming increasingly severe, for the Japan-U.S. and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance.
Alliance, which is based on the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrence
Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of
that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as the peace 2 the U.S. Forces in Japan
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to
Chapter 4
secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan and to The Status of Forces Agreement1 (SOFA) stipulates
maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the
from peacetime that enables USFJ to respond swiftly and status of USFJ, including furnishing of facilities and areas
expeditiously to emergencies. for use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and
For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security satisfying the labor requirements of USFJ.
Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a
core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. (1) Furnishing of JSDF Facilities and Areas
Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S.
presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response Forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance
based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in with agreements reached through the Joint Committee
the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the between the Governments of Japan and the United States.
actions of USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted The Government of Japan has entered into agreements
by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and
USFJ will serve as the basis of such support. public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in
In order for USFJ to carry out the abovementioned order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas.
role, it is essential that all the services of the U.S. Forces, However, should the Government be unable to obtain the
including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For approval of landowners, it will acquire title3 under the
instance, when responding to armed aggression against Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release,2 while
Japan in cooperation with the SDF, the U.S. Forces compensating the landowners for any loss they may have
primarily serve the role of “spear” through its offensive suffered in the process.
power. When the U.S. Forces function as an offensive
power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, (2) Satisfying labor Requirements of USFJ
and Marine Corps stationed in Japan work in an integrated USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and
manner to fully exert their functions. the SOFA stipulates that the requirements of USFJ shall be
In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.
1 The official title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Japan.
2 The official title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
3 The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan Section 3
As of the end of FY2017, 25,803 USFJ local See Fig. II-4-3-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (budget for
employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) FY2018))
at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as

office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/ 4 Host Nation Support (HNS)
supply facilities, members of security guards and fi re
departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational Host Nation Support (HNS) plays an important role to
facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the
operations of USFJ, and support its activities. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices
The Government of Japan hires these employees and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in
in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The the international economic situation, the Government of
MOD supports the stationing of USFJ by performing Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in
administrative work for personnel management, payment FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear costs for
of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).
Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes
in economic conditions that affected both countries, the
Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed
3 in Japan employment stability of the employees was adversely
influenced, and there was even concern that it would
Various costs associated with USFJ include the costs of affect the activities of USFJ. Therefore, in 1987, the
stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations of Governments of Japan and the United States concluded
the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding
Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)4
Chapter 4
well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under
to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the cost principle in the SOFA.
the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan

Fig. II-4-3-1 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2018)
Costs for Stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related

(MOD-Related Budget: ¥378.9 billion (1)+(2)) (¥5.1 billion) costs (¥216.1 billion)
• Projects for land returns • Relocation of the U.S. Marines in
Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ
¥2.6 billion Okinawa to Guam ¥59.0 billion
(¥196.8 billion (1)) • Projects for training improvement • Projects for realignment in Okinawa
¥0.4 billion ¥87.9 billion
• Costs for taking measures to improve
• Projects for noise reduction • Projects for the relocation of Carrier
the living environment in areas • Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥0.8 billion Air Wing ¥19.5 billion
surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥20.6 billion • Projects for contingency use ¥0.2 billion
¥51.1 billion • Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) • Projects for training relocation
• Rent for facilities ¥100.2 billion ¥27.0 billion (Local task force-related cost) ¥ 70 million
• Relocation, etc. ¥4.3 billion
• Projects for facilitating realignment
• Other costs (compensation for
initiatives ¥41.1 billion
fisheries, etc.) ¥26.5 billion
Total: ¥182.0 billion (2) Total: ¥47.6 billion Total: ¥3.8 billion Total: ¥207.8 billion
Non MOD-related budget Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥158.8 billion)
• Expenditures borne by other
ministries (base subsidy, etc.) • Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) • Training relocation costs: ¥1.2 billion • Training relocation costs
• Estimated costs of government ¥125.1 billion (one of the projects aimed at ¥8.3 billion
owned land provided for use as • Utilities costs ¥23.2 billion enhancing training)
• Training relocation costs (NLP) • Artillery live-fire training over • Aviation training relocation
USFJ facilities3
¥0.9 billion Highway 104 as part of realignment
Total: ¥149.2 billion • Parachute training initiatives
Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the
realignment-related costs.
2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the
realignment-related costs refer to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the
cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.
3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.2 billion, FY2017 Budget) and the
estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.1 billion, FY2017 Estimated Costs).
4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
4 The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the ❍ Utilities costs
adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs to
allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) be borne by Japan for each fiscal year is reduced from the
was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs
Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen.
utilities costs from FY1991. The financial responsibility ❍ Costs for Facilities Improvement Program
of the Japanese Government was further expanded to The amount of costs for the FIP will not fall below 20.6
cover training relocation costs from FY1996. billion yen in each fiscal year during the new SMA
The Government of Japan has been reviewing period. For the period of the previous SMA, any amount
HNS while paying full attention to its tight fiscal of reductions in the labor costs and the utilities costs was
conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady to be appropriated for an increase in costs for the FIP.
decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an But such appropriation will not be made during the new
expenditure basis. SMA period.
(3) Scale of Host Nation Support
5 Current Special Measures Agreement The amount of HNS in FY2020, the final fiscal year of
the new SMA period, will be approximately 189.9 billion
As the former SMA was effective up until March 2016, yen, with the average amount for each fiscal year during
the current SMA was intended to “open discussions the same period coming to approximately 189.3 billion
pertaining to future arrangements for an appropriate yen (any change in wages based on recommendations
level for sharing of the costs of U.S. Forces stationed by the National Personnel Authority will be reflected
in Japan” based on the “2+2” agreement of April 2015. appropriately in labor costs for each fiscal year).
Chapter 4
Following this agreement, Japan and the United States (4) Cost-saving efforts: It is clearly stipulated that the
held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, United States will make further efforts to economize
the Governments of Japan and the United States reached the above-mentioned expenditures.
agreement as follows: Subsequently, after the new SMA
was signed in January 2016 and approval by the Diet, the

USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local
new agreement took effect in April of the same year. 6 Communities
The key points of the new SMA are as follows:
(1) Effective period: Five years (from FY2016 through The social conditions surrounding USFJ facilities and
FY2020). areas have changed significantly, including, for example,
(2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear all or part of the labor through urbanization over the past several decades. For
costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities and
relocation. be genuinely accepted by the Japanese people, it is vital
❍ Labor costs to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as
The upper limit of the number of workers at welfare, possible and secure the understanding and cooperation of the
recreation, and morale facilities to be funded by Japan local communities in light of such changes. Japan’s national
will be reduced from 4,408 to 3,893, while the upper land is narrow with limited plains, and there are many cases
limit of the number of workers engaged in activities such where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and
as maintenance of assets and administrative works to be business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence
funded by Japan, will be increased from 18,217 to 19,285. of those facilities and areas, and the takeoffs and landings
As a result, the upper limit of the number of workers to of the U.S. Forces aircraft have considerable impact on the
be funded by Japan will be increased from the current residents’ living environment and local development. It is
22,625 to 23,178. These adjustments will be phased in therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact in
over the new SMA period from FY2016 to FY2020. a way that is responsive to the circumstances of each area.
2 Deployment of New U.S. Forces Assets (F-35B) to Japan
As a fifth generation fighter, the F-35 has high stealth variant; F-35B, the short takeoff and vertical landing
performance and powerful fi re control capabilities. It variant; and F-35C, the aircraft carrier variant.
has three variants: F-35A, the normal takeoff and landing It was confirmed in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” joint

announcement in October 2013 that the deployment of

the F-35B fighter to Japan would begin in 2017 as its
first forward deployment outside of the United States. In
January 2017, 10 F-35B fighters arrived in Iwakuni Air
Base to replace F/A-18 fighters. In November, the AV8B
fighters were replaced by six F-35B fighters.
As the security environment surrounding Japan
is becoming increasingly severe, the Government of
Japan believes that the deployment of the F-35B, the
most up-to-date and high-performance fighter, to Japan
is a manifestation of the iron-clad commitment of the
United States to the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens the F-35B fighters deployed to MCAS Iwakuni (November 2018)
(Photo courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps)
deterrent of the Alliance, and contributes to the security
of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.
3 Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan
As for the realignment of USFJ, “the United States-Japan (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) and logistics support elements—in Japan, Guam, and
was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the Governments Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In
Chapter 4
of Japan and the United States have conducted full-fledged addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States
bilateral discussions concerning coordination of the plan for decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine
the realignment, in view of factors including the following: Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting
1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress

and steadily enable the visible mitigation of the impact on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).
on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating strategic
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and the realignment
Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting
package, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic 2 (August 17, 2017)
Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that
a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of The two Governments agree that, “in view of maintaining
the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by a robust U.S. Force presence in Japan, the Governments
the U.S. Congress. The achievements thereof have been of Japan and the United States reaffirmed their
announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” commitments to implement the existing arrangements
Meeting and through other means. for the realignment of USFJ. These arrangements aim
to maintain operational and deterrence capability in an
increasingly severe security environment, while also
Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting
1 (April 27, 2012) mitigating the impact on local communities and enhancing
support from local communities for the presence and
The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine operations of USFJ.”
Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, the main See Reference 21 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative
focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command Committee (tentative translation) (April 27, 2017))
Fig. II-4-3-2 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure
elements, but the United States decided to alter the of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan
composition of the units. As a result, the U.S. Government Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”)
decided to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa
In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including
and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the

Fig. II-4-3-2 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”-1
1. Realignment in the Kanto Area
[Yokota related] [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]

Relocation of the Air Defense Command and
Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012)
center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008)
and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Tokyo
Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Yokota
Fuchu
Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base [Camp Zama]
(specific conditions and modalities are considered between Sagamihara Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army,
Japan and the U.S.) Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008)
Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central
Zama Readiness Force (Completed on March 26, 2013)
[U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot]
Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on
Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. Kanagawa March 26, 2013)
Army Japan Headquarters
Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and others
(Facilities including the Training Center)
(Land return completed on February 29, 2016)
(Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011.
Development of the Training Assistance Center completed.)
Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Station
(approx. 17 ha)
Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) Legend:
(Joint use started on December 2, 2015) Implemented Continuing
2. Realignment in Okinawa
MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha)
Chapter 4
[Joint/Shared Use]
[Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture]
Transport capabilities using helicopters
Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab
* Implemented on March 17, 2008
Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
training with U.S. Forces, while taking into
account the noise impact on local communities Operations of air-refueling aircraft → MCAS Iwakuni
* Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014
Contingency use → Tsuiki/Nyutabaru Air Base, etc.

[Land Returns]
Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan)
for returning of significant land area south of Camp Schwab
Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining
facilities and areas in Okinawa Replacement SDF bases in mainland, etc.
* Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp Hansen Facility
Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Camp Courtney

Farm No. 1
(total return, about 16 ha) Kadena Air Base [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]
Replacement III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
Facility about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of
Makiminato Service Area their dependents will relocate to Guam
(Camp Kinser) To Guam, etc. * “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states
(total return, about 274 ha) that about 9,000 personnel and their dependents
Naha would be relocated outside of Japan and the
* Return of north access road Camp Kuwae (Lester) authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam
(about 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 (total return, about 68 ha) will be about 5,000.
Naha Port
(total return, about 56 ha)
Legend:
Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Six candidate facilities for land return
A replacement facility will be (partial return, about 153 ha+ ) Implemented Continuing
located south of Kadena Air Base
constructed in the Urasoe-
Pier district under the Naha * Return of West Futenma Housing Area (Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig. II-4-3-8 for the current status on the
Port and Harbor Plan (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 returning of land south of Kadena Air Base)
same time has the advantage of having a certain distance which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of
from these areas that would not heighten military tension its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location
there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a is extremely important from the perspective of security,
large number of small islands, is located roughly in the as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for
center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific
of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific

Fig. II-4-3-2 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”-2
3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc. TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called

“X-band Radar System”
(Deployment completed in June 2006)
The relocation of flight training activities

Chitose
from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF
bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu,
Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well as to Guam.
The relocation to Guam, etc., was agreed Misawa
upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in Shariki
January 2011. Legend:
Deployment of a TPY-2 radar
Implemented
Relocation of carrier-based aircraft (Deployment completed in December 2014)
squadrons to Iwakuni
Continuing
(Relocation completed in March 2018)
Komatsu
Hyakuri
Atsugi
Kyogamisaki
Tsuiki Iwakuni
Nyutabaru Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons
and other units from Iwakuni to Atsugi
(“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013
confirmed the continued deployment of
these units in Iwakuni Air Base)
Kanoya
Relocation of training of MV-22 Osprey, etc.

(Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement
of September 2016)
Chapter 4
Kadena
Relocation of the KC-130 squadron
to Iwakuni Futenma
(Relocation completed in August 2014) The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational
basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam
Relocation of the functions of aircraft for
contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Mariana
Islands
Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam
Part of future civilian aviation facilities were (Japan and the United States confirmed that
established within MCAS Iwakuni the CH-53D squadron will be relocated to
(Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened the U.S. mainland and then to Guam.)
December 2012) (Relocation to the U.S. mainland completed)
Saipan
Guam
to the continent. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability
in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which is of the Asia-Pacific region.
in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ
and capable of high mobility and rapid response, and facilities and areas such as airbases, exercise fields and
also has readiness for wide-ranging missions—with the logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2017, approximately
above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further 70.6% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use)
ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying
strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture

Fig. II-4-3-3 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa
Geographical Advantage of Okinawa

Okinawa holds a position of The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center of
great strategic importance the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (*1)
for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the
perspective of Japan’s security.
Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict
areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including
the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing
Seoul ⇒ Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to
expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the
same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten
Access from continental
Tokyo military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms
Asia to the Pacific
of protecting units.
Approximately 1,260 km Izu Islands In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is
strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific
Shanghai
from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to
the continent.
*1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the
Approximately 3,220 km total volume of its trade.
Approximately 630 km
Okinawa Ogasawara
Islands The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
Hong Kong Taipei
It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the
Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is
important as a strategic location for Japan for the security of
Japan’s sea lanes
Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps (*2), which is
Okinotorishima capable of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness
for a wide variety of missions ranging from armed conflicts to
Approximately 2,760 km
natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical
advantages plays an important role in ensuring not only the
Saipan security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia.
Manila
Chapter 4
*2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and
Guam air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid
response in the event of any kind of situation.
and 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required
necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact adjustments and procedures for the return of land.
on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would
security standpoints. also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa
See Fig. II-4-3-3 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Issues,5 including the return of Naha Port (Naha City).
Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa) Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident
that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the
then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal
Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and
1 Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa documents under the Act on Special Measures for
USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided
When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment,
Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact
covering approximately 278 km2 for exclusive use by should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold
the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas
However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the
strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and Okinawa Action Council between the central government
reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and
lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture. the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report
Both countries have continued their initiatives to was compiled in 1996.
realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, See Reference 27 (Outline of 23 Issues)
centering on those subject to the strong local requests,
and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed
5 The Three Okinawa Issues refer to the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live fire training over Highway 104. The relocation (distribution and
implementation) of artillery live fi re training over Highway 104 in FY2018 is planned for East Fuji Maneuver Area, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, North Fuji Maneuver Area and Ohjojihara Maneuver Area.

2 Outline of SACO Final Report
The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the

adjustment of training and operational procedures, the
implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the
improvement of operational procedures regarding the
SOFA, and also refers to the related facilities and areas
covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO
Final Report represents approximately 21% (about
50 km2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that
time, exceeding the amount of land returned during
the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the
implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is
roughly 43 km2. Government of Japan exerted its full efforts to achieve
See Reference 28 (The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)); the earliest possible return as a way of contributing to the
Reference 29 (Progress of the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-4-3-4 mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.
(Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-
4-3-5 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and On the day before the return, Prime Minister Abe and
Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa) then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy made a Japan-U.S. Joint
Announcement. On the day of the return, a ceremony was
held in Okinawa, which was attended by many officials
Return of a Major Portion of the Northern
3 Training Area including Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga, then Defense
Chapter 4
Minister Inada, then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy, and
(1) Achievement of Majority Return Kunigami Village Mayor Miyagi and Higashi Village
On December 22, 2016, the return of approximately 4,000 Mayor Iju.
ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning

in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands
based on the SACO Final Report. in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by
The returned land accounts for approximately the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove
20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that
Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion the landowners, etc. can use returned lands effectively and
of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners
years since the SACO Final Report in 1996. on December 25, 2017.
Given the requests for an early return of the land
from the local villages of Kunigami and Higashi, the (2) Construction Work for the Relocation of Helipads
The condition for returning the Northern Training Area
was to relocate seven helipads to be returned in the area to
Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO
Fig. II-4-3-4 a preexisting training area. In this regard, the Government
Final Report
Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield Northern Training Area

Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ
Camp Hansen Fig. II-4-3-5
Aha Training Area
Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa
Senaha Communication
Station 400
Sobe Communication 353
350 Area (km2)
Site Offshore Camp Schwab Facilities/Areas
Yomitan Auxiliary 300 278
Airfield Gimbaru Training Area 249 242
250
Torii Communication Kin Blue Beach Training Area
Station 200 185
Kadena Air Base
Camp Zukeran
150 144
Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma 100 83

Makiminato 46 43
: Facilities and areas involved in land return 50 31
Service Area
: Facilities and areas involved in land return 0
Naha Port Facility
(Cancellation of joint use) Right before May 1972 End of End of As of
: Destination sites of other facilities relocation the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2018
programs of Okinawa

of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to make (approximately 481 ha with a land area 100 times larger
considerations for the natural environment and to relocate than Tokyo Dome).
not all but six helipads, which is the minimum necessary, a. Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the
and has steadily made progress with the construction work. Impact on Okinawa
Some protesters impeded the expeditious execution The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance
of the construction work for the relocation of the than merely moving the facility from one location to
helipads, through repeated obstruction such as parking another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating
cars and setting up tents in front of the entrance of the the impact on Okinawa. As such, the Government will
Northern Training Area. Thus, not only the Okinawa work as one to implement this initiative.
Defense Bureau but also the MOD headquarters and (a) Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma
other regional defense bureaus dispatched personnel to MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions
support the relocation construction work. relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S.
Despite such efforts, the continuous obstruction Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation
made it difficult to bring in material and equipment by of the Osprey and other aircraft; (2) Operation of air
land, leading to a decision to transport them by helicopter. refueling aircraft; and (3) Accepting a large number
However, some of the equipment was too heavy for of transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three
civilian helicopters to transport. For this reason, the functions, only (1) “operation of the Osprey and
Ground Self-Defense Force’s CH-47JA helicopter was other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. As
used for their transportation in September 2016. In such for (2) “operation of air refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-
ways, utmost efforts were made towards the achievement 130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS
of the early return. As a result, the relocation of the Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in
Chapter 4
helipads was completed in December 2016. August 2014.

This marked the completion of a task that has
remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO
History and Progress of the U.S. Forces
4 Realignment in Okinawa Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of
fixed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be

Along with the initiatives set forth in the roadmap moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also
related to the realignment of the U.S. Forces, measures led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ
were implemented to alleviate the impact on the local personnel, civilian employees, and dependents.
communities while maintaining the deterrence capabilities. Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting a large
number of transient aircraft in contingencies” will
(1) Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma also be transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru
The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative Air Base.
not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at (b) Landfill Area The area required for the land
its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 160
and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa ha, less than one-third of the approximately 481 ha of
Prefecture. This is a fundamental idea shared between the MCAS Futenma, and the new facility will be equipped
Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. with a significantly shorter runway at approximately
As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the 1,200 m (approximately 1,800 m including the
Government of Japan has not changed its stance that overruns) compared to the current runway length of
the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.
Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent (c) Flight Routes
waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which
MCAS Futenma. enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to
The Government of Japan plans to make further be located over the sea, in line with the requests of
efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths
Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact used daily for training and other purposes are located
on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF
Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing
and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, noise and risks.
including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area For example, while more than 10,000 households

are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June
near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V”
requiring such insulation around the FRF. This means shape, and the Ministers confirmed their commitment
that the noise levels experienced by all households to complete the relocation project at the earliest
will comply with the environment criteria applied to possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite
exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early
encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can as possible.
be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore. During the deliberation process which led to these
b. The Necessity of Constructing the Futenma conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a
Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces,
The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in
ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of
of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability
operations characterized by great mobility and readiness, and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia.
so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions
located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness
aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed
the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other
work on a regular basis. Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or
c. Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the
Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.
Chapter 4
crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral At the “2+2” Meetings in October 2013 and April
discussions on the realignment have been made towards 2015, which followed the “2+2” Meeting of April
realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at 2012, and the joint statement issued at the first Japan-
the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern U.S. Summit Meeting during the Trump administration

of the residents living in the vicinity. in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the
In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October United States also confirmed that the plan to construct
2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent
configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use
Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was of MCAS Futenma.
approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S. See Reference 30 (Background of the Futenma Replacement
military aircraft would fly over settlements in Nago City Facility)
Reference 31 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities
and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid and Areas South of Kadena); Fig. II-4-3-6 (Comparison between
flights over these settlements. In light of this, based on the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma)
negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities d. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment
including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in Procedures
the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shape After the MOD sent the environmental impact assessment
configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa
water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to Prefecture and other parties, the MOD worked on revising
construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum the document based on the opinions provided by the
of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the governor. Finally, the MOD completed the environmental
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and the then impact assessment procedures by sending the revised
Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006. assessment document to related parties including the
After the change of government in September 2009, governor in December 2012, while making the assessment
the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was document available for public review. Throughout these
established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions
both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six
2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected
Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, them in the content of the environmental assessment.
and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with
impact on Okinawa. relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa

Fig. II-4-3-6 Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma
Replacement facility (Henoko Cape)

Camp Schwab
N Runway
Henoko
Nagashima
Toyohara
Birajima
Overrun
Naha
Okinawa
Item Area Runway

Approx. 1,200 m
Replacement Approx. 160 ha
(1,800 m including
facility (landfill area)
overrun)
1/3 2/3
MCAS
Approx. 481 ha Approx. 2,740 m
Futenma
MCAS Futenma
Chapter 4
Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense
them in the assessment. Bureau immediately suspended the land-fill work while
e. Promotion of the Futenma Replacement facility the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Construction Project Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the
The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau Local Autonomy Act to current Governor Onaga to repeal
submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in
Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor December 2016, after examination by the Central and
of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. Local Government Dispute Management Council and
However, Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land- deliberation by the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch, the
fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation
October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the of the land-fill permit by Governor Onaga was illegal.
revocation of the land-fill permit between the Government In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then
of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court
Under these circumstances, the court came up with stated that no circumstances could be found indicating
a settlement recommendation, and the Government of that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill
Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated was in compliance with the condition in Article 4
settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement, (1) (i) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned
the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable
that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact,
Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted
steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and conventions. The reasons given by the court include:
the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take (1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill
responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in area will be significantly reduced from the area of the
accordance with the purpose of the ruling.6 MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying over
Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in the
6 (1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by
current Governor Onaga (the so-called subrogation suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the
validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to suspend execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the
suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend execution by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism.

coastal area that puts the runway extension out to the a. Timing and Size of Relocation
sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000
using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III
to the U.S. Forces. MEF) and approximately 9,000 dependents will be
Moreover, regarding whether the construction of relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2”
replacement facilities takes environmental protection and Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing
other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.
Court, finding that construction methods, environmental Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April
protection measures and countermeasures that can 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States
conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF
and that there is sufficient consideration for disaster personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land
prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on
Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did the FRF and the United States reviewed the composition
not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated
in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process to Guam. As a result, Marine Air-Ground Task Force
and the content of the decision that the construction (MAGTF) is to be stationed and deployed in Guam,
met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Japan, and Hawaii, approximately 9,000 personnel are to
Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the be relocated to locations outside of Japan (about 4,000
land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of of whom are to be relocated to Guam), the authorized
the environment and prevention of disasters.” strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to
Following this Supreme Court ruling, on December be approximately 5,000 personnel, and the end-state for
Chapter 4
26, Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the landfill the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is
permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000
replacement facilities construction project the following personnel envisioned in the Roadmap.
day. On April 25, 2017, it started the construction of the Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October

seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation. 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at
On July 24 of the same year, Okinawa Prefecture filed suit the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine
in the Naha District Court, requesting that this seawall Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the
construction not be allowed to damage the reefs on the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to promote
seafloor, etc., without permission from the Governor the implementation of the consolidation plan for facilities
of Okinawa based on the laws of Okinawa Prefecture. and areas in Okinawa of April 2013.
Subsequently, that Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s b. Costs of the Relocation
claim on March 31, 2018, and on July 23, Okinawa Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an
Prefecture objected to that decision, and filed an appeal agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in
with the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch. U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and
The Government of Japan views that both the national infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide
government and Okinawa Prefecture will cooperate with US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct
each other and act in good faith, according to the purpose cash contribution, while the United States would fund
of the ruling of the Supreme Court and the settlement to the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the
which the two parties agreed. The Government intends to Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed
go forward with the project, while being fully mindful of “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan
the safety of the work and taking the natural environment and the Government of the United States of America
and the living environment of the residents into utmost Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the
consideration based on the relevant laws and regulations. III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa
to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The
(2) Force Reduction and Relocation to Guam Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken
Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-
Governments of Japan and the United States held a series term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct
of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in cash contributions. As part of measures based on this
Okinawa. Agreement, the Japanese Government has been providing
cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation

to the projects for which Japan has provided financial Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental
support since FY2009.7 Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented.
Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April d. Progress of the Guam Relocation Project
2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel While the environmental impact assessment for Guam
to be relocated to Guam were revised and it was agreed was being conducted, the Government of the United States
that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government implemented infrastructure development projects at the
for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval
year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The
commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation
cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal construction work in all project areas, following the lifting
year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the
International Agreement.8 It was also confirmed that National Defense Authorization Act and the completion
Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing of the environmental impact assessment for Guam.
projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. See Fig. II-4-3-7 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project)
Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already
been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam (3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air base
International Agreement would be counted as part of the The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the
Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of
portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and
mentioned above would be used to develop training areas areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling
in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air
Chapter 4
Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the United Base. However, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it
States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both
and any additional costs would be borne by the United the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa
States, and that the two governments were to complete a to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena.
bilateral cost breakdown. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three
Amending the Guam International Agreement was signed categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate
to add the stipulations concerning the development of return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of
training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return
Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training after the relocation abroad.
areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions Since the change of administration at the end of 2012,
remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year Japan and the United States have continued consultation
2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process of under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate
creating a detailed breakdown of required costs. Furthermore, all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces
the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an
2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze early return of land areas south of Kadena, including
on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City
the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012. of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request
c. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment for the return. As a result, both countries announced the
Procedures Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa
As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the
the required procedures were conducted to reflect the return schedule, including the specific years of return.
revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the The return of all land according to the plan will enable
plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha,
in August 2015. the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of USFJ facilities and
Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern areas located in densely populated areas in the central and
7 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions of approximately 124.2 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2016.
8 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth
Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan were abolished by an act revising part of that act that was enacted on March 31, 2017.

Fig. II-4-3-7 Progress of the Guam Relocation Project
(3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications

Station Finegayan
(2) Andersen South
Progress of the project to establish the infrastructure in Andersen

(1) Andersen Air (Electric power facilities).
Force Base
(4) Naval Base

Guam in Apra
Chapter 4
Progress of the project to develop the Headquarters building
(As of February 28, 2018) in the Naval Base Guam in Apra area.
Relocation Project Areas Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects

(1) Andersen AFB On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.
(2) Andersen South Area Training areas (*2) project is in contracting process.

(3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in contracting process.
On-base infrastructure project (*1) is complete.
(4) Naval Base Guam in Apra Headquarters building (*3) project is in progress.
Medical Clinic project (*4) is in contracting process.
*1 On-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for
construction of facilities such as office buildings for the Marines.
*2 Training areas project is to develop facilities for the Marines to conduct basic training such as military operations in urban terrain and driver convoy course.
*3 The headquarters building project is to develop a headquarters building for the Marines.
*4 Medical clinic project is to develop a medical clinic for the Marines.
southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned
In the consolidation plan, both sides confirmed that as soon as required procedures are completed (shown
they would implement the plan as early as possible. The in red in Fig. II-4-3-8), since the announcement of the
Government of Japan will continue to work with all its consolidation plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted
strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be in the realization of the return of the north entrance of
returned at the earliest possible date. Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August
Furthermore, following the announcement of the 2013 and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp
consolidation plan, consultations have been held since Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015.
April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Furthermore, such measures as relocation to Kadena
Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Ammunition Storage Area and Torii Communication
Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau Station have been implemented to advance the land
in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and return. Additionally, in December 2015, Japan and the
appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within U.S. agreed to such measures as the early return of partial
Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing land at MCAS Futenma for a municipal road, and the
necessary cooperation.9 early return of partial land at Makiminato Service Area
Efforts have been made to enable the early return of for the purpose of widening National Road to relieve
9 In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Okinawa Office) and the Cabinet Office also participate in the consultations as observer.

Commentary Land return and site utilization in Okinawa COLUMN

The Japanese and U.S. governments have been continuously promoting realignment, consolidation and reduction of U.S. military
facilities and areas in Okinawa prefecture since the return of Okinawa to Japan for the purpose of mitigating the impact of military
bases on Okinawan residents while maintaining Japan’s deterrence capabilities. The two governments accelerated progress in
recent years and there are a number of examples of land utilization after returns that contribute to local vitalization.
Based on the SACO final report, roughly 4,000 ha of the Northern Training Area, a majority of this facility and the largest return
of land since the repatriation of Okinawa, was returned to landowners after a period of just over 70 years from the end of the war in
December 2017. Effective use of the returned land is expected since it became part of the Yanbaru National Park, and a goal is to
register the land as a World Natural Heritage site.
Additionally, the West Futenma Housing Area on Camp Zukeran returned in March 2015 under the Consolidation Plan for
Facilities and Areas in Okinawa was transferred to landowners in March 2018 after obstacle removal work such as soil pollution
surveys for utilization of the land. Plans for this land include use for the Okinawa Health Medical Center, including transfer of the
University of the Ryukyus’ Medical Department and Hospital.
Japan and the United States agreed to the following actions as partial acceleration of the Consolidation Plan in December 2015
– 1) joint use of a portion of land at Camp Zukeran in order to construct a road that connects Route 58 to the former West Futenma
Housing Area, 2) return of a portion of land at MCAS Futenma , and 3) return of a portion of land at Makiminato Service Area.
This agreement resulted initially in the return of approximately 4 ha of land at MCAS Futenma in July 2017. While the return
came more than 30 years after it was requested by local communities, it is likely to alleviate traffic congestion in the surrounding
area and improve the local living environment through advances in municipal road development suspended for over a quarter century.
The next step was the return of approximately 3 ha of land at Makiminato Service Area adjacent to Route 58 in March 2018.
Chapter 4
While Route 58, which runs alongside Makiminato Service Area, experienced the prefecture’s worst traffic congestion at more than
70,000 cars a day, it is expected that the completion of the land return will help alleviate traffic congestion through use of this land
to widen the road from six lanes to eight lanes.
Japanese and U.S. people involved gathered for a ceremony commemorating the above-mentioned return of a portion of land at
Makiminato Service Area and transfer of the West Futenma Housing Area on May 20, 2018, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga,
Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Fukui, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto, Vice Governor of Okinawa
Jahana, Ginowan Mayor Sakima, Urasoe Mayor Matsumoto, and Deputy Commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan. It was confirmed
that this land return and transfer will lead to realization of effective and appropriate land use.
The Japanese and U.S. governments intend to continue promoting local vitalization through utilization of returned land sites
and advancement of Okinawa as a whole by moving forward with such land returns especially in highly populated areas south of
Kadena Air Base.
A ceremony commemorating the return of land at Makiminato Service Area and transfer
of the West Futenma Housing Area (May 2018)

Fig. II-4-3-8 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base
Army POL Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Camp Kuwae

FY2022 16 ha FY2025 68 ha
or later or later
Camp Zukeran
(Lower Plaza Housing area)
Camp Zukeran (A portion of the warehouse area
of the Facilities and Engineering Compound) FY2024 23 ha
or later
FY2019 or later 11 ha (Note 5)
* JC reached Agreement of Return Camp Zukeran
on September 19, 2013 (A part of Kishaba Housing area)
FY2024
Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.) or later 5 ha
(FY2024 or later) 62 ha Camp Zukeran
(Additional elements) α ha (Note 3)
Makiminato Service Area
(The remainder) Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma housing area)
(FY2024 or later) 142 ha Returned on March 31, 2015 51 ha (Note 4)
Futenma Air Station (eastern side)

Makiminato Service Area
Makiminato Service Area (north access road) Returned on
(Area near Gate 5) 4 ha
Returned on August 31, 2013 1 ha July 31, 2017
FY2014 or later
2 ha
* JC reached Makiminato Service Area (Elements of MSA, Futenma Air Station
Agreement of Return
on July 11, 2013 including the preponderance of the storage area) FY2022 or later 476 ha
FY2025 or later 126 ha Legend
: Returned or immediate return (72 ha)
Naha Port : Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (834 ha)
Makiminato Service Area (area along Route 58) : Return after the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces to locations
FY2028 56 ha
or later Returned on March 31, 2018 3 ha outside of Japan (142 ha +more) Total: 1,048 ha + more
Chapter 4
Notes: 1. The timing and year are based on the best case scenario, the timing may be postponed depending on the progress of the efforts, including relocation to outside of Japan.
Furthermore, the timing and fiscal year in parentheses do not take into account the length of time necessary for relocation to outside of Japan because, though the conditions
for returning the areas include relocation to outside of Japan, its plan is yet to be decided. Consequently, the timing and year may be subject to change according to the
progress of the relocation to outside of Japan.
2. Land area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc.
3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns.
4. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual

measurements.
5. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but
it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013.
6. JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee
traffic congestion, and at the end of July 2017, partial land 5 Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces in Japan
at MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha) were returned to
the landowners, and at the end of March 2018, partial land (1) U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey Deployment in
at Makiminato Service Area (approximately 3 ha) were Okinawa
returned to the landowners and West Futenma Housing The Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical
Area within Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) was takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing
transferred to the landowners. aircraft on the one hand and the speed and range of
All-out initiatives are being continuously made to fixed-wing aircraft on the other. As the primary air unit
steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena of the U.S. Marine Corps, the MV-22 that has been
Air Base under the consolidation plan and mitigate the developed for the U.S. Marine Corps plays an important
impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including
the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time transportation of personnel and goods.
for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. Marine Corps was replacing aged rotary-
See Reference 31 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities wing aircrafts (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior
and Areas South of Kadena) basic performance. In September 2013, all the 24 CH-46s
Fig. II-4-3-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base)
deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s.
The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared
with the CH-46; it can fly faster, can carry more payload,
and has a longer range. Its deployment to Okinawa will
strengthen the deterrence of USFJ as a whole and greatly
contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

(2) CV-22 Osprey Deployment by U.S. Air Force to the aircraft. For example, the cause of the MV-22 mishap
Yokota Air Base off the coast of Okinawa in December 2016 was pilot
In May 2015, the Government of the United States error during the mishap pilot’s attempts to conduct aerial
announced that CV-22 aircraft, tailored to meet the refueling training under challenging weather conditions.
requirements of the U.S. Air Force, would be deployed Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion
to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, system with the MV-22 and the structure of both aircraft
Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, is basically in common; therefore, the Government of
Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture), Japan considers the safety of both aircraft to be at the
with the first three aircraft to be deployed in the latter half same level.
of 2017 for completion of the deployment of a total of 10 In any event, the Government of Japan considers that
aircraft by 2021. However, the Government of the United ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of
States announced in March 2017 that it would delay the the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, including the
arrival of the CV-22s to the U.S. fiscal year 2020. Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in August 2017, Minister of
In April 2018, the Government of the United States Defense Onodera requested Secretary of Defense Mattis
announced 5 aircraft were scheduled to be deployed around and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to
the summer of 2018 to address regional security concerns local communities and ensure safety. The Government of
in the Pacific region, adjusting the previously announced Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration
timeline in 2017. The total of 10 aircraft are expected to be for safety.
deployed in stages over the next several years. See Reference 32 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S.
The CV-22 aircraft to be deployed to Yokota Air Base Forces)
will handle tasks for transporting personnel and supplies

Chapter 4
for Special Operation Forces of the U.S. Forces to deal (4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in
with crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, Case of Disaster
including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters. In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the
As Japan faces an increasingly tougher security central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14
environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 MV22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched
from the perspective of the U.S. commitment to the Asia- for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to
Pacific region and enhancing the readiness posture of the support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed
United States will enhance the deterrence and response promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access,
capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to the and transported several hundred isolated victims and
defense of Japan and the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014,
The Government of Japan will continue to take the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for
responses in a careful and sincere manner in order search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental
to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the
communities. Republic of Korea. Furthermore, in response to the large
earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s
(3) Safety of the Osprey deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to
Prior to the deployment of the MV-22s to MCAS transport personnel and supplies.
Futenma in 2012, the Government of Japan conducted its In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred
own confirmation of the aircraft’s safety by establishing in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily
an analysis and assessment team composed of experts necessities to the disaster stricken areas.
from inside and outside the Government and aircraft In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting
pilots, etc., In addition, when our country itself decided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities
to introduce Ospreys (V-22s) in 2014, the Government immediately and over a large range when large-scale
reconfirmed the safety of the aircraft by collecting and disasters occur because of its high performance and
analyzing all kinds of technical information. multi-functionality. It has also been used for disaster
Regarding recent accidents involving the MV- prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two
22, there has been no change in the recognition of the MV22s participated in the comprehensive disaster
Government of Japan that there is no problem with the prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and
safety of the MV-22 aircraft, as the U.S. side has not given conducted delivery drills for isolated islands.
any explanation that there is any structural problem with Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian

Fig. II-4-3-9 Usability of Osprey Aircraft
Beijing
Seoul
MV-22 radius of action
Approximately 1,100 km (1 aerial refueling)
Tokyo
Izu Islands
MV-22 radius of action
Shanghai Approximately 600 km (no refueling)
CH-46 radius of action
Approximately 140 km
Ogasawara Islands
Hong Kong MV-22 range Approximately 3,900 km

Taipei
m
0k
m
100
0k
CH-46 range Approximately 700 km
150
km
Okinotorishima
3000
km
Manila
4000
Guam
(1) All distances are in straight-line distance
(2) CH-46 has no aerial refueling function
Comparison of Basic Performance MV-22 CH-46
Chapter 4
About two times
Maximum speed Approximately 520 km/h Approximately 270 km/h
the maximum speed
Cruising speed Approximately 490 km/h Approximately 220 km/h
Range Approximately 3,900 km Approximately 700 km
Approximately 600 km About four times Approximately 140 km
Radius of action

(With 24 troops on board) the radius of action (With 12 troops on board)
Number of troops carried 24 12
Number of crew 3–4 3–5
Cargo (inside) Approximately 9,100 kg Approximately 2,300 kg
About three times
Cargo (outside) Approximately 5,700 kg the payload Approximately 2,300 kg
Rotor diameter Approximately 11.6 m Approximately 15.5 m
Angle of flight Approximately 7,500 m Approximately 3,000 m
Own weight Approximately 16,000 kg Approximately 7,700 kg
MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size.
Measurement
6.7 m 5.1 m
17.5 m 25.7 m
assistance and disaster relief activities, including search

Consultation Structures for Mitigating
and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large 6 the Impact on Okinawa
range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such, it
is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain
deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa
variety of operations in the future as well. and the slower progress of return of USFJ facilities and
See Fig. II-4-3-9 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft) areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the
occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated
impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been
implementing initiatives towards the realization of the

SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is have been held since January 2016, discussion took place
committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa on issues such as the relocation of MCAS Futenma and
through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee the suspension of its operation within five years and the
and other means, while listening to the opinions of the return of more than half of the Northern Training Area.
local residents.10 See Section 3-7 (Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ
At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting in December Facilities and Areas)
2013, then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima presented

several requests, including cessation of the operation of
Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously
MCAS Futenma within five years and its early return, the 7 Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces
re-deployment of about twelve MV-22s to bases outside
of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by
Area within seven years. the USFJ (“USFJ Land”), the Act on Special Measures
The Japanese Government as a whole is addressing Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use
the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided
the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates various measures
of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief concerning the USFJ Land agreed to be returned. The MOD
Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use
the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan. of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with
The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting the related ministries, the prefectural government and local
Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa headed municipalities. The MOD:
Chapter 4
by the State Minister of Defense in January 2014 to (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys,
continually work on the reduction of the impact on etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government
Okinawa. and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are
The Consultation between the Central Government agreed to be returned;
and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands
Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister to remove obstacles for use such as soil contamination
for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by
Chief Cabinet Secretary (administrative) and the Governor the activities of the stationed forces, before handing
and Vice Governor of Okinawa, was established with over the land to the owners and
the purpose of holding consultations on measures for (3) provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on
the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa and measures the owners of the returned lands and to promote use
for Okinawa’s development. In the three meetings that of the land.
5 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa
In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing on the return of six facilities and areas in Yokohama
measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces City and on the construction of housing units for
by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the dependents of members of the U.S. Forces in the
impact on local communities. Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and
Navy Annex.” Of the area of approximately 419
ha to be returned, approximately 375 ha consisting
Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in
1 Kanagawa Prefecture of four facilities and areas, including Kami Seya
Communication Station, have to date been returned.
Due to the strong desire from local public bodies See Fig. II-4-3-10 (Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas
and other organizations, the Japanese and U.S. in Kanagawa Prefecture)
Governments, after bilateral consultations, agreed
10 In March, 2013, a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa
development measures.

Fig. II-4-3-10 Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture
Number Name Location Area (ha) Plan for Land Return, etc.
Kamiseya Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Approximately Land return completed at the end of
Communication Station Yokohama City Area 242 ha June 2015
Yokohama City,
Kanagawa Fukaya Izumi-ku, Approximately
Land return completed in June 2014
Prefecture Communication Site Yokohama City Area 77 ha
Naka-ku, Minami-ku
Asahi-ku Negishi Approximately To be returned upon completion of
and Isogo ku, construction of dependent housing in
Seya-ku Dependent Housing Area 43 ha
Yokohama City Area
Kanazawa-ku, Approximately
Minami- Tomioka Storage Area Land return completed in May 2009
Izumi-ku Naka-ku Yokohama City Area 3 ha
ku
Isogo-ku Kanazawa-ku, Approximately
Koshiba POL Depot Land return completed in December 2005
Totsuka-ku Yokohama City Area 53 ha
Agreed in 2014 to change the number
Ikego Housing Area Approximately
Yokohama City Area of housing units to be constructed from
and Navy Annex 37 ha
Kanazawa- about 400, as initially planned, to 171
ku Detached part Kanazawa-ku, Approximately Return procedures to begin upon completion
of Yokohama City Area 1 ha of the current use
: Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation
Fig. II-4-3-11 Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact
Time Improvement
December 2007 Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama
June 2008 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot
September 2008 Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward)
Chapter 4
August 2011 The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced
October 2011 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama
June 2012 Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City
March 2013 The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp to Camp Zama
September 2014 Partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot

December 2015 The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced
February 2016 Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama
Readiness Force Headquarters was abolished and a Japan-

Current Situation Regarding the Realignment
U.S. Joint Headquarters that assumes a coordinating role
2 of the U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the
Roadmap between Japan and the United States was established in
the headquarters of the Ground Component Command.
(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and In addition, for more effective and efficient use
Control capability of Camp Zama and the Sagami General Depot (SGD),
To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to measures were taken for the partial return of respective
enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan facilities and areas. In February 2016, the partial release
(USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama was realized
Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters and Zama General Hospital was established on the
of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and returned site in April 2016. In addition, in December 2015,
the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008. the shared use of a portion of land at SGD (approximately
With the aim of strengthening coordination with the 35ha) with Sagamihara City was realized. In other areas,
reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid the realignment projects associated with the improvement
responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central of U.S. Army Japan command and control capability have
Readiness Force Headquarters (then) was relocated from been undertaken as shown in Fig. II-4-3-11.
GSDF Camp Asaka (Asaka City, Wako City and Niiza See Fig. II-4-3-11 (Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan
City in Saitama Prefecture and Nerima Ward, Tokyo) to Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact)
Camp Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan

(USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In addition,
with the establishment of the Ground Component
Command at the end of FY2017, the GSDF Central

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered
a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral vessels, including USS Ronald Reagan, while anchored
Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka
Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety
Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally
of both countries, combined with the transition to joint be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and
operational posture, is highly important to ensure a repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan.
response with flexibility and readiness of the SDF and The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all
the U.S. Forces. Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the possible measures to ensure safety.
Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)
commenced its operations at Yokota Air Base and the (4) Measures relating to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and
ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and its relevant units MCAS Iwakuni
were relocated to Yokota Air Base.11 These arrangements a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft
have made it possible to enhance coordination between Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Ayase City, Yamato City and
the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, Ebina City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was used as a base
including the sharing of information concerning air for carrier-based aircraft. Since Naval Air Facility Atsugi
defense and BMD. is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of
b. Yokota Airspace carrier jets taking off and landing in particular had been a
To facilitate the operations of civilian airplanes in problem for a long time. It was necessary to resolve such
Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain
approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 the operations of aircraft carriers.
Chapter 4
to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation
control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese project at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi
authorities, to deploy ASDF officers at the Yokota Radar Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with
Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce less impact on the living environment of the surrounding
the airspace by about 40% (i.e., the release of air traffic communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons
control from USFJ). would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to
c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base MCAS Iwakuni. The relocation began in August 2017
At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it and completed in March 2018.13
was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota As the security environment in the Asia-Pacific
Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference region grows increasingly severe, while this relocation
was then established as a working panel attended by allows the long-term forward deployment of a U.S. aircraft
relevant government ministries and agencies and the carrier and carrier-based aircraft, ensuring deterrence, it
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Governments also alleviates issues regarding the noise to a significant
of Japan and the United States are also conducting a extent. This would not have been possible without the
study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding of residents of Yamaguchi Prefecture and
understanding that both countries will not compromise Iwakuni City.
the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased
operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation,
(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander the related measures listed in Fig. II-4-3-13 are to be
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka taken. As a result, the noise problems are expected to
The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important be mitigated from the current situation, with the area
role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the so-
region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. called first category area, decreasing from approximately
aircraft carrier12 provides the core capability of the 1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha.
Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to
11 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese
and U.S. headquarters.
12 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational
capabilities.
13 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 m to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations in
May 2010. The project was completed at the end of FY2010.

VOICE Message from the Iwakuni Mayor (Yamaguchi) COLUMN

Iwakuni City is located in the eastern part of Yamaguchi Prefecture facing the Seto Inland Sea and has various regional characteristics
and resources, including magnificent mountains, clear streams, a beautiful sea, and historical and cultural resources.
One of such unique features is the presence of MCAS Iwakuni jointly used by the U.S. Marines and Maritime Self-Defense
Force. In accordance with the Realignment Roadmap bilaterally agreed in May 2006, 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft relocated from
MCAS Futenma in Okinawa. In addition, approximately 60 U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft relocated from NAF Atsugi in Kanagawa
Prefecture at the end of March 2018. As a result, approximately 120 U.S. military aircraft as well as the U.S. Navy Unit now station
at MCAS Iwakuni.
The City’s comprehensive plan formulated in December 2014 calls for “co-existence with the base.” It outlines measures to
mitigate various impacts attributed to the base, such as aircraft noise and incidents/accidents. At the same time, it outlines measures
for community development, taking advantage of the adjacency to the base, in the fields of education, disaster prevention, tourism,
industrial development, and Japan-U.S. exchanges.
We expect to promote exchanges through sports and cultural events at the Atagoyama Sports Facility (baseball field, athletic
stadium, cultural interaction center, etc.) developed by the Ministry of Defense as carrier-based aircraft were relocated.
About 3,800 people (military personnel, civilian personnel, and their dependents) moved from NAF Atsugi along with the
relocation, and the total number of people is more than 10,000 (including those already here). Iwakuni City seeks to deepen
the mutual understanding and friendship between Japan and the U.S. through various opportunities, while maintaining a good
relationship between U.S. personnel and local residents as “good neighbors.”
Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport, which uses the runway of the U.S. military base, opened in December 2012. The Okinawa route was
established in March 2016 in addition to the Haneda route. The boarding rate since its opening has been 68.0% (as of end of April
Chapter 4
2018), which exceeds the expectation and stays high.
Iwakuni has evolved together with the base and has been cooperative for the stable operations of the base.
It is true that we have faced various challenges as a city hosting the base, but I believe that our efforts contribute to
maintenance of the USFJ deterrence capabilities, Japan’s national defense/security policy, and mitigation of the impact on

Okinawa. Iwakuni City will continue to carry out its duty to realize the long-term development of the city as well as to maintain
local residents’ peace and security.
Iwakuni Mayor Mr. Fukuda (center) on a tour of Atagoyama Sports Completion of the relocation of carrier-based aircraft on
Facility with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Hagerty March 30, 2018 (EA-18G in the photo)
See Fig. II-4-3-12 (Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi facility would be used to support operations in response
and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.) to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as
b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice well as regular exercises and other activities, including
The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In
to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the
established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in
the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a
2011, it was confirmed that the Government of Japan will permanent FCLP training facility is identified.
explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni
to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF Considering that the local public entities, etc., including

Fig. II-4-3-12 Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.
Measure Status of Progress, etc.

After explanation in January 2017 to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the
Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc., Yamaguchi
squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017.
MCAS Iwakuni Started relocation in August 2017.
Completed relocation in March 2018.
Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc., from MCAS Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense
Iwakuni to Naval Air Facility Atsugi system, Japan and the United States confirmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.
Relocation of the KC-130 air refueling aircraft
Relocation completed in August 2014.
from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni
❍ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of the KC-130 to MSDF
Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture).
Rotational deployment of the KC-130 to
❍ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specific timing of the commencement
Kanoya Air Base and Guam
of rotational deployment.
❍ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, training commencement confirmed.
Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will
Iwakuni to Guam return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.
: Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation
Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been (6) Training Relocation
working together to request the resumption of civil a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)
aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ
that “portions of the future civilian air facility will facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City
be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS
Chapter 4
agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in
December 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation bilateral training with ASDF at ASDF facilities, training
aircraft for the first time in 48 years. relocation has been underway since 2007. The MOD has
been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the
(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) training relocation.15

Japan and the United States are set to continue close In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on
coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their the achievements at the “2+2” Meeting in 2010, both
respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 governments agreed to include Guam as a new training
radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed relocation site and to expand the scale of training.
to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Tsugaru City, Moreover, at the Joint Committee in October 2011, they
Aomori Prefecture).14 Also in October 2006, U.S. Army agreed on details for training sites. After that, training was
Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were relocated to Guam and other locations for the first time,
deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa leading to a series of training conducted at relocation sites.
City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village,
Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma
City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the
second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S.
Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in
Kyoto Prefecture).
In addition, the United States deployed Aegis
destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet
Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City in Kanagawa
Prefecture) in October 2015 and March 2016. Another
Aegis destroyer with BMD capabilities, USS Milius, was
A U.S. Marine Corps Osprey landing in a maneuver area (Miyagi Prefecture) during a field
also added to the fleet in May 2018. [P] exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps (Forest Light 02) as part of the relocation of trainings
See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic Missiles, etc.) (February 2018) (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of Defense)
14 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.
15 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at ASDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.

Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments at of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan,
the Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground training while maintaining the deterrent of the Alliance, the
using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Governments of Japan and the United States have been
Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture). This agreement moving forward with the implementation of training,
resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air- etc. for the MV-22 at MCAS Futenma outside of
to-Ground Range in June 2014. Okinawa Prefecture.
The training relocation contributes to enhancing On September 1, 2016, it was agreed at the Japan-U.S.
interoperability between the two countries, and also to Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-
relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by Rotar / Rotary wing aircraft, such as the AH-1 and CH53,
using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will and the MV-22 that are currently stationed at MCAS
help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in
contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. order to further promote training outside of Okinawa and
In addition to assisting USFJ, the MOD/SDF is mitigate the impact of training activities on Okinawa.
conducting efforts to ensure the safety and security Three training relocation programs were scheduled
of the local community, such as the establishment of a for FY2017. The training was held in Hokkaido in
liaison office, facilitating communication with related August 2017, in Kumamoto Prefecture in December, and
government agencies, and response to requirements from in Miyagi Prefecture between February and March 2018
the local community. These efforts have been contributing as Japan-U.S. joint training (field training between the
to successful training relocation. GSDF and the U.S. Marine Corps).
b. Relocation of Training for MV-22, etc. The MV-22’s amount of time located and training
Having decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating
Chapter 4
3, 2013 to reduce the MV-22’s amount of time located exercises participated by the MV-22 to places such as
and training in Okinawa and to utilize opportunities to mainland Japan and Guam, and the Government will
participate in various operations in mainland Japan and continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further
across the region in order to increase training outside mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

6 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan
In order to smoothly implement the realignment of USFJ realignment. As of April 2018, 9 defense facilities in 15
based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on municipalities are eligible to receive the grant.
Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some
States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S.
Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam.
grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. Since these developments may affect the employment
and other systems were established based on the law. of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will
During a period of time before and after the take measures to include education and skills training,
implementation of realignment (10 years in principle),16 which is to help retain their employment.
realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the The Realignment Special Measures Act was
expenses of projects17 which contribute to increasing the supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017.
convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities However, since there remain realignment projects that
affected by the realignment,18 and to stimulate local require implementation, an act revising part of the Act
industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act
with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, to March 31, 2027 was enacted.
after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense See Reference 33 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on
facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States
Forces in Japan)
16 Approximately 6.7 billion yen in the FY2018 budge.

17 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment (replacement of
the aircraft carrier at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of USFJ.
18 The specific scope of projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States
Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.

7 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas
Initiatives to Conserve the Environments around 2 Ensuring Safety of Operations of USFJ

1 USFJ Facilities and Areas
Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime
At the “2+2” Meeting in September 2000, based on the importance in USFJ operations, and an accident or
recognition that environmental conservation is important, incident must not occur. Both Japan and the U.S.
the governments of both nations agreed to make it a cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety.
common objective to ensure the health and safety of Despite such circumstances, a CH-53E helicopter
residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, assigned to MCAS Futenma made an emergency landing
U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such at Higashi Village in Kunigami District and burned into
parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental flames in October 2017, and a window of another CH-
Principles.”19 To follow up on this announcement, Japan- 53E assigned to MCAS Futenma fell onto the playground
U.S. consultations have been enhanced. Specifically, the of Futenma Daini Elementary School in December 2017.
MOD has been working with relevant ministries and Then in 2018, an F-16 fighter assigned to Misawa Air
agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of Base jettisoned fuel tanks in Lake Ogawara in February,
the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS),20 and there have been precautionary and emergency
exchange information on the environment, and deal with landings on civilian airports, etc.
environmental pollution. Regarding these accidents and incidents, Japan
Additionally, at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2010, has clearly conveyed its position to the U.S. side and
Japan and the United States discussed the possibility requested preventive measures to avoid reoccurrence
Chapter 4
of taking a “Green Alliance” approach and studied the especially at summit and ministerial levels, in light of
adoption of renewable energy for the U.S. Forces facilities anxieties and concerns of local communities.
and areas under development in Japan. Causes of these accidents and incidents may vary
Furthermore, the Governments of Japan and the depending on the case, but the Government of Japan has
United States engaged in discussions aimed at the creation determined the rationality of results of investigations and
of a framework for increased initiatives in managing the preventive measures on the U.S. side through not only
environment associated with USFJ facilities and areas. hearing explanations from the U.S. side but also confirming
The Government of Japan then commenced negotiations with SDF expertise. Additionally, the MOD has strongly
with the United States on an agreement that supplements requested the U.S. side to provide information regarding
the SOFA on an environmental front, and they reached the accidents and incidents, and taken appropriate steps,
substantive accord in October 2014, before signing and including explaining to the local authorities in a timely
effectuating the supplementary agreement in September manner, when the relevant information was provided by
2015. This supplemental agreement represents an the U.S. side.
international commitment with legal binding force and
sets forth provisions concerning environmental standards 3 Other Measures
and access to USFJ facilities and areas.
This supplemental agreement is part of a more The Government of Japan has been taking measures for
comprehensive framework for recognizing the the improvement of the living environment in regions
significance of environmental protection. This agreement surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. The Ministry
is the first one to be created to supplement the SOFA of Internal Affairs and Communications also provides
since the SOFA entered into force and has a historical municipalities with base grants, which have alternate
significance that differs in nature from conventional features in terms of municipal tax on real estate.
improvements in the operations of the SOFA. Moreover, in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas,
incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel
and others have affected local areas and their residents,
so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take
effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such
19 Consisting of four items; (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation
20 JEGS is an environmental standard compiled by USFJ in order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment and health of people, and stipulates the handling of
environmental pollutants and storage methods within the facilities and areas.

Commentary Exchanges between Local Residents and the U.S. Forces COLUMN
For the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), it is imperative to gain understanding and cooperation from citizens who live
near USFJ facilities and areas.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has been arranging the Japan-U.S. friendship programs through sports, music, culture, and other
events for residents living near USFJ facilities and areas, and USFJ-related personnel based on the understanding and cooperation
of local residents and the USFJ as an initiative to deepen Japan-U.S. mutual understanding. In addition, the USFJ conducts various
exchange programs in collaboration with the local communities.
For example, the MOD arranged a “scarecrow-making activity” in FY2017 as a new initiative for elementary school students
living near Shariki Communications Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori) and military personnel working at the site where TPY-2 radar (X-band
radar) is deployed to improve BMD capabilities. The USFJ also interacted with the community by attending the graduation ceremony
of elementary school.
The MOD held the Japanese-American Friendship Music Festival with local residents and military personnel at Kyogamisaki
Communications Site (Kyotango City, Kyoto) where the same radar has been deployed since 2014 as a new initiative. The USFJ also
interacted with local residents through English conversation lessons.
The MOD believes that maintaining these exchanges over the years would foster trust relationships between local residents and
the USFJ, and will continue to host Japan-U.S. friendship programs with the understanding and cooperation of local residents and
the USFJ.
Chapter 4
Participants who made the winning scarecrow Participants in a concert by Japanese and U.S. musicians Participants in interaction using English conversation
in the contest
as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing conducted intensive discussions to establish a legally
strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan binding document based on the joint statement, and
is cooperating with USFJ in these prevention measures; in January 2017 signed the Agreement between the
at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and Government of Japan and the Government of the
appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the United States of America on Cooperation with regard
incidents and accidents. to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian
The United States has also taken measures for its Component of United States Armed Forces in Japan,
part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of
(liberty policy), including measures such as nighttime the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
alcohol restrictions as well as curfews applying to U.S. Japan and the United States of America, Regarding
Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank. Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed
Following the case which occurred in Okinawa in Forces in Japan, which immediately went into force. This
April 2016 where a member of the U.S. Forces civilian supplementary agreement supplements and clarifies the
component became a suspect of murder, the Governments content of the “civilian component” prescribed by the
of Japan and the United States engaged in discussions SOFA and it is the second such supplementary agreement,
to develop effective prevention measures, and released following the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation
the Japan-United States Joint Statement in July 2016 on in the Field of Environmental Stewardship, which was
clarifying the scope of the civilian component, among concluded in 2015. It is hoped that the recurrence of
other matters.21 incidents and accidents by the civilian component of
The Governments of Japan and the United States USFJ will be prevented by further promoting cooperation
21 The Joint Statement focuses on such areas as clarifying the scope of the civilian component and enhancing training and orientation processes for all U.S. personnel with SOFA status.

between Japan and the United States and further Meanwhile, the Government of Japan prepared
strengthening management of the civilian component Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016
of USFJ through the steady implementation of this under the understanding that in order to never allow a
supplementary agreement. recurrence of similar tragic incidents, it is necessary
In light of the aforementioned joint statement, for the Government to promptly promote measures to
training materials to deepen understanding about the deter crime and ensure the safety and security of the
history and culture unique to Okinawa, designed for people of Okinawa. The pillars of the Measures consist
all military personnel, the civilian component and their of bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and
families newly arriving in Okinawa, were revised taking the establishment of a safe and secure environment.
into account the views of Okinawa Prefecture and others. The MOD is participating in the Okinawa Local Safety
In November 2016, the relevant local governments Patrol Corps established in the Okinawa General Bureau
observed the actual training using the materials. and will continue to cooperate with relevant ministries
In March 2017, the U.S. Forces in Okinawa invited and agencies to ensure the implementation of effective
journalists to Camp Foster and showed them the training measures.
for new arrivals using the materials. See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony
See Reference 34 (Agreement between the Government of Japan between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)
and the Government of the United States of America on
Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating
to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in
Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and
the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas
Chapter 4
and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan)


Part
Ⅲ
Initiatives to Protect
the Lives and Property
of the People
as well as Securing
the Territorial Land,
Water and Airspace
Chapter 1
Organizations Responsible for
the Defense of Japan, and
Effective Deterrence and Handling
Chapter 2
Active Promotion of Security
Cooperation
Chapter 3
Human Foundation and
Organization that Supports
the Defense Force, and Active
Participation of Female SDF
Personnel
Chapter 4
Measures on Defense Equipment
and Technology
Chapter 5
Interaction with Local Communities
and Japanese Citizens
Joint Exercises conducted by the ASDF, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S.
Marine Corps in the airspace surrounding Kyushu (September 2017)
Organizations Responsible for
Chapter
1 the Defense of Japan, and
Effective Deterrence and Handling
1 Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-

Chapter 1
Section
Defense Forces (SDF)
1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability
Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling
1 Organization of the MOD/SDF the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal
Bureaus shall, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who
To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the Ministry is in charge of defense equipment administration, support
of Defense (MOD)/ the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)1 the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective
consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, responsibilities, by providing the Minister of Defense
Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that
See Fig.III-1-1-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense) the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly
Fig.III-1-1-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense) carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order
to accomplish the mission of the MOD. The Joint Staff is
2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning
the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides
The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the
to the defense of Japan as the head of the MOD, and is Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective.
in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the
the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning
by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice- their respective services except operations of the SDF,
Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force
Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the
to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking
Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding
basic principles concerning administrative affairs under these services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that
the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the the support for the Minister from a policy perspective
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s
and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau perspective shall be provided in a well-balanced manner
and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and like the two wheels of a vehicle, so to speak, in order for
the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions.
who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties This existing concept regarding the support system for the
such as those related to international affairs. Minister of Defense has been made even more explicit by
Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act,
Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air which has been amended to stipulate that the support for
Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General
Agency (ATLA) as an external bureau have been of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General
established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD of each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA
are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the shall be conducted in cooperation with the support for
SDF. The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Minister by each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the
1 The MOD and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates
the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.

Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Section 1
Fig. III-1-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense
Cabinet
Prime Minister
Minister of Defense National Security Council
State Minister of Defense

Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people)
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two)
Chapter 1
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense
Bureaus
Local Branch
External Organ
Internal Bureaus Councils, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations
Minister’s Secretariat
Bureau of Defense Policy
Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Bureau of Local Cooperation
SDF Ethics Review Board
Central Council on Defense Facilities
Defense Personnel Review Board
National Defense Academy
National Defense Medical College
National Institute for Defense Studies
Joint Staff
Ground Staff Office
Maritime Staff Office
Air Staff Office
Defense Intelligence Headquarters
of Legal Compliance
Inspector General’s Office
Defense Council
Bureaus (eight)
Regional Defense
and Logistics Agency

Acquisition, Technology
Units and Organizations Cooperative Units Cooperative Organization
Self-Defense Force
of the Ground
Units and organizations
Self-Defense Force
of the Maritime
of the Air Self-Defense Force

Security Command
SDF Intelligence
Communication Systems
Supervised Units of
Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
SDF Physical Training School
SDF Central Hospital
SDF Regional Hospitals
Provincial Cooperation Offices
*Excluding temporary or special positions.
Act was amended for the establishment of ATLA and the City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch bureaus in
reorganization of Joint Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for charge of comprehensive defense administration.
the MOD reform.2 In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the
burden on local communities hosting bases and inspecting
3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various
activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of
The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations both local public entities and local residents towards the
across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama MOD/SDF activities.
City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities)
2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces
In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties the ASDF are operated integrally. The MOD/SDF is
of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint also making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the
operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and joint operations such as communication, education and
2 The Government has made remarks regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control
means the priority of politics to the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and
control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees such as the
State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by
the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian officials of the Internal
Bureaus issue commands to units.”

Part Ⅲ Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Fig. III-1-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense
Organization Outline
● Ground Component Command
Assumes unified nation-wide command over GSDF troops.
● Regional Armies
• Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery
GSDF*
groups)
• There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions
● Divisions and Brigades
Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others
● Self-Defense Fleet
Chapter 1
• Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and
the Fleet Submarine Force
MSDF*
• Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations
● Regional Districts
There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet
● Air Defense Command
• Composed of four air defense forces
• Primarily responsible for general air defense duties

ASDF*
● Air Defense Force
Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including
aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)
National Defense Academy ● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel
of Japan ● Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate
(Yokosuka, Kanagawa) and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree
National Defense Medical ● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses
College ● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel
(Tokorozawa, Saitama) ● Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine
● Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense
National Institute for Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF
Studies • Conducts research and compiles data on military history
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) • Educates SDF personnel and other senior officials
• Manages books and documents of historical value
● Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects, analyzes and reports on information related to
national security
Defense Intelligence
• Collects various military information including signals and imagery intelligence and information acquired by warning and
Headquarters
surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides intelligence to related organizations
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)
within the ministry
• Consists of one headquarters and six communication sites
Inspector General’s Office of
Legal Compliance ● Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)
● Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to
Regional Defense Bureau
acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement
(eight locations nationwide)
of equipment
Acquisition, Technology and
● Extra-ministerial organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to
Logistics Agency
procurement, research and development, etc.
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)
*See “Location of Principal SDF Units” at the end of the book.
training, as well as to enhance the functions of the Joint through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where
Staff in light of the current security environment. a joint task force3 is organized, but also in cases where a
single SDF unit is employed to respond.
1 Outline of Joint Operations System
(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and
(1) Role of the Chief of Staff Other Chief of Staff
a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the
concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air
the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance,
perspective. such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability,
b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of and education and training.
the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint See Fig. III-1-1-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of
Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground,
Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces)
be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this,
the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered
3 This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command
structure based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, and refers to units, which are made up of more than two units of the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF.

Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Section 1
Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime,
Fig. III-1-1-3
and Air Self-Defense Forces
Prime Minister
Minister of Defense
Chain of command for affairs

Chain of command for operations other than operations
Chapter 1
Responsibilities for Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations
force operations (such as human resources, education, training,*
Force user buildup of defense capabilities)
Force provider
Chief of
Joint Staff Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff,
GSDF MSDF ASDF
Joint Staff
Maritime
Ground Staff Joint Staff Air Staff
Office Staff Office Office
Basic Rule for Joint Operation
The Chief of Joint Staff solely

assists the Minister of Defense on Close coordination among
SDF operations from a military Mobilization unit the Chiefs of Staff
expert’s viewpoint The Commander of the Ground
The Minister of Defense commands Joint Task Force Component Command, Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the
SDF operations through the Chief Commander Commanding General, integrated policies for rear support and
Army and Others other relevant activities
of Joint Staff
The Minister of Defense’s orders to Commander, Self- Commander, Air Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF,
the SDF are executed by the Chief Defense Fleet Defense Command MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support
of Joint Staff and Others and Others and other activities during operations
*The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training
2 Strengthening integrated Operational Functions conducted, such as external explanations including

remarks at the Diet and communication and coordination
In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making with related ministries and governmental agencies.
relating to the operations of the SDF and to make Regarding this work, therefore, the Administrative Vice
the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post
Operational Policy was abolished and some of this for civilian officials, and the Joint Staff Councilor, a post
Bureau’s functions such as the planning and drafting for civilian officials at the level of a division director
of laws and regulations relating to unit operations were and department director general have been established
transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to to conduct external coordination duties, etc., taking
unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units advantage of the expertise of civilian officials concerning
into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff actual operations of the units.
assume work that the Internal Bureaus had previously See Next section (Central Organization Reform at the MOD)
3 Central Organization Reform of the Ministry of Defense
1 Background and Direction of the MOD Reform Council under law, the abolition of the post of the
Director of Defense and the establishment of the Senior
The MOD reform started in response to the frequent Adviser to the Minister of Defense (presently the Special
incidence of scandals within the MOD/SDF, and the Adviser to the Minister of Defense) were implemented
“Council for Reforming the MInistry of Defense,” on the basis of the report in order to strengthen support
which was held at the Prime minister’s office in 2007, for the Minister of Defense and to ensure civilian control
put together the report containing measures against the thoroughly in 2009.
incidence of scandals and central organization reform. Following this, in the “Direction of the MOD
Based on the report, the establishment of the Defense Reform” arranged in August 2013 at the “Committee for

the Deliberations on the MOD Reform,” established in 3 Main Initiatives in FY2018

the MOD in the same year, it was determined that the full-
fledged reform based on following four main points would A certain level of achievement has been realized
be undertaken: (1) mutual posting of civilian officials regarding the reorganization of the MOD central
and uniformed personnel; (2) total optimization of the organization based on the “Direction of the MOD
building-up of defense capability and the strengthening Reform.” Meanwhile, the MOD has implemented the
of equipment acquisition functions; (3) strengthening of following initiatives, considering the increasingly
integrated operational functions, and (4) strengthening of severe security environment surrounding Japan and
Chapter 1
policymaking functions and public relations capability. the increasing need to advance various measures more
effectively and efficiently.
• Enhancement of policy making function by establishing
Specific Initiatives on the Reform of the Ministry
2 of Defense the position of the Director-General for Evidence-
based Policymaking
In accordance with the “Direction of the MOD Reform,” For the building and strengthening of the function that
the MOD has fostered a greater sense of unity by plays the central role of promoting the Evidence-Based
promoting mutual posting of civilian officials and Policy Making (EBPM), the position of Director-General
uniformed personnel. In October 2015, in addition to for Evidence-based Policymaking responsible for the
the previously mentioned reorganization at the Joint overall coordination of the initiatives concerning the
Staff, a large-scale reorganization was implemented, promotion of the EBPM, such as conducting high-level
which included the establishment of the Acquisition, and flexible adjustment of complex policy issues across
Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) by bringing various agencies within the MOD, has been established.
together and consolidating the departments of the MOD • Enhancement of the function of the Joint Staff Councilor
that had been related to procurement in order to accurately Considering the increasingly severe security environment
respond to the extending equipment administration. surrounding Japan, the position of the Joint Staff
By conducting duties at these new organizations, the Councilor has been upgraded from one councilor to
MOD/SDF needs to ensure that this reform will be firmly two councilors, and one of whom is called the Principal
established, while assisting the Minister of Defense both Joint Staff Councilor, in order to enhance and strengthen
from a policy perspective of the Internal Bureaus and functions at the Joint Staff of external briefings and
from a military expert’s perspective of the each Staff the communication and coordination with relevant
Office, with each of them playing the role as the two departments and divisions inside and outside the MOD.
wheels of a vehicle.

Effective Deterrence and Response Section 2
Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely continuous surveillance over a wide region around Japan
and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the during peacetime. If a contingency does arise, ensuring
lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, maritime superiority2 and air superiority3 in our sea and
water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter airspace in a timely manner is important to respond
Chapter 1
the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they effectively and minimize the damage.
happen by building a comprehensive defense architecture. See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces);
If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use
of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units)
seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. Therefore, it
is important to ensure information superiority1 through
1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan
Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is (2) Response by the MOD/SDF
surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth The MSDF patrols the areas such as the waters
largest4 territorial waters (including inland waters) and surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft and
SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and other aircraft. The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations
warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft
territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance
sea and airspace. activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These
activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours
a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major
Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace
1 Surrounding Japan channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF
guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and other
(1) Basic Concept assets.5 Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities
The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers,
activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained
during peacetime so that it can respond to various through such surveillance activities is shared with the
contingencies immediately and seamlessly. relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan
Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination.
GSDF personnel conducting warning and surveillance activities Warning and surveillance activities around the offshore ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft
platforms in the East China Sea (photo taken from MSDF conducting warning and surveillance activities
P-3C patrol aircraft)
1 To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information.
2 Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by
the opposing force.
3 Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.
4 Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included.
5 Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning surveillance
activities by the Self Defense Forces.

Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security

posture so that it can respond quickly to various
contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. The Ministry Rye Song Gang-1
of Defense and the SDF are working to share the

information collected by this type of early warning
surveillance activities and to reinforce our cooperation
with relevant ministries and agencies.
To show an example of the events that were reported
Chapter 1
from SDF’s surveillance, following September 2012 Wan Heng-11
when the Government of Japan acquired property rights

to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri North Korean ship (right) that is strongly suspected of engaging in the act of ship-to-ship cargo
Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), transfer, confirmed by MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities over
the high seas of the East China Sea (February 2018)
Chinese government vessels have carried out intermittent
intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-
the Senkaku Islands.6 In June 2016, a Chinese Navy flagged tankers in the East China Sea to the end of June.
combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone The information was shared with relevant agencies and
to the north of the Senkaku Islands for the first time. ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the
Chinese Navy vessels continue their activities in the government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected
sea areas surrounding Japan, and six vessels including of engaging in transshipment of cargo with the North
the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security
through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security
and Miyako Island, and entered the western Pacific in Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the
December 2016. This was the first time that the entry of information with relevant countries, sent letters of intent
this aircraft carrier into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed.7 to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned
In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship and made public announcements on the subject.9
entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima In response to these illicit maritime activities
(Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru including transshipments with North Korean vessels
Strait to the Pacific Ocean for the first time. In January prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the
2018, the JSDF confirmed that a Chinese submarine United States and other concerned countries are carrying
and warship had been navigating through the Japanese out early warning surveillance activities using aircraft
contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands at the same based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan.
time (more about the submarine below). Furthermore, in Australian and Canadian aircraft made patrol flights over
April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a one-month period starting in late April. In the same
a number of (presumed) fighter jets were observed taking month, the United Kingdom also announced that it would
off from the aircraft carrier Liaoning for the first time. contribute to the international operation to monitor illicit
It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting transactions in North Korean waters and in early May, the
to evade United Nations Security Council sanctions naval frigate HMS Sutherland conducted an information
through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and gathering operation in the international waters around
surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the Japan. The Ministry of Defense and the Self Defense
Self Defense Force is carrying out information gathering Force intend to continue their close cooperation with
on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN
Council sanctions. In 2018, Self Defense Force patrol Security Council resolution.
aircraft have confirmed nine observations8 of seaborne
6 Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan.
7 Activity associated with the passage of Chinese naval vessels through the Ryukyu Islands between Okinawa Hondo and Miyakojima Islands was confirmed seven times in 2017.
8 Specifically, P-3C patrol planes of MSDF Air Patrol Squadron 1 observed rendezvous in the East China Sea on January 20, 2018 between North Korean tanker Rye Song Gang 1 and Dominican
Republic-flagged tanker Yuk Tung, on February 13 between North Korean tanker Rye Song Gang 1 and Belize-flagged tanker Wan Heng 11, on February 16 between North Korean tanker Yu Jong
2and a small vessel of unknown origin, on February 24 between North Korean tanker Chon Ma San and Maldives-flagged tanker Xin Yuan 18, on May 19 between North Korean tanker Ji Song 6 and
a small vessel of unknown origin, on May 24 between North Korean tanker Sam Jong 2 and a vessel of unknown origin, on June 21 between North Korean tanker Yu Phyong 5 and a small vessel of
unknown origin, and the next day between North Korean tanker Yu Phyong 5 and a small vessel of unknown origin, believed to be the same boat, and on June 29 between North Korean tanker An
San 1 and a small vessel of unknown origin.
9 The initiative of the Japanese government to counter this type of transshipment was lauded by President Donald Trump at the U.S.-Japan summit meeting and by Secretary of Defense James Mattis
at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018.

Fig. III-1-2-1 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan
Etorofu
Island
E-2C Airborne
Fixed-wing Early Warning Aircraft
patrol aircraft
Chapter 1
E-767 Airborne Warning
and Control System SDF: Coast observation unit
Takeshima SDF: Rader site (FPS5 BMD response)
SDF: Radar site (BMD response)
SDF: Radar site
Fixed-wing Hachijo
Island
patrol aircraft
Ministry of Defense
* Only a schematic image of a surveillance range.

Not an exact representation of the actual range.
Destroyer Ogasawara
Islands
Senkaku
Islands
Okidaitojima Minami Torishima

Yonaguni Island
Okinotorishima Territorial waters
EEZ
Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters

Fig. III-1-2-2 around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast
Guard Ships
(Times)
20
15
15
12 12
11 11 11 11
10
10
8
7
5
0
Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr.
2015 2016 2017 2018 ASDF F-15J fighter scrambling
See Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is
of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1- conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing
2-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around
the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships); Part I, intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken
Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (North Korea), Part I, Chapter 2, Section on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the
3-2 (Military Affairs) SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for
conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law.
Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in
2 Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace (2) Response by the MOD/SDF
The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in
(1) Basic Concept airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control
Under international law, countries have complete and radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If
exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial

VOICE 24-hour surveillance activities in the East China Sea COLUMN

(Destroyer crew member)
Abukuma destroyer (Kure),
Master Chief Petty Officer, Chief Petty Officer Eiji Naito
Those of us assigned to destroyers and other vessels work 24 hours in shifts on surveillance of foreign ships in the East China Sea.
As Master Chief Petty Officer, I strive to maintain discipline and morale on the ship and strengthen cohesion.
It is not easy to sustain motivation, reduce stress, and preserve mental health when working in the closed space of a ship
Chapter 1
over a lengthy period. I am always making efforts in greetings and engaging in conversations. Greetings are the “lubricant of human
relationships” and serve to accelerate mutual understanding and trust building. Engaging in conversations is important to stay abreast of
changes in team spirit and health. In particular, I try to interact with younger members as much as I can. I learn about their personalities,
hobbies, concerns, and family members so that I can make conversation with them at any time. These conversations with younger
people often help me discover things about myself that I did not know. I reflect on myself and learn every day.
Although it is a tough environment on the sea, I will continue to work hard while fostering communication among shipmates from
officers to young members through various events as well as taking rest in between duties.
Writer giving instructions to team members at the ship cafeteria Writer promoting interaction with team members at the ship
cafeteria (on the right)
airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in
to approach them in order to confirm the situation and December, five aircraft including two fighter jets flew
monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea
event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded airspace. This was the first time that a Chinese fighter has
into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace been confirmed entering the Japan Sea airspace. Then in
would be issued, among other responses. April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew
In FY2016, ASDF aircraft scrambled 904 times, across the East China Sea.
which was a decrease by 264 times compared with the With these kinds of acts, China is expanding the
previous fiscal year. However, this is the 6th highest scope of activities of its air force and escalating its actions
number of times since 1958 when scrambles commenced inside Japanese airspace. It is a troubling situation.
and the number continues to be kept relatively high. Planes were scrambled 390 times in response to
Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled Russian aircraft, an increase of 89 events compared to
500 times in response to Chinese aircraft. This is 351 the year before. Russian aircraft remain active, including
fewer incidents than the previous year, which was a unusual long-distance flights by two bombers through
record, but it is clear that Chinese aircraft continue to Japanese airspace in August 2017 and February 2018.
be highly active, as this is the third highest figure since Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea
the number of scrambles by country or territory was first Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November
made public in 2001. 2013, the MOD/SDF has implemented warning and
A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea,
a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a including the zone in question, and has continued to
Chinese naval vessel entering Japanese territorial waters take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and
near the Senkaku Islands. In August last year, six Chinese surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan.
military bombers were observed in an unprecedented The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace anti-
flight from the East China Sea over Okinawa Hondo intrusion measures in accordance with international law
and Miyakojima Islands northeast across the Pacific to and the SDF Law.

Fig. III-1-2-3 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War
(Times)
1,200 1,168
1,000 943
944 904
873
812 810
800
464 851
567 500
600 571
415
Chapter 1
425
386
400 306
311 299 156
96
220
158 38 473
200 359 390
264 247 248 288 301
197
124
0
1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(FY)
Note: Peaked during the Cold War Russia China Taiwan Others Total
Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and
Fig. III-1-2-4 Fig. III-1-2-5
Which Scrambles Responded Those of Neighboring Countries
Northern
Territories
December 18, 2017:

Chinese fighters (SU-30) Japanese
pass through territorial
Tsushima Strait (first airspace
confirmation) ROK ADIZ
Takeshima
“East China
Sea ADIZ”
August 24, 2017: Chinese *
bomber (H-6) makes
long-distance flight to area
off the coast of Kii Peninsula Japan ADIZ
(first confirmation) Senkaku Ogasawara
Islands Islands
Taiwan ADIZ
: Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft
: Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft
Yonaguni Island
* The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013
Philippines ADIZ ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone
See Fig. III-1-2-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the

Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s
Cold War); Fig. III-1-2-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft 3 Territorial Waters
to Which Scrambles Responded); Fig. III-1-2-5 (Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring
Countries); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 (Military Affairs), (1) Basic Concept
Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-4 (Russian Forces in the Vicinity With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater
of Japan); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-5 (Measures Against
Intrusion of Territorial Airspace)
in Japan’s territorial waters,10 an order for maritime
security operations will be issued. The submarine will
be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and
show its flag, in accordance with international law, and
in the event that the submarine does not comply with
the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese
territorial waters.
10 The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters

VOICE Staff sergeant working at an alert waiting station COLUMN

204th Fighter Squadron, 9th Air Wing (Naha, Okinawa)
Aircraft Maintenance, Staff Sergeant Shihomi Watari
The number of air sovereignty alert scrambles is on the sharp rise in the southwestern region. The number reached 803 in FY2016,
the highest on record. In such a situation, 9th Air Wing activated two fighter squadrons on January 31, 2016, followed by the
Southwestern Air Defense Force on July 1, 2017. The new structure ensures the air defense of the southwestern region.
Chapter 1
As maintenance personnel, we have a sense of urgency all the time to carry out air alert missions. Upon receipt of a scramble
order, we rush from the nearby facility to the alert aircraft and conduct final preparations so that the aircraft can take off as soon as
possible. I focus not only on swiftness, but also ensuring takeoff without a flaw in maintenance. Maintaining an alert aircraft means
bearing responsibility for pilots’ lives. Pilots must carry out their missions safely and surely, and more importantly, return safely. With
that in mind, I commit myself to air alert missions.
Writer setting up a ladder Writer undergoing an inspection before takeoff
(2) Response by the MOD/SDF Chinese naval submarine has been observed operating in
The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities the Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands.
for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation Although international law does not forbid foreign
that violates international law; and responding in shallow submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous
water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to
foreign submarines navigating under the territorial appropriately deal with such activities.
waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed
a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine 4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels
navigating under Japanese territorial waters around
the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the (1) Basic Concept
MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is
and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels primarily responsible for responding to suspicious
until it entered the high seas. armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels).
Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C patrol aircraft However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult
and others also confirmed observation of submerged or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a
submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous situation, an order for maritime security operations will
zones in May 2013 in waters south of Kumejima Island, be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in
in March 2014 off the east coast of Miyakojima Island cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.
and in February 2016 in waters southeast of Tsushima See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-2 (Maritime Security Operations)
Island. Further, in January 2018, a submerged submarine
was spotted by Maritime SDF assets including a (2) Response by the MOD/SDF
destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an
the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an
surfacing in international waters of the East China Sea unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in
flying the Chinese flag. This was the first time that a 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have

been making various efforts. for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team.
In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following Furthermore, based on the “Manual on Joint
steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels” jointly
(2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit;11 prepared by the then Japan Defense Agency and the Japan
(3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF also makes an effort to
(4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment strengthen cooperation between these two organizations,
(flat-nose shells);12 (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of conducting activities such as joint exercises periodically.
military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment
Chapter 1
2 Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands
1 Basic Concept If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops
will be deployed and concentrated in an area expected
Japan has a number of remote islands. In order to respond to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units,
to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units and, through the joint operation involving all the SDF
and so forth in accordance with the security environment, forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), deter and remove
and also to obtain and secure maritime and air superiority enemy attacks. If there is an invasion of the islands, the
by detecting signs at an early stage through persistent enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will
conducted by the SDF in peacetime. be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of
Fig. III-1-2-6 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands
Overall air defense
Secure and maintain maritime

and air superiority Aerial refueling
Surface
vessels Deployment of units to remote island
Maritime air support
Anti-surface
warfare
Operation to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion

SDF troops are to be swiftly deployed and concentrated
in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the Close air support
deployment of enemy units and the troops try to intercept
and defeat any invasions.
Landing
by aircraft
Response in the water
Landing by
Anti-submarine warfare amphibious
vehicle
Landing
by boat
Submarine
Enemy submarine Minesweeping
by ship
11 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime
security operations.
12 A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing.

SDF forces and other initiatives. Furthermore, a precise of contingencies.

response will also be taken to attacks using ballistic Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-
missiles, cruise missiles and other weapons. scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives
See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands) are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities
through: the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing
2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF Ship, Tank); a review of the role of multipurpose vessels;
and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport
For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, aircraft.
Chapter 1
the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys,
and newly formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA
in July 2017. The GSDF, in addition to the Yonaguni International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used
coast observation unit formed in March 2016 and other as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional
newly-formed units, established the Amphibious Rapid relationships with relevant units in joint operations, the
Deployment Brigade with full-fledged amphibious length of the runway, and the geographic environment that
operation capabilities in March 2018. Moreover, the can reduce burdens borne by the local community. The
GSDF will deploy some units including an area security MOD/SDF hopes to gain understanding from the local
unit in charge of the initial responses in Amami Oshima, community through providing in-depth explanations.13
Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island. Moreover, in addition to the acquisition of six fighter
In addition, the MSDF will acquire P-1 fixed wing aircraft (F-35A), one aerial refuelling and transport
patrol aircraft, SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters, aircraft (KC-46A) and four tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22) to
and other equipment. Through these initiatives, the serve in responding to attacks on remote islands, the
MOD/SDF will continue persistent ISR operations, FY2018 budget includes funds for research into the
and develop an immediate response posture in the case technologies required for high-speed glide bombs and
Fig. III-1-2-7 Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands

(As of April 1, 2018)
MSDF Amami Naval Base Facility

ASDF Amami Communication Wing
ASDF 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

Amami Oshima
Okinoerabujima
ASDF 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.
GSDF 15th Brigade
MSDF Fleet Air Wing 5
Kumejima ASDF Southwestern Air Defense
Senkaku Islands Force, etc.
Approx. 420 km
Approx. 290 km Main Island of Okinawa

Approx. 150 km Approx. 210 km
Yonaguni Island Ishigaki

Miyako Island
Island
Approx. 110 km Approx.
Approx.
130 km
120 km ASDF 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.
SDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit
[Legend]
: GSDF Units : MSDF Units : ASDF Units
13 At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22
Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.

new anti-ship missiles to defend remote islands.

Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the
capacity for amphibious operations are being undertaken.
the MOD and SDF carried out the joint amphibious exercise
Dawn Blitz 17 with U.S. Marines in the United States from
October to November 2017, the joint exercises14 (field
training) in November 2017 and the joint amphibious
exercise Iron Fist 18 with U.S. Marines in the United
Chapter 1
States from January to February 2018. And in May 2018,
the first exercises of the newly formed Amphibious Rapid
Deployment Brigade were conducted with the MSDF.
GSDF personnel getting off an amphibious vehicle and deploying during Iron Fist 18
Practical exercises were conducted outside SDF bases in (January 2018)
waters off the west coast of Kyushu and Tanegashima Island.
See Fig. III-1-2-7 (Deployment Status of Major Units in the
Southwestern Islands)
3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense the introduction of Aegis Ashore).
(BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched
response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with
amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack
July 2005, and in December of the same year, the then- situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not
Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take
cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile measures to destroy the ballistic missiles.
interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own As a response against ballistic missiles or other
defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the
means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its
the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Commander, and various postures for effective defense
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).15 are to be taken under a unified command through
See Reference 35 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role
in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen
1 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense ballistic missile.
See Fig. III-1-2-8 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD
(1) Basic Concept (image)); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-4 (Destruction
Measures Against Ballistic Missiles)
Currently, Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-layered
defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis- (2) Response by the MOD/SDF
equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC- Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear
3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan tests and 40 ballistic missile launches. These military
Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).16 actions by North Korea are a severe and imminent threat
The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis to the safety of Japan. Meanwhile, we believe that the
system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to clear commitment made by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the
intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis historic North Korea-United States summit held in June
destroyers but from land (see below for more details on 2018 to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and
14 In FY2017, it was conducted from November 6 to 24 at Numazu Beach Training Area, at Tanegashima/Tsushima and the surrounding areas, and at SDF facilities and related waters and airspace.
Approximately 15,000 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, approximately 1,500 vehicles, approximately 6 vessels, and approximately 170 aircraft participated in this exercise. They conducted
various exercises aimed at the maintenance and enhancement of their joint operational capabilities.
15 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other
targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
16 JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it
provides fighters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in
responses to ballistic missiles.

Fig. III-1-2-8 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)
Mid-course phase
In this phase, the rocket engine burns
out and the missile is flying in outer
space (exoatmosphere) inertially
Boost phase Detection/Discrimination/

In this phase, the Tracking
Terminal phase
rocket engine is
burning and This phase covers
Chapter 1
accelerating the atmospheric re-entry

missile to impact
ASDF air control and

ASDF
warning radar
Patriot PAC-3
(FPS-5, FPS-3
Ballistic missile Upgraded, FPS-7)
GSDF
Aegis Ashore
JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense

MSDF Aegis Ground Environment)
BMD destroyer Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD
Commander, Air Defense Command
repeated in writing, is highly significant. We must now

carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea
toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and missiles.
North Korea probably possesses and has deployed
hundreds of Nodong missiles, which have almost all of
Japan within their range. Based on the progress of North
Korea’s nuclear and missile development gained through
successive nuclear tests and ballistic missile firings and
improved operational capability, our fundamental stance
on the threat posed by North Korean nuclear weapons
and missiles is unchanged.
Considering such a situation, the MOD/SDF, whose Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga encouraging the PAC-3 unit being deployed in Ichigaya
(October 2017)
mission is to protect the lives and assets of the people, are
not changing their intent to do everything necessary to be operational and relevant information, and the expansion
sure that it is able to respond to any situation or state of of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-
affairs, and continue to conduct the necessary intelligence U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).
collection, warning and surveillance activities, and other Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with
necessary activities while closely cooperating with the the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by
United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)17
Further cooperation with the U.S. Government from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered
including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2
and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan
measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD by the U.S. Forces.
17 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed
to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.)

Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan- (3) Strengthening of the BMD System
U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively In light of the severe security environment, the MOD/
conducted through training and other activities. Since SDF have been taking necessary measures for improving
2010, BMD exercise has been held between the MSDF and its capabilities for responding to ballistic missile attacks
the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment based on the National Defense Program Guidelines
via a network and conducting a simulation of response and the Mid-term Defense Program. For example, of
to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and the six MSDF Aegis-equipped destroyers, the MOD is
strengthen bilateral coordination. In February 2018, the currently refurbishing two without BMD capabilities,
Chapter 1
Japan Air Self-Defense Force took part in this exercise Atago and Ashigara, to give them BMD capabilities
as a joint Japan-U.S. air defense/missile defense exercise and this refurbishment of Atago was already completed
with the goal of improving strategic and tactical skills in December 2017. The MOD also decided to acquire
and strengthening cooperation. additional two Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD
Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, there is also a capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These
need to bolster cooperation between the United States, projects will increase the number of Aegis-equipped
Japan and the Republic of Korea. In October and again in destroyers with BMD capabilities from the present five
December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information- (including refurbished Atago) to eight by FY2020.
sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly
objective of strengthening coordination. developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-
With respect to the handling of finely detailed 3 Block IIA), which will be the successor of SM-3 Block
information related to ballistic missiles, the passage IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and
of the Specially Designated Secrets Act in December promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal
2014 (Law no. 108, 2013) has established the basis for with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and
protection of highly confidential information related to diverse ballistic missile attacks.
national security. This has promoted increased sharing of At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting
information not just within the government but with the in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to
United States and other relevant countries. joint production and the deployment phase. Following
In addition, the General Security of Military the FY2017 budget, the expenses to acquire SM-3
Information Agreement (GSOMIA)18 entered into effect Block IIA were budgeted in the FY2018. Acquisition
on November, 2016. As GSOMIA serves as a framework and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be
for protecting various confidential information including implemented in FY2021.
information regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA,
threat shared between Japan and the ROK, which will be SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable
required for practical and effective responses to various altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced
situations, further strengthening of the Japan-U.S.-ROK defeating capability and simultaneous engagement
relationship will be expected. capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception
The SDF engages in various training on a daily basis capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against
to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance
been conducting PAC- 3 maneuver deployment training measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched
nationwide sequentially from June 2017 in an effort with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a
to strengthen the SDF’s capability to counter ballistic higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory).19
missiles and generate a sense of safety and security There will be eight Aegis-equipped destroyers with
among the public. It had conducted 20 training sessions BMD capabilities, and SM-3 Block IIA will also be
as of the end of June 2018 including deployments to U.S. deployed. It is planned that there will be a strengthened
Forces Japan’s facilities. protection system by around FY2021.
See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (North Korea); Chapter 2, With regard to Patriot PAC-3, necessary expenses
Section 1-4-2 (Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation have been appropriated in the supplementary budget
and Exchanges); Reference 35 (History of Efforts for BMD
Development in Japan) for FY2017, which continued from the supplementary
18 The official name is the “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information,” which was signed by
Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador of Japan to the ROK, and Han Min-goo, then-Minister of National Defense of the ROK, in Seoul, ROK, on November 23, 2016.
19 By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the
falling speed of the missile becomes faster.

Fig. III-1-2-9 Overall Enhancement of Japan’s Capabilities to Respond to Ballistic Missiles (SSA) System
●Increasing the Number of Aegis-Equipped Destroyers with Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities to Eight
Aegis-Equipped Destroyers
<To date> <Image of the defense structure around 2021>
DDG “Kongou” Class × 4 DDG “Kongou” Class × 4

+
DDG “Atago” Class × 2
DDG “Kongou” Class New type vessel × 2
Chapter 1
DDG “Kongou” Class

DDG “Kongou” Class
DDG “Atago” Class
Image Image
In the case of protecting all of Japan, three destroyers In the defense structure around 2021, continuous protection of
are necessary. However, since those destroyers may undergo all of Japan with two destroyers will be feasible even taking
regular inspections in turn, there is a difficulty in maintaining into consideration the inspections of the destroyers.
continuous protection.
●Introduction of Advanced PAC-3 (PAC-3 MSE)
Altitude
Coverage of PAC-3
Coverage of
PAC-3 MSE PAC-3 MSE Missile
(the photo shows equipment of the same type)
Enhancement of simultaneous Distance

engagement capability (image)
budget of the previous year, to enable the acquisition attacks in addition to existing Aegis-equipped destroyers
of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile and Patriot batteries.20
Segment Enhancement). Introduction of PAC-3MSE The cost of obtaining all information from the
will realize the extension of interception altitude from United States related to acquisition of Aegis Ashore,
about 10 km to 20- 30 km, meaning that the coverage of improvement of ballistic missile response capability
protection (area) will expand more than twice compared of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment
with the current PAC-3. (JADGE),21 conversion to FPS-7 fixed warning and control
With North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles radars and addition of a BMD function22 is allocated in
posing an unprecedentedly severe and imminent threat to the FY2017 supplementary budget, while the cost of
the safety of Japan, the country must work to drastically geological survey and preliminary design work required
upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in for the deployment of Aegis Ashore and development of
order to ensure constant and sustained protection. At next-generation warning and control radar with detection
meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet and tracking functionality for ballistic missile attacks23 is
in December 2017, a decision was made to purchase two allocated in the FY2018 budget.
Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the Ground Self See Fig. III-1-2-9 (Overall Enhancement of Japan’s Capabilities
Defense Force. The aim is to improve the capability for to Respond to Ballistic Missiles); Reference 36 regarding
(Fundamental Enhancement of Ballistic Defense Capabilities)
multi-layered defense of Japan against ballistic missile
20 The costs required to introduce the Aegis Ashore land-based defense system in 2017 and 2018 are to be covered within the scope of the total MTDP budget.
21 Upgrade to enhance capability against lofted trajectory attacks, attacks with little chance of advance detection and attacks by multiple ballistic missiles launched simultaneously.
22 Acquired FPS-7 fixed warning and control radar for deployment at Wakkanai, Hokkaido. Allocated infrastructure costs required for deployment of FPS-7 at Wakkanai, Hokkaido and Unishima Island,
Nagasaki Prefecture.
23 Development of next-generation warning and control radar with detection and tracking functionality to deal with future airborne threats and ballistic missile attacks, advanced survivability and
economic efficiency.

Commentary Land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) COLUMN

Aegis Ashore is a land-based missile defense system (Aegis system) that consists of radar, a command communication system, an
interceptor missile launcher, and other equipment, which essentially constitutes the BMD part of an Aegis-equipped destroyer for
BMD, and is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles flying in the exosphere from the ground.
As North Korea still holds multiple and various types of ballistic missiles that include Japan within its firing range, this makes it
an imminent challenge for Japan to improve its BMD capability, the deployment of Aegis Ashore would fundamentally boost Japan’s
capabilities to protect itself seamlessly 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.
Chapter 1
Generally speaking, it takes a long time to acquire new defense equipment. This does not change even in the event of an
emergency. Securing the lives and the peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people is the most important duty of the Government,
and the MOD considers it a matter of course to be prepared fully so that Japan can respond to any contingencies. Furthermore,
the working environment for crew onboard Aegis-equipped destroyer is extremely severe. These ships must make port calls for
maintenance and replenishment, creating gaps in defense posture. This means frequent long-term deployments for the crew to
eliminate those undesired intervals. This burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted significantly once Aegis Ashore is deployed.
Moreover, Aegis-equipped destroyer would be able to go back to their core duty of ensuring maritime security, and strengthening
Japan’s deterrence capability as a whole.
GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture have been selected
as possible areas for the deployment of two Aegis Ashore sites after studies within the MOD. In light of this, Parliamentary Vice-
Minister of Defense Fukuda and Ono visited Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures on June 1, 2018. Defense Minister Onodera also
visited both prefectures on June 22 and gave a briefing on the necessity of the deployment. Not only will the MOD conduct a
thorough investigation and implement measures so that the deployment will not affect the livelihood of people in the communities,
but it will also continue to give sincere and detailed briefings with the hope that doing so will resolve any questions and anxiety the
communities may have.
FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving

2 Missile Defense of the United States and initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the then-
Japan- U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation
Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-
(1) Missile Defense of the United States U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic
The United States is developing a multi-tier missile missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a
defense system that combines defense systems suited for technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006
each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight with a view to expanding the coverage of protection25 and
path to provide a mutually complementary response: dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced
(1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and and diverse ballistic missiles attacks.
(3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have In February and June 2017, Japan and the United
developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor
defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed
United States has been deployed in our country in a step- that it meets all performance requirements.
by-step manner.24 Currently, as part of development work, the United
States is carrying out validation of the data connection
(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc. between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and
The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required.
research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in
24 Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan
and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture.
Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014.
25 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued
in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based
on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced
in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011.
The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the
Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.

4 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others
Fig. III-1-2-10 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces
Patrol helicopter
Enemy aircraft
Fixed-wing patrol aircraft
Observation helicopter Search and destruction

Reconnaissance aircraft at sea by MSDF and ASDF
Chapter 1
Guerillas and Destroyer

Enemy Submarine special forces landing
submarine Depot ship
Base for underwater vehicles
used in landing operations
Underwater scooters used Search and

destruction at Warning and
in landing operations surveillance
the water’s edge Light armored
Protection of Air vehicle Reconnaissance
important facilities defense unit
Search and Infantry unit Mobile Combat
destruction in Vehicles
Short range Tanks Obstacle mountainous areas Fighting helicopter
surface-to-air Multipurpose
missiles Search and helicopter
Base destruction
in urban areas
Shovel car Mobile Combat Vehicle
Tank
Mortar Bulldozer
Consequence Infantry unit
Establishment Wheeled
management
of positions armored vehicle
Base Leading local residents
for evacuation, etc. Police
NBC NBC attack
Howitzer reconnaissance
vehicle Rescuing hostage Special
operations unit
Mortar Decontamination vehicle
In Japan where most of the towns and cities are highly force, then public security operations by the SDF will be
urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that
pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the
security. These cases refer to various mode and forms SDF will respond under a defense operation order.
including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed
agents26 etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas
or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack 2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special
Operations Forces
against Japan.
Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces
1 Basic Concept include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and
other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations
In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and of dignitaries.
the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces,
primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on
will collect relevant information and reinforce the security the establishment of a relevant information gathering
of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in
be dealt with by the general police force, various forms coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and
of assistance such as transportation of police officers and destroy of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts
provision of equipment to the police force will be carried will be made for early detection of attacks and indications
out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the
26 Refers to persons committing illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant wounding and killing power.

SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities such as with suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted
nuclear power plants and necessary posture for protection between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.
will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in
the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas
Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
or special operations forces, they will be searched for 4 Weapons
and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and
others and combat units will be promptly deployed to In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the
besiege and capture or to destroy them. danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical)
Chapter 1
See Fig. III-1-2-10 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate
Guerillas and Special Forces) mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area,
and the means for transporting such weapons, as well
3 Response to Armed Agents as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and
countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons.
(1) Basic Concept The sarin gas attack30 on the Tokyo subway in March
While the police assumes primary responsibility 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these
for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, weapons were used.
the SDF will respond in accordance with situational
developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates (1) Basic Concept
with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a
security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement27 way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will
concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and
the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of
divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an
been concluded.28 armed attack but against which the general police alone
See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-1, (Public Security Operations) cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct
public security operations to suppress the armed group
(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies.
The GSDF continues to conduct exercises nationwide with Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under
the police of each prefecture and has been strengthening the category of defense operations or public security
such collaboration by, for example, conducting field operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF
exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will
since 2012.29 Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing cooperate with relevant organizations in information
gathering concerning the extent of the damage,
decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and
injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and
civil protection dispatches.
(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF
Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon
Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as
well as increasing the number of chemical and medical
GSDF units advancing following the guidance from the police in a joint exercise involving three protection unit personnel, in order to improve the
prefectural police departments from the Hokuriku region and the GSDF 14th Infantry Regiment capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also,
at the Shika Nuclear Power Plant (October 2017)
27 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission
(concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).
28 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.
29 The GSDF also conducted exercises at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013,
at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at
Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, and at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Shiga Nuclear Power Plant (Ishikawa) in 2017.
30 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number
of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and
stations as well as supported police forensics.

the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective
in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at
operations to begin within approximately one hour. The bases.
5 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security
1 Basic Approach by the Government approval in 2013. Taking a broad view of ocean policy
Chapter 1
from the perspective of security on the ocean, the Plan

Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan states that the government will act as one in undertaking
will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “comprehensive maritime security” and promote a “free
“Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures and open Indo-Pacific Strategy” in collaboration and
to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, cooperation with related countries.
including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe

maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF
countries by promoting necessary cooperation related
to maritime security. In addition, it is stated in NSS In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable
that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the
alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such
in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities. as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing
The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy31 was given capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and
Cabinet approval in May 2018 after a review of the enhancing joint training using a variety of opportunities.
Basic Plan on Ocean Policy that was given Cabinet See Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)
6 Responses in Space
Utilization of satellites enables the remote sensing of, See Fig. III-1-2-11 (Image of the Use of Space)
communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth.
Thus, countries around the world actively use outer space 1 The Whole-of-Government Approach
and make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety
of satellites such as imagery satellites, communication The Office of National Space Policy32 established in the
satellites, and positioning satellites to enhance Cabinet Office in July 2012 engages in the planning,
information gathering capabilities as well as command drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to
and control, and information and communications the Government’s development and use of space. In light
capabilities. Under such circumstances, for Japan whose of the environmental changes surrounding space policy
defense force is built in line with the basic principles of and the new security policies stated in the NSS that was
exclusively defense oriented policy, the use of space, approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space
which does not belong to any territories of any nations Policy33 was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters
and is not constrained by such factors as the surface of for Space Development established within the Cabinet in
the terrain, is extremely important when: collecting January 2015. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year
information to detect indications of various incidents in development plan focusing on the next approximately 20
advance and strengthening the surveillance activities in years to improve predictability of industries’ investments,
its surrounding seas and airspace; and ensuring means of and strengthen the industrial base, and has the following
communication by the SDF in their international peace goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the
cooperation activities and other activities. use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining
31 In addition to “Comprehensive Maritime Security,” given recent changes in the oceanic environment, basic principles are being established for key policies on oceans with respect to 1) promoting the
industrial use of the oceans, 2) sustaining and preserving the oceanic environment, 3) improving scientific knowledge, 4) deepening polar policies, 5) international collaboration and cooperation and
6) promoting the fostering of human resources for oceanic profession and the understanding of citizens.
32 In April 2016, the Office of National Space Policy was reorganized into the National Space Policy Secretariat.
33 Cabinet decision on April 1, 2016

Fig. III-1-2-11 Image of the Use of Space
Early warning satellite

Communications satellite Meteorological satellite
Geostationary orbit
Altitude approx. 36,000 km
(following the direction
of the Earth’s rotation) Positioning satellite
Distance
Chapter 1
to the moon
approx.
380,000 km Altitude approx. 20,000 km
Outer Space
● Freedom of use, exploration and entry
● Not subject to state acquisition
● Prohibition on the deployment of
weapons of mass destruction
Approx. 36,000 km
(approx. 1/10
of the distance Imagery Satellite, etc.
to the moon) International Space Station
(altitude approx. 400 km)
Altitude up to 1,000 km
Airspace
● Sovereignty over territorial airspaces is
vested in each state.
● The upper limit of territorial airspace is
not defined. General aircraft (altitude approx. 10 km)
and strengthening of space industry and scientific/ that enables the Prime Minister to issue an order to a
technological bases. Amid rising dependence on space satellite remote sensing data holder to prohibit provision
systems and increasing threats and risks in space, of data under certain occasions.
“mission assurance” initiatives are underway to ensure
stable space operations including detection and avoidance 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF
of threats and risks, increased survivability of the systems
themselves and early recovery of functionality. The use of space is extremely important for the MOD/
Responding to Japan’s progress in development and SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and efficiently.
use of outer space, the Diet approved two laws—the Act Thus, it is critically important for the MOD/SDF to be
on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote able to continuously utilize space capabilities even in
Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on contingencies. In order to do so, NDPG stipulates the MOD/
Launch of Artificial Satellites and Launch Vehicles and SDF to strengthen information gathering, C2 (command
Control of Artificial Satellites (Space Activities Act) in & control) and satellite communication capabilities by
November 2016, and Remote Sensing Data Act and part using multiple types of satellites with various sensors
of Space Activities Act went into effect in November 2017. and by enhancing the survivability of satellites through
The Space Activities Act stipulates matters such initiatives as Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In
necessary to secure public safety and provide prompt implementing these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will form
protection of the victims from damages in Japan’s space partnerships with relevant institutions and organizations
development and use, such as a permission system for both in Japan and the United States. As part of this
launching, obligation for compensation, and government initiative, the MOD is advancing deliberations toward
compensation. The government began accepting Japan’s inaugural participation in the Schriever Wargame,
applications for permission after the enforcement of a multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the US Air
part of the Act. In addition, the Remote Sensing Data Force Space Command. This is meaningful for Japan in
Act established (1) a license pertaining to use of satellite terms of enhancing collaboration with partner countries
remote sensing instruments, (2) a certification of persons and drafting the national space policy in the future.
handling satellite remote sensing date and (3) a system Reflecting the formulation of the National Security

Strategy (NSS) and the NDPG, the MOD revised the

“Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of 3 Development of the Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) System
Space” in August 2014. Also, from the perspective of
further promoting cooperation in the space field between When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its
the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in
the two countries established the “Japan-US Space the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the
Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 risk of significant damage to satellite functions caused
and so far held four meetings. The SCWG continues by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it
Chapter 1
to promote consideration in broader fields such as: is speculated that the development and verification test
(1) promotion of policy-related consultation regarding of a killer satellite, which approaches the target artificial
space, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway,
for nurturing and securing experts, and (4) continued increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space.
participation to tabletop exercises. That is why the MOD, based on the Basic Plan on Space
Furthermore, the MOD/SDF launched an X-band Policy and through cooperation with relevant domestic
defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in institutions such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration
January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and Agency (JAXA) and the U.S., aims to establish Space
operated by the MOD for the first time, to be used for Situational Awareness (SSA) by 2022 to monitor and
the information communications of extremely important maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. It
command and control in unit operations. Going forward, is also working to deploy a radar and operating system
in light of the future increase in required communication, to monitor threats to Japanese satellites such as space
the MOD will conduct steady development of Kirameki-3 debris. For this to happen, the government agencies and
to realize integrated communications as well as high- ministries concerned need to work together to build an
speed and large capacity communications, thereby aiming effective operating system. On this point, JAXA is devising
for the early realization of a three-satellite system with all a plan to deploy radar able to monitor low orbit satellites
of the three X-band defense communications satellites. (at altitudes of up to 1,000 km) and a ground-based
optical telescope to monitor geostationary orbit satellites
Fig. III-1-2-12 Initiatives for the Development of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System
SSA System by the Ministry of Education, Culture,

SSA System by the MOD (Image) Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)/JAXA
(renovation and update of existing facilities)
Space Suspicious satellite

debris etc. Japan’s satellite
Optical Monitoring Facility

(Ibara City, Okayama Prefecture)
Avoid if there is any risk
Cooperation
of collision, etc.
Radar Monitoring Facility

U.S. (Kagamino-cho, Okayama Prefecture)
Operation system
Radar Armed Forces
MOD Analysis System (Tsukuba City, Ibaraki Prefecture)
Information sharing
➢ In cooperation with MEXT/JAXA, complete the development of the MOD’s SSA System by FY2022 <Basic Plan on Space Policy>
➢ Started the overall system design in FY2016
➢ Planning to undertake the development of operation systems and sensors in or after FY2017

(at altitudes of around 36,000km). Combined with the future cooperation. The MOD has taken part in the
radar of the MOD that will principally be dedicated to annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise hosted by
the function of geostationary orbit monitoring, Japan is the U.S. Strategic Command since 2016 with the purpose
planning an effective SSA program. of acquiring knowledge related to the operation of SSA
As the project to establish the system gets underway, as well as of strengthening cooperation with the United
the preparation of the new radar and operating system States. Such initiatives to upgrade our SSA capability
will build on the knowledge acquired by the ASDF in also contribute to the strengthening of deterrence against
establishing defense capabilities. A new unit to operate new threats in space.
Chapter 1
the system is also being considered. See Fig. III-1-2-12 (Initiatives for the Development of the Space
To establish SSA, it will be vital to continuously Situational Awareness (SSA) System); Part II, Chapter 2,
Section 3, (Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018); Part II,
exchange views and share information with foreign Chapter 4, Section 2-3-5(Space and Cyberspace Cooperation)
allies, and to carry out discussions about the nature of
7 Response to Cyber Attacks
Information and communications technology has and serves as the control tower in taking measures and
developed and been rapidly and widely adopted. responding to significant cyber security incidents in
As a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for government organizations and agencies, as well as critical
socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a infrastructures.
possibility that people’s life and economic activities will Furthermore, in September 2015, the Cyber Security
be severely affected if the computer systems or networks Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and
fail. The same is true of both the MOD/SDF. If the critical effective promotion of measures pertaining to cyber
functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, security, with the aims: to create and develop free, fair and
there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core safe cyber space; to enhance the vitality of the economy
of Japan’s defense may arise. and society and realize their sustainable development; to
realize society in which citizens can live safely and with
peace of mind; to contribute to peace and stability of the
1 The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other international community as well as the security of Japan.
Initiatives
With regard to cyber attacks, the number of cases recognized 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF
as threats to Japanese governmental organizations and
agencies in FY2016 reached approximately 7,110,000, (1) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach
and these threats have become increasingly serious.34 Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry
In order to deal with the increasing threat to cyber of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry
security, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of
Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government
security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the
Japan’s cyber security measures and the responsibilities NISC, participates in cyber attack response training and
of local governments, as well as by comprehensively personnel exchanges, and provides information about
and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the
security. In response to this, in January 2015, the Cyber NISC as well as sending personnel to the Cyber incident
Security Strategic Headquarters was established in the Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT).
Cabinet and the National center of Incident readiness The MOD is considering applying the knowledge
and Strategy for Cyber Security (NISC)35 was established and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT
in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for systems of government ministries and agencies conducted
planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies by NISC.
34 Cybersecurity Annual Report 2016 (submitted at the “Information Security Policy Council” on July 13, 2017).
35 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant
cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures.

Fig. III-1-2-13 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks
2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks

• 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as
advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber 3) Development of a response posture to
Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication cyber attacks
1) Ensuring safety of information Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF)
systems • Establishment of security measures criteria
of information systems
• Introduction of firewall and virus detection • Establishment of security measures with
software which MOD/SDF staff should comply
• Separation of the network into the Defense • Development of response posture at the
Information Infrastructure (DII) open system time of cyber attack occurrence
Chapter 1
and closed system • Establishment of the Cyber Policy Review

• Implementation of system audit, etc. Committee
Internet
DII open
network
The Six Pillars of
Comprehensive Defensive
DII closed
network Measures against Cyber Attacks 4) Research of cutting-edge technology
6) Coordination with other
organizations and agencies • Research on technology to develop the
cyber training environnent
• Information sharing with the
National center of Incident Cyber Training Environment
readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Simulated attacks
Simulated environment
Forces, and other relevant nations
Defense
5) Development of human resources
• For the purpose of human resources development, implementing
studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie
Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, Control and evaluation
Research
as well as education at professional courses at the SDF
• For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at • Allows for counter-cyber attack
training in a simulated environment
workplaces and professional education at the National Defense Academy
(2) Unique Initiatives by the MOD/SDF of units responsible for responding to cyber attacks is
As unique initiatives by the MOD/SDF, the SDF C4 increasing from 350 to 430 personnel.
(Command, Control, Communication & Computers) See Fig. III-1-2-13 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal
Systems Command and other systems are monitoring with Cyber Attacks); Reference 37 (Efforts in Recent Years by
the Ministry of Defense)
MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock.
In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established (3) Cooperation with the United States
under the SDF C4 Systems Command to enhance and Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including
strengthen the system. joint response, between Japan and its ally the United
In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber
measures including the introduction of intrusion Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a
prevention systems in order to increase the safety of framework between the defense authorities of Japan
information and communication systems, development of and the United States. Under this framework, meetings
defense systems such as the security and analysis device have been held five times to discuss the following
for cyber defense, enactment of regulations,36 stipulating topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding
postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information,
and development of human resources and technological (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response
bases, as well as research on cutting-edge technology. to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation
In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks for training and maintaining experts. Moreover, in May
that are becoming more sophisticated and skilful by the 2015, the two countries announced a joint statement on
day, the Cyber Defense Group expands from 110 to 150 the specific future direction of the cooperation.
personnel, approximately, by the end of FY2018 and the In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United
cyber protection units of the three services of SDF forces States is to be further strengthened by such means as
are also to be increased. As a result, the total number participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a
36 There are directives relating to the information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007).

VOICE Strengthening cyber collaboration with the United States COLUMN

(liaison officer activities)
Unit: Ground Staff Office, Command Communication System and Information Division, Command Communication Section
Assignment: U.S. Army Cyber CoE (Fort Gordon, Georgia) Rank: Lieutenant Colonel Name: Yohei Tsuji
I have been working at the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institute since October
2016 as the Self Defense Forces’ first cyber liaison officer along with liaison officers
Chapter 1
dispatched from various countries.
The institute conducts advanced education to train cyber personnel. My job
involves collecting information on initiatives by the U.S. military and coordinating
entry by members of the Ground Self Defense Forces into the U.S. military’s training
courses, as a new initiative, to help foster cyber personnel for the Ground Self
Defense Forces.
As Japan’s first liaison officer, I intend to continue to promote closer collaboration
Writer in a meeting with liaison officers from other countries
between Japan and the U.S. and with other friendly countries and build a foundation (second from the right) (April 2018)
for future dispatched liaison officers to smoothly carry out their duties.
whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding 2018, the MOD is further developing collaborative
of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the relationships in the cyber area through the dispatch of
defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison personnel to the Centre.
officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution. In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the
defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia
(4) Cooperation with Other Countries etc. to exchange views on initiatives in the information
Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense communications area including cybersecurity and current
authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Estonia, trends in technology.
and others to exchange views on threat awareness and Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond
relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO national borders, it is important to continue to strengthen
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Japan carries international cooperation in the cyber field through
out initiatives looking at possible future operational exchanges of views with defense authorities of other
cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between countries and relevant organizations such as the Cooperative
defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), and
Talks on Cyber Defense and participating in the cyber active participation in cyber defense exercises.
defense exercise (Cyber Coalition) hosted by NATO as In Japan, in July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council”
an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), around ten companies in the defense industry with a
and as an observer in a cyber defense exercise (Locked strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made
Shields) organized by the Cooperative Cyber Defence to improve capabilities to deal with cyber attacks by
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Estonia. As the MOD/SDF, and the defense industry, through joint
Japan received approval to join the CCDCOE in January exercise and other initiatives.
8 Response to Large-Scale Disasters
When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF 1 Basic Principles
works in collaboration with local governments, engaged
in various activities such as the search and rescue of In the event of a major disaster, all possible measures will
disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, controlling be taken to rapidly transport and deploy the SDF units
floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, required and if necessary, to sustain the mobilization for
supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. a long period. Not only will the SDF units respond to the

needs of affected residents and local authorities through governors of these prefectures, the SDF carried out
care, proper collaboration and cooperation, but they euthanization of poultries. Approximately 410 personnel
will also be engaged with institutions concerned, local and 75 vehicles from SDF were dispatched to cope with
authorities and the private sector to save lives, achieve this situation.
urgent rehabilitation and provide livelihood support. c. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire
The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial Over the period from June 2017 to the end of May
response to ensure that disaster relief operations are 2018, local authorities conducted firefighting operations
conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.” against fighting forest fires in Iwate Prefecture, Gunma
Chapter 1
See Fig. III-1-2-14 (State of Readiness for Disaster Relief (Standard)); Prefecture, Tokyo, Nagano Prefecture (twice), Yamanashi
Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-4(Disaster Relief and Others) Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, Shimane Prefecture, Oita
Prefecture and Miyazaki Prefecture but were unable to
2 Response of the MOD/SDF settle the situation despite their efforts. Based on requests
issued by the governors of these prefectures, the SDF
(1) Response to Natural Disasters contributed to aerial firefighting and other resources. SDF
a. Disaster Relief for Heavy Rain Disaster Caused by dispatches were conducted 10 times in total, including
Typhoon No. 10 a total of some 110 personnel, around 37 vehicles and
(1) On July 5, 2017, road flooding, landslide and other some 110 aircraft. Approximately 1,778 tons of water
damages occurred due to heavy rain, cutting off roads was applied on 414 occasions.
and isolating individuals in Toho Village, Asakura-gun, d. Disaster Relief in Response to Volcanic Eruption
Fukuoka Prefecture and many places in Hita City, Oita In January 2018, a number of people were injured by falling
Prefecture. On the same day, the SDF, responding to rocks at a ski resort in Kusatsu, Agatsuma District due to
disaster relief requests from the Governors of Fukuoka and the eruption of Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane. The SDF received
Oita Prefectures, carried out rescue operations for isolated a request from the Governor of Gunma for disaster relief
individuals, searches for missing people, elimination of and conducted a lifesaving mission. The mission was
road obstacles, transportation of personnel and goods, composed of dispatches of around 280 personnel, around
water supply assistance, meal providing assistance, and 75 vehicles and nine aircraft.
bathing assistance, which continued until August 20 in e. Disaster Relief in Response to Water Supply Relief
Fukuoka Prefecture and July 13 in Oita Prefecture. The Since January 2018, water supply failures have occurred
total scale of this disaster relief was approximately 81,950 in Sado, Niigata Prefecture, Uwajima, Ishikawa
personnel, 7,140 vehicles, and 169 aircraft. Prefecture, Oda, Shimane Prefecture and Miyako,
b. Disaster Relief in Response to Bird Flu Outbreak Okinawa Prefecture, due to water pipe breakage, etc. In
In January 2018, the occurrence of highly pathogenic response to disaster relief requests from the governors of
avian influenza was confirmed at poultry farms in Sanuki the prefectures affected, the SDF provided relief supplies
City, Kagawai Prefecture, requiring epidemic control of water. These missions engaged around 765 personnel,
measures to be taken such as euthanization of poultries. some 450 vehicles including water tank trailers, and
In response to the request for disaster relief from the supplied approximately 349 tons of water in total.
Fig. III-1-2-14 State of Readiness for Disaster Relief (Standard)
Common to All
The state of readiness with which SDF troops can begin gathering information immediately after an earthquake of seismic intensity
five-lower or higher occurs.
FAST Force (GSDF)
First response units throughout Japan (about 3,900 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, and about 40 aircraft) are on standby around-
the-clock and will be deployed in an hour upon receiving an order as a standard procedure.
Various units including helicopters (video transmission), chemical protection units, and bomb disposal units are on standby in each
regional army.
FAST Force (MSDF)
Vessels on standby: Designate one response vessel in each regional district
Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard procedure
FAST Force (ASDF)
Standby for scrambling against intrusions into airspace
Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 10–20 aircraft): Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each
base as a standard procedure
*When an earthquake of seismic intensity five-upper or higher occurs, the mission of standby aircraft will be diverted to information collecting

f. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Snow sent to coordinate closely with local governments in up
In February 2018, Awara City , Echizen City and Eiheiji to 74 locations to save lives, rescuing stranded residents,
Town, Yoshida District in Fukui Prefecture were hit by supplying water, providing bathing facilities, distributing
a blizzard that caused a large number of vehicles to be goods, preventing water intrusion and clearing roads.
stranded on roads. In response to a disaster relief request In the wake of the flooding disaster, in order to take all
from the Governor of Fukui Prefecture, a lifesaving possible measures for disaster relief operations, SDF
and snow-clearing mission was conducted. Some 4,960 Ready Reserve Personnel were called up for the third
personnel were dispatched along with some 820 vehicles, time following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
Chapter 1
rescuing some 1,190 trapped vehicles, providing 6,750 and the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake with approximately
meals, clearing around 31.8 km of road and supplying 300 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaging in daily
some 15,320 liters of fuel. support of survivors at its peak. This mission involved
g. Disaster Relief to Save Lives after Landslide approximately 31,500 personnel, 25 boats and 38 aircraft.
In April 2018, Yabakei-cho in Nakatsu City, Oita In total, 2,265 people were rescued, 3,035 tons of water
Prefecture was struck by a landslide. Houses were buried were supplied and 13,008 people were provided with
in mud and residents were missing, feared dead. In bathing facilities (as of July 11, 2018).
response to a disaster relief request from the Governor See Fig. III-1-2-15 (Record of Disaster Relief (FY2017)); Reference
of Oita Prefecture, a lifesaving mission was dispatched. 38 (Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years))
Some 3,250 personnel were deployed, along with some (2) Transportation of Emergency Patients
845 vehicles and two aircraft. The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients
h. Disaster Relief for Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient
In June 2018, an earthquake (magnitude 6.1) hit medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients).
northern Osaka Prefecture, resulting in water supply In FY2017, out of a total of 501 cases of disaster relief,
interruptions in Suita, Mino, Takatsuki and Ibaraki, 401 cases involved the transportation of emergency
Osaka Prefecture. In response to a disaster relief request patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as
from the Governor of Osaka Prefecture, relief water the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima
supply and showering facilities were provided. The Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote
mission involved some 1,145 personnel, around 280 islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority
water trailers and 12 aircraft. of such cases.
i. Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon
Disaster requests by the Japan Coast Guard on such occasions as
In July 2018, record levels of rain fell across a wide swath transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating
of Japan from east to west, causing rivers to breach their areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of
banks and multiple large scale flooding and landslide other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons
events. In response to disaster relief requests from including a short flight range; emergencies of vessels due
the governors of Kyoto Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing.
Okayama Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, Yamaguchi Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical
Prefecture, Kochi Prefecture, Ehime Prefecture and transport operations for serious-case patients, by the
Fukuoka Prefecture, around 300 liaison officers were ASDF transport aircraft C-130H utilizing its mobile
GSDF working on the establishment of bathing facilities after the earthquake with an epicenter in GSDF conducting search and rescue activities in the heavy rainfall disaster in July 2018
northern Osaka (June 2018) (July 2018)

VOICE Rescue activities for people isolated in Fukuoka Prefecture COLUMN

5th Engineer Brigade, 9th Engineer Group (Construction) (Ogori, Fukuoka),
9th Engineer Group (Construction) Commander, Colonel Shinya Yamamoto
Our 9th Engineer Group (Construction) handles disaster relief in

Asakura City and Toho Village in Fukuoka Prefecture. This area is
located on the Chikugo River, which is known for its extensive water
Chapter 1
volume, and has Mount Sangun in the background. While it is rich in

natural beauty, water damage has often occurred.
A heavy rainfall and flood warning had been issued for the area
because of concentrated rain from the morning hours on July 5,
2017 (Wednesday). The Governor of Fukuoka Prefecture submitted

a disaster relief request to the 4th Division Commander at about
7 pm. I proceeded to Haki Branch Office of Asakura City with police
guidance and dispatched a company to rescue people at Matsumoto Activity in Toho Village (Asakura, Fukuoka) (July 2017)
Elementary School and other isolated facilities following coordination
with local personnel.
In Toho Village, meanwhile, lack of road access prevented the liaison team from arriving at the Toho Village Office. Without any
related information, I led the main body of the group in advancing to the area. We cleared the road using the group’s own construction
equipment while moving forward and arrived at Toho Village Office early in the morning on July 6 (Thursday).
Our first action was saving the lives of people trapped in homes destroyed by debris flow in the Iwaya area. I still remember my
exuberance in hearing the report of having saved parents and children trapped in debris with the guidance of employees at Toho
Village Office. Throughout this disaster relief, I was alongside the village mayor, reviewing requests and sending orders to the various
units based on damage information.
We achieved our mission thanks to a spirit of putting victims first and conducting activities in an integrated manner with local
public officials, police officers, and firefighters. I am hoping for a prompt recovery by the area.
VOICE Disaster relief for heavy snowfall in Fukui Prefecture COLUMN

14th Infantry Regiment (Kanazawa, Ishikawa),
Heavy Mortar Company Firing Officer, First Lieutenant Jun Mihara
I participated in disaster relief related to heavy snowfall in northern

Fukui Prefecture as a team leader.
I provided instructions on dispatch preparations for the dispatch
request and immediately proceeded to the area with team members
after receiving the request. Amid steady snowfall totaling about
50 cm a day, we manually removed snow from around each vehicle
with shovels throughout the night so that snow removal trucks could
operate.
Despite these difficult conditions, we successfully carried out our
mission utilizing physical and mental resilience and company cohesion
Team members removing snow (February 2018)
cultivated in our daily training.
I personally reinforced my sense of the importance of physical and
mental preparations, daily training, and cohesiveness with team members in responding immediately to and completing various duties.
I intend to continue working together with other team members in our missions in order to fulfill the expectations of local residents.

Fig. III-1-2-15 Record of Disaster Relief (FY2017)
Total Total Total Total

Number of
Description number of number of number of number of
dispatches
personnel vehicles aircraft vessels
Responses to
storm, flood,
5 6,115 1,026 20 0
and earthquake
disasters
Transporting
emergency 401 2,007 12 413 0
patients
Chapter 1
Search and
16 1,927 173 44 7
rescue
Assisting
66 11,072 1,343 295 0
firefighting
Other 13 2,717 786 20 32
ASDF 1st Tactical Airlift Group in training for medical responses in case of large-scale
Total 501 23,838 3,340 792 39 earthquakes (July 2017)
Kumamoto Approx. Approx.
— 169 0
Earthquake 81,950 7,140
*Disaster relief for the Kumamoto Earthquake is excluded from the FY2017 record.
Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan to respond
to such earthquakes.
medical units in certain occasions.
Furthermore, in FY2017, the SDF carried out (5) Exercises Involving the SDF
66 dispatches of firefighting support, with 55 cases In order to respond to large-scale and various other
responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities. disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF
carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also
(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized
In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has by the Japanese Government or local governments and is
formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and
The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster agencies, and local governments.
prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)
local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the From June to July 2016, the SDF conducted a command
effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan post exercise and a tabletop exercise in preparation for
and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in the predicted Nankai Trough earthquake to enhance the
a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October SDF’s earthquake response capability.
2014, SDF personnel (5 personnel as of April 1, 2018) b. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster
were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section Response Exercise with U.S. Forces
in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet In November 2017, joint exercises were held with U.S.
Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of Forces stationed in Japan in the scenario of a Nankai
nuclear disaster response capabilities. Trench earthquake. The purpose of the exercise was
to maintain and enhance earthquake disaster handling
(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters capabilities in collaboration between the SDF and U.S.
Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters forces and to strengthen cooperation with relevant
in the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the local authorities.
MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift c. Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX)
transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units In September 2017, the SDF participated in a general
in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing disaster prevention training planned and organized
posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/ by Okinawa Prefecture and conducted a field training
SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a well-prepared exercise to deal with sudden large-scale disasters in a
condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/ remote island to maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s
SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from ability to respond to disasters in remote islands and
the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. strengthen collaboration with relevant local authorities.
The MOD/SDF is in the process of formulating d. Other
various contingency plans for responses to large-scale The SDF worked to enhance their earthquake response
earthquakes, which are under consideration at the capability, for example, by conducting the Nankai Rescue
Central Disaster Management Council, based on the 29, an exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake

along the Nankai trough implemented by the GSDF Middle mutual exchange between administrative officials of
Army in June 2017, and “Big Rescue Azuma 2017,” an both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural
exercise in preparation for the same predicted earthquake Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF
implemented by the GSDF Eastern Army in the same month. personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in
They also took part in the Ministry of Defense accordance with requests from local governments. As of the
Disaster Management Headquarters drill, drills held by end of March 2018, as many as 432 retired SDF personnel
the Government Disaster Management Headquarters on are working in disaster prevention and other sections in
Disaster Prevention Day, and more.37 291 local governments in 45 prefectures throughout the
Chapter 1
country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very

(6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other effective way of strengthening collaboration between
Relevant Organizations the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy
It is important for the SDF to strengthen collaboration was confirmed through the experiences of the Great East
with local governments and other relevant organizations Japan Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each
under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting GSDF regional Army establishes a forum for interaction
disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF with senior directors for crisis management and other
implements various measures including: (1) Establishment officials from local governments and share information
of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and and exchange opinions to strengthen collaboration with
Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF those local governments.
Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment See Reference 65 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed
of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local
Government)
prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and
9 Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.
In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other out constantly. From September to October 2017, the
emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas
SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and was conducted in Djibouti with the aim of enhancing
other people overseas upon request from the Minister overseas deployment and activity capabilities and
for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport strengthening cooperation between the SDF and the
Japanese nationals overseas, etc. and upon subsequent U.S. Forces. Furthermore, in December 2017, the SDF
consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article carried out an exercise in Japan for the rescue of Japanese
84-3 (rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article nationals overseas to practice the whole process of the
84-4 (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the
SDF Law. For prompt and, appropriate implementation
of these activities regarding Japanese nationals overseas,
the SDF is prepared to dispatch its units swiftly.
Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness,
with the GSDF designating a helicopter unit and leading
transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels
such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft),
and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel
for dispatch.
Since the rescue and transport of Japanese nationals
overseas require close coordination among the GSDF,
ASDF personnel carrying out confirmation tasks during training for the rescue Japanese
MSDF and ASDF, exercises for this operation are carried nationals overseas (Thailand) (February 2018)
37 In addition, the following drills were conducted and participated in, in 2017: 1) government tabletop drills, 2) the Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, 3) the large tsunami disaster prevention
drill, 4) the drill for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake, 5) a drill related to the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Nine Prefectural and City Governments, 6)
a drill related to the joint disaster drill among the Kinki prefectures, 7) a drill related to the Nankai Trough Massive Earthquake Countermeasure Tokai Block Council Joint Disaster Simulation Drill,
8) a drill related to the Nankai Trough Massive Earthquake Countermeasure Kyushu Block Council Joint Disaster Simulation Drill, and 9) comprehensive disaster prevention drills conducted by
local governments or other bodies.

actions and coordination with related organizations for the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10
the rescue in order to enhance integrated operational Japanese evacuated to Kuwait by an ASDF C-130H
capabilities and strengthen coordination with related plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government
organizations. In January and February 2018, the MOD/ aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals
SDF also took the opportunity of the annual multilateral and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan
joint exercise “Cobra Gold” taking place in Thailand following the kidnapping in Algeria.
to conduct an exercise for the series of activities to With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka,
protect Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of
Chapter 1
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Japanese victims (seven nationals), their families, and
Embassy in Thailand. The staff of the embassy and their other involved parties were transported to Japan. In relation
family members participated in the exercise as well the to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July
collaboration between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H
Foreign Affairs was strengthened through this exercise. transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti.
The MOD/SDF have conducted the transportation See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-6 Rescue and Transportation of
of Japanese nationals in four cases. Responding to Japanese Nationals Overseas
10 Readiness against Invasion
The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops.
against land invasions involving the mobilization of large Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy
ground forces, which was expected primarily during the aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory,
Cold War, will be retained. prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and
In the event of a military attack on Japan, the preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory
SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to
operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the
air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting continuation of their aerial attack difficult.
waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the See Fig. III-1-2-16 (Example of Air Defense Operations)
land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime
communication, based on the characteristic of their
purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces 2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters
Surrounding Japan
will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and
deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an
SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers.
In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable
1 Air Defense Operations massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our
defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan
Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around
surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,38 our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense
it is expected that Japan will be repeatedly hit by rapid above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters
and surprise aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the around our country by combining these multiple operations,
case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and
Operations for aerial defense39 can be categorized into depleting their combat capabilities.
comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by See Fig. III-1-2-17 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea
the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by Areas Surrounding Japan)
38 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.
39 A special characteristic of aerial defense operations is that initial response is critical and can influence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response
on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the outset of operations.

Fig. III-1-2-16 Example of Air Defense Operations
Interception
order
Detect
Airborne Warning
and Control System
(AWACS) 1
Destroy Combat air patrol
(CAP) 2
Aerial refueling/transport
Intercept aircraft (KC-767)
Chapter 1
Detect
Warning and
Detect Destroy control radar
Destroy Cruise missile launched by an enemy
Scrambing fighters Intercept
Identification of
friend or foe
Flow of air defense operations
Intercept
Destroy
Identify
Detect
Interception
order Air Defense Direction Center (DC)
Air wing command post
Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense
ground environments
2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft
Fig. III-1-2-17 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan
Airborne warning and

control system
Anti-air warfare Fighters
Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Air defense in Enemy aircraft

the surrounding waters
Response in the main channel
Enemy surface
vessels
Anti-surface
Mine deployment warfare warfare
Patrol helicopter
Surface-to-ship Aegis-equipped destroyer

missile Response in the waters
Fixed-wing patrol aircraft
Minesweeper
Anti-mine warfare
Anti-submarine warfare
Response in coastal waters Submarine Enemy submarine

Fig. III-1-2-18 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces
Mobile of troops
Fighters
Response in coastal waters Assault

helicopter
Surface-to-ship missile Surface ship
Chapter 1
Unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft
Surface-to-air missile
Response in sea waters
Response to enemy
heliborne units
Mobile Combat
Vehicles
Surface-to-air
missile
Surveillance radar
Tank
Response in sea waters
Armored Artillery
vehicle
Response in urban areas
Response to enemy
airborne unit
Guiding evacuees
3 Operations Protecting the Land

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime
Transportation
In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries
are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much
the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne of its resources and food, making maritime transportation
troops from the air. routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our
For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country
be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation
they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous
or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come
we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our and assist in the defense of Japan.
enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime
as much as possible and attack them at an early stage. transportation, the SDF combines various operations
See Fig. III-1-2-18 (Example of Operations for Coping with the such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine
Landing of Invading Forces) operations to patrol,40 defend SDF ships, and protect
straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes41 to directly
defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air
operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation
routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from
fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.
40 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.
41 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

11 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians
ministries and agencies and with the participation of

1 Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and local governments and others. They also participate
the Role of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF
and cooperate in civilian protection exercises held
In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection by other ministries, agencies and local governments.
Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for As an example, in November 2017, the central
the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of government (the Cabinet Office and the Fire and
Chapter 1
armed attack: 1) a land invasion, 2) an attack by guerrillas Disaster Management Agency) and local governments
or special forces, 3) a ballistic missile attack, 4) an air (Nagasaki Prefecture and Unzen City) held a civilian
attack and points to consider in taking measures to protect protection exercise in Unzen, Nagasaki Prefecture with
civilians depending on the type of attack. the scenario of a ballistic missile launch and landing,
The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and one of the anticipated types of armed attack. The GSDF
the Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection and MSDF as well as Provincial Cooperation Office
Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Nagasaki JSDF participated in the training.
Logistics Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation See Document 39 (Participation of the Ministry of Defense and the
where Japan is under attack, the SDF would make utmost SDF in Civilian Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central
and Local Government Bodies (2017)
efforts to fulfil its basic task of repelling the attack It also
states that, within the scope of no hindrance to the task, (2) Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments
the SDF would do as much as possible to protect civilians The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are establishing
through support on evacuation and disaster relief. liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial
See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1-4 (Civil Protection) Cooperation Offices to ensure ongoing and close
collaboration with local governments and other bodies.
Civilian protection councils are also being established
Initiatives by the Ministry of Defense and the
2 SDF to Facilitate Measures for Civilian Protection in local governments for comprehensive implementation
of measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each
(1) Civilian Protection Training branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials
For sound and expeditious implementation of measures have been appointed to the councils.
to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired
on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example,
collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and they act as coordinators with the Ministry of Defense and
local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the the SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint
SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned action plans and exercises.
12 Response to Other Events
1 Military Intelligence Collection Some examples of intelligence collection methods used

by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and
For formulating defense policy accurately in response analyzing signals emanating from military communications
to the changes in the situation and for operating and electronic weapons in the air over Japanese territory;
defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various (2) collecting, interpreting, and analyzing data from various
contingencies, it is necessary to grasp mid- to long-term imagery satellites (including Information Gathering
military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and Satellite);42 (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships,
to detect the indications of those situations at an early aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing
stage. To this end, the MOD/SDF always makes efforts a variety of open source information; (5) information
to collect information swiftly and accurately by using exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and
various methods. (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés
42 Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) of the Japanese government is operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the imagery
intelligence provided by the IGS.

and other officials. and technology cooperation, and to Belgium, where NATO
As the security environment surrounding Japan has and the EU are headquartered, in view of the importance of
become increasingly severe, strengthening intelligence ensuring continued robust collaboration, cooperation and
capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important mutual security arrangements with Europe.
issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting See Fig. III-1-2-19 (Dispatched Defense Attachés)
comprehensive enhancement of its intelligence capabilities
at all stages, including collecting, analyzing, sharing, and
Initiative against Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
securing intelligence. Specifically, the MOD will move 2 Attacks
Chapter 1
forward with the high-level use of geospatial data such as
visualization of situations by fusing various information, Electromagnetic pulse attacks place an extreme burden
securing highly competent analysts by such means as on electronics by generating instantaneous powerful
integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and
enhancing the dispatch posture of defense attachés. other means leading to their malfunctioning or destruction.
In light of the changing situation in Europe, the This type of attack would impact not just the defense field
dispatch of defense attachés to Finland, which was but Japanese people’s lives in general. Led by the Cabinet
suspended in 2014, was resumed in February 2018. Secretariat, the MOD, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
In March, additional officers were dispatched to the Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
Philippines and Viet Nam, countries located on sea lanes and Tourism, and others are deliberating the necessary
vital to Japan. By the end of 2018, a new dispatch is cross-governmental countermeasures.
planned for Chile in view of the importance of collecting The MOD and the SDF will advance the multiplication
strategic information in Pacific Rim countries. Additional of the communications network required for information
attachés are also anticipated to be dispatched to Malaysia, sharing among the services, and conduct research on the
a country located on key sea lanes and with which Japan is protection of components against EMP attacks. The FY2018
increasingly engaged across a range of fields from military budget includes funding for research on a component of
exchange to capacity building support, defense equipment EMP warhead and EMP protection technology.
Fig. III-1-2-19 Dispatched Defense Attachés
Sweden Finland
Kazakhstan
Poland
Delegation of Japan Mongolia
Ukraine to the Conference on
Germany (2) Disarmament (Geneva)
Netherlands
United
Kingdom (2) Russia (3)
Belgium
*dispatch of one
additional personnel China (3)
scheduled in FY2018
Republic of Korea (3) United States (6)
France (2)
Permanent Mission
Austria Vietnam (2) of Japan
Myanmar to the United Nations
Italy (New York)
Thailand
Morocco Philippines (2)
Algeria Malaysia* dispatch of one additional personnel

scheduled in FY2018
Nigeria
Singapore
Egypt Australia (3)
Indonesia
Djibouti
Saudi Chile* scheduled to dispatch
Ethiopia Arabia India (3) for the first time in FY2018 Brazil
Kenya Turkey Pakistan [Legend]
South Africa Lebanon Afghanistan Dispatch destination

Jointly administered country
Jordan Iran
Figures in parentheses indicate the number of defense attachés dispatched.
Israel United Arab Emirates No figure indicates one dispatched defense attaché.
Kuwait As of April 1, 2018 (67 defense attachés dispatched to 45 embassies and 2 delegations of Japan)

Chapter
2 Active Promotion
of Security Cooperation
In situations where the need and potential for international on the principle of international cooperation. Specifically,
cooperation in the security and defense areas are increasing the MOD/SDF plans to enhance bilateral and multilateral
unprecedentedly, the MOD/SDF is required to actively defense cooperation and exchanges, and more actively
contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace promote the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
Chapter 2
and stability of the region and the peace, stability, and (UNPKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace
prosperity of the entire international community from the cooperation activities, and other relevant missions as
perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based avenues to address global security issues.
Active Promotion of Security Cooperation
Section 1 Towards Strategic International Defense Cooperation
1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
The peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region are Regarding the form of defense cooperation and
closely linked to the security of Japan and growing more exchanges, Japan has long strived to alleviate any
important for the international community amid global conditions of confrontation and tension and foster a
balance of power changes. While nations with large-scale collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building
military power concentrate in the region, any framework face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues
for regional security cooperation has not been sufficiently and exchanges. In addition, recognizing the increasing
institutionalized. As national political, economic and need for international cooperation, Japan has recently
social systems differ widely in the region, visions of enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional
security vary from country to country. Furthermore, there exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner
have been an increasing number of unilateral actions by appropriately combining various means including
attempting to change the status quo by coercion without joint exercises and capacity building assistance,
paying respect to existing international law. The issues defense equipment and technology cooperation, and
involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause the development of institutional frameworks such as the
concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).
freedom of navigation and overflight, and the stability In addition, multilateral regional security cooperation
of the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those
issues have become an important challenge to ensure the that focus on dialogue to cooperation that seeks to build
regional stability. regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and
Under such circumstances, strategic international multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multi-
cooperation to promote bilateral and multilateral layered, practical manner for improving the regional and
security cooperation1 and exchanges more effectively global security environment.
in consideration of the international situation and See See Reference 40 (Record of Major Multinational Security
security challenges has been growingly required for Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)); Reference
42 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly
building confidence between the relevant countries and Accepted Students in FY2016))
establishing a foundation for their cooperation to resolve Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges
regional security issues. (June 2017-June 2018)) Fig. III-2-1-2 (Security Dialogues and
Defense Exchanges)
1 On December 16, 2015, at the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense and SDF Senior Personnel, Prime Minister Abe said: “I would like you to advance strategic international defense cooperation, boldly
and without being caught up in existing ideas. By doing this, I would like you to play a part in the strategic foreign and security policies that I develop by taking a panoramic perspective of the globe.”

Towards Strategic International Defense Cooperation Section 1
Fig. III-2-1-1 Number of high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations (June 2017–June 2018)
More than 5 exchanges

More than 3 exchanges
2 exchanges
1 exchange
*NATO (3 exchanges)
Norway
Finland
Sweden Russia
United Estonia
Kingdom Belgium Latvia Canada
Germany Ukraine
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Mongolia
France
Austria
Chapter 2
Spain Serbia
Italy Montenegro United States
Jordan
Egypt Laos Republic
India of Korea
UAE Myanmar Vietnam
Bahrain Thailand
Cambodia Philippines

Sri Lanka Brunei
Djibouti Malaysia
Singapore
Brazil
Fiji
Australia
Chile
New Zealand
* “High-level” refers to Minister, State Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-Minister,
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of each SDF branch.
2 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives
Multilateral framework initiatives such as the ASEAN

Initiatives under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the 1 Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Framework
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),2 a security cooperation
framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady The ASEAN countries hold the ASEAN Defence
progress and serve as an important foundation for Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting
cooperation and exchange in the areas of security and between defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and
defense. Japan has contributed to the enhancement of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Plus) comprising the ASEAN members and eight non-
Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the ASEAN countries including Japan.3
Tokyo Defense Forum annually. The ADMM-Plus is the only official meeting of the
See See Reference 40 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region including
(Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years); Reference 41 (Situations the countries outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the
Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements); Reference 42
(Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly ADMM-Plus is highly significant from the perspective of
Accepted Students in FY2017)); Reference 43 (Multilateral encouraging the development and deepening of security
Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense); and defense cooperation in the region. The MOD/SDF
Reference 44 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)
has been participating in and providing support for the
meeting. Established under the ministerial meeting in
2 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently
comprises 26 countries and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the
regional situation and the security area. The 26 countries are the 10 ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and
Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998),
North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization member is the European Union (EU).
3 It was founded in October 2010. As the non-ASEAN countries, Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China and Russia participate in this meeting.

Fig. III-2-1-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges
Classification Type Significance Major initiatives

Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through ● Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense
Exchange
frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries
between
defense policies that are important common interests to both ● Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of
Defense Ministers
sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchanges. Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-
and high-level
Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Chief
officials
of Joint Staff, Officers at the GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Chief level
Regular Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through ● Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Deputy
consultation continuous and direct exchanges of views between national Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts
between defense defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of ● Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and
officials mutual trust and cooperation between related countries. their counterparts in foreign countries.
Bilateral Exchange Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual ● Personnel exchanges
between trust and cooperation between related countries through ● Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, and
units bilateral exercises and events for exchanges. bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations
In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening ● Mutual acceptance of students
the understanding of the other countries’ defense policies and • National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National
Exchange of
Chapter 2
the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual Defense Academy, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff College, Joint
students
trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel Staff College
exchange and establishing human networks. ● Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of ● Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for
Research
both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in
exchanges
maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges. other countries
● Dialogues at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

• Experts’ Working Groups (Maritime security, Military
medicine, Counter-terrorism, Humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, Peacekeeping operations, Humanitarian Mine
Action, Cyber security
● Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense
Japan
• Japan-ASEAN Defence Vice-Ministerial Forum
• Tokyo Defense Forum
• Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific
(MCAP)
Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of
• International Symposium on Security Affairs
situations and on security policy among related countries as
Security dialogue ● Multinational Dialogues held by Defense Authorities
well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide range of
• Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)
Multilateral multilateral issues.
• Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)
• Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)
• The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)
• Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)
• Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)
● Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors
• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)
• Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)
• Munich Security Conference
• Halifax International Security Forum
• The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)
• The Fullerton Forum
Multilateral Improving skills and contributing to enhancement of mutual ● Personnel exchanges
exercises trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and ● Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief,
and seminars seminars. minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations
the ADMM-Plus are (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior contributing to free and open seas.
Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM)-Plus, (2) ADSOM-Plus The joint declaration released by the ADMM, which
Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) Experts’ was held before the ADMM-Plus, included the promotion
Working Groups (EWGs).4 of procedures for the Standard Operating procedure
In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera (SOP) on the Multi-National Cooperation Centre
participated in the fourth ADMM-Plus, emphasizing that (MNCC) to be adopted as part of an ASEAN’s SOP.
the international community should be united to exert MNCCs aim at maximizing the effectiveness of activities
maximum pressure on North Korea to change its policy of assisting states’ militaries, and SOP on MNCC was
to dismantle all nuclear and ballistic missile problems, prepared by the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and
noting that Japan was implementing joint drills with the Disaster Relief, in which Japan and Laos served as co-
U.S. Navy in the South China Sea and other activities chairs from 2014 to 2017.
4 Japan has proactively contributed to the EWGs in 2017, participating in the EWG on Humanitarian and Disaster Relief in May and September in the EWG on PKO in May and October, in the EWG on
Humanitarian Mine Action in May and October, in the EWG on Cyber Security in July and November, in the EWG on Maritime Security in November, and in the EWG on Military Medicine in December.

See See Fig. III-2-1-3 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the Organizational Chart and Overview of
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)) Fig. III-2-1-3 the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus)
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ <Participating countries>

2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia,
• Held annually United States
Regarding the ARF, in which mainly by diplomatic • Ministerial level
authorities are engaged, concrete efforts5 have been made
ASEAN Defence Senior
in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional Officials’ Meeting Plus
(ADSOM-Plus)
security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security,
• Held annually
and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF • Vice-Minister and Director
has been making active contributions to this forum. At General level
Experts’ Working
an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM ADSOM-Plus Working Group Group (EWG)
Chapter 2
on MS) that has been held since 2009,6 for example, • Held annually
Japan has taken leadership in formulating a collection of • Director level
best practices concerning support for capacity building Overview of Experts’ Working Group (EWG)
in the field of maritime security. In the field of disaster Establishing EWGs in the seven specific regional security fields
Co-chaired with non-ASEAN countries
relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and Promoting information sharing, workshops and seminars, and multinational joint exercises

Submitting recommendations and reports
aircraft to ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx)
EWGs
conducted since 2009. (1) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(2) Maritime security
(3) Military medicine
(4) Counter-terrorism
Multilateral Security Dialogues Sponsored by (5) Peacekeeping operations
3 MOD/SDF (6) Humanitarian mine action
(7) Cyber Security
(1) ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting

and Vientiane Vision
Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the
ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December
2013, the first ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal
Meeting took place in Bagan, Myanmar, in November
2014. This meeting, in which opinions were exchanged
on cooperation in non-traditional security areas such
as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity Chief of Joint Staff of Japan participating in the Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief-of-staff-level meeting
(October 2017)
bringing defense ministers from Japan and the ASEAN
member states together for the first time in the history of
nearly 50 years of friendship and cooperation between
Japan and ASEAN. This marked an important first step
towards strengthening bilateral defense cooperation in
the future.
In November 2016, the second ASEAN-Japan
Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting was held in
Vientiane, Laos. At that meeting, then Defense
Minister Inada proposed Japan’s own initiative called
the “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation
Initiative with ASEAN” as a guideline for Japan-
ASEAN defense cooperation, which was welcomed by GSDF Chief of Staff participating in the 10th Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)
all ASEAN member states. At the third ASEAN-Japan (September 2017)
5 In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF
Defense Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting.
6 In 2011, Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand co-hosted the third ISM on MS in Tokyo. In 2017, Japan, the Philippines and the United States co-hosted the ninth one in Tokyo.

MSDF Chief of Staff and Navy Chiefs of Staff from G7 countries participating in the Regional Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs participated as a chair in the 9th ASEAN
Seapower Symposium (October 2017) Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum held in Fukuoka (the sixth person from the left)
Chapter 2
(September 2017)
security; and (3) Coping with increasingly diversifying

and complex security issues.
Based on the vision, Japan has promoted practical
defense cooperation with ASEAN by combining diverse

measures including: (1) promotion of international
law to share understanding and experience regarding
international law, (2) capacity building assistance,
(3) defense equipment and technology cooperation,
(4) joint training and exercises, and (5) human resource
development and academic exchange. In June 2017, as
the first Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation programs,
ASDF Chief of Staff holding a meeting with Air Martial Davies, Chief of Air Force, Royal Australian Japan implemented the Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider
Air Force (September 2017)
Cooperation Program7 on Destroyers Izumo and
Sazanami combining on-board training and seminars on
Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting that took place maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
on the sidelines of the fourth ADMM-Plus meeting in relief (HA/DR) and the Japan-ASEAN Joint Exercise for
October 2017, Japan and ASEAN shared the recognition Rescue (JXR) Observation Program, inviting participants
that Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation has become from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.
even more important as regional security has become In August and September 2017, Japan conducted a
diverse and complex. ASEAN welcomed and supported program which included a briefing at the Cabinet Office,
the “Vientiane Vision,” and Japan and ASEAN agreed a visit to the sight of the joint disaster prevention drills
to further promote Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation by the nine municipalities in the Kanto region,8 and a
based on the vision. tour in disaster prevention facilities in Tokyo for ASEAN
The “Vientiane Vision” is the first of its kind to embassy officials in Tokyo. In February 2018, Japan
present an overall picture of the priority areas of the invited ASEAN countries to an observer program for the
future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in Japan-U.S.-Australia Cope North Guam 2018 HA/DR
a transparent manner. Specifically, the vision that urges Exercise in Guam. In the same month, Japan conducted
that cooperation contributing to capacity building in each the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on Humanitarian
ASEAN country and the entire ASEAN give priority to Assistance and Disaster Relief, inviting participants
three points: (1) Consolidating the order based on the from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat
principles of international law; (2) Promoting maritime to promote capacity building, mutual understanding,
7 See “VOICE: My Experience from Japan-ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program” (p.376)

8 The nine local governments participating in the exercise were Saitama Prefecture, Chiba Prefecture, Tokyo Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama City, Kawasaki City, Chiba City, Saitama City
and Sagamihara City.

the development of human networks through seminars In addition, since 2001, the MOD has invited to
on Japan’s responses to experiences with large-scale Japan key figures who are primarily involved in security
disasters, and visits to SDF units. policy from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the
See See Reference 45 (Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense objective of promoting their understanding of Japan’s
Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN) security and defense policy as well as the current status
of the SDF.
(2) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum
Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan- 4 Others
ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum for the purpose
of strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships (1) International Conferences Hosted by International
through the development of human networks between Organizations
Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials. State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attended the United
Chapter 2
In September 2017, the MOD held the ninth Japan- Nations Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference
ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Fukuoka, in held in Vancouver in November 2017 and delivered a
which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN speech as representative of Japan that co-sponsored the
countries and the ASEAN Secretariat participated to conference. In the speech, he noted that Japan would make
exchange their views on three themes: (1) ASEAN further contributions to the United Nations Project for

at its 50th Anniversary: Achievements and Further African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities
Enhancement of Unity, (2) Regional Security Situations, and promote initiatives to increase women participants in
and (3) The "Vientiane Vision": Current Status and UN PKO forces.
Prospects. The Japanese and ASEAN participants See See Chapter 3 Section 2 (Initiatives to Support UN Peacekeeping
recognized various regional common issues such as the Operations, etc.)
situation of the Korean Peninsula and the situation in the

East and South China Sea, and agreed that it is important (2) International Conferences Hosted by Private
for Japan and ASEAN to respond to these challenges in Organizations
the closest cooperation International conferences on security include not only
inter-governmental conferences but also meetings
(3) Tokyo Defense Forum, etc. organized by private organizations in which various
The MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum people such as government officials, scholars, and
(Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 for senior journalists participate to discuss medium- to long-
officials in charge of defense policy (Director-General term security issues. Major international conferences
level officials and general-level officers) from the organized by private bodies include the Asia Security
countries in the region to discuss defense policies of the Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)9 hosted by International
participating countries and confidence-building measures Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Munich
in the field of defense. Security Conference,10 one of the most prestigious
The 22nd Asia-Pacific Defense Forum was held meetings on security in Europe and the United States.
in March 2018 with the participation of 26 Asia- Japan’s Foreign Minister Kono and State Minister of
Pacific countries, the United Kingdom, France, the Defense Yamamoto attended the 54th Munich Security
ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the Conference held in February 2018. In addition to dozens
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for of ministers such as foreign and defense ministers from
a broad range of discussions on (1) “Situation of the the U.S., the U.K., France, and Russia, heads of more
Korean Peninsula,” (2) “Responses to Various Crises,” than 10 international organizations participated in the
and (3) “Promotion of Mutual Confidence between conference to discuss security in Europe, cyber security,
Defense Authorities: Communication and Transparency.” nuclear security and other topics.
9 This is a multilateral conference sponsored by the IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues
and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place.
10 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual
participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and key executives of
international organizations.

At the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, The MSDF Chief of Staff attended the Regional
Defense Minister Onodera delivered a speech at the Seapower Symposium sponsored by the Italian Navy
second plenary session on “De-escalating the North in October 2017. Along with the U.S. Chief of Naval
Korean Crisis,” introducing Japan’s efforts to resolve Operations and the First Sea Lord of the British Royal
the issue of North Korea as well as expressing Japan’s Navy, the MSDF Chief of Staff publicized the importance
determination in working towards long-term stability and of cooperation through capacity-building support and
development at the Indo-Pacific region. The Minister also Japan’s maritime security initiatives. As naval chiefs
held bilateral and trilateral meetings with participants from the Group of Seven industrialized countries joined
from other countries, exchanging opinions on the regional the symposium, the MSDF Chief of Staff held talks with
situations including the ones in North Korea, East and his counterparts from other countries to discuss and share
South China Sea and defense cooperation among others, the recognition of what the naval branch should do to
and confirming the measures for strengthening future maintain maritime order based on the rule of law.
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cooperation with those countries. The ASDF Chief of Staff attended the Air Power
Conference and the Royal International Air Tattoo
(3) Service-to-Service Exchange Initiatives air show sponsored by the British Royal Navy at the
In October 2017, the Chief of Joint Staff participated invitation of the British Chief of Air Staff, attempting to
in a Japan-U.S.-ROK chief of defense conference, enhance bilateral air force relationship through talks on
agreeing with his counterparts to continue cooperation in regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges,
addressing common security issues to enhance regional and other topics. In September 2017, the ASDF Chief
peace and stability. of Staff visited Hawaii to attend the Pacific Air Chiefs
The GSDF Chief of Staff participated in the 10th Symposium. At the symposium, the ASDF Chief of Staff
Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) sponsored by held a meeting with his U.S., Australian and Philippine
the U.S. Army and the ROK Army in September 2017. counterparts to deepen mutual understanding and enhance
Through the conference, the GSDF Chief of Staff held confidential relationship. The ASDF Chief of Staff also
talks with his counterparts in other Pacific countries to participated in the Singapore Air Show in February 2018
enhance confidential relations at high levels. At Japan- and the Air Power Conference, a symposium sponsored
ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK talks, particularly, the by the Australian Air Force, in March 2018, holding talks
GSDF Chief of Staff confirmed the need for enhancing with his counterparts from other participating countries
cooperation between Japanese and ROK army branches to enhance bilateral relations.
to secure regional peace and stability.
3 Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives
The security environment surrounding Japan has become

Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity
increasingly severe. As any country cannot maintain its 1 Building Assistance
peace and stability on its own, it is indispensable for
the international community to unite to resolve global (1) Objectives of Implementing Capacity Building
issues. Under such a circumstance, capacity building Assistance
assistance especially in the security and defense-related Providing assistance for capacity building has the
areas is increasingly becoming important. For this following objectives: (1) enabling recipient countries to
reason, defense authorities of Southeast Asian and other contribute to improving the global security environment;
countries request the MOD to provide capacity building (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with recipient
assistance and express expectation for cooperation at countries; (3) strengthening the relationships with other
various opportunities such as international conferences donor countries such as the United States and Australia;
and bilateral meetings. The MOD/SDF is working to and (4) promoting Japan’s efforts to work proactively
further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and and independently to realize regional peace and stability
exchanges by combining capacity building assistance and to gain trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole.
other diverse practical means. Capacity building assistance initiatives also facilitate the
improvement of SDF capabilities.

KEY WORD
Capacity building assistance

Capacity building assistance is designed to proactively create regional
stability and improve the global security environment by enhancing the
capacity of recipient countries through continuous human resource
development and technical assistance in security and defense
fields on a regular basis. In the security and defense fields such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the disposal of landmines
and unexploded ordnances, military medicine, maritime security, and
UN peacekeeping operations, particularly, the MOD/SDF provides
support to armed forces and military-related organizations of other
countries by utilizing its own capabilities.
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ASDF personnel providing capacity building assistance (in the area of cyber security) in Vietnam
(December 2017)
(2) Specific Activities

Japan launched capacity building assistance programs in maintenance, training of Papua New Guinea personnel
2012 to provide assistance in various areas such as HA/ for a military band, training of Uzbekistani personnel

DR, peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and for military medicine, and training of personnel from all
international law to 15 countries and one organization ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat for the
mainly in the Asia-Pacific region. HA/DR area.
See See Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent Capacity Building Assistance From January to March and from October to
Initiatives) and Fig. III-2-1-5 (Past Capacity Building Assistance December in 2017, the MOD/SDF implemented a program
Activities)
for supporting the enhancement of disaster response
MOD/SDF capacity building assistance activities capacity for Djibouti forces, including education on
include the dispatch of MOD/SDF officials to foreign how to operate engineering equipment such as hydraulic
countries for long- to short-term programs. Long-term shovels, graders, and dozers, in order to strengthen the
dispatches include lectures and practical training for bilateral relationship.
large-scale systematic human resources development.
Short-term dispatches include seminar lectures by SDF (3) Cooperation with Partner Countries
personnel with relevant knowledge. In addition, the In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment,
MOD/SDF invites foreign officials to Japan to observe Japan’s cooperation with other donor countries is essential.
and experience SDF education and training operations. In particular, Japan’s capacity building cooperation with
Under long-term dispatch programs, the MOD/SDF the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom is
has provided technical assistance regarding engineering considered a priority.
activities such as road construction in Mongolia, which The joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security
builds on previous assistance, engineering assistance Consultative Committee (SCC) in April 2015 states that
for the Harii Hamutuk training program sponsored by the two countries would strengthen their continued close
Australian forces in Timor-Leste, and support for a coordination on cooperation including capacity building
military band from January to March 2018 in Papua New assistance to realize peace, stability, and prosperity in the
Guinea, which is serving as the chair of the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, at a Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 2018. Meeting in October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera
Short-term dispatch programs included human expressed that Japan would proceed with capacity
resource development seminars on air rescue, aviation building initiatives for ASEAN based on the Vientiane
medicine and cyber security areas in Vietnam, land Vision. The two ministers then agreed to promote defense
survey in Cambodia, seminars and practical trainings cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, including
for HA/DR and aviation meteorology areas in Myanmar, capacity building assistance.
support for the military band in Papua New Guinea, HA/ Under a Japan-Australia personnel exchange
DR in Malaysia, and in Laos, and seminars for search and program, the MOD has accepted an official from the
rescue in Sri Lanka. Australian Department of Defense to its International
Under the invitation program, the MOD/SDF Policy Division’s Capacity Building Office each for three
implemented training of Philippine personnel for ship periods: from July to September 2013, from February

Fig. III-2-1-4 Recent Implementation of the Capacity Building Assistance (April 2017 – June 2018)
Uzbekistan Myanmar Mongolia Laos Vietnam ASEAN
Military medicine Aviation meteorology Civil engineering Humanitarian assistance Aviation medicine care, air rescue, Humanitarian assistance
humanitarian assistance military medicine and disaster relief cyber security and disaster relief
and disaster relief
Thailand Philippines
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Vessel maintenance, medical

Aviation safety and engineering
PKO program (*)
Djibouti Brunei
Disaster response Humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief,
search and rescue
Cambodia Sri Lanka Malaysia Indonesia Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea
Civil engineering Search and rescue Humanitarian assistance International law of the sea Vehicle maintenance, Military band development
and disaster relief civil
engineering (*)
*Includes collaborative projects with other countries providing assistance
2015 to August 2016, and from August 2016 to June terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance and
2018. In exchange, the MOD dispatched an official to disaster relief, promotion of quality infrastructure, gender
the Australian Department of Defense each for three equality, and demining.
periods: three months from July 2015, one year from It is important for Japan and other countries providing
August 2016, and an ongoing period from April 2016. capacity building assistance to conduct such assistance
In November 2017, Japan and Australia held the first effectively and efficiently by closely coordinating with
working group on capacity building assistance. and mutually complementing each other.
Japan has also cooperated with the United States and
Australia in capacity building assistance to Timor-Leste. 2 Pacific Partnership
The SDF and the U.S. forces participated in the Harii
Hamutuk capacity building assistance program sponsored The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is
by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste in October in an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from
2015, 2016 and 2017, providing technical guidance on the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region
engineering including construction for engineering units to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities,
of the Timor-Leste forces. and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation
In the joint statement issued for the third Japan-UK between countries participating in the initiative and
Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting in December facilitate international peace cooperation activities
2017, Japan and the United Kingdom welcomed progress through cooperation with governments, military forces,
of coordination of capacity building in developing international organizations, and NGOs in those countries.
countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East Japan has sent SDF medical personnel and units
and Africa, and shared the view to use a coordination under the Pacific Partnership since 2007. In 2018, Japan
mechanism for future joint capacity building in strategic dispatched medical personnel to Micronesia, Palau
priorities such as maritime security and safety, counter- and Sri Lanka, and a lecturer to the Women, Peace and

Fig. III-2-1-5 Past Capacity Building Assistance Activities
Country FY 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Military medicine Military medicine
Mongolia Civil engineering
Underwater
Underwater medicine
medicine
PKO PKO
Aviation safety
Humanitarian
assistance and
Vietnam disaster relief
International
aviation law
Aviation medicine
Air rescue
Chapter 2
Cyber security
Vehicle maintenance
Timor-Leste Civil engineering
Cambodia Civil engineering
Oceanography Oceanography

International
Indonesia aviation law
International law of the sea
Humanitarian
assistance and
Papua New Guinea disaster relief
Military band development
Underwater medicine
Aviation meteorology
Myanmar Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
International
aviation law
Humanitarian
assistance and
disaster relief
International
Philippines aviation law
Military medicine Military medicine
Vessel maintenance
Humanitarian
assistance and
ASEAN countries
disaster relief
International
aviation law
Malaysia Humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief
Laos Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
International
aviation law
Thailand
Aviation safety
Djibouti Disaster response
Kazakhstan Military medicine
Uzbekistan Military medicine
Humanitarian
assistance and
Brunei disaster relief,
search and rescue
Note: : Japan’s own projects, : Projects implemented in cooperation with other countries providing assistance, Green letters: ASEAN member states

Security (WPS) international engagement conference (2) Initiatives for Multilateral Joint Exercises
in Indonesia. It also sent the Osumi transport ship and a. Participation in and Hosting of Multilateral Joint
medical personnel to Vietnam for search and rescue Exercises
training and cultural exchange. The GSDF participated in the Khaan Quest multilateral
exercise in Mongolia in July 2017 and the Kamandag 2017
3 Multilateral Joint Training U.S.-Philippine joint exercise implemented the U.S. and
Philippine marines in the Philippines in September 2017.
(1) Significance of Multilateral Joint Training in the In June 2017, the MSDF implemented the first Pacific
Asia-Pacific Region Guardian multilateral joint exercise with the Canadian and
In the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively New Zealand navies in waters south of Japan’s Shikoku
participated in multilateral joint training in non-traditional Island. In July 2017, the MSDF implemented the Japan-
security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant U.S.-India Malabar 2017 exercise in waters east of India,
Chapter 2
Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional sponsoring the annual trilateral naval drill for the first time.
training conducted in preparation for combat situations. In November 2017, the MSDF conducted a joint exercise
It is important to participate in such multilateral training with the U.S. and Indian navies in the Sea of Japan.
so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also In December 2017, the ASDF took part in the
to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. Christmas Drop Japan-U.S.-Australia joint humanitarian
In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to assistance and disaster relief exercise in the Federal
continue to actively engage in such training. States of Micronesia.
See See Reference 46 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last
Three Years))
VOICE Working as an Australian Department of Defence Exchange COLUMN

Official in the Japan Ministry of Defence
Daniel Golding, Exchange Official, Capacity Building Assistance Office, International Policy Division
Since August 2016, I have been working as the Australian Department of Defence Exchange Official within International Policy
Division in the Japan Ministry of Defense. I have been contributing to the planning and implementation of the JMOD’s regional capacity
building programs and engagement with security partners such as the United States and Australia. For example, I implemented a
new capacity building program to assist ASEAN member states improve their humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
capability. I also took part in coordinating the Australian Prime Minister’s visit to JGSDF Narashino Training Area and I joined the
Prime Minister’s office call with Defense Minister Onodera in January 2018. I greatly appreciate the opportunities provided through
this exchange program to contribute to the continued enhancement of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership and to work
with and learn from my JMOD and JSDF colleagues.
Briefing participants of the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR (February 2018)

b. Multilateral Tabletop Exercises, etc.

In September 2017, the SDF participated in Exercise
Equateur 2017, a multilateral exercise led by French
Armed forces stationed on New Caledonia, implementing
a multilateral command post exercise for island disaster
relief operations.
The GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation
Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002
as part of its multilateral cooperation, inviting officers from
relevant countries. In November 2017, participants from
11 countries and the United Nations World Food Program
reviewed the past MCAP results to share knowledge about U.S. and Indian liaison officers on board of JA Izumo that participated in the Exercises Malabar 2017
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humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and conducted
training for the Japan-U.S. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise
(TREX) for disaster prevention.

4 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In promoting cooperation and exchanges in the area of have built up cooperation since then through the United
security, it is necessary to strengthen them based on a Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),
combination of the most optimal means while taking into Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and
account the situations of cooperation partner countries various international disaster relief operations. When the
and their relationship with Japan. Therefore, not only Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March 2011,
comprehensive efforts within multilateral frameworks the Australian Defense Force (ADF) dispatched three
but also bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges out of its four transport aircraft to Japan to engage in
are important. a disaster relief mission. Cooperation between the two
countries has deepened and is becoming more practical.
In the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and
1 Exchanges Sudan (UNMISS), for example, Japan accepted two ADF
officers dispatched to engage in UNMISS operations
(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges from January to May 2017 into the Japanese camp.
with Australia Against the background of the deepening defense
Australia is a “Special Strategic Partner” for Japan in cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries
the Asia-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are in March 2007 announced the Japan-Australia Joint
allied with the United States and share not only universal Declaration on Security Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint
values11 but also strategic stakes and interests. In recent declaration focusing on security with a country other than
years, particularly, Japan and Australia as responsible the United States. Japan and Australia have also developed
countries in the Asia-Pacific region are strengthening the foundation for cooperation such as the Japan-Australia
mutual cooperation focused on areas such as HA/DR Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement ACSA, the
activities and cooperation in capacity building assistance. Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, and
Defense cooperation between Japan and Australia the Agreement between the Government of Japan and
started with cooperation in the United Nations Transitional the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The two countries Defense Equipment and Technology.
11 Universal values: The National Security Strategy stipulates “freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law” as universal values.

Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA,12 a new Regarding bilateral service-to-service cooperation

agreement for expanding the situations in which the and exchanges, the MSDF dispatched P-3C anti-submarine
provision of goods and services is possible was signed patrol aircraft to the Townsville Base in September
by the two countries in January 2017, followed by the 2017 to participate in Exercise Pacific Protector 2017
establishment of relevant laws and regulations. The new that Australia hosted under the Proliferation Security
agreement was concluded in light of the expansion of Initiative (PSI). In the same month, Air Marshal Gavin
cases in which the SDF and the ADF conduct operations Davies, Chief of Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force,
together due to the further advances in their defense visited Japan and agreed with the ASDF Chief of Staff
cooperation and exchanges, and the development of to form a sister squadron relationship between the two
the Legislation for Peace and Security in Japan. The countries’ aerial refueling and transport squadrons. In
agreement was approved by the National Diet in April October 2017, the MSDF conducted the Japan-Australia
2017 and put into force in September 2017. Relevant Trident joint exercise with the Australian Navy. In the
Chapter 2
domestic laws were developed then. same month, an Australian Air Force C-130J transport
Japan will continue deepening its cooperative squadron visited Japan for interaction with its ASDF
relationship with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner” counterpart squadron. In November 2017, C-2 transport
that has both intention and ability to contribute to the aircraft of the ASDF called at Australia’s Richmond Air
maintenance of peace and stability in the region jointly Force Base for a service-to-service exchange. Through
with Japan. such service-to-service cooperation and exchanges,

the two countries have tried to further promote mutual
(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation understanding and confidential relations.
and Exchanges See See This chapter’s Section 4-2 (International Initiatives
In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera held a Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction),
Reference 47 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
defense ministerial meeting with Australian Defense with Australia (Past Three Years))
Minister Payne on the occasion of the Fourth ADMM-
Plus meeting. The two ministers then agreed that Japan (3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the United
and Australia would closely cooperate in deterring States, and Australia
provocative actions by North Korea and enhance Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States
cooperation with relevant countries in regard to the South and share universal values. They cooperate closely to
China Sea situation through capacity building assistance resolve various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and
and joint exercises while securing their regional presence the international community are facing. In order to ensure
along with the United States. They also agreed to the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is
further develop Japan-Australia defense cooperation important Japan and Australia to proactively promote
and continue coordination on a bilateral agreement to trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose
reciprocally improve procedures to facilitate the two presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.
countries’ joint actions. The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum
At a Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in January (SDCF), a Director General-level meeting among the
2018, the two countries’ top leaders ordered their three countries of Japan, the United States and Australia,
respective defense ministers to pursue deeper and has met nine times since April 2007.
wider bilateral defense cooperation including further At an SDCF meeting held in October 2016, the
cooperation regarding exercises, operations, capacity three countries’ defense authorities signed a Trilateral
building, the exchange of visits between maritime/ Information Sharing Agreement to expedite their sharing
ground/air force units, defense equipment, and science of classified information for cooperative activities
and technology. regarding joint exercises and operations among the three
12 Official title: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan
and the Australian Defense Force. In addition to the activities this agreement currently applies to, the following activities and situations will also be newly subject to the agreement: (1) Internationally
coordinated operations for peace and security; (2) Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing; (3) Perilous situations; (4) Armed
attack situations, etc.; (5) Activities in situations threatening survival; (6) Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas; (7) Counter-piracy activities; (8) Elimination of mines and other
dangerous objects; and (9) Intelligence gathering activities.

Commentary Operation Christmas Drop COLUMN

Training names are often attached to joint training with other countries. The names are fundamentally based on the training
purpose and content. As the name suggests, the “Operation Christmas Drop” (official name: Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training for
humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue in the Federated States of Micronesia and other countries) is a training for dropping
supplies around Christmas (in December). Supplies (daily goods, etc.) dropped in the training are given to people living in the
Federated States of Micronesia as assistance. These goods are donations mainly gathered by the U.S. Air Force and the philanthropic
organizations in the U.S. Good providers and training participants package the items together ahead of the drop. Participating aircraft
from the various countries are named “Santa No. ???” during the training period and embark toward the destination. Additionally,
the aircraft fly at a low altitude of about 100m for the actual drop and this lets training participants see people waiting for the goods
waving from the ground. The drop hence feels like more than a simple provision of goods and truly a mission to “deliver gifts.”
Unlike training conducted at training grounds, the Operation Christmas Drop requires a decision on the drop point based on local
Chapter 2
circumstances through watching resident movements on genuine outlying islands. It is a valuable opportunity that provides training
very similar to actual mission conditions. The “Santa” mission also raises the motivation of members and contributes to significant
training results.

Team members cheering the drop’s success Inside the plane during the training mission
countries. They plan to utilize this agreement to further Japan, the United States and Australia have also
deepen their collaboration. carried out joint exercises by service branch. In May
On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, for example, the GSDF participated in the Southern
2018, Defense Minister Onodera held a Japan-U.S.- Jackaroo joint exercise with the U.S. and Australian
Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Defense forces in Australia.
Secretary Mattis and Australian Defense Minister In September 2017, the MSDF implemented a Japan-
Payne. The three ministers agreed on the importance U.S.-Australia joint exercise (an anti-submarine warfare
of maintaining free and open maritime order. They also drill) with two submarines, each from the United States
agreed to draft a strategic action agenda that would and Australia in waters south of Japan’s Honshu Island.
provide a long-term vision for trilateral cooperation In June 2017, the three countries and Canada conducted a
in the Indo-Pacific region. With regard to the regional joint cruising exercise in the South China Sea.
situation, the ministers agreed to remain united to support The ASDF participated in the Christmas Drop Japan-
for the diplomatic efforts to achieve complete, verifiable U.S.-Australia joint humanitarian assistance and disaster
and irreversible disarmament of its nuclear, chemical relief exercise in the Federal States of Micronesia.
and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs. In February 2018, the ASDF cohosted a Japan-U.S.-
They welcomed sustained international cooperation to Australia joint exercise and a trilateral humanitarian
deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate illicit activities, assistance and disaster relief exercise (Exercise Corp
such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers. In addition, they North Guam 2018) in Guam. Through these various
confirmed that they would continue to share concerns training and exercise opportunities among Japan, the
about the ongoing situation in South China Sea situation, United States and Australia, Japan continues efforts to
and underscored the shared commitment to upholding improve mutual understanding and interoperability.
lawful uses of sea, including the South China Sea.

2 Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges been accumulated. On the sidelines of the Shangri-La
Dialogue in June 2018, Defense Ministers Onodera and
(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation Song met again and welcomed positive moves toward the
and Exchanges comprehensive resolution of pending issues involving
While Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have North Korea. They also confirmed that their countries
difficult bilateral issues, it is important for them to would cooperate with the international community
advance their relations in future oriented manner, including the United States in line with the relevant United
Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging Nations Security Council resolutions to lead North Korea
complex security challenges including not only the to take further concrete actions. The ministers welcomed
nuclear and missile issue of North Korea, but also counter- steady Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchanges
terrorism measures, peacekeeping operations, responses and agreed to promote bilateral cooperation in a wide
to large-scale natural disasters, counter-piracy measures, range of areas to enhance the foundation for bilateral
Chapter 2
and maritime security. In order to effectively address such defense cooperation and exchanges.
security challenges, the two countries should carry out b. Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information
not just exchanges for increasing mutual understanding Agreement
and confidence building but also more broad-ranging Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement
concrete defense cooperation. Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by
North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and
and Exchanges shared confidential information regarding North Korea’s
a. Overview nuclear weapons and missiles via the United States. In
Since 2015, Japan’s defense cooperation and exchanges light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding
with the ROK have been implemented at various levels North Korea with its frequently repeated ballistic
including ministerial and other high levels and unit levels. missile launches and nuclear tests, Japan and the ROK
In dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile concluded the General Security of Military Information
issue, particularly, Japan should strengthen cooperation Agreement in November 2016 to further promote
with the ROK in the security and defense areas. Following bilateral cooperation. This agreement will serve as a
North Korea’s ballistic missile launches in July and framework to appropriately protect classified information
September 2017, Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial shared between the Japanese and ROK Governments and
teleconferences were carried out swiftly on July 6 and is expected to promote smoother and swifter information
September 6. The Japanese and ROK Defense Ministers exchanges between the two governments.
then agreed that the two countries should be united to See See Reference 48 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation
address the North Korean nuclear and missile issue. In and Exchanges (Past Three Years))
this respect, they gave high ratings to past Japan-ROK

and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation and agreed to continue (3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship
close cooperation. Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share common
In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera held interests pertaining to the peace and stability of this region,
talks with ROK Minister of National Defense Song it is important for the three countries to seize opportunities
Young Moo on the occasion of the Fourth ADMM-Plus to promote close cooperation in addressing various security
meeting. They reaffirmed that Japan and the ROK would issues including those regarding North Korea.
continue to closely cooperate in dealing with North Japan, the United States, and the ROK have
Korea’s nuclear and missile issue. As for bilateral defense conducted a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on
cooperation and exchanges, they agreed to steadily the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In response to
implement specific cooperation and exchange measures growing North Korean threats, however, Defense Minister
such as personnel exchanges and the exchange of ship Onodera held a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting
and aircraft visits to advance cooperation. Based on the with U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis and ROK Minister
minister-level agreement, an MSDF training squadron of National Defense Song on the occasion of the Fourth
made a port call to Pyeongtaek in October 2017 before ADMM-Plus meeting in October 2017 to share their
an ROK naval training squadron visited Yokosuka in recognition. On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue
December 2017. Including such exchange of visits, Japan- in June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera had another
ROK defense cooperation and exchanges have steadily Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Defense

Secretary Mattis and ROK Minister of National Defense been strengthening their relations in the area of security
Song, where they agreed to support diplomatic efforts for in recent years.
the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan
of the Korean Peninsula and continue enforcement of all and India have steadily deepened since October 2008
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration
They also welcomed sustained international cooperation on Security Cooperation between Japan and India.
to deter, disrupt and ultimately eliminate illicit activities Meetings and consultations at various levels such as the
such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers. ministerial and Chief of Staff levels, as well as service-
At the working level, the three countries have to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral
coordinated with each other while closely sharing exercises, have been regularly conducted. Moreover,
information through such opportunities as Director- the two countries signed the Memorandum on Japan-
General and Director level meetings, video conferences, India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges in September
Chapter 2
and chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework 2014 and saw the conclusion of the Agreement between
of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). the Government of Japan and the Government of India
For example, they implemented a Director-General level concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and
DTT video teleconference in response to North Korea’s Technology as well as the General Security of Military
nuclear and ballistic missile tests from July 2017. They Information Agreement in December 2015, further

then reaffirmed that they should continuously enhance solidifying the institutional basis of Japan-India defense
their security cooperation and coordination to deter and cooperation and exchanges. These agreements have
respond to North Korean threats and agreed to cooperate strengthened the relationship between the two partners
with other countries in continuing to exert pressure on that are capable of dealing with regional and global
North Korea to take concrete actions to terminate the issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership.
nuclear and ballistic missile program.
At the chief of staff level, the Chief of Joint Staff (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation
participated in Japan-U.S.-ROK meetings in October and Exchanges
2017 and May 2018, agreeing with his U.S. and ROK At the Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting in
counterparts to continue further cooperation on common September 2017, the two ministers reaffirmed the evolution
security issues to enhance regional peace and stability. and expansion of bilateral defense cooperation and agreed
The Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperative relationship has to pursue opportunities for the promotion of Japan-India
been transforming into a more substantive relationship. cooperation and exchanges by deepening and advancing
For example, the three countries conducted ballistic the Japan-U.S.-India exercise Malabar and by building
missile information sharing exercises in waters around on bilateral exchanges in a wide range of areas including
Japan in October and December 2017. Using various observer participation in humanitarian assistance and
opportunities, Japan, the United States and the ROK are disaster relief exercises. As for the ground service branch,
required to enhance their security cooperation in various the ministers agreed to proactively conduct exchanges in
areas in the future. the areas of peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism,
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in which
3 Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges the two countries have strong interests. Regarding the air
service branch, they reaffirmed their intentions to pursue
(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges further cooperation and exchange opportunities through
with India the bilateral exchange of aircraft visits.
India is growing more influential against a backdrop of Recent service-to-service exchanges included the
the world’s second largest population, its high economic first participation by the Chief of Staff Joint Staff in the
growth and latent economic power. Located in the center Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India in
of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East January 2018. In March 2018, the Chief of Staff Joint
and Africa, India is an extremely important country Staff visited India for talks with Admiral Sunil Lamba,
geopolitically for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee of India.
share universal values as well as common interests in They then agreed on the need for deepening Japan-India
the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world defense exchanges.
and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Japan and India have proactively conducted service-
Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have also to-service exchanges through exercises and training.

Commentary Participation in the Raisina Dialogue COLUMN

On January 18, 2018, the Chief of Staff participated in the Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum, held in India with Commander of
the United States Pacific Command Admiral Harris, Royal Australian Navy Chief Bartlet, and India Chiefs of Staff Committee Head
Lanba. This was the third Raisina Dialouge since the first meeting in 2016, though the first participation by the Ministry of Defense
and Self Defense Forces.
The forum had a session on the topic of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s Chief of Staff commented on
the importance of an open and free Indo-Pacific region and contributions by the Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces to
robust collaboration among Japan, the US, Australia, and India and the safety and stability of international society. Many attendees
understood these points.
Chapter 2
(From the left) Chief of Staff, Navy Chief Bartlet (Australia), Navy General Lanba (India),
and Admiral Harris (US) (January 2018)
Since July 2017, for example, the MSDF and the Indian
Navy conducted seven joint exercises including those
involving patrol aircraft. In December 2017, ASDF
helicopter crew members visited an Air Force Squadrons
in India.
Opportunities for Japan-U.S.-India trilateral
exercises have also increased. For example, the MSDF
implemented the Malabar 2017 exercise with the U.S.
and Indian navies in eastern waters of India in July 2017,
hosting the first annual trilateral naval drill. In November
2017, a Japan-U.S.-India joint naval exercise took place
in the Sea of Japan.
See See Reference 49 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
with India (Past Three Years)) Prime Minister Abe and President Xi Jinping at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held during the
APEC Summit Meeting (November 2017) [Photo: Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office]
4 Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in
(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation all areas, including security. In the security area, Japan
with China continues to encourage China to play a responsible,
A stable relation between Japan and China is an constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability
essential factor for the peace and stability of the Asia- and prosperity, to comply with international norms of
Pacific region. From broad and medium- to long-term behavior, and to improve transparency with regard to its
perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to advancing military capabilities in the context of its rapidly
build and enhance the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship increasing defense budget. As part of such efforts, Japan

continues defense exchanges to improve the transparency China must strive to promote confidential relations and
of Chinese military and security policies and promote mutual understanding through dialogue at various levels
measures such as the development of a framework to in various areas and must proactively step up concrete
avert or prevent unexpected incidents. cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as
counter-piracy measures.
(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges
Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the (3) “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism
Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of the between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China”
three Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, At Japan-China Summit Meetings in January and April
and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese
gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014. Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to develop a mechanism for
In November 2015, Japan-China Defense Ministerial communications, particularly maritime communications,
Chapter 2
Meeting was held for the first time in four years and five between the two countries’ defense authorities. Based
months on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting. Then on the agreement, their defense authorities held the first
Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani and Chinese Defense Joint Working Group Meeting on the mechanism in April
Minister Chang Wanquan held a frank exchange of views 2008 and accumulated talks. At the third Joint Working
regarding various issues between the two countries and Group Meeting in June 2012, they agreed on the basic

shared the recognition that it would be important for Japan objectives and composition of the mechanism.
and China to develop their defense exchanges. On the From the fourth Joint Working Group Meeting in
occasion of the ADMM-Plus meeting in October 2017, January 2015, diplomatic authorities of both countries
Defense Minister Onodera exchanged opinions with then joined the negotiations.
Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wan Quan as well. After the eighth meeting of the Japan-China High-
In March 2015, the 13th Japan-China Security Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs in December
Dialogue took place in Tokyo, with the two countries’ 2017 and the seventh Joint Working Group Meeting in
diplomatic and defense authorities participating. It was April 2018, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities
the first such meeting in four years. The 14th one came signed the memorandum13 on the mechanism in the
in Beijing in November 2016 and the 15th in Tokyo in presence of Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese
October 2017. Premier Li Keqiang on the occasion of the Japan-China
Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have also Summit Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and the operation
participated in the Japan-China High-Level Consultation of this mechanizm commenced on June 8, 2018.
on Maritime Affairs. The latest meetings of the The “Maritime and Aerial Communication
consultation included the seventh one in Fukuoka in June Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan
2017, the eighth one in Shanghai in December 2017 and and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual
the ninth one in Sendai in April 2018. understanding and confidence between Japan and China
In February 2018, Japan’s Sasakawa Peace and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, (2) to avoid
Foundation and China’s Ministry of National Defense unexpected collision, and (3) to prevent unforeseen
agreed to resume the Japan-China field-grade officer circumstances in the sea and air from developing into
exchange program for the first time in six years. In military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The
April 2018, a Chinese delegation led by Major General mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and
Ci Guowei, Deputy Chief of the Office for International expert meetings between the two countries’ defense
Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defense, authorities, (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese
paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Onodera. defense authorities, and (3) on scene communication
In efforts to build a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship measures between vessels and aircrafts of the SDF and
Based on Common Strategic Interests,” Japan and the People’s Liberation Army.
13 Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of Defense

The signing of the memorandum after a decade of Russia “2+2” Meeting, where the two countries’ defense
negotiations is an important step for promoting mutual and foreign ministers participate. At the first Japan-Russia
understanding and confidence between Japan and China “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries
and very significant for avoiding unexpected collision. agreed to conduct ground service unit exchanges and the
It is important for the mechanism to be operated in a mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis,
manner to contribute to building confidential relations and joint exercises of counter-piracy units of the MSDF
between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities. and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the
See See Reference 50 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges regular Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting.
with China (Past Three Years)) At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in December
2016, the two leaders welcomed dialogues between the
national security councils of both countries as well as
Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges
5 and Cooperation defense exchanges and agreed to continue these dialogues
Chapter 2
and exchanges going forward.

(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March
with Russia 2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding
Given that Russia is a key security player in the Asia- the regional situations among others, and agreed to
Pacific region and an important country neighboring continue conducting defense exchanges such as working-
Japan, it is very important for Japan to promote level meetings, unit-to-unit exchanges, and search and
confidential relations with Russia through bilateral rescue exercises. The Japanese side protested against
defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have the activities of the Russian Armed Forces to enhance
continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, armaments in the Far East, including the deployment of
the MOD/SDF has continuously conducted various surface-to-ship missiles on the Northern Territories and
dialogues with Russian defense authorities according to the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain
the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges the Four Northern Islands, expressing that these activities
signed in 1999 (revised in 2006), annual meetings conflicted with Japan’s stance that the Northern territory
based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of is an inherent part of the territory of Japan and were
Incidents on and over the High Seas,14 and joint search regrettable.
and rescue exercises. In part of recent major Japan-Russia military
The Government of Japan deals with the relationships exchanges, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff
with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the of the Russian Armed Forces, visited Japan and met with
solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian the SDF Chief of Joint Staff in December 2017. They
situation and other factors into account. At the same time, exchanged opinions on matters of interest to the two
it is important to maintain constant contacts with Russia, countries regarding security and agreed on the need for
as one of Japan’s neighbors, at the working level to avoid Japan-Russia defense exchanges. In November 2017,
unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. The Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian
MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner Ground Forces, visited Japan for talks with the GSDF
and advances defense exchanges with Russia accordingly. Chief of Staff, to build their confidential relations.
As for exercises and drills, the MSDF and the
(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges Russian Navy conducted a search and rescue exercise in
At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, waters off Vladivostok in November 2017.
the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding See See Reference 51 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of with Russia (Past Three Years))
security and defense and agreed to set up the Japan-
14 Official title: Japan-Russia Agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea beyond territorial waters and the air space above them

“2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the

Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with
6 ASEAN Member States first “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in December of the
same year, the two countries agreed to start negotiations
ASEAN member states continue to experience rapid on an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment
economic growth and are garnering international attention and technology, actively participate in a multilateral
for their potential as a growth center that is open to the naval exercise (Komodo 2016), and further advance
world. Such ASEAN member states and Japan have been capacity building assistance. The Joint Statement of
traditional partners with a history of exchanges and a a Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017
close economic relationship over the past nearly 50 years. confirmed the importance of continuing dialogues
ASEAN member states, located in geopolitically between their foreign and defense authorities at various
important areas occupying strategic points on Japanese levels, including the regular Japan-Indonesia “2+2”
sea lanes, are also playing an important role in ensuring Meeting and foreign and defense authorities’ meetings,
Chapter 2
the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire in order to further promote close cooperation in the
region. Therefore, it is important for Japan to strengthen security and defense fields. Similarly, at the working
cooperation in the security and defense areas and enhance level, exchanges at various levels have been carried
confidential relations with ASEAN member states. out, including consultations between the diplomatic
Based on this principle, Japan and ASEAN member and defense authorities of both countries, consultations

states have been working to foster trust and deepen between the respective defense authorities, and various
mutual understanding through high-level and working- educational and academic exchanges.
level exchanges and promoting effective cooperation Furthermore, Japan and Indonesia have also been
such as capacity building cooperation, joint exercises, cooperating through capacity building assistance
and defense equipment and technology cooperation. In in oceanography, international maritime law, and
addition to these bilateral cooperation efforts, Japan has international aviation law, and conducted the second
strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks seminar on international maritime law for the Ministry
such as the ADMM-Plus and ARF. At the second ASEAN- of Defense of Indonesia and the Indonesian Navy in
Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Laos in March 2018.
November 2016, Defense Minister Inada announced
the “Vientiane Vision” as a guideline for the Japan- (2) Vietnam
ASEAN defense cooperation going forward. The vision With Vietnam, which is a coastal country facing the South
provided an overall picture of the priority areas of the China Sea with a population of approximately 90 million,
future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in Japan has developed cooperation and exchanges between
a transparent manner for the first time and was welcomed their defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit
by all ASEAN member states. Meeting held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to
From the viewpoint of actively promoting such elevate the relationship between the two countries to an
bilateral and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” At the Japan-Vietnam
security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan Summit Meeting in May 2018, both countries confirmed
strives to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges that they would strengthen cooperation in the security
with ASEAN member states. and defense areas.
See See Section 1-2-3 (Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting
by the MOD/ SDF); Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent Implementation of in April 2018, Defense Minister Onodera and Defense
Capacity Building Assistance; Fig.III-2-1-5 (Past Capacity
Building Assistance Activities); Reference 52 (Recent Minister of Vietnam Lich signed the “Joint Vision
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation,”
(Past Three Years)) which serves as a guideline of future Japan-Vietnam
defense cooperation and exchanges. In the meeting,
(1) Indonesia concerning the regional situation, both ministers called
Indonesia conducts active defense cooperation and for self-restraint on militarization and other unilateral
exchanges with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia actions to change the status quo made in the South China
Summit Meeting in March 2015, Prime Minister Abe Sea, and agreed on the importance of the peaceful conflict
and President Joko agreed to strengthen their Strategic resolutions based on international law and the conclusion
Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and of an effective Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea at
reaffirmed their intention to hold a Japan-Indonesia an early time. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial

Meeting held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue on Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean
in June 2018, both ministers agreed to promote defense and exchanged opinions on the North Korean issue, as
cooperation and exchanges in specific areas such as well as bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation
U.N. peacekeeping operations and capacity building and exchanges.
assistance and shared the recognition of the South China As for recent major service-to-service exchanges,
Sea situation. In service-to-service exchanges between Melvyn Ong, then Chief of the Singaporean Army,
Japan and Vietnam, the GSDF Chief of Staff held talks visited Japan and held talks with the GSDF Chief of Staff
with Chief of General Staff Giang and other senior in October 2017, reaffirming that each ground service
Vietnamese military officers in Vietnam in January 2018, would work to strengthen their relationship. In November
and they agreed to cooperate in Vietnam’s participation 2017, ASDF C-2 transport aircraft visited the Paya
in the U.N. peacekeeping operations. In April 2016, an Lebar Air Base in Singapore for unit-to-unit exchange.
MSDF vessel visited the Cam Ranh Bay International In February 2018, the ASDF Chief of Staff attended the
Chapter 2
Port. In April 2017 the MSDF destroyers Izumo and Singapore Air Show and exchanged opinions with his
Sazanami participating in the multilateral exercise foreign counterparts.
“Pacific Partnership 2017” called at the Cam Ranh Bay Additionally, MSDF vessels have made port calls
International Port for medical and facility repairing in Singapore during international cooperation operations
activities deepening bilateral defense exchanges. In such as UN peacekeeping operations and counter-piracy
December 2017, an ASDF U-4 utility support aircraft flew activities. Also, service-to-service exchanges have been
to the Da Nang International Airport for an unit exchange. actively conducted.
In April 2018, Le Huy Vinh, Commander of Air Defense
and Air Force, Vietnam, visited Japan and held talks with (4) The Philippines
the ASDF Chief of Staff. They agreed to enhance the Between Japan and the Philippines, mutual visits by naval
Japan-Vietnam Service-to-Service relationship. vessels, working-level exchanges including consultations
As for capacity building assistance program to between their defense authorities, and service-to-service
Vietnam, the ASDF implemented programs on air rescue exchanges have been frequently conducted along with
in June 2017, on aviation medicine in November 2017, high-level exchanges. At the Japan-Philippines Defense
and on cybersecurity in December 2017. Ministerial Meeting held in January 2015, the two
It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation
their relationship in order to achieve more concrete, and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intention of
practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional
defense cooperation and exchanges. security areas such as maritime security, in addition
to defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial
(3) Singapore consultations on a regular basis, reciprocal visits between
In December 2009, Singapore became the first country the SDF Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the
in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense each SDF Service, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
cooperation and exchanges with Japan. Since then, Forces of the Philippines and the Commander of each
cooperative relationship is progressing steadily based service, and participation in training and exercises. At the
on the memorandum. Singapore and Japan have so far Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in November 2015,
conducted 15 regular meetings between their defense the two leaders of both countries reached a consensus
authorities. Moreover, the two countries actively conduct in principle on the agreement concerning the transfer of
high-level defense exchanges as Japan’s Minister of defense equipment and technology, which was signed in
Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by February 2016.
the IISS almost every year to explain Japan’s security At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in
policy. In May 2018, Defense Minister of Singapore Ng September 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President
Eng Hen visited Japan for a Japan-Singapore Defense Duterte agreed on the transfer of MSDF TC-90 training
Ministerial Meeting, where defense ministers of both aircraft to the Philippines in order to enhance its
countries exchanged opinions on bilateral and Japan- capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
ASEAN defense cooperation and the regional situation transportation, and maritime situational awareness. At
covering the South China Sea. In June 2018 when the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in January 2017,
Defense Minister of Japan Onodera visited Singapore to the two countries agreed that they would promote defense
attend the Shangri-La Dialogue, he paid a courtesy call cooperation in various fields such as capacity building

assistance, defense equipment cooperation, and training the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés
and exercises. and consultations between their defense authorities at an
At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting early stage. As for the acceptance of foreign students at the
in October 2017, after the transfer of two MSDF TC-90 National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first
training aircraft to the Philippine Navy, Defense Minister one to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent
Onodera announced to Defense Minister of Philippines the largest cumulative number of students to the academy.
Lorenzana that the transfer of TC-90 would be changed In November 2017, State Minister of Defense
from lease to grant. In March 2018, the remaining three Yamamoto visited Thailand, where he reviewed an
TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy at international defense equipment exhibition the “Defense
Naval Base Heracleo Alano, Sangley Point, Cavite City, and Security 2017” and agreed with the Thai side
in the presence of Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister to promote Japan-Thailand defense equipment and
of Defense Fukuda and Defense Minister of Philippines technology cooperation including an early conclusion
Chapter 2
Lorenzana. The grant of five TC-90 aircraft including the of the agreement concerning the transfer of defense
two transferred earlier was then completed. This transfer equipment and technology.
covers training for Philippine Navy pilots and maintenance Since 2005, the MOD/SDF, has been participating
support for Philippine Navy maintenance personnel. in the multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold cohosted
In June 2018, Minister Onodera had the Japan- by the United States and Thailand. In Cobra Gold 2018,

Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister in January and February 2018, an exercise for rescue of
Lorenzana on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Japanese nationals overseas was conducted in addition to
At the meeting, they exchanged opinions on the North a command post exercise. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of
Korea issue. Minister Lorenzana thanked Japan for Defense Fukuda reviewed the Cobra Gold 2018.
supporting the Philippines’ stance on the South China Concerning recent major service-to-service
Sea. Minister Onodera informed Minister Lorenzana of exchanges, MSDF destroyer Onami participated in the
Japan’s decision to grant parts of GSDF UH-1H utility 50th Anniversary of ASEAN International Fleet Review
helicopters which are no longer used in GSDF to the 2017. On this occasion, the MSDF Chief of Staff met
Philippines as requested early. The two ministers agreed with representatives from Australia, India, Malaysia,
to promote Japan-Philippines defense cooperation in a Peru, the ROK, Singapore and Vietnam to promote
wide range of areas including joint training, and defense mutual understanding and friendship. In November
equipment and technology cooperation. 2017, an ASDF C-2 transport aircraft visited the U-Tapao
As for recent service-to-service cooperation and Royal Thai Navy Airfield. In January 2018, an ASDF
exchanges, a GSDF unit participated in the U.S.- KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft called at the
Philippines joint exercise Kamandag conducted on the Don Mueang Air Force Base. Taking these opportunities,
Philippine island of Luzon in September and October ASDF had unit-to-unit exchanges with their Thai
2017. In November 2017, the MSDF Chief of Staff counterparts. In May 2018, Srisuwan, Chief of Defense
visited the Philippines for high-level exchanges including Forces, Royal Thai Armed Forces, visited Japan for talks
a meeting with Philippine Navy Commander Mercado. with State Minister of Defense Yamamoto and the Chief
In June, September and November 2017 and in February of Joint Staff. In the same month, Royal Thai Air Force
2018, MSDF aircraft and ships conducted search and Commander Air Chief Marshal Johm Rungswang, a
rescue, and other friendship exercises with the Philippine graduate from Japan’s National Defense Academy and
Navy to deepen mutual understanding and promote Air Staff College, visited Japan for having talks with
friendship. In June 2017, President Duterte became the the ASDF Chief of Staff and paying a courtesy call to
first foreign leader to board MSDF destroyer Izumo Defense Minister Onodera, and agreed with Defense
that called at the Port of Subic Bay. Japan’s defense Minister Onodera and the ASDF Chief of Staff to enhance
cooperation with the Philippines is deepening steadily. Japan-Thailand relations.
See See Chapter 4 Section 4-3 (Building New Defense Equipment As for capacity building assistance programs,
and Technology Cooperation) ASDF has implemented seminars on aviation safety
and international aviation law for Thailand since 2016.
(5) Thailand In 2018, GSDF conducted a seminar for the Royal Thai
With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense Army planning to send a unit to the United Nations
cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which covered the
good relationship between the two countries, including characteristics of the UNMISS Command, engineering

VOICE Participation in the International Fleet Review COLUMN

for the ASEAN 50th Anniversary
Destroyer Oonami (Yokosuka),
Commanding Officer, Commander Hirotaka Okumura
I participated in the International Fleet Review for the ASEAN 50th Anniversary held in Pattaya (Kingdom of Thailand) in November
2017 along with about 180 crew members and one on-board aircraft as the commanding officer of Destroyer Oonami. The
participation in the International Fleet Review and related events held with a unified crew under a slogan of “representing our country
despite being small” that showed the strength of Japan Maritime Self Defense Force to other participating countries.
The event that stood out the most to me was the city parade that took placein poor conditions with roads flooded to just
below the knee due to a sudden squall, though November is the dry season in Thailand. While the rain had stopped and water in
front of the viewing stand had pulled back when the parade began, conditions in starting point were not good and many countries
Chapter 2
proceeded carefully while closely watching their footsteps. Japan’s Oonami crew members advanced in an orderly manner and
proudly salutedthe inspector. We received praise from Thai people and other countries.
By publicly demonstrating the strength of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force at the city parade, rail manning in the fleet
review, and other unit actions as representatives of Japan, Japan obtained the trust of ASEAN countries and the US, Australia, and
other friendly countries. I am very proud and appreciative of our members.
Writer at the port entry welcome event Writer saluting the review officers (right side)
(second person from the right)
missions, security, and other matters. Through the Banh. They talked on the regional situation and gave high
seminar, the SDF shared its experiences and the lessons appreciation to progress in the Japan-Cambodia defense
learnt with the Royal Thai Army over five years of cooperation, including capacity-building assistance and
deployment to UNMISS service-to-service exchanges.
As for capacity building assistance programs to
(6) Cambodia Cambodia, GSDF has implemented practical training
In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which for road construction and other programs. In July 2017,
Japan sent an SDF unit for UN peacekeeping operations. the GSDF conducted an education program for the
As indicated by Japan’s capacity building assistance engineering unit of the Royal Cambodian Forces to train
for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense instructors on land survey.
cooperation and exchanges between the two countries
have made steady progress. At the Japan-Cambodia (7) Myanmar
Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral Japan has been promoting exchanges with Myanmar since
relationship was upgraded to “strategic partnership.” Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic
After the summit, then Defense Minister Onodera government in March 2011, including the first visit to the
signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and country by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the invitation of Myanmar to participate in multilateral
and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kingdom of conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the two
Cambodia. In September 2017, Defense Minister Onodera countries’ defense authorities held their first consultation
held a ministerial meeting with Cambodian Deputy in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyidaw, exchanged opinions
Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea on how to proceed with their future defense exchanges

and agreeing to further promote exchanges. In November capacity building assistance and agreeing with him to
2014, then Defense Minister Eto held a meeting with then promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the
Defense Minister Wai Lwin of Myanmar and confirmed two countries. In March 2018, the first Lao students at
their intention to promote defense exchanges, while Japan’s National Defense Academy graduated.
visiting Myanmar for the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial With regard to recent capacity building assistance,
Roundtable Meeting chaired by Myanmar. the GSDF provided practical training on humanitarian
In August 2017, Senior General Min Aung assistance and disaster relief for the Lao People’s Army
Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Defense engineering and medical units in November 2017.
Services, visited Japan at the invitation of the Nippon
Foundation. He paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister (9) Malaysia
Abe and met with the Chief of Joint Staff to exchange Japan signed the agreement concerning the transfer of
views on the promotion of defense cooperation and defense equipment and technology with Malaysia in
Chapter 2
other matters. Under the Japan-Myanmar Military April 2018.
Officials Exchange Program sponsored by the Nippon As for capacity building assistance programs to
Foundation since 2014, general officers in Myanmar Malaysia, GSDF implemented a seminar on humanitarian
have been invited to visit SDF facilities in Japan. In assistance and disaster relief in Malaysia in November 2017.
September 2017, 10 senior Myanmar military officials

visited Japan under the program, paying a courtesy call (10) Brunei
on Defense Minister Onodera. Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the
In part of recent major Japan-Russia military Second ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August
exchanges, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited Myanmar in 2013, then Defense Minister Onodera held talks with
January 2018 for the first time, exchanging views with Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief and exchanged views on the ADMM-Plus initiatives.
of Myanmar Defense Services, and other Myanmar At the working level, the Vice-Minister of Defense for
military officials on the regional situation, and defense International Affairs visited Brunei in February 2018 for
cooperation and exchanges. They confirmed that they talks with Permanent Secretary Rahman of the Ministry
would attempt to enhance bilateral relations. of Defense on defense cooperation and exchanges. In
As for recent capacity building assistance, the ASDF February 2018, Japan implemented capacity building
implemented support for Myanmar regarding aviation assistance programs to Brunei for humanitarian aid,
meteorology in July and October 2017. In February disaster relief, and search and rescue, which contributed
2018, the GSDF conducted a humanitarian assistance and bilateral relations.
disaster relief seminar for Myanmar.
Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Other
(8) Laos 7 Asia-Pacific Countries
Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and
Laos have made gradual progress since 2011, when the See See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level
Defense Attaché to Vietnam was appointed concurrently Exchanges (June 2017 – June 2018)); Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent
Implementation of Capacity Building Assistance; Fig. III-2-1-
as Defense Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National 5 (Past Capacity Building Assistance Activities); Reference 53
Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-
first time. In August 2013, the first Japan-Laos Defense Pacific Countries (Past Three Years))
Ministerial Meeting was held. Since 2014, Japan and Laos

have served as co-chairs of the EWG on Humanitarian (1) New Zealand
Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus With New Zealand, a memorandum on defense
meeting, while the relationship between the two cooperation and exchanges was signed in August 2013.
countries’ defense authorities has made significant strides During a Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries
through cooperation under multilateral frameworks. In agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA.
November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada became the As for recent service-to-service exchanges,
first Japanese defense minister to visit Laos, exchanging Lieutenant General Timothy Keating, Chief of the New
views with Minister of National Defense Lieutenant Zealand Defense Force, visited Japan in July 2017 for
General Chansamone regarding policies for further talks with the Chief of Joint Staff on international and
defense cooperation such as high-level exchanges and regional situations. They confirmed that Japan and New

Zealand would continue to closely cooperate. In June

2017, the New Zealand Navy’s frigate Te Kaha visited
Japan to participate in the Pacific Guardian multilateral
exercise along with Japanese and Canadian ships.
In November 2017, an ASDF C-2 transport aircraft
squadron visited Christ Church International Airport
for a unit-to-unit exchange. In May 2018, Vice-Marshal
Tony Davies, Chief of Royal New Zealand Air Force
visited Japan, agreeing with the ASDF Chief of Staff that
Japanese and New Zealand air services should enhance
their relationship.
The party of the State Minister of Defence of Sri Lanka being briefed on JS Izumo
Chapter 2
(2) Mongolia
Following the signing of a memorandum on Japan- (4) Sri Lanka
Mongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January In July 2017, Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense
2012, Japan and Mongolia have promoted high-level Ruwan Wijewardene exchanged views with then Japanese
exchanges and worked to strengthen cooperation through Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa
capacity building assistance. At the 14th Shangri-La on future defense cooperation and boarded the MSDF
Dialogue in May 2015, a Japan-Mongolia Defense destroyer Izumo that was at the Port of Colombo. When
Ministerial Meeting was held for an exchange of opinions the Sri Lankan minister visited Japan in November 2017,
regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. he paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Onodera,
At a meeting between the Japanese Chief of Joint Staff exchanging views on cooperation in the improvement
and the Mongolian Chief of Defense in October of the of maritime surveillance capabilities and in search and
same year, agreement was reached to promote security rescue operations.
cooperation in the area of peacekeeping operations. In part of recent service-to-service exchanges, the
As for major service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff during his first visit to Sri Lanka
GSDF had sent observers to the Khaan Quest multilateral met with President Sirisena, sharing the recognition of
exercise, co-hosted by the United States and Mongolia the security environment and exchanging views on the
since 2006, and has dispatched a unit to the exercise need for deepening Japan-Sri Lanka defense exchanges.
since 2015 to maintain and improve capabilities for The MSDF implemented goodwill exercises in waters
U.N. peacekeeping operations and enhance mutual close to Sri Lanka in July, August and December 2017 to
understanding and confidential relations among the deepen mutual understanding, friendship, and goodwill.
participating countries. In April 2018, the MSDF destroyer Akebono in the 30th
anti-piracy operations unit called at the Port of Hambantota,
(3) Timor-Leste providing a capacity building assistance seminar for the Sri
In June 2016, for the first time in 14 years, then Defense Lankan Navy regarding search and rescue.
Minister Nakatani visited Timor-Leste to which the SDF
had dispatched a unit for UN peacekeeping operations to
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with
support the country’s independence since 2002. Minister 8 European Countries
Nakatani and Minister Cristovão agreed that the two
countries would continue and deepen exchanges between Europe shares universal values with Japan and plays a
defense authorities through capacity building assistance, central role in working to address common challenges
the dispatch of students from Timor-Leste to Japan’s to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional
National Defense Academy and other schools, and port security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating
calls by MSDF vessels. piracy, as well as international peace cooperation
As for capacity building assistance, Japan has activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation
continued educational assistance to the Timor-Leste and exchanges with European countries provides the
Defense Force for vehicle maintenance since 2012. foundations for Japan to become actively involved in
The GSDF has participated in Exercise Harii Hamutuk dealing with these challenges and is important for both
sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste since Japan and Europe.
2015, providing technical guidance on civil engineering.

See See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level

Exchanges (June 2017-June 2018)); Reference 54 (Recent
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries
(Past Three Years))
(1) The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has
influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the
world, has historically maintained close relations with
Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same
strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both
countries are important allies of the United States. Given
this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan Prime Minister May and Defense Minister Onodera on board of JS Izumo (August 2017)
Chapter 2
to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by
working together on global issues such as international two countries to implement the mutual provision of goods
peace cooperation activities, counter-terrorism and and services such as water, food, fuel and transportation
counter-piracy operations and by exchanging information between the SDF and the British Armed Forces through
on regional situations. unified procedures in joint exercises and large-scale

With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United disaster relief operations, further facilitating and
Kingdom, the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation strengthening the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership. The
was signed in June 2012. Following this, Agreement on Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,
the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology came issued during the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in August
into effect in July 2013 and the Japan-U.K. Information 2017, stipulated that the two countries agreed to develop
Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, an action plan with specific measures relating to bilateral
leading to the development of a foundation for defense security cooperation between the relevant authorities. At
equipment and technology cooperation as well as the third Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017,
information sharing between the two countries. the two countries included the bilateral ground exercises,
At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, British naval ships’ deployment to the Asia-Pacific region
prime ministers of both countries agreed to hold a Japan- and joint exercises with the SDF, and prototyping of new
U.K. “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting air-to-air missiles as a joint research into a joint statement,
and begin negotiations on the ACSA in order to enhance demonstrating that bilateral security cooperation was
bilateral cooperation in the security field. Following steadily deepening.
this, the first “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2015. In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera conducted
At the meeting, the two countries agreed to strengthen the Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting with
cooperation in the security and defense fields and shared Defense Minister Williamson on the occasion of the
strategic situational awareness. During the second “2+2” Shangri-La Dialogue. Based on the joint statement at the
Meeting in January 2016, the two countries agreed to Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two
promote joint exercise, cooperate in defense equipment ministers agreed to continuously promote Japan-U.K.
and technology areas and in capacity building assistance defense cooperation including the expansion of British
to Southeast Asian countries and confirmed that they warships into the Asia-Pacific region, the joint exercise
would aim to conclude ACSA as early as possible. In between Japanese and British ground services planned for
January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA15 was signed. After autumn 2018, and other service-to-service exchanges and
the approval by Japan’s National Diet in April 2017, joint exercises. They also exchanged views on defense
ACSA entered into force in August. At the same time, equipment and technology and agreed to continue defense
relevant domestic laws were developed. equipment and technology cooperation, including a
The effectuation of the Japan-U.K. ACSA enables the Japan-U.K. joint study on potential cooperation regarding
15 The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) joint exercises; (2) UN peacekeeping operations; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief
operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures for or transportation of nationals of either party or others for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication
and coordination or other routine activities; and (8) any other activity in which the provision of supplies and services is permitted under the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

future fighter aircraft. On the North Korea issue, Defense and Japan-U.K. defense cooperation and exchanges. In
Minister Onodera stated that cooperation between the November 2017, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited the
British Navy and the MSDF in warning and surveillance United Kingdom and exchanged views with General
activities against offshore North Korean ship-to-ship Carter, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army,
cargo transfers of goods were significant for securing on Japan-U.K. cooperation in amphibian operations. In
the effectiveness of relevant United Nations Security April 2018, the MSDF conducted a joint exercise with
Council resolutions, and that such activities had come to the British Navy frigate HMS Sutherland in waters south
lead North Korea to change policies. As Defense Minister of Kanto region in Japan. In July 2017, ASDF KC-767
Onodera mentioned the need for continuing sanctions aerial refueling/transport aircraft participated in the Royal
on North Korea, Defense Minister Williamson said the International Air Tattoo (RIAT) air show and conducted
United Kingdom would support the Japanese stance. unit exchanges including a joint goodwill exercise with
In part of recent working-level exchanges, the Typhoon fighters and Voyager aerial refueling aircraft.
Chapter 2
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited the In December 2017, three ASDF fighter pilots visited the
United Kingdom in February 2018 and paid a courtesy Coningsby Air Force Base for a sister squadron exchange.
call to Frederick Curzon, Minister of State for Defense
and Deputy Leader of the House of Lords. In part of recent (2) France
service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff France is a major power that has influence not only in
visited the United Kingdom in March 2018 for talks with Europe and Africa, but also in the world. It historically
Peach, Chief of the Defense Staff of the British Armed has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned
Forces. They exchanged views on situational awareness as Japan’s special partner.
VOICE Participation in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) COLUMN

404th Tactical Airlift Squadron, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki, Aichi),
Captain, Yu Shigeoka
I took part in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) at RAF Fairford, United Kingdom, as a KC-767 crew member. RIAT is the
world’s largest airshow and 246 military and commercial aircraft from 26 countries participated in the event. The Air Self-Defense
Force KC-767 on static display attracted many visitors both civil and military and there was a long queue to catch a glimpse of it.
We could see high interest in the Air Self-Defense Force by the visitors’ enthusiastic look on their faces staring at on-board panel
description. In addition, the Air Self-Defense Force taiko drummers performed beside the tanker every day. The taiko performance
was a huge success with the audience gathering around the drummers. Some came to see our performance several times and
called for encores. What surprised me most was that more visitors than I had imagined visited the UK all the way from Japan just
to see the airshow. It was a precious and worthwhile experience that I was involved in the event of a global attention to promote the
Air-Self Defense Force and to help deepen the understanding of its roles. I am proud and honored to have this opportunity and hope
to join the airshow again in the future.
ASDF personnel showing taiko (dram) performance at the RIAT.

The first Japan-France “2+2” Foreign and Defense

Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris in January 2014,
followed by the visit of French Minister of Defense
Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when the
Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and
exchanges was signed. At the second Japan-France “2+2”
Meeting held in Tokyo in March 2015, the two countries
underscored the threat of terrorism, and confirmed that
they would strengthen bilateral intelligence exchanges Japan-France “2+2” Meeting (January 2018)
and cooperation in Africa and the Middle East in fighting

against terrorism in cooperation with the international
community and enhance bilateral cooperation in the held a Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting on the
Chapter 2
areas of defense equipment and technology and maritime occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. They exchanged
security. Then, the two countries signed the Agreement views on the regional situation covering the Korean
concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Peninsula and the South China Sea, and agreed to take
Technology. At the third Japan-France “2+2” Meeting in various opportunities to implement defense exchanges
Paris in January 2017, the two countries confirmed that and cooperation, including joint exercises in line with

they would: (1) commence negotiations in the Japan- the agreement at the Japan-France “2+2” Meeting in
France ACSA; (2) materialize cooperation regarding January 2018. They also confirmed the quick kick-
unmanned underwater vehicles for mine detection, off of the feasibility study for mine countermeasure
as the first concrete cooperation project in the defense technology, the first bilateral defense cooperation project,
equipment and technology field; and (3) promote and agreed to deepen bilateral collaboration, including
joint exercises. The two countries also expressed their defense equipment and technology cooperation through
expectations for fleshing out their cooperation in the discussions of further cooperation in the area.
field of space including the Space Situational Awareness As for recent service-to-service exchanges, the
(SSA) system. On this basis, in March 2017, the second SDF has participated in the Equateur humanitarian and
meeting of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue disaster relief exercises hosted by the French Armed
on Space was held. In the meeting, the “Technical forces stationed in New Caledonia since 2014, and took
arrangement concerning information sharing regarding part in Exercise Equateur 17 in September of the year.
SSA between the relevant authority in Japan and the In November 2017, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited
Minister of Defense of the French Republic” was signed France and exchanged views with French Army Chief
to strengthen the Japan-France SSA cooperation, and the of Staff Bosser on the enhancement of future Japan-
two countries agreed to promote specific cooperation. France defense cooperation and exchanges, based on the
At the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting achievements of the Japan-France-UK-U.S. joint exercise
and the fourth bilateral “2+2” Meeting in January 2018, and others. In February 2018, the SDF implemented a
the ministers welcomed the broad agreement in Japan- joint exercise with the French naval frigate Vendémiaire
France ACSA negotiations and agreed to quickly kick-off in waters south of eastern Japan.
the cooperative research on the feasibility study for mine
countermeasure technology, the first bilateral defense (3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
cooperation project. They also welcomed a French naval When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014,
fleet’s visit to Japan as part of the Jeanne d’Arc 2017 he held a meeting with then North Atlantic Treaty
task group and the implementation of the ARC 2017, Organization (NATO) Secretary General Rasmussen at
the first Japan-France-UK-U.S. joint exercise in waters NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership
around Japan, Guam, and the Tinian Islands, and agreed and Cooperation Programme (IPCP).
to enhance cooperation in capacity building assistance Based on the IPCP, female GSDF personnel were
to developing countries. At the Japan-France Defense dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in
Ministerial Meeting in January 2018, the ministers December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation
confirmed the abovementioned points and agreed to in the field of women, peace and security. Furthermore,
cooperate in the early conclusion of the bilateral ACSA. the MOD/SDF has participated in the annual meeting of
In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera and his the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP)
French counterpart Minister for the Armed Forces Parly, since 2015.

In January 2017, then Defense Minister Inada Italy Information Security Agreement in June 2016 and
visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels for the first time the signing of the Agreement on the Transfer of the
in 10 years and held a meeting with NATO Secretary Defense Equipment and Technology in May 2017. In the
General Stoltenberg. In the meeting, they confirmed same month, Minister of Defense Pinotti visited Japan to
the importance of Japan-NATO cooperation in dealing hold a defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese
with today’s security issues and agreed to promote and Italian ministers agreed to deepen collaboration
cooperation in various fields, such as maritime security between the two countries’ defense authorities through
including counter-piracy operations, cybersecurity, HA/ cooperation in various areas including equipment and
DR, and mainstreaming women, peace and security. On technology.
the dispatch of a Japanese liaison officer to the Supreme Spanish Defense Minister De Cospedal visited Japan
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which had in January 2018 for a Japan-Spain defense ministerial
been proposed by the NATO side, then Defense Minister meeting, where the Japanese and Spanish ministers
Chapter 2
Inada in the meeting announced Japan’s intention to agreed to further enhance the relationship between
dispatch a liaison officer. The liaison officer was assigned the two countries’ defense authorities based on the
to SHAPE in February 2017. memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges
In October 2017, NATO Secretary General signed in November 2014.
Stoltenberg on his visit to Japan exchanged opinions The Netherlands’ Minister of Defense Hennis-
with Defense Minister Onodera on Japan-NATO defense Plasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a Japan-
cooperation and exchanges, and the regional situation Netherlands defense ministerial meeting, where the
and reviewed the MSDF destroyer Teruzuki, attempting two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense
to promote the NATO side’s understanding on Japan’s cooperation and exchanges.
maritime security initiatives. In June 2017, General Denis With Scandinavian and Baltic countries, Japan has
Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, tried to enhance relations through high-level and other
visited Japan for the first time. In March 2018, the Chief exchanges, including Military-Military Talks at the
of Joint Staff visited NATO Headquarters in Belgium and director-general level with Finland in September 2017
exchanged views with General Petr Pavel, Chairman of and with Sweden in October 2017. In January 2018,
the Military Committee, on situational awareness and State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Sweden
Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges. and agreed with Swedish Defense Minister Hultqvist to
further promote defense exchanges and cooperation in
(4) Other European Countries areas such as defense equipment and technology.
With Germany, Japan signed the agreement on defense During his Europe tour16 in January 2018, Prime
equipment and technology transfer in July 2017. In the Minister Abe and Prime Minister Ratas confirmed that
same month, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International the two countries will continue to advance cooperation in
Affairs visited Germany for the first Japan-Germany the cyber domain, utilizing opportunities such as Japan-
defense vice-ministerial strategic dialogue, indicating Estonia Cyber Dialogue, and welcomed the approval of
progress in high-level and other bilateral exchanges. Japan’s participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber
In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera held Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in
a Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting with Estonia. In Latvia, the Japanese leader agreed with Prime
German counterpart Von der Leyen on the occasion of Minister Kučinskis to further deepen Japan-Latvia talks
the Shangri-La Dialogue. They welcomed progress in on security through such opportunities during Latvian
Japan-Germany defense cooperation in various areas and Defense Minister Raimonds Bergmanis’s visit to Japan.
agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation through NATO, In May 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera visited
particularly in the cybersecurity area. Finland and Estonia. In Finland, Defense Minister Onodera
Japan and Italy have been promoting institutional held talks with his Finnish counterpart Niinistö, offering
development for facilitating defense cooperation and to deepen bilateral defense cooperation in a wide range of
exchanges, including the entry into force of the Japan- areas while citing an MSDF training squadron’s planned
16 15 In January 2018, Prime Minister Abe became the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit the three Baltic Countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the three southeastern European countries
of Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania.

visit to Helsinki in August 2018. They agreed to further Colombian ministers signed a memorandum on defense
enhance bilateral cooperation through consultations exchanges and agreed to proceed with specific exchanges
between their defense authorities and exchanges between going forward.
defense squadrons. In Estonia, Defense Minister Onodera From April to May 2018, State Minister of Defense
met his Estonian counterpart Luik to offer the further Yamamoto visited Brazil for talks with Brazilian Defense
development of bilateral cooperation through the dispatch Minister Silva e Luna. They exchanged views on bilateral
of MOD personnel to the CCDCOE. The two ministers defense cooperation and exchanges, and the regional
agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in fields situation and agreed to sign a bilateral memorandum
including cyberdefense. on defense cooperation and exchanges at an early
date and further develop bilateral defense cooperation
9 Other Countries and exchanges including high-level exchanges and
collaboration in humanitarian assistance and disaster
Chapter 2
See See Fig. III-2-1-1 ((Major Achievements in High-Level relief. State Minister of Defense Yamamoto also
Exchanges (June 2017 – June 2018)); Reference 55 (Recent encouraged Japanese Brazilian military personnel active
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries
(Past Three Years)) in the Brazilian Armed Forces.
Kazakhstan and Japan implemented their first
Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks deputy defense minister-level exchange in July 2017

between defense authorities, and other exchanges have when the Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of
been conducted, with the Japan-Canada ACSA signed Defense Kobayashi met with Kazakhstan’s Deputy
in April 2018. Most recently, State Minister of Defense Defense Minister Skakov in Kazakhstan. They signed
Yamamoto held talks with Canadian Defense Minister a memorandum between the Ministries of Defense of
Sajjan. They then welcomed progress in Japan-Canada Japan and Kazakhstan.
defense cooperation, as indicated by the KAEDEX Japan- From Uzbekistan, Japan invited three army
Canada joint training in July 2017 and the Canadian Navy medicine experts to training at the MOD and the National
submarine Chicoutimi’s visit to Yokosuka in November Defense Medical College in September 2017 under
2017, and agreed to further promote the defense the first capacity building assistance program for that
cooperation. In February 2018, General Vance, Chief of country. They received briefing on the development of
the Defense Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces, visited medical officers, the outline of the National Defense
Japan for talks with the Chief of Joint Staff. They shared Medical College, and viewed education and research
the recognition of the security environment and agreed to achievements of the National Defense Medical College
promote Japan-Canada defense exchanges. Research Institute.
As for recent major service-to-service exchanges, Japan has also proceeded with defense cooperation
the Canadian Navy sent its ships Winnipeg and Ottawa and exchanges with Middle Eastern countries. With
to Japan in July 2017 and its submarine Chicoutimi Djibouti, the only country where an overseas SDF base
from October to December 2017. They and the MSDF is located, Japan has been cooperating in counter-piracy
participated in the Pacific Guardian Japan-Canada-New operations. During his visit to Djibouti in September
Zealand joint exercise in June 2017, a Japan-U.S.-Canada 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto paid a
joint exercise in November 2017 and the KAEDEX courtesy call on Defense Minister Bahdon and thanked
Japan-Canada joint exercise in July and December the Djiboutian government for its support for the SDF
2017. In July 2017, a Canadian rescue and transport operations base. They exchanged views on such topics as
aircraft squadron visited the ASDF’s Komaki Base for Japan’s support for enhancing disaster response capacity
a squadron-to-squadron exchange. In the same month, in Djibouti.
ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft visited With Turkey, Japan’s Administrative Vice-Minister
Canada’s Comox Air Force Base for another squadron- of Defense signed a Statement of Intent to promote
to-squadron exchange. In September 2017, the ASDF defense exchanges and cooperation at his talks with
Chief of Staff visited Canada for a high-level exchange then Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense
with Lieutenant-General Hood, Commander of the Royal Ümit Dündar in July 2012. In March 2013, then Minister
Canadian Air Force. of National Defense Yilmaz visited Japan for a Japan-
In March 2015, Colombia’s Minister of Defense Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, the
Pinzón visited Japan for the first Japan-Colombia Defense ministers of the two countries agreed to hold a meeting
Ministerial Meeting. In December 2016, the Japanese and between their defense authorities at the earliest possible

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono holding a dialogue with Vice-Minister of Defense

Dhahiri during his visit to UAE (November 2017)
Chapter 2
State Minister of Defense Yamamoto shaking hands with Lieutenant General Hegazi, Chief of
Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, during his visit in Egypt (September 2017)
State Minister of Defense Yamamoto paid a courtesy call to the Minister of Defence Bahdon
during his visit to Djibouti (September 2017)
date and promote a variety of defense exchanges. From Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman,
Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, visited
defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when Japan in September 2014 to hold a Japan-Saudi Arabia
Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Japan in October Defense Ministerial Meeting and sign a memorandum
2016. In July 2017, then Defense Minister Inada held on defense exchanges.
talks with Jordanian Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates
Mulki and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation (UAE) in May 2013, followed by visits to Bahrain, Kuwait
and exchanges. They appreciated the memorandum as it and Qatar in August of the same year. During the visits,
paved the way for Japan-Jordan defense exchanges and he shared the view with the leaders of the countries on the
cooperation and agreed to promote concrete defense need for promoting cooperation with those countries in the
cooperation initiatives. security and defense fields. Japan signed a memorandum
With regard to the relations with Egypt, State on defense exchanges with Bahrain in April 2012
Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited the country in and with Qatar in February 2015. In November 2017,
September 2017, marking the first high-level visit from Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono visited the
the Japan Ministry of Defense. At the meeting between UAE to hold dialogues with Vice-Minister of Defence
the State Minister and Lieutenant General Mahmoud Dhahiri and other officials, and observed the Dubai Air
Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, Chief of Staff of the Show 2017. ASDF C-2 transport aircraft, which was on
Egyptian Armed Forces, welcomed progress in bilateral operational training overseas, participated in the show,
defense exchanges and agreed to continue exchanges and and a special booth for C-2 aircraft was set up for the first
cooperation in the future. In part of recent major service- time by the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency.
to-service exchanges, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian In May 2018, UAE Minister of State for Defense Affairs
Armed Forces visited Japan in August 2017 and held a Bowardi visited Japan and agreed with State Minister of
meeting with the Chief of Joint Staff, where they agreed Defense Yamamoto to further promote specific defense
to further developing bilateral defense exchanges. cooperation initiatives, based on the Memorandum on

Japan-UAE Defense Cooperation and Exchanges signed With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with
on the day. Regarding service-to-service exchanges, Sultan Qaboos bin Said in January 2014 and they agreed
ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft visited to enhance cooperation and promote defense exchanges
the Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE for a squadron-to- in the field of maritime security, including counter-piracy
squadron exchange in July 2017. measures to ensure the security and safety of sea-lanes.
VOICE My Experience from Japan-ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program COLUMN

Indonesia Navy
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Muhammad Alfa Desdianto
Chapter 2
As the representative of Indonesia Navy, getting the chance to board on JS Izumo was an invaluable experience for me because it
was a grand opportunity to take a tour on the ship and meet with other participants from different parts of ASEAN countries, while
having discussions and exchanging ideas that would help broaden the networks and strengthen our friendships.
Throughout the week of the program, I was fortunate enough to get the chance to participate in various attractive activities such

as Search and Rescue exercise and Ship Handling on board. There were also many advanced weapons systems provided in the ship
which I was glad I had the opportunity to see. I have learned another valuable experience during the visits. The ship crews provided
excellent technical services and hospitality to the participants, this has given me the insight into the roles and responsibilities I have to
apply later when having guests to visit our ships. Also, even though there were cultural differences among the participants, everyone
was very considerate and respected each other well. They were very open to any suggestions and ideas, therefore created a good
atmosphere in the environment.
Overall, I was very happy with the amount of things I have learned and experiences from being the participant in the Japan-
ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program on JS Izumo. I hope to be able to get another chance to participate in other international
events like this as the representative of Indonesia.
LTJG Alfa observing replenishment at sea

Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security

For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order various initiatives including assistance for capacity
on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the building in this field for coastal states, and making the
rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as most of various opportunities to enhance joint training
ensuring safe maritime transport, is a foundation of its and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate
peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. In vicinity of Japan.
cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5 (Initiatives towards Ensuring
engages in anti-piracy operations, as well as promotes Maritime Security)
Chapter 2
1 Counter-Piracy Operations
Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime To date, approximately 30 countries, including the
transportation to import most of the resources and food United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters
necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part
nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. of its counter-piracy initiatives, the European Union (EU)
has been conducting Operation Atalanta since December
1 Basic Approach 2008, in addition to the counter-piracy operations
conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)2
The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement that was established in January 2009. Meanwhile, other
agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with countries have been dispatching their assets to the area.
piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely The international community continues to have a critical
difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by interest in and take actions to tackle the acts of piracy off
itself, the SDF is to take action as well. the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
As these initiatives by the international community
have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy
Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy
2 and Initiatives by the International Community
Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in
For Japan and the international community, the waters Fig. III-2-2-1 the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number
of incidents in Southeast Asia)
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are
(Number of incidents)
extremely important, connecting Europe and the Middle 237
250
218 219
East with East Asia. Regarding the waters in this area, Somalia and
surroundings
successive United Nations Security Council resolutions1 200 Southeast Asia
were adopted, such as United Nations Security Council 141 147

150
Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in 128
102 104
111
response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase 100 83
70 70 68
54 75
in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring 48 80 76
50
ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who 22 51 46 11 9
15 0 2
are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. 0
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
These resolutions have requested that various countries (Year)
take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast
1 Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions
1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014),
Resolution 2246 (adopted in 2015), and Resolution 2316 (adopted in 2016) and Resolution 2383 (adopted in 2017).
2 The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter-
piracy operations.

Ensuring Maritime Security Section 2
Fig. III-2-2-2 SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations
Activities by other countries

[Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Naval Vessels Patrol Aircraft
One Destroyer
(approx. 200 personnel/eight Coast Guard Officers aboard) Direct Escort Zone Defense
National Tasking CTF151 CTF151
Direct escort National Tasking (Japan, China, ROK, India, etc.) (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, (Japan)
Turkey, etc.)
Escorting private vessels using the escort method (right figure)
EUNAVFOR EUNAVFOR
Zone defense CTF151 (Germany, Spain, Netherlands,
(Germany, Spain)
Italy, etc.)
Warning and surveillance activities within specific waters (left figure)
(Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out
(*) One vessel system (one for direct escort and one for zone defense) has been deployed by all the participating countries in rotation.
since December 14, 2016. Direct escort is carried out as a major activity, and zone
defense is conducted during the non-escort operation period.
Chapter 2
Escort Route
(900-1,100 km)
During the non-monsoon period
(March-May and
September-November), the escort route

is extended approx. 200 km to the east
Djibouti
[Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]

Two P-3C patrol aircraft (approx. 60 personnel)
[Deployment Support Group for Counter Enforcement] Surveillance flight CTF151
(approx. 110 personnel) Somalia
Provision of information regarding the airspace
Implementation of guard/maintenance at SDF over the escort route.
operational facility. Potions Copyright©2016 GeoCatalog Inc.
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, GeoEye, Getmapping, AeroGRID, IGP, UPR-EGP, and the GIS Community
0 50 100 200km
occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in

the Gulf of Aden has currently hovered at a low level.
However, the assumed root causes of piracy such as
terrorism and poverty in Somalia have still remained
unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s
capability to crack down on piracy is also still insufficient,
if the international community reduces its counter-piracy
efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore,
there is no great change in the situation in which Japan
must carry out its counter-piracy operations.
See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3, (3) (Counter-Piracy Operations)
Fig. III-2-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in Units from Japan, the U.S., Germany, and Spain engaging in counter-piracy operations
the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in
Southeast Asia))
began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels,
3 Japanese Initiatives while MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning
and surveillance operations in June the same year.
(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations In view of the United Nations Convention on the
In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-
Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated Piracy Measures Act3 in July the same year in order to
vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy.
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two MSDF destroyers This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all
3 Official name: Acts on Punishment of and Measures Against Acts of Piracy

Fig. III-2-2-3 Structure of the Deployed Forces

MSDF personnel
GSDF personnel
Commander, Self Defense Fleet
MSDF and GSDF personnel
Commander, Deployment Surface Commander, Deployment Air Force Commander, Deployment Support Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)
Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed unit at the Headquarters
Headquarter Headquarter Total of less than 20 personnel
Squadron Support and Operation Guard Military

1 destroyer logistics units units units Police units
(2 P-3Cs)
Total approx. 200 personnel Total approx. 60 personnel Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground)
Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard [Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]
Escort private ships with destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151
Chapter 2
[Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]

Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard Conduct surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by P-3C patrol aircraft
1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 [Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement]
or 2 special boats Facilitate communication and coordination with relevant authorities of Djibouti and conduct duties
related to necessary support for the DAPE to conduct counter-piracy operations
[CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters]
SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordination
among units of countries participating in CTF 151
* In addition, Airlift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will
provide airborne transportation of materials etc. when necessary.
nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their flag areas in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, there are JCG
states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to officers aboard the MSDF destroyer.4
a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in In recent years, while there are still ongoing requests
order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as for escort from vessels that are vulnerable to piracy such
approaching civilian vessels. as tankers with relatively low speed and low broadside,
Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures the demand for direct escort has been decreasing. This
concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in is partly due to the existence of other initiatives for self-
Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came defense of private vessels involving the boarding of
into force on November 2013, which made it possible to private armed security guards.
have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided As this trend was expected to continue, the
certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry Government of Japan determined that the SDF would
small arms for the purpose of security operations. decrease the planned number of direct escorts and carry
See Peference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); out zone defense during the period when direct escort is
Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use not conducted. Accordingly the Government of Japan
of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units);
changed the number of the deployed MSDF destroyers
from two to one for operations off the coast of Somalia
(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces and in the Gulf of Aden from December 2016: (1) based
See Fig. III-2-2-2 (SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations) on the number of destroyers in recent years, the planned
Fig. III-2-2-3 (Structure of the Deployed Forces) number of direct escorts in a month would be decreased,
a. Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy and at the same time, (2) during the period when direct
Enforcement escort is not conducted, zone defense would be carried
The Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy out instead.
Enforcement (DSPE) is a unit that conducts counter- b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement
piracy measures using MSDF destroyers. The DSPE The Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy
strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area Enforcement (DAPE) is a unit conducting counter-
in two different manners – direct escort of private vessels piracy activities using the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft
across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated (two aircraft dispatched). The unit conducts warning and
4 Eight JCG officers are onboard and conduct judicial law enforcement activities, including arresting and interrogating pirates, as required.

Ensuring Maritime Security Section 2
surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined while between March and June 2017 and March and June
in coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters5 and 2018 a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also
confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the dispatched to the Headquarters.
unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyers, f. Achievements
the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, As of May 31, 2018, the DSPE has escorted 3,826
responding by such means as confirming the safety vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a
of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these
The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is constantly vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden.
shared with other related organizations, and contributes As for the DAPE, it commenced the counter-piracy
significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming operations in June 2009. As of May 31, 2018, the DAPE
vessels suspected of being pirate ships. has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown
c. Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy 1,951 missions with their flying hours totaling 14,910
Chapter 2
Enforcement hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating
In order to improve the operational efficiency and the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy
effectiveness of the DAPE, the Deployment Support operations on around 13,160 occasions. The activities
Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) carries conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 70-
out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up 80% of the warning and surveillance operations carried

in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport. out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community.
The Ministry decided to lease adjacent land on the eastern
side of the site that does not have a structure and is empty, 4 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors
in addition to the site itself, from November 2017 from a
standpoint of strengthening security. The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been
d. Transport Unit highly praised by the international community. For
The Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF transport example, national leaders and others have expressed
aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly
the DAPE and the DGPE. well-received by the United Nations Security Council
e. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed unit at Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which
the Headquarters are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast
In order to strengthen coordination with the units of of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many
other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels
enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter- piracy that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that
operations, the MOD decided to dispatch SDF personnel the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace
serving as the CTF 151 commander and the headquarter of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there.
staff in July 2014, and has dispatched SDF personnel to Additionally, The Japanese Shipowners' Association
the CTF 151 Headquarters where an officer from other and other groups expressed appreciation for protection
countries serves as the commander since August 2014. of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of
During the period from May to August 2015, the SDF efforts in fighting against piracy.
also dispatched a CTF 151 commander for the first time,6
5 In addition, DAPE has been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible. Moreover, it became possible
to conduct more flexible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination
between other countries’ units was further enhanced.
6 No member of the SDF had ever served as a commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF.

2 Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety and Order on the Seas through Maritime Training
the participating countries. At the same time, the exercise

Training Conducted by the SDF and Counter-Piracy
1 Teams from Various Countries in the Gulf of Aden also contributes to the maintenance of maritime security,
while also contributing to the improvement of the global
The SDF’s deployed unit and counter-piracy unit of EU security environment.
and others have conducted various exercises in the Gulf
of Aden with the objective of enhancing their mutual
Strengthening of Cooperation in Maritime
cooperation and tactical skills required for counter- 3 Security through Joint Training, etc.
piracy activities.
These training exercises have an essential significance Through the participation in multilateral joint exercises,
in that they strengthen the cooperation between the SDF the MSDF improves its tactical skills as well as
Chapter 2
and counter-piracy teams from various countries and advancing mutual understanding and strengthening of
regional organizations, and contribute to the maintenance trust relationships with other participating countries. It
of public safety and order on the seas. implemented Malabar 2017, a joint training exercise by
Japan, the U.S., and India, in India’s eastern waters and
carried out joint cruise training by Japan and the U.S.,
Participation in the U.S. Hosted International

2 Maritime Exercise and Other Exercises Japan and Australia, and Japan, the U.S., Australia, and
Canada in the South China Sea.
The MSDF has participated in every multilateral Strengthening cooperation with other countries
mine countermeasures exercise in the waters around through these joint exercises contributes to the
the Arabian Peninsula hosted by the U.S. Navy since maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely
its first exercise in 2012. This exercise was renamed high significance.
International Maritime Exercise7 since May 2017 and See Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework
items for the exercise was increased. Participating in and through Dialogue)
Reference 46 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last
these exercises assists in the enhancement of the tactical Three Years))
skills of the MSDF and the strengthening of trust among
3 Initiatives in the Asia-Pacific Region
The National Security Strategy and the National Defense strengthening cooperation related to maritime security
Program Guidelines state that Japan will play a leading with various countries through security dialogue and
role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable defense interaction among defense authorities at bilateral
Seas,” including maritime security cooperation with and multilateral levels with the aim of maintaining and
other countries. advancing “free and open seas” supported by a maritime
Accordingly, the MOD/SDF implements capacity order defined by laws and rules. In response to this, the
building assistance in maritime security for Myanmar, MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines, security within regional security dialogue frameworks
thereby assisting countries such as coastal states enhance such as the ADMM Plus and the Inter-Sessional Meeting
their capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with on Maritime Security (ISMMS).
partners that share the same strategic interests as Japan. See Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security
The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was Framework and through Dialogue); Section 1-3 (Promoting
Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral
approved by a Cabinet decision in May 2018, calls for Security Cooperation)
7 The exercise took place in May 2017, and command post exercises were carried out.

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities Section 3
Section 3 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation

Activities
The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the
peace cooperation activities working in tandem with fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and
diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official other problems.
1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities
stand-by units, and the designated units are always ready

Framework of International Peace Cooperation
Chapter 2
to be deployed.
1 Activities and the Significance of Stipulating such
In September 2015, the UN launched the
Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF
Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) so
The international peace cooperation activities undertaken the UN Headquarters to be able to grasp the registered
by the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international items of each country more specifically in order to

peace cooperation operations such as United Nations ensure the flexibility and readiness of international
peacekeeping operations (the so-called UN PKO); peacekeeping activities. In light of this change, Japan
(2) international disaster relief operations to respond to registered engineering units and staff officers of mission
large-scale natural disasters overseas; (3) activities based headquarters in March 2016. Additionally, at the Defense
on the former Special Measures Act on Humanitarian Ministers’ Meeting on United Nations Peacekeeping
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities Operations (PKO) held in November 2017, JAPAN
based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures announced that it would make arrangements for additional
Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special registration of fixed-wing aircraft for PCRS to enable air
Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation transport assistance for rapid PKO deployment.
activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary
activities,1 were upgraded to become one of the primary International Peace Cooperation Activities
Fig. III-2-3-1
missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and Conducted by the SDF
the maintenance of public order.2
International Peace Cooperation Activities
See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Framework for operation of
Self Defense Forces following implementation of peace and Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in
the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations”
security legislation)
Fig. III-2-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities International Disaster Relief Activities
International Peace Cooperation Mission
Conducted by the SDF) Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of
Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); International Disaster Relief Teams”
Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Cooperation and Support Activities, etc. for the Armed Forces
Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units); Reference of Foreign Countries
56 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and
Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 57 (The SDF Record Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in
Situations that the International Community is Collectively
in International Peace Cooperation Activities) Addressing for International Peace and Security”
Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq

Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on
Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support
2 Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009)
Activities to Respond to International Terrorism

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on
the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-
important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010)
operation. For this reason, all three branches of the SDF, Legend : Activities based on time-limited acts
: Activities based on permanent acts
namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch
1 Affairs prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Law (miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions
2 Missions defined in Article 3 of the SDF Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas
surrounding Japan (in 2007) and international peace cooperation activities. In accordance with the entry into force of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016, “situations in areas surrounding
Japan” was revised to “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”

Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information- complicated international peace cooperation activities.
gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are The initiative aims to contribute to more effective
required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while international peace cooperation activities by enhancing
ensuring the safety of personnel and unit in international the collaboration in the field of education.
peacekeeping activities, etc. In addition, in order to
respond to various environments and prolonged missions,
Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched
the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, 3 SDF Units
deployment, and information communication, as well as
developing a structure of logistic and medical support for SDF personnel are expected to fulfill their assigned duty
conducting smooth and continuous operations. under severe working conditions while being far away
With regard to the education necessary for from their home country and their families. Therefore, it
engaging in international peace cooperation activities, is extremely important to make necessary arrangements
Chapter 2
the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out
Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical
Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be and mental health. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has
deployed to international peace cooperation activities, implemented various measures to support families to
as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and
Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of their families.

the Joint Staff College offers not only a basic education In addition, the SDF also provides the following
courses on international peace cooperation activities, but mental health checkups on an ongoing basis for all the
also specialized education to train personnel who can personnel to be sent: (1) a pre-dispatch course to acquire
be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental
missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. health assessment conducted several times during the
These specialized courses are conducted by using UN pre-dispatch to post-dispatch period; (3) counseling on
standard training materials and foreign instructors. anxiety, trouble and other matters among the dispatched
Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided personnel provided by mental health personnel being
education for personnel from foreign militaries and dispatched; (4) dispatch of mental healthcare support
other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative teams from Japan consisting mainly of medical officers
represents the approach taken by the MOD/ SDF, which with specialized knowledge; (5) education before
emphasize the necessity of collaboration and cooperation returning to Japan for reducing stress upon return;
with other related ministries and foreign countries, based (6) temporary health checkups after returning to Japan.
on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and
2 Initiatives to Support UN Peacekeeping Operations, etc.
As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and
regions around the world, UN Peacekeeping Operations large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and
(PKO) have expanded their missions in recent years to from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.
include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), Japan has been promoting international peace
the promotion of political processes, providing assistance cooperation activities in various regions including
in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and
(DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector South Sudan for more than 25 years, and the results of
Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, these activities have been highly praised both inside and
and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions outside of Japan. From the perspective of “Proactive
as ceasefire monitoring. To date, there are 14 UN PKO Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of
missions ongoing (as of the end of May 2018). international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation
International organizations, such as the Office and expectations from the international community, Japan
of the United Nations High Commissioner for will continue to actively engage in international peace
Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and non- cooperation operations in a multilayered way. In this
governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and regard, to maximize the effect of Japan’s contribution to

international organizations, that the Triangular Partnership

Project3 of collaboration among the United Nations,
supporting UN Member States, TCC/PCC, including the
UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering
Capabilities (RDEC) led by Japan is effective, and Japan
intends to make further contributions to this project and
promote to increase female peacekeepers.
The JGSDF Central Readiness Force Commanding
General (then) participated in the UN PKO Military
Chiefs Meeting held in July as a related meeting to the
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono and Mr. Khare, Under-Secretary-General for Field
Defense Ministerial conference and exchanged opinions
Support, United Nations Secretariat, at a preparation meeting for the ministerial meeting on the regarding the current situation and issues for PKO.
UN Peacekeeping (August 2017)
Chapter 2
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
the international community, it is necessary to deliberate 2 Sudan (UNMISS)
more deeply about how the SDF should contribute
to the international community. Therefore, regarding (1) Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel

international peace cooperation operations and other to UNMISS
relevant missions, the SDF will continue to proactively The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established
take part in peacekeeping activities by utilizing their following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
accumulated experiences and advanced skills in fields Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan
such as engineering, as well as by expanding the dispatch and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army in
of SDF personnel to further responsible positions, January 2005.
such as mission headquarters and the Department of Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched
Peacekeeping Operations in the UN. As such, the SDF two GSDF officers to UNMIS headquarters as staff
places more emphasis on taking more of a leading role, officers (logistics and database officers), but UNMIS
and the MOD/SDF will be proactively involved in Japan’s ended its mission in July 2011 following South
initiatives for international contribution. Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective
of consolidating peace and security as well as helping
establish necessary conditions for the development
International conferences related to UN
1 Peacekeeping Operations of South Sudan, the UN Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. The Japanese
The Ministry of Defense held the “preparatory meeting,” Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with
in Tokyo in August 2017 which covers administrative UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF
discussion, ahead of UN peacekeeping Defense engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch
Ministerial conference. The preparatory meeting’s of two staff officers (logistics and database officers) to
participants were 32 countries, including co-host UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided
Bangladesh and Ministerial conference host Canada, and to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, Coordination Center,
two international agencies. This meeting involved opinion and an additional staff officer (engineering officer). In
exchanges on training and capacity building assistance addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one
for Troop /Police contributing (TCC/TPP)and confirmed staff officer (air operations officer) in October 2014.
of UN needs and best practices of other countries. South Sudan shares borders with six countries and
In light of the preparatory meeting results, State is positioned in a highly important location, connecting
Minister of Defense Yamamoto commented at the UN the African continent on all four points of the compass.
peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference held in The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only
Vancouver in November 2017 that Japan hopes that essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and
capacity gaps in the UN peacekeeping can be harrowed stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension,
through collaboration by the UN Member Stated and Africa as a whole, as well as crucial issue that should
3 A partnership for supporting the capability building of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through cooperation among the UN, UN PKO troop contributing countries, and third
countries that possess technologies and equipment.

be dealt with by the international community. Based On November 15, 2016, the Cabinet approved
on the accumulated experience through past PKO, the the changes to the International Peace Cooperation
MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of Assignment Implementation Plan for South Sudan
South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation after the deliberations by the National Security Council
in infrastructure development, on which the UN places (9-minister meeting). After the 11th rotation took over
great expectations. in December 2016, the dispatched unit was assigned the
See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3-7 (Situation in South Sudan) task of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, which
was approved by the Legislation for Peace and Security,
(2) Activities by the SDF as well as the task to carry out joint protection of camps.
In January 2012, a then Coordination Center of the SDF The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a
was established for the first time in the SDF’s participation milestone of five years in January 2017 since the dispatch
in UN PKO, both in the South Sudan capital city of Juba of the first engineering rotation. In all of the PKOs
Chapter 2
and in Uganda, in order for coordination of the activities conducted by Japan, the unit has made a record number
conducted by the dispatched engineering unit. Since of achievements. The major achievements include a total
the commencement of its engineering activities within of approximately 260 km of road repair and a total of
UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched approximately 500,000 m2 of development.
engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities. Japan could move on to a new phase regarding
The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel engineering activities in Juba that the SDF was in
after the second unit took over in June of the same year, charge of. Considering the above-mentioned issues
and carried out activities with great significance such as in a comprehensive manner, on March 10, 2017, the
repairing roads and constructing facilities for displaced Government of Japan came to the conclusion that the
people while ensuring the safety of the personnel. SDF engineering unit would withdraw from Juba around
VOICE UNMISS Headquarters activities COLUMN

Assignment: UNMISS Engineer Staff Officers
Rank: Major, Fumiyasu Morishita
I have been working in Juba as the engineering staff officer in the 9th UNMISS Headquarters since June 2017.
There are four headquarters members at UNMISS – myself, the intelligence officer, the logistics staff officer, and the air
operations officer. The Japanese embassy also has two Self Defense Forces members as liaison personnel.
The engineer Division that I belong to is the largest UNMISS organization with about 300 civilians, military people, and local
staff. I provide direct support to the engineer Division chief at the group Cheif’s office. Specifically, I handle national projects, such
as development of main roads in South Sudan.
I am very excited about using knowledge and skills cultivate as a commander in the Ground Self Defense Forces on behalf of
South Sudan and the United Nations despite facing numerous issues, such as difficult coordination with local agencies, equipment
and materials shortages, rainy season with intense rainfall that cripples work efforts, and poor infrastructure. I also feel responsibility
as someone wearing the Japanese uniform to serve as a goodwill ambassador for Japan in the area.
Writer coordinating with the British Corps of Engineers Writer: Second from the left

Fig. III-2-3-2 Organization of UNMISS government and the International Peace Cooperation
Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth
Assignment of Japanese Personnel
and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. They will
United Nations Headquarters continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.
António Guterres, Secretary-General See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3 (The Situation of the Self-Defense
of the United Nations
Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and
Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Security), Fig. III-2-3-2 (Organization of UNMISS)
David Shearer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Deputy Special
Deputy Special Representative
Representative of of the Secretary- Director of
Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to the
the Secretary-
General
(Political)
Chief of Staff Force Commander General, UN
Resident &
Humanitarian
Mission Support
Division 3 UN Secretariat
Coordinator
Joint Mission
Analysis Center
Military
Headquarters Engineering Section
Aviation Section
(1 Aviation
The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces
Logistics (1 Engineering
Chapter 2
(1 Intelligence Operation
Staff Officer)
(1 Logistics
Staff Officer)
Staff Officer)
Staff Officer) actively contribute to efforts of the United Nations to
Note: Double lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. achieve international peace and dispatch personnel to the
United Nations Secretariat for the purpose of utilizing
experiences of dispatched personnel in Japan’s PKO
the end of May, 2017, and Minister of Defense Inada activity. As of June 2018, one Self Defense Forces member

issued an assignment termination order for the dispatched (working level) is involved in formulation of United
engineering unit on March 24, 2017. SDF personnel Nations PKO policies and plans at the UN Department
engaged in withdrawal work, then sequentially withdrew of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). There is also
from South Sudan by the end of May 2017, and terminated one administrative official (working level) working on
the operations by the engineering unit in UNMISS. activities related to the Triangular Partnership Project at
In response to a request from the UN to transfer the UN Department of Field Support. Since December
items possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such 2002, including personnel currently dispatched, Japan
as heavy machinery, vehicles, and residence-related has sent six Self Defense Forces members (one manager
containers, Japan transferred these items to UNMISS level, five working level) to the UN DPKO and two
with no charge, intending to make Japan’s cooperation administrative officials (working level) to the UN
with UNMISS more effective. Prior to this transfer of Department of Field Support.
items, the MOD, responding to a request from UNMISS, See Reference 58 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to
provided training on the operation and maintenance of International Organizations)
heavy machinery to UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS

would be able to conduct engineering activities in a 4 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers
smooth manner using these heavy machinery and other
equipment even after the withdrawal of the Japanese unit. To support PKO undertaken by African and other
These dedicated activities by the dispatched countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel
engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued as instructors to PKO centers in Africa that provide
by the UN and South Sudan. Personnel dispatches to education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute
the UNMISS headquarters are continuing. Four JGSDF to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of
members (logistics officer, database officer, engineering the centers. Following the speech by State Minister of
officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out Defense Yamamoto that pledged to promote initiatives
duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the to increase female peacekeepers at the UN peacekeeping
logistics officer procures and transports goods needed Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver
in UNMISSS activities, the database officer collects (Canada) in November 2017, Japan dispatched two
and compiles information on security conditions, Self Defense Forces personnel, including one female
the engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS member, as teachers on gender in the PKO field to the
engineering activities, and the air operations officer Peace Support Training Center in the Federal Democratic
assists in operation of aircraft run by UNMISS. Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE-PSTC) in December 2017.
Additionally, two liaisons staff have been dispatched It has sent a total of 31 Self Defense Forces members (26
to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South times to eight countries) thus far since November 2008,
Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. including the latest dispatch.
These people help interactions between the South Sudan Based on experiences and lessons learned in

VOICE Dispatch as a gender instructor to the Ethiopian Peace Assistance COLUMN

Training Center
Assigned unit: Education & Training Research Headquarters (Meguro Ward, Tokyo)
Rank: Colonel, Kaori Oosaki
During December 2-8, 2017, I was dispatched to Peace Assistance Training Center located in the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia as the instructor on gender in a “conflict prevention courses” with participation of about 30 trainees (military and civilian)
from African countries who are future PKO member candidates. I lectured to the trainees on “Introduction to Gender” and taught
them about the need to protect vulnerable gender groups during and after conflicts and have them participate in the policy decision
process in order to realize the PKO duty of civilian protection and the efficacy of including a gender perspective in various activities
as a method.
This was Japan’s first dispatch to a PKO Center in another country of someone from the Self Defense Forces as a gender
Chapter 2
instructor. Despite feeling considerable pressure and uncertainty ahead of the course, I enjoyed the instruction, including laughter,
after coming into contact with enthusiastic trainees.
Gender mainstreaming is one of the issues in security situations receiving the most attention in the United Nations and globally.
It is also a topic that should be covered in participation of Self Defense Forces in international peace cooperation activities and other
initiatives. I believe it should be actively promoted to ensure that PKO members from various countries effectively carry out their
duties with a gender perspective.
Writer giving a course to trainees Writer supporting a discussion by trainees
* Gender: Socially and culturally formed sexual distinctions for biological sexual differences.
* Gender mainstreaming: Measures and activities that incorporate a gender perspective with the aim of attaining gender equality
overseas activities by Self Defense Forces, dispatched Abe expressed Japan’s active support at the PKO
Self Defense Forces personnel provide courses on the Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by
importance of building relationships with local residents the RDEC.
at locations where international peacekeeping activities In the RDEC, the UN Department of Field Support
take place and gender issues. (DFS) procures heavy equipment and carries out training
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-4 (1) (International Conferences for engineers using funds provided by Japan. Japan has
Hosted by International Organizations) been dispatching SDF personnel to the International
Reference 58 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to
International Organizations) Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya
as instructors since the trial training in September 2015.
Training took place twice during May-October 2017, to
Support to the UN Project for Africa Rapid
5 Deployment of Engineering Capabilities which SDF personnel were dispatched who provided
training regarding the operation of heavy equipment for
Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas personnel in the Tanzanian national military and others.
of facilities and transport that are essential for promoting Training has been provided in five sessions to date for
smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support a total of approximately 130 members from five East
the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and African countries.
implement high quality activities, Prime Minister The Ministry of Defense plans to actively support

future training, particularly following the speech by State Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver
Minister of Defense Yamamoto at the UN peacekeeping (Canada) in November 2017
3 International Disaster Relief Operations
In recent years, the role of military affairs has become participate in international disaster relief activities and to
more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.
capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)
relief are growing. To contribute to the advancement
of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged
International Disaster Relief Operations by the
in international disaster relief operations proactively 2 SDF and SDF’s Posture
Chapter 2
from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and
improvement of the global security environment. Responding to specific relief requests by the governments
To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations
take any necessary action based on prepared disaster in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international
relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services,

of Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic
conducting international disaster relief operations, prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and
which fully utilize their functions and capabilities, while personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water
taking into consideration specific relief requests by the supply activities using water-purifying devices. In
governments of affected countries and disaster situations addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to
in these countries. carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the
See Reference 57 (International peacekeeping activities conducted affected area.
by Self Defense Forces) The Ground Component Command and regional
units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units
1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out
international disaster relief operations in an independent
Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of
of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also
Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel
disaster relief activities in response to requests from and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore,
the governments of affected countries and international in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness
organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search
Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to activities using P-3C patrol aircraft.

Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and

Non-Proliferation
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is
and missiles, which serve as their means of delivery, pose a the development of an international framework for arms
pressing challenge to peace and stability of the international control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, and Japan is
community. Moreover, many countries are working on the playing an active role in this effort.
regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering See Fig. III-2-4-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and
the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian Non- Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.)
perspectives and defensive requirements.
Chapter 2
1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation
Japan actively participates in international initiatives also working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned
for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC.
regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and The MOD/SDF has seconded eleven personnel, including
biological weapons, as well as missiles as a means of GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Office to work on this
delivery and associated technologies and materials. project, and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise
Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to
Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 17
field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage occasions. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating
and dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of
protection against chemical weapons to the Organization regulations and decisions, by dispatching MOD officials
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons
was established to continuously implement verification Convention (BWC), as well as international export control
measures following the entry of the CWC into force. In regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the
addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the
the regulation of the CWC are synthesized at the GSDF same time, SDF personnel were dispatched to training to
Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct foster substitute inspectors1 provided by the Preparatory
protection research. Thus, the school has undergone Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
inspections ten times in total since its establishment, in Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
accordance with the CWC regulations. See Reference 58 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to
Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is International Organizations)
Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons,
Fig. III-2-4-1
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.
Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.

Category Biological Delivery Systems Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons
Weapons (Missiles)
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Treaty on the Non- Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention)
The Hague Code
Conventions on Arms Proliferation of Nuclear Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons of Conduct Against
Control, Disarmament and Weapons (NPT) Convention (Ottawa Treaty)
Convention (CWC) Convention (BWC) Ballistic Missile
Non-Proliferation, etc. Comprehensive Nuclear- U.N. Register of Conventional Arms
Proliferation (HCOC)
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) U.N. Report on Military Expenditures
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Export Control Frameworks Nuclear Suppliers Group Missile Technology
Australia Group (AG) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
Aimed at Non-Proliferation (NSG) Control Regime (MTCR)
New International Initiatives
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Aimed at Non-Proliferation of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
Weapons of Mass Destruction
1 Experts in relevant fields registered with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, in preparation for the implementation of On-site Inspections (OSI) following the effective date
of the CTBT. They are also expected to become inspectors who conduct OSI after the CTBT enters into force.

Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section 4
Japan has signed various conventions on the CCW framework.

regulation of conventional weapons such as the Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of the initiatives of the international community that focus
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed on the problem of anti-personnel mines by submitting
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional
Effects (CCW),2 based on humanitarian perspectives stocks to the UN.
and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the In addition, the MOD/SDF participates in the UN
Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),3 Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on
which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. Military Expenditures and other meetings related to
With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with the purpose of increasing
cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed the transparency of military preparedness and military
in February 2015. expenditure, and provides the requisite reports. It also
Chapter 2
The Ministry dispatches personnel to government dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert
expert meetings related to Lethal Autonomous meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving
Weapon Systems (LAWS) and other events under the these systems.

2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry
and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and also participated
the United States announced its Proliferation Security in the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012, which
Initiative (PSI)4 in May 2003, and sought the participation Japan hosted for the first time. Recently, Japan participated
of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being in Pacific Protector 17, a PSI maritime prevention exercise
undertaken based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises organized by Australia, in September 2017 and trained
aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation in activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider destruction with other participating countries.
issues on policies and legislations. Based on the proliferation cases in the areas
Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of
the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the
and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives
personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in to strengthen non-proliferation frameworks including
ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004. PSI, as well as holding various relevant exercises and
The MOD/SDF has participated in PSI maritime meetings and participating in the same kind of activities
interdiction exercises, hosted by Japan, twice, working in which other countries hold.
partnership with relevant organizations such as the Ministry See Fig. III-2-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction
Exercise (Since 2013))
Fig. III-2-4-2 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012)
Date Exercise Location Participation of MOD/SDF

Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support
Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical
July 2012 PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan Japan
Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon
Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)
September 2012 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK Republic of Korea Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)
February 2013 PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE UAE Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)
August 2014 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S. United States Joint Staff (including one ship)
November 2015 PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand New Zealand Joint Staff
September 2016 PSI exercise hosted by Singapore Singapore Joint Staff, Yokosuka Fleet Training Group, Internal Bureau
September 2017 PSI exercise hosted by Australia Australia Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)
2 CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
3 Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention.
4 An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while
complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and related materials.

Human Foundation and Organization
Chapter
3 that Supports the Defense Force,
and Active Participation of Female
SDF Personnel
Section 1 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports

the Defense Force
In order to exert its defense capabilities with the further enhances and strengthens its human foundation
maximum effectiveness, it is essential that the MOD/SDF and organization, which supports the defense force.
1 Recruitment and Employment

Chapter 3
1 Recruitment See Fig. III-3-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join
the SDF)
It is vital to secure highly qualified personnel for the For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting
MOD/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial
Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force, and Active Participation of Female SDF Personnel
Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have Cooperation Offices in 50 locations throughout Japan
continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with
economic and employment upturn, as well as the the understanding of educators and support from
advancement of declining birthrate and popularization recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments
of higher education, the environment surrounding the are also carrying out some of the administrative activities
recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel
such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as
recruit excellent human resources with a strong desire announcing the recruitment period and promoting the
to enlist, by explaining sufficiently to them the missions, SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them
roles, duties, and working conditions of the SDF. the requisite budget.
Fig. III-3-1-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF
The number of 18–26 year-olds Number of newly-employed
(thousand people) personnel (people)
20,000 The number of 18–26 year-olds: About 17 million 30,000
⇒ About 11 million (down by about 40%) The number of newly-employed personnel
19,000 The number of 18-26 year olds (thousand people)
About 17 million 25,000
18,000 people
The number of newly-employed personnel: varies from year to year
(approximately equal to or larger than that of FY1994)
17,000
20,000
16,000
About 14,000
15,000 people 15,000
About 12,000
people
14,000
10,000
13,000
About 11 million
12,000 people
5,000
11,000
10,000 0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY)
Material sources: Data before FY2014 (excluding data for FY2005 and FY2010) are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920–2000” and “Annual Report on Population Estimates,”
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by the National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research based on “Population Census,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Data from FY2015 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force Section 1
Fig. III-3-1-2 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel

<Rank>
General (GSDF, ASDF),
Admiral (MSDF) to Second
Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Officer
Ensign (MSDF)
Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note 1)
Sergeant Major (GSDF),

Chief Petty Officer (MSDF),
Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)
Master Sergeant (GSDF)
Petty Officer First Class (MSDF) Officer Candidate
Master Sergeant (ASDF) Enlisted (upper)
Sergeant First Class (GSDF)
Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF)
Technical Sergeant (ASDF)
Sergeant (GSDF)
Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF) (Note 5)
Staff Sergeant (ASDF)
(4 years: Sergeant Major/Chief Petty Officer/

(Note 3) (Note 2) (Note 6)
Senior Master Sergeant upon graduation)

Leading Private (GSDF)
National Defense Academy Student
Civilian universities and colleges

Leading Seaman (MSDF) Leading Private
General candidate for enlistment (Upper)
(Includes students on loans)

Airman First Class (ASDF) SDF
Medical College student
Medical College student

(Note 4)
Division of Medicine
(2 officers per appointment, two/
3 sergeants through screening)
Division of Nursing
Personnel (u)
Student airmen (MSDF, ASDF)
National Defense
National Defense
(2 officers per appointment,
(2 officers per appointment,

Ensign after about 6 years)
in short-term
GSDF High Technical School Student
three years per term)

service
Second Lieutenant/
Private First Class (GSDF)
(3 years, Leading Private
Seaman (MSDF) 3rd Class

upon graduation)
Airman Second Class (ASDF)

Candidate
for SDF
Private (GSDF) Personnel (u)
Chapter 3
Seaman Apprentice (MSDF) 2nd Class (3 months)
Airman Third Class (ASDF)
1st Class
Aged 18 or older and under 27 Senior high school, and others

Junior high school,
and others
Legend : Exam or selection :Employment exam :Appointment after completing the program
Notes: 1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine.
2. Student candidates for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been appointed as an officer with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).”
Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined,
and since 2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper).”
3. As for the SDF candidates, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in short-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status for the first three months of their
enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel.
4. GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the
international community. For SDF students, starting from FY2010 appointments, their status was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a
high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those
who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc.,
in addition to the conventional general examination.
5. A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing in 2014.
6. For student airmen, the Maritime Self-Defense Force selects from persons 18 or above and under 23 in age and the Air Defense Force 18 or above and under 21 in age.
2 Employment
(1) Uniformed SDF personnel

Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’
free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under
various categories.
See Fig. III-3-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel)
Due to the uniqueness of their duties, personnel
management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from
that of general civilian government employees,1 including
“Early Retirement System” and “Fixed Term System” to
Graduation ceremony at the National Defense Academy (March 2018) [Photo: Cabinet
maintain the SDF’s strength. Secretariat Public Relations Office]
After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are
assigned their branch of service and duties at units all See Reference 59 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed
around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, SDF Personnel)
Reference 60 (Status of Application and Recruitment of
following basic education and training at respective Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2017))
training units or schools of respective SDF services. Fig. III-3-1-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel)
1 SDF personnel are designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law

Fig. III-3-1-3 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel (2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve
Mandatory
Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel
Rank Designation Retirement Age It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed
General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF) Sho
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major
Shoho
60 SDF personnel promptly depending on situational
General (ASDF)
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) Issa 56 changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF),
Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)
Nisa
55 number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF) Sansa
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF) Ichii
the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade
(MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)
Nii system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second
Lieutenant (ASDF)
Sani the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.2
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), 54 See Fig. III-3-1-4 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve
Juni
Warrant Officer (ASDF) Personnel)
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF),
Socho
Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF
Isso
(MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second
personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order
Niso
Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF),
53 or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base
Sanso
Staff Sergeant (ASDF) guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF),
Shicho
Airman First Class (ASDF) uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman
Isshi —
their mission together with incumbent uniformed SDF
Chapter 3
Second Class (ASDF)

Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman
Nishi
Third Class (ASDF) personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance
Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General
(GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff of a defense call-up order or other orders. SDF Reserve
Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62. Personnel candidates, some of whom are recruited
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician,
dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60. among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF
VOICE Companies Supporting Self Defense Force Reserve Personnel COLUMN

and Others (Cooperating Site for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others)
Muneo Taniguchi, Representative Director & Chairman, Nara Kotsu Bus Lines Co., Ltd.
(Chairman of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel Employment Cooperating Company Association
Our company has built a variety of businesses around the mainstay bus operation primarily in Nara Prefecture, including restaurants,
real estate, and other related businesses, with a theme of “safe and reliable Nara Kotsu” since its establishment through a merger
during the war years in 1943.
It has actively hired retiring uniformed Self Defense Force personnel for many years, totaling over 100 people thus far. The
company currently has two SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and nine SDF Reserve Personnel.
Uniformed SDF personnel join our company with a solid sense of responsibility, enthusiasm, and strong psychological wherewithal.
Many are both serious-minded and disciplined. They provide a model for other employees and help invigorate the workplace.
Furthermore, uniformed SDF personnel play a major role in social contribution, such as international peace cooperation operation
and disaster responses. I believe that hiring many retiring uniformed SDF personnel enhances enterprise value as well.
The company is honored to have received Minister of Defense certification as a “cooperating site for Self Defense Force Reserve
Personnel and others.” We intend to pursue hiring of retired uniformed SDF personnel even more actively than in past years and hope to
serve as a bridge between the Self Defense Forces and local society and contribute to advances in society through our business efforts.
Writer receiving a certificate of Minister of Defense certification

as a “cooperating site for Self Defense Force Reserve Personnel
and others” (left)
2 Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems.

Fig. III-3-1-4 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

SDF Reserve Personnel SDF Ready Reserve Personnel SDF Reserve Candidate Personnel
● After the issuance of defense call-up order and ● Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of ● Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or
Basic concept
others, serve as SDF Personnel the basic framework of defense capability MSDF upon completion of education and training
● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready ● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel (Common to General and Technical Employment Categories)
Candidate Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve ● Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including
Personnel those with less than a year of SDF experience)
● Enlisted (Lower): 18–37 years old ● Enlisted (Lower): 18–32 years old ● General: 18–34 years old; Technical: between the
● Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under ● Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three age of 18 and 53–55 depending on technical skills
Age
the age of two years added to respective years subtracted from respective retirement age possessed
retirement age
● Employed by screening, based on application ● Employed by screening, based on application ● General: Employed by examination, based on
● Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is application
Employment
appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon ● Technical: Employed by screening, based on
completion of education and training application
● Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the ● Former Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in ● Not designated
point of retirement in principle principle
● Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF ● Former Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of
Rank Ready Reserve Personnel. Designated rank at retirement in principle
designation the point of retirement in principle
● Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
• General: Private
• Technical: Designated based on skills
● Three Years/One term ● Three Years/One term ● General: Within of three years
Term of service
● Technical: Within of two years
● Although the Self-Defense Forces Law ● 30 days per year ● General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to
Education/ designates a maximum of 20 days per year, Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course)
Training actual implementation is 5 days per year as a ● Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve
standard as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)
● Promotion is determined by screening the ● Promotion is determined by screening the service record of ● Since there is no designated rank, there is no
Promotion service record of personnel who have fulfilled personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days) promotion
Chapter 3
the service term (actual serving days)
● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ● Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day
Benefits, ● SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month ● SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ● Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
allowances, and ● Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term is not paid because defense call-up duty or any
other terms ● Special subsidy for corporations employing other duties are not required
SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month
Call-up duty and ● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster ● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster ● Education and training call-up
other duties call-up, training call-up call-up, training call-up
personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after
completing the necessary education and training.
Previously, it was stipulated that SDF Reserve
Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel who
received a disaster and other call-up orders3 would begin
their service as SDF personnel five days or later (ten days
in the case of a defense call-up order for SDF Reserve
Personnel) after the issuance of the order. However, based
on the performance of calling up the SDF Ready Reserve
Personnel in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in
2016,4 the Order for Enforcement of the SDF Law was
partially revised in August 2016 to make it possible to SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaging in their tasks, responding to the call-up order for
shorten the number of days, provided that those personnel the heavy rainfall disaster in July 2018
have no objection.
As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow
civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days
adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such
exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from companies. Also, the MOD issues special certificates5 to
the companies that employ these personnel are essential companies that create an environment for SDF Reserve
for the smooth operation of the systems. Personnel they employ to participate in training sessions.
For this purpose, the MOD provides a special Moreover, the MOD takes various measures to gain
subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready understanding and cooperation from the companies that
3 The call-up orders refer to the defense call-up order, civil protection call-up order, and disaster call-up order for SDF Reserve Personnel as well as the defense call-up order, civil protection call-up
order, security call-up order, and disaster call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel; they do not include the training call-up orders for SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.
4 In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, a call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was issued for the second time in the SDF’s history, and 162 Ready Reserve Personnel engaged
in activities such as livelihood support to the affected people. In this case, a considerable number of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel who had received the call-up order arrived at their respective
SDF units prior to the date they were supposed to appear.
5 A system for recognizing companies that cooperate with the SDF Reserve Personnel program was introduced in FY2015. In that fiscal year, the directors of Provincial Cooperation Offices gave out
certifications and issued special certificates to those companies. In FY2016, the Minister of Defense gave out certifications. The certified companies are listed on the websites of the MOD and the
Provincial Cooperation Offices.

employ SDF Reserve Personnel. For example, the MOD and General Service National Public Employees
has been developing a framework that allows the MOD/ conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA),
SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination
a training call-up and scheduled term that SDF Reserve for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the
Personnel are called up to perform actual operations MOD. After participating in the common training course,
and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when civilian personnel recruited in this process work in a wide
requested by their employers. In addition, the MOD range of fields.
has established a new system where the employers are Administrative officials are engaged in defense-
provided with a subsidy if (1) SDF Reserve Personnel related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the
or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense
order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc. or (2) if they Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at
have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other
to injuries during their duties, etc. in order to contribute locations throughout the country.
to securing understanding and cooperation of the duties. Technical and engineering officials are working in the
Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Internal Bureaus of the MOD, ATLA, the SDF bases, the
Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout
Chapter 3
of retired SDF pilots, who are to be reemployed in the the country. They are engaged in constructing various
private sector, to SDF Reserve Personnel through the defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.),
reemployment system.6 carrying out R&D, efficient procurement, maintenance and
improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing
(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering mental health care for SDF personnel.
Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel Instructors conduct advanced research on defense
There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at
— administrative officials, technical and engineering the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National
officials, instructors, and others7 — in addition to Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical
uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian College, and other organizations.
personnel are mainly recruited from those who have See Reference 61 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.)
passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive
2 Daily Education and Training
1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult
for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the
Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external
SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic
for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, companies and research institutes.
the respective SDF training units and schools provide
opportunities for phased and systematic education 2 SDF Training
according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities
and instill knowledge and skills. (1) Training by Each SDF
A considerable extent of human, temporal, and Training conducted by units in each service can be
economic efforts such as securing instructors with broadly divided into training for individual SDF
special skills, and improving equipment and educational personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for
facilities, are necessary for providing education. In their respective fields, and training for units to enhance
the event that personnel need to further improve their their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is
6 The reemployment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots
over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and is also significant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole.
7 Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called” SDF personnel,” which include administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others
in addition to uniformed SDF personnel.

Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF conducting basic training
conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational joint exercises and other training and exercises in the United
classification and individual ability. Training for units States and surrounding sea and airspace where they can
is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small secure training conditions not available in Japan.
to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training See Reference 63 (Results of Firing Training and Related Training
including coordination between units is also conducted. by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United
States (FY2017))
In addition to training for national defense, the
MOD is endeavoring to improve training corresponding 3 Initiatives to Prevent Accidents, etc.
to the diversified SDF roles required in recent years,
Chapter 3
such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster Any accident that can cause injury to the public, damage
relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel,
joint operational capabilities and to respond to various must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, the MOD/SDF
situations, the MOD is making efforts to widen the scope constantly strive as one for safety management such as
of joint exercises and bilateral and multilateral exercises implementing the highest level of safety measures and
participated by the individual SDF services.8 precautions during routine training. Despite these efforts,
See Reference 62 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2017) in August 2017, an SH-60J helicopter, assigned to the
MSDF destroyer Setogiri, fell into the sea to the west of
(2) Training Environment Tappizaki, Aomori Prefecture during a training flight and
SDF training has been planned and conducted under three members lost their lives on duty. Furthermore, in
conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat October 2017, a UH-60J helicopter, which belongs to the
situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF ASDF Hamamatsu Air Base (Shizuoka Prefecture) fell
makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas, into the Pacific Ocean to the south of Hamamatsu City,
including further use of the prime training environment Shizuoka Prefecture during a training flight and four
of Hokkaido stated in the National Defense Program members lost their lives on duty.
Guidelines (NDPG) and other guidelines. They also strive In February 2018, an AH-64D helicopter belonging
to carry out more practical combat training by conducting to the GSDF Camp Metabaru (Saga Prefecture) fell
and crashed into a civilian house in Kanzaki City, Saga
Prefecture, doing major damage to the local community
including injury of one resident, fire on three buildings and
damages to the buildings surrounding the crash site, as
well as losing two SDF personnel on duty. Following the
incident, the MOD/SDF has been committed to providing
psychological care and compensation for damages for the
people affected by it so they can return to their daily life
as soon as possible. The Aircraft Accident Investigation
Committee established in the GSDF has been taking special
measures by allowing civilian experts in aeronautical
engineering etc. to participate in this investigation and an
Minister of Defense Onodera encouraging the airborne brigade members during the “FY2018
First Drop Maneuver of the First Airborne Brigade” (January 2018) interim report9 was released in May 2018.
8 Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional training
includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the treatment of
prisoners of war and other detainees is practiced.
9 The investigation progress of the AH-64D aircraft accident: http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/news/press/2018/pdf/20180528.pdf

It is greatly regretted that incidents such as these making its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such
have occurred as they compromise safety of the residents accidents by thoroughly investigating the causes of
in the regions, cause anxiety to the wide public regarding them and making sure each member has recognized the
the SDF’s operation and trainings and puts the lives of importance of safety management once again.
SDF personnel at risk. The MOD/SDF as a whole is
3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources
is also actively working to develop a family support system

1 Measures for Personnel System Reform and for to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural
the Improvement of Pay and Conditions
disasters and other events, which will include receiving
With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members
fixed number of SDF personnel has been constantly of SDF personnel. All of these are conducted as routine
reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need initiatives. Furthermore, specific welfare services for SDF
for further skilled and professional personnel in order personnel deployed overseas include facilitating direct
to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as communication with their families in Japan by means
Chapter 3
diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. such as e-mail and video conference systems. Support for
In light of such circumstances, it is stated in the sending comfort items from their families at a later date
NDPG that measures are to be implemented with regard to is also provided. Moreover, briefing sessions for families
personnel system reform in order to ensure the robustness of the dispatched SDF personnel are held to provide them
of the SDF and to make effective use of human resources with a variety of information, and a consultation desk
under the constrained budget. exclusively for families of the dispatched SDF personnel
Furthermore, due to the harsh environmental (family support centers), a website for the families of the
circumstances under which uniformed SDF personnel dispatched SDF personnel and similar facilities have been
have to perform their duties, the MOD/SDF strives to established to provide consolation for the various questions
provide salaries, allowances, welfare and other benefits and concerns raised by the families.
that reflect the special nature of their duties in order to let
uniformed SDF personnel concentrate on their duties with
Dealing with Retirement and Re-Employment of
pride, relieved of anxiety. The MOD/SDF also promotes 3 SDF Personnel
measures relating to awards and honors, beginning with the
expansion of the system of Defense Meritorious Badges. In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many
uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s
2 Initiatives to Support Families (personnel serving under the early retirement system)
or in their 20s (most uniformed SDF personnel serving
In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of
families, as well as between the families, the MOD in them need to find another job after retirement in order to
cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations secure their livelihoods.
Briefing sessions for families of the personnel dispatched to the Gulf of Aden Personnel of the Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy Enforcement (GSDF) receiving
conform items

Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility duties without any concerns, the MOD allows uniformed
of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, SDF personnel after mandatory retirement to be reappointed
and is crucially important both for resolving any concerns for fixed terms within three years before the age of 60 (one
that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future year for SDF administration officials and others). The Mid-
as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD Term Defense Program (MTDP) states that the SDF will
conducts support measures such as occupational training actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced
useful for their re-employment. The measures to support knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel
the re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel prove beneficial to the SDF’s strength.
is also important from the perspective of enabling them Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of
to give back to society with their various skills, thereby SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment
reinforcing human resources infrastructure. were introduced in October 2015 replacing the former
As the MOD does not have the authority to provide prior approval system. As are the cases in other national
them with employment placement, the Foundation for government employees, the following three regulations
the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public
consultation services with permission from the Minister regarding the fairness of official duties: 1) regulation on
of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. personnel and requesting information; 2) regulation
Chapter 3
Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent on seeking employment opportunities at companies
abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in office;
and responsibility gained through their work performance, and 3) regulation on re-employed personnel making
education, and training. Furthermore, they have various requests.10 In order to ensure strict observation of these
qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with
and vocational training. Therefore, they are making no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel
positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring
including manufacturing and service industries, as Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Reemployment
well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation and
industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally,
and risk management at local governments. Based on for the purpose of appropriate implementation of
the NDPG, the MOD has promoted further utilization of unified management and disclosure of re-employment
retired uniformed SDF personnel in the areas of disaster information by institutionalizing notification and
prevention and crisis management at local governments, announcement of such information by the Cabinet, it
and has provided supports for these retired personnel’s has been decided that information on the re-employment
re-employment in the sectors that lack sufficient human status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial
resources in collaboration with relevant ministries and positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator
agencies. The MOD will make further efforts to improve in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year
the re-employment environment for retired SDF personnel. by the Cabinet. In response to the introduction of this
See Reference 64 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support) system in FY2015, notifications of re-employment of the
Reference 65 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions
Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government)
submitted during FY2016 were compiled, and a total of
For the purpose of ensuring an environment where 203 cases were officially announced in September 2017.
uniformed SDF personnel can devote themselves to their
4 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline, etc.
1 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline ability on duty, it is essential to achieve support and trust
from the public. To this end, the SDF is required to always
The MOD/SDF has gained great expectations from the maintain strong discipline.
public and in order for the SDF to perform its maximum The MOD/SDF has so far strived to foster well-
10 Stipulated in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 65 of the SDF Law

disciplined personnel by impressing in them an the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel,
awareness of compliance with the law through setting up and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent
such campaign periods as the “MOD Anti-Drug Abuse suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion
Month,” “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/
“Self-Defense Personnel Sexual Harassment Prevention external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling
Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Power Harassment hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps
Prevention Week” and implemented various measures and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise
such as thorough instructions on service discipline. awareness about mental health for commanders as well as
However, the number of personnel subjected enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign
to disciplinary action has remained high and taking period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring
measures to eradicate violation of the law has become by commanders of the mental health condition of their
a pressing issue in order to achieve support and trust subordinates whose working environment has been
from the public. Based on this situation, in October 2017, changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution
Minister of Defense Onodera issued the “Instructions of of various reference materials.
the Minister of Defense toward Eradication of Violation
of the Law,” which included strengthening disciplinary
action and expediting the administrative process of 3 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in
Chapter 3
the Line of Duty

disciplinary action as the pillars. Thus, the MOD is
proceeding with its effort to eradicate violation of the law. Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve
Over the last few years, in addition to the daily report in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety
issues related to the South Sudan PKO11 and the daily Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today,
report issues related to Iraq,12 the MOD/SDF has faced SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble
issues such as uniformed SDF personnel’s inappropriate mission of protecting the peace and independence of
remarks toward diet members.13 Amid a situation Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly
where the security environment surrounding Japan is to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations
extremely severe, it is necessary to gain understanding and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and
and cooperation from the public, perform its duty and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time
respond to the expectations from the public in order to period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost
maintain the nation’s peace and security. The MOD/SDF their lives in the line of duty.
will make its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order
issues with the aim of recovering trust from the public. to express condolences are carried out by each unit to
which the personnel who perished in the line of duty
2 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel belonged. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the
achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the
SDF personnel suicides was a record 101 in FY2005, line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences,
and have subsequently increased and decreased, with 90 memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms,
suicides in FY2017. The suicide of SDF members is truly such as the Memorial Service for members of the SDF
a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and personal who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted
their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to with the participation of the Prime Minister.14
11 See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 2-2 for the results of the special defense inspection and measures to prevent recurrence
12 See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 2-4 for the overview of the cases and measures to prevent recurrence
13 For the final report on this case, see: http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/08b.html
14 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument
with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members,
the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of
Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the
MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel Section 2
Section 2 Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active

Participation of Female Personnel
The security environment surrounding Japan has become achieve work-life balance of its staff members.
increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging
of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s commitment are the active participation of female personnel, and the
increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a number of female personnel is on the rise.
rising number of MOD staff, both male and female, who The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of
deal with such situations will face time constraints due to initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the
childcare, nursing care and other reasons. further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of
Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring female personnel in a unified manner, such as formulating
preparedness to consistently respond to various situations various plans1 that include three reforms: (1) working
requires creating an environment that enables staff to style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career
be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for
morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the promoting active engagement of female personnel.
basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to
Chapter 3
1 Working Style Reform
(1) Value and Mentality Reform of Defense respectively honored particularly excellent
In order to implement working style reform, a focus initiatives, out of the applications received from various
needs to be placed especially on reforming the values organizations, and used them to help achieve work
and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding reform of each workplace.
working style. In FY2017, the MOD/SDF carried out
educational initiatives such as seminars and lecture (3) Flexible Working Hours and Location
meetings for raising awareness concerning working style Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations
reform and the concept of work-life balance. The MOD/ is necessary in light of factors such as operational
SDF also implements the “Take more annual leave” fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals.
promotional campaign to encourage staff to take a longer For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime
leave during holiday seasons, with an intention to reform system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose flexible
values related to working style. working hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple
(2) Work Reform in the Workplace

It is important that initiatives for the promotion of work-
life balance are appropriate for the actual circumstances
of individual workplaces, and that staff members
themselves consider specific measures for improving
their workplace environment. This approach will lead to
developing effective initiatives and workplace climate.
Based on this perspective, during the campaign period
for enhancing work-life balance from June to September
2017, the “Competition for initiatives to promote
Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” was
held. The Minister of Defense and the State Minister Employee working at home using telework
1 (1) “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” (January 2015), (2) “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role
of Women in the Workforce (FY2016-FY2020)” (April 2016), and (3) “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-Life Balance of the Personnel of the MOD based on the Act on Advancement of Measures
to Support Raising Next-Generation Children (FY2015-FY2020)” (March 2015).

periods. In addition, telework, a work style that allows the Internal Bureau of the MOD aim to begin adopting
working at home has become available in the Internal this work system from FY2019 and are steadily making
Bureau of the MOD in FY2017 after two years of test preparation by beginning to pilot the system.
introduction from FY2015. Organizations other than
2 Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care
In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare
be successful in their careers while realizing work-life leave to promote their participation in family life.
balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment
balancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to that enables staff to balance work life with their family life
ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working by distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return
patterns unique to the SDF. to work smoothly after childcare leave and encouraging
staff to use a “childcare form” to facilitate managers’ and
(1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff the human resources department’s thorough and detailed
to Realize a Successful Career While Engaging in understanding of the situation regarding childcare.
Chapter 3
Childrearing and Nursing Care The MOD/SDF has a system to rehire SDF personnel
The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which who have previously resigned mid-career. It reassessed the
enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing system so that former SDF personnels who had resigned
care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who in their mid-career due to childrearing and nursing care
take childcare leave and other leaves. In particular, the could be reemployed from January 2017. Based on this
VOICE Feelings about working again as a Ground Self Defense Force member COLUMN
Western Army Medical Unit, First Lieutenant, Tomomi Ikezaki
I joined the Ground Self Defense Force(GSDF) in 1993 as an officer candidate and worked as a treatment platoon leader in the
medical division, but in 1999, in my mid-career, I quitted in order to take care of my first daughter. After it, I raised my three children
and worked as a care welfare specialist at the same time. My husband, an active member of the Self Defense Forces(SDF), told
me about the renewed hiring program for former SDF members. I had not been thinking about coming back to the GSDF at all.
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm from my youthful years rekindled my motivation and I immediately decided to volunteer again. Receipt
of my appointment certificate after the interviews filled me with the same inspiration as when I first joined the GSDF.
I began working as a GSDF officer again on the 1st January, 2018. There have been many things to learn and remember given
significant changes in the environment surrounding the GSDF and its role since I left. While everyday was challenging, I felt that I
could be useful even after a blank of 18 years and was happy to be rehired. I greatly appreciate the support from my superiors, peers
and family, and will strive to become even more effective for my unit.
First Lieutenant Ikezaki and her superior

Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel Section 2
system, some previous Ground Seld Defense Force MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, and ASDF Iruma
personnels were recruited in January 2018. Air Base, respectively. Additionally, in April 2017, a
workplace nursery was newly opened at Ichigaya district
(2) Ensuring Childcare Services where the MOD is located in April within National
To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to Defense Medical College in October 2017.
concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure In addition, in the event of emergency operations
childcare services tailored to the irregular working such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes measures to
patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/ provide temporary care within SDF camps and bases for
SDF has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp children of SDF personnel who have no alternative but to
Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp attend to duties with their children.
Makomanai, GSDF Asaka Camp dormitory district,
3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel
For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion homogeneity among the members, into an organization
of female personnel in a unified manner, the MOD/SDF that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources
Chapter 3
has been making various efforts to advance the careers of in a flexible manner.
motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up At the present moment, the largest human resource
specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women,
of female personnel based on the “Action Plan for who account for half of the population targeted for
Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female
and Work-Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated SDF personnel has the following significance: (1)
the “Initiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse
SDF Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation.
to the Times and Environment” (the “Initiative”) in April For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up
2017 to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the a path for female personnel with motivation, ability,
active participation of female SDF personnel. and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their
abilities in various fields, and aim for doubling the ratio
(1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female of female SDF personnel.
SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy In terms of employing and promoting female SDF
The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promoting the personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management
active engagement of female personnel and the MOD/SDF policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and
personnel management policy. Specifically, with SDF women and assign the right person to the right place based
duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude.
personnel are required to have multifaceted capabilities
including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making (2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female
ability, and skills than before. In addition, under a severe SDF Personnel
recruitment environment due to the declining birthrate While the SDF has been accepting female SDF personnel
and greater advancement into higher education, it is since its establishment in 1954, assignment of female
anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time personnel had been restricted in some units, such as the
restraint including those involved in childcare, nursing GSDF infantry companies and tank companies. However,
care, and other responsibilities will significantly increase. the Initiative, formulated in April 2017, virtually removed
In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve the restriction on the assignment of female personnel
from a conventional organization with an emphasis on across the SDF.2
2 With regard to part of the GSDF NBC Weapon Defense Unit, the GSDF Tunnel Company, and MSDF submarines, the assignment restriction has not been removed due to reasons in relation to protecting
motherhood and the characteristics of the equipment.
Also, certain units such as GSDF rifle platoons and tank platoons from which the assignment restriction has been removed, personnel will be assigned successively to the units whose preparation has
completed by proceeding with necessary preparation such as making of assignment standards.

Fig. III-3-2-1 Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel

(Number) (%)
15,000 7.0
14,000
GSDF personnel
13,000 MSDF personnel Recruitment of women started 6.0
for aviation students of
ASDF personnel the MSDF and the ASDF
12,000
Total number of female SDF personnel /
Total number of SDF personnel Recruitment of women
11,000 started for students the of 5.0
the National Defense Academy
10,000
9,000
4.0
8,000
Recruitment of
7,000 women started
Recruitment of women for students the of
3.0
started in the general the National Defense
6,000 service area of Medical College
the MSDF and the ASDF
5,000
2.0
4,000 Recruitment of
women started in
3,000 the general service
Chapter 3
area of the GSDF
2,000 1.0
1,000
0 0.0
54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 (FY)
Note: As of the end of March 2018, the total number of female SDF personnel is 14,686 (approximately 6.5% of the total number of the current SDF personnel)
(3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel personnel in the overall SDF personnel and halve the
a. Female SDF Personnel mid-career retirement rate.
As of the end of March 2018, the number of female See Fig. III-3-2-1 (Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel)
SDF personnel is about 15,000 (about 6.5% of total SDF b. Female Administrative Officials, Technical and
personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others
2008, about 4.9% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of As of the end of March 2018, the number of female
1.6 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel - administrative officials, technical
SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years. and engineering officials, and instructors, and others
In order to increase the proportion of female SDF - is approximately 3,200 (about 24.0% of total civilian
personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9% personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March
by 2030, the MOD/SDF plans to ensure that women 2008 when females made up 22.8% of the total civilian
account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.2 percentage point, indicating
personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, the increase that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising
in the number of female recruits will be realized by trend in recent years.
measures such as the elimination of the gender quota and With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall
the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits. government target, the MOD has set up its goal of
In addition, with regard to promotion, the proportion of ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in
women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be
or higher will be increased from 3.1%. As for the careers achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women
of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer of the Division-Director level at local organizations and
or higher in the future, an emphasis is given on assigning Assistant-Division-Director level at the ministry proper
them to a commander or assistant commander post at the or equivalent should be approximately 5%, and the
rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the
to gain experience. ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately
Furthermore, in addition to these specific numerical 2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief
targets, the “Initiative” formulated in April 2017 indicates level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be
that the MOD aims to double the percentage of female approximately 27%.

Enhancement of Medical Functions Section 3
Section 3 Enhancement of Medical Functions

For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must is important to appropriately and accurately carry out
remain in good health through appropriate management of medical activities such as medical care in disaster relief
their health. Also, it is important that the SDF always seeks and international peace cooperation activities.
to enhance its capabilities in military medicine, such as The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and
first aid capabilities for protecting the lives of the personnel strengthening its capabilities in military medicine to be
engaging in a variety of services as much as possible. able to appropriately carry out a variety of its missions,
Under the circumstance where the SDF’s missions including in response to various emergency events and
are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it international peace cooperation activities.
1 SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions
The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF through measures such as promoting the consolidation
Chapter 3
personnel and other persons transported from their area of of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels, by
activity in various emergency situations, while in normal reorganizing 16 SDF hospitals located nationwide into
circumstances these hospitals provide medical care to roughly 10 locations to develop more efficient and higher-
SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also quality hospitals. For instance, MOD/SDF is promoting
play the role of educational institutions that train medical enhancement of medical care by making some SDF
personnel and maintain and enhance their skills. hospitals designated as secondary emergency medical
Based on the NDPG, etc., the MOD currently institutions by the local municipalities to welcome
aspires to establish a high-quality medical care system emergency patients, etc.
2 Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College
As the only educational institution for the training of College would be strengthened as the training and
physicians as well as public health and registered nurses research center for defense medicine. Based on these, the
under the jurisdiction of the MOD/SDF, the National MOD is strengthening the organizational structure of the
Defense Medical College plays the role of training and National Defense Medical College, enhancing its training
producing the primary medical staff for the medical and research functions, and strengthening its cooperation
activities of the SDF as well as maintaining and improving with all three branches of the SDF. Furthermore, the
their skills. National Defense Medical College conducts advanced
In such a situation, the NDPG, etc. states not only that research on defense medicine by incorporating advanced
the MOD/SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical technology in order to utilize specialized medical
medical care system, including improved management technology and to contribute to operation of SDF units as
of the National Defense Medical College Hospital, but well as education and research of the National Defense
also that the function of the National Defense Medical Medical College.
3 Enhancement of Education of Medical Officers and Nurses
While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical
in medical care, such as medical officers, due to the training and practice. The MOD/SDF continues efforts to
diversification of missions, only 80% of the positions implement various measures to prevent medical officers
have been filled in the case of medical officers in from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education
particular. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical after graduation from the National Defense Medical
officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of College and other institutions, promoting various

initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical 2014, which is training public health/registered nurses
officers to engage in medical practice, helping them who are capable of fully responding to the diversification
acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in of missions and the sophistication of medical technology.
areas such as infectious diseases, as well as increasing The first batch of students (109 students) graduated from
their motivation for work. the College in March 2018.
Furthermore, with the aim of training and securing Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff are
high-quality public health/registered nurses, a four- educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other
year “nursing course”1 was established in the School of relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse
Medicine at the National Defense Medical College in April missions and missions under special circumstances.
4 Enhancement of First Aid Capabilities on the Frontline
Based on the NDPG and other guidelines stating that frontline. Specifically, since 2017, the MOD commenced
the MOD “conducts a review on emergency medical specific education and training for SDF personnel who
treatment on situational responses and improves first aid are certified as both Licensed Practical Nurses and
capabilities on the frontline,” the MOD/SDF has conducted Emergency Life-Saving Technicians to acquire necessary
Chapter 3
research on relevant initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces knowledge and skills, so that the SDF personnel with
and carried out reviews for appropriate and accurate these qualifications will be able to provide specialized
life-saving activities. For the purpose of deepening this relief treatments3 on the spot to SDF personnel who were
review, the “Committee on accurate life-saving for the injured on the frontline, prior to their transfer to SDF
MOD/SDF first aid activities on the frontline” comprised hospitals and other medical facilities. Those who have
of external experts, was held at the MOD in April 2015, completed this education and training curriculum have
and a report2 was prepared in September 2016 based on been allocated to units as “Frontline Medics.”4 The SDF
the discussions in the Committee. The MOD/SDF is is also improving medical materials to be carried by the
working to develop a framework for providing maximum “Frontline Medics.”
protection for the lives of the personnel injured on the
5 Improving the Capabilities to Deal With Infectious Diseases
In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease who have expertise that is necessary to contribute to the
outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the Ministerial Meeting Japan Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities and by
on Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases was accelerating the establishment of a framework including
established in September 2015 under close cooperation the National Defense Medical College.” In response to
among relevant administrative bodies, for the entire this, the MOD/SDF conducts various reviews on the
government to advance effective and comprehensive enhancement of capabilities to respond to infectious
measures on infectious diseases that could be a global diseases, a potential global threat. Based on these reviews
threat. In the same month of the same year, a decision was as well as other factors, the MOD/SDF is currently
made on the Basic Guidelines for Strengthening Measures improving the necessary facility equipment at the National
on Emerging Infectious Diseases. This basic guideline Defense Medical College Hospital and the SDF Central
stipulates that, “The Government of Japan will promote Hospital. The aims of this improvement are to provide
the improvement of the ability to address emerging personnel training for the enhancement of capabilities
infectious diseases at the Ministry of Defense and the to deal with infectious diseases and develop readiness
Japan Self-Defense Forces by training human resources for offering medical treatment to patients affected by
1 The nursing course consists of two training courses: one for fostering SDF officers who are certified nurses or public health nurses; and the other for fostering technical and engineering officials with
the same qualifications.
2 “Report on the committee on accurate life-saving for the MOD/SDF first aid activities on the frontline” (September 2016)
3 First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief.
4 The “Frontline Medics” are of those who are certified as Licensed Practical Nurses (Refer to the Assistant Nurse stipulated in Article 6 of the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses (Act
No. 203 of 1948)) and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (Refer to the Emergency Life-Saving Technician stipulated in Section 2, Article 2 of the Emergency Life-saving Technicians Act (Act No. 36 of
1991)), those who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in Article 4 of the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions (MOD Directive No. 60 of 2016).

Enhancement of Medical Functions Section 3
VOICE Certified as a Frontline Medics (Sergeant Major Takayanagi) COLUMN

After completing the education mission of the first-year Frontline Medics
group education (Major Koiwai)
Ground Self Defense Forces Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo),
Sergeant Major, Etsushi Takayanagi
Frontline Medics conduct cricothyroidotomy and other emergency aid in limited situations to improve
the survival of the SDF personnel.
The training, based on the guidelines adopted by the US armed forces and others, was
practical, challenging, and fruitful. I felt nervous about the final exam, but I devoted all my energy
to using actual medical equipment as effectively as possible and analyzing the symptoms of patient
simulators as completely as possible. As a result, I managed to get the certificate.
I will show my full commitment to be a member of Frontline Medics, brush up my skills and
knowledge, and educate would-be Frontline Medics. Writer engaged in emergency aid
(Sergeant Major Takayanagi)
Chapter 3
Ground Self Defense Forces Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo),
Instructor, Major, Kazuki Koiwai
Introduction of Frontline Medics is a major leap for the SDF medical troops to change into the troops
that can better save lives.
Advanced skills and knowledge are required to perform invasive procedures(*). To meet this
need, we focused on teaching trainees specialist knowledge and had them participate in reality-
oriented, physically and mentally strenuous exercises so that the trainees can perform procedures
properly even in extreme situations. The first-graduating personnel worked excellently hard and
acquired reliable skills. I feel proud of them.
I will remain committed to establishing medical support capabilities and operations
Writer supporting certification tests
* Surgical procedures including incisions and punctures. for Frontline Medics (Major Koiwai)
Class I infectious diseases,5 which are classified as the on advanced initiatives implemented by various
most dangerous category of infectious diseases. The SDF foreign countries, and collects information by seizing
Central Hospital was designated as a medical institution opportunities such as defense medicine exchanges for the
for Class I infectious diseases in April 2017 and has been purpose of contributing to the enhancement of capabilities
implementing trainings to deal with infectious diseases. to deal with infectious diseases.
In addition, the MOD also conducts research
5 Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fevers, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa disease (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious
Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases)

Chapter
4 Measures on Defense
Equipment and Technology
While defense equipment has become more advanced and over other countries. Hence, Japan is required to further
complex, the defense industry in Japan has been exposed develop defense equipment and technology policies
to harsh conditions due to a decrease in the number while also taking into account these points.
of units procured caused by Japan’s severe financial Amid such a situation, it is indispensable to work
conditions and an increase in imports of foreign-made on (1) strategic research and development for ensuring
equipment. In addition, other countries are aiming to Japan’s technological superiority, (2) maintenance and
acquire advanced military capabilities utilizing the latest strengthening of defense production and technological
technologies. In order to ensure the quality of defense bases, (3) strengthening of project management, and
capabilities sufficiently and to enhance deterrence as (4) promotion of defense equipment and technology
well as response capabilities amid the situation in which cooperation, in order to maintain an environment in which
rapid advancements in technological innovation have a defense equipment that meets the SDF’s operational
significant influence on the global security environment, needs will be procured into the future.
it is crucial that Japan ensure technological superiority
Chapter 4
Section 1 Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring

Technological Superiority
Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology
1 Necessity of Ensuring Technological Superiority
As the security environment surrounding Japan perspective of creating superior defense equipment and
becomes increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure ensuring Japan’s security, and also, improvement of
technological superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s technology platforms is a pressing issue. The state-of-
advanced technological strength in order to protect the the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive
lives and property of Japanese people in any situation. technologies that shall not be easily shared with other
Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas,
in technological innovation, it is forecast that we will which should strategically maintain their domestic
see the operationalization of so-called game-changing technology platforms, it is necessary to promote research
technology that will completely transform combat aspects and development domestically. In the cases of defense
in the future, and the United States and other countries equipment procurement and technology cooperation
are proceeding hastily with research and development. such as international joint development, it is important
See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6 (Trends Concerning Military to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-
Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and edge technology (key technology). This requires not
Technological Bases)
only research and development by the MOD, but also
Thus, as a nation, strategically working on the the promotion of research and development by both the
ways to ensure technological superiority and ensuring public and private sectors together.
advanced technology platforms are important from the

Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority Section 1
2 Defense Technology Strategy and related documents

For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that promotes medium-
superiority, inventing as well as delivering advanced to long-term research and development. At the same time,
equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and it also promotes research and development that serve as
dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense the foundation of defense force building and initiatives
and civilian technologies, taking account of the National such as “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for
Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Security,” which puts into perspective the identification
Guidelines (NDPG), the MOD formulated the Defense and development of advance technology expected to be
Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presented used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/
the specific direction for various measures that should be overseas agencies and defense purposes.
addressed strategically. Based on this strategy, the MOD (iii) Protection of Technologies
promotes various measures. The MOD implements technology control for proper
technology transfer to prevent situations in which
1 Overview of Defense Technology Strategy Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention,
undermining the maintenance of the peace and security
(1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives of the international community or ensuring Japan’s
The following two objectives of the MOD technology technological superiority. The MOD also establishes
policy are designed to strengthen the technical intellectual property management taking into account
capabilities, which are the foundation of Japan’s defense the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the
capabilities, to make the foundation more robust: utilization of intellectual property.
Chapter 4
(i) Ensuring technical superiority
(ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through 2 Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook
effective and efficient research and development
The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology

(2) Specific Measures to be Promoted Outlook presents an outlook of the technologies that
The following three measures are promoted to achieve can be applied to equipment expected to be established
the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph. in roughly the next 20 years, and indicates technology
(i) Grasping Technological Information fields that need to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s
With regard to various scientific technologies that support technological superiority, with a particular focus on
defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current advanced technology fields that have the potential to
situation and trends both in and outside of Japan including become game changers. It is expected that making this
dual-use technology in the public and private sectors and Outlook, public will facilitate the integration of superior
cutting-edge scientific technology. In addition, the MOD civilian advanced technologies and the development of
develops and publishes the Medium- to Long-Term technologies outside of the ministries aimed at defense
Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below) equipment applications.
to identify advanced technology fields, which have the This Outlook selects and makes a comprehensive
potential to become game changers. assessment of 57 cases of “future equipment technologies”1
(ii) Development of Technologies and 21 cases of “potential technologies,”2 and on that basis,
The MOD formulates the “Research and Development identifies the following four technology fields as the focus
of research and development going forward:
KEY WORD (i) Efforts for unmanned technology
(ii) Efforts for smart and network technology
Dual-use technology (iii) Efforts for high-power energy technology
(iv) Efforts to improve the function and performance of
Technology that can be used for both civilian and defense purposes
legacy systems
1 Technology fields with future importance and element technology

2 Technologies, which are in the basic research stage at this point in time, but which will dramatically enhance the function of existing equipment, etc. and have the potential for inventing new
equipment, if applied to equipment, etc. in the future

3 “Research and Development Vision” development. So far, the MOD has prepared and published
the “Future Fighter R&D Vision” in August 2010 and the
The “Research and Development Vision” provides “Research and Development Vision of Future Unmanned
the direction of medium to long-term research and Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle”
development by clarifying technical challenges regarding in August 2016. Based on these visions, the MOD is
equipment that are deemed to become important, and currently conducting various research and study toward
presenting a concept for defense equipment that looks technological demonstrations including those for beyond
ahead to the future and a roadmap for research and line-of-sight type unmanned aerial vehicles.
development to achieve the concept. The MOD will continue to establish and publish
The MOD publishes research and development research and development visions for equipment that
visions and shares them with the defense industry, with requires development and enhancement of technological
the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies bases while ascertaining trends in defense technologies.
and realizing more effective and efficient research and
3 Initiatives regarding Research and Development
The MOD invents equipment that meets the needs of the development of the next-generation warning and control
SDF indicated in the Medium Term Defense Program radar equipment that can respond to future airborne
(MTDP), including (1) improvement of air defense threats and ballistic missiles with superior detecting
capability, (2) enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and tracking capabilities, survivability, economic
Chapter 4
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, (3) unmanned efficiency and other aspects as well as research aiming
equipment that can be used flexibly at times of various to load dual wavelength infrared sensors with superior
contingencies including large-scale disasters, and detecting and discriminating capabilities onto “advanced
(4) enhancement of the capacity of existing equipment. optical satellites,” which are currently being planned
The MOD also makes proposals regarding highly by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
promising technologies based on technological trends, and Technology (MEXT) and the Japan Aerospace
as well as adopting advanced technologies and dual-use Exploration Agency (JAXA), and to operate them in the
technologies for prototyping, and conducts testing and space environment. The MOD also promotes research
evaluation of the prototype equipment. Particularly for on high mobility powered suits and the environmental
improving air defense capability, with regard to future awareness enhancement technology for remote control
fighters, the MOD conducts strategic studies including vehicles that can be used flexibly at times of various
research on the large-thrust and compact engines, the contingencies including large-scale disasters.
advanced sensor system that integrates radars and Furthermore, in the area of advanced research, which
infrared sensors to enable detecting and tracking of has the potential to ensure technological superiority,
stealth fighters, and integrated fire control technology for the MOD conducts research regarding the element
expanded shooting opportunities and improved shooting technology of the next generation of night vision devices
efficiency through cooperation among multiple aircraft to as well as components of EMP warheads (EMP radiation
be able to take into account the development (including part), which induce the malfunction and destruction of
the possibility of international joint development) of sensor and electronic equipment, and study on EMP
fighters as an option before the retirement of F-2 fighters. protection technology. The MOD also conducts research
The decision on the development will be made in FY2018 regarding the electromagnetic acceleration system that
and necessary measures will be taken accordingly. utilizes electric energy to accelerate the speed, extend the
Furthermore, the MOD carries out a study on the element range and realize the higher power of projectiles , which
technology based on the high-energy laser system, which are not feasible using conventional gunpowder, research
can be applied to close air defense of vessels and bases, regarding the high-energy laser system that responds to
and a study on the technology, which induces malfunction threats such as a large number of small unmanned aerial
or destruction of electronic equipment built into incoming vehicles and mortar shells that fly high and low in the
missiles to neutralize the missiles by generating and sky for a low cost and short reaction time, research on
irradiating high-powered directed microwaves. element technology of HVGP (Hyper Velocity Gliding
To improve ISR capabilities, the MOD undergoes Projectile) intended for the defense of remote islands

which can glide at high velocity and attack a target in of a new test and evaluation facility “Iwakuni Oceanic
order to enable island-to-island firing, and research Environmental Test and Evaluation Satellite (provisional
regarding miniaturization of high-power engines and the name)” in Iwakuni City to efficiently and effectively
entire system design through simulation models in order conduct research on unmanned underwater vehicles, etc.
to improve mobility on the sea for the future amphibious using dual-use technologies based on the “Basic Policy
technology. Furthermore, the MOD began development on the Relocation of Governmental Organizations.”3
4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology
The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) smooth implementation of research projects, program
and domestic research institutions, such as universities officers, who are in charge of managing research progress,
and independent administrative institutions, proactively are assigned in the same manner as competitive research
engage in research collaborations and technological funding programs being conducted by other government
information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced ministries and agencies. The program officers provide
civilian technology is incorporated and efficient research support including checking research progress and
and development is conducted. In FY2015 the MOD processing budget execution procedures.
launched a competitive research funding program called Active utilization of advanced civilian technology
“Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” through such programs is not only essential for securing
to discover creative research activities conducted in the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people
universities, research institutes, companies, etc., which into the future, but is also beneficial for the development
Chapter 4
are expected to apply defense equipment in the future and of Japan’s science, technology and innovation in
to promote promising research seeds. non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment
While total of 33 research projects were awarded in innovative technology by the Defense Advanced
by FY2017, this program was expanded in FY2017 in Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States

order to enable the awards of larger-scale and longer- facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole
term research projects (total budget of about 11 billion including civilian technology, such as the development
yen). The program will continue to run on a similar of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD
scale in FY2018. intends to promote relevant measures.
In the basic research areas, free thinking of Moreover, under the Council for Science, Technology
researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For and Innovation (CSTI), the “Council for Innovation
this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to Strategy” was launched with the Chief Cabinet Secretary
freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, as the chairman in order to coordinate implementation
for example, researchers will be able to publish all of of comprehensive strategies. The Minister of Defense
their research results to have a wide range of academic participates in it as a member with the aim of promoting
discussions. Hence, in this program the MOD will neither policies of science and technology that directly connect
restrict contractors’ publication of research results, nor with ensuring safety and security of the public by further
designate research results as confidential, never providing strengthening cooperation among industry, government
any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some and academia, etc.
research results have already been published through oral See Fig. III-4-1-1 (FY2017 Awarded Research Projects for the
presentations, publications, etc. From the perspective of “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program
3 Decided at the Advisory Council on Vitalizing Towns, People and Jobs on March 22, 2016

Fig. III-4-1-1 FY2017 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program
Representative Institution
Research Title Brief Summary
for the Project
This project aims to acquire a method that estimates combustion
phenomenon in a hypersonic speed range and aerodynamic heating from
Fundamental researches of fluid and Japan Aerospace Exploration
data obtained by ground-based facilities via wind tunnel tests, trial flight
combustion for the hypersonic flight Agency
tests, and simulators for the purpose of enhancing fundamental technology
that supports future hypersonic aviation.
Development of a mid-infrared quantum This project aims to realize a mid-infrared light source with high output and
National Institute for Materials
cascade lasers of high beam quality by high beam quality by introducing a surface emitting element using photonic
Science
[Large-scale research projects (Type S)] Six projects
photonic crystal structures crystal to the quantum cascade laser.

This project aims to make a feasibility study of an uncooled turbine system
Development of innovative material technology based on the molybdenum alloy and nickel alloy materials for utilization in
IHI Corporation
for uncooled turbine system an aircraft engine through surveying material technology and manufacturing
process.
This project aims to realize a method of identifying the type, volume, and
Development of remote sensing technology for
location of the multiple toxic substances immediately from a distance, by
trace hazardous substances in the atmosphere Shikoku Research Institute Inc.
radiating the laser and measuring resonance Raman scattering light emitted
by resonance Raman effect
by substances.
This project aims to enhance output power of high-frequency devices
Innovative high-power/high-frequency devices dramatically by applying an electron transport channel structure that is
Fujitsu Limited
utilizing ultimate quantum confinement effect realized by means of a strong quantum confinement effort enabled by a new
semiconductor material, and by applying a high heat dissipation material.
This project aims to obtain adhesive strength of carbon fiber reinforced
plastics that exceeds existing technologies and methods, which will be
realized by perceiving systematically the effect of the process factor through
Research on improving reliability management understanding the mechanism of adhesive strength of the adhesive surface Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
technology of composites structure bonding by observing the molecular-level chemical state and electron state, assessing Ltd.
Chapter 4
the adhesive strength in micro and macro scale, and simulating the molecular
dynamics of the interface chemical state, and evaluating the new surface
reformulation method.
This project aims to realize a measurement method for estimation of
High resolution stereoscopic image estimation
the stereoimage of buried material in the ground through observation of Japan Aerospace Exploration
of buried material in heterogeneous medium
electromagnetic wave scattering from the buried material with multiple Agency
by multi angle 3-D holographic GB-SAR (*1)

aspects.
In-situ electrochemical measurement of epoxy This project aims to realize a new evaluation method to visualize molecular
Japan Aerospace Exploration
equivalent weight at CFRP (*2) adhesive level adhesive imperfection at adhesive interface through electrochemical
Agency
interphase observation of molecular bonds in CFRP adhesion.
[Small-scale research projects (Type A/B)] Eight projects
This project aims to realize technology for high-sensitivity and high

The research on seawater microscopic precision detection of buried objects under the ocean floor by building an National Institute of Information
electromagnetic field response and its electromagnetic field transmission model with considering the factors in and Communications
application for seafloor exploration microscopic electromagnetic response in ocean water, with applying this Technology
model to the sensor technology.
The proposal of rechargeable batteries This project aims to realize a semiconductor solid-state battery which
accumulating electrons in trap levels of expects excellent safety features because of the no need of ion transfer and Toshiba Materials Co.,Ltd.
semiconductor materials chemical reaction.
This project aims to realize optical materials and systems with transmittance
Optical materials and lenses with ultra-wide
over an ultra-broadband range from visible to far-infrared through discovery
transmission wavelength from visible to far- Panasonic Corporation
of new optical materials, lens formation process research, and optical design
infrared
for realizing ultra-broadband resolution.
This project aims to realize an innovative lithium rechargeable battery with
Development of non-volatile and high energy
excellent safeness and high energy density by raising the volatilization Hitachi, Ltd.
density secondary battery
temperature of the electrolyte.
Research on active control of acoustic This project aims for realization of an acoustic meta-material that actively
impedance by MUT(*3)-type acoustic controls acoustic features using MEMS (*4) technology based on an acoustic Hitachi, Ltd.
metamaterial impedance matching physical model.
This project aims to realize a ceramic coating material for an ultra-high
Development of ultra-high temperature temperature thermal barrier, designing and reviewing an optimal chemical
Japan Fine Ceramics Center
thermal barrier coating system composition and layer structure by theoretical calculation, and optimizing
conditions through an actual process.
*1. GB-SAR: Ground-Based Synthetic Aperture Radar
*2. CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic
*3. MUT: Micro machined Ultrasonic Transduce
*4. MEMS: Micro Electro Mechanical Systems

VOICE Development of consumer products using the security COLUMN

technology research promotion program
Osaka City University, Graduate School of Engineering, Chemistry and Biology Department, Professor
Yusuke Yamada
I have studied heterogeneous catalysts working as well as adsorbents for safety removal of pesticides and other toxic substances
released in water and air. The final goal of the research is protecting agricultural workers from exposure to the harmful chemicals by
using a developed heterogeneous catalyst that can be applied to an agrochemical protection mask in future. This research is supported
by “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which has started one and a half years ago. Regularly scheduled meetings
with a program officer during the period are valuable opportunities to receive useful advice from an expert perspective.
Chapter 4
Writer analyzing test results (research representative)

Commentary Technology interaction with the US Defense Advanced Research COLUMN
Projects Agency (DARPA)
In the United States Department of Defense, various research organizations
contribute to technology development, and DARPA invests in breakthrough
technologies for national security. Investment by DARPA have contributed
to the creation of new defense technology such as precision weapons and
stealth technology, but also icons of civilian society such as the Internet
and Global Positioning System receivers small enough to fit in your hand.
DARPA is an important actor in the U.S. innovation ecosystem. The Ministry of
Defense has conducted technology exchanges with various defense research
organizations, including DARPA, in order to carry out efficient technology
development. Technical exchange between representatives from DARPA and MOD

The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases,

Section 2 and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases
Excellent defense production and technological MOD established the Strategy on Defense Production
bases are indispensable in inventing superior defense and Technological Bases in June 2014 to maintain and
equipment in an effective and efficient manner, while strengthen the bases.
ensuring technological superiority. For this reason, the
1 The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases
The term “defense production and technological bases” equipment. In addition, while research and development
refers to the human, physical and technological bases expenditure is increasing, the ratio of research and
for development, production, operation, sustainment and development expenditure to defense-related expenditure
maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense has leveled off.
equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In Furthermore, changes in the international
Japan, most of those bases are covered by companies (the environment such as the realignment of the Western
defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment defense industries and advances in international joint
and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of development and production projects can be mentioned
companies,1 which own special and advanced skills and as the issues that impact on Japan’s defense production
Chapter 4
facilities are involved in the defense production and and technological bases. There are also new changes
technological bases. Meanwhile, the degree of defense emerging in the institutional framework, such as the
demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that transfer of defense equipment and technology based on
accounts for the entire company sales) is approximately the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
3% on average, indicating that defense businesses are not and Technology (see Section 4), which was approved by
their primary business in many companies.2 Furthermore, the Cabinet in April 2014.
Japanese defense production and technological bases See Fig. III-4-2-1 (Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for
face some issues such as difficulties in maintaining Equipment, etc.)
Fig. III-4-2-2 (Current Status of Research & Development
and passing on skills and techniques and withdrawal of Expenditure)
some companies from defense businesses because the Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6-2 (Trends Concerning Defense
effect of mass production is hard to expect due to limited Production and Technological Bases)
Section 4-1 (The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense
demand, and unit costs and maintenance/sustainment Equipment and Technology)
costs are increasing due to the advances in recent defense
2 The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases
Technological Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The

1 Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy
Production and Technological Bases, etc.
and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG),
In light of the current situation, for the purpose replacing “Kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic
of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense development/production).”3
production and technological bases, which is important See Reference 5 (National Security Strategy (Outline))
and an essential element supporting Japan’s defense Reference 6 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for
FY2014 and beyond)
capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and
1 For example, it is said that there are approximately 1,100 fighter aircraft-related companies, approximately 1,300 tank-related companies, and approximately 8,300 destroyer–related companies.
2 According to the survey on defense demand dependence conducted with 46 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2015. Although relatively small in scale, some
companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a significant
impact on the management of these companies.
3 The basic guideline for production and development of defense equipment, the development guideline for defense industry, and the stimulation guideline for R&D (Directive July 16, 1970)

The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases Section 2
Fig. III-4-2-1 Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc.

Maintenance and Upgrade Defense-Related
Expenditures for Equipment, etc Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures (100 million yen) Expenditures
(100 million yen) (100 million yen)
13,000
Defense-Related Expenditures (100 million yen) 51,000
49,412 49,198 49,385 49,262 49,388
48,452 48,607
49,287 49,215 49,392 48,297
47,815 47,838 48,996
11,000 48,760 48,000
47,028 48,221
47,236 47,903 46,625
46,406 47,426
46,835 46,826 46,804
46,453
45,518
9,000 8,750 45,000
8,553
8,141
43,860 7,862 7,794
7,612
7,387 7,352 7,459 7,431 7,527 7,502
7,199
6,686 6,993
7,000 6,757 6,554 6,508 6,662 6,680 6,795 42,000
6,636
41,593 6,365 6,422
6,177
5,730
39,198 5,333
4,902
5,000 4,763 39,000
4,393
0 0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
FY FY1989 FY1990 FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018
(100 million yen)
Defense-Related
Expenditures
39,198 41,593 43,860 45,518 46,406 46,835 47,236 48,452 49,412 49,287 49,198 49,215 49,385 49,392 49,262 48,760 48,297 47,903 47,815 47,426 47,028 46,826 46,625 46,453 46,804 47,838 48,221 48,607 48,996 49,388
Upgrade Expenditures
(100 million yen)
Maintenance and
4,393 4,763 4,902 5,333 5,730 6,177 6,365 6,636 6,757 6,422 6,554 6,508 6,662 6,686 6,680 6,795 6,993 7,387 7,352 7,199 7,459 7,431 7,527 7,502 7,862 7,794 7,612 8,141 8,750 8,553
Chapter 4
Notes: 1. Excluding SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the introduction
of new government aircraft.
2.“Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs with each service of the SDF
(referring to the amount calculated by excluding repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft from the repair costs of each SDF unit). The amounts represent
contractual figures.

Fig. III-4-2-2 Current state of R&D spending
2 Overview of Defense Production and
Technological Bases Japan’s R&D spending and percentage of R&D spending
in defense-related costs (contract basis)
(100mn yen) (%)
(1) Significance of Formulation of the Strategy on 1,600 5.0
Defense Production and Technological Bases
4.0
“The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological 1,200
Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the 3.0
context of the formulation of the strategy on defense 800
production and technological bases and the status of 2.0
this strategy; (2) characteristics of defense production 400

1.0
and technological bases; and (3) changes in the security
environment surrounding defense production and 0 0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
technological bases.
Research & Development Expenditure (100mn yen)
Percentage of R&D Budget out of Defense Budget of Major Countries (%)
(2) Goals and Significance of Maintaining and
Note: R&D spending and defense-related costs include supplemental budgets for the
Strengthening Defense Production and subject fiscal year. Additionally, defense-related costs exclude SACO-related
expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for
Technological Bases mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the introduction of
Through the maintenance and strengthening of defense new government aircraft.
production and technological bases, the MOD intends

to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially (3) Basic Stance for Promoting Measures
contribute to deterrence enhancement, and maintain For the promotion of measures, it is necessary to take into
and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing
sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by long-term partnership between the private and public
cutting-edge technology. sectors; (2) strengthening international competitiveness;
and (3) ensuring consistency with effective and efficient
acquisition of defense equipment.

Fig. III-4-2-3 Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases
Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases
● Utilize negotiated contracts
● Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements)
Improve contract system ● Establish flexible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures
● Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost
● Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle
● Formulate a R&D vision
● Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology
Measures regarding Research and ● Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes
Development (R&D) ● Cooperation with and utilizing R&D programs including those that cover dual-use technology
● Fund advanced research with promising output for defense
● Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations
● Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States
● Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation
Defense equipment and technology ● Contributing to international logistics systems
cooperation ● Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation
● Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use
● Technology control and information security
● Promote understanding of significance of defense business and industry
Measures regarding defense
● Maintain resilient supply chains
industry organization
● Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems
● Implementation of efforts such as unification of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform
Strengthen MOD’s structure ● Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management
and procurement
Measures through cooperation with ● Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries such as Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
relevant ministries (METI)
(4) Methods of Defense Equipment Procurement (6) Courses of Actions for Each Defense Equipment
With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently Sectors
Chapter 4
multiple methods, such as domestic development, With regard to the main defense equipment sectors
international joint development and production, licensed (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft,
domestic production, utilization of commercially explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics
produced goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods and command control systems, unmanned equipment,
directly affect defense production and technological space systems and cyber), the MOD will analyze the
bases. According to the characteristics of defense current situation of defense production and technological
equipment, it is necessary to select the acquisition method bases. At the same time, it will also take the following
appropriately, including international joint development actions. Based on the priority matters for developing the
and production, which became more agile and flexible SDF’s structure indicated in NDPG, the MOD will present
due to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening
Equipment and Technology. of defense production and technological bases and the
acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and
(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies.
Defense Production and Technological Bases See Fig. III-4-2-4 (Direction in the Various Defense Equipment
In order to carry out the maintenance and strengthening Sectors (Outline))
of defense production and technological bases, the MOD

will promote the following measures with a focus on
variation and efficiency, while considering Japan’s severe 3 Initiatives in Line with the Strategy on Defense
Production and Technological Bases
financial condition: (1) improvement of the contract
system; (2) efforts regarding research and development; (1) Past Initiatives
(3) promotion of defense equipment and technology Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and
cooperation; (4) initiatives regarding defense industrial Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various
organizations including the building of a robust production measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening
and technology platform through understanding actual of defense production and technological bases, such as the
conditions of supply chain; (5) strengthening of the improvement of contract system including the Long-term
MOD’s structure through the establishment of ATLA, Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which was
etc.; and (6) collaborative measures with other relevant formed by integrating the organizations involved in the
ministries and government agencies. procurement of defense equipment.
See Fig. III-4-2-3 (Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening In addition, the following new measures are also
Defense Production and Technological Bases) taken in ATLA.

The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases Section 2
Fig. III-4-2-4 Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)
● With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases
to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built.
● Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and efficient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of
Ground equipment
production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented.
● Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology
cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted.
● Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby
making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies.
Supplies, etc.
● As for fields where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology
cooperation will be considered.
● With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will
be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises.
● Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts will also
Ships
be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices.
● Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and
strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities.
● For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to
prepare for the start of Regional MRO&U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region. As for future fighter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical
research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development
of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it.
Aircraft
● With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for
civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand
in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic
production and domestic development.
● A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosives in
Explosives
various situations, will be maintained.
● In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant
technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be
established including propulsion devices such as fixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of
guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range.
Guided weapons ● Regarding international joint development as one option, efficient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability
with allied and friendly nations.
● Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for
the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological
Chapter 4
phases.
● Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the
detection performance of fixed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the
Communications technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology.
electronics and ● Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian technological
command control bases, which are progressing at a significant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing reflecting the latest
systems technological standards.
● Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high-output

semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted.
● In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and
development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of
Unmanned
unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account.
equipment
● Defense equipment and technology cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other
countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases.
● While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space development,
Cyber and space
from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future, will
systems
be discussed.
• Formulation of Defense Technology Strategy, and price competitiveness while maintaining defense
Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook production and technological bases, as well as using
and the Research and Development Vision for ensuring advanced design and construction technology.
the technological superiority, and implementation of
the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for (2) Future Initiatives
Security.” With the understanding that defense production and
• Formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for technological bases are an important and indispensable
promoting project management, and improvement of foundation supporting Japan’s defense capabilities,
contract systems (see Section 3). ATLA plays the main role in promoting measures for
• Participation of Japanese companies in the international defense equipment and technology while cooperating
F-35 Program and defense equipment and technology with relevant ministries, government agencies, and private
cooperation involving joint research and development companies, etc. These measures include swift application
with other countries (see Section 4). of quickly progressing advanced civilian technologies,
• Grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and promotion of defense equipment and technological
responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen cooperation as a package including maintenance, etc.,
defense production and technological bases. early detection of risks pertaining to supply chains, and
• Adopting a new procurement method for acquiring an promotion of the matching of small and medium sized
escort ship (new destroyer) to ensure future technologies enterprises with the MOD/SDF.

VOICE Defense industry supporting development of defense capabilities COLUMN

NANRI Co., Ltd., Representative Director and President, Kazuhiro Nanri
NANRI Co., Ltd., was founded in 1939 and manufactured automobile and special vehicle parts as a supervised plant for the Army
Arsenal during the war and as a registered vendor for the U.S. Military Procurement Bureau after the war. Our involvement in defense
products began with repairs of underbody parts (trackbelt, track rollers, and sprockets) of tracked vehicles (tanks, armored cars,
and others) provided to the Ground Self Defense Forces from the U.S. military. We developed our unique repair technologies by using
U.S. military manuals as reference. Now we are mainly conducting repairs of underbody parts of all armored vehicles of the Ground
Self Defense Forces as our primary business.
NANRI Co. Ltd is a small company with about 20 employees. We creatively produce machine tools and repair tools necessary
for our work so that we can perform almost all processes internally. All employees (including the president) are skilled workers who
are engaged in field operations. Given difficulties of technology transmission, which is an issue for small companies, we are making
efforts to assure the stable quality through the application of new technologies (such as welding robots).
The business environment for tracked vehicles has been getting severe in recent years. While this raises concerns about
continuing our business because we heavily rely on the defense industry, I believe that it is important to keep our repair technology
that has been cultivated over many years, and to maintain our pride and sense of responsibility as the only domestic repair company.
We will continue to work on maintaining our foundation with manufacturing capabilities that are trusted by customers.
Chapter 4
Trackbelt welding Trackbelt, track roller, and sprocket photos

Efforts toward Project Management, etc. Section 3
Section 3 Efforts toward Project Management, etc.

1 Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle
also carried out a comparison between these statuses and

1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through the Acquisition Strategy of the 12 equipment for project
Focused Project Management
management selected in 2016, conducted quantitative and
Since defense equipment is becoming more advanced objective analysis and evaluation based on these plans, and
and complex in recent years, the cost of the entire life reviewed the Acquisition Strategy. Regarding equipment
cycle of the equipment has tended to increase (equipment that has not yet been selected for project management
design, research and development, full rate production or semi-project management, ATLA is also considering
and acquisition, and maintenance). For acquiring the designating them as new project and semi-project.
necessary number of equipment when it is needed, it is See Fig. III-4-3-1 (Equipment for Project Management and Equipment
extremely important to streamline the process throughout for Semi-Project Management)
the life cycle of equipment.

Therefore, the Department of Project Management
in ATLA selects important equipment which functions, 2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project
Management
performance, costs and schedule are managed throughout
the life cycle of equipment (project management), The following initiatives are being conducted to promote
Chapter 4
and works to realize the most efficient acquisition in and strengthen project management.
accordance with operational needs.
To realize the efficient acquisition of equipment (1) Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS
that will enable effective and efficient operation and For project management of certain kinds of equipment,

maintenance, in addition to the 12 equipment for project especially for the management of cost and schedule of
management selected in November 2015, the MOD
selected another equipment for project management as Equipment for Project Management and
Fig. III-4-3-1
Equipment for Semi-Project Management
well as 3 equipment for semi-project management1 in
April 2017. The MOD designated a Project Manager (As of March 31, 2018)
Equipment for Project Management
(PM) responsible for project management for each
SM-3 Block IIA
equipment. At the same time, the Ministry also Type-03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (Improved)
established the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is Global Hawk (Long Endurance UAV)
composed of officials from relevant departments within AAV7 (Amphibious Vehicle)
the Ministry. In 2016 and 2017, for the equipment of New Destroyer *1
GSDF New Utility Helicopter
project management and the equipment for semi-project
Osprey (Tilt-Rotor Aircraft)
management, the MOD prepared the Acquisition Enhanced SH-60K
Strategy and the Acquisition Plan to state the basic P-1
matters necessary to practice project management C-2
F-35A
systematically, such as the purpose of the acquisition
Future Fighter Aircraft *2
program and acquisition policy, and the cost of the FY2017 Submarine
life cycle. The MOD practices project management in *1 New destroyers with combined features of enhanced response capabilities to deal with
accordance with these plans and works to realize the diverse duties and a compact hull and manpower-saving.
*2 Successor aircraft to F-2 fighter (under study)
most strategically efficient equipment acquisition.
Equipment for Semi-Project Management
Specifically, in light of acquisition plans prepared by
a new ship-to-air missile
each service and the status of these plans, ATLA checks Type-12 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles (Advanced) and New Air-to-Ship
the progress of each acquisition program and the status of Guided Missiles for Reconnaissance Aircraft
the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System
cost from a comprehensive perspective. In 2017, ATLA
1 Semi-project is an acquisition project of specific equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of PM and IPT, focusing on risks in functions, performance, costs,
schedules and other risk factors as in the equipment for project management.

the equipment, the MOD promotes the introduction of the

cost and schedule management method for visualizing 3 Effective and Efficient Acquisition from a joint
Perspective
the progress by each Work Breakdown Structure (WBS),2
to detect early the signs of cost increase and schedule Acquisition of defense equipment based on a joint
delay so that swift measures can be taken. perspective is required to build a Dynamic Joint
Defense Force.
(2) Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate So far, based on the, the Ministry has been striving
Costs such as life cycle cost are estimated based on actual to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance
cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced expenses through (1) making the equipment function
in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is integrated, and (2) procuring common equipment and
needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD has built supplies in bulk, standardizing some components, and
a cost database and promotes the collection of cost data. development of product families, etc.3
Since accumulating sufficient amount of cost data takes Hereafter, the Ministry will promote effective
time, using statistical methods is also considered. and efficient acquisition throughout the life cycle of
the defense equipment by adopting perspective of
(3) Development and Accumulation of Expertise project management from the conceptual phase that
through Strengthened Cooperation with Research is becoming more advanced and complex due to the
and Educational Institutions, etc. cutting-edge technology such as systemization and
For further improving the management skill as of project networking technology.
managers and for developing human resources among
KEY WORD
those who engages in project management, the MOD
Chapter 4
strengthens collaboration with research and educational

Development of product families
institutions on project management by regular training
sessions on project management methods used overseas This refers to adding different variations to the functions and
and in the private sectors. performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different
operational demands, while standardizing their basic component parts.
2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters
1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems 2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.
For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is The production of defense equipment requires a
a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set
MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive amount is to be procured in bulk, in many cases a
Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, besides the contract for more than five years is needed. With regard
Contractual Systems Study Groups has been held since to defense equipment and services, economies of scale5
2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons:
special research officer system4 has been adopted in order (1) the annual procurement quantity is small; (2) the
to surely embody the review results. MOD is the only customer; and (3) companies that
provide such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In
addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically
move forward with their businesses with a high degree of
2 WBS is a hierarchical structure used to practice project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, in which the schedule and cost of each deliverable (components
and services) are allocated.
3 Examples of “procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk,” “standardizing some components,” and “development of product families” are small arms, vehicles, and chemical supplies used
by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), short-range surface-to-air missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF, and anti-ship
missiles used by all three branches of the SDF, respectively.
4 This is a system to conduct research, which contributes to the acquisition system of defense equipment, by inviting experts such as associate professors from different universities specializing in
the areas of concern in order to review and reconsider an effective procurement system, based not only on the viewpoints of the Ministry of Defense personnel but also on theories that have been
proposed in the field of business administration and economics.
5 Economies of scale refer to the cost advantage that arises with an increased output of a product. For example, costs per unit can be reduced by a bulk purchase of materials.

predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry. the construction technology base since February 2017.
For these reasons, the upper limit of acts that incur This is done by selecting a party that has made the
national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as best proposal with respect to the MOD’s requirements
within five years in principle was changed to within ten as a procurement counterparty, with the runner-up
years for specific equipment through the enactment of also involved in designing and building facilities as a
the Long-term Contract Act.6 The introduction of this subcontractor. The MOD concluded a proposal agreement
change regarding long-term contracts will make stable in April 2017 and decided on a procurement counterparty
procurement possible, leading to the realization of the and a subcontractor in August 2017.
systematic improvement of defense capability. At the
same time, for companies, given that the procurement
amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel 3 Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve
Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost
and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk
orders, will be made possible. Furthermore, this will With regard to the procurement of defense equipment,
prevent subcontractors from withdrawing from the there is a large variety of equipment without a market price,
defense industry. and therefore, they tend to have high prices. In light of this
See Fig. III-4-3-2 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost characteristic, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction
Reduction Effect) of procurement cost and improvement of companies’
Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for Greater Efficiency)
incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, the MOD
In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year has been striving to achieve the reduction of procurement
contracts utilizing the PFI Act,7 it achieves the planned prices by confirming the actual costs incurred and ensuring
acquisition and execution of budgets through the that no excessive business profit will be added after the
Chapter 4
standardization of investment amounts of the national execution of the contract through cost audit contracts
expenditure and draws out certain benefits such as with a special provision requiring respective companies
cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks to conduct a review of the contract sum and return any
for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of excessive profit (audit contracts incorporating a provision

new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD requiring the return of excessive profit).
launched the “project of development and operation of However, it has also been noted that these contracts
X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and diminish the companies’ motivation for cost reduction as
the “project of operation and management of private they would be required to return excessive profits after
ships” in March 2016. the completion of the contract payment at the end of
In addition, regarding procurement of certain the fiscal year. Therefore, the MOD is developing a new
equipment with which little competitiveness can be incentive contract system in which public and private
expected due to its characteristics, and companies that sectors jointly carry out the management of contract
work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the implementation to minimize the risk of it, and in which a
MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring certain percentage will be given back to the companies if
transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and the cost reduction has been performed.
putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of In addition, using special research officers
the implementation of smooth and efficient procurement, and companies with expertise, the MOD conducts
and the enhancement of the company’s predictability. examinations of frameworks for reviewing cost reduction
Specifically, as a new initiative, in acquiring new measures based on a public-private partnership, and
destroyers with the combined features of improved new methods for more efficient and reduced equipment
capabilities to respond to various missions and a compact procurement costs by encouraging competition among
hull, the MOD has adopted a procurement method to companies by way of the MOD’s active evaluation of
acquire the new destroyer efficiently equipped with business partners.
the necessary functions and to maintain and strengthen
6 “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015)
7 Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative

Fig. III-4-3-2 Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect
Integrated procurement of GSDF transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in the FY 2017 budget

[Traditional procurement (image)]
FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022

Delivery of three helicopters Total of
24.2 billion yen approx. 53.1
Conclusion of billion yen
a contract
Conclusion of Delivery of
a contract three helicopters Reduction of
28.9 billion yen 8.6 billion yen
(Reduction by 16.2%)
through integrated
[Procurement based on long-term contracts (image)] procurement.
FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022

Total of
approx. 44.5
billion yen
Conclusion of Delivery of Delivery of

a contract three helicopters three helicopters
3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives
entering into contracts for defense equipment, supplies,

1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and and components based on the approach of consolidating
Replenishment
Chapter 4
the quantities required for several years into a single

With regard to periodic maintenance checks of defense specific fiscal year. In the FY2018 budget, some reduction
equipment, the MOD has been working to achieve in expenses is expected due to a bulk purchase of the next-
greater efficiency by extending the interval between generation IFF equipment for fighters (F-15), computer
the maintenance checks, after making sufficient effort software licenses, and other equipment.
to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD embarks on the In addition, the MOD is facilitating the compilation
introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)8 from of a database on the breakdown of procurement price and
the perspective of improving the equipment availability actual price of major equipment in the past. By using
ratio and long-term cost reductions. In the FY2018 this database, the Ministry expects not only to verify the
budget, cost savings can be expected due to conclusion validity of procurement prices, but also to enhance the
of an umbrella agreement regarding maintenance parts accuracy and efficiency of life cycle cost estimation for
for the F110 engine (for fighter (F-2)) and transport new equipment.
helicopters (CH-47J/JA) and others. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for Increasing the
See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement)
Efficiency of Procurement)
3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of The MOD implements measures for making contracts
Defense Equipment
more appropriate and strengthening checking functions
When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency
to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.
expenses by procuring common equipment and As a part of the effort to “make public procurement
supplies in bulk, standardizing some components, and more appropriate” across the whole government, the
developing product families, etc., in addition to a review MOD continues to carry out the introduction and
of the contract system. The MOD also carries out bulk expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system9
purchases, seeking greater efficiency by budgeting and and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition
8 PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved, in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive
outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries.
9 Unlike the automatic bid system which focuses only on price, this is a system which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and
other elements. This method is adopted when it is appropriate to carry out such procedures as evaluating the technological elements.

to these, based on reflection on the past, strengthening for stricter checks – namely, ATLA conducts internal
system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the inspections, by establishing the inspection and audit
effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other department, and through deliberations in the Defense
measures have steadily been carried out in order to Procurement Council, consisting of external experts, and
prevent recurrence of incidents such as overcharging and defense inspection conducted by the Inspector General’s
falsified results of equipment testing by defense-related Office of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also
companies. Through these measures, the MOD strives to improved its education department and strives to enhance
surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness compliance awareness by providing thorough education
and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate. pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel.
In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks See Fig. III-4-3-3 (Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the
through both internal and external checking systems Procurement of Defense Equipment)
Fig. III-4-3-3 Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the Procurement of Defense Equipment
Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics Agency (ATLA)
Other organizations Commissioner, ATLA

and agencies Third-party organization
Assistant Commissioner
Inspector General’s Office
of Legal Compliance (Director,) Audit and Evaluation Division Defense Procurement Council
(Deliberation conducted
❍ 24 staff members (regular staff as of the end by external experts)
to staff in charge
Training and education
❍ Directly reports the results and
Dissemination of goods practices

Ordering of remedial actions
improvement plans of defense of FY2017)
❍ Internal inspection: inspection carried out from ❍ Seven external experts including
inspections to the Minister of Defense.
the perspectives of compliance and the prevention university professors, lawyers, and
Whistleblower, etc.
Defense of collusive bidding.

inspection certified public accountants.
Chapter 4
❍ Internal audit: an audit regarding accounting and
tasks such as project management, research and ❍ Study and deliberation will be
development and procurement conducted on rules regarding
Auditing Division at Internal procurement, project management,
the Minister’s Secretariat Human Resources ❍ 14 staff members inspection single bidder projects, and
Development Center (regular staff as of Internal
❍ Conducts an audit of ATLA as necessary. specifications, etc.
the end of FY2017) audit
Training and education Study and
Audit regarding compliance, etc. deliberation
Internal and external multi-layered checks and

mutual supervision within the organization
Reporting Department of
implementation
status Project Management Audit Firm
(Project Management Group)
Corporations Equipment development
officer, etc. Understanding ❍ Advice on the operation of project
Contracts, etc. of rulemaking and Department of
Department of operation status management and operational
Equipment Policy
Procurement Operations Department of Advice status, etc.
(Practical Development and Technology Strategy ❍ Use of the advice for the improvement
Procurement Group) Application
Department of of duties and enhancement of internal
for various Procurement Management audit capabilities.
approvals, etc. (Rulemaking Group)
Commentary Improvement of FMS related issues COLUMN

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the U.S. security program through which the U.S. allies and others can purchase defense equipment and
services from the U.S. government based on the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), so it is different from sales for the purpose of economic
profits. Between the Japanese and the U.S. governments, FMS is based on the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. This
program allows Japan to procure equipment with a high level of military confidentiality which cannot be generally purchased through
Direct Commercial Sales and the higher performance equipment which is only manufactured by the U.S. This is the reason why FMS is
very important in strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, and Japan’s FMS procurement amount has been increasing in recent years.
Meanwhile, there are FMS-related issues, such as late case closures and cost transparency. Japan and the U.S. have been actively
engaged in making improvements in these issues, as the result of repeated requests for improvements to the U.S. side based on points
raised by indications from the Board of Audits and requests by Defense Minister Onodera to U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis for cooperation in
lowering prices in order to build up the most efficient defense capabilities in the current severe security environment.
On June 2018, Minister Onodera and Secretary Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and the ministers welcomed
improvements in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales such as strengthening efforts to improve cost transparency and late case
closures as well as initiating concrete discussion on more efficient multi-year contracts. The ministers affirmed that both countries would
continue to make efforts to realize Japan’s smooth and timely procurement of U.S.-made assets.
The Ministry of Defense continues make efforts to improve FMS - related issues in close cooperation with the U.S.
*In the formulation of the FY2018 budget, the MOD held negotiations with the United States regarding FMS costs and made efforts to reduce expenditure by scrutinizing
the cost. For example, for tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22 Osprey), in its negotiations with the United States, the MOD sought to leverage economies of scale through joint
procurement of Osprey aircraft with the U.S. Navy (40 aircraft) and to scrutinize minimum initial cost necessary for operations. As a result, the MOD was able to realize
a cost reduction of 25.5 billion yen, reducing the cost from 97.1 billion yen, as estimated at the FY2018 budget request stage, to 71.6 billion yen in the actual budget.

Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment
Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation and technological cooperation through the strengthening of
in defense equipment and technology with other countries intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts,
in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and cooperation including assistance for maintenance and
enhancement of defense production and technological repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative
bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our posture between the public and private sectors.
national security, peace and international cooperation.
1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
2 Main Contents of the New Three Principles

1 Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles
on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
(1) Clarification of Cases Where Transfers are
Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, Prohibited (the First Principle)
in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment
and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case of
Chapter 4
in individual cases, such as the participation of domestic violating the obligations based on agreements signed by
companies in the joint development of Ballistic Missile Japan and other international agreements; (2) in the case
Defense (BMD) by Japan and the United States, it has of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of
taken separate measures in which arms exports are dealt the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of
with outside the Three Principles.1 transferring to the countries in conflicts.

Amidst this situation, in April 2014, based on the See Fig. III-4-4-1 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers
National Security Strategy, the Government formulated Are Prohibited”)
the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment

and Technology as new principles replacing the Three (2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be
Principles on Arms Exports etc.2 and its implementation Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and
guidelines. The new principles clarified the concrete Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)
standards, procedures and limitation. The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited
See Reference 66 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion
Equipment and Technology) of peace contribution and international cooperation,
(2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other
cases. The Government will conduct strict examination
on the appropriateness of the destination and end user
Fig. III-4-4-1 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited”
Situation Specific examples

(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms
and other international arrangements Trade Treaty, etc.
(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.
Security Council Resolutions
Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or
(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a conflict
restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack
1 In December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports
based on the premise of strict control, with regard to (1) cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation, and (2) cases regarding international joint development and production of
defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security.
2 The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace
contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that
there is provision of technology in addition to goods, the term “transfer” was adopted rather than “export.”

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Section 4
Fig. III-4-4-2 The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted”
Situation Specific examples

(1) Contribution to the Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have
proactive advancement positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when:
of peace contribution and ● the recipient is a foreign government, or
international cooperation ● the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution
Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s
security, and that:
● are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,
● contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,
and of the following:
• overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF
in accordance with laws,
• provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S.,
(2) Contribution to the • provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces, or
security of Japan • defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or
minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or
● are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as
“the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or
for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:
• temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the
SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,
• export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or
• export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas
(3) In cases where the
influence is judged • Returning of misdirected items
extremely limited from • Export of sample items on the premise that they will be returned
the perspective of the • Re-export of equipment brought in by police officers of overseas government agencies
security of Japan
Chapter 4
whilst ensuring transparency, and the extent the overseas (3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose
transfer of such equipment and technology will raise Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)
concern for Japan’s security. In addition, it has been Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology
decided that important cases would be deliberated at will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control

the National Security Council and along with this, is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige
information concerning the cases that were deliberated the government of the recipient country to gain its prior
would be disclosed. consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third
See Fig. III-4-4-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate
Transfers May Be Permitted”) for the active promotion of peace contribution and
international cooperation, cases involving participation
in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases
where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control
may be ensured with the confirmation of the control
system at the destination.
2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
1 Cooperative Research and Development, etc. and parts, etc. related to the Aegis System and F100
engine parts that are installed in F-15 and F-16 from
Since 1992, Japan has implemented 21 cooperative Japan to the United States, Japan has affirmed since July
research projects and 1 cooperative development 2014 that these overseas transfers fall under the case,
project with the United States. At present, 4 cooperative which may be permitted, based on deliberations at the
research projects (cooperative research on Hybrid National Security Council.
Electric Propulsion, cooperative research on High-Speed See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-2 (Missile Defense of the United
Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization, cooperative research on States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation)
Reference 23 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development
Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, Projects)
cooperative research on Chemical Agent Detector-kit
Colorimetric Reader) are in operation. In addition, with
regard to the transfer of parts for Patriot PAC-2, software

structural components, such as main wings, fuselage,

2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of Common and turbines without transporting the airframe and
Equipment between Japan and the United States
engines overseas; and
(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production ❍ The ability to carry out refurbishment work domestically,
of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional in the event that performance improvements to the
Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade F-35A fighter aircraft are sought in future.
(MRO&U) Capability In addition, participation of Japanese companies in
In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter the implementation of FACO and parts production will
aircraft as the next-generation fighter aircraft to succeed have significance in that they will be able to come in
the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government contact with the system integration technology of stealth
decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to fighter as well as the cutting-edge fighter technology
have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside and know-how. Therefore, it will also contribute to
from several complete aircraft, which shall be imported. strengthening of defense production and technological
In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has bases. The F-35A fighter aircraft on which FACO was
been working to enable the involvement of Japanese conducted in Japan was deployed to the ASDF Misawa
industries in the manufacturing process in preparation Air Base in January 2018.
for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is
onwards. So far the Japanese Government has decided anticipated, the U.S. Government plans to establish
on the range of production participation by Japanese maintenance depot (regional Maintenance, Repair,
industries including the Final Assembly and Check Out Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability) mainly for
(FACO) for airframe and engines, the manufacture of some airframe and engine in the North America, Europe, and
Chapter 4
engine parts (19 items) and radar parts (7 items), and the the Asia-Pacific regions. In December 2014, with regard
manufacture of some Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture to regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35,
System (EODAS)3 parts (3 items). the U.S. Government announced the following decisions:
Possessing the skills and facilities required for (1) Regional MRO&U Capability for airframe will be
FACO for airframe and engines is important for Japanese provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities
companies in implementing effective operational required not later than early 2018;4 (2) With regard to the
support for the F-35A fighter aircraft such as for the regional MRO&U Capability for engine, initial capability
following reasons: will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan
❍ The ability to offer a swift response within Japan in providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.5
the event that an airframe and engines suffer damage Establishing a maintenance depot that utilizes the
and require work that cannot be carried out by the SDF FACO facility for airframe and engine within Japan, and
unit itself, including the repair or replacement of major contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are
significant from the perspectives of securing the operational
support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan,
maintaining the foundation of the Japanese defense industry,
strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening
equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common

Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey
As the Planed Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S.
Marine Corps Osprey deployed at Futenma was scheduled
to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried
out a public tender to select a maintenance company
Minister of Defense Onodera delivering an address at the F-35 deployment commemorative
and decided to select Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.6 as the
ceremony (Misawa) (February 2018)
3 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six built-in cutting edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile
detection and tracking.
4 The regional MRO&U for airframe in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture)
5 The regional MRO&U for engine in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo)
6 The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.

maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. from the following perspectives: (1) Smooth introduction
From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at of the GSDF Osprey (V-22);7 (2) Smooth and effective
GSDF Camp Kisarazu. operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and
The MOD intends to establish common maintenance (3) Enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment
base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by of common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu
allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at would be extremely significant in that it will lead to the
GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. realization of the reduction of Okinawa’s burden as well
Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future as the “Strengthening the basis to repair and maintain
aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp common equipment” stated in the new guideline.
3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
operative Research on The Certification Process of Jet

1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Engines, the Cooperative Research on The Feasibility of
with Major European Countries, etc.
a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System
Defense equipment and technology cooperation with (JAGUAR) were launched in July 2016, February 2018
major European countries, which have competitive and March 2018, respectively.
defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of Furthermore, a LOA on the Joint Preliminary Study
security and defense cooperation with these countries as on Potential Collaborative Opportunities for Future
well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense Combat Air System (FCAS)10/Future Fighter between
Chapter 4
production and technological base in Japan. Therefore, the defense authorities of the two countries was signed in
Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with March 2017. Based on the agreement of this arrangement,
these countries. the two countries are exchanging information regarding
future fighter and the FCAS that are under study by Japan

(1) United Kingdom and the United Kingdom respectively, and opinions
In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United about the potential for future collaboration. At the Third
Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement on the UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.8 In the (“2+2”) held in December 2017, in response to the
same month, the two countries also started Chemical and progress of the feasibility study on a Joint New Air-to-Air
Biological Protection Technology cooperative research Missile (JNAAM) Phase 2, the two countries expressed
project, marking the first time that Japan had engaged in expectations for the early embodiment of the cooperative
such research with a country other than the United States. research project including the research prototyping and
The joint research resulted in success in July 2017. the test firing.
Also, in July 2014, technology information on air- See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((1) The United Kingdom)
to-air missile seeker technology9 for cooperative research
with the United Kingdom was determined by the National (2) France
Security Council as a case where overseas transfer may be Japan and France established a committee on cooperation
permitted as stipulated in the Three Principles on Transfer in the field of defense equipment and a on export control
of Defense Equipment and Technology. Responding to respectively in January 2014, and signed the Agreement
the said decision, in November of the same year, a Letter concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and
of Arrangement was signed on the “co-operative research Technology11 in March 2015. Moreover, at the Fourth
project on the feasibility of a joint new air-to-air missile” Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting
and the cooperative research started. The Cooperative (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed
Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation , the Co- the intention to quickly start the cooperative research
7 GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-7JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In June 2015, a
contract regarding 5 aircraft out of the 17 was signed with the United States Department of the Navy, and these 5 aircraft will be delivered by the end of FY2018.
8 Official name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military
Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items
9 A missile component device for searching, detecting and tracking targets.
10 Generic name of the whole future fighter aircraft system in the United Kingdom.
11 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

on The Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure multifaceted cooperation, including the following:
Technological Activities and started the joint research in (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in
the following June. the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with
In addition, State Minister of Defense Wakamiya the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the
(then) visited France in June 2017, inspected the “Paris request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility
Air Show 2017” in Paris and exchanged opinions with of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine
high government officials. The MSDF P-1 Maritime Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the
Patrol Aircraft participated in the event and ATLA set up Defence Science and Technology Organization of Australia
an exhibition booth to exhibit the P-1 aircraft for the first (in the field of marine hydrodynamics and exchanges
time at international defense equipment exhibition. among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((2) France) defense industries in both countries. Subsequently, joint
research on Marine Hydrodynamics started in December
(3) Germany 2015. Moreover, even though Japan had submitted the
Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning proposal for the Future Submarine Program in November
the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology12 in 2015, the Government of Australia announced in April
July 2017. 2016, that they selected a French company as their partner
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda for the Program.
visited Germany in April 2018, inspected the “Berlin Air See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense
Show 2018” held in Berlin, and met with high ranking of Cooperation and Exchanges)
the Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany. The MSDF

P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft participated in the event and (2) India
Chapter 4
ATLA set up an exhibition booth related to the P-1 aircraft. Defence equipment and technology cooperation with
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((4) Other European Countries) India is considered an important field of cooperation
based on the special strategic global partnership between
(4) Italy Japan and India. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in
At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in March 2017, the December 2015, the Agreement between the Government
two countries agreed to start negotiations on an agreement of Japan and the Government of India concerning the
on the transfer of defense equipment and technology,13 and Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology15 was
signed the Agreement in the following May. signed. The discussions on the US-2 amphibian aircraft
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((4) Other European Countries) are underway for cooperation between the two countries.
Other than the US-2, discussions for forming the
case of defence equipment and technology cooperation
2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc., including dual use technologies have been held, including
with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region
the Third Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment
As partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region have and Technology Cooperation held in September 2017.
expressed their interest and expectation regarding At the Japan-India Defence Ministerial Meeting held in
defense equipment and technology cooperation with September 2017, the ministers agreed to commence the
Japan, the MOD proactively seeks to build relationships technical discussions for research collaboration in the
with these countries. area of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and Robotics.
Moreover, in September 2017, ATLA and the Department
(1) Australia of Defence Production, jointly hosted the first-ever Japan-
With Australia, the Agreement between the Government India Defence Industry Forum in Tokyo with attendance of
of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the government officials and Japanese and Indian companies,
Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology14 was aiming to revitalize cooperation between the defence
signed in July 2014. industries. The said forum was an unprecedented event
Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial that showed steady progress of discussions on defence
Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek equipment and technology cooperation in both countries.
12 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
13 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
14 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
15 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

or transfer to the governments of developing states the

SDF’s equipment which is no longer used for a lower
price than the current price. Based on a proposal from
the Philippines, the transfer was confirmed at the Japan-
Philippines Defence Ministerial Meeting in June 2018
that parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H
utility helicopters, that became unnecessary for the SDF
would also be donated.
Between Thailand, State Minister of Defense
Yamaguchi visited Thailand in November 2017, inspected
an international exhibition on defense equipment
(Defense and Security 2017), and agreed to promote
future defense equipment and technology cooperation
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda and the Secretary of Nation Defense Mr.
Lorenzana at the TC-90 transfer ceremony (March 2018) between the two countries including early conclusion
of the agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense
See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-3 (Japan-India Defense Equipment and Technology at the meeting with high
Cooperation and Exchanges) officials of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.
Between Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR)
(3) ASEAN Countries for regular consultations concerning defense equipment
Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges and technological cooperation was signed during the
of views take place regarding defense equipment and Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting
Chapter 4
technology cooperation in non-traditional security in November 2016.
sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief Japan and Malaysia signed the Japan-Malaysia
and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence
Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Equipment and Technology16 in April 2018. The MOD

Participating countries have expressed their expectation will continue to promote cooperation for humanitarian
for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these assistance and disaster relief as well as the maritime
issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan security area through these initiatives.
at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 (Defense Cooperation and
Meeting held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’s Exchanges with ASEAN Countries);
defense equipment and technological cooperation with

ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on (4) Middle East
the following three points: (1) equipment and technology In November 2017, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of
transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) Defense Ono visited the United Arab Emirates, inspected
holding seminars on defense industries. As a specific the “Dubai Air Show 2017” held in Dubai, and met
initiative with the Philippines, an official agreement was with high government officials of the country including
made on the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Rumaithi. The ASDF
to the Philippine Navy at the Japan-Philippines Summit C-2 transport aircraft, which was on an overseas flight
Meeting in September 2016, and TC-90 pilot training training, participated in this event and ATLA set up an
was conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy at exhibition booth relating to the C-2 transport aircraft for
the MSDF Tokushima Air Base from November of the the first time.
same year to March 2018. Since April 2017, maintenance
and repair assistance by dispatched personnel from a
Japanese maintenance company has been provided. 3 Establishment of Regulations on Equipment
Cooperation with Developing Countries
Furthermore, two TC-90 aircraft were transferred to
the Philippine Navy in March 2017, and the remaining Surrounded by an increasingly severe security
three TC-90 aircraft were transferred in March 2018. environment, it has become even more important for
This transfer was the first case of application of the Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and
provision of the SDF Act that enables the MOD to grant friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and
16 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to the SDF Act. This provision enables the MOD to grant
develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the or transfer to the governments of developing states the
international community to cooperate towards improving SDF’s equipment which is no longer used for a lower
the security environment. Among these friendly nations, price than the current price. (Legislation for the partial
some have difficulties in acquiring the adequate level revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry
of defense equipment by their own because of their of Defense and other Acts including this provision was
economic and financial situations. Some of these states approved in May 2017).
are requesting to use SDF’s equipment which are no Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment
longer used. However, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the for lower price than the current price pursuant to this
Public Finance Act stipulates that the Government shall provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment and
receive reasonable consideration when transferring or to which government such equipment to be transferred
leasing any governmental properties including the SDF’s will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of
equipment to other countries. Therefore, a transfer for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
lower price than the current price is not allowed unless and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an
otherwise provided. international agreement must be concluded between
Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to
of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9, prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the
Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act17 was created in transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.18
4 Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use

Chapter 4
With regard to aircraft involving many technological application procedure for private companies interested in
bases shared between the defense and the civilian sectors, civilian use. So far, technical data related to the civilian
the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10
developed by the MOD from the perspective that taking engine that are mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft
measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian have been disclosed in response to requests from the
sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the implementing companies. In December 2016, ATLA and
production and technological bases of Japanese aircraft, IHI Corporation, a manufacturing company of F7-10
and by extension, to maintaining and strengthening the engine, signed a contract for the civilian use of the F7-10
defense production and technological base in Japan. In for sales to JAXA for the first time.
August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for The MOD will consider the possibility of civilian use
the development of a concrete system for converting of equipment other than aircraft based on the intention of
aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed the defense industry.
5 Technology Control
In promoting defense equipment and technology Japan. At the same time, from the perspective of Japan’s
cooperation internationally, the MOD will properly security, the MOD will strengthen technology control in
evaluate the sensitivity and strategic value of defense cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
technology and dual-use technology, and protect these Industry, in order to avoid the risk of the diversion of
technologies that should be protected as strengths of technologies into weapons.
17 Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act (Act 34 of 1947)

Governmental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.
18 As of June 2018, Japan has signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Italy,
Germany, and Malaysia.

6 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions
From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment

and technology cooperation, ATLA has participated in
international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce
Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced
technology. These initiatives help foreign government
officials understand regarding Japan’s equipment policies
and technology.
ATLA has participated in international defense
equipment exhibitions such as Defense and Security
Equipment International (DSEI) held in London, United
Kingdom and Defense and Security (D&S) held in
Bangkok, Thailand as well as air shows held in Paris, ATLA’s display booth at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) in the U.K.
France and Dubai, United Arab Emirates in 2017 and
an air show held in Berlin, Germany in 2018. At these
events, ATLA widely disseminated information on the
policy measures taken by ATLA, the outcomes of research
and development through exhibitions of P-1 patrol
aircraft, C-2 transport aircraft and research prototypes of
unmanned equipment developed in Japan, and on advanced
Chapter 4
technology possessed by Japanese manufacturers.
Moreover, taking this opportunity of government
officials gathered from different countries at these events,
meetings were held between high officials of various

countries including the State Minister of Defense and
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense from Japan. P-1 patrol aircraft on display at the ILA Berlin Air Show (April 2018)
Through these initiatives, ATLA was able to contribute to
forming the platform for promoting defense equipment
and technology cooperation by deepening other countries’
understanding of measures regarding defense equipment
and advanced technology in Japan.
7 Public-Private Defense Industry Forum
The Public-Private Defense Industry Forum is held with a through explanation of various systems surrounding the
purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology defense industry in Japan and each country as well as
cooperation with partner countries in the Asia-Pacific presentations by each company on their products and
region as a joint effort between the public and private technology. Most recently, the said forum was held with
sectors. This forum is held to deepen understanding Indonesia in August 2017, with India in September 2017,
of the relevant parties and facilitate concrete defense with Vietnam in October 2017, and with Australia in
equipment and technology cooperation in the future March 2018.

Interaction with
Chapter
5 Local Communities and
Japanese Citizens
Various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement is necessary to further deepen the trust between local
without the understanding and cooperation of each communities and people, and the SDF.
and every person and local governments. Therefore it
Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities

1 Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society
The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster
citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from friendly interaction with local communities. The SDF
local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities also provides transportation and other assistance at a
contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional
provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence. medical treatment efforts by providing general medical
The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent
ordnance and other dangerous explosives found transport for emergency patients from isolated islands.
Chapter 5
throughout Japan. In FY2017, there were approx. 1,611 Furthermore, based on national policy,1 the MOD/SDF
such cases (approx. 49.5 tons). In particular, cases ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized
handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. enterprises to receive orders, while taking efficiency into
34% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/
Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens
of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, divided ordering2 and the securing of competition
and approx. 15,550 explosives (approx. 7.8 tons) were amongst companies within the same qualification and
handled in FY2017. grade divisions.3
The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents See Reference 67 (Activities in Civic Life)
access to their facilities to the extent that it does not
2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF
Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, support and cooperation from the local community are
the cooperation from local governments and relevant indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities,
organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel including education and training, and disaster relief.
and to support the reemployment of uniformed SDF Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international
personnel who retire at a relatively young age under the peace cooperation operations and other duties receive
SDF’s early retirement system. support and cooperation from the relevant organizations
The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations for the procedures involved.
with local communities, and therefore, various forms of
1 “The Contract Basic Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises in FY2017” (Cabinet decision on July 25, 2017)
2 For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided.
3 This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly of small and medium enterprises.

Collaboration with Local Communities Section 1
3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents
Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces personnel,
nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships and the families to interact with each other through sports
with their respective local communities, through and music. Furthermore, Regional Defense Bureaus
collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination
Offices. Specifically, Regional Defense Bureaus hold for relevant local governments when implementing the
seminars on defense issues for local residents and provide realignment of the U.S. Forces, the reorganization of
explanations about the annual white paper, Defense SDF units, deployment of equipment, and training. They
of Japan, to local governments in order to gain wide also conduct the necessary liaison and coordination in the
understanding on defense policies. They also host Japan- event of incidents and accidents, or any other emergency
U.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S. situation, such as major earthquakes.
4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas
1 Scale and Features of Defense Facilities cause noise and other issues, impacting the living
environment of local residential communities.
The uses of defense facilities are diverse, and they often See Fig. III-5-1-1 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots))
require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January Fig. III-5-1-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in
Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities))
1, 2018, approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and
areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is
jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S.
Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose to enhance 2 Initiatives to Promote Harmony between Defense
Facilities and Surrounding Areas
the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training
Chapter 5
and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the
establishment and operations of defense facilities have defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security
emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s
of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions

frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony
Fig. III-5-1-1 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in
Fig. III-5-1-2
(as of January 1, 2018)
Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)
Other regions 10% Approx. 111km2 (as of January 1, 2018)

Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km2
Kyushu region 12% Approx. 136km2 Other regions 9% Approx. 22km2
Tohoku region 13% Approx. 147km2
Chubu region Tohoku region 9% Approx. 24km2
16% Approx. 178km2
Distribution Hokkaido region Kanto region 12% Approx. 32km2
by region 42% Approx. 460km2
Distribution Okinawa Prefecture 70%
accounting for approx. 0.3%
by region Approx. 185km2
Total area: Approx. 1,090km2
of Japan’s land area
Total area: accounting for 0.07% of
Approx. 263km2 Japan’s land area
Distribution
by use
Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 814km2
Distribution Maneuver Areas 47%
Airfields 7% Approx. 81km2 by use Approx. 123km2
Barracks 5% Approx. 54km2
Airfields 23% Approx. 61km2
Others 13% Approx. 141km2
Warehouses 15% Approx. 40km2
0 20 40 60 80 100 Others 15% Approx. 40km2
(%)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. (%)
Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. III-5-1-3 Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas
Purpose Measures Description of Measures

● Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical
Subsidies to finance sound facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service
insulation work centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly
● Housing
Preventing Noise Problems ● Compensation for relocating buildings
● Land procurement
Compensation for relocations
● Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the
area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
Improving green belts ● Planting trees, installing grass fields
Preventing Impact Subsidies to finance impediment ● Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities
Besides Noise prevention work
Reducing Impediment Subsidies for building facilities ● Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities,
Related to Living and meant to stabilize people’s welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc.
Business lives ● Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities
Provision of specified defense ● Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities
Reducing Impact on
facilities environs improvement ● Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance
Surrounding Areas
adjustment grants for school buildings, etc.*
* Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011)
between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas

FY2018 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas
as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of Fig. III-5-1-4
near Bases (Based on Expenditures)
the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken
(100 million yen)
measures to promote harmony between defense facilities
Project Mainland Okinawa
and surrounding areas since 1974, based on the Act on Projects for preventing
87 20
Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around disturbances
Sound insulation projects 506 150
Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act).
Measures related to relocations 38 1
See Fig. III-5-1-3 (Measures for Harmony Between Defense
Subsidies for stabilizing
Facilities and Surrounding Areas) 245 60
people’s livelihoods
Road improvement projects 54 18
Chapter 5
Environs Improvement
(1) Measures based on the Act on Improvement of Living Adjustment Grants
235 33
Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities Other projects 10 2
Based on the Living Environment Improvement Act, the
MOD has implemented various measures to prevent, Regarding the Specified Defense Facilities Environs
alleviate, and mitigate impact such as aircraft noise in Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has
the surrounding areas caused by the SDF or U.S. Forces implemented initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process
activities, or by establishing and operating defense since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of
facilities including airfields. Furthermore, taking into these grants.
consideration the requests from the relevant local
governments, the MOD partially revised the Living (2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense
Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a Facilities and Surrounding Areas
review to enable the Specified Defense Facilities Environs In response to the requests by related local governments,
Improvement Adjustment Grants to be applied to so- the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve
called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. more effective and efficient measures to harmonize
In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the
eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway severe fiscal situation.
to provide sound insulation at residences and efforts are See Fig. III-5-1-4 (FY2018 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near
being made to ensure its further progress. Bases (Based on Expenditures))

Collaboration with Local Communities Section 1
5 Other Initiatives
1 Response to Cases of Interference against SDF and 2 Response to Helicopters and Drones Flying over
U.S. Forces Aircraft by Kite Flying and Laser Irradiation U.S. Forces Facilities and Surrounding Airspace
Cases of interference against SDF and U.S. Forces Cases of flying a helicopter or a drone over the facilities
aircraft by kite flying and laser irradiation have of the U.S. Forces and its surrounding airspace have
frequently occurred in the areas surrounding air stations been identified. These are very dangerous acts that may
in Atsugi and Futenma. These are extremely dangerous cause a collision with U.S. Forces aircraft. In fact, there
and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to is negative impact on the safe operations of the U.S.
control aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. Forces aircraft, including a case where a helicopter of
Therefore, the MOD disseminates information regarding the U.S. Forces had to take a different route to avoid a
the risks involved in those acts to local residents by collision with a drone. Therefore, from the viewpoint of
putting up posters and requests their cooperation in preventing unforeseen accidents in advance,
別紙第２ as well as
別紙第２
reporting to the police while closely cooperating with
平成３０年版防衛白書コラム（提出用） securing the safety of the area and the safe operations of
平成３０年版防衛白書コラム（提出用）
relevant local governments. Additionally, the Ordinance aircraft, the MOD calls on users of a helicopter or drone

for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised to refrain from engaging in such an act by handing out
【X!執筆担当（地方協力局）周辺環境整備課・防音対策X!X!課X!】
【X!執筆担当（地方協力局）周辺環境整備課・防音対策X!X!課X!】
in December 2016, making these interference acts subject leaflets and putting up posters with the cooperation of
第
to regulation, as well as fines 部
第 and
部other第Ⅲ部
penalties.
第Ⅲ部 relevant local governments.
掲載箇所
掲載箇所第章
第章第５章
第５章
第節
第節第１節
第１節
Commentary
種別
別 92,&(
92,&( 解説
解説 ○
○
Initiatives taken by local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities
Ｑ＆Ａ
Ｑ＆Ａ
COLUMN

Chapter 5
タイトル防衛施設周辺の地方公共団体の取組
タイトル防衛施設周辺の地方公共団体の取組
It is imperative to gain cooperation of related local authorities in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and nearby areas.
防衛施設と周辺地域との調和を図るためには、関係地方公共団体の協力が必要不可欠です。
防衛施設と周辺地域との調和を図るためには、関係地方公共団体の協力が必要不可欠です。
Local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities conduct initiatives to improve the living environments utilizing assistance
防衛施設周辺の地方公共団体は、地域住民の生活の安定と福祉の向上のため、防衛施設から生じる
projects funded by the Ministry of Defense to address obstacles resulting from the presence of defense facilities in order to ensure
防衛施設周辺の地方公共団体は、地域住民の生活の安定と福祉の向上のため、防衛施設から生じる
the stability of the lives of local residents and the enhancement of their welfare.
障害などに対し、防衛省の補助事業を活用して様々な生活環境の整備などを行っています。
障害などに対し、防衛省の補助事業を活用して様々な生活環境の整備などを行っています。

For example, these entities build parks and other venues to facilitate evacuations of residents, using the national subsidy in
例えば、演習場や飛行場等があることによって地域住民のくらしに影響を及ぼす場合には、補助事
例えば、演習場や飛行場等があることによって地域住民のくらしに影響を及ぼす場合には、補助事
cases where training sites, airfields, and other facilities affect the lives of local residents.
業を活用し、住民の避難等の円滑化を図るため、公園等の整備を実施しています。
業を活用し、住民の避難等の円滑化を図るため、公園等の整備を実施しています。
Additionally, schools, hospitals, and other facilities that require quiet environments are outfitted with noise insulation features
また、自衛隊や在日米軍の飛行場などの航空機の離着陸などにより生じる騒音を防止・軽減するた
また、自衛隊や在日米軍の飛行場などの航空機の離着陸などにより生じる騒音を防止・軽減するた
that prevent and alleviate noise created by the takeoff and landing of aircraft at airfields used by the Self-Defense Forces and U.S.
Forces stationed in Japan and other activities.
め、静穏を必要とする学校・病院などの防音工事を実施しています。
め、静穏を必要とする学校・病院などの防音工事を実施しています。
Example of noise
Example of park building insulation work Ventilation

Sound

absorption Temperature holding
Sound
and dehumidification

insulation
(Photo provided by Ginowan City, Okinawa)

（写真提供：沖縄県宜野湾市） (Photo provided by Oarai Town, Ibaraki)
（写真提供：茨城県大洗町）
（写真提供：沖縄県宜野湾市）（写真提供：茨城県大洗町）
In Ginowan City, where Futenma Air Station is located, a park was built to facilitate
普天間飛行場等が所在する宜野湾市では、住
Noise insulation work involves the installation of soundproof sashes (sound insulation),
防音工事は、屋外の騒音を遮断するための防
防音工事は、屋外の騒音を遮断するための防
普天間飛行場等が所在する宜野湾市では、住
smooth evacuations of local residents. installation of air-conditioning equipment to keep the sealed indoor environment
民の避難等の円滑化を図るため、市内の公園の comfortable
音サッシの取付け（遮音）
音サッシの取付け（遮音） (ventilation, temperature holding 、密閉された室内環境
and dehumidification), and the installation
、密閉された室内環境
民の避難等の円滑化を図るため、市内の公園の of sound absorption materials on the room walls and ceilings (sound absorption)
整備を実施しました。を快適に保つための空調機器の取付け（換気・
を快適に保つための空調機器の取付け（換気・
整備を実施しました。
温度保持・除湿）
温度保持・除湿）、室内の壁・天井に吸音材料の
、室内の壁・天井に吸音材料の
取付け（吸音）を実施します。
取付け（吸音）を実施します。 Defense of Japan 434

Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and

Related Activities
1 Various Public Relations Activities
As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out magazine, “Japan Defense Focus(JDF).” It is proactively
without the understanding and support of the Japanese transmitting information to the international community
people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking through efforts such as providing international media
easily comprehensible public relations activities and to with opportunities for press coverage, enhancement of the
gain the trust and cooperation of the public. English section of the MOD website, publishing English
According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the Self- versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as
Defense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the well as producing PR videos.
Cabinet Office (in January 2018), the public expectations
and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing 2 Events and PR Facilities
as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both
domestically and internationally. In light of this result, The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform
the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These
activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise,
of the current status of the MOD/SDF. cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration
In addition, given that understanding and support flights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition,
from foreign countries are also of utmost importance at camps and bases throughout the country, events
for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on
essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation.
information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF In some instances, they also hold parades throughout
Chapter 5
initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad. the cities, with cooperation from the local communities.
See Reference 68 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the
Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at
of Cabinet Office))
Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted
approximately 40,000 visitors in total in 2017.

Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop
1 Information Communication for Domestic and review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in
International Audiences
rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively.
The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet In 2017, an air review was planned to be held by the
such as official websites, video distribution, and social ASDF at Hyakuri Airbase in commemoration of the
media (Social Networking Service)1 as well as actively 10th anniversary of the reorganization into the MOD
distributes information through various means including
television broadcasting, large-sized billboards, and the
showing of PR videos on trains.
The MOD has also been making great efforts to
provide accurate information in a more extensive and
timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and
“Manga-Style Defense of Japan (Comic),” as well
as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine
“MAMOR” and cooperation on media coverage.
Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in the
MOD/SDF initiatives by the international community, the
MOD has been striving to gain the understanding of people
in other countries by publishing the monthly English FY2017 SDF Marching Festival at the Nippon Budokan
1 In addition to Facebook and other SNS accounts, GSDF and MSDF opened an Instagram account in January and October 2017 respectively.

Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities Section 2
VOICE Self Defense Force Athletes Aiming for the Tokyo Olympics COLUMN
Second Lieutenant Yuki Irie
Last year I won at the Emperor’s Cup All Japan Championship Tournament
for the first time in a year and obtained the right to participate in various
international tournaments. I am committed to continue training as
a member of the Ministry of Defense Self Defense Forces and as a
representative of Japan, and I will give back to everyone by winning a
Gold medal in the Tokyo Olympics. I appreciate your continued support
and encouragement.
Second Lieutenant Naito Ehara

I managed to win a Bronze medal at the Rio Olympics with the support and encouragement
of many people. The Japanese team demonstrated its cohesiveness in the relay, however,
I discovered the need to foster more resilience in individual races. I am going to dedicate
myself to daily training with the goal of winning a medal in not only the relay, but also
in individual races at the Tokyo Olympics held in 2020 by fully utilizing the environment
provided by the JSDF Physical Training School.
Your continued encouragement is highly appreciated.
Chapter 5
but was called off due to stormy weather caused by the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore,
approaching Typhoon No. 22. In 2018, a troop review by the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting films
the GSDF is planned to take place. and TV programs.

The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to
the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the 3 Trial Enlistment Programs
facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya
district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 420,000 as of the end The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for
of March 2018. Each SDF service also has a large-scale undergraduate and graduate students as well as women2
PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups,
A scene from the spring tour with university students at the GSDF Camp Omiya
The summer tour for university students conducted at the ASDF Misawa Air Base
2 Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website.

companies and other organizations.3 FY2017, approximately 150 people participated in SDF
These programs are intended to promote participants’ Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF
understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities received approximately 1,900 requests for Enlistment
to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as Experience Programs, and approximately 24,000 employees
well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In experienced SDF life.
2 Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Document Management
explanation, had never been released, even though disposal

1 Necessity of Appropriate Operation of of the relevant data was instructed. Based on the decision
the Information Disclosure System
by the Defense Minister that normal investigation would
Democracy is founded on the principle that the public not be enough considering the situation, a special defense
has access to accurate information, thereby making inspection was initiated by the Inspector General’s Office
appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. of Legal Compliance on March 17 and its result was
Administrative documents held by the government are announced on July 28.
of utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate The result of the special defense inspection identifies
information, and it is an important responsibility for the improper conducts, including those leading to a violation
government to manage them in an appropriate manner of MOD/SDF personnel of the Information Disclosure
and respond to the public’s information disclosure Act. The MOD/SDF considers this result severe and
requests properly. Information held by the MOD/SDF is regrettable and should reflect upon it.
no exception to this, the MOD/SDF bears this important The MOD considers that the underlying causes of
responsibility under the Act on Access to Information these problems were that there were not enough levels of
Held by Administrative Organs. awareness on the importance of information disclosure
See Reference 69 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry is within the MOD/SDF, and that there were not enough
Chapter 5
of Defense (FY2017)) levels of communication among relevant departments and

agencies within the ministry. In order not to repeat such
Results of the Special Defense Inspection
2 Regarding Daily Reports of PKO in South Sudan, a case ever again, the MOD/SDF will be fully committed
and Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention to implementing measures to prevent the recurrence
of similar cases regarding information disclosure and

The background of the issue over daily reports written document management, while encouraging the personnel
by SDF engineering units dispatched to South Sudan is to change their mindset, fostering transparent and open
as follows. Concerning an information disclosure request culture in the organization and further enhancing the
made on October 3, 2016, the MOD initially refused the collaboration among departments and agencies. In this
request after receiving the response submitted by the way, everyone at the MOD/SDF must work together and
Chief of Staff of the GSDF, with the explanation “not make the utmost effort to regain the public confidence.
disclosed because the corresponding documents do not a. Results of the Special Defense Inspection and
exist.” Later, however, the daily reports in question were Relevant Matters
found within the Joint Staff Office through the second At the instruction of Defense Minister, the Inspector
search conducted at the instructions from the Defense General’s Office of Legal Compliance had strictly
Minister on December 26, 2016. Therefore, the MOD and fairly conducted a thorough investigation on the
publicly announced the fact on February 6, 2017, and management status of these daily reports4 over the
withdrew its initial decision, issuing a disclosure decision period of four months starting from March 17, 2017,
(partial disclosure decision) instead on February 13. from a highly independent standpoint, led by a former
Later, on March 15, the media reported that the daily superintendent prosecutor of a high public prosecutor’s
reports in data format had been retained in the GSDF, office and also served by active prosecutors, which ended
but the fact, which was inconsistent with the initial with the announcement of the result on July 28, 2017.
3 Tours to experience the daily life of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are implemented upon request from private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices.
4 The scope of this special defense inspection is the management status of the daily reports written for a period between July 7 and 12, 2016 (local time) by the engineering unit dispatched to South
Sudan, for which information disclosure request in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999) was sought on October 3, 2016. To read the
body of the report, see http://www.mod.go.jp/igo/inspection/pdf/special04_report.pdf.

On the same day, the MOD imposed strict disciplinary Appoint “a person in charge of information disclosure”
measures against the relevant persons. at each organization with a document controller in
See Reference 70 (Results of the Special Defense Inspection place. Ensure that accurate judgment is made in
(Overview)) document identification through multiple reviews
b. Measures to Prevent the Recurrence and searches, even in cases where it was decided that
In response to what was pointed out in the results of there was no corresponding document subject to an
this special defense inspection which was announced on information disclosure request.
July 28, 2017, the MOD/SDF has taken the following • Ensuring close cooperation and information sharing
measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases. among each of the Staff Offices, internal bureaus and
❍ Handling of daily reports Administrative Vice Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, etc.
• Review of the retention period of daily reports (to be Considering the possibility that the document
retained for 10 years) subject to a disclosure request might be retained in
Ensure that all daily reports written by SDF units, other organizations, each of the Staff Offices work
including those written by the engineering unit closely with relevant internal bureaus and try to share
dispatched to South Sudan will be retained for 10 information and further improve the accuracy of
years. After the retention period expires, they will be document search and identification.
transferred and archived under the management of the • Extensive and improved education and training to raise
National Archives of Japan. personnel awareness
• Central management under the Joint Staff Councilor5 Raise awareness of the personnel by developing
Ensure that the Joint Staff Councilor is responsible subjects regarding information disclosure operation
for central management of these daily reports by for the personnel (senior officials in particular) in
organizing and storing them in data format, and also various personnel training programs and make such
for centrally handling all subsequent information subjects mandatory, as well as prepare and distribute
disclosure requests. the “Information Disclosure Handbook” describing
• Strengthening structure attached to the Joint Staff Councilor the procedures for information disclosure in an easy-
Chapter 5
To appropriately respond to information disclosure to-understand manner.
requests, assign officials in charge of operating ❍ Management of administrative documents
information disclosure to the position attached to the • Review of retention period for documents including
Joint Staff Councilor reports regarding the SDF’s actions

❍ Information disclosure operation Retain reports of actions based on various orders,
• Strengthening check function by establishing a new irrespective of domestic or overseas deployment that
post “Information Disclosure Inspector” will contribute to the decisions by the Minister of
To evaluate the appropriateness of the judgement in a Defense and senior officers for a period of 3 to 30
strict manner regarding all cases for which disclosure years depending on the document type, and after the
was rejected due to the absence of requested documents, retention period expires, transfer them to the National
establish a new post of Information Disclosure Archives of Japan.
Inspector who is responsible for interviewing persons • Ensuring the appropriateness of document management
involved and carry out on-site inspection at a division of the entire ministry
that may possess the said document. Require each organization to consult with the supervising
• Regular verification of the whole information document controller (Director-General of the Secretariat)
disclosure operation by the Inspector General’s Office about preparing or modifying its guidelines for standard
of Legal Compliance document retention periods. Also implement measures,
Ensure that the whole information disclosure operation including appropriate labeling of handling types of
at the MOD/SDF is regularly inspected and verified by administrative documents, thorough management of
the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance. appropriate access control, clarification of an expiration
• Thorough review of all cases for which disclosure was date of a retention period, and clear definition of a
rejected due to the absence of relevant administrative responsible department in the case of administrative
documents documents shared by two or more departments.
5 The Joint Staff Councilor was the title then. It was divided into Principal Joint Staff Councilor and Joint Staff Councilor on April 1, 2018, responsible for centrally managing all documents including
daily reports.

• Personnel education 4 Daily Reports in Iraq and Relevant issues

To make these measures fully known and understood
by the personnel, prepare the manual for them and In the efforts to achieve centralized management for all
hand it out to all of them, as well as provide individual regular reports,6 including daily reports, under the Joint
training for senior officials and working-level officials Staff Councilor,7 as part of the recurrence prevention
in charge of document management across the measures which resulted from reflections on the South
organization, including regional organizations. Sudan PKO daily report issue. Extremely inappropriate
In addition, as for the management of handling over the daily reports in Iraq was also identified.8
administrative documents, the MOD also review rules, Among them, with regard to the background of
including the MOD regulations on administrative the reports found at the GSDF Ground Research and
documents management in light of the revised Development Command (the department of the time,
Guidelines on Administrative Document Management hereinafter the same shall apply.),9 it has found that the
(signed by Prime Minister on April 1, 2011, hereinafter daily reports in Iraq were found on March 27, 2017, to
called the “New Guidelines”), and make such rules be kept at the GSDF Ground Research and Development
fully known and understood by the personnel. Command, just when the re-searching had been underway
at the instruction by the Defense Minister from February
22, 2017, and nevertheless, said discovery had not been
3 Initiatives for Appropriate Management of reported to the Defense Minister (which was announced
Public Documents
on April 4, 2018). As there was the possibility that this case
Following the issue over public documents, at the entailed a grave problem that might affect civilian control,
informal meeting of Cabinet members on March 23, at the instruction of Defense Minister Onodera, the MOD
2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed the members decided on April 4, 2018 to initiate an investigation by
to immediately work on the following two points: (i) for the “investigation team on ‘Daily Reports’ of GSDF in
senior officials to take initiative in ensuring that all Iraq” which was head by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of
officials will understand and abide by strict rules under Defense Ohno Keitaro.10 Furthermore, in this process, the
Chapter 5
the New Guidelines effective from April 2018 and investigation on the background of the cases in (b), (c)
(ii) accelerate the transition to an electronic approval and (d) listed below had also been put in place.
system designed for strict management of document The investigation indicates that the MOD/SDF had
history such as update information. not responded to the instruction of Defense Minister in
Prior to this instruction, on March 12, at the MOD, an appropriate manner, made inappropriate responses
Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera instructed senior to questions, document requests, information disclosure
officials to bear in mind once again the importance of requests from the Diet members, and failed to promptly
information disclosure, management of administrative correct such actions thereafter. The MOD regards them as
documents, and information protection while performing a problem to be reflected upon.
their duties. Then upon the instruction of Prime Minister The investigation has not identified any inappropriate
as mentioned above, the minister reminded them to ensure intentions in performing paperwork in connection with
that all administrative documents would be managed the instructions by the Defense Minister or questions
properly in accordance with the New Guidelines, and at the Diet. The daily reports in question were found
ensure that all the personnel would be aware of the need to and publicly announced while taking the recurrence
accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system, prevention measures under the instruction of the Defense
thereby making efforts to manage all the documents in an Minister. In addition, it is not considered that there was
appropriate fashion. any conduct that constitutes violation of any resolutions
6 Regular reports produced for senior officers (including command headquarters) by units carrying out actions based on deployment orders that will contribute to the decisions by the Minister of Defense
and the senior officers.
7 See footnote 5.
8 This case was triggered by the fact that a part of the Iraq daily reports were found at the Ground Staff Office's medical department and the Research and Development Command (which was
announced on April 2, 2017), but with regard to the said reports, the Defense Minister previously responded in the Diet that the MOD searched for retained daily reports of the unit in Iraq but failed
to find any of them.
9 The Ground Research and Development Command was reorganized into Japan Ground Self Defense Force Training Evaluation Research and Development Command on March 27, 2018.
10 At a later date, the MOD decided to conduct an investigation with assistance from a lawyer, a former superintending prosecutor of the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office. The investigation team
visited the Japan Ground Self Defense Force Training Evaluation Research and Development Command to collect documents and other materials and check computers of relevant officials and files
of administrative documents, in addition, the team conducted interviews with approximately 70 people and questionnaires to approximately 400 people. The team held 34 meetings in total until the
investigation team’s report was published.

or approvals in the Diet. With such things considered c. Background of the Discovery of Daily Reports at the GSDF
the MOD concludes that there was no issue that could International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit
undermine civilian control itself. That said, the MOD Regarding this matter, the investigation concluded that it
must take it seriously that the case in question gave rise was considered inappropriate that adequate search had not
to concerns and distrust for civilian control among the been conducted in response to the document request from
public. The results of each investigation were announced the Diet member, and thus the response was provided to
on May 23, 2018, and are summarized as follows: the effect that the MOD did not retain the daily reports;
a. Investigation on Daily Reports in Iraq11 and it was also considered inappropriate that even when
When the special defense inspection on the daily reports the reports were found through the special defense
of the PKO unit in South Sudan had been underway, the inspection and the information disclosure request, any
existence of the daily reports from Iraq retained at the necessary effort to correct the response provided to the
GSDF Ground Research and Development Command document request or the answers to the Diet questions
was identified. As for this matter, the investigation found had not been made thereafter.
that the e-mail that notices the instructions about re- d. Background of the Discovery of the Daily Reports from
searching by the Defense Minister was not clear enough Iraq at the Air Staff Office
for the recipients to understand the message as intended. Within the ASDF, any daily reports from Iraq were not
In addition, it was also found that sufficient searches found in the searches conducted in February, August,
had not been conducted in response to the information and March 2018, but in April 2018, the daily reports
disclosure request, and appropriate paperwork had not from Iraq for 3 days were found. This is not considered
been performed. For such reasons, the existence of the appropriate as daily reports in its procession were not
daily reports in Iraq was not reported to the Defense fully understood by the ASDF.
Minister. As a result, this indicates that the MOD/SDF e. Measures to prevent the recurrence13
did not properly respond to the instruction of the Defense Based on the facts made clear through the investigation,
Minister, and took inappropriate responses to questions, the MOD publicly announced the investigation report
document requests, and information disclosure requests on May 23, 2018, imposed strict disciplinary measures
Chapter 5
from the Diet, and failed to promptly correct such against Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and 16
response thereafter. This is extremely regrettable. relevant subordinates concerned, and also announced the
b. Background of the Report to Minister by Joint Staff following measures to prevent the recurrence of similar
Councilor and Others Regarding the Daily Reports cases. In the meantime, at the meeting of Cabinet members

from Iraq12 regarding the ideal management of public documents held
Regarding this matter, the investigation has found that: on June 8, 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed
Since the Joint Staff Office identified the existence of the Cabinet members to lead the initiative in taking all
the daily reports from the units dispatched to Iraq on possible measures to ensure proper management of public
March 2, 2018, the Joint Staff Councilor and relevant documents. Accordingly, the MOD will fully implement
departments had taken all the necessary steps, including these measures to prevent the recurrence and do every
close examination of the reports found, coordination effort to regain the public’s confidence in the MOD/SDF.
with relevant departments in connection with matters ❍ Strengthening of Structure in Charge of Performing
to be reported to Defense Minister, double-checking for Minister’s Instruction and Order
any daily reports left unsearched, and confirmation on • Specify in writing important instructions and operational
response status about document requests and information orders, etc. from Defense Minister, and senior officials.
disclosure requests from Diet members. After all these • Require the above instructions, etc., to be notified to
steps on March 31, the MOD provided the explanation the division chief or official in the equivalent position,
to the Defense Minister. In retrospect however, if as well as require relevant responses to be approved by
such a problem was identified, the MOD should have the division chief or official in the equivalent position.
immediately informed the minister thereof. Accordingly, • If such instructions, etc., are made, a responsible
this response is not considered appropriate. department or bureau to notify the Minister's Secretariat
of implementation and coordination status is required.
11 To read the body of this investigation team’s report, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_1.pdf

12 To read the body of the report on (b), (c) and (d) herein, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_2.pdf
13 For the summary of the measures to prevent the recurrence, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_3.pdf

❍ Appropriate response to administrative document ❍ Create an organization capable of the prompt and
management and information disclosure by maintaining accurate response to information disclosure, etc.
such documents as electronic files. • Examine a system to centrally retain and control
• Accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system administrative documents in the electronic format.
• Require all the personnel to notify a responsible person • Reinforce exclusive structure, particularly at the Joint
at a division in charge, etc., of the response status Staff Office. As part of this, reemploy retired SDF
❍ Reinforce the check system for administrative personnel with expertise on administrative document
document management and information disclosure management and information disclosure for daily
• Establish a new organization responsible for inspection reports and other documents as part-time officials.
of administrative document management and
information disclosure14
• Build a framework to receive instructions and advising
from external experts
❍ Reform a mindset of individual SDF personnel
regarding administrative document management and
information disclosure
• Develop extensive training programs designed to
help SDF personnel improve necessary judgment in
performing operations
• Consider designating administrative document
management and information disclosure as part of
Minister of Defense Onodera delivering a special address to the SDF personnel nationwide
criteria for personnel performance appraisal (April 2018)
3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation

Chapter 5
1 Engagement in Policy Evaluation 3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System
The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various In light of respecting individual rights in line with the
policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2017, Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by
the MOD conducted policy evaluations of R&D programs Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to
and projects concerning taxation special measures as well ensure the security of the personal information under its
as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the control, and discloses such information upon request.
Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP).
4 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower

2 Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making Protection System
In order to promote Evidence-Based Policy Making The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing
(EBPM), the MOD has worked on the establishment of made by its officials, employees and outside workers,
the structure for promotion of EBPM within the ministry, establishing internal contact desks to deal with
including the establishment of a new position, “Director- whistleblowing and to protect whistleblower.
General for Evidence-based Policymaking,” who plays a See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Organization of the Ministry of
central role of the EBPM in FY2018. Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF))
14 See Section 2-2-(b).

Reference
Reference

Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country
United States Russia United Kingdom France China

400 313 60
Minuteman III: 400 SS-1846 DF-5 (CSS-4) 20
ICBM
SS-1930 DF-31 (CSS-10) 40
(Intercontinental ― ―
SS-2563
Ballistic Missiles)
SS-2778
RS-2496
Missiles
148
IRBM DF-4 (CSS-3) 10
― ― ― ― DF-21 (CSS-5) 122
MRBM
DF-2616
Reference
SLBM 336 192 48 64 48

(Submarine Trident D-5: 336 SS-N-1848 Trident D-5: 48 M-4516 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) 48
Launched SS-N-2396 M-5148
Ballistic Missiles) SS-N-3248
Submarines equipped
with nuclear ballistic 14 13 4 4 4
missiles
78 76 63 90
Aircraft B-220 Tu-95 (Bear): 60 ― Mirage2000N: 23 H-6K90
B-5258 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16 Rafale: 40
Approx. 4,000 Approx. 4,300 215 300 Approx. 270
Number of warheads (including Approx. 1,850
tactical nuclear warheads)
Notes:
1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2018,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2017, etc.
2. In February 2018, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of February 5, 2018: the number of deployed strategic
nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,350 and the delivery vehicles involved 652 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,444 and the delivery vehicles involved
527 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2017, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,800 (including 150 tactical nuclear warheads).
3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed
is to be no more than 180.
4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 120-130 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 130-140, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 10-20.
Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries
(Approximate Numbers) and Regions (Approximate Numbers)
Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces Regular Reserves
Country or Region Military Service System
(10,000 persons) (10,000 persons)
Ground Number
Tonnage Number United States Volunteer 129 80
Country or Forces Country or Country or of
(10,000 of
Region (10,000 Region Region Combat Russia Conscription / Volunteer 90 200
tons) Vessels
persons) Aircraft
United Kingdom Volunteer 15 8
India 120 United States 636.8 945 United States 3,576
France Volunteer 20 3
North Korea 110 Russia 204.2 1,093 China 2,845
Germany Volunteer 18 3
China 98 China 178.7 754 Russia 1,468
Italy Volunteer 17 2
Pakistan 56 United Kingdom 58.0 130 India 950
India Volunteer 140 116
Republic of Republic of
49 India 47.8 315 640
Korea Korea China Conscription 204 51
United States 47 France 39.2 298 Egypt 573 North Korea Conscription 128 60
Vietnam 41 Indonesia 25.5 176 North Korea 545 Republic of Korea Conscription 62.5 310
Myanmar 38 Italy 23.6 183 Taiwan 495 Egypt Conscription 44 48
Republic of Israel Conscription 18 47
Iran 35 21.5 240 Pakistan 447
Korea
Ground 14 3.3 (0.4)
Egypt 31 Germany 21.1 118 France 430
Japan Volunteer Maritime 4.2 0.05
Indonesia 30 Australia 21.0 102 Turkey 377
Air 4.3 0.05
Russia 28 Turkey 20.8 210 Saudi Arabia 376
Notes:
Turkey 26 Taiwan 20.5 392 Israel 364 1. Data from “The Military Balance 2018” and other sources.
Thailand 25 Spain 19.0 173 Iran 340 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as
of the end of FY2017. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel
United and is not included in the total figure.
Colombia 22 Brazil 17.8 109 295
Kingdom 3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of
volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
Japan 14 Japan 48.8 135 Japan 400 4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the
conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly
Notes:
introduced as a replacement of the former.
1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from “The Military Balance 2018” and other sources,
and data on maritime forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2017–2018 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2017, and
combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat
aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan
Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces
(10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) (Number of Combat Aircraft)
250 250 8,000
1998 1998 1998
2008 2008 2008
200 200
2018 2018 6,000 2018
150 150
4,000
100 100
2,000
Reference
50 50
0 0 0
Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan
Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline) economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability,
(Approved by the National Security Council and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own
and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a
“Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international
I. Purpose
cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that
❍ As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan Japan should stand to hold.
needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives
determine the course it should pursue in the international community, National Interests
and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies ❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial
and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its
society. nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace
❍ In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition.
more proactive role as a major global player in the international ❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic
community. development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end,
❍ The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes
presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security. an international environment that offers stability, transparency and
❍ With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control predictability).
tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of ❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal
Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human
structured manner through a whole-government approach. rights, and the rule of law.
❍ When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan National Security Objectives
will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize ❍ To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace
its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from
smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy. directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat
❍ The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.
decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will ❍ To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region,
regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan,
timely and appropriate manner. through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust
II. Fundamental Principle of National Security and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within
1. Principles Japan Upholds and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security
❍ Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal cooperation.
values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human ❍ To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful,
rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the
capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a
strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic
has achieved its development benefiting from an open international efforts and further personnel contributions.
economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges
“Open and Stable Seas.” 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges
❍ Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological
since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of Innovation
maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not ❍ The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise
becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China
observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. is increasing its presence in the international community. The
❍ Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has
in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and
States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.
other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability ❍ The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation
and prosperity in the international community through initiatives has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat
for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.
addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other
well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. Related Materials
❍ Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been ❍ The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement
cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery,
has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development
participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to
the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan Japan and the international community.
has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, (3) Threat of International Terrorism
playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free ❍ International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms
of nuclear weapons.” due to the advancement of globalization.
❍ Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date ❍ Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have
as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and

actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand
international terrorism both at home and abroad. and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the
(4) Risks to Global Commons Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan
❍ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote
to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have comprehensive policies.
been spreading and become more serious. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International
❍ In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number Environment
of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo ❍ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable
by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
respective states. ❍ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security
❍ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more
growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international
coming under threat. community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the
Reference
❍ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of principle of international cooperation.
outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused ❍ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating
by satellite collisions amongst others. power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s
❍ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure position in the international community.
and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious. ❍ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its
(5) Challenges to Human Security soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also
❍ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify
poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas
infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, activities.
food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and ❍ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international
natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the
security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. number of Japanese staff in such institutions.
❍ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend
the international community. Japan
(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks ❍ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop
❍ The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in
the entire global economy is growing. strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and
❍ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on
trade rules are becoming apparent. joint operations.
❍ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as ❍ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local
an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime,
resources by emerging countries are observed. Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for
2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed
(1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region attacks to large-scale natural disasters.
❍ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with ❍ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF),
large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its
regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations,
sufficiently institutionalized. prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive
(2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions perspective.
❍ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear ❍ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence
weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order
has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence,
of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures
increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD)
and of other countries is being substantially aggravated. and protection of the people.
❍ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity
situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored. ❍ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies
❍ North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime
as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent surveillance capabilities.
issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility. ❍ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and
(3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected
❍ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with situations.
international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for ❍ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and
regional and global issues. development of remote islands near national borders, and from a
❍ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land
range of areas without sufficient transparency. in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas
❍ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change surrounding defense facilities.
the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which (4) Ensuring Maritime Security
are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the ❍ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining
maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by
South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule
airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight,
Defense Identification Zone”). and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant
❍ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, international law, rather than by force.
the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship ❍ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in
contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability. a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while
IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security paying attention to the establishment of international networks.
1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles ❍ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea
• To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime
its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with
Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.
capabilities to respond to future developments. (5) Strengthening Cyber Security
• Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its ❍ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace
diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to
strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and
in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure
• In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is
security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in suspected.

❍ Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-
comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard scale disaster response operations.
to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc. (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces
❍ Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to ❍ While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing
enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S.
cooperation. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements,
(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including
❍ Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against Okinawa.
international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s
facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community
living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will
analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism. engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both
(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities within and outside the region through the following approaches.
Reference
❍ Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting ❍ Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the Asia-
capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human Pacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic
intelligence and open source intelligence. interests.
❍ Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing — ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security
capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all- cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together
source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues.
means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence — Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership
will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security
appropriately utilized in policy formulation. cooperation.
(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation — ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop
❍ From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors
on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years.
contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts
including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in towards maintaining and strengthening its unity.
joint development and production of defense equipment and other — India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of
related items. areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic
❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles and Global Partnership.
on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played ❍ Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship
so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as
overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage
security environment. In this context, considerations will be made China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of
with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly
cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and but in a calm manner to China’s recent attempts to change the status
ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized quo by coercion.
use and third party transfer. ❍ Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of
(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and
Security Purposes missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang
❍ Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information- Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant
gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan Security Council resolutions.
will also enhance a system for space situational awareness. ❍ Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including
❍ Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole.
a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long- ❍ In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in
term, including the development of technologies. multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks.
(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities ❍ Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region
❍ Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, towards ensuring the stability of the region.
including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s ❍ European countries are partners for Japan which together take a
technological capabilities. leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the
❍ Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations
effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE.
efforts of industries, academia, and the Government. ❍ Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging
❍ Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in
technologies in diplomacy. tackling global challenges.
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance  ❍ Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations
• Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation
cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a
of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability
and the broader international community. of the Middle East.
•The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a ❍ Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the
rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially
presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development
including Japan and its partners. (TICAD) process.
• In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of
peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the the International Community
international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and
Alliance. stability of the international community.
(1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations
in a Wide Range of Areas ❍ Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the
❍ Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.
Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such ❍ Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council
as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-
bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of
with various policies in line with the Strategy. the Council.
❍ Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. ❍ In order to establish the rule of law in the international community,
on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from
as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly
and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad reflected.

❍ Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to ❍ Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition
the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense
development of legal systems. production and technological bases, including through strengthening
(3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation international competitiveness.
❍ Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
nuclear weapons.” ❍ It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate
❍ Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non- its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the
proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative
nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a relations with other countries.
manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended ❍ With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower,
deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance. Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic
(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing
❍ Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also
Reference
international peace cooperation activities. strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.
❍ Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, ❍ Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and
and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education
assistance. overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to
❍ Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO strategic public relations efforts and other areas.
personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or ❍ By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s
organizations concerned. position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate
(5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism understanding in the form of international opinion.
❍ Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other (3) Reinforcing the Social Base
countries on the situation on international terrorism and international ❍ It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to
counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and
international legal framework. to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they
❍ Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc. perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them,
5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.
Issues ❍ Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well
Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open as love for the country and region.
international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability ❍ Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to
and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase
Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in
of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and Japan.
stability of the international community. (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base
(1) Sharing Universal Values ❍ Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at
❍ Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares institutions of higher education.
universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and ❍ Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions
the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to of higher education, think tanks, etc.
addressing global issues. ❍ Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and
❍ Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting government officials.
democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
❍ Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.
Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014
(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing
and beyond
Human Security
❍ It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address (Approved by the National Security Council
development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
based on the principle of international cooperation. Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014
❍ Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and Beyond are included in the reference.
and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and
development goals. Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as
❍ Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of of the end of FY2013.
human security in the international community. (Additional reference)
(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond
Countries I. NDPG’s Objective
❍ Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government
countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide of Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and
them education and training. Japan will further promote human beyond” as new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense
resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can Capability Build-up in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the
contribute to development in their home countries. Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the “National Security Strategy” (approved
(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).
❍ Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan
the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP.
1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a
Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity
growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security
in the Asia-Pacific region.
problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into
(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international
❍ Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the
community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of
stable supply of energy and other natural resources.
shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries
❍ In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive
such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United
strategy for countering global warming.
States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play
(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges
the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the largest
❍ Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
national power.
❍ Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and
There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as
culture.
well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that
6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security
is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty
and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding
and maritime economic interests.
• In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other
ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation
capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.
efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with
• It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies
weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of
both at home and abroad to ensure national security.
international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent
(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological
security challenges.
Bases

In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent
of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in
asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion cooperation with allies and partners.
concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the 3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous
freedom of the high seas. remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime
Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food
commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air
community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology traffic, through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order based
innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of
future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity.
proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration
munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology. of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and
2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear
Reference
are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake
resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous
collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non- damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other
traditional security fields. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai
territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly
raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations. necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale
North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military disasters.
force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and 4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict
proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era,
which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large- presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing
scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result,
maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities. the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly
North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines,
by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet
escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing
other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to
destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly
region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-
utmost attention to such activities. military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding
In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain
presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have regional and global stability.
been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy
through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted 1. Basic Policy
nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its
community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive
miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international
ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time,
coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability
a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own
security. security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by
As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries,
in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.
continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense
reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding
China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-
military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security
the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and
surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure
and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.
its military and security is not fully achieved. When implementing these measures, under the Constitution,
In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force
activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-
the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to
taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the
the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence
has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable.
Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended
cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan
an “Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its own assertion thereby will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic
infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas. missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time,
China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear
and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term
military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.
expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan. 2. Japan’s Own Efforts
As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will Recognizing that a country’s security depends first and foremost on
need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own
concerns over regional and global security. initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to
As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the
and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and
and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces other countries concerned.
have been active. (1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture
The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make
region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based
presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency
order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the
its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and

promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and
as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation
protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security
of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has
local governments, private sectors, and others. become more important than ever for Japan’s security to strengthen the
Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective.
to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance (1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-
the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign U.S. Alliance
countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety. In order to ensure Japan’s national security by maintaining and
In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the
increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-
by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense
them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S.
Reference
training and exercises. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response capabilities, while
(2) Japan’s defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.
Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security
and represent Japan’s will and ability to deter threats from directly environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S.
reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation
In the times of an ever-changing security environment with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various
surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone”
adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited situations.
resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and
and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities
joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational
Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities against various cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response
situations. and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning,
Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.
Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields
to various situations, including “gray zone” situations which require The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability
SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening
of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity
conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but
(hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.
strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its
the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside
deployment of units in response to the security environment and Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ
rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese
will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In people during the Great East Japan Earthquake.
dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the
damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields,
and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information
of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and
waters and airspace. technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.
Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response (3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S.
capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and Forces in Japan
its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective
based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including
adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made
to realize a more robust defense force. to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and
At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the
to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek
will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important
in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which location in terms of national security and where the stationing of
is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-
international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ
operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps
including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other
and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and
international security environment) and other efforts more proactively areas there.
than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in 4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation
light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
defense force. In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been
From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster
environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM
resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and
effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making
to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious
demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of
Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the
sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one
technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a another in the region.
wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation. Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea
3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North
The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a
Treaty, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by
Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral concluding an agreement on security information protection and an
security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.
stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with
region and the world at large. which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation
Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as

international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with
joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch
with Australia. of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and
Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries.
among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening With regard to international peace cooperation activities and
cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively
the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia. conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase
As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of
security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters
China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In
confidence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to
Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of
expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the
Reference
the air surrounding Japan. training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding
Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.
the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), high- IV. Future Defense Forces
level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen 1. The Role of the Defense Force
understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2)
develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in
bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.
stability. (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations
Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate
countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people
actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve
assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an
countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of
frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of
strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, development at an early stage.
including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not
well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities. to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing
As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the various situations from occurring.
security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond
Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the
initiatives, including the Official Development Assistance, and necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.
aligning it with joint training and exercises and international Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored
peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a
relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby consecutive or concurrent manner.
expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are
scope. emphasized in particular:
Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan
the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan,
and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with
relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond
in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts
enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts
region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond
ARF and the ADMM Plus. seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures
(2) Cooperation with the international community for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding
It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security Japan.
challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces b. Response to an attack on remote islands
have diversified, there are increasing opportunities for such forces In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept
to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and
conflicts and maintaining peace but also in supporting post-conflict air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed
reconstruction, building peace and promoting confidence-building to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in
and friendly relationships. accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any
Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so,
global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with
international community. appropriately.
Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning c. Response to ballistic missile attacks
arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch
assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-
regional conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will
failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by
problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic
regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear
it shares security interests and with international organizations and power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units.
other relevant bodies. d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace
In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up
with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede
(NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation
(OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair
countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover,
Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and
equipment and technology with these countries and organizations. cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities
In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant
region and improve the global security environment based on the organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing
policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.
of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various e. Responses to major disasters
international peace cooperation activities, including international Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and
peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part
in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer

term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that
response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of
government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military
and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan
in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will
livelihood support. cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations
(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.
environments 2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces
Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the (1) Basic approach
timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively
various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan
environment in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole including the has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in
vicinity of Japan. relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions
Reference
Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more
Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and effective build-up of the defense force.
multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense
exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulfilling its capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of
key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which
environment, including the building and strengthening of intra- is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various
regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region. situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern
As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of
respond appropriately to global security issues including regional rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a
conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed wide-ranging logistical support foundation.
states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style
strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF
and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills
cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the
assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote
environment. efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.
Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when (2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized
engaging in the aforementioned initiatives. From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense
a. Holding training and exercises force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and
As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions
training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral with interoperability with the U.S. forces.
joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively a. ISR capabilities
and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various
capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will
build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft
countries. and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF
b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according
Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with to the developments of situations.
other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone b. Intelligence capabilities
of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection,
further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected
and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly
relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures
interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its
outer space and cyberspace. vicinity.
c. Promoting capacity building assistance In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various
Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT,
engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using
development and technical support on a regular basis in order to unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated
enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to
improving the security environment with particular focus on active combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to
creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a
d. Ensuring maritime security framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly
As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain capable personnel in information gathering analysis.
an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone c. Transport capability
of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment
secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti- capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the
piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including
promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration
coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid
exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments
surrounding our country. among various means of transport, considering their respective
e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities characteristics.
Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations d. Command and control, and information and communications
and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in capabilities
international peace cooperation assignments and emergency In order to establish a command and control system that can
relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner,
peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force
leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-
to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each
Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience
overseas deployment. held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will
f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF’s units
and nonproliferation such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through
Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of
activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining
In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF’s of the command and control function in each regional army
knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, headquarters, and other measures.

Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and
its information and communications capabilities that are equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.
prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with (1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and
functions among the three services. nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other
e. Response to an attack on remote islands situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic
In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment
a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced
the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain
naval vessels, and missiles, etc. mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order
Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations,
to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation,
the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons,
Reference
capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure and international peace cooperation activities.
without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient
Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and
capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c.
respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given
In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air the excellent training environment there.
defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific. The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern
f. Response to ballistic missile attacks region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent
To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the
Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment
capability against the threat of ballistic missiles. of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.
With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in
readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at
response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire sea, as far as possible.
territory. c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in
Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units
and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan- and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided
U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own missile units referred to in (3) d. below.
deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic
of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly
launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary. deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on
g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization
While strengthening information collection capability using and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately,
satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing according to geographical characteristics.
command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF (2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)
will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol
continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment,
enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional
space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively
SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby
institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S. facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the
As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and
surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest international peace cooperation activities etc.
equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to
prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities. in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped
h. Responses to major disasters, etc. destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai against ballistic missile attacks.
Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by
emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol
initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly
gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning
aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, and surveillance in those seas.
the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long- c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order
term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding
appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence
posture based on a joint operational approach. gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively
and other similar activities conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding
In international peace cooperation activities and other similar Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional
activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred
capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of to in a. above.
personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing (3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
transport and deployment capability, information communication a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting
capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and
remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and
structure for smooth and continuous operation. control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying
From the standpoint of carrying out international peace into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in
cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning
measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning,
Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in surveillance and control in the air over long periods in the event of
Djibouti. “gray zone” situations.
Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly
capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan
education, training and personnel management systems in order based on a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter
to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will
overseas cooperation activities. maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will
3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces enable fighter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out
The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan.

c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively and relevant organizations.
carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are
international peace cooperation activities etc. becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote
d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with
providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the
attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. sufficiency of reserve personnel.
above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface- 4. Medical
to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above. In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability
V. Basic Foundations for SDF to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation
To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will
a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through
main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced
strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense
Reference
ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to
are as follows. securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and
1. Training and Exercises emergency medical technicians.
Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of
and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first
enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid
tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced
effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF joint capabilities.
will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases
in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases
and exercises. is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep
In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits
exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute
environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, to enhancing deterrence.
while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal
that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly
including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment
2. Operational Infrastructure are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan’s defense
The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance,
military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the
that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of
deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. the defense industry.
Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate
dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production
program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in
an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, international joint development and production and adapting defense
thereby enhancing readiness. equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases
The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian without delay.
airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day- With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation,
to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective
operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-
on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense
measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has
from home and of their families while they are away. become the mainstream to participate in international joint development
The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense
in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this
availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based
upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage
ammunition. more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by
3. Personnel and Education utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint
Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and development and production of defense equipment and other related items.
missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that
will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines
in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles
resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the
variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made
morale. with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases
Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring
appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third
account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the party transfer.
SDF. 6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment
The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment,
human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense
and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment
privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF through introducing a project manager system, as well as through
will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and
Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives
who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-
in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to cycle of equipment.
various situations as part of the government. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness
In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through
from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will
higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and
measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more
Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment.
secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign 7. Research and Development
at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities
for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and

development, in order to guarantee that research and development that buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields
meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe to ensure that Japan’s defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its
fiscal situation. expected function.
In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote
research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective,
taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)
in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international
(Approved by the National Security Council
joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and
and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
development that can ensure Japan’s technological superiority against new
The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the
threats in strategically important areas.
National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by
From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology
the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has
effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend
been established as shown in the attached document.
in science and technology including information related to technological
Reference
(Attachment)
development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government,
Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)
industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense
will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be I. Program Guidelines
applied to defense (dual-use technologies), by enhancing partnerships In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance
with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond
control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies. (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December
The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development 17, 2013) (hereinafter “NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint
initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives. Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF
8. Collaboration with Local Communities to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly
The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing
with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource
the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force will serve
to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities,
are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology
improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities,
recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support
support for them. operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF
Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by
the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities
and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF’s
in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios.
on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and
cooperation of local governments and communities. efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following
Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution program guidelines:
to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, 1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its
and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to
using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and
and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement
reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence,
in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I
the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities
of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer
local economy. space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace
9. Boosting Communication Capabilities cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international
The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public society to improve the international security environment such as U.N.
relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/
via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will
understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties. steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these
10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base functions and capabilities.
The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related 2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to
matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite
security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including
to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a defense posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region. Furthermore, the
particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.
of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style
research exchange with other research and educational institutions within invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will
the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to
and overseas. respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to
11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater
The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly efficiency and rationalization of its activities.
reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of 3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly
unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with
in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF
functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions. will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and
VI. Additional Points quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its
project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during
1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan’s defense force over the
its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to
next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular,
improve cost-effectiveness.
systematic review over the course of implementation of the various
4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and
measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the
internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and
future defense force will be facilitated through validations based on joint
the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement
operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a
measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and
timely and appropriate manner.
reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.
2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and
5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to
verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at
strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,
that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised
in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the
adequately.
Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation
3. In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to
and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including
achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability
the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan

will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective aircraft, and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In
6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan’s public finance, addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the
Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad
of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate
taken by the Government. ground-based aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which
II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF.
1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), (2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands
given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for (a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure
the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out
basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an armored regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate
division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will
operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering
Reference
addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767)
control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure
other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early
efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one squadron
units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air
In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section
nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense
the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-
into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades prepared surveillance posture will be maintained.
that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By (b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority
establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including
initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the
islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one
sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to squadron to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate
land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter
be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and
several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after
established. considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace
From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more
while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-
for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve
will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping
equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that
tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and
Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure
newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. new aerial refueling/transport aircraft, and continuously work to
In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities
howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF
than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote
direct command of the respective regional armies. islands in the Pacific.
2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the (c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy
security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the
various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct
operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-
activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers
mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis- (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft
equipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service-
as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will extension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-
also be continued. wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as
3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type
Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the
Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required
at Naha Air Base. for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as
To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean
and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-
support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of to-ship guided missiles.
advanced tactical skills. (d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response
4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale
will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active- transportation and deployment operations and improve effective
duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport
The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the
through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF
FY2013. will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen
the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of
III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities
cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary
1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose
(1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan helicopters that will success the existing multipurpose helicopters
In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the
areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and
stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers assignments among the various means of transportation.
(DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment
and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles
on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) that support units’ amphibious landing efforts on remote islands,
and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will
fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with
patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation,
the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers with and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations
additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding
airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning

its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large- NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in
scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF’s order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities
transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units.
considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants
including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to
private sector and reserve personnel. confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after
Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear
introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid power plants.
deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and (4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace
rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various (a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space
situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering
security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped
the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver deployment with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing
Reference
training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications
improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these
bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively
will also promote the development of improved capabilities of promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on
ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range. satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its
(e) Development of C3I satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic
From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies
at establishing a command and control system which enables and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate
the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to cooperation including in the area of personnel development with
immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt such organizations.
with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station (b) Response to Cyber Attacks
GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks,
each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint
and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as operations and efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will
stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the
the Ground Central Command, while promoting efficiency and survivability of the command and control systems and information
rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional communication networks of the three services, to strengthen
army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis,
regional army headquarters. and to develop a practical training environment where response
With regard to the information and communications capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts
capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers
operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the
infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace.
secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks,
Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication response measures and technological trends, including through
equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint
data link functions among the three services, upgrade the field exercises with allies.
communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise
outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are
communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to
take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through
of further enhancements to its communications systems. efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized
(3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of
Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise
will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities through personnel management efforts.
against the threat of ballistic missiles. To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through
For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close
for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly
SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve
continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in training and exercises.
(2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air (5) Response to Large-scale Disasters
guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough
interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF
to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient
its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture
promote the improvement of its automated warning and control based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a
systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will
procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan
systems. Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage
Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage
development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people’s lives, In
Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities
measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private
The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the sector’s efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials.
effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government
make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD
respond to a ballistic missile attack. will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to
The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when
posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. the basis for the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected.
Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., (6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities
with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for
Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan’s own deterrence and response MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen
capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing,
address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, sharing and securing intelligence.
and will take necessary measures. With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and
In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in
forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue the security environment, the MOD will promote the development
to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and

actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and
to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long
diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities
the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection
by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications,
variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military
while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which
development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT are highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will work
gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to facilitate international peace cooperation activities that more
to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will also reinforce its effectively meet the needs of the SDF’s activity areas. Japan will
posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas through strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role
cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for in the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send
collecting public information. more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping
Reference
In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which
from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.
manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand
Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government
gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations
of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only
develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.
cross-organizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations,
efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period in the Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation
policy departments and operational sides. in such operations.
Considering the importance of information security, under (6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and
the current severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient Nonproliferation
intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control
expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other
posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its
complete information sharing between those who need to know, contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of
including relevant government agencies. weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of
2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan,
Security Environments but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation
From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will
principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the
region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely 3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability
and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace (1) Training and Exercises
cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its
following elements will be particularly important to these efforts: deterrence effectiveness, the SDF’s joint training and exercises
(1) Holding Training and Exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted
In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from
and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies
training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these
visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment
focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective
interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use
relationships with relevant countries. of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve
(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-
Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other trained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training
countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone and exercises in the SDF’s southwestern region, where only limited
of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further space is available for SDF training, and accounting for relations with
steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/
exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively
including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces
cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop
common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring sufficient amphibious operational capabilities.
the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-
(3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including
By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced.
help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise
fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations
and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner.
well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. (2) Operational Infrastructure
Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid
such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for deployment and response to various contingencies as well as for
coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency
Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF
capacity building. will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and
(4) Ensuring Maritime Security base support functions such as runways, information-communication
For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas,” which serve infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately
as the cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary
state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing
cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store
their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as necessary ammunition and spare ports in locations most appropriate for
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living
a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective
with countries which share Japan’s goal of maintaining maritime of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various
security. measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.
(5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with
To immediately commence international peace cooperation lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper

improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector’s transport
contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve
will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The
Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel
to realized performance. equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who
(3) Personnel and Education the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other
Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to
internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long- using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations.
standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the
of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program,
situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel
skills, experience, physical strength and morale. themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.
(a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution (4) Medical
Reference
Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military
achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range
to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate of missions in responses to various situations and international peace
and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with
and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across
sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to
well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/ medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient
airman. and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in
To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital.
reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency
the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with
sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider
encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment
its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and
status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into
on new systems for early retirement including systems used account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore,
by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense
distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in
to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the field of defense medical science.
the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant (5) Defense Production and Technology Base
officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology
appropriately with consideration to personnel’s physical strength base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment
so as to maintain SDF’s strength. of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment
(b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected
In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan’s
its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD
personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s
where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF’s defense production and technology base as a whole.
strength. With a view to enhancing the technological capability and
To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with improving productivity of Japan’s defense production and technology
high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will
measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology
the Defense Meritorious Badge program. development, such as through international joint development and
In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF production with other countries including the United States and the
will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys
the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies,
adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft
and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security- developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses.
affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of The MOD will promote international joint development and
situations. production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit
(c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support both manufacturers and the government.
In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from (6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment
social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project
pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project
personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public management including insertion of a technological perspective
understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate
engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual
coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and disposal. In relevant efforts, the MOD will establish a database of
local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for
attractive job option. price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more
As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector’s
to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to
at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in
collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In
through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconside-
SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts ration, including review of specifications and project plans, when
as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle
retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the
personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment life-cycle costs.
environment. To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring
(d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts
In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify
are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various
promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel equipment, the government will take necessary measures after
in broad areas To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize
of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which
with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and
opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use of a

consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, (10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base
globally competitive companies. To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and
(7) Research and Development (R&D) crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of
Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan’s severe fiscal education on security-related matters at educational institutions,
situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending
operational needs of the SDF. MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role
In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank
promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts
missiles in view of replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle- as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating
range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface- the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD’s headquarters
to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign
studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS
fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the
Reference
for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner.
possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace (11) Promoting Reform of the MOD
the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its
take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among
MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-
on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and
capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with
the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will
for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint
large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate
equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft. efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind
With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the
technological advantage in the areas of strategically important prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration
fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the
direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the
of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the
research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.
while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance
in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research 1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
and development, and availability of effective joint operations among In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and
major pieces of equipment. the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will
From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual- Cooperation while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for
use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with these efforts.
universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint
of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF
In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-
of scientific technological trends including information relevant U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as
to technological development and gathering industry-academic- BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.
government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of
to have military technologies employed in civilian activities. counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and
In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.
of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S.
development posture, and take necessary measures. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence
(8) Collaboration with Local Communities cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and
As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such technology cooperation.
efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment 2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in
and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated Japan
harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan
communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation
areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures Support (HNS).
such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies
V. Quantities of Major Procurement
and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of
local governments and communities. The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement
Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces
contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this
in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the
emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., current security environment.
the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in VI. Expenditures
the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF 1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments
camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in
governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental FY2013 prices.
contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises 2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by
(SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of
measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment
for local SMEs to receive orders. procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation
(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970
Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign billion over the next five years.
countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of 3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with
SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international
effectively via various media sources such as social media networks security environment, trends in technological standards including
with due consideration to consistency in the information content. information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.
Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF VII. Other
activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily
its English web site. implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in
Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs
to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Reference 8 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned
(As of March 31, 2018)
Rocket Launchers, Anti-aircraft
Type Recoilless Guns Mortars Field Artillery Tanks Armored Vehicles
etc. Machine Guns
Approximate number
2,600 1,100 420 80 50 640 990
owned
Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.
Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications
Reference
Number Maximum Crew Full Length Full Width
Service Type Model Use Engine
Owned Speed (knots) (number) (m) (m)
Liaison and
Fixed-wing LR-2 7 300 2 (8) 14 18 Turboprop, twin-engines
Reconnaissance
AH-1S Anti-tank 56 120 2 14 3 Turboshaft
OH-6D Observation 27 140 1 (3) 7 2 Turboshaft
GSDF OH-1 Observation 37 140 2 12 3 Turboshaft, twin-engines
Rotary-wing UH-1H/J Utility 127 120 2 (11) 13 3 Turboshaft
CH-47J/JA Transport 56 150/140 3 (55) 16 4/5 Turboshaft, twin-engines
UH-60JA Utility 40 150 2 (12) 16 3 Turboshaft, twin-engines
AH-64D Combat 12 150 2 18 6 Turboshaft, twin-engines
P-1 Patrol 19 450 11 38 35 Turbofan, quadruple-engine
Fixed-wing
P-3C Patrol 54 400 11 36 30 Turboprop, quadruple-engine
SH-60J Patrol 22 150 3 20 16 Turboshaft, twin-engine
MSDF
SH-60K Patrol 58 140 4 20 16 Turboshaft, twin-engine
Rotary-wing
Minesweeping and
MCH-101 10 150 4 23 19 Turboshaft, triple engine
transport
F-15J/DJ Fighter 201 mach 2.5 1/2 19 13 Turbofan, twin-engine
F-4EJ Fighter 52 mach 2.2 2 19 12 Turbojet, twin-engine
F-2A/B Fighter 92 mach 2 1/2 16 11 Turbofan, single-engine
F-35A Fighter 4 mach 1.6 1 16 11 Turbofan, single-engine
RF-4E/EJ Reconnaissance 13 mach 2.2 2 19 12 Turbojet, twin-engine
C-1 Transport 17 mach 0.76 5 (60) 29 31 Turbofan, twin-engine
Fixed-wing
ASDF C-130H Transport 14 320 6 (92) 30 40 Turboprop, quadruple-engine
KC-767 Aerial refueling transport 4 mach 0.84 4-8 (200) 49 48 Turbofan, twin-engine
Addition of aerial refueling
KC-130H 2 320 6 (92) 30 40 Turboprop, quadruple-engine
functions transport
E-2C Early warning 13 330 5 18 25 Turboprop, twin-engine
E-767 Early warning and control 4 450 20 49 48 Turbofan, twin-engine
Rotary-wing CH-47J Transport 15 150 5 (48) 16 4 Turboshaft, twin-engine
Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported.
2. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ.
3. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2016.

Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service
Category Destroyer Submarine Mine Warfare Ship Patrol Combatant Craft Amphibious Ship Auxiliary Ship
Number (vessels) 47 18 24 6 11 29
Standard Displacement
258 51 23 1 28 127
(1,000 tons)
Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications

Reference

Use Name Service Weight (kg) Full Length (m) Diameter (cm) Guidance System
Patriot (PAC-3) ASDF Approx. 300 Approx. 5.2 Approx. 26 Program + command + radar homing
Anti-ballistic
SM-3 MSDF Approx. 1,500 Approx. 6.6 Approx. 35 Command + IR image homing
Patriot (PAC-2) ASDF Approx. 900 Approx. 5.3 Approx. 41 Program + command + TVM
Improved Hawk Approx. 640 Approx. 5.0 Approx. 36 Radar homing
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile Approx. 570 Approx. 4.9 Approx. 32 Radar homing
Type-o3 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Improved) GSDF Approx. 460 Approx. 4.9 Approx. 28 Radar homing
Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)

Approx. Image + IR homing
Approx. 100 Approx. 16 Radar homing
2.7/2.9
Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1) GSDF/ASDF Approx. 100 Approx. 2.7 Approx. 16 IR homing
Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2) Approx. 12 Approx. 1.4 Approx. 8 Image + IR homing
Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B) Approx. 13 Approx. 1.5 Approx. 8 IR image homing
GSDF
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3) Approx. 12 Approx. 1.4 Approx. 8 Image + IR homing
Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile Approx. 100 Approx. 2.9 Approx. 16 Active radar homing
Anti-aircraft and Surface-to-air missile for base air defense ASDF Approx. 100 Approx. 2.9 Approx. 16 Active radar homing
antimissile
SM-1 Approx. 590 Approx. 4.6 Approx. 34 Radar homing
SM-2 Approx. 710 Approx. 4.7 Approx. 30 Command + radar homing
Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M) MSDF Approx. 230 Approx. 3.7 Approx. 20 Radar homing
Sea Sparrow (RIM-162) Approx. 300 Approx. 3.8 Approx. 25 Inertial guidance + radar homing
RAM (RIM-116) Approx. 73 Approx. 2.8 Approx. 13 Passive radar homing + IR homing
Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M) Approx. 230 Approx. 3.7 Approx. 20 Radar homing
Sidewinder (AIM-9L) Approx. 89 Approx. 2.9 Approx. 13 IR homing
Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3) Approx. 91 Approx. 3.0 Approx. 13 IR homing
ASDF
Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4) Approx. 220 Approx. 3.7 Approx. 20 Radar homing
Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B) Approx. 220 Approx. 3.7 Approx. 20 Radar homing
Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5) Approx. 95 Approx. 3.1 Approx. 13 IR homing
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1) Approx. 660 Approx. 5.1 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + radar homing
GSDF
Type-12 surface-to-ship missile Approx. 700 Approx. 5.0 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS
Harpoon (SSM) Approx. 680 Approx. 4.6 Approx. 34 Inertial guidance + radar homing
Harpoon (USM) Approx. 680 Approx. 4.6 Approx. 34 Inertial guidance + radar homing
Harpoon (ASM) Approx. 530 Approx. 3.8 Approx. 34 Inertial guidance + radar homing
MSDF
Anti-ship Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B) Approx. 660 Approx. 5.1 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + radar homing
Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C) Approx. 510 Approx. 4.0 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + radar homing
Maverick (AGM-65) Approx. 300 Approx. 2.5 Approx. 31 IR image homing
Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1) Approx. 600 Approx. 4.0 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + radar homing
Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2) ASDF Approx. 540 Approx. 4.0 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B) Approx. 530 Approx. 4.0 Approx. 35 Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS
Type-87 anti-tank missile Approx. 12 Approx. 1.1 Approx. 11 Laser homing
Anti-itank Type-01 light anti-tank missile GSDF Approx. 11 Approx. 0.9 Approx. 12 IR image homing
TOW Approx. 18 Approx. 1.2 Approx. 15 IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile Approx. 33 Approx. 1.6 Approx. 15 IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Anti-ilanding Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS) Approx. 59 Approx. 2.0 Approx. 16 Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
GSDF
craft and IR image homing
antitank Middle range multi-purpose missile Approx. 26 Approx. 1.4 Approx. 14
Laser homing
Hellfire GSDF/MSDF Approx. 47 Approx. 1.6 Approx. 18 Laser homing

Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)
(Unit: 100 million yen, %)
Item Ratio of Ratio of
Ratio of
Annual Defense-Related Defense-related
GNP/GDP General Defense- Defense-
Expenditures Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate Expenditures Expenditures
(Original Annual Related Related
on General from Previous from Previous from Previous to Annual to General
Estimates) Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Account Year Year Year Expenditures Annual
(A) (C) (D) to GNP/GDP
(B) on General Expenditures
(D/A)
Fiscal Year Account (D/ B) (D/C)
1955 75,590 9,915 △0.8 8,107 △2.8 1,349 △3.3 1.78 13.61 16.6
1965 281,600 36,581 12.4 29,198 12.8 3,014 9.6 1.07 8.24 10.3
1975 1,585,000 212,888 24.5 158,408 23.2 13,273 21.4 0.84 6.23 8.4
Reference
1985 3,146,000 524,996 3.7 325,854 △0.0 31,371 6.9 0.997 5.98 9.6
1995 4,928,000 709,871 △2.9 421,417 3.1 47,236 0.9 0.959 6.65 11.2
46,826 △0.4 0.985 5.07 8.76
2010 4,752,000 922,992 4.2 534,542 3.3
47,903 0.3 1.008 5.19 8.96
46,625 △0.4 0.964 5.05 8.62
2011 4,838,000 924,116 0.1 540,780 1.2
47,752 △0.3 0.987 5.17 8.83
46,453 △0.4 0.969 5.14 9.06
2012 4,796,000 903,339 △2.2 512,450 △5.2
47,138 △1.3 0.983 5.22 9.20
46,804 0.8 0.960 5.05 8.88
2013 4,877,000 926,115 2.5 527,311 2.9
47,538 0.8 0.975 5.13 9.02
47,838 2.2 0.956 4.99 8.47
2014 5,004,000 958,823 3.5 564,697 7.1
48,848 2.8 0.976 5.09 8.65
48,221 0.8 0.955 5.01 8.41
2015 5,049,000 963,420 0.5 573,555 1.6
49,801 2.0 0.986 5.17 8.68
48,607 0.8 0.937 5.03 8.41
2016 5,188,000 967,218 0.4 578,286 0.8
50,541 1.5 0.974 5.23 8.74
48,996 0.8 0.885 5.03 8.40
2017 5,535,000 974,547 0.8 583,591 0.9
51,251 1.4 0.926 5.26 8.78
49,388 0.8 0.875 5.05 8.39
2018 5,643,000 977,128 0.3 588,958 0.9
51,911 1.3 0.920 5.31 8.81
Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2010 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in
FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen in FY2018), the U.S. Forces
realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012,
64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, and 216.1 billion yen in FY2018), as well as
expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen in FY2018), while
the lower figures include them.
Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)
Item Annual
National Composition Composition Education and Composition Composition
Expenditures on Social Security Public Works
Defense Ratio Ratio Science Ratio Ratio
Fiscal year General Account
46,826 5.1
2010 922,992 272,686 29.5 55,872 6.1 57,731 6.3
47,903 5.2
46,625 5.0
2011 924,116 287,079 31.1 55,100 6.0 49,743 5.4
47,752 5.2
46,453 5.1
2012 903,339 263,901 29.2 54,057 6.0 45,734 5.1
47,138 5.2
46,804 5.1
2013 926,115 291,224 31.4 53,687 5.8 52,853 5.7
47,538 5.1
47,838 5.0
2014 958,823 305,175 31.8 54,421 5.7 59,685 6.2
48,848 5.1
48,221 5.0
2015 963,420 315,297 32.7 53,613 5.6 59,711 6.2
49,801 5.2
48,607 5.0
2016 967,218 319,738 33 53,580 5.5 59,737 6.2
50,541 5.2
48,996 5.0
2017 974,547 324,735 33.3 53,567 5.5 59,763 6.1
51,251 5.3
49,388 5.1
2018 977,128 329,732 33.7 53,646 5.5 59,789 6.1
51,911 5.3
Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul figures.
2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in
FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen in FY2018) the U.S. Forces realignment-related
expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen
in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, and 216.1 billion yen in FY2018), as well as expenses
related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen in FY2018), while the
lower figures include them.

Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)
Fiscal year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Composition Composition Composition Composition Composition
Budget Budget Budget Budget Budget
Item Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
43.8 43.8 44.2 44.2 44.2
Personnel and provisions 20,930 21,121 21,473 21,662 21,850
42.8 42.4 42.5 42.3 42.1
26,909 56.2 27,100 56.2 27,135 55.8 27,334 55.8 27,538 55.8
Materials
27,918 57.2 28,680 57.6 29,069 57.5 29,589 57.7 30,061 57.9
16.6 15.4 15.8 17.2 16.6
Equipment acquisition 7,964 7,404 7,659 8,406 8,191
16.3 14.9 15.2 16.4 15.8
3.1 2.9 2.2 2.5 2.1
R&D 1,477 1,411 1,055 1,217 1,034
Reference
3.0 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.0

2.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5
Facility improvement 950 1,293 1,461 1,571 1,752
1.9 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.4
23.7 24.5 24.1 22.2 23.0
Maintenance 11,361 11,808 11,707 10,888 11,343
23.3 23.7 23.2 21.2 21.9
9.2 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.0
Base countermeasures 4,397 4,425 4,509 4,529 4,449
9.0 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.6
The cost for SACO-related projects 120 0.2 46 0.1 28 0.1 28 0.1 51 0.1
U.S. Forces realignment related
expenses (reduction of burden on 890 1.8 1,426 2.9 1,766 3.5 2,011 3.9 2,161 4.2
local communities)
Introduction of government aircraft — — 108 0 140 0.3 216 0.4 312 0.6
1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Others 760 758 744 723 768
1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5
47,838 48,221 48,607 48,996 49,388
Total 100 100 100 100 100
48,848 49,801 50,541 51,251 51,911
Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016,
2.8 billion yen in FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen in FY2018), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities; 89.0 billion
yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, and 216.1 billion yen in FY2018), as well as expenses related to the introduction
of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen in FY2018), while the lower figures include them.
Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries
Fiscal year
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Country
47,838 48,221 48,607 48,996 49,388
Japan 48,848 49,801 50,541 51,251 51,911
(100 million yen) 2.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
2.8% 2.0% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3%
U.S. 577,897 562,499 565,370 568,896 612,542
(U.S. 1 million dollar) △4.9% △2.7% 0.5% 0.6% 7.7%
China 8,082 8,896 9,544 10,444 11,070
(100 million yuan) 12.2% 10.1% 7.6% 7.1% 8.3%
Russia 24,791 31,814 37,753 28,523 29,530
(100 million RR) 17.9% 28.3% 18.7% △24.4% 3.5%
Republic of Korea 357,056 374,560 387,995 403,347 431,581
(100 million won) 4.0% 4.9% 3.6% 4.0% 7.0%
Australia 29,303 32,695 32,882 35,191 36,231
(1 million Australian dollar) 15.2% 11.6% 0.6% 7.0% 3.0
U.K. 34,500 35,200 35,000 35,500 36,000
(1 million GBP) △0.9% 2.0% △0.6% 1.4% 1.4%
France 38,921 36,791 39,939 40,841 42,820
(1 million euro) 2.1% △5.5% 8.6% 2.3% 4.8%
Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2018 are estimated values.
4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (However, since FY2015, only the defense
expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated
by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.) In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government
expenditure. For FY2016 and FY2018, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 and FY2017
defense expenditure (886.9 billion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure.
5. Russia’s defense expenditure is based on the FY2014-2017 expenditures and the FY2018 budget amount in the Information on Excecution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal
Treasury (initial).
6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.
7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.
8. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.
9. The French defense expenditure for FY2018 is an estimation.
10. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (12.0 billion yen for FY2014, 4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 2.8 billion yen for FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen
for FY2018), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (89.0 billion yen for FY2014, 142.6 billion yen for FY2015,
176.6 billion yen for FY2016, 201.1 billion yen for FY2017, and 216.1 billion yen for FY2018), as well as expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for FY2015,
14.0 billion yen for FY2016, 21.6 billion yen for FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen for FY2018), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.

Reference 16 Outline of “Cabinet Decision” and Legislation Development
Items of the Cabinet

Outline Legislation Development
Decision
• Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation * Acceleration of procedures to issue orders
in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all for public security operations/maritime
areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In security operations
1. Response to an cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately,
Infringement that the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations
Does Not Amount to or maritime security operations.
an Armed Attack • The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” * Revision of the Self-Defense Forces
to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Law (Protection of weapons and other
Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan equipment of the units of the U.S. and other
Reference
(including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. countries’ Armed Forces)
• So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (*1) * The Act Concerning the Measures for the
➢ The Government is of the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at Peace and Security of Japan in Situations
a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not That Will Have an Important Influence on
regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of
with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries the Act Concerning the Measures for the
engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. Peace and Security of Japan in Situations
➢ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by in Areas Surrounding Japan), Revision
armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. of the Ship Inspection Operations Act,
➢ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities Enactment of the International Peace
becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes in the situation. Support Act
• Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities * Revision of the International Peace
2. F urther Contributions Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF’s use Cooperation Act, revision of the Self-
to the Peace of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in Defense Forces Law (Rescue of measures
and Stability of response to urgent requests) and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace for Japanese nationals overseas)
the International cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like
Community activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the
territorial State.
➢ As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state
organization” (*2) other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected
to appear as an adversary.
➢ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese
nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities
be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within
which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.
➢ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area
within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National
Security Council.
• The Government understands that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack * Revision of Legislation for Responses to
against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and Armed Attack Situations, revision of the
poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no Self-Defense Forces Law (The provision
other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to concerning defense operations) etc.
the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense
3. M
easures for Self- in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.
Defense Permitted • The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on
under Article 9 of the the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes that which is triggered by an armed attack
Constitution occurring against a foreign country, it is permitted under the Constitution only when it is taken as a measure for self-
defense which is inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.
• The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders
for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not
against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in
the current laws and regulations.
Notes: 1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past legislations to
ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan
from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of
force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries.
2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution
of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”

Reference 17 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces
Operation Applicable Situations Conditions Required for Operations Main Type of Authorized Actions
(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister ❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3
against Japan from outside occur or when it (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required conditions for exercising the right of self-
is considered that there is an imminent and in principle) defense)
clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is (3) Cabinet decision: required ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for
necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. public security operation)1
Defense operation (2) When there is a situation in which an armed ❍ Others (including control over the Japan
(Self-Defense Forces attack against a foreign country that is in a close Coast Guard, emergency passage,
Law Article 76) relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses appropriation of supplies, marine
an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to transportation restriction, treatment of
be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s prisoners, civil protection, etc.)1
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and
Reference
therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against

such a situation.
When there are areas in which the deployment of (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Establishment of positions and defense
SDF units under the order for defense operations (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet facilities in the intended deployment area
Establishment of defense is expected and the reinforcement of defensive decision on the Basic Response Plan)1 ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
facilities preparations is deemed necessary (intended (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime body or other personnel on duty
(Self-Defense Forces deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units Minister)
Law Article 77-2) for possible operation in cases where the situation has
intensified and the order for defense operations (only
for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued
When a defense operation order is expected under a (1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person ❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military
Measures to be taken before tense situation delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; forces as a measure related to the actions
a defense operation order Minister of Defense for services based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions
(Self-Defense Forces Law (2) Consent of the Diet: not required for supplies; Related Measures Act
Article 77-3 and U.S. and required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic ❍ Provision of services as a related measure
Others’ Military Actions Related Response Plan) for services2 ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
Measures Act) (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required body or other personnel on duty
(approval of the Prime Minister) for services
When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing
governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, (2) Consent of the Diet: not required residents, emergent pursuant to the
or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime provision of the Civil Protection Law
Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Minister) ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties
Civil protection dispatch Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc.
(Self-Defense Forces governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry,
Law Article 77-4) Chief (Prime Minister) etc.)3
❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot
inspections, use of weapons, etc.)
❍ Use of weapons
When it is deemed that the public security cannot be (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister ❍ Application of the Police Duties Law
maintained by the law enforcement force in the event (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc.
of indirect aggression or other such emergencies Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry,
Public security operation
(3) Cabinet decision: required etc.)
by order
❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
(Self-Defense Forces
Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot
Law Article 78)
inspections, etc.)
❍ Use of weapons
❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
When situations have intensified and a public security (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life and
operation order and illicit activity by those armed with (2) Consent of the Diet: not required body or other personnel on duty
Information gathering before
rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime
public security operation order
and there is a special need to gather information Minister)
(4) Additional requirements: consultation between the
Law Article 79-2)
Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety
Commission
When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister ❍ Application of the Police Duties Law
maintained in serious situations by the prefectural (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc.
Public security operation governors and by the Prime Minister (3) Cabinet decision: required Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry,
by request (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes etc.)
(Self-Defense Forces a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
Law Article 81) the prefectural Public Safety Commission Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot
inspections, etc.)
❍ Use of weapons
When special measures are deemed necessary to (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law
prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (interrogation; measures such as evacuation,
Guarding operation attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in (3) Cabinet decision: required etc.; entry (all only when police officers are
(Self-Defense Forces Japan (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults not present); crime prevention and control)
Law Article 81-2) with the National Public Safety Commission after ❍ Use of weapons
hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural
governor
When special measures are deemed necessary to (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
protect lives and property or maintain order at sea (2) Consent of the Diet: not required Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot
Maritime security operations
(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime inspections, etc.)
Minister; when the response is for a submerged ❍ Use of weapons
Law Article 82)
submarine, approval of the Prime Minister is not
subject to Cabinet decision)

When special measures are deemed necessary to (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
combat acts of piracy (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot
the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the inspections, etc.)
Counter-piracy operations
counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been ❍ Use of weapons
completed)
Law Article 82-2 and
(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime
Anti-Piracy Law)
Minister)
(4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits
the response procedures to the Prime Minister
When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Use of weapons
toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report
Destruction measures against to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from required)
Reference
ballistic missiles, etc. the damage caused by the missiles (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime
(Self-Defense Forces Minister)
Law Article 82-3) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order
can be made in advance according to the emergency
response procedures approved by the Prime Minister
When judged necessary in order to protect lives and (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law
property in the event of natural calamities or other designated by the Minister (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police
disasters4 (2) Consent of the Diet: not required officers are not present)
(3) Cabinet decision: not required ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
Disaster relief dispatch
(4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural Law (request for cooperation)
governors or other parties designated by Government ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster
Law Article 83)
ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert
when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a zones, guarantee of passage for emergency
request to be made) vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor
or police officer is present)
When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law
Warning Headquarters deems the support of the (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (the same as in the case of a disaster relief
Earthquake disaster SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Earthquake dispatch)
relief dispatch implementation of emergency measures to deal with Disaster Warning Headquarters is established by ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard
(Self-Defense Forces earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Cabinet decision) Law (the same as in the case of a disaster
Law Article 83-2) Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large- (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director- relief dispatch)
Scale Earthquakes) General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning
Headquarters (Prime Minister)
When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Same as in disaster relief dispatch
Response Headquarters deems the support of the (2) Consent of the Diet: not required
SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Nuclear Disaster
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch
implementation of measures to deal with emergency Response Headquarters is established by Cabinet
situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning decision)
Law Article 83-3)
Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director-
General of the Nuclear Disaster Response
Headquarters (Prime Minister)
When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ The action necessary to make intruding
Action against violation of
airspace in violation of international law and/or the (2) Consent of the Diet: not required aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial
territorial airspace
provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws (3) Cabinet decision: not required airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away,
and regulations issuing radio transmission warnings, use of
Law Article 84)
weapons, etc.)5
Elimination of mines and other (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and
dangerous objects (2) Consent of the Diet: not required other dangerous explosive objects found on
(Self-Defense Forces (3) Cabinet decision: not required the sea
Law Article 84-2)
Emergency situations overseas (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life
(2) Consent of the Diet: not required or body or other personnel on duty, and to
Rescue of Japanese (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime execute duties
nationals overseas Minister)
(Self-Defense Forces (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for
Law Article 84-3) Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as
guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are
at risk for harm to their life or body
Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
Transportation of Japanese situations overseas (2) Consent of the Diet: not required body or other personnel on duty
nationals overseas (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary
(Self-Defense Forces (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister
Law Article 84-4) for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals
whose lives and bodies are threatened
Situations that will have an important influence on (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
Logistics support and other
Japan’s peace and security a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; body or other personnel on duty
activities
Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue
(Self-Defense Forces Law Article
activities, and ship inspection operations
84-5, Law Concerning Measures
(2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures
to Ensure Peace and Security
in principle)
of Japan in Situations that Will
(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime
Have an Important Influence on
Minister to implement response measures, for the
Japan’s Peace and Security, and
draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation
Ship Inspection Operations Act)
guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)
Situations where the peace and security of the (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
international community is threatened, where the a delegated authority by the Minister-for supplies; body or other personnel on duty
international community is collectively addressing the Minister of Defense-for services, search and rescue
Logistics support and other situation to remove the threat in accordance with the activities, and ship inspection operations
activities objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required
(Self-Defense Forces Japan needs to make independent and proactive with no exception)
Law Article 84-5, International contributions to these activities as a member of the (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime
Peace Support Act, and international community Minister to implement response measures, for the
Ship Inspection Operations Act) draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation
guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)
❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body
or other personnel on duty

In the case that a large scale disaster has happened or (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense
International disaster relief
is about to happen overseas, especially in developing (2) Consent of the Diet: not required
activities
countries/areas (3) Cabinet decision: not required
(4) Additional requirements: request of the government
Law Article 84-5 and
of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch
International Disaster
international disaster relief teams, and consultation
Relief Law)
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs
United Nations peacekeeping operations and (1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
internationally coordinated operations for peace and Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF body or other personnel on duty
International peace security personnel dispatched individually) Minister of ❍ Use of weapons to execute duties (when
cooperation activities (so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) conducting so-called “safety-ensuring”
(Primary operations of operations of peacekeeping activities) (2) Consent of the Diet: required (only if the operations operations)
Reference
peacekeeping force and are conducted by SDF units, etc.; prior consent
“safety-ensuring” operations) required in principle)
(Self-Defense Forces (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of
Law Article 84-5 and international peace cooperation operations and the
International Peace draft implementation plan)
Cooperation Act) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the
International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime
Minister)
United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally (1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or
International peace coordinated operations for peace and security, and Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF body or other personnel on duty
cooperation activities international humanitarian assistance personnel dispatched individually) Minister of ❍ Use of weapons for so-called “kaketsuke-
(Operations other than (operations other than the so-called primary operations Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) keigo”
primary operations of and “safety-ensuring” operations of peacekeeping (2) Consent of the Diet: not required
peacekeeping force) activities) (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of
(Self-Defense Forces international peace cooperation operations and the
Law Article 84-5 and draft implementation plan)
International Peace (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the
Cooperation Act) International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime
Minister)
(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in
threatening Japan’s survival.
2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified
in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.
4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry’s facilities.
5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.”
Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units
Type of Operation Provision Content

Article 88, Self-Defense SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
Forces Law
Defense operation
Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply
Forces Law mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the
Establishment of defense Article 92-4, Self-Defense situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons
facilities Forces Law to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to
persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 92-3 (2), Self- Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police
Civil protection dispatch
Defense Forces Law officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.
Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security
Forces Law operations.
SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police
Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty
Public security operation
Forces Law and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other
than the use of weapons.
Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis
Forces Law mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be
Information-gathering reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such
Article 92-5, Self-Defense
duties before public danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The
Forces Law
security operation order use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger)
of the Penal Code.
Article 91-2 (2), Self- Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
Defense Forces Law
SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police
Guarding operation
Article 91-2 (3), Self- Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation
Defense Forces Law when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no
appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security
Maritime security Forces Law operations.
operation Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis
Forces Law mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy
operations.
Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy
Counter-piracy operations If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the
Law
counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of
the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction measures Article 93-3, Self-Defense SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
against ballistic missiles Forces Law

Type of Operation Provision Content
Action against violation of Article 84, Self-Defense The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of
territorial airspace Forces Law necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.1
SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent
considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate
means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals
Rescue of Japanese Article 94-5, Self-Defense
and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect
nationals overseas Forces Law
their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come
under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-
defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and
Transportation of necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of
Article 94-6, Self-Defense
Japanese nationals other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those
Forces Law
overseas granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under
Reference
Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the
extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means
of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the
duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there
Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have
are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with
an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security -
personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the
Logistics support activities, etc.
safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to
protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm
to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect
inspection operations their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for
cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and
necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such
situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of
International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel;
(2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of
foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their
Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called
Act – International peace cooperation operations “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other
than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct
their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection
of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are
no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other
individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to
persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Protection of SDF SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in
Article 95, Self-Defense
weapons and other the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm
Forces Law
equipment to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in
Protection of weapons and
activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities
other equipment of the
Article 95-2, Self-Defense carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably
units of the U.S. Armed
Forces Law necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of
Forces and armed forces
weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the
of other foreign countries
Penal Code.
SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the
Article 95-3, Self-Defense extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or
Guarding facilities
Forces Law to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or
Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in
internal order Forces Law maintaining order within the SDF.
SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the
extent judged to be reasonably depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to
Article 12, The U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related
protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their
Measures Act
duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under
Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the
measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently
Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel
may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use
Article 152, Prisoners of War Act weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except
for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use
weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of
weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their
duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established
Article 11, International Peace Support Act within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign
armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there
are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of
other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36
(self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Notes: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.”

Reference 19 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures
(April 27, 2015) and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and
communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.
I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines
The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for
In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies
from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of
prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained
cooperation will emphasize: from peacetime.
• seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; B. Enhanced Operational Coordination
• synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive
• a whole-of-government Alliance approach; command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan
• cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the
organizations; and continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions
Reference
• the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the
The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. United States Armed Forces.
Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to
on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support
Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States
to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action
forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat- through their respective chains-of-command.
ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce C. Bilateral Planning
those forces rapidly. The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated
Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make
cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will
of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and
advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.
prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in
significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security
II. Basic Premises and Principles through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes
The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will
and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles. be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The
A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible
and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be
the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.
unchanged. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both
B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States governments.
under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security
including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate
the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex
well as other relevant international agreements. security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure
C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to
will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan
regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote
policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with further cooperation with partners.
its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken
defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to
D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate
budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-
create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:
objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective • assess the situation;
framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected • share information; and
to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on • develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including
their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.
III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will
Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that
governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security.
operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime
The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security,
multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range
cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the
available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for
a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take
coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. measures, including, but not limited to, the following:
A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications
impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive
order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two
Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require governments will share and protect information and intelligence,
an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance while developing and maintaining common situational awareness.
Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among
and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the relevant agencies.
Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective
and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in

a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of third-country noncombatants.
developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination
2. Air and Missile Defense through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate,
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees,
maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and
ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two
will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation
network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting
pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to training and exercises.
the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will 2. Maritime Security
continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments
launches and other aerial activities. will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative
3. Maritime Security measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing
Reference
The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council
measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, resolution or other basis under international law.
including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees
the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan
various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will
in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while handling
while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations
awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee
necessary. response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate
4. Asset Protection support upon a request from Japan.
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will 4. Search and Rescue
provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support,
engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense
cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support
5. Training and Exercises to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.
will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in
training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United
activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and
areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United
and modern. States Armed Forces.
6. Logistic Support 6. Logistic Support
Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which
logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self- includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation,
Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable
mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and
to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The
services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and assets of central and local government agencies as well as
of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic
Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese
the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition laws and regulations.
and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements. 7. Use of Facilities
7. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use
In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance
resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements.
Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use
use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. of facilities and areas.
Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a
facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate. core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.
B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two
The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-
influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the
be defined geographically. The measures described in this section defense of Japan.
include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments
respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest
amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments
decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in
de-escalation of such situations. Chapter IV.
In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two
efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust
Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence
measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues,
those listed below. including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate
1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations the situation.
When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the
evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain
of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by
coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/
of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including,
carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering,
means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and
governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to areas in Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks
a. Principles for Coordinated Actions against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.
If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility
and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks,
promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-
and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island.
the reestablishment of peace and security in the region. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary
Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and
citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations,
repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. and rapid deployment.
The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant
to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating
waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional
Reference
The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.
appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations
and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.
United States will take actions to shape the regional environment v. Cross-Domain Operations
in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
and security. will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an
Recognizing that all instruments of national power will armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These
be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple
will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their domains simultaneously.
respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Examples of cooperation across domains include the
Alliance Coordination Mechanism. actions described below.
The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate,
from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the
basis required to facilitate these deployments. sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s
The two governments will take actions as appropriate to ISR assets.
provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations
to an armed attack against Japan. involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement
b. Concept of Operations the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces
i. Operations to Defend Airspace conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close
will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and bilateral coordination, as appropriate.
surrounding Japan. The two governments will cooperate to address threats in
The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral
for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air cooperation set out in Chapter VI.
superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during
against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. operations, as appropriate.
The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations c. Operational Support Activities
to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in
ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks support of bilateral operations.
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces i. Communications and Electronics
will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure
attacks against Japan. effective use of communications and electronics capabilities,
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed as appropriate.
Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of Forces will ensure effective communication between the two
a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral
United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture operations under common situational awareness.
to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan ii. Search and Rescue
and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
operations. Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate
The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations,
for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.
Japan. iii. Logistic Support
The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations When operations require supplementing their respective
to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United
iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and
will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding availability.
Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The two governments will make appropriate use of
The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility the authorities and assets of central and local government
for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.
ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other iv. Use of Facilities
associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional
Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and
to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance
warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction. cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.
The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection
to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological,
Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United
providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and
The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed
through information sharing and other forms of cooperation Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will
among relevant agencies. support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and
iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse
Japan regions of the world.
When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving When each of the two governments decides to participate in
the use of force in accordance with international law, including full international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond,
respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United
laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with
third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This
cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.
attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of- A. Cooperation in International Activities
government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. The two governments will participate in international activities, based
Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense
other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the
The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations maximum extent practicable.
Reference
involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed The two governments may coordinate the activities through
attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will
Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The
clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share
and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective
people. cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate
Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below: on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the
1. Asset Protection Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will regional and international activities will include:
cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will 1. Peacekeeping Operations
include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations
in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the
Ballistic Missile Defense. Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate
2. Search and Rescue closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two
cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for
support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same
and rescue, as appropriate. mission, as appropriate.
3. Maritime Operations 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will When the two governments conduct international humanitarian
cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to
safety of sea lines of communication. requests from governments concerned or international organizations
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the
in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support,
operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples
in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and
interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries operational coordination, planning, and execution.
involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. 3. Maritime Security
4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security,
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate.
will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe
accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and
will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
missile launches. and counterterrorism activities.
5. Logistics Support 4. Partner Capacity Building
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining
resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The
Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities,
based on their respective capabilities and availability. as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and
The two governments will make appropriate use of the experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of
authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of
well as private sector assets, to provide support. cooperative activities may include maritime security, military
E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness
When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.
primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and In circumstances when international action is required for the
private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize,
that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts
essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are
affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japanese or U.S. nationals.
the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include When the two governments participate in international activities,
search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective
two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance capabilities and availability of their assets.
Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. 7. Training and Exercises
To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities,
cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate,
through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two
Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work
increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing
V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common
In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will tactics, techniques, and procedures.
take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation 8. Logistic support
for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific When participating in international activities, the two governments
region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government

of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology
Japanese laws and regulations. cooperation; and
B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation • explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense
The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and equipment and technology.
multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities • Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two
to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information
organizations. sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.
The two governments also will work together to strengthen • In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information
regional and international institutions with a view to promoting sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation
cooperation based upon international law and standards. in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the
VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation protection of classified information.
A. Cooperation on Space • The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation
Reference
Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two with partners on information sharing.
governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure C. Educational and Research Exchanges
the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning
As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges
resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication
awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts
support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials
will share information about actions and events that might affect the to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.
safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two VIII. Processes for Review
governments also will share information to address emerging threats The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly
against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving
in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a
technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the
systems, including hosted payloads. Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of
To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self- the circumstances at that time.
Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to
cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing
space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, Reference 20 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment
and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; Implementation
command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of
relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)
where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces Overview
and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan
cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities. and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan
B. Cooperation on Cyberspace Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document,
To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and
governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation
in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is
two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on reflected in this document.
the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including Finalization of Realignment Initiatives
the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When
governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence
services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States for U.S. forces in Japan.
Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through The construction and other costs for facility development in the
information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate. implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will: (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear
• maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The
• share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent
• ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain
mission assurance; deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.
• contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity;
Key Implementation Details
and
• conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for 1. Realignment on Okinawa
cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies. (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those  The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration
against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura
Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape,
have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter
coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800
to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April
expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while
that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult  In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in
closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such
as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water
VII. Bilateral Enterprise
surface areas.
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a  Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further  Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully
the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: operationally capable.
A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation  Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at
In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air
and maintenance, the two governments will: Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary,
• cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of  Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities
common equipment and services; will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning,
• strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the
mutual efficiency and readiness; return of MCAS Futenma.
• facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient

 In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
 The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.  A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD
(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not
 Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) required for contingency or training purposes.
personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate  Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha)
from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected
integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible
3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
(formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment  ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate
Headquarters. to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base
 The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure
Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and requirements.
Reference
Makiminato Service Area.  A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established
 The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense
will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required
command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate
a base support capability. appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
 Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure  The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of
development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military
provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion operational requirements.
in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure  Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial
on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized  Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by
rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October
and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam 2006.
estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending  Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of
plus approximately $1 billion for a road. air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions
(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
 Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma,  Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire
and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for
facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control
enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and
Base. military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace.
 Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the
2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience
candidate facilities will be examined: and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of
 Camp Kuwae: Total return. U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be
 Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining completed in Japan FY2009.
facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.  The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and
 MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above). modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to
 Makiminato Service Area: Total return. be completed within 12 months from commencement.
 aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including  The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that
additional staging constructed at Urasoe). dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or
 Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return. the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
 All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities  Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will
designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military
Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will dual-use.
occur before the return of designated facilities. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps
 While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa  The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from
(SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B,
may need to be reevaluated. E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the
 Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of
requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006. training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
 ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S.  Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to
forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from
(d) Relationships among Initiatives Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S.
 Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment operations from Atsugi.
initiatives are interconnected.  The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its
 Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support
on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis
from Okinawa to Guam. for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To
 The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be
(1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s developed at Kanoya.
financial contributions to fund development of required facilities  U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS
and infrastructure on Guam. Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability Guam.
 U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be  Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to
transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces,
Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring
FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
Camp Zama.  A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier
 Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting
battle command training center and other support facilities will be a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.  Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at
 In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient MCAS Iwakuni.
and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented. 5. Missile Defense
 Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local  As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their
redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will
underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will continue.

 The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa
has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)
and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in
radar becomes operational in summer 2006. Australia.
 The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ. (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to
 U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within locations outside of Japan.
existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be
possible time. consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.
6. Training Relocation (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.
 Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation
Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will
can be developed. be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up
 Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and to $2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial
Reference
Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the support (investment or loan) will not be utilized.
following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part
and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF of the aforementioned commitment.
facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future. II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity
 The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF
(1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability,
facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will
 Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is
take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing
currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities
coastal states with patrol boats).
and training requirements.
(2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training
 In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of
areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to
Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of
participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
cooperation by the end of 2012.
 At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by
Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint III. Land Returns in Okinawa
training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of
period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be procedures:
maintained. Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a
 The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering
bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access
(Attached conceptual diagram omitted) road, area near Gate 5)
(ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa:
Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance
of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial
Reference 21 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil,
Committee and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1
(iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to
(April 27, 2012)
locations outside of Japan:
Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline) Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service
Preamble Area
(1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities
plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap. and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.
(2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma
from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the
from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. only viable solution.
(3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects
Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully
promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen operational and to protect the environment.
the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance. (END)
For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website.
(http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html)
Reference 22 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2017
Joint Training
Training Designation Date Location Japan United States Reference
Joint Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet
Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise ASDF Yokota, Kasuga, Exercise and training for Japan-
Feb. 16, 20-23, HQ, JS Kongo and Teruzuki, Air Defense U.S. 7th Fleet HQ, several vessels,
for Air Defense / Naha, and U.S. Yokosuka U.S. coordination, enhancement of
2018 Command HQ, 2nd and 5th Air Defense etc.
Missile Defense Naval Base interoperability
Group
Ground Self-Defense Force

Joint Base Elmendorf- Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with May 28 - 1st Airborne Brigade
Richardson, Alaska and Team U.S. coordination, enhancement of
U.S. Army Jun. 30, 2017 Totaling approximately 100 personnel
surrounding training area Totaling approximately 100 personnel interoperability
Japan-U.S. joint Regional North Eastern Army, Ground Staff Office, I Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, Capacity maintenance and
Fort Shafter Army Base,
Army command post Jun 4-13, 2017 etc. etc. enhancement for command and
Hawaii
exercise U.S. Totaling approximately 180 personnel Totaling approximately 150 personnel staff activities of the Regional Army
Major units of one battalion from
Shoalwater Bay Training Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S. 1st Airborne Brigade 4-25 Infantry Brigade Combat Team
Jul. 7-19, 2017 Area, Queensland, U.S. coordination, enhancement of
in Australia Totaling approximately 60 personnel (Airborne)
Australia interoperability
Totaling approximately 300 personnel
One battalion from 4th Marine
Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver
Regiment, 3rd Marine Division; one
Area, Yausubetsu 28th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S. battalion from 12th Marine Regiment
Aug. 10-28, 2017 Maneuver Area, Brigade, 11th Artillery Troop, etc. U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Marines (artillery), etc.
Kamifurano Maneuver Totaling approximately 1,300 personnel interoperability
Totaling approximately 2,000
Area, etc.
personnel

Major units of 20th Infantry Regiment, Major units of 2-3 Infantry Battalion, Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S. Yakima Training Center,
Sep. 5-22, 2017 6th Division 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Army Washington
Totaling approximately 320 personnel Totaling approximately 230 personnel interoperability
Higashi Fuji Maneuver Major units from 3-21 Battalion, 1-25
Major units from 34th Infantry Regiment, Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S. Area, Ohjojihara Brigade Combat Team
Sep. 8-25, 2017 1st Division U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Army Maneuver Area, Camp Totaling approximately 1,200
Totaling approximately 1,200 personnel interoperability
Takigahara, etc. personnel
Camp Pendleton,
Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S. Oct. 7-Nov. 4, California and U.S. naval Infantry Regiments, Western Army, etc. 1st Marine Expeditionary unit, 3rd
U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Marines 2017 facility in San Clemente Totaling approximately 100 personnel Fleet
interoperability
Island
North Eastern Army, GSO, Central I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Japan-U.S. joint Regional Capacity maintenance and
Reference
Nov. 29-Dec. 13, Readiness Force, Ground Research and Brigade, U.S. Army Japan HQ, etc.
Army command and post Camp Sendai, etc. enhancement for command and
2017 Development Command, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600
exercise (Japan) staff activities of the Regional Army
Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel personnel
Ohyano Maneuver Area, Major units from 43rd Infantry Regiment, Major units of 2-1 Battalion, 4th Exercise and training for Japan-
Field training with U.S.
Dec. 8-20, 2017 Vice-Camp Takayubaru, 8th Division Marine regiment, 3rd Marine Division U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Marines
etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel Totaling approximately 400 personnel interoperability
Major units of 2-1 Battalion, 4th
Ohjojihara Maneuver Major units of 39th Infantry Regiment, Marine Regiment; major units of C Exercise and training for Japan-
Joint exercise with U.S. Feb.15-Mar. 2,
Area, Camp Kasuminome, 9th Division Regiment, 31st Marine Expeditionary U.S. coordination, enhancement of
Marines 2018
Camp Tagajo Totaling approximately 600 personnel Battalion interoperability
Totaling approximately 550 personnel

Joint cruise training Apr. 23-29, 2017 Western Pacific 2 vessels Several vessels Tactical training
Japan-U.S. joint training Apr. 25, 2017 Mutsu Bay 1 vessel 1 vessel Tactical training
Sea area south of Kanto Tactical maneuver, take off and
Joint training with U.S.
May 1-3, 2017 through sea area east of 2 vessels 1 vessel landing training, mock at-sea oil
Navy
southwestern islands replenishment training, etc.
Joint cruise training May 7-10, 2017 South China Sea 2 vessels 2 vessels Tactical training
Waters surrounding the
Japan-U.S. joint training May 18, 2017 2 vessels 2 vessels Tactical training
Republic of Singapore
May 26-27,
Joint cruise training South China Sea 2 vessels 1 vessel Tactical training
2017
Sea of Japan and
Joint training with U.S. Several carriers, etc. / Several
Jun. 1-3, 2017 airspace over Sea of 2 vessels Tactical training
Navy carrier-borne aircraft
Japan
Joint training with U.S. Sea of Japan through Several carriers, etc. / Several
Jun. 3-9, 2017 2 vessels Tactical training
Navy sea east of Okinawa carrier-borne aircraft
Jun. 13-15,
Joint cruise training South China Sea 2 vessels Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
2017
2 vessels / 4 aircraft /
Minesweeping special Minesweeping training, diving
Jul. 18-30, 2017 Mutsu Bay 16 vessels / 12 aircraft approximately 10 underwater
training training
disposal personnel
Joint training with U.S. Anti-submarine warfare training,
Jul. 26, 2017 Sea of Japan 2 vessels 1 vessel
Navy etc.
Jul. 26, 2017 Mutsu Bay 1 vessel 1 vessel Communication training, etc.
Navy
Sep. 6-7, 2017 East China Sea 2 aircraft 1 aircraft Information sharing training
Navy
Sea south of Kanto
Sep. 11-28,
Joint cruise training through waters 3 vessels Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
2017
surrounding Okinawa
Waters and airspace
Sep. 29-Oct. 1,
Joint cruise training surrounding Okinawa 1 vessel Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
2017
through Bashi Channel
Waters and airspace
surrounding Bashi
Joint cruise training Oct. 7-16, 2017 1 vessel Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
Channel through north of
Kyushu via Okinawa
Nagaura G parking at Yokosuka District HQ, Self-Defense Commander, Fleet Activities
Yokosuka District HQ, Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Yokosuka, U.S. Naval Hospital Training and exercise for Japan-
Medical special training Oct. 17, 2017 Self-Defense Forces Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka U.S. coordination in the medical
Hospital Yokosuka, U.S. Yokosuka Totaling approximately 350 area
Naval Hospital Yokosuka Totaling approximately 160 personnel personnel
Waters and airspace
Joint training with U.S. Oct. 26-Nov. 12, surrounding Sea of Several carriers, etc. / 2 carrier-
3 vessels Tactical training
Navy 2017 Japan, East China Sea borne aircraft
and Okinawa
Waters and airspace
from the Sea of Japan
Nov. 12-16,
Joint cruise training through the East 1 vessel Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
2017
China Sea and around
Okinawa
Minesweeping special Nov. 20-30, 1 vessel / 2 aircraft / approximately Minesweeping training, diving
Sea of Hyuga 22 vessels / several aircraft
training 2017 10 underwater disposal personnel training

Anti-air warfare training,
Waters and airspace anti-surface warfare training,
Multi Sail 2018 Mar. 8-14, 2018 1 vessel 4 vessels
surrounding Guam anti-submarine warfare training,
shooting training, etc.
Mar. 19-22,
Japan-U.S. joint training East China Sea 2 aircraft 1 aircraft Information sharing training
2018
Japan-U.S. joint cruise Waters and airspace
Mar. 11, 2018 1 vessel Several carriers, etc. Tactical training
training north of South China Sea

Reference
Enhancement of joint response

Air defense combat Area and airspace to the
Apr. 16-21, 2017 13 aircraft 10 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
training west of Hokkaido
tactical skills
Navigation and Kyushu area and
Apr. 25, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
formation training airspace
tactical skills
Joint training with U.S. The eastern area and Several carrier, etc. / 2 carrier-
Apr. 28, 2017 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
Navy airspace of Okinawa borne aircraft
tactical skills
May 1, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
May 17-18, 1 aircraft / 1 Patriot / approximately Enhancement of capability and
Loading training Kadena Air Base 1 AMG / approximately 20 personnel
2017 30 personnel Japan-U.S. coordination
May 29, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Sea of Japan and area Enhancement of joint response
Joint training with U.S. Several carrier, etc. / Several
Jun. 1-2, 2017 and airspace over the Aircraft capabilities, improvement of
Navy carrier-borne aircraft
Sea of Japan tactical skills
Joint training with U.S. The eastern area and Several carrier, etc. / Several
Jun. 6, 2017 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
Navy airspace of Okinawa carrier-borne aircraft
tactical skills
Eielson Air Force Base,
Air defense combat
Alaska, Joint base
training / aerial refueling Enhancement of capability and
Jun. 9-24, 2017 Elmendof-Richardson, 11 AMG Several aircraft
training / tactical airlift Japan-U.S. coordination
their surrounding
training
airspace
Jun. 20, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Navigation and Over the vicinity of the
Jul. 6, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
formation training East China Sea
tactical skills
tactical skills
tactical skills
Aug. 8, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Aug 16, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Navigation and Over the vicinity of Sea
formation training of Japan
tactical skills
tactical skills
Sep. 9, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Sep. 18, 2017 4 aircraft 6 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Oct. 10, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Oct 21, 2017 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills

Nov. 2, 2017 4 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Airspace around the Sea Enhancement of joint response
Tactical training Nov. 10, 2017 of Japan, East China Sea 2 aircraft Several carrier, etc. / 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
and around Okinawa tactical skills
Area and airspace over
Tactical training Nov. 13, 2017 4 aircraft Several carrier, etc. / 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
the Sea of Japan
tactical skills
Nov. 29-Dec. 1,
Fighter combat training Airspace around Kyushu 2 aircraft 2 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
2017
Reference
tactical skills
Airspace over Sea of Enhancement of joint response
Fighter combat training,
Dec. 4, 2017 Japan and around 4 aircraft 4 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
etc.
Okinawa tactical skills
Dec. 6, 2017 2 aircraft 1 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Navigation and Okinawa area and
Dec. 12, 2017 5 aircraft 11 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Jan. 22, 2018 4 aircraft 4 aircraft capabilities, improvement of
tactical skills
Training area for
Airfield Damage runway reconstruction, Southwestern Air Facility Unit / 9th U.S. Air Force 18th Civil Engineer Enhancement of capabilities,
Feb. 26-28, 2018
Repair Training Ammunition storage site, Air Wing Squadron enhancement of interoperability
Kadena Air Base
Training area for runway
Airfield Damage U.S. Air Force 35th Civil Engineer Enhancement of capabilities,
Mar. 28, 2018 reconstruction, Misawa Northern Air Facility Unit / 3rd Air Wing
Repair Training Squadron enhancement of interoperability
Air Base
Training area for runway
Airfield Damage 7th Air Wing / Central Aircraft Control Enhancement of capabilities,
Mar. 29, 2018 reconstruction, Yokota U.S. Air Force 374th Airlift Wing
Repair Training and Warning Wing enhancement of interoperability
Air Base
Reference 23 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects
Date of conclusion of
intergovernmental agreement
Item Summary Completion date
to implement joint research
and development
Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar,
ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low-
vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, Completed
combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine
exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications
SM-3 Block IIA Development of advanced missile interceptor June 2006 Ongoing
Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and
Hybrid Electric Propulsion November 2012 Ongoing
technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor
High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate
March 2014 Ongoing
Optimization stability and large deck area
Comparison of Operational Jet Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss
November 2015 Ongoing
Fuel and Noise Exposures for flight line personnel
Chemical Agent Detector-kit
Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit February 2017 Ongoing
Colorimetric Reader
Reference 24 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2015)

Type of
Date Participants Outline and Results
Consultation/Place
Apr. 8, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands
2015 Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani • Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea
Tokyo Secretary of • Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines
Defense • The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and
Carter supported this effort.
• Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense
authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries
• Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a
regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology
• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigrate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss
measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

Type of
Consultation/Place
Apr. 27, Japan-U.S. Security Minister of Defense • Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S.
2015 Consultative Nakatani Alliance
Committee (“2+2”) Minister for Foreign • Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement)
Meeting/ Affairs Kishida • Shared recognition on the importance of “rule of law,” including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral
New York Secretary of attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts
Defense • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
Carter • The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigaty the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact.
Secretary of State • Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Kerry Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible
Apr. 28, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian
2015 Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani countries
Washington, D.C. Secretary of • Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation
Defense • Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance
Reference
Carter of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines

• The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan’s efforts in this
regard.
• Welcomed the establishment of the “Space Cooperation Working Group” as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two
defense authorities
• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that
it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base the consolidation in Okinawa.
• Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology
cooperation.
May 30, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas
2015 Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani • Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation
Singapore Secretary of • Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability
Defense Carter • The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the commencement of Diet
deliberations
• Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditious negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
• Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further
strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace
• The Japanese side stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that
it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa.
• The Japanese side is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance the
deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region but the Japanese side
requested provision of necessary information from the viewpoint of ensuring safety. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary
information and ensure the safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.
Nov. 3, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. The Japanese side stated that it will
2015 Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani support the U.S. Forces’ activities in the South China Sea.
Malaysia Secretary of • In light of North Korea’s posture to continue activities for launching long-range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States
Defense Carter will closely cooperate on this matter
• Agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation with the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines
• The Japanese side explained the recent enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the U.S. side stated that they support and
welcome the enactment
• Welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM). Confirmed
that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.
• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that
it would continue to cooperate on this matter.
• The Japanese side requested that the U.S. Force minimize the impact on the local residents in the relevant areas associated with their
operation and give maximum consideration to the aspect of safety. The U.S. side expressed its intention to always ensure maximum safety
of both the local residents and the U.S. Forces personnel.
• Regarding the Host Nation Support (HNS), agreed that they would continue to hold consultations between the two countries, and make
efforts to reach an early agreement
• In light of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for
equipment and technology
Jun. 4, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed their intention to devise a set of effective prevention
2016 Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA
Singapore Secretary of status, including the civilian component
Defense Carter • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas
• With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this
matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)
• Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for
Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness
of the new Guidelines
• Welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further
deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology
• The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only
solution. The U.S. side stated that it fully understands Japan’s position and would maintain close cooperation with Japan.
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to outside of
Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate with Japan.
• Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area
Sep. 15, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands
2016 Ministerial Meeting/ Inada • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas
Washington, D.C. Secretary of • With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this
Defense Carter matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)
• Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral
frameworks
• Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for
Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness
of the new Guidelines
• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level
consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016
• The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only
solution.The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter.
• Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area

Type of
Consultation/Place
Dec. 7, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Agreed to oppose North Korea’s nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the
2016 Ministerial Meeting/ Inada East and South China Seas
Tokyo Secretary of • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands
Defense Carter • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral
frameworks
• Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the
foundation
• Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the
Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security
• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level
consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016
• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December
2016
Reference
• With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they
would continue to cooperate closely on this matter
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to
cooperate on this matter
Feb. 4, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Shared the view that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region
2017 Ministerial Meeting/ Inada • Shared the view that advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan
Tokyo Secretary of and the United States and the region
Defense Mattis • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands
• Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea
• Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral
frameworks
• The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan’s role in the Alliance
• The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be
enhanced through its ongoing presence
• Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States’ unwavering commitment to extended deterrence
• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into
account the Guidelines established in 2015
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that
it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration.
• With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they
would continue to cooperate closely on this matter
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure
the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Jun. 3, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Shared the view that North Korea’s successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability
2017 Ministerial Meeting/ Inada of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK
Singapore Secretary of collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration
Defense Mattis • The Japanese side highly praised the United States’ visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its
carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea
• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands
• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and
regarding engagement in the South China Sea
• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the
joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end
• Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting
• Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to
continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation
• Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate
closely on this matter
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure
the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Aug. 17, Japan-U.S. Security Minister of Defense • Reaffirmed the two government’ commitment to bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Alliance is the cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific
2017 Consultative Onodera region’s peace and security.
Committee (“2+2”) Minister for Foreign • Reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.
Meeting / New York Affairs Kono • Condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and agreed on taking concrete
Secretary of actions to bolster the defense capabilities of the Alliance to deter threats of North Korea while closely coordinating between Japan and the
Defense Mattis U.S., and the two countries and the Republic of Korea.
Secretary of State • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.
Tillerson • Reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea.
• Underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of
navigation.
• Confirmed their shared intent to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through
reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations.
• Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-
Term Defense Program.
• The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan.
• Directed respective staffs to proceed with the policy making process based on the guidance given by the ministers.
• Reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.
• Welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
• Reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region.
• Confirmed their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense,
non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security.
• Affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space and cyber, and called for deepening consultations for such cooperation.
• Highlighted ongoing efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region.
• Emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral exercises between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea.
• Affirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to Southeast Asian
nations.
• Confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building.
• Reaffirmed the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.
• Reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan.
• Reaffirmed the overall level of Host Nation Support.
• Reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use.
• Stressed the importance of steadily implementing supplementary agreements to SOFA regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian
component.

Type of
Consultation/Place
Aug. 17, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Agreed on the importance of establishing trust between defense leaders of Japan and the U.S., and working together to strengthen the Alliance.
2017 Ministerial Meeting / Onodera • Exchanged views on issues regarding North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime
Washington D.C. Secretary of and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies.
Defense Mattis • Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues regarding North Korea.
Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea.
• In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the
Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their
respective capabilities.
Oct. 23, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Shared information on the situation of and prospects for North Korea's nuclear and missile development.
2017 Ministerial Meeting / Onodera • The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate
Philippines Secretary of threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated
Defense Mattis response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to
extended deterrence.
Reference
• Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also
confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination
to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships.
• Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to
continue to share information between Japan and the U.S.
• Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close coordination between Japan
and the U.S.
• Reaffirmed the two governments’ intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea.
• Shared the position that Japan and the U.S. will work together for the peace and security of the East China Sea while keeping a close watch
on the situations.
• Agreed on the importance of engagement in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea,
and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADMM Plus.
• The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the “Vientiane Vision,” Japan’s
defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN.
• Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners.
• The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in
ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.
Apr. 20, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense • Held close discussion and agreed on future course of action concerning the North Korea issues, including the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting.
2018 Ministerial Meeting / Onodera • Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete initiatives by North Korea to give up its nuclear development
Washington D.C. Secretary of has been confirmed, despite the changes in the regime’s posture such as requesting for talks.
Defense Mattis • The Japanese side spoke about the necessity to put maximum pressure on North Korea in order to make it abolish its nuclear and missile
development, and affirmed that the two governments will maintain pressure and sanctions on North Korea with the goal of having North
Korea relinquish all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missile plans in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.
• The U.S. side commended efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its
commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations.
• Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through joint training and exercise.
• Agreed on the importance of continuing close information-sharing to ensure the Alliance’s response capabilities to any situation.
• Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such
as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffirmed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense
cooperation through the steady enforcement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
• The Japan side talked about moving forward on the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the
study of setting forth a next Mid-Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers.
• The Japanese side spoke about the need to introduce high-performance equipment including those used by the U.S. military to bolster
Japan’s defense capabilities amid an increasingly severe security environment. The two ministers affirmed to work together to make
it possible for Japan to smoothly and swiftly acquire equipment made in the U.S. including the Aegis Ashore by addressing the issues
regarding FMS.
• The Japanese side requested the securing of safe operations by the U.S. Forces, including the CV-22 to be deployed to Yokota Air Base and
U.S. Forces aircraft in Okinawa, and the U.S. side acknowledged the importance of ensuring flight safety.
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on the local community of Okinawa and other places, and
concurred that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Japan on efforts to gain the understanding of the local community.
Reference 25 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee United Nations Security Council resolutions including the newly adopted
Resolution 2371. The Ministers strongly encourage China to take decisive
(August 17, 2017)
measures to urge North Korea to change its course of action. The Ministers
called on North Korea to end its systematic human rights violations and to
Begin Text:
immediately release all foreign nationals held in North Korea, including
I. Overview Japanese abductees and U.S. citizens.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance (“the Alliance”) is the cornerstone of the Asia- The Ministers expressed continuing concerns about the security
Pacific region’s peace, prosperity, and freedom. This dynamic partnership environment in the East China Sea. They also recalled the situation in early
is also increasingly important in promoting values shared by both nations, August 2016. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of working together to
including freedom, democracy, peace, human rights, free and fair markets, safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea and reconfirmed that
and the rule of law. The Ministers renewed their resolve to uphold the rules- Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and
based international order amid the challenging security environment. that the United States and Japan oppose any unilateral action that seeks to
Today the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (“SCC”) charted undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.
a path forward for the Alliance in addressing the ongoing and emerging The Ministers expressed serious concern about the situation in the South
threats that pose a challenge to regional peace and security, based on the Joint China Sea and reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral coercive actions by
Statement by the leaders of both countries on February 10, 2017. The SCC claimants, including the reclamation and militarization of disputed features,
reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan that alter the status quo and increase tensions. They reiterated the importance
Defense Cooperation and to pursue further ways to strengthen the Alliance. of the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes through full respect for legal
The Ministers also reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of and diplomatic processes, including arbitration. They also emphasized the
Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. importance of compliance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in
II. The Regional Strategic Environment the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including respect for
The Ministers condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s recurring freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. In this
provocations and development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, regard, the Ministers recalled the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on
which have entered a new phase, and pose an increasing threat to regional July 12, 2016. The Ministers acknowledged the adoption of the framework of
and international peace and stability. The Ministers committed to bolster the the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) and look forward to the
capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond to these threats. They also conclusion of a meaningful, effective and legally binding COC. The Ministers
concurred on continuing to pressure North Korea, in cooperation with other underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea,
countries, to compel it to take concrete actions to end its nuclear and ballistic including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation,
missile programs, and to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and coordinated capacity
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Ministers called on the building assistance.
international community to comprehensively and thoroughly implement the

III. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation Training Area in 2016, the single largest land return in Okinawa since 1972.
(1) Alliance Responses They noted progress on the land returns that were announced in December
The Ministers confirmed their shared intent to develop specific measures 2015 and called for further implementation of those returns. The Ministers
and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including also reaffirmed the importance of steady implementation of the Consolidation
through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa and their commitment to update the
Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations amid an increasingly plan as soon as possible.
challenging regional security environment. To that end, Japan intends to The Ministers also welcomed progress in the relocation of a total
expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel, along with their
an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program. The associated dependents, from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including
United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities Guam. They confirmed the steady implementation of the Guam International
to Japan. To expedite work already underway in this regard, the Ministers Agreement.
gave the following guidance to their staffs: The Ministers welcomed Japan’s commitment to make utmost efforts to
• Accelerate implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense secure a permanent field carrier landing practice facility as soon as possible.
Reference
Cooperation and pursue additional types of cooperation under Japan’s The Ministers confirmed their intent to continue to promote aviation
Legislation for Peace and Security; and, training relocation, including tilt-rotor/rotary wing training relocation, which
• Explore new and expanded activities in various areas, such as Intelligence, has helped to mitigate the impact of training activity on Okinawa.
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), training and exercises, research (2) Host Nation Support (HNS)
and development, capacity building, and the joint/shared use of facilities. The Ministers welcomed the entry into force of the current Special Measures
(2) Implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Agreement (SMA) in April 2016, which serves as a pillar of the Alliance and
Cooperation a symbol of Japan’s enduring support for the U.S. military presence in Japan.
The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments' unwavering commitment to The Ministers confirmed that the overall level of HNS is to be maintained
continue implementation of the 2015 Guidelines. The Ministers welcomed roughly at the Japan Fiscal Year 2015 level. The Ministers reaffirmed that the
important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding in the current SMA period is
and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to be no less than a budget of 20.6 billion yen per year.
(ACSA) as milestones in enhancing bilateral defense cooperation. The (3) Other Issues
Ministers noted the successful use of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared
(ACM) to respond to regional events. The Ministers reaffirmed the critical use to enhance interoperability and deterrence, build stronger relationships
role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as with local communities, and strengthen the Self-Defense Forces’ force
well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and they expressed posture, including in Japan’s southwestern islands.
their intention to deepen engagement on this subject through the Extended The Ministers reiterated their determination to address issues related
Deterrence Dialogue. They also confirmed their shared commitment to to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) through mutual consultations.
enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and The Ministers welcomed the entry into force of supplementary agreements
missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian component, and they
technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security. stressed the importance of steadily implementing these agreements. The
The Ministers affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space, Ministers acknowledged the United States’ enhanced training and orientation
particularly in resiliency, Space Situational Awareness, hosted payloads and processes for personnel with SOFA status.
satellite communications. They called for deepening consultations in a timely
manner on Alliance responses to serious cyber incidents, underscoring the
critical importance of further enhancing Allied deterrence and defense. Reference 26 Joint Statement (February 10, 2017)
IV. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The Ministers highlighted ongoing Alliance efforts to advance trilateral and President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held their
multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region, first official meeting today in Washington D.C. and affirmed their strong
notably the Republic of Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries. determination to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and economic
The Ministers underscored the importance of cooperating to promote a relationship.
rules-based international order, taking note of the United States’ continued U.S.-Japan Alliance
commitment to maintain a strong presence in the region and Japan’s initiatives The unshakable U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity,
demonstrated by its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” and freedom in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. commitment to defend
Regarding cooperation with the Republic of Korea, the Ministers Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear
emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral and conventional, is unwavering. Amid an increasingly difficult security
exercises, including missile warning, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will strengthen its
interdiction operations exercises. presence in the region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities
Regarding cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, the Ministers in the alliance. The United States and Japan will continue to implement
affirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and and expand defense cooperation as laid out in the 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense
defense equipment and technology transfers in areas including maritime Guidelines. The United States and Japan will further enhance cooperation with
security, defense institution building, and humanitarian assistance and disaster allies and partners in the region. The two leaders underscored the importance
relief (HA/DR). Recognizing the importance of upholding the maritime order of maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.
in the region, the Ministers confirmed their shared commitment to launch a The two leaders affirmed the commitment of the United States and
whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building, which Japan to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, to ensure the long-term,
would incorporate existing efforts in this regard. sustainable presence of U.S. forces. They affirmed that the United States
V. The U.S. Force Presence in Japan and Japan are committed to the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement
(1) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters. It is the
The Ministers, in view of maintaining a robust U.S. force presence in Japan, only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station
reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing Futenma.
arrangements for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, which aim to The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
maintain operational and deterrent capability in an increasingly severe security Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose
environment, while also mitigating the impact on local communities and any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these
enhancing support from local communities for the presence and operations islands. The United States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard
of U.S. forces in Japan. the peace and stability of the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored
As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers welcomed the the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law,
resumption of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) construction and including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the
reconfirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab- sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims
Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and
operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate
continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The Ministers tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and
reaffirmed the two Governments’ unwavering commitment to the plan and to act in accordance with international law.
underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon The United States and Japan strongly urge North Korea to abandon its
as possible and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. In this nuclear and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative
context, the Ministers called for the steady implementation of the construction actions. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is fully capable of ensuring the security
plan, noting the adverse impact of further delays on the ability of the Alliance of Japan. The United States is fully committed to defending its homeland,
to provide for peace and security. forces, and allies, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities. The
The Ministers welcomed the return of a major portion of the Northern two leaders affirmed the importance of an early resolution of the abductions

issue. They also affirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation among the that they remain fully committed to strengthening the economic relationships
United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The United States and Japan between their two countries and across the region, based on rules for free
are also committed to rigorous implementation of the U.N. Security Council and fair trade. This will include setting high trade and investment standards,
resolutions on North Korea. reducing market barriers, and enhancing opportunities for economic and job
The United States and Japan will strengthen their bilateral technological growth in the Asia-Pacific.
cooperation on defense innovation to meet the evolving security challenges. The United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of both deepening
The United States and Japan will also expand bilateral security cooperation in their trade and investment relations and of their continued efforts in promoting
the fields of space and cyberspace. The United States and Japan also strongly trade, economic growth, and high standards throughout the Asia-Pacific
condemn terrorism in all forms and manifestations and will enhance our region. Toward this end, and noting that the United States has withdrawn
cooperation to fight against terrorist groups that pose a global threat. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the leaders pledged to explore how best to
The two leaders instructed their foreign and defense ministers to convene accomplish these shared objectives. This will include discussions between the
a Security Consultative Committee (SCC: “2+2”) meeting to identify ways to United States and Japan on a bilateral framework as well as Japan continuing
further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through the review of to advance regional progress on the basis of existing initiatives.
Reference
the respective roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries. In addition, the two leaders expressed interest in exploring cooperation
U.S.-Japan Economic Relations across sectors that promote mutual economic benefits to the United States
The United States and Japan represent 30 percent of the world’s GDP and share and Japan.
an interest in sustaining a strong global economy, ensuring financial stability, The two leaders decided to have their countries engage in an economic
and growing job opportunities. To advance these interests, the President and dialogue to discuss these and other issues. They also reaffirmed their intent to
the Prime Minister reaffirmed their commitments to using the three-pronged continue cooperation in regional and global fora.
approach of mutually-reinforcing fiscal, monetary, and structural policies to Invitations to Visit Japan
strengthen domestic and global economic demand. Prime Minister Abe invited President Trump for an official visit to Japan
The two leaders discussed opportunities and challenges facing each of during the course of this year, and also welcomed an early visit of Vice
their economies and the need to promote inclusive growth and prosperity President Pence to Tokyo. President Trump accepted these invitations.
in their countries, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. They emphasized
Reference 27 Outline of 23 Issues

(As of April 1, 2018)
Classification
Area
Facility Scope Gun-Ten- U.S. Remarks
(ha) SCC Governor
Kyo Forces
<Already returned>
Returned on December 31,
Army POL Depots 1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City 4 ◎ 1990
Returned on September 30,
2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa) 0.1 ◎ 1991
Camp Zukeran
20. Awase Meadows Golf Course 47 ◎ Returned on July 31, 2010
3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district 480 ◎

Northern Training Area Returned on March 31, 1993
4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line (256) ◎
Camp Schwab 5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko) 1 ◎ Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex 6. In whole 0.1 ◎ Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage 7. In whole Building ◎ Returned on March 31, 1993

Sunabe Warehouse 8. In whole 0.3 ◎ Returned on June 30, 1993
Returned on November 30,
Yaedake Communication Site 9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho) 19 ◎ 1994
10. In whole 62 Returned on September 30,
Onna Communication Site
11. Eastern part (26) ◎ 1995
Kadena Air Base 12. A part of southern area (Tobaru) 2 ◎ Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site 13. In whole 0.1 ◎ 1996
14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin) 3 ◎ 1996
Returned on June 30, 2014
Camp Hansen
(55ha)
23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City) 162 ◎
Returned on June 30, 2017
(107ha)
(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner
(Yamanaka Area))
74 ○ Returned on March 25, 1999
Kadena Ammunition 15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58) 3 ○ ◎ Returned on March 25, 1999
Storage Area
(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities) 9 ○ Returned on March 31, 2005
(22. Continuing use area for GSDF) 58 ○ Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station 16. Kadena bypass 4 ◎ Returned on March 31, 1999
Returned on September 30,
Deputy Division Engineer Office 17. In whole 4 ◎ 2002
(19. Southern side of the eastern part) 2 ○ ○ 1994
Camp Kuwae 18. Northern part (Ihei) 38 ◎
Returned on March 31, 2003
(18. Along Route 58) (5) ○
MCAS Futenma 21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan) 4 ◎ Returned on July 31, 2017
17 facilities, 21 issues 977 7 8 3 3

Classification
Area
Facility Scope Gun-Ten- U.S. Remarks
(ha) SCC Governor
Kyo Forces
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>
Change agreed on December
Camp Kuwae 19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae) 0.5 ◎ 21, 2001
Kadena Ammunition Storage Release agreed on March
Area
22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area 43 ◎ 28, 1996
2 facilities, 2 issues 44 2 0 0 0
Total 17 facilities, 23 issues 1,021 9 8 3 3
Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
Reference
3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa
which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezon-
ing and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of
Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.
Reference 28 The SACO Final Report under the following conditions:

(December 2, 1996) • Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx.
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end
November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern
Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people Training Area to the ocean.
of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance. • Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the
The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the remaining Northern Training Area.
Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. — Aha Training Area
Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres)
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres)
reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land
forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The provided.
work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. — Gimbaru Training Area
The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention
Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing
to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities
by November 1996. are relocated to Camp Hansen.
The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of — Sobe Communication Site
intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the
to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna
Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and — Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with
impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the
time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe
forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Communication Site is relocated.
Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas — Camp Kuwae
in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention
acres) will be returned. to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is
Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to
the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt — Senaha Communication Station
implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with
this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the
forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii
conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx.
with local communities will take place as necessary. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to — Makiminato Service Area
make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen
status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are
forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the — Naha Port
Joint Committee. Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx.
The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub- 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area
Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee (approx. 35ha /87 acres).
described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and
important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish
In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp
Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be
international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in
policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).
environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:
these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time. — Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Return Land: Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception
— Futenma Air Station — See attached. of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is
— Northern Training Area relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 FY1997.
acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 — Parachute drop training
acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

— Conditioning hikes on public roads The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)
Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives: (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)
— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and 1. Introduction
Futenma Air Station a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and
Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special
March 1996 have been implemented. Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15,
— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a
Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation
aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining
— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status
Reference
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine
Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air
implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and
the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation
the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the
corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and
— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed
with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998. facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when
— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station no longer necessary.
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under
maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the
U.S. forces. Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of
Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures: technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will
develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon
— Accident reports
SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee,
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide
will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets.
investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on
Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on
December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor
the status of its work.
policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate
2. Decisions of the SCC
local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents
a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter
involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities.
operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be
— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight
— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long),
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and
direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such
areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and
— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces
helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft
official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S.
operations.
forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by
b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at
October 1997.
this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support
— Supplemental automobile insurance
these aircraft and their missions.
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded.
c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft,
Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all
maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at
personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning
Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air
in January 1997.
Base.
— Payment for claims
d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims
may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the
under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce
• Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and
operational flexibility currently available.
evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures.
e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after
Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance
adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
3. Guiding Principles
• A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which
a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will
Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans,
be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels
as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S.
throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation
authorities.
of facilities.
• In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the
b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations
U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court
and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities
judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of
and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by
Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in
the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics,
order to address the difference in amount.
emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be
— Quarantine procedures
fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by
SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be
the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in
Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or
Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S.
causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational
forces in the United States.
requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access,
— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee
environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement,
survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to
other U.S. military facilities and housing.
d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure
platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against
severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment
and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF;

safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units,
fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported
short-period contingency/emergency operations. by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation 5. The Next Steps
facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later
Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the
life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. following items: concept development and definitions of operational
f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa requirements, technology performance specifications and construction
informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site
schedules of implementation. selection.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational
Reference
Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction,
of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory installation of required components, validation tests and suitability
Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at
mentioned below are technically feasible. significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.
a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a
number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
Reference 29 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report
[Return of Lands]
1. Already returned facilities
Name of Facility (Project) State of Progress
• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc.
Northern Training Area • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction
(Return of major portion) of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)
• December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010 ha) was returned
Aha Training Area
• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)
(Return of total area)
• January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach
Gimbaru Training Area
Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen
• July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)
• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as
Sobe Communication Site antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen
(Return of total area) • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m2) was returned
• December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Sobe Communication Site [approximately 53 ha])
• October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
• July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha)
• December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield [approximately 191 ha])
• March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities
Senaha Communication
and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station
Station
• September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion)
(Return of most areas)
• October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station
2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

MCAS Futenma * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
(Return of total area → • December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.
Return of total area)* • July 2017: Partially returned (approx. 4ha)
• July 2002: Youth Center provided
• March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)
• January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities.
• December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital.
• February 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (helipad)
• December 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility).
• May 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors)
Camp Kuwae
• October 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1)
(Return of most areas →
• October 2010: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2)
Return of total area)*
• September 2011: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood
storage facility, etc.)
• February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished
• March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened
• December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished
• April 2017: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) were furnished
* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Makiminato Service Area * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
(Return of partial area → • December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway
Return of total area)* • March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha)
Naha Port Facility
(Return of total area → * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Return of total area)*

(Phase I: Golf Range Area)
• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• July 2002: Two high rises were furnished
• July 2006: An underpass was furnished
(Phase II: Sada Area)
• February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished
Housing Consolidation Camp
(Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area)
Zukeran
• March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
(Return of partial area →
• June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished
Return of partial area)*
(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)
• March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
Reference
• February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished
* May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
* April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family
housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based
on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.
[Adjustment in training or operation]

Point State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire
• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997
Training over Highway 104
Parachute Drop Training • Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000
[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

1. Initiatives already taken
• June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility
• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished
• February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp
• October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway.
Relocation of the U.S. Navy • April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility.
Ramp at Kadena Air Base • February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar.
• July 2013: Ramp, etc. provided.
• July 2014: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc.
• December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc.
• January 2017: Relocation completed
Installation of Noise Reduction
• July 2000: Furnished
Baffles at Kadena Air Base
2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and
operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

Reference 30 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility
Month & Year Background

Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was
April 1996 announced. SACO Interim Report.
→ The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
SACO Final Report
December 1996
→ A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).
Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be
November 1999
for joint military-civilian use
Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF
December 1999 “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision)
Reference
→ Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab
“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa.
July 2002 “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared.
→ Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.
November 2003 Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
August 2004 A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
“2+2” Joint Statement
October 2005
→ Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago,
April 2006 and the village mayor of Ginoza.
→ Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
• “2+2” Joint Statement
→ Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved
“Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of
May 2006
Okinawa.
• “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision)
→ The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006 Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”
August 2007 The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.
April 2009 Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party.
September 2009
→ Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting
November 2009
→ Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009 Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
May 2010 → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”
August 2010 Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011 → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the
replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011–
The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.
January 2012
The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
February 2012
→ Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012 → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution.
Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
December 2012 Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
March 2013 Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.
Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa”
April 2013
→ MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.
October 2013
→ Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
December 2013 Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
July 2014 Started the construction of replacement facilities
Joint press release by Japan and the United States
October 2014
→ Reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma
April 2015 → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that
addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project
• The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit
October 2015 for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution
• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism recognized the request of the Okinawa Defense Bureau and decided to suspend execution of the revocation
of the landfill permit
• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
November 2015 → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit

Month & Year Background
• The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation
• L andfill work was suspended
March 2016 • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit
•O kinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
→ Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court-
suggested settlement under the philosophy of ‘’haste makes waste,’’ and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of
April 2016
the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands
the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its
efforts through close cooperation.
Reference
• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review
• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
June 2016
→ Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the
Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.
July 2016 • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act
September 2016
→ Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.
→ Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely
• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the
national government)
December 2016 • Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
• Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
→ Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following
the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction
→ Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely
February 2017
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
April 2017 Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation
Okinawa Prefectural Government filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the
July 2017
governor.
Joint statement of "2+2"
August 2017
→ The four ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
Reference 31 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena
Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures

West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2014 or later
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2019 or later 1
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later 2,3
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later
Naha Port JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later
Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) －
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later 4
Notes:
1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.
2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate
timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.
4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

Reference 32 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces
June 6, 2011 The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.
June 13, 2012– Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa
• Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July).
June 29- • Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013.
• The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the
safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.
July 23 Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government).
September 19
The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.
Reference
October 6 Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
January 28, 2013 The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.
The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron
April 30
(off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 30 The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 25 Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
May 11, 2015 The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.
December 13, 2016 Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.
February 1, 2017 Periodic aircraft maintenance of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.
Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey
March 14
that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.
August 5 Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.
United States Forces, Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and a total of ten Osprey would be deployed
April 3, 2018
gradually over the next few years.
Reference 33 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan
1. Purpose
It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and
security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to
contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.
2. Special Measures, etc.
(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to
their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area
of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents’ lives more convenient and to developing
industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.
The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants
based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.
(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts
Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the
development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant
ministers, and at the Council’s meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the
establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).
(3) Measures for USFJ local employees
Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.
3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on
the situation of the realignment.
Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant
to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.
2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ
relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation.
However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint
Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was
confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.

Reference 34 Agreement between the Government of Japan and ARTICLE 3
the Government of the United States of America on The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the
Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays
Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices
an essential role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty.
Relating to the Civilian Component of the United 1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian
States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall
Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual direct the Joint Committee to develop.
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United 2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that
the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible
(signed on January 16, 2017) to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or
knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements.
Reference
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America
(hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), hereinafter ARTICLE 4
referred to as the “Parties”; Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall
Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons
referred to as the “United States armed forces”) under the Treaty of Mutual ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America Component.
(hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the Agreement under Article VI of
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United ARTICLE 5
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United 1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish
States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “Status of Forces a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly of
Agreement”), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, contribute to contractor employees who have been designated as members of the
the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon
in the Far East; the request of either Party regarding such notification.
Bearing in mind the “Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing 2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States
Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular
to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component” reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the
announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status.
Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United 3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall
States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component.
complex regional and global security environment; The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government
Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component of Japan.
defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as the “Civilian Component”)in fulfilling the United ARTICLE 6
States’ obligations under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this
and education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for
Agreement status; resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.
Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a
framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces ARTICLE 7
Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.
Component; 2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces
Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided Agreement remains in force.
for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate
(hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Committee”) as the means for consultation this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic
between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the channels to the other Party.
implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and
Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the
practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving purpose, have signed the present Agreement.
the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance; DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both
Have agreed as follows: texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.
ARTICLE 1
The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties
with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component.
ARTICLE 2
The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint
Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to
initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement.

Reference 35 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan
1993 May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995 Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
1998 The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense
(BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999 Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002 Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003 The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
Reference
Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures)
2005
The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006 July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediate after the launch
The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started
2007
SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
2009 April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the
2012 Yellow Sea
December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
North Korea launched ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2014 June 29: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
July 9: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2015 March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be “satellites” in a single year
February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
February 7: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
March 18: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
April 15: Launched a ballistic missile
April 23: Launched a ballistic missile
April 28: Launched two ballistic missiles
May 31: Launched a ballistic missile
June 22: Launched two ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 100 km and fell near the east coast of North Korea
The second flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2016
July 9: Launched a ballistic missile
July 19: Launched three ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan; the second failed to fly on and did not fall
into the Sea of Japan, the details being unclear; and the third flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
August 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, one of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan while the other exploded
immediately after the launch
August 24: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
September 5: Launched three ballistic missiles, all of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan
October 15: Launched a ballistic missile
October 20: Launched a ballistic missile
December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability
interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage
North Korea launched ballistic missiles beginning in February
February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ)
April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch
April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site
May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2017
May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan
June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea
July 4: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan.
July 28: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan.
August 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 2,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific.
September 15: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 3,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific.
November 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan.
December 19: NSC and the cabinet meeting approved introducing 2 Aegis Ashore systems.
2018 January 31: The U.S. conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA

Reference 36 Regarding fundamental enhancement of ballistic missile missile defense capabilities to continuously and sustainably protect Japan
defense capabilities in ordinary times.
2. In response, Japan intends to deploy two land-based Aegis systems (Aegis
Approved by the National Security Council and Ashore) that are capable of continuously and sustainably protecting Japan
a Cabinet decision on December 19, 2017 from ballistic missile attacks as a new ballistic missile defense system
and having the Ground Self Defense Force possess these systems. This
(Building a new ballistic missile defense system)
initiative seeks to improve capabilities for multilayer defense of Japan
1. While Japan has been addressing the threat of ballistic missiles based
from ballistic missile attacks along with Aegis-equipped warships and the
on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond
Patriot surface-to-air missile unit.
(approved by the National Security Council and a Cabinet decision on
(Handling costs)
December 17, 2013) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-
3. Costs required to build the land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore) in
FY2018) (approved by the National Security Council and a Cabinet
fiscal 2017 and 2018 will be covered within the scope of the Medium Term
decision on December 17, 2013), North Korea’s nuclear and missile
Defense Program’s overall budget.
Reference
developments have become more severe and pressing threats to Japan’s

national security and it is necessary to fundamentally enhance ballistic
Reference 37 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity
April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a
whole
2012
June: Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC)
September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated
May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC)
2013 August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of
further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area
October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities
March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command
2014
November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted
January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet
January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat
2015
May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG
September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision
2016 April: MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology
2018 January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence located in Estonia.
Reference 38 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)
Kumamoto Northern Kyushu

FY 2013 2014 2015 2016 Earthquake* 2017 torrential rains*
(2016) (2017)
Number of Dispatches 555 521 541 515 — 501 —
Personnel 89,049 66,267 30,035 33,123 814,200 23,838 81,950
Vehicles 7,949 9,621 5,170 5,824 — 3,340 7,140
Aircraft 1,255 1,232 888 725 2,618 792 169
Vessels 51 0 2 11 300 39 0
* Kumamoto Earthquake and Northern Kyushu torrential rains excluded from fiscal 2016 and fiscal 2017 results respectively.

Reference 39 Record of Participation by the MOD and SDF in Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2017)
Location Location
Types of Exercise Training content (estimated) Date Types of Exercise Training content (estimated) Date
(cumulative times) (cumulative times)
October 30, Toyama Prefecture Simulation and Terrorism using explosives February 1, Tokushima Prefecture
Terrorism using explosives
2017 (8 times) Field exercise Falling ballistic missile 2018 (10 times)
Simulation exercise
Terrorism using chemical November 7, Tochigi Prefecture
February 2, Tottori Prefecture
agents 2017 (3 times) Falling ballistic missile
2018 (5 times)
Terrorism using explosives November 9, Kanagawa Prefecture
Field exercise February 5, Kagawa Prefecture
and chemical agents 2017 (5 times)
November Fukuoka Prefecture 2018 (3 times)
Simulation exercise Terrorism using explosives Simulation exercise
22, 2017 (5 times) February 6, Miyagi Prefecture
2018 (2 times)
Reference
Simulation and November Nagasaki Prefecture
Falling ballistic missile
Field exercise 22, 2017 (4 times) February 7, Aomori Prefecture
Terrorism using explosives November Saitama Prefecture 2018 (4 times)
Simulation exercise
and chemical agents 24, 2017 (4 times)
Terrorism using chemical February 8, Shizuoka Prefecture
November Oita Prefecture Field exercise
Field exercise agents 2018 (4 times)
Terrorism using chemical 25, 2017 (4 times)
agents January 12, Aichi Prefecture February 9, Fukushima Prefecture
2018 (4 times) 2018 (3 times)
January 15, Kochi Prefecture February Osaka Prefecture
Terrorism using explosives Simulation exercise
2018 (2 times) 13, 2018 (3 times)
Terrorism using chemical January 16, Yamagata Prefecture Terrorism using chemical February Gunma Prefecture
agents 2018 (6 times) agents 15, 2018 (2 times)
January 17, Iwate Prefecture
2018 (5 times) Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007.
January 18, Yamanashi Prefecture Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.
2018 (3 times) Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.
Simulation exercise
January 19, Gifu Prefecture Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.
Terrorism using chemical 2018 (4 times) Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.
agents January 23, Nara Prefecture Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.
2018 (3 times)
Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013.
Terrorism using explosives January 24, Chiba Prefecture
Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014.
and chemical agents 2018 (3 times)
Terrorism using chemical January 25, Wakayama Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015.
agents 2018 Prefecture (2 times) Implemented in 22 Prefectures in FY2016.
January 26, Nagano Prefecture
2018 (3 times)
January 30, Miyazaki Prefecture
2018 (5 times)
Simulation exercise Terrorism using explosives
January 31,
Tokyo (6 times)
2018
Reference 40 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)
(Apr. 1, 2013 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Dialogue Date
❍ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus)
• Ministerial Meeting (Aug. 2013, Nov. 2015, Oct. 2017)
• Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus) (Apr. 2013, Apr. 2014, Feb. 2015, Apr. 2016, Apr. 2017)
• Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (Feb. 2014, Jan. 2015, Feb. 2016, Mar. 2017, Jan. 2018)
(ADSOM Plus WG)
• Experts’ Working Group (EWG)
• Maritime Security EWG (May 2013, Sep. 2013, Jan. 2014, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, Feb. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2015,
Mar. 2016, Nov. 2016, Nov. 2017, May 2018)
• Military Medicine EWG (Oct.2013, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, May 2015, Sep. 2015, Jan. 2017 Dec. 2017, Feb. 2018)
Participation in Intergovernmental • Counter-Terrorism EWG (Sep. 2013, Oct. 2014, Oct. 2015, Dec. 2016, Jul. 2017)
Security Dialogues • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG (Jun. 2013, Jan. 2014, Jul. 2014, Dec. 2014, Aug. 2015, Dec. 2015, May 2016, Dec.2016,
in the Asia- Pacific May 2017, Sep. 2017, Feb. 2018, Apr. 2018)
Region • Peacekeeping Operations EWG (Apr. 2013, Feb. 2014, Sep. 2014, Mar. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017,
Apr. 2018)
• Humanitarian Mine Action EWG (Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, Oct.2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018)
• Cyber EWG (Jul. 2017, Nov. 2017, May 2018)
❍ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Nov. 2014, Nov. 2016, Oct. 2017)
❍ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
• Meeting among defense authorities (Apr. 2013, May 2013, Dec. 2013, Apr. 2014, Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2015,
Apr. 2016, May 2016, May 2017, Jun. 2017, May 2018, Jun. 2018)
Hosted by • IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (Jun. 2013, Jun. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2016, Jun. 2017, Jun. 2018)
the private sector
❍ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Feb. 2014, Oct. 2014, Sep. 2015, Sep. 2016, Sep. 2017)
Security Dialogue
❍ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Oct. 2013, Mar. 2015, Mar. 2016, Mar. 2017, Mar. 2018)
hosted by
(Tokyo Defense Forum)
the Ministry
❍ International Seminar for Military Science (Jul. 2013, Jul. 2014, Jul. 2015, Jul. 2016)
of Defense
❍ International Conference of Cadets (Mar. 2014, Mar. 2015, Mar. 2016, Mar. 2017, Feb. 2018)

Reference 41 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements
Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement Security and Defense Cooperation
Information Security Agreement
Agreement (ACSA) Documents
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Signed in September 1951 and entered into
Agreement between Japan and the United Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in April 1952
States of America in March 1954 and entered force in October 1996 Signed in January 1960 and entered into
into force in May 1954 Signed in April 1998 and revised in force in June 1960
Established the Transfer of Military September 1999 Signed and entered into force Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
United States
Technologies to the United States of America Signed in February 2004 and revised in in August 2007 Cooperation
(exchange of notes) in November 1983 July 2004 Set forth in November 1978
Established the Transfer of Arms Signed in September 2016 and entered Set forth in September 1997
and Military Technologies to the United States into force in April 2017 Set forth in April 2015
Reference
of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in

April 1996
Signed in May 2010 Signed memorandum in September 2003
Signed in May 2012
Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in January 2013 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on
Australia Entered into force in March
Entered into force in December 2014 Signed in January 2017 Security in March 2007
2013
Entered into force in September 2017 Revised memorandum in December 2008
Signed memorandum in January 2004
Signed in July 2013
United Signed in January 2017 Revised memorandum in June 2012
Signed and entered into force in July 2013 Entered into force in January
Kingdom Entered into force in August 2017 Japan-U.K Joint Declaration on Security in
2014
August 2017
Signed in March 2015 Agreed to begin negotiations at Signed and entered into force
France Signed statement of intent in July 2014
Entered into force in December 2016 the “2+2” in January 2018 in October 2011
Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in
Signed in December 2015 Signed and entered into force
India — October 2008
Entered into force in March 2016 in December 2015
Signed memorandum in September 2014
Agreed to move forward with opinion
Republic of Signed and entered into force
— exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Signed statement of intent in April 2009
Korea in November 2016
Meeting in January 2011
Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2”
Indonesia — — Signed memorandum in March 2015
Meeting in December 2015
Signed in February 2016 Signed statement of intent in July 2012

Philippines — —
Entered into force in April 2016 Signed memorandum in January 2015
Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand

New Zealand — — Signed memorandum in August 2013
Summit Meeting in July 2014
Germany Signed and entered into force in July 2017 — — —
Signed in March 2016 Signed statement of intent in June 2012

Italy Signed in May 2017 —
Entered into force in June 2016 Signed memorandum in May 2017
Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on
Canada — Signed in April 2018 — Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in
November 2010
Signed memorandum in August 1999
Russia — — —
Revised memorandum in January 2006
Announced: Individual Partnership and
Signed and entered into force
NATO — — Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between
in June 2010
Japan and NATO in May 2014
Malaysia Signed and entered into force in April 2018 — — —
UAE — — — Signed memorandum in May 2018
Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Viet Nam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and Czech; signed
statement of intent with Turkey
Reference 42 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016)
(Number of students)
Country Timor- Republic United United Sub
Thailand Philippines Indonesia Singapore Malaysia Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar India Pakistan Mongolia Australia Germany France Canada Bangladesh Kazakhstan Mexico Czech Spain
Institution Leste of Korea States Kingdom total
National Institute
for Defense 1 1 1 1 2 2 8
Studies
National Defense
Academy 5 2 11 2 2 4 2 3 3 1 9 7 51
Ground Self-
Defense Force 2 1 1 2 1 4 4 1 1 3 20
(Staff College, etc.)
Maritime Self-
Defense Force 1 4 1 1 1 2 10
Air Self-Defense
Force 1 1 1 4 7
Joint Staff College 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 15
Total 10 6 0 1 1 12 3 2 4 7 5 7 15 4 4 14 1 0 7 1 1 2 1 1 2 111

Reference 43 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense
(Apr. 1, 2013 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Security Dialogue Outline Recent Situations
Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level The 9th forum was held in Fukuoka in September 2017, with the participation of
officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries.
Hosted by Ministry of Defense
Internal Bureau and others
Japan-ASEAN Defense to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The Candid and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding
Vice-Ministerial Forum objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by the following three topics of “50th Anniversary of ASEAN - Achievement and
building close interpersonal relationships. Enhancement of Unity,” “Current Regional Security Status,” and “Vientiane Vision -
Status Quo and Prospects for the Future.”
Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held Having the participation of 27 countries, 25 in the Asia-Pacific region, France and
annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge the U.K. with the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the International
Forum for Defense Authorities in
of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 22nd Forum was held in March 2018.
the Asia-Pacific Region
Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide Opinions were exchanged on 1) Current situations on the Korean Peninsula 2)
(Tokyo Defense Forum)
Reference
defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to Response to a wide range of contingencies 3) Facilitating mutual trust between
promote confidence building focusing on the defense field. defense authorities - Communication and transparency.
Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since In November 2017, with the participation of 11 countries from the Asia-Pacific
2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries region and other regions, group discussions under the theme of “The Role of Army
Multinational Cooperation
from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them Types during Large-Scale Disasters” were held. In addition, training related to the
program in the Asia Pacific
with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete Japan-U.S. joint disaster prevention exercise (TREX) was conducted.
(MCAP)
cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region
has in common.
Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides With the participation of 5 service branches from 4 countries to include the U.S.
a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under
G5 Dialogue
that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral the theme of “Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army
(G5D)
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively should aim for” and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.
GSDF
contribute to regional peace and stability.

Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since The 21st Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November
1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major 2017. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from
Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks
countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with armies in 19 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged
(MLST)
opportunities to exchange views on logistic system. under the theme “Logistics Cooperation in International Emergency Assistance
Activities.”
Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since With the participation of students from army colleges in 17 countries in the Asia-
Army Command and General 2001 with the participation of students of army colleges from the Pacific region, the 17th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was
Staff College Seminar Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with held in August 2017. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Armies’ initiatives
opportunities to exchange views on training of military units. and partnership in large-scale disaster and international disaster relief operation.”
Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since The 21st seminar was held in February 2018 with the participation of navy military
1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia- personnel from 17 countries, personnel from the National Graduate Institute for
Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Keio University, and personnel from the
Asia Pacific Naval College
opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with Canon Institute for Global Studies. Presentations by the participants and active
Seminar
a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Changes in the Role of the
to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding Navy.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the
MSDF
between participating countries. understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.
Hosted by the MSDF, this programs has been held annually since With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 25 countries, the
Western Pacific naval
2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the 7th WPNS STEP was held in October 2017. Presentations and exchange of candid
Symposium Short Term
WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with views were carried out under the theme of “Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific
Exchange Program
opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan's security Region of the 21st Century.”
(WPNS STEP)
environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.
Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since Air staff college personnel and researchers from seven countries were invited in
2015, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges November 2017 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange
Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to their views on the theme of “Initiatives on the Gray Zone Issues.”
Staff College Seminar provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer’s
education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as
ASDF
International Air Force Education Seminar.)

Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 With the participation of air staff college students from 22 countries and 1
International Air Command and with the participation of students of air staff college students from the organization, the 17th seminar was held in October 2017. Opinions were exchanged
Staff Seminar Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with on the theme of “Air Power and Multilateral Cooperation.”
opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.
Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting
National Defense Academy
International Seminar on provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national
Defense Science by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.”
regions.
Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been In February 2018, 20 countries were invited to the 21st conference, and opinions
held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from the were exchanged on the theme of “To Become Ideal Leaders.”
International Cadets’ Conference
Asia-Pacific region. The conference is designed to provide them with
opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.
Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this In July 2017, notable researchers and practitioners from the United States, China,
symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan were invited to this symposium to
International Symposium on and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide exchange opinions under the theme “Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-
Security Affairs opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the Pacific.”
public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current
National Institute for Defense Studies
security issues.
Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar In July 2017, researchers and practitioners from the United States, China,
has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan were invited to this seminar to
International Security Colloquium knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed exchange opinions under the theme “Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-
to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional Pacific.”
reports and discussions on security issues.
Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum In September 2017, researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom,
has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military Israel, and Japan were invited to this forum to exchange opinions under the
International Forum on War
historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual theme “Historical Analysis of Unconventional Wars.”
History
understanding of its participants by making comparative studies
of military history.
Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop- In January 2018, researchers were invited from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar,
style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China and the United States
Asia-Pacific Security Workshop
discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces to exchange opinions on the theme of “Security outlook of the Asia Pacific countries
in common. and its implications for the defense sector.”

Reference 44 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues
Other Multilateral Security Dialogue Overview

Started in October 2010. This is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, and provides
ADMM Plus: ASEAN Defence
opportunities for exchanging views on issues concerning regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM Plus held in October 2017 that
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.
Japan-ASEAN Defense First held in 2014. A platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related
Ministerial Meeting issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.
A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue
and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam,
Internal Bureau Cambodia (since 1995), Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the
Hosted by the Government
ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum

and others ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since
2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007)), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet
Reference
through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.
Asia-Pacific Military Operations ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology.
Research Symposium (ARMORS) Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and
Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD) Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan
has participated since the first meeting in 2012.
CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior
Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense
defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference
Conference (CHOD)
since the first meeting in 1998.
Joint Staff
PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities.
Pacific Area Senior Officer
Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in
Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)
Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held.
Pacific Armies Chiefs
Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in
Conference (PACC)
1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about
Pacific Armies Management
efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has
Seminars (PAMS)
participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The GSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the
Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the “Current situation and the future of Japan-
U.S. Cooperation” which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.
GSDF CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land
forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the
Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)
region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time
and delivered an address.
Held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious
PACOM Amphibious Leaders operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute to regional stability through strengthening relations
Symposium (PALS) with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated
from the first meeting.
Annual Meeting of the Hosted by AUSA, the annual meeting provides opportunities for exchanging opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army,
Association of U.S. Army (AUSA) and since 2014 the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF participated in the meeting twice to deliver speeches.
International Sea Power ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange
Symposium (ISS) views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
Western Pacific Naval WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and
Symposium (WPNS) others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping
International MCM Seminar exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF
hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange
Asia Pacific Submarine
views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF
Conference
hosted the conference in October 2006.
This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has
MSDF participated since the third event in 2012.
This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has
participated since the third event in 2012.

Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference,
SPC: RAN Sea Power Conference
the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.
Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common
RSS: Regional Seapower
naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.
Symposium
Security Symposium
IMSS: International Maritime Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Chief of Staff of Navy from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime
Security Symposium security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.
Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Chief of Staff of Navy of nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security
Galle Dialogue
challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.
PACS: Pacific Air Chiefs PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries
Symposium exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996
ASDF PACRIM Airpower Symposium and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this
symposium since the first event held in 1995.
APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this
Air Power Conference (APC)
conference six times since 2000.
Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of
Defense opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas.
Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs
Intelligence Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of
Conference (APICC)
Headquarters relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February
2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue Overview
Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of
Heads of Defence Universities, defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions
Colleges and Institutions Meeting based on certain themes. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first
National meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. Japan co-chaired the meeting held in the Philippines in September 2017.
Institute for CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member
Defense countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions
Studies NATO Defense College from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational
Conference of Commandants exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern
(CoC) Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the
conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). The NIDS also attended the conference held in Poland in May 2016, and the conference
held in Croatia in May 2018.
Reference
Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense
IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security.
Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
A sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (director / vice chief level) of the
IISS Fullerton Forum countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting
in 2013.
Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and
Hosted by the Private Sector
defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues
Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue) centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the
Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did
not take place in 2011.
Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and
defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues
Munich Security Conference
centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the
Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.
Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by
Halifax International Security Forum many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who
exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.
Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is
designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia
The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)
and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has
participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.
Reference 45 Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN
Introduction
Ø “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” is Japan’s own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation
Ø Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum
starting from 2017
Contents
1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation
(1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone
(2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong
ties; Further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment
(3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide
multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states
2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening “exchanges” toward “cooperation”
(1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges
(2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states
(3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and
promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus
3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the “ASEAN-Wide” Practical Cooperation
(1) Purpose: In addition to the cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,” “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical
cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the
rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation
(2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points
Ø To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold
principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
Ø To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
Ø To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields
(3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures
1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e.
conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation.
2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup
planning (sharing know-how), etc.
3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding
seminars on defense industries, etc.
4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self- Defense Forces’ training, etc.
5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc.
(4) The JMOD institutional development to better address “ASEAN-Wide” practical cooperation based on the Vision

Reference 46 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Exercise Period (Venue) Participating countries Participating SDF units, etc.
Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet,
Japan, U.S., Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, ROK,
January - February 2016 (Thailand) Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal
China, Malaysia
Bureau, etc.
Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office,
Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Central Readiness
January - February 2017 (Thailand)
Cobra Gold Malaysia, China, India Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command,
Internal Bureau, etc.
Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff
Japan, U.S. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Office, Western Army, Central
January - February 2018 (Thailand)
Reference
Malaysia, China and India Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense
Command, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.
May – August 2015 1 vessel
Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore
(Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Philippines) Approximately 60 personnel
July – August 2016 Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., Canada, ROK, Malaysia,
1 vessel
(Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau, Singapore,
Approximately 70 personnel
Indonesia) New Zealand
Pacific Partnership
March – May 2017 2 vessels
Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK
(Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam) Approximately 70 personnel
March - June 2018
(Micronesia, Palau, Indonesia, Japan, U.S. Australia, U.K., ROK Approximately 50 personnel
Sri Lanka, Vietnam)
Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Office,
Japan, U.S., India, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, China,
ARF-DiREx May 2015 (Malaysia) Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command,
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Laos, etc.
SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital
Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office,
ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and
September 2016 (Thailand) Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense
Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise
Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Russia Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau
Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore,
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training May 2016
Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, 1 vessel
Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise) (Brunei and Singapore)
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Russia
November 2016
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training
(Waters and airspace around New Japan, U.S., Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, etc. 1 vessel
Exercise (Mahi Tangaroa 16)
Zealand)
Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, ROK, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, 5 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College,
Global Peace Operations Keris Aman August 2015 (Malaysia)
Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Australia, Central Readiness Force
Initiative Capstone etc.
Exercise
Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Nepal, Central Readiness Force
Shanti Prays III March – April 2017 (Malaysia)
Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, etc. 2 personnel
June – July 2015 (Mongolia) Japan, U.S., etc. Approximately 40 personnel
May – June 2016 (Mongolia) Japan, U.S., etc. Approximately 50 personnel including observers
Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)
July - August 2017 (Mongolia) Japan, U.S., etc.
*including observers
Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, Philippines,
May 2015 (Australia) Brunei, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Approximately 30 personnel
Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Guinea, Canada
Convention
April - May 2016 (Australia) Japan, U.S., ROK, China, Australia, UAE, etc. Approximately 30 personnel
April - May 2017 (Australia) Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc. Approximately 20 personnel
KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise
April 2016 (Indonesia) Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc. 1 vessel
organized by the Indonesian Navy
December 2015 1 aircraft
(Waters around Micronesia) Approximately 25 personnel
January – February 2016
1 vessel
(Waters around Singapore - India)
December 2016 1 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training Japan, U.S., Australia
(Waters around Micronesia) Approximately 25 personnel
September 2017
4 vessels / 4 submarines / 30 aircraft
(Waters around Japan)
December 2017
1 aircraft / approximately 25 personnel
(Waters around Micronesia)
June 2016
1 vessel
(Waters and airspace around Hawaii)
October 2016
1 vessel
(Waters west of Kyushu)
November 2016
1 vessel
January 2017
1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training Japan, U.S., ROK
March 2017
1 vessel
April 2017 1 vessel
(Waters west of Kyushu) 1 aircraft
October 2017
2 vessels
December 2017
1 vessel

Exercise Period (Venue) Participating countries Participating SDF units, etc.
March 2016
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Training Japan, U.S., Canada 2 aircraft
(Waters off the Sanriku Coast)
September 2016
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Joint 1 vessel
(Waters around Hawaii) Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada
Training
June 2017 (South China Sea) 2 vessels
June 2017
Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training Japan, Canada, New Zealand 1 vessel
(Waters south of Shikoku)
September – November 2015
Japan, U.S., India 1 vessel
U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Joint (Waters and airspace east of India)
Exercise (Exercise Malabar) June 2016 1 vessel
Japan, U.S., India
(Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa) 3 aircraft
Reference
Japan-U.S.-India Joint Exercise June 2017
Japan, U.S., India 2 vessels
(Malabar) (Waters and airspace east of India)
November 2017
Japan-U.S.-India Joint Exercise Japan, U.S., India 1 vessel
Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational September 2016 1 vessel
Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.
Maritime Exercise (Kakadu) (Waters around Australia) 2 aircraft
Australia-Hosted Proliferation Security September 2016
1 aircraft
Initiatives (PSI) Maritime Interdiction (Australia and waters and airspace Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.
Exercise around Australia)
September 2017
U.S.-Hosted International Mine
(Waters around the Arabian Japan, U.S., etc. 2 vessels
Countermeasures Exercise
Peninsula)
U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise May 2017 (Bahrain) Japan, U.S., etc. Several personnel
August 2015
Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures (Waters around Singapore and Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, etc. 3 vessels
Exercise Indonesia)
June 2017 (Waters around Guam) Japan, U.S., etc. 5 personnel
Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise May 2016 (Waters around ROK) Japan, U.S., ROK, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore 2 vessels
February 2016
Approximately 20 aircraft
(U.S. Guam Island and surrounding
airspace)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training February 2017
Approximately 20 aircraft
(Cope North Guam) (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding Japan, U.S., Australia
airspace)
February - March 2018 Approximately 20 aircraft
(Guam and its surrounding airspace) Aprroximately 460 personnel
Field Training with U.S. and Australian
May 2015, May 2016, May 2017
Forces in Australia Japan, U.S., Australia Approximately 100 personnel
(Australia)
(Exercise Southern Jackaroo)
Northern Army Headquarters
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training
August 2015 (Hokkaido) Japan, U.S., Australia Approximately 3,300 personnel, approximately 300
(Northern Rescue 2015)
vehicles
Middle Army
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training
July 2016 (Central District) Japan, U.S., Australia 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10
(Nankai Rescue 2017)
aircraft
June – August 2016
RIMPAC (Waters and airspace around Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines,
2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.
(Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise) Hawaii, and waters around U.S. Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.
West Coast)
November 2016
New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral
(Waters and airspace around New Japan, New Zealand, etc. 2 aircraft
Training (Ngatahi)
Zealand)
Multilateral Training hosted by French Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand,
Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix November 2016 (New Caledonia) Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., 5 personnel
du Sud) France
Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand,
September 28-October 7, 2015
Multilateral Training hosted by French Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., 7 personnel
(New Caledonia)
Forces in New Caledonia France
(Exercise Équateur 2015) Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Tonga, New Zealand,
September 2017 (New Caledonia) 1 personnel
Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, U.K.
May 2015
Japan-France-U.S. Joint Training Japan, U.S., France 1 vessel, 2 aircraft
(Waters west of Kyushu)
May 2017
Japan-France-U.K. Joint Training (Waters west of Kyushu – Guam – Japan, France, U.K., U.S. 220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft
Northern Mariana Islands)
Pakistani Navy-Hosted Multinational February 2017
Japan, Pakistan, etc. 2 aircraft
Maritime Training (Aman-17) (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)
Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational March 2017
Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc. 1 vessel
Maritime Exercise (Waters around Malaysia)
Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training April 2017 (Gulf of Aden) Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK 1 vessel, 1 aircraft

Reference 47 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
May 2015 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation
Jun. 2015 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
✰ E xchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation
Nov. 2015 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
✰ Confirmed the importance of joint exercises and further deepening defense equipment and technology cooperation
Nov. 2015 Visit to Australia by Minister of Defense (6th “2+2” Meeting)
✰ 1) Shared grave concern over large-scale land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and agreed to comply with freedom of
navigation and of overflight, 2) Agreed to further enhance joint exercises and promote cooperation in the fields of capacity building
assistance, cyber, and outer space
Dec. 2015 Visit to Japan by Prime Minister of Australia (Summit Meeting)
Reference
✰ Issued Joint Statement (Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond)
High-level talks between
Aug. 2016 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
heads of state and defense
✰ Agree to further progress in defense cooperation through capacity building support, joint exercises, etc.
Jan. 2017 Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)
✰ Sign Japan-Australia ACSA
Apr. 2017 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
✰ Identified series of new initiatives for further strengthening Japan-Australia defense cooperation
Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army
Jul. 2017 Visit to Australia by Vice Defense Minister of Japan
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force
Sep. 2017 Telephone conference between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers
Oct. 2017 Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus))
Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister (summit meeting, meeting with Japanese Defense Minister)
Mar. 2018 Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Sep. 2015)
between defense ministry Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Jan. 2018)
representatives
Oct. 2015 Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2015
Mar. – May 2016 Participation in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruising exercise
Apr. 2016 Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2016
May 2016 Joint exercise with Australian Navy submarines
Sep. 2016 Participation in multinational joint exercise Kakadu 2016 hosted by the Australian Navy
Sep. 2016 Visit to U.S. Yokota Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (KC-30A) and implementation of exchanges between inflight refueling and
airlift troops
Dec. 2016 Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special
airlift troops
Unit-level exchange, etc.
Dec. 2016 Participation in Exercise Southern Jackaroo, U.S.-Australia military training exercise hosted by Australia Army
Dec. 2016 Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special
airlift troops
Feb. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 to Australia
Aug. 2017 Visit to Australia by Central Readiness Force
Oct. 2017 Japan-Australia Trident (Navy)
Nov. 2017 Japan-Australia joint exercise (Navy)
Nov. 2017 Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and implementation of exchanges between troops
Dec. 2017 Implementation of exchanges between Central Readiness Force and Australian Army 1st Division
May 2015 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2015 3rd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Townsville) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
Jun. 2016 4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
Feb. 2016 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
See reference 46 for trilateral
Oct. 2016 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
training and exercise)
Jun. 2017 5th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Japan) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
Jun. 2017 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2018 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
Jun. 2018 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))

Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
May 2015 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2015 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
Oct. 2015 Visit to the ROK by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
✰ Issued first joint press release. Agreed on the importance of Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation regarding issues of concern
for the security of the two countries.
Oct. 2015 Visit to the ROK by ASDF Chief of Staff
Jan. 2016 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Feb. 2016 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Jun. 2016 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
✰ The two ministers agreed to strengthen the system for emergency communication between the MOD and the ROK Ministry of National
Defense.
Reference
High-level talks between heads Mar. 2016 Visit to the ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff
of state and defense Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff
Sep. 2016 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
Sep. 2016 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Mar. 2017 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
May 2017 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Jul. 2017 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Sep. 2017 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Sep. 2017 Visit to ROK by Chief of Staff, GSDF (to participate in PACC)
Oct. 2017 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM Plus))
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Chief of ROK Army
Regular discussions Apr. 2015 10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul)
between defense ministry Aug. 2015 21st Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Seoul)
representatives Mar. 2018 11th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
Oct. 2015 Japan-ROK joint search and rescue exercise (MSDF), participation of ROK naval vessels in Fleet Review
Nov. 2015 Participation of the ROK Navy Band in Japan Self-Defense Force Marching Festival
May 2016 Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach (MSDF) hosted by the ROK
May 2016 Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF)
Jun. 2016 Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF)
Jul. 2016 Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF)
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDF)
Oct. 2017 Port visit to Pyeongtaek by MSDF Training Squadron (MSDF)
Dec. 2017 Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy, Japan-ROK joint search and rescue training (Yokosuka) (MSDF)
Mar. 2018 Visit to base in Pohang by MSDF P-3C (MSDF)
Apr. 2015 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.)
May 2015 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jan. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Feb. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference
Jun. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016
Sep. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Oct. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.)
Oct. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (maritime interdiction exercise)
Nov. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise)
Dec. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul)
Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral Mar. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Cooperation Mar. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise)
Apr. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (anti-submarine exercise)
Apr. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo)
May 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference
Jul. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Aug. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Sep. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Oct. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM Plus))
Oct. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii)
Dec. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
Mar. 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Washington D.C.)

Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Nov. 2015 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
Nov. 2015 Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army
Dec. 2015 Visit to India by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)
✰ Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and Agreement concerning Security Measures for the
Protection of Classified Military Information were signed.
Feb. 2016 Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2016 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
High-level talks between heads
Jul. 2016 Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi)
of state and defense
Dec. 2016 Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff
Dec. 2016 Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy Staff, Indian Navy
Apr. 2017 Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff
Reference
May 2017 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Jan. 2018 Visit to India by Chief of Staff (to participated in the Raisina Dialogue)
Mar. 2018 Visit to India by Chief of Staff
Apr. 2015 3rd Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 4th Defence Policy Dialogue
Regular discussions
Feb. 2016 1st Japan-India Air Component Staff Talks
between defense ministry
Mar. 2017 4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue
representatives
Jan. 2018 7th Japan-India Navy Staff Talks (Delhi)
Dec. 2015 Expert-to-expert exchanges in aviation safety (Japan)
Feb. 2016 MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy (in waters east of India)
Mar. 2016 Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (India)
Mar. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges between U-4 transport aircraft crews (in India)
Mar. 2016 Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (Japan)
Jun. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases.
Jul. 2016 ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India.
Unit-level exchange, etc. Aug. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Dec. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Mar. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area (Japan)
Sep. 2017 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Oct. 2017 Japan-India goodwill and joint exercise (MSDF)
Dec. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (India)
Jan. 2018 Japan-India joint exercise (MSDF)
May 2018 Japan-India joint exercise (MSDF)
Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
May 2015 Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
High-level talks between heads
Nov. 2015 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
of defense
Jun. 2016 Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo)
Jun. 2015 5th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities
(Beijing)
Nov. 2016 14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Beijing)
Regular discussions
Nov. 2016 6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities
(Tokyo)
representatives
Oct. 2017 15th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Tokyo)
Apr. 2018 7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities
(Beijing)
May 2018 ✰ Signing of the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” (Memorandum)
Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
May 2015 Japan-Russia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
High-level talks between heads Mar. 2017 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting)
of defense Nov. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army
Dec. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military
Jan. 2017 16th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
Unit-level exchange, etc. Oct. 2017 Port visit to Vladivostok by MSDF Training Squadron
Nov. 2017 17th Japan-Russia joint search and rescue training

Reference 52 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
May 2015 Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Aug. 2015 Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2015 Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia
Dec. 2015 Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Indonesia (1st Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Indonesia Dec. 2015 Visit to Japan by Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff
Apr. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff
Aug. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ)
Nov. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff
Reference
May 2015 Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Oct. 2015 Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army
Nov. 2015 Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense (Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Jul. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership)
Aug. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Vietnam Nov. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Aug. 2017 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial meeting))
Oct. 2017 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM Plus))
Jan. 2018 Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense
Jun. 2018 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Visit to Singapore by Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)
Jul. 2015 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Feb. 2016 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2016 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2016 Japan-Singapore Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)
Singapore Jul. 2016 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2017 Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Oct. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Singapore Army
Feb. 2018 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
May 2018 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
May 2015 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Army
Jun. 2015 Visit to Japan by President and Philippine Secretary of National Defense
Aug. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense
Sep. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
Nov. 2015 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
Feb. 2016 ✰ Concurred that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology
cooperation
May 2016 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Vice Ministerial Meeting))
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ)
Philippines Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy
Mar. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
Apr. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2017 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (9th Japan-ASEAN Vice Ministerial Meeting))
Oct. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Oct. 2017 Japan-Phillipines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phillipines (4th ADMM Plus))
Nov. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff
Mar. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy
Apr. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Jun. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2018 Japan-Phillipines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))

Jul. 2015 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces
Aug. 2015 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Under Secretary of Defense of Thailand (Sapporo (7th Japan-ASEAN Vice Ministerial Meeting))
Feb. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Chief of Joint Staff
Mar. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2016 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander
Jun. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense (Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Aug. 2016 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces
Aug. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Thailand Nov. 2016 Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff
Jan. 2017 Visit to Thailand by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense
May 2017 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
Reference
Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by State Minister of Defense

Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by MSDF Chief of Staff
Feb. 2018 Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (to observe exercise)
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defense Forces
May 2018 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
May 2015 Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2015 Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Sapporo (7th Japan-ASEAN vice-
Ministerial Meeting)
Feb. 2016 Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Cambodia Aug. 2016 Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister)
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ)
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Vice-
Ministerial Meeting))
Jul. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force
Aug. 2015 Visit to Japan by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence
Apr. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Jun. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense
Jul. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Myanmar Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense and Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (Defense Ministerial Meeting),
Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ)
Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
Jan. 2018 Visit to Myanmar by GSDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos
Nov. 2015 Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
Concurred that the two countries would continue to coordinate and cooperate with each other through the humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief EWG
Feb. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Laos Apr. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Aug. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos
Nov. 2016 Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting))
Nov. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Nov. 2016 Visit to Laos by Chief of Joint Staff
May 2015 Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2015 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Sapporo (7th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial
Meeting))
Nov. 2015 Visit to Japan by Chief of Defence Force, Malaysian Armed Forces
Nov. 2015 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
Aug. 2016 Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Malaysia Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial
Meeting))
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy
Jun. 2017 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN vice-Ministerial
Meeting))
Apr. 2018 ✰ Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Sapporo (7th Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
Feb. 2016 Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Aug. 2016 Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Brunei Sep. 2016 Visit to Brunei by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Vice Ministerial Meeting))
Feb. 2018 Visit to Brunei by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Oct. 2016 7th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
Indonesia
Regular discussions between defense ministry
High-level talks between heads of state and Jul. 2017 3rd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Consultation (PM), 8th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
Dec. 2015 6th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo)
Vietnam Nov. 2016 4th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
defense representatives
Aug. 2017 5th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Nha Trang)

Singapore Apr. 2017 15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
Sep. 2016 4th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Sendai)
Philippines Feb. 2017 5th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
Thailand Aug. 2016 13th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 13th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Thailand)
Cambodia Jul. 2017 5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation, 4th Japan-Cambodia Defense Consultation (Phnom Penh)
Myanmar Mar. 2017 2nd Japan-Myanmar Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)
Reference
Laos Jul. 2017 2nd Japan-Laos Defense Consultation (Vientiane)
Malaysia Jun. 2017 6th Japan-Malaysia Defense Consultation (Kuala Lumpur)
Aug. 16 Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Indonesia Jan. 2017 Japan-Indonesia unit-to-unit exchanges (Halim) (ASDF)
Jul. 2015 Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Ho Chi Minh) (ASDF)
Dec. 2015 Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Ho Chi Minh) (ASDF)
Vietnam Feb. 2016 Participation in Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (Vietnam) (MSDF)
Dec. 2016 Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF)
Dec. 2017 Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF)
May 2017 MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Singapore Navy (Singapore) (MSDF)
Singapore Oct. 2017 Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Tokyo, etc.) (GSDF)
Nov. 2017 Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF)
May 2015 Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Manila)
Jun. 2015 Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Palawan)
Jul. 2016 Japan-Philippines unit-to-unit exchanges (Clark) (ASDF)
Sep. 2016 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Jan. 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Philippines May 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
May 2017 Participation in U.S.-Philippines joint naval exercise Balikatan 2017 (Philippines)
Sep. 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Nov. 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Feb. 2018 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
May 2018 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Jan. 2017 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF)
Sep. 2017 Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Nov. 2017 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (U-tapao) (ASDF)
Thailand
Nov. 2017 Participation in fleet review hosted by the Royal Thai Navy in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN (Pattaya) (MSDF)
Jan. 2018 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Don Mueang) (ASDF)
Feb. 2018 Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Myanmar Mar. 2016 Japan-Myanmar unit-to-unit exchanges (Mingaladon) (ASDF)
Mar. 2016 Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF)
Laos
Jan. 2017 Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF)
Aug. 2015 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Apr. 2016 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Malaysia Jan. 2017 Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Subang) (ASDF)
May 2017 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
Jan. 2018 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
May 2017 Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise
Brunei Jul. 2017 Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (Bandar Seri Begawan) (ASDF)
Feb. 2018 Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise (MSDF)

Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Apr. 2015 Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
May 2015 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2015 Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Secretary of Defence
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander
Nov. 2015 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
New Zealand Jun. 2016 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Feb. 2017 Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff

May 2017 Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2017 Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense
Jul. 2017 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force
Reference
May 2018 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander

May 2015 Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2015 Visit to Mongolia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Oct. 2015 Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces
Mongolia Oct. 2015 Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Jul. 2016 Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander
Timor-Leste Jun. 2016 Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Timor-Leste)
Dec. 2016 Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Jul. 2017 Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Sri Lanka
Nov. 2017 Visit to japan by Sri Lankan Minister of Defense
Mar. 2018 Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Joint Staff
Maldives Dec. 2016 Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Fiji Mar. 2018 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Force
Papua New
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force
Guinea
Sep. 2015 9th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)
New Zealand
Feb. 2017 10th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington)
Regular discussions
representatives
Jan. 2016 3rd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 3rd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and
security authorities (Tokyo)
Mongolia
Aug. 2017 4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between
defense and security authorities (Ulaanbaatar)
Aug. 2016 8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)
Pakistan
Apr. 2018 9th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Nov. 2015 PSI Exercise
Oct. 2016 Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H)
Nov. 2016 Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy
New Zealand Nov. 2016 Multilateral joint exercise hosted by New Zealand Navy
Feb. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand
Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise
Nov. 2017 Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges
Apr. 2015 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise

Nov. 2015 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Mar. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
May 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Jul. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Sri Lanka
Dec. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Apr. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Jul. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Aug. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Dec. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Feb. 2016 Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise
Pakistan Jan. 2017 Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise
May 2017 Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)
Maldives Apr. 2015 Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise

Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Sep. 2015 Visit to the U.K. by MSDF Chief of Staff
Jan. 2016 Visit to Japan by U.K. Secretary of State for Defence (2nd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Jun. 2016 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2016 Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense
Nov. 2016 Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff
Jan. 2017 ✰ Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in August 2017
Apr. 2017 Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence
Jul. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
United Kingdom Aug. 2017 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan and tour of JS Izumo by U.K Prime Minister
Sep. 2017 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Reference
Nov. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff
Dec. 2017 Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Feb. 2018 Visit to the U.K. by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence
Feb. 2018 Visit to Japan by First Sea Lord
Mar. 2018 Visit to the UK by Chief of Joint Staff
Jun. 2018 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jan. 2016 Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Mar. 2016 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, French Navy
Jun. 2016 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2016 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense
Jan. 2017 Visit to France by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
France Jun. 2017 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense
Sep. 2017 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Nov. 2017 Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff
Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
May 2018 Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2015 Visit to Germany by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Feb. 2016 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)
Sep. 2016 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense
Sep. 2016 Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff
Germany Jul. 2017 Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue)
Jul. 2017 ✰ Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies
Sep. 2017 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Apr. 2018 Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin International Aerospace Show)
May 2018 Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2018 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2016 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jun. 2016 Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense
May 2017 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Italy ✰ Signed Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
Sep. 2017 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Oct. 2017 Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff
Feb. 2018 Signed a document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations
Oct. 2015 Visit to Japan by Netherlands Chief of Defence
Netherlands Dec. 2016 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Spain Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Feb. 2015 Visit to Belgium by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Belgium
Mar. 2018 Visit to Belgium by Chief of Joiont Staff
Feb. 2017 Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sweden Mar. 2017 Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff
Jan. 2018 Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense
Feb. 2017 Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Finland Mar. 2017 Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander
May 2018 Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial meeting)
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Norway
Norway
Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy of Norway
May 2015 Visit to Estonia by State Minister of Defense
Estonia
May 2018 Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Bulgaria May 2015 Visit to Bulgaria by State Minister of Defense
May 2015 Visit to Japan by State Secretary of Defence of Latvia
Latvia
Feb. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Latvia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Poland Jun. 2015 Visit to Japan by Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Poland
Nov. 2015 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Georgia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Georgia ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and signed a memorandum on
defense exchanges
Jul. 2017 Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Kazakhstan
✰ Signed memorandum for defense exchange between Japan and Kazakhstan

High-level exchanges between Dec. 2015 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Czech Republic (Japan- Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting)
heads of state and defense Czech Republic Jul. 2017 Visit to Czech Republic by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
✰ Signed memorandum for defense cooperation between Japan and Czech Republic
Jun. 2016 Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
Jan. 2017 Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg)
NATO Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO
Oct. 2017 Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister)
Mar. 2018 Visit to NATO by Chief of Joint Staff
Sep. 2015 14th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
(Tokyo)
Oct. 2016 15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
United Kingdom
(London)
Nov. 2017 16th Japan- U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
Reference
(Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives
Sep. 2015 18th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo)
Jul. 2016 19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 17th Japan-France Consultation between defense
France authorities (Paris)
Dec. 2017 20th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 18th Japan-France Consultation between defense
authorities (Tokyo)
Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-Germany Consultation between
Germany
defense authorities (Berlin)
Dec. 2015 3rd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Italy
Sep. 2017 4th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome)
Oct. 2016 1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)
Spain Jul. 2017 2nd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Oct. 2015 3rd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)
Sweden Oct. 2017 4th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Oct. 2015 1st Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Helsinki)
Finland Sep. 2017 2nd Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Poland Mar. 2016 2nd Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Warsaw)
Norway Oct. 2015 3rd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Oslo)
Feb. 2016 14th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)
NATO May 2017 15th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)
EU Oct. 2016 1st Japan-EU Consultation on Security and Defense (Belgium)
Jul. 2015 Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to the U.K.
Apr. 2016 Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise
Jul. 2016 Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K.
Jul.-Aug. 2016 Port call in London by MSDF training squadron
United Kingdom Oct.-Nov. 2016 Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise
Nov. 2016 Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise
Jul. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges
Apr. 2018 Japan-U.K. joint exercise
May 2015 Japan-France goodwill exercise

Oct. 2015 Japan-France goodwill exercise
France Mar. 2016 Japan-France goodwill exercise
Jun. 2017 Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show)
Feb. 2018 Japan-France joint exercise (VINEX18)
Germany Apr. 2018 Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show)
Jan. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
May 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Jun. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Jul. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
EU
Sep. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Nov. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Jan. 2017 Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Dec. 2017 Japan-EU bilateral exercise

Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)
(Apr. 1, 2015 - Jun. 30, 2018)
Jul. 2015 Visit to Canada by MSDF Chief of Staff
Oct. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force
Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2))
Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy
Canada Jun. 2016 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2017 Visit to Canada by Joint Chief of Staff
Nov. 2017 Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Dec. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy
Feb. 2018 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Armed Forces
Feb. 2016 Visit to Brazil by GSDF Chief of Staff
Brazil
Reference
Apr. 2018 Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense
May 2015 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces
High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others
Nov. 2015 Visit to Turkey by Chief of Joint Staff

Turkey
May 2016 Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2016 Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Visit to Jordan by Chief of Joint Staff
Jordan
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of Jordan
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Saudi Arabia
Jan. 2017 Visit to Saudi Arabia by Chief of Joint Staff
May 2016 Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander
Nov. 2017 Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show)
UAE Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
May 2018 Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs Bowardi (signing ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and
exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting)
Dec. 2016 Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama dialogue)
Bahrain Dec. 2017 Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue)
Jun. 2018 Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Dec. 2015 Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff
Aug. 2016 Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial meeting)
Oct. 2016 Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense ministerial meeting)
Nov. 2016 Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti
Jan. 2017 Visit to South Sudan and Bahrain by State Minister of Defense
Jan. 2017 Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff
Others
Feb. 2017 Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff
May 2017 Visit to Djibouti and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Jul. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chili
Aug. 2017 Visit to Ukraine by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces
Sep. 2017 Visit to Djibouti and Egypt by State Minister of Defense
Dec. 2017 Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Apr. 2016 3rd Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)
Dec. 2016 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Canada
Regular discussions between defense ministry
Dec. 2017 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities
(Ottawa)
Turkey Nov. 2017 3rd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Ankara)
Jordan Nov. 2017 2nd Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Anman)
representatives
Jun. 2015 1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
Saudi Arabia
Nov. 2016 1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue (Riyadh), 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities
Egypt Oct. 2015 1st Japan-Egypt Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, Japan-Egypt Consultation between defense authorities
Kuwait Mar. 2016 1st Japan-Kuwait Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
Dec. 2015 1st Japan-UAE Security Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)
UAE
Nov. 2017 1st Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Abu Dhabi)
Qatar Nov. 2015 2nd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Doha)
Dec. 2015 2nd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Manama)
Bahrain
Dec. 2016 3rd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
Jul. 2017 Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komaki) (ASDF)
Jul. 2017 Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF)
Canada
Jul. 2017 Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange “Komox” (ASDF)
Dec. 2017 Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF)
Jun. 2015 Japan-Turkey goodwill exercise

Turkey Dec. 2015 Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise
Jun. 2016 Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise
Saudi Arabia Apr. 2017 Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise
Jan. 2017 Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF)
Apr. 2017 Japan-UAE goodwill exercise
UAE
Jul. 2017 Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchange (Al Dhafra) (ASDF)
Nov. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (oversears flight training and participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show)
Oman May 2018 Japan-Oman goodwill exercise (MSDF)

Reference 56 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities
Law Concerning Special Measures on

Replenishment Support Special
Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Item International Peace Support Act International Peace Cooperation Act Measures Law
Assistance in Iraq
(Expired on January 15, 2010)
(Expired on July 31, 2009)
❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and ❍ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered ❍ Proactive contribution to the efforts by ❍ Proactive contribution to the
security of the international community efforts towards international peace the international community to support international community to prevent
and encourage the self-reliant efforts and eradicate international terrorism
by the Iraqi people towards the prompt ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace
Purpose reconstruction of the State of Iraq and security of the international
❍ Contribution to ensuring peace community including Japan
and security of the international
community including Japan through the
Reference
reconstruction of Iraq
Provisions in ❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter ❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) ❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF ❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF
the SDF Law 6) of the SDF Law of the SDF Law Law Law
❍ Cooperation and support activities1 ❍ International peacekeeping activities ❍ Humanitarian and reconstruction ❍ Replenishment support activities
❍ Search and rescue activities1 ❍ Internationally coordinated operations for assistance activities
❍ Ship inspection operations3 peace and security ❍ Support activities for ensuring security
Major
❍ International humanitarian assistance
Activities
❍ International election monitoring activities
❍ Supplies cooperation for the
abovementioned activities
❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Areas excluding Japan (including the high ❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of Japan
❍ Territories of foreign countries seas) ❍ Territories of foreign countries ❍ Territories of foreign countries
Areas of (consent of the agency in charge of (A ceasefire agreement between the (consent of the agency in charge of (limited to the Indian Ocean States)
Operation administration (in such countries) is parties of the dispute and an agreement administration is required in such (consent of such countries is required)2
required. by the receiving country are required) countries and in Iraq)2 ❍ High seas (limited to the Indian
❍ High seas and the airspace above ❍ High seas and the airspace above2 Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above2
❍ Prior approval required without ❍ To be discussed in advance in the Diet ❍ To be discussed in the Diet within (Note 5)
exception in principle, only for cases where SDF 20 days from the day since the SDF
Diet Approval units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire initiates such measures4
monitoring and safety-ensuring
operations4
❍ Report on the details of operation ❍ Report about the details of operation plan ❍ Report on the details of operation plan is ❍ Report about the details of operation
Diet Report
plan is required without delay is required without delay required without delay plan is required without delay
Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.

2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented.
3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.
4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered
necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.
Reference 57 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (As of June 30, 2017)
Place of Dispatch Period of Dispatch Number of Personnel Description of Principal Tasks
• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities,
Southeast Iraq, etc. Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006 Approx. 600
GSDF etc.
Kuwait, etc. Jun.– Sep. 2006 Approx. 100 • Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF Persian Gulf, etc. Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004 Approx. 330 • Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities
ASDF Kuwait, etc. Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009 Approx. 210 • Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

MSDF Indian Ocean Approx. 320 • Materials supplies for foreign vessels
U.S. Forces in Japan, Nov. 2001– Nov. 2007
ASDF − • Transportation of materials
etc.
(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law
MSDF Indian Ocean Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010 Approx. 330 • Materials supplies for foreign vessels
(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

Off the coast of Somalia / Mar. 2009 – Dec. 2016 Approx. 400 Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
MSDF (Maritime Force)
Gulf of Aden Dec. 2016 – Approx. 200 Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
May 2009 – Feb. 2011 Approx.100
Off the coast of Somalia / Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs,
Feb. 2011 – Jun. 2012 Approx.120
Gulf of Aden Djibouti accounting, public relations, health, etc.
Jun. 2012 – Jul. 2014 Approx.110
MSDF (Air Unit) Off the coast of Somalia /
Jul. 2014 – Jul. 2015 Approx. 70 Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
Gulf of Aden Djibouti
Off the coast of Somalia /
Jul. 2015 – Approx. 60 Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
Gulf of Aden Djibouti
Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of
MSDF (Support Unit) Djibouti Jul. 2014 – Approx. 30 Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy
operation, etc.
MSDF (Combined Task
Bahrain, etc. Aug. 2014 – Under 20 Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151
Force 151 Command Unit)

MSDF
Djibouti Jul. 2012 – Jul. 2014 3 Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct
(Local Coordination Center)
anti-piracy operation
May 2009 – Feb. 2011 Approx. 50
GSDF (Air Unit) Djibouti Feb. 2011 – Jun. 2012 Approx. 60 Security of activity base and P-3C
Jun. 2012 – Jul. 2014 Approx. 80
GSDF (Support Unit) Djibouti Jul. 2014 – Approx. 80 Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy
operation, etc.
(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities
Reference
Period of Total Number
Number of Personnel Description of Principal Tasks
Dispatch of Personnel
Ceasefire Sep. 1992 – • Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire
8 16
United Nations Transitional monitors Sep. 1993 • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
PKO Authority in Cambodia • Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure
(UNTAC) Sep. 1992 –
Engineer unit 600 1,200 • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups
Sep. 1993
• Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities
Headquarters May 1993 – • Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at
5 10
United Nations operation in staff Jan. 1995 UNUMOZ Headquarters
PKO Mozambique Transport
(ONUMOZ) May 1993 – • Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related
coordination 48 144
Jan. 1995 technical coordination in the allocation of transport
unit
Rwandan
Sep.– Dec.
refugee relief 260 • Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
1994
unit
Humanitarian Relief • Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies
Humanitarian
Operation for Rwandan between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic
aid
Refugees Air transport Sep.– Dec. of the Congo)
188
unit 1994 • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of
humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief
operations
Feb. 1996 –
1st-3th personnel: 2
Headquarters Feb. 2009 • Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate
United Nations 38
staff Feb. 2009 – transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
Disengagement Observer 14th-17th personnel: 3
Jan. 2013
PKO Force
(UNDOF) Feb. 1996 –
1st-33rd personnel: 43 • Transport food and other supplies
(Golan Heights) Aug. 2012
Transport unit 1,463 • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure,
Aug. 2012 – maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance
34th personnel: 44
Jan. 2013
• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Humanitarian Humanitarian Relief Air transport Nov. 1999 –
113 • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related
aid Operations in Timor-Leste unit Feb. 2000
personnel
Humanitarian Relief
Humanitarian Air transport
Operations for Afghanistan Jan. 2001 138 • Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR
aid unit
Refugees
Headquarters Feb. 2002 – 1st rotation: 10 • Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military
United Nations Transitional 17
staff Jun. 2004 2nd rotation: 7 headquarters
Administration in Timor-
Leste (UNTAET) (United • Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit
PKO 1st and 2nd rotation: 680 activities
Nations Mission in Timor- Mar. 2002 –
Leste (UNMISET) from May Engineer unit 3rd rotation: 522 2,287 • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that
Jun. 2004
20, 2002) 4th rotation: 405 are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance
• Public welfare support operations
Humanitarian Relief
Humanitarian Air transport Mar. – Apr.
Operations for Iraqi 50 • Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR
aid unit 2003
Refugees
Humanitarian Humanitarian Relief Air transport Jul. – Aug.
98 • Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
aid Operations for Iraqi Victims unit 2003
United Nations Mission in Mar. 2007– • Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the
PKO Arms monitors 6 24
Nepal (UNMIN) Jan. 2011 Nepalese government force
United Nations Mission in Headquarters Oct. 2008– • Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector
PKO 2 12
Sudan (UNMIS) staff Sep. 2011 • Database management
• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military
Headquarters Feb. 2010 – logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such
2 12
staff Jan. 2013 as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of
military items
United Nations
Stabilization Mission 1st rotation: 203
PKO 2nd rotation: 346
in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) 3rd and 4th rotation: 330
Feb. 2010 –
Engineer unit 5th and 6th rotation: 317 2,184 • Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.
Jan. 2013
7th rotation: 297
Withdrawal support unit:
44
United Nations Integrated
Military liaison Sep. 2010 –
PKO Mission in Timor-Leste 2 8 • Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste
officer Sep. 2012
(UNMIT)
• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall
military logistics
Headquarters
Nov. 2011 – 4 29 • Management of database
staff
• Planning and coordination of engineering duties
• Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports
1st rotation: 239 • Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were
United Nations Mission in 2nd – 4th rotation: 349 added after 5th personnel)
the Republic of South Jan. 2012 –
PKO Engineer Unit 5th and 6th rotation: 401 • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit
Sudan May 2017
7th – 10th rotation: 353 activities
(UNMISS) 11th rotation: 354 • Coordination regarding logistics
Withdrawal support unit: 3,912
58
Local support • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit
Jan. 2012 – (Number of personnel for
coordination 1st to 4th rotations includes activities
Dec. 2013
center personnel at the local • Coordination regarding logistics
support coordination center)
Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia,
Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF
Period of Number of
Description of Principal Tasks
Dispatch Personnel
Local operations
• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others
coordination center
Medical assistance • Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid
International disaster relief activities in unit/Air support unit Nov. 12 – Dec. 1,086 materials
Philippines (typhoon disaster) Maritime dispatched 13, 2013
• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
unit
Airlift unit • Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
Local support
• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries
coordination center
International disaster relief activities for Mar. 11–
Reference
MSDF Patrol aircraft 137 • Rescue operations including searching

the missing Malaysian airplane (search) unit Apr. 28, 2014
ASDF Airlift unit • Rescue operations including searching
Local coordination • Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant
Dec. 5 – 11, 4
International disaster relief activities in center organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
2014
response to Ebola virus disease outbreak Air transport unit 10 • Transport activities
in West Africa (infectious disease) Epidemiological study Apr. 21 –
1 • Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
support May 29, 2015
Local support • Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia
3
International disaster relief activities in coordination center Jan. 3 – 9, Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
Indonesia (airplane accident) International disaster 2015
Approx. 350 • Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
relief surface force
Joint operations • Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and
4
coordination center relevant countries
International disaster relief activities in Apr. 27 –
Nepal (earthquake disaster) Medical support unit May 22, 2015 Approx. 110 • Medical treatment for affected people
Air transport unit Approx. 30 • Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment
International disaster relief activities in Nov. 15 – 18,
Air patrol unit Approx. 30 • Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft)
New Zealand (earthquake disaster) 2016
Reference 58 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(As of June 30, 2017)
(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies
Period of Dispatch Position in the Dispatched Organization Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the
1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1
Aug. 1, 2004 – Jul. 31, 2007 Netherlands)
Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 23, 2000 Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands) 1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The
Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007 1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Hague, the Netherlands)
Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009 Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands) 1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013 Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands) 1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016 Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands) 1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005 Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008 Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014 Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016 Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Jun. 1, 2015 – Nov. 30, 2017 1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
(UNDPKO) (New York)
Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New
Aug. 29, 2016 – 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
York)
Feb. 11, 2017 – Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York) 1 administrative official
Notes: The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.
Period of Dispatch Position in the Dispatched Organization Dispatched Personnel
November 21 – 30, 2008 Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt) 2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
May 22 – June 6, 2009 Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt) 1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
August 28 – September 5, 2009 Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali) 2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
April 10 – 17, 2010 Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)Note
August 14 – 30, 2010 Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali) 1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
November 15 – 20, 2011 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) 1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
July 31 – August 5, 2012 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) 1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Reference
December 15 – 19, 2012 Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt) 1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 9 – 14, 2013 South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
August 28 – September 1, 2013 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 – 9, 2013 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 8 – 13, 2014 South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 23 – May 25, 2014 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
August 12, 2014 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 – 9, 2014 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 6 – 23, 2014 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 19 – April 1, 2015 UN Peacekeeping Centre (India) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
June 4 – July 1, 2015 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
September 5 – 20, 2015 South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 22 – November 7, 2015 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 21 – April 1, 2016 UN Peacekeeping Centre (India) 1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
May 31 – June 17, 2016 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
November 4 – 19, 2016 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 6 – 19, 2017 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
June 2 – 18, 2017 Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia) 2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)
December 1 - 15, 2017
2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Notes: First dispatch of female SDF personnel.
Reference 59 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel

Category GSDF MSDF ASDF Joint Staff etc. Total
Authorized 150,856 45,363 46,942 3,993 247,154
Actual 138,126 42,289 42,785 3,589 226,789
Staffing Rate (%) 91.6 93.2 91.1 89.9 91.8
Non-Fixed-Term Personnel Fixed-Term Personnel

Category
Officer Warrant Officer Enlisted (upper) Enlisted (lower)
Authorized 45,693 4,930 139,610 56,921
Actual 42,333 (2,196) 4,618 (54) 137,911 (8,143) 19,200 (1,678) 22,727 (2,615)
Staffing Rate (%) 92.6 93.7 98.8 73.7
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.
Reference 60 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2017)
Classification Number Applied Number Recruited Competition Ratios

GSDF 2,531 ( 370 ) 180 ( 12 ) 14.1 ( 30.8 )
MSDF 1,322 ( 185 ) 83 ( 15 ) 15.9 ( 12.3 )
Officer candidates
ASDF 1,583 ( 327 ) 54 ( 11 ) 29.3 ( 29.7 )
Total 5,436 ( 882 ) 317 ( 38 ) 17.1 ( 23.2 )
Non- Technical Petty Officer MSDF 81 ( 17 ) 15 ( 5 ) 5.4 ( 3.4 )
commissioned
officers Technical Sergeant ASDF 0 0 —
MSDF 878 ( 92 ) 81 ( 5 ) 10.8 ( 18.4 )

Aviation students ASDF 2,309 ( 227 ) 68 ( 5 ) 34.0 ( 45.4 )
Total 3,187 ( 319 ) 149 ( 10 ) 21.4 ( 31.9 )

Classification Number Applied Number Recruited Competition Ratios
GSDF 16,837 ( 2,797 ) 2,971 ( 201 ) 5.7 ( 13.9 )
Non-commissioned officer MSDF 3,203 ( 484 ) 1,300 ( 112 ) 2.5 ( 4.3 )
candidates ASDF 9,111 ( 1,603 ) 773 ( 202 ) 11.8 ( 7.9 )
Total 29,151 ( 4,884 ) 5,044 ( 515 ) 5.8 ( 9.5 )
GSDF 17,768 ( 2,786 ) 5,055 ( 897 ) 3.5 ( 3.1 )
Uniformed SDF personnel MSDF 4,386 ( 693 ) 944 ( 173 ) 4.6 ( 4.0 )
candidates (Privates) ASDF 5,356 ( 934 ) 1,514 ( 134 ) 3.5 ( 7.0 )
Total 27,510 ( 4,413 ) 7,513 ( 1,204 ) 3.7 ( 3.7 )
Humanity and social science 154 ( 48 ) 21 ( 5 ) 7.3 ( 9.6 )
Reference
Recommended Science and engineering 226 ( 25 ) 80 ( 11 ) 2.8 ( 2.3 )

Total 380 ( 73 ) 101 ( 16 ) 3.8 ( 4.6 )
Selective exam Science and engineering 140 ( 12 ) 29 ( 2 ) 4.8 ( 6.0 )
National Defense Academy Total 247 ( 32 ) 40 ( 4) 6.2 ( 8.0 )
Students Humanity and social science 6,555 ( 2,629 ) 75 ( 22 ) 87.4 ( 119.5 )
General exam
Science and engineering 8,452 ( 1,672 ) 268 ( 21 ) 31.5 ( 79.6 )
(first term)
Total 15,007 ( 4,301 ) 343 ( 43 ) 43.8 ( 100.0 )
General exam
Science and engineering 468 ( 62 ) 38 ( 5 ) 12.3 ( 12.4 )
(second term)
Total 665 ( 110 ) 47 ( 7 ) 14.1 ( 15.7 )
National Defense Medical College students 6,622 ( 2,031 ) 85 ( 19 ) 77.9 ( 106.9 )
National Defense Medical College nursing students
2,294 ( 1,823 ) 75 ( 68 ) 30.6 ( 26.8 )
(SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)
Recommended 142 64 2.2
GSDF High Technical School
General exam 2,318 257 9.0
Students
Total 2,460 321 7.7
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.

2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2017.
Reference 61 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, and Others

Special Service Regular Service
Minister of Defense Authorized Strength Non-Authorized Strength Authorized Strength Non-Authorized Strength
State Minister of Defense Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of
Defense (2) SDF Personnel
Senior Adviser to the Minister of Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Candidates for SDF Personnel
Defense
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Reserve Personnel 47,900
Special Advisers to the Minister of
Defense (up to 3) Director General, and others 658 Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075 Administrative Officials,
Part-Time Officials
Administrative Officials, and others 20,285 Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,621 and others 28
SDF Regular Personnel 247,154 National Defense Academy students
National Defense Medical College students
GSDF High Technical School students
Part-Time Officials
Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations
2. “Others” in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of
the Minister of Defense

Reference 62 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2017
❍ Integrated training
Exercise Period Location Main Participating Units, etc. Note
To enhance ability to deploy units overseas
Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Defense
Training for protection measures and their operational capabilities relating to
Sep. 25 - Oct. 2, Camp Utsunomiya, Komaki Airbase, Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air
for overseas Japanese nationals transport of overseas Japanese nationals and
2017 Republic of Djibouti, etc. Support Command, etc.
and others others, and strengthen coordination between
SDF and U.S. Forces
Internal Bureaus, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence
Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness
Numazu Kaihin Training Site,
Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District HQs,
Tanegashima Island and waters To maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint
SDF joint exercise (command Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, SDF
Nov. 6 - 24, 2017 around Tsushima Island, other SDF operations capabilities through studying and
Reference
post exercise) Command Control Communication Computers Systems
facilities and waters and airspace practicing SDF joint operations
Command, SDF Central Hospital etc.
surrounding Japan
Approximately 15,000 personnel, approximately 1,500
vehicles, 6 vessels, approximately 170 aircraft
To enhance joint operations capabilities
MOD Ichigaya, Soumagahara Western Army, Central Readiness Force, MP, Air Defense
Training for protection measures relating to protection measures for overseas
Training Area, Iruma Airbase, route Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command,
for overseas Japanese nationals Dec. 11 - 15, 2017 Japanese nationals and others, and
connecting Soumagahara Training ASDF MP, Air Materiel Command, etc.
and others strengthen coordination between SDF and
Area to Iruma Airbase Approximately 390 personnel
relevant organizations
❍ GSDF
Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area,
Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Camp Northern Army, etc.
Army Corps field training
Sep. 16 - 28, 2017 Sapporo, Camp Higashi Chitose, Approximately 17,000 personnel, 3,200 vehicles,
exercise (Northern Army)
Sapporo city, Otaru city, Kushiro 50 aircraft, and 2 vessels To maintain and enhance Army’s capability to
city, wakkanai city, Ishikari city, etc. respond to various situations
Cmaps, bases, maneuver areas Western Army, etc.
Army Corps field training Oct. 23 - Nov. 22,
and privately owned land inside Approximately 14,000 personnel, 3,800 vehicles,
exercise (Western Army) 2017
the Western Army District 60 aircraft
Middle-Northern Regional Army Major units of 10th Division
Joint relocation exercises (camp Jun. 27 - Jul. 31,
Districts (Hamataiki Training Area, Approximately 2,600 personnel, 1,000 vehicles and
relocation for divisions) 2017
Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.) 3 aircraft
Eastern - Northern Regional Army
Joint relocation exercises (camp One Infantry Regiment of the 12th Division
Sep. 2 - 28, 2017 Districts (Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver
relocation for regiments) Approximately 900 personnel, 260 vehicles, and 6 aircraft
Area etc.)
Northern-Eastern Regional Army To enhance control capability and
Districts (Kita-Fuji Training Area, adjustability necessary for long-range
Joint relocation exercises (camp One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade
Nov. 3 - 13, 2016 etc.) mobility
relocation for regiments) Approximately 410 personnel and 180 vehicles
Jumonjihara Maneuver Area,
Amami Oshima Island etc.
Major units of one Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division
Joint relocation exercises (camp Northeastern-Western Regional Approximately 1,200 personnel, 400 vehicles, and
Oct. 14 - Dec. 4,
relocation for regiments) Army Districts (Hijudai Training 4 aircraft
2017
2nd Division, 5th Division Area, etc.) Major units of one Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division
Approximately 650 personnel, 300 vehicles, and 2 aircraft
❍ MSDF
Maritime Staff Office, MSDF Staff Commands of the Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District
MSDF exercise Oct. 31 - Nov. 9, To conduct drills for unit operations, maritime
College and the locations of other HQs, Maritime Materiel Command, etc.
(Table Top Exercise) 2017 operations, etc.
participating Units Approximately 3,200 personnel
MSDF exercise Nov. 10 - 26,
Waters and airspace around Japan Approximately 25 vessels and 60 aircraft Conduct drills for maritime operations
(Field Training Exercise) 2017
Reference 63 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2017)
Name of Training Date Location Dispatched Unit

HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live- Oct. 3 - Dec. 13, 15 anti-aircraft companies
McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.
fire training 2017 Approximately 500 personnel
GSDF
Surface-to-ship missile unit level live-fire Nov. 15 - Dec. 17, 3 surface-to-ship missile regiments and artillery training unit
Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.
training 2017 Approximately 230 personnel
(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of Jul. 1 - Oct. 3,
Sea areas surrounding Guam and Hawaii 1 submarine
submarine 2017
(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of Jan. 16 - Apr. 14,
Sea areas surrounding Hawaii 1 submarine
submarine 2018
MSDF
Oct 13 - Nov. 25,
Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer Sea areas surrounding Hawaii 1 destroyer
2017
Training in the U.S. by dispatch of Escort Feb. 26 - Mar. 22,
Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam 1 destroyer
Flotilla 2018
Aug. 30 - Nov. 17, 6 Air Defense Missiles groups, Air Defense Missile Training Group
ASDF Annual practice by antiaircraft units McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.
2017 Approximately 370 personnel

Reference 64 Main Measures for Re-employment Support
Classification Measures for employment support Description
Occupational aptitude testing Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes
Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift
operation, boiler maintenance, large-sized special vehicle operation, electrician, regular-sized vehicle operation, first-level
Technical training
training for nursing care workers, heavy-duty vehicle operation, chief hazardous material engineer, crane operation, mid-sized
vehicle license [new in FY2018], etc.)
Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and
Disaster prevention and
Measures for retiring the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office's Regional Disaster
risk management training
uniformed Prevention Manager license)
SDF personnel Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public qualifications (hazardous materials engineer,
Reference
Correspondence courses electrician, financial planner, (class B), real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, medical clerk, data security
officer [new in FY2018], etc.)
Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary
Business management training
knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement
Career guidance Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment
Outsourcing career counseling, etc. Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel
Measures for internal
Training for support personnel Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
support personnel
Support for publicity aimed at
Measures for promotion Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire
to business owners
outside of SDF
Inviting business owners on unit tours Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.
Reference 65 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government
(As of March 31, 2018 432 personnel)
Prefectural
Government employment situation
Government
Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Sapporo City Government (two persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Muroran
City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government,
Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government, Akabira City Government, Nayoro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (three persons), Takikawa City Government,
Hokkaido
Sunagawa City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kitahiroshima City Government, Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town
Office, Naganuma Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Bihoro Town Office (two persons), Engaru Tow Office (two persons), Shiraoi Town
Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office
Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (three persons), Towada City Government, Misawa City
Aomori
Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office
Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Yamada Town
Iwate
Office
Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Oohira Village Office,
Miyagi
Minamisanriku Town Office
Akita Akita Prefectural Government, Yokote City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government, Yurihonjo City Government, Daisen City Government, Senboku City Government
Yamagata Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government, Asahi Town Office
Fukushima Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government
Koga City Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Joso City Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Moriya City Government, Hitachi Omiya City
Ibaraki
Government, Ami Town Office, Sakai Town Office
Tochigi Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government
Gunma Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government, Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government
Saitama Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government, Fukaya City Government, Soka City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government, Yoshikawa City Government
Chiba Prefectural Government, Chiba City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons),
Chiba Mobara City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Ichihara City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Kimitsu City Government, Urayasu City
Government, Yotsukaido City Government, Tomisato City Government, Katori City Government, Oamishirasato City Government
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (two persons), Ota Ward Office, Shibuya Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office,
Tokyo
Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office
Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (eight persons), Kawasaki City Government (four persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka
Kanagawa City Government, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Ebina City Government (two persons),
Zama City Government
Niigata Niigata Prefectural Government (two personnel), Murakami City Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government, Tainai City Government
Toyama Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government, Himi City Governmet
Ishikawa Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Kaga City Government, Nomi City Government
Fukui Fukui Prefectural Government (two persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office
Yamanashi Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Yamanakako Town Office
Nagano Nagano Prefectural Government, Matsumoto City Government, Ina City Government, Chino City Government
Gifu Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Gifu City Government, Minokamo City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Hida City Government, Kaizu City Government
Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Ito City Government, Shimada City Government (two
Shizuoka
persons), Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Makinohara City Government, Oyama Town Office
Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government, Handa City Government, Kariya City Government, Nishio City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tokai City Government,
Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Aisai City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City
Aichi
Government, Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Minamichita Town Office (two
persons), Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office, Handa City Government
Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Toba City
Mie
Government, Shima City Government
Shiga Shiga Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Kyoto Kyoto Prefectural Government, Joyo City Government, Yawata City Government, Kyotango City Government, Kizugawa City Government, Seika Town Office (three persons)
Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Kaizuka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki
Osaka City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Daito City Government, Takaishi City
Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office

Prefectural
Government employment situation
Government
Hyogo Hyogo Prefectural Government, Akashi City Government, Miki City Government, Kawanishi City Government, Yabu City Government
Nara Nara Prefectural Government (two persons), Nara City Government (three persons), Gojo City Government (two persons), Gosho City Government, Tawaramoto Town Office
Wakayama Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government
Tottori Tottori Prefectural Government (three persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office
Shimane Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government
Okayama Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government (two persons), Asakuchi City Government
Hiroshima Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office
Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Hagi City Government, Hofu City Government, Iwakuni City Government (two persons), Nagato City Government,
Yamaguchi
Shunan City Government, Waki Town Office
Reference
Tokushima Prefectural Government (three persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi
Tokushima
City Government
Kagawa Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Zentsuji City Government, Sanuki City Government, Manno Town Office
Ehime Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government
Kochi Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Fukuoka City Government (two persons), Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government (two persons), Tagawa City Government, Nakama City
Fukuoka Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government (two persons), Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Itoshima City Government, Kasuya Town
Office, Chikuzen Town Office
Saga Saga Prefectural Government (four persons), Yoshinogari Town Office
Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (three persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government (three
Nagasaki
persons), Matsuura City Government, Iki City Government
Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Yashiro City Government, Minamata City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Kuma
Kumamoto
Village Office
Oita Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Kitsuki City Government
Miyazaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government, Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi
Miyazaki
City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government (two persons), Mimata Town Office, Tsuno Town Office
Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government, Aira City Government,
Kagoshima
Minami Okuma Town Office
Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2018 (part-time personnel included).
Reference 66 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and peace and security through timely and effective implementation of
Technology contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace
(Approved by the National Security Council cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses
and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014) to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing
The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international
of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and
with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other
referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s
policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s
have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace- enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development
loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non- and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to
permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising
proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has costs.
repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and
of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact
as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. on the international community, the need for each government to control the
Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while
the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining taking various factors into account is recognized.
an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-
power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non- loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course
Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer
security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles.
challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to
in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.
its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects 1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited
Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be
commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the permitted when:
evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international
that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in agreements that Japan has concluded,
world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council
in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, resolutions, or
while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party
Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security
international cooperation. Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace
From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national and security in the event of an armed attack).
security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance 2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict
with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided examination and information disclosure
to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be
of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while
the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense
the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer
policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international
measures. cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing
An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology international joint development and production projects with countries
contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S.

(hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the
and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be
the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international
equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international
will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of
and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and parts etc. to a licenser.
technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be
will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will
of the international export control regime and based on the information implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of
available at the time of export examinations. 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.
Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology”
viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed
Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet
Reference
Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly
on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies
of 1999). for the design, production or use of arms.
3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of
third parties the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based
In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will
technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and
ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve
Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen
extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate the international export control regimes.
Reference 67 Activities in Civic Life
Items Details of Activities and Their Past Records

❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.
❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total of 1,379 disposal operations (average of approximately 27 operations per week), weighing approximately 42.1 tons in total;
Disposal of Unexploded
in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 25.6 tons, (accounting for about 61% of such
Bombs1
bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the
SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
❍ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as
well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others.
Removal of Underwater ❍ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas.
Mines2 ❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total 23,598 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.2 tons in total (1 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive
hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much
cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
❍ Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with
the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).
❍ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured
patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.
❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and
Medical Activities3
so forth when a disaster occurs.
❍ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine
Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine,
respectively.
❍ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.
Cooperation in ❍ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of
Supporting Athletic ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.
Meetings4 ❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from
Exchanges with Local
local communities.
Communities
❍ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.
Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.
4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.

Reference 68 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)
Outline of the survey period: January 11 - 21, 2018

Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 18 years or older in Japan
Valid responses (rate): 1,671 (55.7%)
Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel
For details, refer to <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-bouei/index.html>
Reference
1 Interest in the Self Defense Forces 2 Impression toward the SDF
Good impression Bad impression
(subtotal) 89.8 (subtotal) 5.6
Interested (subtotal) 67.8 Not Interested (subtotal) 31.4
Good More of More of Bad
Very Somewhat Not that Totally impression a positive a negative impression
interested interested interested uninterested impression impression
(Eligible Don’t know (Eligible Don’t know

number number
of people) 14.9 52.9 25.9 of people) 36.7 53.0
Total (1,671) Total (1,671)
4.7 0.7
0.8 5.5 4.9
3 Defense capabilities of the SDF 6 Role expected of the Self Defense Forces
(multiple responses)
(%)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Disaster dispatches
Should be decreased (relief activities, emergency patient transport, 79.2
Should be and other activities during disasters)
increased Current strength is sufficient Don’t know Protecting national security
(Eligible (national security in surrounding sea and airspace, 60.9
number response to attacks on islands, and others)
29.1 60.1
of people)
Total (1,671) 6.2 Maintaining public order in Japan 49.8
4.5
Responding to ballistic missile attacks 40.2
4 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF Participating in international peace cooperation

activities (such as United Nations PKO and 34.8
international emergency relief activities)
Private-sector cooperation (civil engineering
Appreciate (Total) 87.3 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.4 projects and National Sports Festival assistance, 26.0
unexploded ordnance disposal, and others)
Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not
appreciated a certain degree very much appreciate at all Rescuing Japanese people in other countries 21.0
(Eligible Don’t know Promoting defense cooperation and interaction

(implementing meetings and discussions and joint 20.8
number training with defense agencies of other countries,
of people) 36.7 50.6
defense equipment assistance, and others)
Total (1,671) 5.3 1.1 Contributing to stable use of cyberspace
18.2
6.2 (response to cyberattacks and others)
Taking actions to deal with piracy (initiatives to

protect private-sector vessels from piracy offshore 17.3
near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
5 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities Cooperating with arms control and disarmament
14.8
and non-proliferation effects
Should Should reduce Assisting capability building (initiatives to improve

Should make maintain the amount capabilities of developing countries in national 13.2
Should not security and defense fields)
more efforts current of efforts in engage in
in engaging engagement engaging from such efforts
proactively level current level Contributing to stable use of outer space 7.5
Don’t know
(Eligible
number Others 0.1
of people) 20.6 66.8
Total (1,671) 5.3 5.6
1.7 Nothing in particular 2.2
Unsure 1.7
Total (N = 1,671 people, M.T. = 407.7%)

Reference 69 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2017)
Regional Defense Bureaus Acquisition, Technology and

Ministry of Defense Headquarters Total
and Branches Logistics Agency
1. Number of disclosure requests 1926 2974 250 5150
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure 2373 2867 220 5460
Requests accepted 1358 1297 101 2756
Requests partially accepted 924 1552 105 2581
Requests declined 91 18 14 123
3. Number of administrative protests 1494 3 7 1504
4. Number of lawsuits 2 0 0 2
Reference
Reference 70 The Results of the Special Defense Inspection (outline) In addition, in February 2017, in order to ensure consistency with
the fact that only the Daily Reports that exist at the JS had been made
July 27, 2017 public, the Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department,
The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance GSO deemed this appropriate document management, then, among other
things, requested the disposal of the daily reports, and the Daily Reports
The Results of the Special Defense Inspection (outline) were disposed of. Although this does not directly constitute a violation of
1. Subject Items the Information Disclosure Act, it was inappropriate because it could be
said that a request for disposal, etc. was made to make the facts match the
An inspection was conducted regarding “the state of management of “The
non-disclosure decision by reason of the non-existence of the documents.
Daily Reports Prepared between July 7-12, 2016 by the GSDF Engineering
(4) Inappropriate response including the delay in reporting to the Minister of
Unit Dispatched to South Sudan” (hereinafter referred to as “the Daily
Defense and the public explanation (December 2016-January 2017)
Reports”), for which a disclosure request was made pursuant to the provisions
The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO
of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act
caused confusion in mutual understanding because he/she explained to
No.42 of May 14, 1999; hereinafter referred to as “the Information Disclosure
the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS that daily reports existed as
Act”))
personal data while recognizing that the possibility that the daily reports
2. Subject Organizations, etc. existing at the GSDF were administrative documents.*2 Meanwhile, the
The organizations, etc. of the Ministry of Defense related to the management Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS received instructions from the
of the Daily Reports (Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Internal Minister of Defense to search again for the Daily Reports but did not
Bureau, and the Joint Staff (hereinafter referred to as “JS”), the Ground Staff instruct the GSO, etc. to conduct a search again. Later, although he/she
Office (hereinafter referred to as “GSO”), and the Central Readiness Force confirmed the existence of the Daily Reports, he/she took approximately
(hereinafter referred to as “CRF”) Headquarters). one month to make a report to the Minister of Defense. In addition, he/
3. Outline of the Inspection Conducted she did not confirm the state of the GSDF daily reports and was unable to
The special defense inspection began on March 17, 2017, and the acquisition grasp them accurately. It is inappropriate that the Ministry of Defense was
and analysis of the related documents, etc., questionnaire surveys, on-site, etc. unable to respond appropriately as the result, having created documents for
confirmation, and interviews were conducted. public explanation that were different from the facts among other things.
4. The Results of the Inspection *2 Media reports that the GSO said to the JS civilian officials in this
exchange that “it’s too late to say that they exist” could not be confirmed.
(1) Inappropriate response to the disclosure request dated July 19*1 (July-
(5) Continuing the posture regarding the public explanation (February 2017)
September 2016)
The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the Administrative Vice
Regarding the disclosure request dated July 19 that is related to the
Chief of staff, JS received the explanation from the Chief of Staff, GSDF
disclosure request for the Daily Reports, the Vice Commanding General
and others that the Daily Reports data existed at the CRF Headquarters
(international), CRF, while recognizing the existence of daily reports
but it was unclear whether they were being managed as administrative
as administrative documents, provided guidance with the intent that
documents. The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense recognized the
it was desirable to remove daily reports from such documents and did
data as personal data, did not confirm the state of the GSDF daily reports,
not disclose existing daily reports. This is inappropriate since the Daily
and indicated the policy for public explanation to the effect that there were
Reports were not disclosed pursuant to their disclosure request by reason
no problems as the response under the Information Disclosure Act since
of the nonexistence of the documents as the consequence of this response.
the Ministry of Defense was making the Daily Reports public. In addition,
It is also inappropriate that disclosure procedures for the documents
the abovementioned response to the question was explained to the
excluding daily reports were taken by reason of the non-existence of the
Minister of Defense and approved. On that occasion, it was not mentioned
documents even though the GSO and GSO staff were in a situation where
by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense or the Administrative
they could recognize the existence of daily reports.
Vice Chief of staff, JS that the Daily Reports existed within the GSDF.
*1 “All documents exchanged during July 6-15, 2016 (Japan Time)
It is inappropriate that because of this, the posture regarding the public
between CRF Headquarters and the GSDF engineering unit dispatched
explanation to the effect that the Daily Reports were being appropriately
to South Sudan (including electronic format)”
handled within the GSDF was maintained by the GSDF even though the
(2)Inappropriate response to the disclosure request dated October 3 (October-
opportunity existed to change the posture regarding the public explanation
December 2016)
by confirming the state of the GSDF daily reports.
Regarding the disclosure request for the Daily Reports, it is inappropriate
*3 Separately from this, there was an occasion on which an explanation
that the GSO and CRF Headquarters staff, while recognizing the existence
was given to the Minister of Defense regarding the handling of daily
of daily reports as administrative documents, based on the response to the
reports at the GSDF among other matters. However, although the
disclosure request dated July 19, made a non-disclosure determination
possibility cannot be denied that there may have been some statements
by reason of the non-existence of the documents and did not disclose the
regarding the existence of daily report data at the GSDF as part of the
Daily Reports, which existed.
exchange on that occasion, there were no facts to the effect that a report
It is also inappropriate that non-disclosure procedures were taken by
was made by document indicating the existence of daily report data at
reason of the non-existence of the documents even though the GSO and JS
the GSDF or that a report was made seeking approval for nondisclosure.
staff were in a situation where they could recognize the existence of daily
In addition, there are no facts to the effect that any decision or approval
reports.
by the Minister of Defense was made concerning whether or not to
(3) Inappropriate response concerning the management of the Daily Reports
make public.
(December 2016, February 2017)
In December 2016, the Director of Operations Support & Intelligence 5. Rectification Measures
Department, GSO gave guidance regarding the appropriate management (1) Implementing appropriate information disclosure operations
of bulletin boards under the premise that they would be disposed of after A) It is necessary to thoroughly conduct the education, etc. of the related
use without taking measures regarding disclosure even though he/she staff to raise their awareness regarding the appropriate implementation
recognized that nondisclosure procedures had been taken regarding the of information disclosure operations.
disclosure request for the Daily Reports by reason of the non-existence of B) In the case where it is to be decided that an administrative document
the documents. This is inappropriate because it is unavoidable for this to be does not exist, it is necessary to conduct multiple searches and to
interpreted that guidance was given to make the facts fit the non-disclosure expand the scope of the searches, actually confirm the state of document
decision based on the nonexistence of the documents. management, and otherwise thoroughly conduct meticulous searches

C) It is necessary to attempt to strengthen the confirmation function by (3) Considering how the retention period for daily reports, etc. should be and
such means as implementing the inspection of information disclosure the measures to be taken It is necessary for the Ministry of Defense to
operations by an organization that has no connection to the information swiftly consider how the retention period for daily reports, etc. should be
disclosure procedures. In addition, strive to confirm the appropriateness after the retention period has lapsed and take measures.
of procedures regarding disclosure requests by utilizing regular defense 6. Conclusion
inspections. It is necessary to recognize that the understanding and support of the Japanese
(2) Implementing appropriate document management, etc. public is essential to the activities of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-
A) It is necessary to take measures to clearly grasp the state of Defense Forces and that it is extremely important to fulfill the responsibility
administrative documents by such means as appropriate indications to explain to the Japanese public, swiftly take rectification measures, and do
of the retention period, etc. on the administrative documents and to the utmost to secure appropriateness in all types of operations.
take measures to keep the distribution of sensitive documents to the
smallest number possible
B) It is necessary to review the management manual for administrative
Reference
documents such as clarifying the responsibility in the case where
multiple document managers possess the same administrative
document.
Outline of History regarding the Handling of Daily Reports

Date(s) Outline
Response to disclosure request related to the Daily Reports
• Received disclosure request for all documents (including electronic format) of the exchanges during July 6-15, 2016 (Japan Time) between the Central Readiness
July 19, 2016
Force Headquarters and the GSDF engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan.
• The Vice Commanding General (international), CRF provided guidance with the intent that it was desirable to remove daily reports from such documents when he/
she received the report regarding the documents including daily reports.
July 20-September 13
• The opinion that a partial disclosure should be made of the documents excluding daily reports was submitted to superiors after coordination between the GSO and
the CRF Headquarters staff.
To September 15 • The JS, etc. responded to the opinion inquiry that it had no opinions.
September 16 • Disclosure decision.
Response to disclosure request for the Daily Reports
October 3 • Received disclosure request for the Daily Reports.
• The GSO and the CRF Headquarters staff coordinated the position to make the same response as for the July 19 disclosure request. The GSO staff submitted to
October 6-November 2
superiors the opinion of non-disclosure by reason of the non-existence of the documents.
November 29 • The JS responded to the opinion inquiry that it had no opinions.
December 2 • Non-disclosure decision.
Response regarding the handling of the Daily Reports after the non-disclosure decision
December 12 • The Liberal Democratic Party Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters demanded documents regarding the non-disclosure decision.
December 13 • A request for administrative review regarding the non-disclosure decision is received.
• The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO provided guidance regarding the appropriate management of GSDF Command System Bulletin
Around December 13 Board.
→ CRF Headquarters disposed of the Daily Reports from the bulletin board.
December 16 • When reported to the Minister of Defense on the non-disclosure decision, the Minister of Defense gave instructions for a new search.
December 26 • The Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS confirmed the existence of the Daily Reports at JS.
• The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO explained to the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS that daily reports existed at the GSDF
as personal data. the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS based on the determination of the Administrative Vice-Minister that it was unclear whether the daily
January 27, 2017
reports of the GSF were fit for disclosure, explained to that only the Daily Reports that existed at would be reported to the Minister of Defense.
• The Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS reported the existence of the Daily Reports at the JS to the Minister of Defense.
February 6 • The Daily Reports, etc. were submitted to the Liberal Democratic Party Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters.
February 7 • The Daily Reports were disclosed.
• The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO requested CRF Headquarters, etc. to manage documents appropriately.
Around February 8 → CRF Headquarters disposed of the Daily Reports.
February 9 • The request for administrative review is approved.
February 10 • GSDF began acquiring the Daily Reports and confirming disposal history.
• A disclosure decision was made anew.
February 13
• The handling of daily reports at GSDF, etc. was explained to the Minister of Defense by the Deputy Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc.
• The Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc. reported to the Administrative Vice-Minister and the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS on the existence of the Daily Reports data
at CRF Headquarters, etc. as the interim state of affairs regarding the abovementioned confirmation.
• The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO explained that it was unclear whether they were being managed as administrative documents.
February 15
• The Administrative Vice-Minister explicitly expressed the judgment that it was unnecessary to report the Daily Reports to the Minister of Defense since the state of
management of the Daily Reports was unclear.
• The handling of daily reports at the GSDF, etc. was explained to the Minister of Defense by the Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc.
• The Administrative Vice-Minister explained to the Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc. that the Daily Reports had been disclosed by the Ministry of Defense and there was no
February 16
problem under the Information Disclosure Act based on the understanding that the Daily Reports of the GSDF were personal data.
• The answer was explained to the Minister of Defense regarding the point of contention to the effect that there was no problem under the Information Disclosure
February 21 Act and was accepted. On this occasion, the Administrative Vice-Minister and the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS did not touch on the fact that the Daily
Reports existed at the GSDF.

Defense Chronology
Year Date Major Events Year Date Major Events Year Date Major Events
1945 Aug. 15 World War II ends 1952 Apr. 28 Japan–U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty 1958 Jan. 14 First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February
Aug. 17 Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established enter into force 28)
Aug. 17 Republic of Indonesia declares independence Apr. 28 Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished Jan. 31 U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite
Aug. 28 Provisional government of People’s Republic of Vietnam May 01 May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza Feb. 17 ASDF begins airspace anti-intrusion measures
established May 26 U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Apr. 18 House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic
Sep. 02 GHQ established Germany and hydrogen bombs
Oct. 09 Shidehara Cabinet established May 27 European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed Jun. 12 Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes
Oct. 15 General Staff Office and Military Command abolished Jul. 21 Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and Minister of State for Defense
Oct. 24 United Nations established enters into force Aug. 23 Chinese People’s Liberation Army attack on Quemoy
Nov. 30 Army and Navy Ministries abolished Jul. 26 Japan–U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed intensifies
1946 Jan. 04 GHQ orders purge from public office Jul. 31 National Safety Agency Law promulgated Sep. 11 Fujiyama–Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on
Aug. 01 National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
Jan. 10 First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through
February 14) Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the Oct. 04 Commencement of Japan–U.S. talks on the revision of the
National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
Jan. 27 GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative
Oct. 23 Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued
Reference
right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Oct. 15 National Safety Force inaugurated
Oct. 30 Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes denying counteroffensive against mainland China
Feb. 26 Far East Commission formed
Director-General of the National Safety Agency Dec. 17 U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
Mar. 05 Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech
Oct. 31 U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test 1959 Jan. 12 Ino becomes Minister of State for Defense
Apr. 05 First meeting of Allied Council on Japan
Nov. 01 U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Mar. 30 Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces
Apr. 24 Civil administration of Okinawa established unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case
May 03 International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened Nov. 12 Japan–U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed
1953 Jan. 01 Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated Jun. 18 Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi
May 22 Yoshida Cabinet established becomes Minister of State for Defense
Oct. 01 International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders Apr. 01 National Safety Academy (predecessor of National
Defense Academy) established Aug. 25 China–India border dispute
judgment Sep. 18 USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete
Nov. 03 The Constitution of Japan promulgated May 21 Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet
Jul. 27 Korean War Armistice Agreement signed military reductions at U.N.
Dec. 19 First Indochina War starts (through 1954) Sep. 26 Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera
1947 Mar. 12 Truman Doctrine announced Aug. 12 USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
Sep. 27 Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk Sep. 27 U.S.–Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David
May 03 The Constitution of Japan takes effect Nov. 06 National Defense Council decision to produce 200
Jun. 01 Katayama Cabinet established Oct. 01 U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on
Jun. 05 Marshall Plan announced Oct. 30 Ikeda–Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual November 10
increase in self-defense strength
Aug. 15 India and Pakistan gain independence Dec. 01 Antarctica Treaty signed
Dec. 25 Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored
Aug. 15 First India–Pakistan conflict (through 1965) Dec. 16 Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa
1954 Jan. 21 U.S. launches world’s first nuclear submarine case
Oct. 05 Cominform established (USS Nautilus)
Dec. 17 Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and 1960 Jan. 11 Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho
Mar. 01 U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll
municipal police forces established) Jan. 19 New Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into
Mar. 01 Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident force June 23)
1948 Mar. 10 Ashida Cabinet established
Mar. 08 Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Feb. 13 France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara
Apr. 01 USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949)
May 14 Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval May 01 U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down
Apr. 27 Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated vessels
May 14 Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts in Soviet airspace
Jun. 02 House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting May 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and
(through February 24, 1949) dispatch of troops overseas
Jun. 11 U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution tsunami in Chile
Jun. 09 Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self- Jul. 19 Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of
Jun. 26 Berlin airlift starts Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy State for Defense
Aug. 15 Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence Law pertaining to the MDA
Jul. 20 U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris
Sep. 09 North Korea established Jul. 01 Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air SLBM
Oct. 19 Inauguration of the second Yoshida Cabinet Self-Defense Forces inaugurated
Dec. 08 Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes
Nov. 12 International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders Jul. 21 Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Minister of State for Defense
judgment Sep. 03 Chinese People’s Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Dec. 20 Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front
1949 Jan. 25 Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) Matsu for the first time
1961 Jan. 13 National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF
established Sep. 08 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20
Feb. 16 Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet signing of collective defense pact
Apr. 12 USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft
Apr. 04 North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes Dec. 02 U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
May 16 Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK
effective August 24) (NATO established) Dec. 10 Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister
of State for Defense Jul. 06 Soviet–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Apr. 21 Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese
Mutual Assistance signed
Communist Army launches general offensive 1955 Mar. 19 Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara
becomes Minister of State for Defense Jul. 11 Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
May 06 Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany)
Mutual Assistance signed
Jul. 05 Shimoyama incident Apr. 18 Africa–Asia conference held at Bandung
Jul. 18 Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda
Jul. 15 Mitaka incident May 05 West Germany formally admitted to NATO becomes Minister of State for Defense
Aug. 17 Matsukawa incident May 06 Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; Jul. 18 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted
Sep. 24 USSR declares possession of atomic bomb opposition to firing intensifies on Second Defense Build-up Plan
Oct. 01 People’s Republic of China established May 08 Protests begin at Sunagawa Base Aug. 13 Construction of Berlin Wall
Oct. 07 German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) May 14 Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts) 1962 Jul. 18 Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second
Dec. 07 Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan Jul. 31 Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense
1950 Jan. 27 U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries Aug. 06 First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Jul. 23 International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed
Feb. 14 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Bombs held in Hiroshima in Geneva International Conference
Assistance signed Aug. 31 Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on Aug. 15 GSDF completes 13 division organization
Jun. 21 John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Oct. 15 Type 61 tank first introduced
State, visits Japan Nov. 14 Japan–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Oct. 20 China–India border dispute (through November 22)
Jun. 25 Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) Nov. 22 Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Oct. 24 U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through
Jun. 28 Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet Minister of State for Defense November 20)
Jul. 07 United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea Dec. 19 Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated Oct. 28 Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares
Jul. 08 General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the 1956 Feb. 09 House of Representatives passes resolution to ban dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, Nov. 01 Defense Facilities Administration Agency established
the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men February 10)
Nov. 09 Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for
Aug. 10 National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put Feb. 14 Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Defense (through November 26)
into effect Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful
co-existence with the West 1963 Jun. 20 Agreement signed for U.S.–Soviet hotline
Aug. 13 Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Jul. 18 Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third
Reserve begins Mar. 23 Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki
term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense
Aug. 14 Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Apr. 17 USSR announces dissolution of Cominform
Aug. 08 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.–USSR–
Police Reserve Apr. 26 First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed U.K. (enters into force on October 10)
Sep. 07 National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the Jul. 02 National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated Aug. 14 Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima Jul. 26 Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Sep. 16 Malaysian Federation established
Sep. 15 U.N. troops land at Inchon Sep. 20 First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered Dec. 09 Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet
Oct. 25 Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War Oct. 19 Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese–Soviet Dec. 17 ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee
Nov. 24 U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a relations becomes President
peace treaty with Japan Oct. 23 Hungarian Revolution 1964 Jun. 15 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan
Dec. 18 NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of Oct. 29 Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6) Jul. 18 Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi
NATO Forces Dec. 18 Japan joins the U.N. becomes Minister of State for Defense
1951 Jan. 23 Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Dec. 23 Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently Aug. 02 Gulf of Tonkin incident
Police Reserve becomes Minister of State for Defense Oct. 16 China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
Jan. 29 First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) 1957 Jan. 31 Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad Nov. 09 Sato Cabinet established
Mar. 01 Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy interim, Minister of State for Defense
Nov. 12 U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese
graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class Feb. 02 Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense port (Sasebo) for the first time
begins Feb. 25 Kishi Cabinet established 1965 Feb. 07 U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam
Apr. 11 MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of Mar. 15 House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and
the Allied Powers Feb. 10 Diet debate on Mitsuya study
hydrogen bombs
Jul. 04 Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second Jun. 03 Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno
May 15 U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test becomes Minister of State for Defense
term) May 20 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted
Aug. 30 Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers dismissed Jun. 22 Japan–ROK Basic Treaty signed
on Basic Guidelines for National Defense
Sep. 01 U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Australia– Sep. 01 Second India–Pakistan conflict (to September 22)
Jun. 14 National Defense Council decision and Cabinet
New Zealand–U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty understanding adopted on First Defense Build-up Plan Nov. 10 Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic
Sep. 08 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan–U.S. observation (through April 8, 1966)
Jun. 21 Kishi–Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early
Security Treaty concluded withdrawal of the USFJ issued 1966 May 16 Cultural Revolution starts in China
Oct. 20 Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief Jul. 10 Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima Jul. 01 France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined
operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, becomes Minister of State for Defense April 4, 2009)
in the wake of Typhoon Ruth Aug. 06 Japan–U.S. Security Council inaugurated Aug. 01 Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term);
Oct. 26 House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense
Aug. 26 USSR announces successful ICBM test
Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval Oct. 27 China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test
given November 18) Aug. 27 Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura
Nov. 29 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted
Dec. 26 Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (third Sep. 10 National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 on Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan
term) aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17
Dec. 03 Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes
1952 Jan. 19 ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas Oct. 04 USSR launches the world’s first artificial satellite, Minister of State for Defense
(Rhee Line) Sputnik 1
1967 Jan. 27 Outer Space Treaty signed
Feb. 28 Japan–U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Nov. 23 World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow
Declaration Feb. 17 Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet
Apr. 26 Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Mar. 14 National Defense Council decision adopted on Key matters
1958 Jan. 01 Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N.
Apr. 28 Japan–Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded Security Council for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan (Cabinet
decision on March 14)
Jan. 01 European Economic Community (EEC) starts

1967 Mar. 29 Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case 1973 Oct. 17 Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies 1981 Jan. 06 February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet
Jun. 05 Third Middle East War (through June 9) Nov. 07 Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO understanding)
Jun. 17 China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Nov. 25 Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet Apr. 22 Defense Agency announces classification of the laws
Jul. 01 Formation of European Community (EC) 1974 Jan. 05 Japan–China Trade Agreement signed and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency
Legislation
Aug. 08 Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Jan. 18 Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement
(ASEAN) Treaties Jul. 07 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit
Nov. 25 Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet Apr. 20 Japan–China Aviation Agreement signed Jul. 13 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment
in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits
1968 Jan. 16 Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. Apr. 25 National Defense Medical College opens
troops east of Suez Oct. 01 (GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral exercises (in
May 18 India carries out its first underground nuclear test
communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area
Jan. 19 U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Jul. 03 U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation (through October 3)
Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test
Nov. 30 Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes
Jan. 23 Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Ban Treaty) signed
Minister of State for Defense
Korea Oct. 08 Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize
Dec. 13 Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military
Feb. 26 New Japan–U.S. nuclear agreement signed Nov. 11 Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet Council of National Salvation
May 13 First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense
1982 Feb. 15 (GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise
Jun. 26 Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan Nov. 13 Japan–China Marine Transport Agreement signed (staged at Takigahara, through February 19)
Reference
Jul. 01 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Nov. 15 U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration Apr. 02 Falklands dispute (ends June 14)
Aug. 20 Soviet and Eastern European troops invade tunnel
Apr. 25 Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula
Czechoslovakia Nov. 23 U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement
May 15 Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas
Aug. 24 France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the on SALT II
located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease
South Pacific Dec. 09 Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of Law
Nov. 30 Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second State for Defense
Jun. 06 Israeli forces invade Lebanon
term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense 1975 Apr. 01 Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense
Jun. 08 BWC enters into force in Japan
1969 Jan. 10 National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29)
Jun. 09 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I,
aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet Apr. 23 U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War
II and III concluded
Mar. 02 Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Apr. 30 South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally
Jun. 29 Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) Aug. 01 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (START-I) U.S.–Soviet Union (Geneva)
Apr. 15 North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki)
Jul. 23 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and
plane Nov. 17 First summit meeting of most industrialized nations approved by National Defense Council
Jun. 10 South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since
Aug. 17 U.S.–China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales
Revolutionary Government 1976 Apr. 05 Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in to Taiwan
Jul. 25 U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident)
Sep. 09 Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike
Nixon Doctrine) Jun. 04 Publication of second white paper on defense, “The Missile Base Case
Nov. 21 Sato–Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Defense of Japan” (henceforth published annually)
Oct. 12 China successfully tests SLBM water launch
Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972) Jun. 08 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for
Oct. 20 Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi
1970 Jan. 14 Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Japan
Air Base noise suit
Minister of State for Defense Jul. 02 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed
Nov. 27 Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanikawa becomes
Jan. 24 Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces Jul. 08 Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Minister of State for Defense
(involving seven countries) established
1983 Jan. 01 U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command
Feb. 03 Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Aug. 05 Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma (Central Command)
Feb. 11 First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully Nike suit
Jan. 14 Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of
launched Aug. 18 U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief
Mar. 05 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force Sep. 06 MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport Cabinet Secretary)
Mar. 31 Yodo hijacking Sep. 15 Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet Mar. 23 U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense
Apr. 16 U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks Oct. 29 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted Initiative (SDI)
Apr. 24 China successfully launches its first satellite on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977 Jun. 12 Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to
Jun. 23 Automatic extension of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Nov. 05 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted inspect Northern Islands
Aug. 12 West Germany–USSR sign non-aggression pact on Immediate-term Defense Build-up and Handling Major Sep. 01 KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin
Oct. 20 Publication of “The Defense of Japan,” the first white Items in Preparations for Defense Forces Oct. 09 19 ROK Government officials, including cabinet ministers,
paper on defense Dec. 24 Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists
Nov. 25 Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment State for Defense Oct. 25 U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya 1977 Feb. 17 Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit Nov. 08 Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military
1971 Feb. 11 Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for Jun. 30 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan
military purposes (Treaty remains effective) Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
Jun. 17 Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed Jul. 01 Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200- Dec. 12 (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise
Jun. 29 Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters (staged at Fuchu, through December 15)
signed Aug. 01 North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea Dec. 27 Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara
Jul. 05 Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara of Japan and Yellow Sea becomes Minister of State for Defense
becomes Minister of State for Defense Aug. 10 Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study 1984 Jan. 01 Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN
Jul. 30 All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft Nov. 28 Inaguruation of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru on January 7)
(Shizukuishi) becomes Minister of State for Defense Jun. 11 (MSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise
Aug. 02 Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense Dec. 29 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted (staged at Yokosuka, through June 15)
Aug. 09 India–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed on introduction of F-15s and P-3C Oct. 16 Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of
Sep. 30 U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the 1978 Apr. 12 Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on
danger of nuclear war Islands Legislation to Deal with Emergencies
Oct. 25 U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China Aug. 12 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the Nov. 01 Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato
and expel Taiwan People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing becomes Minister of State for Defense
Nov. 24 House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear Sep. 21 Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of 1985 Mar. 12 U.S.–Soviet Union arms control talks begin
weapons emergency legislation study Apr. 02 USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa
Nov. 27 ASEAN declares SEA neutrality Nov. 03 Vietnam–Soviet Friendship Agreement signed Jun. 04 China announces the reduction of one million personnel
Dec. 03 Third India–Pakistan conflict Nov. 27 (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral training exercises (east from the People’s Liberation Army
Dec. 03 Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Aug. 12 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL
Dec. 05 ASDF first domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered Nov. 27 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves aircraft crash
Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, presented to and Sep. 18 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted
1972 Jan. 07 Sato–Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National
of Okinawa and the reduction of bases on Mid-Term Defense Program; National Defense
Defense Council on November 28 Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on
Feb. 08 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted Dec. 05 Afghanistan–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations introduction of Patriots
on Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan and Cooperation signed Dec. 27 Detailed arrangements for the supply of military
Feb. 27 U.S. President Nixon visits China; China–U.S. Joint Dec. 07 Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister technologies to the U.S. concluded
Communique of State for Defense Dec. 28 Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet
Apr. 10 Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Dec. 25 Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal (second term)
(BWC) completed on September 26, 1989) 1986 Feb. 24 First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise
Apr. 18 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted 1979 Jan. 01 U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through
on SDF deployment in Okinawa termination of the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty February 28)
May 15 Return of Okinawa after one year Apr. 09 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in first Atsugi Air
May 26 SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit Jan. 07 Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime Base noise suit
of U.S. President Nixon to USSR announced Apr. 26 Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet
Jul. 03 India–Pakistan truce signed Jan. 11 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted Union
Jul. 04 ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful on introduction of E-2C Jul. 01 Security Council Establishment Law enacted
unification Feb. 11 Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran Jul. 22 Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes
Jul. 07 Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister Feb. 17 Sino–Vietnamese War (through March 5) Minister of State for Defense
of State for Defense Mar. 26 Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed Aug. 10 U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New
Sep. 29 Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of Jun. 18 SALT II signed Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San
diplomatic relations between Japan and China Francisco, through August 11)
Jul. 17 Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980–
Oct. 09 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted FY1984) Aug. 15 Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations
on Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Sep. 05 Government approves the first transfer of military
Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, Key Matters for Inclusion in Jul. 25 Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to
ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26) technology to the U.S.
Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and Measures to Enhance
Civilian Control Nov. 09 Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Sep. 22 Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final
Minister of State for Defense documents (Stockholm)
Dec. 21 East–West Germany Basic Treaty signed
Dec. 27 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan Oct. 15 USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from
Dec. 22 Inauguration of second Tanaka Cabinet Afghanistan
1973 Jan. 23 14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee 1980 Feb. 04 Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense
Feb. 26 Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the Oct. 27 First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise
meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through
(Kanto Program) first time (through March 18)
Apr. 11 Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual October 31)
Jan. 27 Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect 1987 Jan. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
on January 28) Assistance lapses
May 18 China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity
Feb. 01 Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength Jan. 30 Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing
Feb. 21 Laos Peace Treaty signed Ocean for the first time
Jul. 17 House of Councillors establishes special committee for of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective
Mar. 29 U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam June 1)
Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues
May 29 Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense May 27 Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees
Jul. 17 Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of
Jun. 22 General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union State for Defense of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair
visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating
signed Aug. 18 Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls
Jul. 01 Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa Aug. 19 Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced (COCOM) to Communist areas
Sep. 07 Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional Aug. 21 Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main May 29 Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China
(Naganuma Judgment) island of Okinawa (through June 4)
Sep. 21 Japan–North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations Sep. 03 First meeting of the Japan–U.S. Systems and Technology Jul. 15 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 1st Yokota Air
Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4) Base noise suit
Oct. 06 Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)
Sep. 22 Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war Jul. 20 U.N. Security Council adopts Iran–Iraq Conflict Cease Fire
Oct. 08 Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow)
resolution (Number 598)

1987 Aug. 26 Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief 1991 Jun. 03 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of 1994 Oct. 21 U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign “Framework
Teams enacted Fugendake on Mt. Unzen Agreement” relating to support for North Korean light
Oct. 06 First Japan–U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through Jul. 31 U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow water reactors, and provision of substitute energy
October 7) Sep. 06 Soviet State Council approves independence of three Dec. 01 First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices
Oct. 21 Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and Baltic states of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through
announced Sep. 17 U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, December 17)
Nov. 06 Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations Dec. 01 Commander of U.S.–ROK Combined Forces devolves
of State for Defense Oct. 09 SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
Nov. 29 KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Iraq chemical weapons for the first time Dec. 05 START-I comes into force
Bay of Bengal Nov. 05 House of Representatives establishes the Committee on Dec. 18 Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
Dec. 08 INF Treaty signed National Security Dec. 20 First visit to Japan by the ROK’s naval training vessel
Dec. 18 Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of Nov. 05 Miyazawa Cabinet established; Miyashita becomes (Harumi, through December 23)
air defense on the high seas Minister of State for Defense Dec. 26 Kanazawa branch of Nagoya High Court renders
1988 Mar. 02 Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement Nov. 26 Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines judgement in 1st Komatsu Air Base noise suit
concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Dec. 05 Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of 1995 Jan. 17 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-
Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Ukrainian Republic Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)
Mar. 14 Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters Mar. 09 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
Reference
Dec. 08 CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and

around the Spratly Islands Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus) (KEDO) established
Apr. 12 Signing of official documents for the transfer of military 1992 Feb. 07 Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty Mar. 20 SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue
technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to (Maastricht Treaty) operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Feb. 25 China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, system (through March 23)
between the two countries designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part May 11 NPT extended indefinitely
May 29 U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, of China May 19 Enactment of “Act on Special Measures Incidental to
instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged) Apr. 01 Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use
Jun. 01 Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against Defense Agency by United States Forces in Japan” (effective June 20)
the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident Apr. 01 First female students enter National Defense Academy Jun. 05 The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both
Jul. 23 Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off of Japan issue the “letter concerning the prevention of accidents
Yokosuka) Apr. 27 Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and
Aug. 17 First joint verification of an underground nuclear test to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base military aircraft of the Republic of Korea”
carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) May 22 North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Jul. 28 Vietnam officially joins ASEAN
Aug. 20 Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran–Iraq War Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns Aug. 01 1st KEDO Meeting (Japan–U.S.–ROK) held (New York)
Aug. 24 Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense May 23 START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet Aug. 08 Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto
Sep. 20 First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced States including Russia becomes Minister of State for Defense
Oct. 17 U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised May 25 IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of Sep. 04 Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers
Military Bases Agreement North Korea’s nuclear facilities (through June 5) based in Okinawa
Nov. 29 Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and Jun. 19 Announcement of “International Peace Cooperation Law” Sep. 15 Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention
detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of Oct. 27 Announcement of “Law Relating to the Treatment of
Dec. 07 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to “Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International
the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops Disaster Relief Teams” Organizations” (effective January 1, 1996)
Dec. 27 Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet Aug. 10 International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force Nov. 17 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of a
1989 Jan. 07 Demise of Emperor Showa Aug. 24 China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases
1989 Feb. 15 Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Sep. 17 Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities in Okinawa
Afghanistan Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September Nov. 19 Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President
Feb. 24 Emperor Showa’s funeral 26, 1993) Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action
Sep. 19 Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Narita) Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)
Mar. 09 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
started (Vienna) Sep. 30 U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines) Nov. 28 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
Nov. 09 CFE Treaty becomes formally effective on National Defense Program Outline for the period
Mar. 09 Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) from FY1996
started (Vienna) Nov. 24 U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal
from Philippines complete) Dec. 14 Security Council of Japan decision adopted on Mid-Term
Mar. 15 Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet decision on
judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit Dec. 03 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military December 15)
Mar. 30 New BADGE system begins operations action by multinational forces in Somalia
Dec. 14 Security Council of Japan makes decision “Regarding
Apr. 01 Consumption Tax Law enforced Dec. 12 Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter” (December
May 10 START-I reopened at U.S.–Soviet foreign ministers becomes Minister of State for Defense 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next-Generation Support
conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through Dec. 16 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy Fighter “F-2” decided
May 11) peacekeeping operations in Mozambique Dec. 14 Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
Jun. 03 Uno Cabinet established; Yamasaki becomes Minister of Dec. 18 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted Dec. 15 10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-
State for Defense on Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting
Jun. 04 Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in (FY1991–FY1995)
Dec. 20 IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces
Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident) Dec. 21 Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 2nd Atsugi UNPROFOR and formally commences operations
Jun. 20 Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit Air Base noise suit
Dec. 26 Tokyo High Court renders judgement on remanded appeal
Jun. 22 Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi 1993 Jan. 03 U.S.–Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed trial for 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit
Air Base suit to vacate the premises Jan. 13 Japan signs CWC 1996 Jan. 11 Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of
Jun. 24 Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Feb. 25 Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base State for Defense
Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin noise suit and 1st Yokota Air Base noise suit Jan. 26 START-II ratified by U.S. Senate
Aug. 10 Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister Mar. 12 North Korea announces secession from NPT Jan. 31 SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement
of State for Defense Mar. 25 Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service Observer Force (UNDOF)
Sep. 26 Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia Apr. 08 Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Mar. 08 China carries out three missile firing exercises in total,
Nov. 09 GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual Cambodia naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval
demolition of the Berlin Wall) May 04 Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to
1990 Feb. 13 U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) Taiwan March 8–25
of 195,000 May 04 Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police Mar. 23 Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan
U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. officer in Cambodia President Lee Teng-hui re-elected
troops in Europe May 11 Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin Apr. 12 Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador
Feb. 20 Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of
“military technology related to FS-X” to U.S. January 8, 1995) Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years
Feb. 28 Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa May 14 United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters after conditions are satisfied)
becomes Minister of State for Defense staff depart for Mozambique Apr. 15 Signing of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Mar. 03 Japan–U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm May 29 North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective
Springs, through March 4) central Sea of Japan October 22)
May 29 Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative Jun. 01 Along with full operation of the private government plane Apr. 16 Cabinet decision adopted on promotion of solutions to
handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in
USFJ Land Jun. 09 Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Okinawa Prefecture
Jun. 19 Japan–U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare Prince Apr. 17 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued
necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Jun. 11 North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT Jul. 12 Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna)
Okinawa (23 items) in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.–North Jul. 20 U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in
Jun. 21 Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the Korea consultations Japan
establishment of a ministerial conference on security Jul. 12 Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response Jul. 26 First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through
Aug. 02 Iraq invades Kuwait to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through July 30, Russian Navy’s 300th anniversary naval review)
Aug. 02 U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen August 12) Jul. 29 China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then
Oct. 03 German unification Aug. 04 Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war announces moratorium on nuclear testing
Oct. 16 Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Aug. 09 Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanishi becomes Aug. 28 First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through
Operations submitted to Diet Minister of State for Defense September 6)
Oct. 24 USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic Sep. 01 U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review Aug. 28 Supreme Court renders judgement in lawsuit regarding
Nov. 10 Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Sep. 13 Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of mandamus pertaining to proxy signature with regard
Operations annulled provisional autonomy to the Act on Special Measures Concerning USFJ Land
Nov. 12 Coronation of Emperor Sep. 23 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the Release
Nov. 23 Great Thanksgiving Festival United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Sep. 10 U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test
Oct. 12 Japan–Russia agreement on prevention of marine Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Dec. 20 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) accidents signed Sep. 18 North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east
Nov. 01 Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing
Dec. 29 Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda
established operation completed November 7)
becomes Minister of State for Defense
Dec. 02 Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense Sep. 26 Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into
1991 Jan. 17 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of the Gulf
Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands
Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters 1994 Feb. 23 “Advisory Group on Defense Issues” inaugurated under
the Prime Minister Sep. 27 Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and
Jan. 17 Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and
declares the establishment of the provisional government
Iraq, Operation Desert Storm Feb. 24 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement
in 1st Kadena Air Base noise suit Oct. 03 Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed
Jan. 24 Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts
to restore peace in the Gulf region Feb. 25 Defense Agency’s “Defense Posture Review Board” Nov. 07 Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma
inaugurated becomes Minister of State of Defense
Jan. 25 Cabinet decision adopted on ordinance on interim
measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees Mar. 23 First female aviation students join MSDF Nov. 18 Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational
(promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled Mar. 24 First female aviation students join ASDF stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-
April 19) Herzegovina
Mar. 30 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 2nd Yokota Air
Mar. 13 Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the first Base noise suit Dec. 02 SACO final report approved by Japan–U.S. Joint Security
trial for the lawsuit pertaining to noise generated by the Council
Apr. 28 Hata Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of
Komatsu Air Base State for Defense Dec. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
Mar. 31 WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater
Jun. 08 U.S. DoD submits “Report on Activities and Programs for
in Japanese territorial waters
Apr. 11 Gulf War formally ended Countering Proliferation” pertaining to weapons of mass
destruction such as nuclear weapons 1997 Jan. 02 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the
Apr. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster
on “Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf” Jun. 30 Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes
(through March 31)
Apr. 26 Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart Minister of State for Defense
for the Persian Gulf Sep. 22 U.S. DoD announces “Nuclear Posture Review”

1997 Jan. 20 Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters 1999 Nov. 22 SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste 2002 May 20 The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-
Apr. 29 CWC enters into force Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000) Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission
May 12 Russia–Chechnya peace treaty signed Nov. 22 Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET)
Jun. 09 Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station May 24 Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America
Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition Dec. 17 U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002) relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in Reductions
Jul. 01 Hong Kong reverts to China place of UNSCOM May 30 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement
Jul. 03 The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines Dec. 20 Rule over Macao transferred to China in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit
stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan Dec. 27 Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the “Joint Jun. 13 U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
(at Kita Fuji, through July 9) Response Manual for Suspicious Ships” Jun. 29 Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North
Jul. 16 North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line Dec. 27 Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
(MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station Jul. 16 U.S. Government releases “National Strategy for
Sep. 11 Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet Dec. 28 Cabinet decision adopted on Government Policy for the Homeland Security”
Sep. 23 Guidelines for New Japan–U.S. defense cooperation Relocation of Futenma Air Station Jul. 29 Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed
approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC) 2000 Jan. 17 Anti-personnel mine disposal begins Sep. 04 Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious
Nov. 10 China–Russia summit talks: China–Russian joint Feb. 16 First assembly of the Research Commissions on the ship)
Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on Sep. 17 Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong- Il, the North
Reference
statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China–
Russian eastern border declared February 17) Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions
Dec. 03 Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Apr. 01 Enactment of the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Sep. 20 U.S. Government announces “National Security Strategy”
Dec. 03 Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee Ethics Act” Sep. 30 Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba
Dec. 04 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony in Apr. 05 Mori Cabinet established becomes Minister of State for Defense
Ottawa (121 nations) Apr. 14 Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Oct. 01 Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition
Dec. 19 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted II (START-II) of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and
on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996– May 07 Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties Planning Branch) (through July 6)
FY2000) as President Oct. 13 First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)
1998 Mar. 26 Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel May 08 Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building Oct. 15 Five of those abducted return to Japan
Apr. 28 The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan–U.S. Jun. 16 The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Oct. 16 U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for
May 11 India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated into force nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State
May 13) Jul. 04 Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Kelly’s visit to North Korea
May 22 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in Minister of State for Defense Oct. 16 Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd Atsugi
1st Kadena Air Base noise suit Jul. 21 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23) Air Base noise suit
May 28 Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated Jul. 21 U.S.–Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Oct. 31 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement
May 30) Strategic Stability announced in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe
Jun. 06 U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns Aug. 25 Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Communication Site
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan Futenma Air Station established Nov. 01 Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect
Jun. 12 Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Sep. 13 SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned classified information (defense secrets)
Government Reform Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China Nov. 14 KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of
Jun. 12 Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law Oct. 12 U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.–North Korea Joint heavy oil to North Korea from December
promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning Communique Nov. 18 First SDF and police authority hold joint command post
use of force enters into force July 12) Oct. 12 Terrorist attack on the U.S.S Cole, an American destroyer, exercise in Hokkaido
Jun. 22 A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of in Yemen Nov. 21 NATO Prague Summit decides new membership for seven
ROK, seized by ROK forces Nov. 20 The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides countries in Central and Eastern Europe
Jul. 27 China publishes its first comprehensive defense white to accept the SDF Dec. 02 SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N.
paper, “Defense of China” Dec. 05 Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)
Jul. 29 Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ becomes Minister of State for Defense Dec. 12 North Korea announces it will resume operation and
ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral Dec. 15 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted establishment of nuclear-related facilities
exercise between Japan and Russia on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005) Dec. 16 Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense
Jul. 30 Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of 2001 Feb. 05 SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to
State for Defense Relief Operation (through February 11), following the revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on
Aug. 31 North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies major earthquake which hit western India on January 26 the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
through Japanese airspace Feb. 09 Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005) Dec. 17 U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system
Aug. 31 Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Feb. 10 Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine 2003 Jan. 10 North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-
Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost Mar. 01 The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
sharing after North Korean missile launch Mar. 07 Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail Jan. 24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
Sep. 01 Temporary freezing of Japan–North Korea normalization sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of Jan. 28 Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of
talks the Russian Embassy Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air
Sep. 02 Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter Apr. 01 Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force Station Replacement
flights) implemented Apr. 01 Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes Feb. 08 Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some
Sep. 24 Japan–ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima exceptions)
Apr. 26 Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister
Issue shelved) of State for Defense Mar. 20 U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq
Sep. 30 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded May 14 Diplomatic relations established between North Korea Mar. 27 Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency
Oct. 21 KEDO signed and EU Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota
Nov. 14 Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations and number of Ready Reserve personnel) enters into force
Jun. 15 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established
in region November 18–December 1, return to Japan Mar. 30 International peace cooperation activities are conducted
Aug. 08 Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee
December 5) ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru
Nov. 15 First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total relief returns to Japan on April 2)
(returned December 16)
of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) Apr. 21 ASDF in-flight refueling training (through May 1)
Sep. 11 Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur
(Iwo Jima) May 01 U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major
Sep. 12 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Nov. 20 Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense terrorist attacks
Dec. 17 U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against May 13 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement
Sep. 19 Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit
Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in
UNSCOM inspections (through December 20) the U.S. May 31 U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security
Dec. 22 Cabinet decision adopted on introduction of information Initiative (PSI) for the first time
Sep. 21 First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality
gathering satellite of National Defense Jun. 01 U.S.–Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between
Dec. 22 Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of the United States of America and the Russian Federation
Oct. 01 U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on Strategic Offensive Reductions
SACO) Oct. 02 In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the
Dec. 25 Security Council approves Japan–U.S. Cooperative Jun. 06 Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws
U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies the North Atlantic Treaty
1999 Jan. 14 Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet Jun. 13 Cabinet decision adopted on Bill Concerning the Special
Oct. 06 International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance
Mar. 01 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force in Japan refugees (through October 12) in Iraq
Mar. 23 Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula Oct. 07 U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October
(Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) Jul. 04 Cabinet decision adopted on “Implementation Plan for
19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi
Mar. 29 GSDF establishes first brigade ground fighting) Afflicted Persons”
Apr. 01 Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Oct. 08 Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti- Jul. 17 International peace cooperation activities are conducted
Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet) Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief
May 24 Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the Response Measures at the first meeting of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)
“Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” (adding Oct. 29 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures Jul. 26 Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and
cooperation for operations to respond to situations in passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of
areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective Nov. 02 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend Councillors plenary session
September 25) the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and Jul. 29 Cabinet decision adopted on changes to the
May 28 Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is implementation plan of the International Peace
of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan separately enforced on November 1, 2002) Cooperation Operations in the Golan Heights
promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Nov. 16 Cabinet decision adopted on basic plan based on the
Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and Aug. 27 First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law August 29)
enters into force Nov. 25 Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an
Jun. 15 Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships Sep. 11 Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial
MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers Zone
which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South depart for cooperation and support activities
Korean Naval ships Sep. 12 First joint exercise of PSI held in the Coral Sea northeast
Nov. 27 Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) of Australia (through September 14)
Jul. 23 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in second Atsugi Air Dec. 05 U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I
Base noise suit Sep. 14 Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East
Dec. 20 U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an countries, including Iraq
Aug. 05 First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu) Sep. 22 Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term)
Dec. 22 Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai Sep. 30 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of award for
Aug. 25 The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and serving as Chairman
Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding people engaged in dangerous activities (November 3,
Dec. 22 Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu 2003 Former SDF personnel are conferred the award for
Japan comes into force
Dec. 29 Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba people engaged in dangerous activities for the first time)
Sep. 02 North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern
Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a 2002 Jan. 29 U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts “Axis of Evil” in the State Oct. 07 Joint communique signed for the first time at Japan–
new military demarcation line on the sea of the Union Address China–ROK Summit meeting
Sep. 23 SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation Feb. 15 Cabinet decision adopted on international cooperation Oct. 10 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for
of necessary resources for international disaster relief execution plan for Timor-Leste another two years
operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November Mar. 02 680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Oct. 15 China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5
22) Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004) Nov. 15 SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq
Sep. 29 Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Mar. 06 Kanazawa District Court renders judgement in 2nd Nov. 19 Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet
Chechnya Komatsu Air Base noise suit Nov. 29 Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death
Sep. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Mar. 27 Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel in the central region of Iraq
accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura System Dec. 04 Australia decides to participate in missile defense
(through October 3) Apr. 22 2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the program
Oct. 05 Inauguration of second Obuchi Cabinet; Kawara becomes first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through Dec. 18 Iran signs IAEA agreement
Minister of State for Defense May 2)
Dec. 19 Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass
May 04 Independence of Timor-Leste destruction program

2003 Dec. 19 Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense 2005 Sep. 09 Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including 2007 Jan. 23 U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in
system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions) Sovremenny Class,are navigating in the sea area Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal
Dec. 26 ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait surrounding “Kashi” gas field near the median line Feb. 13 North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities
Dec. 30 Relief materials transported by air in response to great between Japan and China in the East China Sea during the Six-Party Talks
earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch Sep. 19 Joint statement adopted at Fourth Round of Six-Party Mar. 05 First Aviation Training Relocation associated with
of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1–2, 2004) Talks realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through
2004 Jan. 22 ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait Sep. 21 Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet March 8)
Feb. 03 Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian Oct. 12 SDF units dispatched for Japan Disaster Relief operations Mar. 13 Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the
and reconstruction support activities in response to large-scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
Feb. 09 Implementation of Iraq-related response measures units returned home by December 2) signed
approved in Diet Oct. 20 GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field Mar. 23 Emergency response procedures for destruction measures
Feb. 09 MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return training against terrorist attacks for the first time against ballistic missiles are prepared
on April 8) Oct. 29 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Mar. 28 Establishment of the Central Readiness Force
Feb. 25 Second Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through Washington, D.C.) joint announces “Japan–U.S. Alliance: Mar. 30 A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma
February 29) Transformation and Realignment for the Future” Base
Mar. 04 Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in Oct. 31 Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga Mar. 30 SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission
response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through becomes Minister of State for Defense in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January
Reference
March 11) Oct. 31 Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 18, 2011)
Mar. 22 EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year) Apr. 16 Japan–U.S.–India naval drill conducted for the first time
of the structure and organization of EU rapid response Nov. 09 First session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks held Apr. 16 Nagoya District Court, Kanazawa Branch renders
capabilities (Beijing, through November 11)” judgment on the third and fourth trials for the suit
Mar. 26 Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense Nov. 11 Cabinet decision adopted on “the Government’s actions pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base
system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of to be taken for the time being in connection with the May 01 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,”
Councillors plenary session) matters approved at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement “Alliance
Apr. 15 First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas Committee held on October 29, 2005” Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security
implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait Nov. 16 India and Pakistan complete the opening of five areas and Defense Cooperation”
Apr. 15 Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the on the effective control line in Kashmir to enable May 18 ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility
Defense Agency/SDF disaster rescue activities for the sufferers from the great May 29 Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new
Apr. 28 U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution earthquake in Pakistan etc. intercontinental ballistic missile
1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass Nov. 27 Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place May 29 Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Base
destruction for the first time in Fukui Prefecture noise suit
May 20 United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor Nov. 30 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Jun. 01 Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities
(UNMISET) transfers defense and security authority to Base noise suit Administration Agency and its consolidation into the
Timor-Leste Dec. 01 Partial revision of the Act on Remuneration of Defense Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector
May 22 Japan–North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family Agency Personnel (revised remuneration) enters into force General’s Office of Legal Compliance and the Local
members of abductees return to Japan Dec. 14 The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur) Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc)
Jun. 01 Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated (sovereignty Dec. 16 U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the
transferred on June 28), and Iraqi Governing Council human rights situation in North Korea Self-Defense Forces Law enacted
dissolved Dec. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted Jun. 28 Russia succeeds in the experimental launch of new
Jun. 01 U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on “Japan–U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava
on reconstruction of Iraq Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense” Jul. 04 Koike becomes Minister of Defense
Jun. 14 Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency 2006 Jan. 10 Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment Jul. 14 Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the
response measures passed in House of Councillors Feb. 03 The United States releases “Quadrennial Defense termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed
plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Review” (QDR) Forces in Europe (CFE)
Jun. 14 Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Feb. 04 Japan–North Korea negotiations concerning abduction Jul. 20 Enactment of the “Basic Act on Ocean Policy”
Ships passed issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/ Jul. 31 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the
Jun. 18 Cabinet agreement for SDF’s activities in Iraq for missile issues are held (through February 6) dispatch of the U.N./AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after Mar. 06 At the Japan–China intergovernmental conference, China Darfur region in Sudan
reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East Aug. 10 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S. General
forces) China Sea (through March 7) Security of Military Information Agreement
Jun. 23 Third Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through Mar. 16 The United States announces the National Security Aug. 27 Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes
June 26) Strategy Minister of Defense
Jun. 28 Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government Mar. 27 Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic Aug. 29 Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures
Jul. 20 In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, patrols missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of Law
commenced by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With Sep. 01 Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities
Singapore and Malaysia the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a Headquarters, Inspector General’s Office of Legal
Aug. 13 U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan joint operations posture Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created
City, Okinawa Apr. 23 Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of Sep. 26 Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister
Sep. 27 Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to of Defense
becomes Minister of State for Defense Guam as part of realignment of USFJ Sep. 27 Second session of the Sixth Round of the Sixth Six-Party
Oct. 04 Final report by “Council on Security and Defense May 01 The Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Talks held (Beijing) (through September 30) (October 3,
Capabilities” Washington, D.C.) announces the “United States– Japan Sixth Six-Party Talks Agreement “Second-Phase Actions
Oct. 06 The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three stage Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” published)
reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK May 05 Peace agreement between Sudanese Government and Oct. 03 The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the “Second-Phase
by 2008 certain rebel forces in Darfur Conflict Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,”
Oct. 25 PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by May 11 The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State is announced
Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment Oct. 17 First Japan–U.S.–Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF, U.S.
Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27) of USFJ Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force)
Oct. 25 EU leaders sign the EU Constitution May 15 U.S. rescinds designation of Libya as a state sponsor Nov. 01 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order
Nov. 07 Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative of terrorism issued on termination of response measures based on
troop review May 27 Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
Nov. 10 Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered Java, Indonesia Nov. 16 Council for MOD Reform established
submarine into Japan’s territorial waters–Maritime May 29 First P-3C visit to Australia Nov. 21 The USS Kitty Hawk is denied docking in Hong Kong
security operations order issued (through November 12) Jun. 01 SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international and returns to Yokosuka via the Taiwan Strait (through
Nov. 16 Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake November 25)
over its nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s that occurred in central Java (through June 22) Nov. 28 Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time
territorial waters Jun. 16 Nepalese Government and Maoists sign peace accord (through December 1)
Dec. 26 Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster Jun. 19 Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority Dec. 13 Russia seizes four Japanese fishing vessels off Kunashiri
Dec. 27 China releases a white paper, “China’s National Defense to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is Island
in 2004” transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq Dec. 18 Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of
Dec. 10 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted Jun. 20 The Government makes a decision to discontinue the USFJ Differential, etc.) Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts
on “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005” and activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile
“Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005–FY2009” units continue to support the United Nations and the Dec. 19 Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S.
Dec. 28 MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand’s Phuket multinational forces forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ
Island to engage in the international disaster relief Jun. 23 Agreement concerning provision of arms and military realignment
activities for Indonesia’s Sumatra earthquake and Indian technologies to the United States is signed Dec. 24 “Improvement of next fixedwing aircraft” and “Important
Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005) Jun. 29 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document “The Japan- issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup
2005 Jan. 04 SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the U.S. Alliance of the New Century” announced in FY2008”
international emergency assistance in response to the Jul. 05 North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles Dec. 24 Cabinet decisions adopted on “Changes of emergency
major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in into the Sea of Japan response measures on destruction measures by ballistic
the Indian Ocean (All teams returned home by March 23) Jul. 13 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Atsugi Air missiles”
Jan. 19 The Japanese Government newly formulates measures Base noise suit 2008 Jan. 16 Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special
to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Jul. 31 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January
Japan’s territorial waters of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. 24, 25)
Feb. 10 North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement reinforcement of facilities administration function of the Jan. 25 New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost
implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed
announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods) reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Feb. 19 Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat
Feb. 17 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement Provincial Cooperation Offices) Feb. 20 U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down
in 2nd Kadena Air Base noise suit Aug. 16 A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, out-of-control satellite outside the earth’s atmosphere
Feb. 19 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” killing one of its crew members. The Government files a with an SM-3
Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives strong protest to Russia Feb. 21 Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures
confirmed Aug. 29 U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S.
Mar. 08 “ROK’s Government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft Yokosuka naval facility ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010)
approaching Takeshima without authorization” Aug. 29 The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Mar. 14 Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital
Mar. 14 National People’s Congress adopts “Anti-Secession Law” Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China
Mar. 14 A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and Sep. 20 Chinese Navy performs joint search and rescue exercises Mar. 18 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy”
three crew abducted (Released on March 20) with U.S. Navy (sea around San Diego) Mar. 26 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of
Mar. 16 Shimane Prefecture establishes “Takeshima Day” Sep. 26 Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc.
Mar. 25 Cabinet decision adopted on Basic Guidelines for the State for Defense reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication
Protection of Civilians Oct. 09 North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test Unit)
Apr. 25 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad Oct. 13 Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which Apr. 24 Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea
accident on JR West’s Fukuchiyama Line announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities
Jul. 14 Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces Dec. 19 U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution destroyed in an air attack
permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea May 12 M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China
East China Sea 2007 Jan. 09 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the May 30 The Convention on Cluster Munitions is adopted at an
Aug. 05 An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of international conference in Dublin
disaster relief activity in Connection with the accident of a the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and Jun. 24 First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28)
small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All stipulation of the SDF’s international peace cooperation Jun. 26 Agreement reached between the Government of Japan
units returned home by August 10) activities as its primary mission) and Government of China on the joint development of
Sep. 09 First China-Russia joint military exercises “Peace Mission Jan. 09 Kyuma becomes Minister of Defense natural gas in the East China Sea
2005” (through August 25) Jan. 12 China conducts an anti-satellite test

2008 Jun. 26 North Korea submits its nuclear program 2009 Aug. 01 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment 2010 Dec. 17 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
Jun. 26 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. on National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and
in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011
Jul. 07 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9) Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the to FY2015)
Jul. 12 Publication of the Press Communique of the Heads of Defense Councilors System) 2011 Jan. 11 China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the
Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Sep. 16 Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes next-generation stealth aircraft
Talks Minister of Defense Jan. 14 U.N. Security Council chairman’s statement concerning
Jul. 15 Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Sep. 17 U.S. President Obama announces review of MD the conclusion of the UNMIN mandate is adopted
Defense released deployment in Europe Jan. 14 Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term)
Jul. 17 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Sep. 30 M7.6 earthquake occurs off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia Jan. 21 Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in
Base noise suit Oct. 01 China conducts 60th Anniversary Military Parade connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the
Aug. 02 Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi Oct. 05 SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief stationing of U.S.Forces in Japan (comes into effect on
becomes Minister of Defense activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia April 1)
Aug. 08 Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes (though October 17) Jan. 27 Supreme Court renders judgement in 2nd Kadena Air
between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Oct. 20 1st Ministry of Defense Policy Meeting Base noise suit
Aug. 10 Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Oct. 27 Destroyer collides with ROK cargo ship in the Kammon Jan. 28 Prime Minister Kan attends the World Economic Forum
Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Straits Annual Meeting (Davos meeting) (through January 30)
Reference
Aug. 29 TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing Nov. 10 North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Feb. 04 The United States releases “National Security Space
patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 Yellow Sea Strategy” (NSSS)
Sep. 09 U.S. President G.W. Bush announces reduction of Nov. 11 Government Revitalization Unit “project screening” Feb. 05 New START comes into effect
U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in (through November 27) Feb. 08 The United States releases the “National Military Strategy”
Afghanistan Nov. 12 Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Emperor of Feb. 22 Iranian naval ships pass through Suez Canal
Sep. 24 Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Japan’s coronation Feb. 23 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the
Defense Nov. 23 Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3)
Sep. 25 The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS “George (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery Mar. 11 Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the
Washington”arrives in the port of Yokosuka for the at Sea Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the
first time Dec. 01 Lisbon treaty comes into effect Anti-Piracy Law
Sep. 25 China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” Dec. 03 Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Mar. 11 Great East Japan Earthquake strikes
and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Mar. 11 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great
first time Supreme Court) East Japan Earthquake (through August 31)
Oct. 03 U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, Dec. 05 START I lapses Mar. 12 Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to
attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan Dec. 17 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26)
Oct. 10 U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors on the build-up of defense capability for FY2010 Mar. 16 Cabinet decisions adopted on first disaster call-up of SDF
of terrorism 2010 Jan. 11 China announces that it has performed missile reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel in the
Oct. 19 Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail interception test wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake
through Tsugaru Strait for the first time Jan. 12 M7 earthquake occurs in Haiti Mar. 16 Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF
Oct. 22 Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Jan. 17 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel (through
Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed) August 31)
Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Jan. 19 “2+2” joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Mar. 17 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 allowing use
Cooperation signed Japan–U.S. Security Treaty of force against Libya
Oct. 24 SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Jan. 29 First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA Mar. 19 The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France
Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Feb. 05 Decision made to dispatch SDF units to United Nations commence military operations against Libya
Nov. 02 Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, Apr. 05 U.S. President Obama gives speech in Prague
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation Apr. 11 Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great
Ocean for the first time completed) East Japan Earthquake established
Dec. 02 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on Feb. 27 U.S. announces “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) and Apr. 15 Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF
countering piracy off the coast of Somalia “Ballistic Missile Defense Review” (BMDR) and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31)
Dec. 03 Convention on Cluster Munitions signed Mar. 07 Russia publishes new Navy doctrine Apr. 27 Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law
Dec. 20 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted Mar. 11 ASDF Hyakuri Base, joint civilian use of runway (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the
on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005– Mar. 26 ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank in the Yellow Sea environment surrounding specified defense facilities)
FY2009) by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine May 02 U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin
Dec. 23 ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Mar. 26 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization
Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new Al-Qaeda
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Jun. 01 SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation
Dec. 26 Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia Youth Technical School) Jun. 21 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” in
for escort mission Apr. 01 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of “Toward a
2009 Jan. 08 ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri) the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment Deeper and Broader Japan–U.S. Alliance: Building on 50
Jan. 15 Ministry of Defense decides on “Basic Policy Relating to of the job status of GSDF students) years of Partnership”
the Development and Use of Space” Apr. 02 In Thailand, Thaksin supporters occupy the center of Jun. 22 U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw
Jan. 27 Japanese fishing boat No. 38 Yoshimaru caught by cities such as Bangkok. On April 10, they clash with Thai U.S. troops from Afghanistan
Russian Coast Guard in Sea of Japan Government security forces (through May 19) Jun. 24 Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction
Jan. 31 Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as Apr. 06 U.S. announces “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR) Jun. 28 First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction
new president Apr. 12 1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through measures
Feb. 10 Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal April 13) Jul. 08 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish
duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the May 01 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and UNMISS
redeployment group mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27) Jul. 09 Independence of the Republic of South Sudan
Feb. 17 Signing of the “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in May 19 Signing of Japan–Australia ACSA Jul. 11 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1997 to terminate
Okinawa to Guam” May 23 MOD/SDF participate in Pacific Partnership 2010 (through UNMIS
Feb. 17 U.S. President Obama decides to increase the number of July 15) Jul. 14 U.S. DoD releases “Department of Defense Strategy for
troops dispatched to Afghanistan by approximately 17,000 May 26 Enactment of the “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Operating in Cyberspace”
Feb. 27 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Aug. 10 Conducts its first navigation Chinese aircraft carrier
2nd Kadena Air Base noise suit Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Varyag
Mar. 06 U.S.–Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, agreement to Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Aug. 24 The Chinese fisheries patrol ships enter Japan’s territorial
“reset” bilateral relations (Geneva) May 27 U.S. announces “National Security Strategy” (NSS) waters near the Senkaku Islands
Mar. 13 Cabinet decision adopted on Anti-Piracy Measures Law May 28 Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Sep. 02 Noda Cabinet established; Ichikawa becomes Minister
Mar. 13 SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security Committee (“2+2”) of Defense
operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Jun. 08 Kan Cabinet established Sep. 09 24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Jun. 09 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding Sep. 19 Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry
Mar. 14 2 MSDF ships are dispatched to protect vessels with ties additional sanction on Iran Sep. 27 Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint
to Japan from the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in Jun. 25 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Nato Information statement made
the Gulf of Aden Security Agreement Sep. 29 Chinese space laboratory “Tiangong 1” launched
Mar. 27 SDF action order for implementation of destruction Jun. 28 Release of the U.S. “National Space Policy” (NSP)
measures against ballistic missiles is issued Sep. 30 Cabinet decisions adopted on “Promotion of the
Jul. 01 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project” and
Mar. 30 MSDF ships begin escort missions as part of anti-piracy the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment “Promoting development and utilization of aerospace”
measures of the job status of SDF recruits) Oct. 10 ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment
Apr. 03 Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Jul. 13 Cabinet decision adopted on “Act on the Preservation (through October 28)
Agreement with Djibouti of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Oct. 11 Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air
Apr. 05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies Infrastructure of Remote Islands for Maintaining and Station noise suit
through Japanese airspace Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Oct. 24 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-France
Apr. 05 U.S. President Obama delivers speech in Prague Continental Shelf” Information Security Agreement
Apr. 06 SDF action order for termination of destruction measures Jul. 29 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in Oct. 31 NATO ends operations in Libya
against ballistic missiles is issued 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit Nov. 15 Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF personnel
Apr. 10 Supreme Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base Aug. 01 Coming into effect of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in
noise suit Aug. 31 Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan
May 04 1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines) in Pakistan (through October 10) on November 28)
May 15 Order issued for P-3C to be dispatched to Djibouti for Sep. 07 Release of the “Future Direction of Procurement Reform” Nov. 22 Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in by the Comprehensive Procurement Reform Promotion Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific
the Gulf of Aden Committee Ocean
May 19 “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Sep. 07 Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard Dec. 18 Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq
Guam” comes into force patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands Dec. 20 Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by
May 25 North Korea conducts the underground nuclear test Sep. 10 Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF officers as the Cabinet regarding “acquisition of the next-generation
Jun. 02 Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated key military contact personnel (military observers) to the fighter aircraft”
Jun. 11 Commencement of warning and surveillance flights in the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) Dec. 20 Cabinet Decision on dispatching engineer units, etc. for
Gulf of Aden by P-3Cs (dispatched on September 27) United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
Jun. 16 Provisional government of Somalia declares a state of Sep. 17 Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (deployed from January 11, 2012) (Operation completed
emergency due to outbreak of fighting Sep. 28 North Korea holds conference of the Workers’ Party of on May 31, 2017)
Jul. 04 North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles Korea and a Plenary Meeting of Central Committee; Dec. 27 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines
into the Sea of Japan Kim Jong-un is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Central for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc.
Jul. 14 Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions Military Commission Dec. 28 Environmental impact statement for the Futenma
Jul. 17 Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Oct. 01 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to
Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012)
Possession the lowest enlisted ranks) 2012 Jan. 05 U.S. announces the defense strategic guidance
Jul. 24 Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for Oct. 19 The United Kingdom releases “Strategic Defence and Jan. 11 1st Advance unit for UNMISS starts departing Japan
anti-piracy operations Security Review” (SDSR) Jan. 13 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes
Jul. 28 The exterior of the body of oil tanker “M. STAR” damaged Nov. 01 Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island Minister of Defense
in an explosion at the Straits of Hormuz Nov. 19 NATO adopts New Strategic Concept Feb. 10 Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency
Jul. 31 Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational Nov. 23 North Korea shells the ROK’s Yeonpyeong island Mar. 16 Chinese government ship “Haijian” enters Japan’s
forces from Iraq Dec. 07 Establishment of a governmental committee to review territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
information security, as a result of the leakage of the video Mar. 26 Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base
showing the fishing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands Mar. 27 Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit

2012 Mar. 30 SDF action order for implementation of destruction 2013 Jul. 13 Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea 2014 May 19 U.S. Department of Justice indicts Chinese PLA officers
measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated of Okhotsk and others for conducting cyber attacks
April 13) Jul. 22 China Coast Guard sign put up May 20 China-Russia joint maritime military exercise “Naval
Apr. 13 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a Jul. 24 Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main Interaction 2014” (East China Sea) (through May 26)
“Satellite” island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the May 21 Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 4th Atsugi
Apr. 13 Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Pacific Ocean for the first time Air Base noise suit
Defense Commission Aug. 21 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the May 24 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft
Apr. 17 Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the Pacific Ocean May 27 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2155 that extends
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) Aug. 22 Russian bombers intrude into Japan’s airspace UNMISS mandate and limits it to four areas including
(through February 28, 2013) Aug. 27 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of civilian protection, etc.
Apr. 27 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific May 31 Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Onodera attend
statement Ocean 13th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore)
Apr. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Aug. 30 “Direction of the MOD Reform” released Jun. 07 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Pacific Ocean Sep. 01 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities holds first Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
May 17 Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security meeting Jun. 11 Japan-Australia “2+2” (Tokyo)
Agreement Sep. 08 Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa Jun. 11 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft
Jun. 04 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); and Miyako Island
Reference
Jun. 19 Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense Sep. 09 Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality released
Jul. 01 26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through flies over the East China Sea Jun. 21 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of
July 2) Sep. 10 1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to
Jul. 03 First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held early retirement system)
(Hokkaido, through July 5) Sep. 27 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on Jun. 29 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Jul. 11 Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement elimination of Syrian chemical weapons Jun. 29 ISIL declares establishment of “Islamic State” and caliphate
Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Oct. 03 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”, Jul. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Development of Seamless
Senkaku Islands Tokyo) Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and
Jul. 12 One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Oct. 03 Signing of the “Protocol to amend the agreement Protect its People”
Senkaku Islands concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Jul. 08 Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of
Jul. 12 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law Okinawa to Guam” Defense Equipment and Technology is signed
for Establishment of Cabinet Office Oct. 16 Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 Jul. 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Aug. 10 South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima (through November 8) Jul. 13 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Sep. 07 “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the Oct. 23 Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Jul. 25 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the
MOD/JSDF” is released Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of
Sep. 11 Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands Ocean Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs)
Sep. 23 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Oct. 30 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Jul. 26 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Aug. 01 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the
Sep. 25 The first Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned Nov. 08 Typhoon No. 30 Haiyan hit Leyte Island, Philippines Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF
Oct. 01 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term) Nov. 12 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air
Oct. 16 Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18) Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.)
between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island Nov. 15 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Aug. 06 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall in
for the first time (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Yamaguchi Prefecture (through August 8)
Nov. 26 Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Syrian chemical weapons, etc. Aug. 8- U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in
Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Nov. 22 Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded Northern Iraq
Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. category of people who may be transported by the Aug. 10 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply
Dec. 04 Launch of capacity building program in East Timor JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other supports in Kochi Prefecture (through August 14)
Dec. 07 SDF action order for implementation of destruction emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into Aug. 12 Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern
measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated force Territories and Chishima Islands
December 12) Nov. 23 China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Aug. 17 Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in
Dec. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a Defense Identification Zone” Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture
“Satellite” Nov. 24 Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., Aug. 17 Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in
Dec. 13 A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the Tamba City, Hyogo Prefecture
time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue
Aug. 19 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces’
Dec. 26 Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Dec. 04 National Security Council established patrol aircraft
Minister of Defense Dec. 08 The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Aug. 20 Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities
Dec. 31 UNMIT ends Identification Zone in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through
2013 Jan. 16 Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria Dec. 13 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets September 11)
Jan. 19 A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a promulgated Aug. 28 MOD formulates “Basic Policy Relating to the
helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer Dec. 15 Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar Development and Use of Space (revised)”
Jan. 20 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement landing Sep. 01 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo); “Tokyo Declaration
Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return Dec. 15 Confrontations occur between forces aligned with for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership”
unit flag) the president and forces aligned with the former vice Sep. 03 Eto becomes Minister of Defense
Jan. 20 As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals president
Sep. 03 2nd Reshuffled Abe Cabinet is established
Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces Dec. 17 National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted
on “National Security Strategy,” “National Defense Sep. 10 U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL
Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian Sep. 11 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply
hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and
“Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)” supports in Ebetsu City, Hokkaido (through September 13)
January 24)
Dec. 23 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Sep. 18 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2177 on Ebola
Jan. 23 Australia announces the National Security Strategy virus disease countermeasures; UNMEER’s establishment
Jan. 25 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
Dec. 23 Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned is announced
on build-up of defense capability for FY2013 Sep. 19 Russia begins large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014”
Jan. 25 “Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Strategic (incorporated into Pacific Fleet)
Dec. 27 Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for (through September 25)
Headquarters for Space Development Sep. 22- The United States and other coalition countries begin
Jan. 27 China announces that it has performed missile public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement
Facility construction project airstrikes on ISIL in Syria
interception test Sep. 26 Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN
Jan. 30 A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF 2014 Jan. 01 Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Information Security
Agreement Peacekeeping Operations (New York)
destroyer in the East China Sea Sep. 27 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt.
Jan. 31 Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to Jan. 07 National Security Secretariat launched
Jan. 15 Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing Ontake (through October 16)
the Pacific Ocean Sep. 29 Afghanistan’s new government is launched
Jan. 31 Japan–Australia ACSA enters into force vessel in the Hiroshima Bay
Jan. 22 Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Oct. 03 Cabinet decision adopted on “Establishment of the
Jan. 31 Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA) Headquarters for Creating a Society where All Women Shine”
of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Bases on Okinawa established
Jan. 28 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2134 approving Oct. 26 Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the
Forces Act, etc. MOD/SDF
Feb. 01 Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially deployment of EU units to Central Africa
Feb. 14 Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Nov. 16 Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in
amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Okinawa gubernatorial election
Feb. 07 Russian fighters intrude into Japan’s airspace MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established
Feb. 15 Disaster relief teams dispatched after heavy snowfall Nov. 21 “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of unmanned
Feb. 12 North Korea’s underground nuclear test aerial vehicle
disaster (through February 23)
Feb. 15 First meeting of a panel of experts on the establishment of Nov. 23 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to an
a Japanese National Security Council (NSC) Mar. 01 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano
Feb. 20 Naha District Court renders judgment on Henoko Ocean Prefecture
environmental assessment case Nov. 24 ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near
Mar. 03 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Feb. 23 Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Takeshima
Minister Abe Mar. 04 The United States releases QDR, releases FY2014 budget
proposal Nov. 28 Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief
Mar. 01 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola
of Japan’s industries in the production of the F-35A Mar. 11 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the
missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28) virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through
Mar. 15 SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony December 11)
to return unit flag) Mar. 18 Russian “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea Dec. 01 SDF personnel dispatched to NATO for the first time
Mar. 22 Entry into force of Japan-Australia Information Security Dec. 01 Russia establishes the Northern Joint Strategic Command
Agreement Mar. 19 A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan’s
contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island) Dec. 04 Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the
Mar. 26 Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing’s Pacific Ocean
affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self- Mar. 24 Prime Minister Abe attends 3rd Nuclear Security Summit
(Hague, through March 25) Dec.4- Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in
Defense Forces Act, etc. Western Pacific. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya
Mar. 30 Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Mar. 26 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27)
Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 01 Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing and circle Japan
Apr. 02 North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended
laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Dec. 06 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy snowfall
the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11)
disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Apr. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Three Principles on Transfer
of Defense Equipment and Technology” Dec. 10 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets
Talks in October, 2007 enters into force
Apr. 26 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” Apr. 10 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2149 approving
PKO deployment to Central Africa Dec. 19 Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative
Apr. 29 France releases “White Paper on Defence and National Committee (2+2)
Security” Apr. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu
outbreak in Kumamoto Prefecture (through April 16) Dec. 24 Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes
May 07 Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island Minister of Defense
to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 28 U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement: (EDCA) Dec. 24 Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect
May 27 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Dec. 26 Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific May 02 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Kyogamisaki is completed
Ocean Dec. 31 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to
Jun. 18 Afghanistan starts final phase of transition of security Ocean
May 07 Collision and confrontation between Chinese and disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)
responsibilities from the International Security Assistance
Force Vietnamese vessels occur
Jul. 04 Signing of the Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the May 14 “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the
Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and the Japan- relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to
U.K. Information Security Agreement Guam” comes into force
Jul. 05 China-Russia joint naval exercise. “Naval Interaction May 15 The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis
2013” (through July 11) for Security submits its report

Year Defense Domestic International
2015 Jan. 15 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Jan. 09 “Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Jan. 01 NATO begins “Resolute Support Mission”
bird flu outbreak in Okayama Prefecture (through Strategic Headquarters for Space Development Jan. 02 ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals
January 19) Jan. 16 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Cairo) subsequently released on January 24 and February 1)
Jan. 18 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to Jan. 17 Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Amman) Jan. 07 Shooting incident against a publisher (Charlie Hebdo), etc. in Paris
the bird flu outbreak in Saga Prefecture (through Jan. 18 Japan-Israel summit meeting (Jerusalem, through Jan. 29 African Union decides to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram
January 20) January 19) Feb. 02 U.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2016
Jan. 18 Defense Minister Nakatani visits Djibouti Feb. 09 Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 06 The United States releases “National Security Strategy” (NSS)
Jan. 19 Defense Minister Nakatani visits South Sudan Feb. 10 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 12 Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire
Jan. 21 First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Feb. 10 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo) agreement)
Meeting (London) Feb. 27 Japan-Poland summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 13 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Jan. 21 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (U.K.) Mar. 06 Japan-Laos summit meeting (Tokyo) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Jan. 26 FY2014 SDF joint exercise (command post exercise) Feb. 14 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Mar. 09 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo)
(through January 30) Island through to the Pacific Ocean (February 15)
Jan. 29 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting Mar. 20 The Ruling Coalition on the Development of Security
Legislation presents “Concrete Vision for the Feb. 26 Saudi Arabia begins airstrikes on Houthis in Yemen
(Tokyo)
Development of Security Legislation” Mar. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Jan. 29 Memorandum on Japan-Philippines Defense
Cooperation and Exchanges is signed Mar. 23 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar. 18 An armed group attacks Bardo Museum in Tunisia (three Japanese nationals killed)
Reference
Feb. 02 Disaster relief teams dispatched to help remove Mar. 24 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 02 EU3+3 and Iran agree on “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”
snow to eliminate isolated areas as a result of the Mar. 27 Japan-Portugal summit meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 23 U.S. DoD releases “The DoD Cyber Strategy”
severe snowstorm in Rausu Town, Hokkaido (through Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Apr. 26 ASEAN Summit (Kuala Lumpur) (through April 27)
February 3) May 13 Japan-Belgium summit meeting (Tokyo) May 08 U.S. DoD releases “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
Feb. 08 Inaugural airborne exercise under Japan-U.S. joint May 14 Cabinet decision on “Bill for the Development of the People’s Republic of China”
exercise (North Wind 2) (through February 22) Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International May 09 North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully
Mar. 13 Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Peace Support Bill” May 11 China-Russia naval combined exercise Joint Sea 2015 (I) is held (Mediterranean Sea) (through
Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) May 14 Cabinet decisions on “Responses to Foreign May 21)
Mar. 13 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through May 21 Two Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the
Mar. 13 Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in
Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Tokyo) that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in this airspace)
Mar. 14 Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) International Law,” “The Government’s Responses to May 25 Signing of India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Cooperation (Vietnamese Minister
Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding of National Defence visits India)
Mar. 20 Japan-Timor Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting Seas by an Armed Group,” and “Responses to Acts
(Tokyo) May 26 China releases defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy”
of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or
Mar. 30 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Jun. 12 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Apr. 08 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas” advance to the Pacific Ocean
Apr. 21 National Defense Medical College instructor May 20 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 01 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy
dispatched to support WHO’s epidemiological studies May 25 Japan-Malaysia summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 07 Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the
on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Philippines (The Hague) (through July 13)
May 29 Japan-EU Summit (Tokyo)
Africa, etc. (through May 29) Jul. 18 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Jun. 04 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Tokyo) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Apr. 27 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response
to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) Jun. 07 Japan-France summit meeting (Germany) Jul. 29 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft, early warning aircraft, and two bombers fly between
Apr. 27 The new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Jun. 07 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Germany) the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (July 30)
Cooperation” is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Jun. 08 Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Germany) Aug. 01 Russia creates Aerospace Force by merging the Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces
Consultative Committee meeting (“2+2,” New York) Jun. 11 Naha District Court’s Okinawa Branch renders Aug. 05 France and Russia agree to annul agreement on France’s delivery of two Mistral-class
Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, judgment in 3rd Futenma Air Station noise suit amphibious assault ships
D.C.) Jul. 30 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 4th Atsugi Air Aug. 17 Seven Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward. Subsequently, China-Russia naval
Apr. 30 Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Facility noise suit combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the
Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Aug. 03 Japan-Italy summit meeting (Tokyo) exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait eastward (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering
Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements Sep. 15 Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo) Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near
(so-called “Long-term Contract Act”) Sep. 19 Legislation for Peace and Security (“Bill for the the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4).
May 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption at Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” Aug. 20 Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK
Kuchinoerabu Island (through June 1) and “International Peace Support Bill”) is passed in Aug. 20 U.S. DoD submits Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy to Congress
May 30 Defense Minister Nakatani attends 14th Asia Security the House of Councillors plenary session Aug. 22 Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island
Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through May 31) Sep. 26 Prime Minister Abe visits the United States (through Aug. 25 Agreement on inter-Korean joint press statement (August 25 agreement)
May 30 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) September 29)
Aug. 26 Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan
May 30 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Sep. 27 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (New York)
Sep. 03 China holds commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victories against Japanese
Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting Sep. 27 Japan-Iran summit meeting (New York) aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. In an address, President Xi Jinping announces
(Singapore) Sep. 28 Japan-Russia summit meeting (New York) reduction in troop strength by 300,000.
May 31 Pacific Partnership 2015 (through August 14) Sep. 28 Japan-Ukraine summit meeting (New York) Sep. 15 Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of the
May 31 Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Sep. 28 Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (New York) Nemuro Peninsula
Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy Sep. 28 Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (New York) Sep. 30 Russia’s second Borey-class SSBN Alexander Nevsky arrives in Kamchatka
operations (through August 27)
Sep. 29 Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field Sep. 30 Russia begins airstrikes on ISIL forces, etc. in Syrian territory
Jun. 03 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the U.S. Oct. 03 Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims
Jun. 07 Joint disaster response exercise with U.S. Forces Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Status responsibility for the attack in a statement)
(TREX) of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Oct. 10 North Korea holds commemorative event of the 70th anniversary of the Korean Workers’
Jun. 29 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through July 3) Oct. 05 Japan-France summit meeting (Tokyo) Party (KWP)
Jul. 03 Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of Oct. 06 Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 26 U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Islands in
missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7) Oct. 07 Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation
Aug. 18 Joint exercise in the United States (Dawn Blitz 2015) Oct. 08 Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 29 The tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction with respect to some of the matters in the South
(through September 9)
Oct. 15 Yamaguchi District Court’s Iwakuni Branch renders China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Philippines (The Hague)
Sep. 01 Exercise for medical activities in the aftermath of judgment in 1st Iwakuni Air Base noise suit Oct. 31 A Russian jetliner crashes in the Sinai Peninsula, killing all passengers and crewmembers.
large-scale earthquakes
Oct. 27 Cabinet verbal understanding regarding “Revocation ISIL’s Sinai Province claims responsibility for the incident.
Sep. 01 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water of reclamation approval based on the Act on Nov. 03 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through November 4)
supply supports in Tsushima City, Nagasaki Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface
Prefecture (through September 2) Nov. 07 China and Taiwan hold first summit meeting since their split
pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Facility Nov. 08 Myanmar general election (opposition party NLD wins majority)
Sep. 10 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rain construction project”
in Kanto and Tohoku in September 2015 (through Nov. 11 A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the contiguous zone south
Oct. 28 Written notice regarding start of construction work of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12)
September 19) related to Futenma Replacement Facility construction
Oct. 01 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture Nov. 13 Terror attacks in Paris, France. ISIL France claims responsibility for the attacks in a statement.
Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of Nov. 01 Japan-China-ROK summit meeting (Seoul) Nov. 15 G20 Antalya Summit (Antalya, Turkey) (through November 16)
actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment Nov. 18 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Manila) (through November 19)
Nov. 01 Japan-China summit meeting (Seoul)
of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.) Nov. 22 East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Summit (November 21-22)
Nov. 02 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Seoul)
Oct. 01 Technical Research and Development Institute and Nov. 23 The United Kingdom releases “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Equipment Procurement and Construction Office Nov. 10 Japan-Netherlands summit meeting (Tokyo)
Review 2015” (NSS-SDSR 2015)
are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Nov. 13 Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Istanbul)
Nov. 24 Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the
Agency is established Nov. 15 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Philippines (The Hague) (through November 30)
Oct. 18 FY2015 SDF Fleet Review Nov. 15 Japan-EU summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Nov. 24 CMC Reform Work Conference is held, and President Xi Jinping delivers address on the
Oct. 20 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) Nov. 15 Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) direction of military reforms (through November 26)
Oct. 23 SDF Joint Exercise (Field Training Exercise) (through Nov. 15 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Nov. 24 Turkish Armed Forces shoots down Russian Armed Forces aircraft saying it violated Turkish
November 13) Nov. 16 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) airspace
Nov. 03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia) Nov. 16 Japan-Saudi Arabia summit meeting (Antalya, Nov. 27 China’s four bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of
Nov. 03 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM- Turkey) Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson of China
Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through November 4) Nov. 18 Japan-Canada Summit (Manila) announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four bombers and early
Nov. 04 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Nov. 19 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Manila) warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island.
Lumpur) Nov. 26 Suit is instituted for “Case regarding retraction order Dec. 02 Shooting terror attack in California, United States
Nov. 06 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting request for revocation of the landfill permit based on Dec. 07 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
(Vietnam) provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Dec. 07 U.S. P-8 aircraft are deployed to Singapore (through December 14)
Nov. 12 Japan-Georgia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) Dec. 13 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Nov. 22 Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Nov. 30 Japan-France Summit (Paris) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Consultations (Sydney) Dec. 04 Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release “Implementation of Dec. 16 The United States decides to sell weapons including two missile frigates to Taiwan and
Nov. 22 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas notifies Congress
Dec. 04 Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting in Okinawa” Dec. 21 Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan
(Tokyo) Dec. 12 Japan-India summit meeting (New Delhi) Dec. 23 A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous
Dec. 12 Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer Dec. 12 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-India zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through December 26)
of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed General Security of Military Information Agreement Dec. 24 Russia-India joint statement (includes cooperation on military technology, joint development
(New Delhi) Dec. 18 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Tokyo) of military equipment, etc.)
Dec. 17 Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dec. 26 A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into
Meeting (Tokyo) Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time
Dec. 30 The leaders of Russia, France, Germany, and Ukraine agree to extend ceasefire agreement in
eastern Ukraine that was set to expire in end of 2015
Dec. 31 China announces its first domestic aircraft carrier is being built in Dalian, Liaoning Province
Dec. 31 China establishes PLA Army Headquarters, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force
Dec. 31 Russia revises National Security Strategy
2016 Jan. 06 Special survey of radioactivity related to North Jan. 22 Cabinet decision on 5th Science and Technology Jan. 01 U.S. bombers conduct low-level flight over the Osan Air Base in the ROK
Korea’s nuclear test (through January 15) Basic Plan Jan. 02 China conducts aircraft test flights to Fiery Cross Reef (January 3 and 6)
Jan. 08 Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting Jan. 22 The New Special Measures Agreement (SMA) Jan. 06 North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test”
(2+2) (Tokyo) between Japan and the United States is signed Jan. 08 The ROK declares setting of new air defense identification zone. It also resumes loudspeaker
Jan. 08 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Jan. 28 Council between the Government and Okinawa broadcasts targeting North Korea.
Conference Prefecture is established Jan. 11 Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central
Jan. 09 1st escort flotilla U.S. deployment exercise in FY2015 Feb. 02 Judgment is rendered on appeal suit requesting Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC’s introduction of
(Guam) (through January 30) termination of the monitoring activities of the Appeal multiple section system)
Jan. 09 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Intelligence Security Command

2016 Jan. 12 FY2015 Japan-U.S. joint exercise(command post Feb. 19 Decision is rendered on the immediate appeal Jan. 12 U.S. President Obama delivers State of the Union address
exercise)(through February) against decision to dismiss petition against order of U.S.-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)
Jan. 19 MOD/SDF participate in multinational exercise Cobra provisional disposition to suspend construction of Jan. 14 Terror attacks occur in Jakarta, Indonesia. ISIL Indonesia claims responsibility for the attacks
Gold 2016 (through February 19) SDF camp in Yonaguni Island in a statement.
Jan. 25 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Feb. 29 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 16 Legislative Yuan and presidential elections are held in Taiwan, confirming change in
supply supports due to heavy snowfall, etc. (through Mar. 04 The government announces it would accept the government to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the first time in eight years.
February 1) court’s settlement recommendation in the “Case Jan. 16 Western countries lift sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear development program
Jan. 27 “X-2” is established as the Advanced Technology regarding retraction order request for cancellation Jan. 20 Shooting terror attacks occur at a university in Pakistan
Demonstrator model of the reclamation permit based on provisions of Jan. 21 The United States begins airstrikes on ISIL in Afghanistan
Jan. 31 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy
Act” (“administrative substitute execution suit”) Jan. 25 At the National Maritime Work Conference, China’s State Oceanic Administration Director
of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law announces priorities of the next five years would include building a “Spratly Island reef
(establishment of 9th Air Wing) and suspends landfill work (Futenma Replacement
Facility construction project) ecological protected area”
Feb. 03 SDF action order for implementation of destruction Jan. 26 Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan
measures against ballistic missiles is issued Mar. 16 Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
issues correction instruction to Okinawa Prefectural Jan. 27 Four Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward
Feb. 07 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Jan. 30 A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the
Conference Government for cancellation of the landfill permit
(Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation
Feb. 08 SDF action order for termination of destruction
Reference
Mar. 19 Signing of the Japan-Italy Information Security Jan. 31 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft and early warning aircraft pass Tsushima Strait for the
measures against ballistic missiles is issued first time through to the Sea of Japan
Agreement
Feb. 10 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Joint Chiefs of Staff Video- Feb. 01 Chinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the
Teleconference is held Mar. 23 Okinawa Prefectural Government applies for a
review by the Central and Local Government establishment of five theaters of operations
Feb. 12 State Defense Minister Wakamiya attends Munich Dispute Management Council regarding the Feb. 02 Four Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
Security Conference (through February 14) correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Feb. 04 A Chinese Navy AGI conducts round-trip northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous
Feb. 29 Japan-Philippines Agreement Concerning the Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Futenma zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8)
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is Replacement Facility construction project)
signed (Manila) Feb. 07 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite”
Mar. 29 Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security Feb. 07 ROK decides to begin formal consultations on THAAD deployment by U.S. Forces Korea
Mar. 16 20th Tokyo Defense Forum (Forum for Defense (“Act for the Development of the Legislation for
Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region) is held Feb. 09 U.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2017
Peace and Security” and “International Peace
(through March 18) Support Act”) Feb. 10 The ROK decides to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in
Mar. 28 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment response to North Korea’s nuclear test and long-range missile launch
Mar. 31 Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting (Washington, D.C.)
of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law Mar. 31 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Feb. 11 North Korea declares the Kaesong Industrial Complex a military control zone and expels all
(establishment of JGSDF Camp Yonaguni, etc.) ROK nationals from the zone
Mar. 31 Japan-Canada summit meeting (Washington, D.C.)
Apr. 06 U-125 accident Feb. 12 U.S. DoD submits “Annual Report: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Apr. 01 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” to Congress
Apr. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30) Apr. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Space Feb. 15 U.S.-ASEAN summit meeting (California) (through February 16)
Policy”
Apr. 17 Cabinet decision regarding disaster relief call-up of Feb. 15 A submerged submarine sails Tsushima Strait southwestward from the Sea of Japan to the
ready reserve personnel in the wake of the 2016 Apr. 08 Japan-Estonia summit meeting (Tokyo)
East China Sea
Kumamoto Earthquake Apr. 28 Alleged murder case involving a civilian component
member of the USFJ in Okinawa Prefecture Feb. 16 Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands
Apr. 17 Disaster relief call-up order for to ready reserve are confirmed
personnel is issued (through May 9) May 02 Japan-France Summit (Paris)
Feb. 17 Terror attack occurs in Ankara, Turkey
Apr. 18 Disaster relief teams dispatched to remove fallen May 06 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Sochi)
Feb. 25 Australia releases “2016 Defence White Paper”
trees in Hiroo Town, Hiroo District, Hokkaido (through May 13 Japan-Kuwait summit meeting (Tokyo)
Mar. 07 U.S.-ROK Key Resolve and Foal Eagle combined exercise (through April 30)
April 21) May 24 Japan-Canada summit meeting (Tokyo)
Mar. 10 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Apr. 22 First flight of Advanced Technology Demonstrator May 25 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Ise Shima)
(X-2) Mar. 18 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
May 26 G7 Ise-Shima Summit (through May 27)
May 02 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone Mar. 18 The United States and the Philippines agree to utilize five Philippine bases for carrying out
May 27 U.S. President Obama visits Hiroshima defense cooperation based on the EDCA
Conference Jun 07 Entry into force of the Japan-Italy Information
Jun. 03 Defense Minister Nakatani attends 15th Asia Security Mar. 22 Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium
Security Agreement
Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through June 5) Mar. 28 Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
Jun. 21 Central and Local Government Dispute Management
Jun. 04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Council announces ruling (Futenma Replacement Mar. 31 U.S.-China summit meeting (Washington, D.C.)
Jun. 04 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan- Facility construction project) Mar. 31 Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1)
U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 1 U.S. returns FAC3162 Yugi Communication Site Apr. 07 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Jun. 04 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) (Hachioji City, Tokyo) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Jun. 04 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 14 Prime Minister Abe visits Mongolia and attends the Apr. 08 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
11th ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) Summit Meeting advance to the Pacific Ocean
Jun. 05 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)
(through July 16) Apr. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Jun. 06 Defense Minister Nakatani visits Myanmar, Thailand,
and Timor-Leste (through June 10) Jul. 15 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 17 Chinese naval patrol aircraft lands in Fiery Cross Reef in Spratly Islands and evacuates sick
Jul. 15 Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) people
Jun. 13 MOD/SDF participate in Pacific Partnership 2016
(through August 24) Jul. 15 Japan-China summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 20 China’s early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
Jul. 15 Japan-EU summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) through to the Pacific Ocean
Jun. 28 Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise (PACIFIC
DRAGON2016) (Hawaii) Jul. 15 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 20 China releases images from President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Central Military Commission
Joint Operations Command Center
Jun. 29 FY2016 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through Jul. 16 Japan-Cambodia summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar)
July 8) Apr. 23 North Korea launches an SLBM
Jul. 22 Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Jul. 11 ASDF aircraft dispatched to Juba, the capital of South Tourism files a suit with the Naha branch of the Apr. 28 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Sudan, to transport Japanese nationals overseas Fukuoka High Court seeking the declaration of Apr. 29 Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established
due to the situation dererionation in South Sudan illegality of inaction (Futenma Replacement Facility May 02 China deploys landing ship to Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands
(through July 26) construction project) May 06 7th KWP Congress (through May 9)
Jul. 13 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) Jul. 22 Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and May 10 A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South
Aug. 03 Inada becomes Minister of Defense Tourism files a suit with Okinawa Prefecture seeking China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation”
Aug. 15 Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti) confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act May 14 An expedition unit comprised of approximately 200 personnel led by the Deputy Commander
Aug. 20 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) of the Russian Pacific Fleet arrives in Matsuwa Island of the Chishima Islands and
supply supports in Shibetsu City, Hokkaido Aug. 03 2nd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established subsequently begins survey activities
Aug. 23 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Aug. 25 Prime Minister Abe attends TICAD VI (6th Tokyo May 17 A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over
supply supports in Biei Town, Kamikawa County, International Conference on African Development) the South China Sea
Hokkaido (through August 28) and visits Nairobi in the Republic of Kenya (through May 19 Russia-ASEAN summit meeting (through May 20)
Aug. 23 FY2016 training of transportation of Japanese August 29) May 20 Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of DPP, becomes President of Taiwan
nationals overseas Aug. 28 Japan-Kenya summit meeting (Nairobi) May 22 U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam
Aug. 25 Trainings for new duties based on the Legislation for Sep. 02 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Vladivostok) May 23 China and Russia hold first joint missile defense exercise (through May 28)
Peace and Security begin Sep. 04 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Hangzhou) May 24 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (through May 27)
Aug. 25 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Sep. 05 Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Hangzhou) May 25 Hibatullah Akhundzada is chosen as new Emir of the Taliban in Afghanistan
Aug. 26 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Sep. 05 Japan-China summit meeting (Hangzhou) May 31 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
supply supports in Akadaira City in Hokkaido (through Sep. 06 ASEAN-related summit meeting (Vientiane, Laos) Jun. 03 15th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore) (through June 5)
August 27) (through September 9) Jun. 06 8th U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (Beijing) (through June 7)
Aug. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy Sep. 06 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Vientiane); Jun. 07 A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force
rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Iwate Prefecture transfer of TC-90, etc. to the Philippines is officially reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea
(through September 16) agreed
Jun. 08 New Zealand releases “Defence White Paper 2016”
Aug. 31 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy Sep. 06 Japan-Lao PDR summit meeting (Vientiane)
rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Hokkaido (through Jun. 09 A Chinese naval combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for
Sep. 07 Summit meeting with the State Counsellor of the first time
September 18) Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi (Vientiane)
Sep. 01 Operational training by the MOD Disaster Jun. 12 Shooting terror attack in Florida, United States
Sep. 07 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Vientiane)
Countermeasures Headquarters Jun. 14 Police workers are killed in Magnanville in western Paris
Sep. 07 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Vientiane)
Sep. 02 Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 15 A Chinese naval intelligence gathering vessel sails in Japan’s territorial waters near
Sep. 07 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Vientiane) Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and then sails within
(Tokyo) Sep. 07 Japan-India summit meeting (Vientiane)
Sep. 03 ADMM-Plus Military Medicine and Humanitalian Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly
Sep. 12 First trainnig relocation involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary wing conducts east-west passages outside the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. (June
Assistance and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise 2016 aircraft outside of Okinawa Prefecture in the context of
(Thailand) (through September 9) 19 through 20)
the realignment of the U.S. Forces (through October 5) Jun. 16 Five Chinese naval vessels sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Sep. 08 State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attends UN PKO Sep. 13 Japan-Canada summit telephone talk
summit follow-up meeting (U.K.) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Sep. 16 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders the Jun. 22 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Sep. 10 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone judgement in favor of the central government in
Conference Jun. 23 Group in favor of separation from EU wins national referendum in the U.K.
the action for the declaration of illegality of inaction Jun. 28 Bombing at Istanbul Airport in Turkey
Sep. 15 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)
D.C.) Jun. 30 The new Duterte administration is established in the Philippines
Sep. 19 Prime Minister Abe visits New York (through
Sep. 21 Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) September 21) Jul. 02 Australian federal election is held; Prime Minister Turnbull is to remain in office
Sep. 22 Search and rescue of U.S. military aircraft off the Sep. 19 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (New York) Jul. 02 Bangladeshi militants take hostages (7 Japanse nationals are killed); ISIL claims responsibility
east coast of Okinawa Prefecture on the Internet
Sep. 20 Third Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting
Sep. 26 Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross- Jul. 05 Chinese military exercise in South China Sea (through July 11)
Sep. 21 Japan-Turkey summit meeting (New York)
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (Tokyo) Jul. 07 Collision between the Sudan Armed Forces and anti-mainstream groups occurs in South
Sep. 21 Japan-Iran summit meeting (New York) Sudan’s capital, Juba
Oct. 08 Defense Minister Inada visits South Sudan’s capital,
Juba Sep. 21 Japan-Cuba summit meeting (Havana) Jul. 08 The U.S. and ROK decide on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea
Oct. 14 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Joint Staff Meeting Sep. 23 Okinawa Prefecture files an appeal with the Supreme Jul. 08 NATO Warsaw summit meeting (through July 9)
(Washington, D.C.) Court regarding the action for the declaration of
illegality of inaction (Futenma Replacement Facility Jul. 09 North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile
Oct. 17 Japan-U.K. joint exercise “Guardian North 16” construction project) Jul. 12 China conducts test flight over the Subi Reef and Mischief Reef (through July 13)
(through November 6) Jul. 12 The arbitral tribunal renders a final award in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions
Sep. 28 Japan-Singapore summit meeting (Tokyo)
Oct. 21 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to 2016 are ruled in favor of the Philippines with regard to arbitral proceedings pursuant to the South
Tottori Earthquake (through October 28) Oct. 14 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo)
China Sea
Oct. 22 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (maritime Oct. 19 Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Tokyo)
Jul. 13 Germany releases “Defense White Paper 2016”
interdiction operations exercise) (through October 23) Oct. 26 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Tokyo)
Signing of detailed arrangements for the transfer Jul. 15 Terror attack with a truck occurs in Nice, France
Oct. 23 Troop review in commemoration of the SDF Jul. 16 Coup d’etat attempt in Turkey fails
anniversary of TC-90, etc.
Oct. 27 Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 18 Chinese Air Force announces that it will be conducting combat patrol in the South China Sea
on a regular basis

2016 Oct. 28 Signing of agreement on sharing of information Oct. 28 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S.- Jul. 18 Incident in which passengers in a train are stabbed occurs near Würzburg in southern
among Japan-U.S.-Australia defense authorities Australia Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Germany
Oct. 30 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (field training exercise) Nov. 02 Meeting with State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Jul. 19 North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
“Keen Sword 17/28FTX” (through November 11) Suu Kyi (Tokyo) Jul. 24 Terror attack by a suicide bomber occurs near an open music festival in the State of Bavaria
Nov. 01 Cabinet Decision regarding changes to the Nov. 07 Japan-Kazakhstan summit meeting (Tokyo) in southern Germany
procedures for responding to piracy (reducing Nov. 08 Ballot counting of U.S. presidential election Jul. 25 South Sudan’s First Vice President Machar is dismissed and replaced by Taban Deng
the number of ships to engage in counter-piracy Nov. 10 Prime Minister Abe has a Telephone conference with Jul. 26 Hostage incident occurs in a church in Rouen in northern France
operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of U.S. President-elect Trump Aug. 01 U.S. Forces begins airstrikes on ISIL-controlled regions in Sirte in northern Libya (through
Aden from two to one) Nov. 11 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo) December 21)
Nov. 09 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile Nov. 14 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo) Aug. 03 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (one of them fell into Japan’s EEZ)
information sharing exercise) (through November 10)
Nov. 16 Japan-Malaysia summit meeting (Tokyo) Aug. 05 200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels operate in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. Chinese
Nov. 15 MSDF aircraft conducts the international disaster government vessels intrude into Japan’s territorial waters following the fishing vessels for the
relief activity in response to the 2016 New Zealand Nov. 17 Prime Minister Abe meets with U.S. President-elect
Trump (New York) first time (total of 15 vessels in 5 days / through August 9)
Earthquake (through November 18)
Aug. 12 Three Chinese naval vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Nov. 15 Cabinet Decision on changes in the “Implementation Nov. 17 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders advance to the Pacific Ocean
Plans for the International Peace Cooperation judgement in 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suit
Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Aug. 14 Three Chinese naval vessels sail west bound toward the Sea of Japan from the Sea of
Reference
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” (mission of Nov. 18 Japan-Peru summit meeting (Lima) Okhotsk
“kaketsuke-keigo” was added) Nov. 19 Japan-Columbia summit meeting (Lima) Aug. 15 U.S. Forces deploys B1B bombers to Guam
Nov. 16 2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Nov. 19 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Lima) Aug. 18 A Chinese early warning aicraft and two bombers fly over Tsushima and advance to the Sea
Meeting (Vientiane) Nov. 20 Japan-China summit meeting (Lima) of Japan
Nov. 16 Japan-Lao PDR Defense Ministerial Meeting Nov. 20 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Lima) Aug. 20 Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Tsushima Strait in the southwestern direction
(Vientiane) Nov. 21 Japan-Argentina summit meeting (Buenos Aires) Aug. 22 U.S.-ROK bilateral exercise “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” (through September 2)
Nov. 25 6th working group consultation meeting on the Nov. 23 Signing and entry into force of Japan-ROK General Aug. 24 North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile
Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism Security of Military Information Agreement Aug. 31 Police officers are shot in Copenhagen, Denmark
between the defense authorities of Japan and Dec. 01 Japan-Singapore summit meeting (Tokyo) Sep. 04 G20 (Summit on the Financial Market and the World Economy)
China (Tokyo) Dec. 01 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders Hangzhou Summit (Hangzhou, China) (through September 5)
Nov. 28 Japan-China Security Dialogue (Beijing) judgement in 3rd Futenma Air Station noise suit Sep. 05 North Korea launches three ballistic missiles (fell into Japan’s EEZ)
Nov. 29 Dispatch of disaster relief teams in response to bird Dec. 01 Japan-France defense equipment and technology Sep. 09 North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test
flu in Niigata Prefecture (through December 4) agreement takes effect Sep. 12 China-Russia joint maritime exercise “Joint Sea 2016” (in the South China Sea) (through
Dec. 03 Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting Dec. 08 Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Atsugi Air September 19)
(Tokyo) Facility noise suit Sep. 17 Bombing in New York, U.S.
Dec. 07 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Dec.13 Emergency water landing of MV-22 Osprey (off the Sep. 25 Four Chinese bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets (probable) pass
Dec. 07 Disaster relief teams dispatched for search and coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture) between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
rescue of U.S. military aircraft off the coast of Tosa Dec. 15 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Yamaguchi (fighter jets [probable] are observed for the first time passing)
Shimizu in Kochi Prefecture (through December 8) Prefecture) (through December 16) Sep. 26 Third Russian Borey-class SSBN “Vladimir Monomakh” arrives in Kamchatka
Dec. 09 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kobayashi Dec. 20 Supreme Court dismisses Okinawa’s appeal in Sep. 29 U.S.-ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (through October 1)
attends Manama Dialogue (Bahrain)(through the action for the declation of illegality of inaction Sep. 29 Indian Army announces it hit terrorist bases on the Pakistan side of the line of control in
December 10) (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Kashmir (tensions remain)
Dec. 13 Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting Dec. 22 Return of a major portion of the Northern Training
(Tokyo) Oct. 07 The U.S. concludes Russian involvement in the Democratic National Committee cyber attacks
Area based on the SACO Final Report (1996) Oct. 07 The U.S. lifts economic sanctions on Myanmar
Dec. 16 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) (Seoul) Dec. 26 Governor of Okinawa Onaga withdraws his
Dec. 16 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird Oct. 09 Attack on a U.S. naval vessel occurs in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen
cancellation of the reclamation approval (Futenma
flu in Shimizu Town, Kamikawa County in Hokkaido Replacement Facility construction project) Oct. 13 King Bhumibol of Thailand passes away
(through December 22) Dec. 27 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Hawaii) Oct. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Dec. 19 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Inada visit Oct. 17 Operation to recapture ISIL-controlled Mosul begins
flu in Kawaminami Town, Koyu County in Miyazaki Arizona Memorial (Hawaii) Oct. 17 China launches manned spaceflight “Shenzhou 11”
Prefecture (through December 21) Dec. 27 Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility is Oct. 19 U.S.-ROK foreign and defense ministerial meeting (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)
Dec. 22 The implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the resumed Oct. 20 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
SDF Law (decided by the National Security Council) Oct. 20 Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Osumi Strait and advance to the Pacific Ocean
Dec. 22 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to Oct. 21 A U.S. destroyer sails around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part of the
fire in Itoigawa City in Niigata Prefecture (through “Freedom of Navigation Operation”
December 23) Oct. 24 Sixth plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (through
Dec. 22 Transition to the joint production and deployment October 27)
phases of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD Oct. 27 China’s early warning aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island
(SM-3 Block IIA) (decided at the National Security of Okinawa and Miyako Islad and advance to the Pacific Ocean
Council)
Nov. 01 Battle in the City of Mosul begins
Dec. 27 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird
flu in Nankan Town of Tamana County in Kumamoto Nov. 08 Presidential candidate Trump wins U.S. presidential election
Prefecture (through December 28) Nov. 13 Earthquake occurs in New Zealand
Nov. 15 Russia deploys aircraft carrier “Kuznetsov” in combat for the first time in the history of the
Russian Navy
Nov. 18 The Russian Forces announces the deployment of surface-to-ship missile on the islands of
Etorofu and Kunashiri
Nov. 19 Peru APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (through November 20)
Nov. 22 Russian patrol helicopter flies near Japan’s airspace over the Senkaku Islands
Nov. 25 Two bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets fly over the sky between
the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly from the
south of Sakishima Islands)
Dec. 01 Prince of Thailand’s accession to the throne
Dec. 10 Two Chinese fighter jets, two bombers, and two intelligence gathering aircraft fly between
the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly toward
the Bashi Channel)
Dec. 12 Vice Prime Minister English becomes Prime Minister of New Zealand
Dec. 15 Capture of U.S. unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) by China in the South China Sea
Dec. 16 UNMISS Mandate is extended for one year (December 15, 2017)
Dec. 17 Libyan Government of National Accord declares the liberation of Sirte in Northern Libya from
ISIL
Dec. 18 Hostage situation occurs in a tourist site in Jordan
Dec. 19 A truck drives into pedestrians in Berlin, Germany’s capital
Dec. 19 Russian Ambassador is murdered in Turkey’s capital Ankara
Dec. 20 Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of DPP, holds telephone conference with then U.S. President-elect
Trump
Dec. 25 Six Chinese naval vessels including an aircraft carrier sail between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean (first time a Chinese aircraft
carrier is observed sailing into the Pacific Ocean)
Dec. 27 “China’s Space Activities in 2016” is released
Dec. 30 Russia and Turkey-led ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the opposition
parties takes effect in all regions of Syria (excluding ISIL, etc.)
2017 Jan. 05 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris) Jan. 06 Resumption of aerial refueling training by the Osprey Jan. 02 Chinese Navy announces its aircraft carrier “Liaoning” conducted training in the South China
Jan. 06 3rd Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial of the U.S. Forces Sea
Meeting (“2+2”) (Paris) Jan. 12 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Manila) Jan. 05 Chinese naval vessels sails through the Tsugaru Strait westward
Jan. 14 Signing of Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross- Jan. 14 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Sydney) Jan. 09 Six Chinese bombers, an early warning aircraft, and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly over
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (Sydney) Jan. 15 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Jakarta) the Tsushima Strait and advance to the Sea of Japan
Jan. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to Jan. 16 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Hanoi) Jan. 10 Chinese naval vessels sail through the Tsushima Strait
bird flu in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture (through Jan. 16 Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation with Jan. 11 The ROK release “Defense White Paper 2016”
January 16) Regard to the Implementation Practices Relating to Jan. 20 Trump becomes President of the U.S.
Jan. 21 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile the Civilian Component of the U.S. Armed Forces in Jan. 24 Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
information sharing exercise) (through January 23) Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Jan. 27 U.S. President Trump signs a memorandum on the rebuilding of the U.S. Forces
Jan. 23 FY2016 SDF joint exercise (command post exercise) Agreement (SOFA) Jan. 28 U.S. President Trump signs a memorandum requesting the establishment of comprehensive
(through January 27) Jan. 20 193rd session (extraordinary session) of the Diet is plans to destroy ISIL
Jan. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird convened (through June 18) Jan. 29 Iran conducts test launch of a mid-range ballistic missile
flu in Kijo Town in Koyu County, Miyazaki Prefecture Jan. 21 Relocation of navy aircraft operations at Kadena Air
(through January 26) Feb. 08 U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft and Chinese military aircraft fly abnormally close to each other
Base based on the SACO Final Report (1996) (South China Sea)
Jan. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to Jan. 28 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk
heavy snow in Chizu Town in Yazu County, Tottori Feb. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Feb. 10 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Feb. 28 U.S. President Trump delivers address to Congress
Prefecture
Feb. 22 Japan-Canada summit telephone talk Mar. 01 U.S.-ROK joint military exercise (ROK) (through April 30)
Jan. 24 Launch of X-band communications satellite
Feb. 23 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS “Carl Vinson” participates in the exercise
“Kirameki 2”
judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit Mar. 02 A Chinese early warning aircraft, six bombers (probable), and six fighter jets (probable) fly
Jan. 26 Signing of Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-
Mar. 06 First relocation of training involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (London)
wing aircraft to main land Japan from Okinawa (total of 13 aircraft, the largest fleet so far)
Feb. 04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Prefecture in the context of the realignment of U.S.
Feb. 04 Test launch of advanced interceptor missiles for Mar. 02 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to
Forces (through March 17) the East China Sea
BMD (Hawaii) Mar. 07 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Feb. 04 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to Mar. 05 Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait
Mar. 13 Japan-Saudi Arabia summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar. 06 North Korea launches four ballistic missiles (three of them fell into Japan’s EEZ)
bird flu in Kohoku Town, Kishima County in Saga
Prefecture (through February 6) Mar. 15 Japan-Mozambique summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar. 10 President of the ROK Park Geun-hye is dismissed
Feb. 18 State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attends the 53rd Mar. 20 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Hannover) Mar. 16 The Trump administration submits the FY2018 budget blueprint to Congress
Munich Security Conference (Munich) Mar. 20 Japan-France summit meeting (Paris) Mar. 22 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Feb. 20 Japan-Finland Vice-Ministerial Consultation Mar. 21 Japan-EU summit meeting (Brussels) Mar. 22 An attack with a car occurs in central London, U.K.
Feb. 22 Japan-Sweden Vice-Ministerial Consultation

Mar. 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Mar. 21 Japan-Italy summit meeting (Rome) Mar. 23 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to
crash of rescue helicopter of Nagano Prefecture Agreed to commence negotiation concerning the the East China Sea
(through March 6) conclusion of Japan-Italy defense equipment and Apr. 02 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances
Mar. 07 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call technology transfer agreement to the Pacific Ocean
Mar. 07 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Mar. 27 Transfer of MSDF TC-90 to the Philippines Apr. 03 Bombing occurs on subway in St. Petersburg, Russia
Conference Mar. 27 Completion of development of future transport Apr. 05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Mar. 07 Japan-India Vice-Ministerial Dialogue on defense aircraft (XC-2) Apr. 06 The U.S. launches strikes on Syria
policies Apr. 04 Japan-Australia summit telephone talk Apr. 16 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Mar. 09 Participation in Pacific Partnership 2017 (through Apr. 06 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Apr. 18 Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait
May 25) Apr. 09 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Apr. 20 China launches its first unmanned cargo spacecraft “Tianzhou 1”
Mar. 09 Dispatch of MSDF personnel as commander of Apr. 12 Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 24 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances
combined task force for counter-piracy (CTF151) Apr. 13 100th Anniversary Ceremony of the America-Japan to the Pacific Ocean
(through late June) Society Apr. 26 China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier is launched
Mar. 10 Termination of dispatch of SDF units to United Apr. 18 U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy call on
Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan Apr. 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Prime Minister Abe May 10 Moon Jae-in becomes President of the ROK
(UNMISS) is announced Apr. 24 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk
Mar. 14 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile May 14 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Reference
Apr. 25 Commencement of seawall construction (Futenma May 14 Macron becomes President of France
information sharing exercise) Replacement Facility construction project)
Mar. 16 Conclusion of arrangements regarding Japan-U.K. May 14 China hosts an international conference pertaining to “One Belt, One Road”
Apr. 27 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Moscow)
joint study on the possibility of cooperation with the May 17 Chinese fighter jets intercepts a U.S. military radiation-detecting aircraft (East China Sea)
U.K. on future fighter jets Apr. 28 Japan-U.K. summit meeting (U.K.)
May 18 An object believed to be a small unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) flies over the front of the
Mar. 20 GPOI Capstone Multilateral Exercise (Nepal) (through May 01 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk bridge of a Chinese government ship which is within Japan’s territorial waters near the
April 3) May 11 Japan-ROK summit telephone talk Senkaku Islands
Mar. 20 Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 17 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) May 19 Hassan Rowhani is re-elected as the President of Iraq
Mar. 20 Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial May 19 Japan-Argentina summit meeting (Tokyo) May 21 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) May 22 Japan-Italy defense equipment and technology May 22 Terror attack by a suicide bomber occurs in Manchester, U.K.
Mar. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird transfer agreement is signed May 23 The Trump administration submits FY2018 budget proposal to Congress with a 10% increase
flu in Kurihara City in Miyagi Prefecture (through May 26 Prime Minister Abe attends G7 Taormina Summit and in defense budget
March 27) visits Malta (through May 28) May 23 Martial law is declared in Mindanao in the Philippines
Mar. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird May 26 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Taormina) May 24 A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands
flu in Asahi City, Chiba Prefecture (through March 25) May 26 Japan-EU summit meeting (Taormina) in the South China Sea and conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” (reported)
Mar. 24 Cabinet Decision on changes to “Implementation May 26 Japan-France summit meeting (Taormina) May 25 A Chinese fighter jet intercepts a U.S. naval patrol aircraft (South China Sea)
Plans for the International Peace Cooperation May 27 Japan-Malta summit meeting (Malta) May 25 NATO Brussel summit meeting
Assignment for UNMISS” May 30 Japan-ROK summit telephone talk May 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (fell into Japan’s EEZ)
Mar. 27 Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue Jun. 06 Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo)
operations in response to an avalanche in Nasu May 30 The U.S. successfully intercepts ICBM target for the first time
Jun. 06 Japan-Canada summit telephone talk May 31 Bombing in Afghanistan’s capital Kabul
Town, Nasu County in Tochigi Prefecture
Jun. 07 Japan-Lao PDR summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 02 The 16th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore) (through June 4)
Mar. 31 Enforcement of the law for partial amendment of the
USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law (validity is Jun. 20 Japan-Guinea summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 03 A car runs into pedestrians and a bombing occurs in central London, U.K.
extended for 10 years, etc.) Jun. 27 Japan-Czech summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 04 President Duterte of the Philippines goes aboard MSDF JS Izumo
Apr. 03 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ASW exercise) Jul. 03 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Jun. 05 Montenegro joins NATO
(through April 5) Jul. 08 Japan-U.S. Summit (Hamburg) Jul. 01 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return
Apr. 12 Defense Minister Inada pays courtesy call on Sri Jul. 24 Okinawa Prefectural Government files lawsuit with Jul. 02 A Chinese naval Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering ship sails within Japan’s territorial
Lankan prime minister (Tokyo) Naha District Court to seek an injunctive order for waters near the southwest of Kojima Island, Matsumae Town, Hokkaido
Apr. 14 Pacific Partnership 2017 (through May 18) actions that crush the reef, etc. (construction of
Jul. 02 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical
Apr. 14 Diet approval of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross- Futenma Replacement Facility)
miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
Servicing Agreement Jul. 31 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Jul. 04 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ)
Apr. 19 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) Jul. 31 Return of the land along the eastern side of MCAS
Jul. 07 Chinese Navy’s aircraft carrier “Liaoning” enters a port in Hong Kong and is shown to the
(Tokyo) Futenma
public (through July 11)
Apr. 19 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Aug. 03 3rd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established
Jul. 10 The Iraqi government declares liberation of Mosul
Apr. 20 Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Aug. 15 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Jul. 11 China conducts a completion ceremony of the Support Base in Djibouti in Guangdong Province
Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Aug. 29 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Jul. 13 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa
Apr. 22 Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue Aug. 30 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. Four other bombers pass between the
operations in Futaoijima, Shimonoseki City, Aug. 30 Japan-U.K. Summit (Tokyo) main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
Yamaguchi Prefecture Sep. 03 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Jul. 15 Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters in the southeast of Tsushima-
Apr.25 Enactment of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Sep. 08 Japan-France summit telephone talk shimojima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture) and north of Okinoshima (Munakata City,
Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural Sep. 14 Japan-India Summit (Gujarat) Fukuoka Prefecture)
arrangements
Sep. 20 Japan-France summit (New York) Jul. 17 Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters in the west-northwest
May 03 Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. joint exercise (through of Henashisaki (Nishitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture) and northeast of Tappizaki
May 22) Sep. 21 Japan-U.S. Summit (New York)
Sep. 28 194th session (extraordinary session) of the Diet is (Higashitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture)
May 08 Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. joint exercise (through Jul. 20 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft, an intelligence gathering aircraft and four bombers pass
May 22) convened (through September 28)
Oct. 04 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea.
May 08 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance from
May 15 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Oct. 11 A U.S. Forces helicopter conducts an emergency
the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean
Conference landing and catches fire in Higashi-son, Kunigami-
gun, Okinawa Prefecture Jul. 21 China-Russia joint exercise “Joint Sea 2017 (1)” (Baltic Sea) (through July 28)
May 15 Search of missing GSDF aircraft (LR-2) in Hakodate Jul. 22 A new U.S. navy aircraft carrier “Gerald R. Ford” commissioned
City, Hokkaido (through May 16) Oct. 11 Tachikawa branch of the Tokyo District Court renders
judgement in the 6th Yokota Air Base noise suit Jul. 23 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through August 14)
May 22 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 24 Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies
Oct. 23 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
May 22 Memorandum on Japan-Italy Defense Cooperation toward the East China Sea
and Exchanges signed (Tokyo) Oct. 26 Japan-Canada summit telephone talk
Oct. 30 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Jul. 28 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ)
May 22 Japan-Italy Agreement concerning the Transfer of Jul. 30 The Chinese military holds a parade for the 90th anniversary of the foundation
Defense Equipment and Technology signed (Tokyo) Oct. 31 Japan-France summit telephone talk
Nov. 01 195th session (special session) of the Diet is Aug. 01 China conducts a flag raising ceremony for the Support Base in Djibouti
May 30 Return of Colors ceremony of JSDF engineering
convened (through December 9) Aug. 09 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
dispatched to South Sudan
Nov. 01 Inauguration of the fourth Abe Cabinet Island and flies toward the East China Sea
May 31 Dispatch of SDF units to UNMISS is terminated
Nov. 06 Japan-U.S. Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 10 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical
Jun. 03 Dispatch of rescue teams in response to the crash of miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
a civilian aircraft (light aircraft) (through June 4) Nov. 10 Prime Minister Abe attends APEC Economic Leaders’
Meeting and ASEAN-related summit meeting Aug. 12 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft and two bombers pass between the main island of
Jun. 03 Defense Minister Inada attends the 16th Shangri-La Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 4) (through November 14)
Nov. 10 Japan-Canada Summit (Da Nang) Aug. 13 Two Chinese electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and
Jun. 03 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
(Singapore) Nov. 29 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Aug. 14 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Jun. 03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Dec. 05 Japan-Madagascar Summit (Tokyo)
Island and flies toward the East China Sea
Jun. 03 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting Dec. 06 Japan-Latvia Summit (Tokyo) Aug. 17 A car runs into pedestrians in Barcelona, Spain
(Singapore) Dec. 13 Fall of a U.S. Forces helicopter window onto Futenma Aug. 23 Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
Jun. 03 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Dai-ni Elementary School in Ginowan City, Okinawa
Prefecture Aug. 24 Six Chinese bombers, after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Jun. 03 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting Island, fly over the Pacific Ocean in the south of Kyushu and Shikoku, turn around off the Kii
(Singapore) Dec. 14 Japan-Myanmar Summit (Tokyo)
Peninsula, and fly to the East China Sea on a similar route (First time for a Chinese aircraft to
Jun. 03 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting fly northeast bound after advancing to the Pacific Ocean)
(Singapore) Aug. 25 Inflow of fugitives, mainly Muslims, into Bangladesh following the clash between Myanmar’s
Jun. 04 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting security forces and a Muslim armed group
(Singapore) Aug. 26 India announces agreement between India and China on disagreement of border personnel at
Jun. 04 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting Doklam following the confrontation of their forces
(Singapore) Aug. 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
Jun. 20 FY2017 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through Sep. 03 North Korea conducts sixth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test for ICBM”
June 23)
Sep. 08 A ceremony to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties
Jul. 01 Establishment of Southwestern Air Defense Force between Japan and China
Jul. 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Sep. 14 A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait northward
heavy rain in North Kyushu in July 2017 (through
Sep. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
August 20)
Sep. 18 China-Russia joint exercise “Joint Sea 2017 (2)” (Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk) (through
Jul. 05 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call
September 25)
Jul. 28 Minister of Defense Kishida came into office
Sep. 24 Chinese vessels sail Soya Strait eastward
Aug. 03 Minister of Defense Onodera came into office
Sep. 30 Chinese vessels sail Osumi Strait westward
Aug. 17 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)
Oct. 01 Catalonia, Spain conducts a referendum on whether to become independent
(Washington, D.C.)
Oct. 01 Shooting in Las Vegas, United States
Aug. 17 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington,
D.C.) Oct. 10 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel
Aug. 26 MSDF SH-60J helicopter falls into the sea west of Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
Tappizaki, Aomori Prefecture Oct. 13 U.S. President Trump announces a new Iran strategy
Aug. 31 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Oct. 13 France releases the “Strategic Review”
Sep. 04 Participation in the multinational joint exercise Oct. 14 Bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia
EQUATEUR 2017 hosted by the French Armed Forces Oct. 17 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) declares liberation of Raqqa
in New Caledonia (through September 15) Oct. 18 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (through October 24)
Sep.06 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Oct. 31 A car runs into pedestrians in New York, United States
Sep. 06 Participation in the PSI maritime interdiction exercise, Nov. 05 U.S. President Trump visits Japan, ROK, China, Vietnam and the Philippines (through
Pacific Protector 2017 hosted by the Australian November 14)
government (through September 9) Nov. 11 Three U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercises in the western Pacific (through
Sep. 12 Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) November 14)
Sep. 13 Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum Nov. 13 31st ASEAN Summit (Manila)
(Fukuoka) Nov. 18 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and
Miyako Island and flies toward the Bashi Channel

Sep. 14 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Nov. 19 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft
Sep. 14 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the East China Sea to reach
Conference (Tokyo) the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
Sep. 15 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call again to fly toward the East China Sea
Nov. 20 The United States re-designates North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
Sep. 17 Disaster relief teams dispatched for flood prevention
activities, etc. in Usuki City, Oita Prefecture (through Nov. 23 Australia releases the “Foreign Policy White Paper 2017”
September 18) Nov. 23 Four Chinese bombers and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of
Sep. 25 FY2017 exercise for the rescue of Japanese Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main
nationals overseas island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea. An intelligence
gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island via
Oct. 17 ASDF UH-60J helicopter crashed in the Pacific Ocean Sakishima Islands in the South Pacific and flies toward the East China Sea
south of Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture
Nov. 24 A mosque in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt is attacked
Oct. 22 Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving
activities in Kishiwada City, Osaka Prefecture Nov. 28 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to
(through October 23) the East China Sea
Oct. 23 4th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM- Nov. 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ)
Plus) (Clark, Philippines)(through October 25) Dec. 05 Chinese vessels sail east bound from the Osumi Strait and advances to the Pacific Ocean
Dec. 06 The Russian government announces that eradication of the ISIL is complete
Reference
Oct. 23 3rd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal
Meeting, Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, Dec. 06 The U.S. government recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel
Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting, Japan- Dec. 07 A Chinese early warning aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa
ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting, Japan-U.S.-ROK and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of
Defense Ministerial Meeting , Japan-Philippines Okinawa and Miyako Island again
Defense Ministerial Meeting (Clark, Philippines) Dec. 07 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves
Oct. 24 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Clark, to the East China Sea
Philippines) Dec. 08 The United States announces a strategy regarding the INF Treaty
Oct. 27 Japan-China Security Dialogue (Tokyo) Dec. 09 Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of
Nov. 05 FY2017 joint disaster response exercise with the Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main
U.S. Forces island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
Nov. 06 Visit of Srilankan State Minister of Defence to Dec. 09 The Iraqi government declares liberation of all areas from the ISIL
Ministry of Defence Dec. 11 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an intelligence gathering aircraft and an
Nov. 06 FY2017 SDF joint exercise (field training exercise) electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
(through November 24) to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass
Nov. 14 State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attends UN between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The
peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi
(Vancouver) Channel via the south of Sakishima Islands on the Pacific Ocean side
Dec. 01 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Dec. 11 Terror attack by a suicide bomber occurs in New York, United States
Dec. 05 Japan-China high-working-level maritime discussion Dec. 11 President Putin visits Syria and announces withdrawal of the main part of troops (The two
(Shanghai) (through December 6) bases in Syria will continue daily operation)
Dec. 09 Parliamentary Vice-Minister Ohno attends Manama Dec. 13 80th anniversary ceremony of “the Nanking Incident in China”
Dialogue (Bahrain)(through Dec.10) Dec. 14 The mandate of the UNMISS is extended for three months (through March 15, 2018)
Dec. 11 Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Dec. 17 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two electronic warfare aircrafts pass between
Forces Valery Gerasimov visits Japan (through the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly to the East China Sea
December 12) Dec. 18 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Dec. 11 FY2017 exercise for the rescue of Japanese Island and flies to the East China Sea
nationals overseas (Japan) (through December 16) Dec. 18 The United States releases the National Security Strategy
Dec. 14 Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dec. 18 A Chinese Su-30 fighter jet’s advance to the Sea of Japan is confirmed for the first time
Consultations (2+2) (London) Dec. 19 The United States denounces North Korea for the cyber attack using malware “WannaCry”
Dec. 14 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) in May 2017
Dec. 19 National Security Council and Cabinet approval on Dec. 20 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
the “fundamental improvement in ballistic missile Island and flies to the East China Sea
defense capability” Dec. 26 Taiwan releases the National Defense Report
2018 Jan. 09 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Jan. 12 Japan-Estonia Summit (Tallinn) Jan. 09 North-South High Level Official’s Meeting
Jan. 09 FY2017 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (command post Jan. 13 Japan-Latvia Summit (Riga) Jan. 10 A Chinese submerged submarine enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Miyako Island and
exercise) (through February 3) Jan. 13 Japan-Lithuania Summit (Vilnius) Taisho island (through January 11)
Jan. 11 Dispatch of disaster relief teams in response to Jan. 14 Japan-Bulgaria Summit (Sofia) Jan. 11 A Chinese vessel enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Taisho island
bird flu in Sanuki City, Kagawa Prefecture (through Jan. 15 Japan-Serbia Summit (Belgrade) Jan. 17 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical
January 12) miles of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (reported)
Jan. 16 Japan-Romania Summit (Bucharest)
Jan .15 Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 19 The U.S. National Defense Strategy is released
Jan. 18 Japan-Australia Summit (Tokyo)
Jan. 21 Participation in multinational joint exercise Cobra Jan. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of
Feb. 02 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk
Gold 2018 (through February 23) Japan from the East China Sea
Feb. 06 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo)
Jan. 23 Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue Jan. 29 A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait northward and after advancing to the Sea of Japan
operations, etc. in response to the eruption of Mt Feb. 07 U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy visit to
Prime Minister Abe temporarily, sails the strait southward
Kusatsu-Shirane Jan. 31 U.S. President Trump delivers the State of the Union address
Jan. 26 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Feb. 09 Japan-ROK Summit (PyeongChang)
Feb. 14 Japan-Norway Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 02 The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)
Feb. 14 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 05 Maldives declares a state of emergency
Jan. 26 Deployment of the first F-35A at ASDF Misawa
Feb. 20 U.S. military aircraft throws away a fuel tank into Feb. 08 North Korea conducts a military parade
Air Base
Lake Ogawara in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Feb. 09 PyeongChang Olympics (through February 25)
Jan. 27 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Aomori Prefecture Feb. 10 Sri Lanka declares a state of emergency
Jan. 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water
supply supports in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture Feb. 23 Japan-Chile Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 14 South African President Zuma resigns
(through February 2) Mar. 06 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 15 Ethiopian Prime Minister resigns
Jan. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Mar. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 15 The United States and other countries denounce Russia for a large scale of damage caused by
supply supports in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture Mar. 13 Naha District Court renders judgement regarding ransomware “Not Petya” in June 2017
(through February 2) the demand of an injunctive order for actions that Feb. 16 Ethiopia declares a state of emergency
Feb. 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest crush the reef, etc.(Futenma Replacement Facility Feb. 23 U.S.-Australia Summit
fire in Kakogawa City, Hyogo Prefecture (through construction project) Feb. 26 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 28)
February 6) Mar. 14 Japan-Sri Lanka Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 27 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of
Feb. 06 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to heavy Mar. 23 Okinawa Prefectural Government appeals against Japan from the East China Sea
snow in Fukui Prefecture (through February 10) the judgement of the Naha District Court to the Feb. 27 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft’s passage of Tsushima Strait Western Channel is
Feb. 15 Disaster relief teams dispatched to help remove Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court(Futenma confirmed for the first time
snow in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture (through Replacement Facility construction project) Mar. 05 1st session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) (through March 20)
February 18) Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area Mar. 05 ROK special envoys visit North Korea and meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un
Feb. 16 State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attends the adjacent to Route 58
Mar. 09 PyeongChang Paralympics (through March 18)
Munich Security Conference (through February 18) Apr. 05 Japan-Iraq Summit (Tokyo)
Mar. 18 President Putin is re-elected as president (4th term)
Feb. 16 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Apr. 11 Japan-Bhutan Summit (Tokyo)
Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Mar. 18 The Turkish government announces taking control of Afrin, Syria
Apr. 12 Japan-Switzerland Summit (Tokyo)
Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Mar. 23 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft
Apr. 17 Japan-U.S. Summit (Florida) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)”
Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk thereafter turn around, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again and
Feb. 16 Japan-ASEAN Cope North Guam 2018 exercise
program (through February 21) (Guam) Apr. 29 Japan-ROK summit telephone talk fly to the continent. At the same time, two fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island
May 04 Japan-China summit telephone talk of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the East China Sea
Feb. 21 Disaster relief teams dispatched for collection of
fuel, etc. in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori May 09 Japan-China-ROK Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 23 Hostage siege in Trèbes, south of France
Prefecture (through March 7) May 10 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Mar. 23 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical
Feb. 26 Japan-ASEAN HA/DR Invitation Program (Kanto May 15 Japan-Samoa Summit (Tokyo) miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
Region) (through March 2) May 16 Japan-Fiji Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 25 Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea visits China (through March 28)
Mar. 20 Participation in Pacific Partnership 2018 (through May 18 Prime Minister Abe attends the 8th Pacific Islands Mar. 26 China-North Korea Summit
June 2) Leaders Meeting (Fukushima) (through May 19) Mar. 26 Presidential election in Egypt
Mar. 27 Establishment of the Ground Component Command May 24 Prime Minister Abe visits Russia (through May 26) Apr. 05 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances
and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and May 25 Japan-France Summit (St. Petersburg) to the Pacific Ocean
first reorganization of rapid deployment divisions/ May 26 Japan-Russia Summit (Moscow) Apr. 10 An aircraft that appears to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (BZK-005) files over the
brigades East China Sea (within Japan’s air defense identification zone)
May 28 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk
Mar. 27 22nd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia- Apr. 12 China conducts a naval review on the South China Sea
Jun. 07 Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.)
Pacific Region (Tokyo) (through March 28) Apr. 14 The United States, United Kingdom and France conduct military operations against facilities
Jun. 08 Prime Minister Abe attends the G7 Summit in
Apr. 06 Launch of X-band communications satellite related to chemical weapons in Syria
Charlevoix (through June 9)
“Kirameki 1” Apr. 18 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach
Jun. 08 Japan-Germany Summit (Charlevoix)
Apr. 0 9 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
Jun. 08 Japan-U.K. Summit (Charlevoix)
Apr. 09 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Apr. 19 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an
supply supports in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture Jun. 08 Japan-Italy Summit (Charlevoix) intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
(through April 11) Jun. 08 Japan-Canada Summit (Charlevoix) to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter the two bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and
Apr. 11 Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue Jun. 11 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
operations in response to the landslide in Nakatsu Jun. 12 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Apr. 20 North Korea announces a halt to “nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire”
City, Oita Prefecture (through April 23) and abolishment of nuclear test sites
Apr. 20 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, Apr. 20 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach
D.C.) the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
Apr. 22 Signing of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross- Apr. 20 A flight of carrier-based fighter jets (probable) of the Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” over
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (Toronto) the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time
Apr. 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Apr. 21 Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” pass between the main island of
supply supports in Irabujima, Miyakojima City, Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the East China Sea
Okinawa Prefecture (through May 2) Apr. 24 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through April 29)
May 04 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Helsinki)
May 06 Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tallinn)

May 09 Defense authorities of Japan and China sign Apr. 26 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an
the Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
Communication Mechanism to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the
May 10 Signing of the Memorandum on Defence Cooporation main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers,
and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the United Arab Apr. 27 The Inter-Korean Summit, Panmunjom Declaration agreement
Emirates (Tokyo) Apr. 28 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of
May 10 2nd Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program Japan from the East China Sea
(Indonesia-Malaysia) (through May 15) May 08 China-North Korea Summit
May 15 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean May 08 U.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran
Policy” May 11 Two Chinese bombers and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of
May 18 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter, the two fighter jets
Plans for the International Peace Cooperation (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again
Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the to fly toward the continent. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the Pacific
May 21 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Ocean in the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the East China Sea
May 29 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii) May 12 Attack occurs near the Paris Opera House in the center of Paris, France
Reference
Jun. 02 Defense Minister Onodera attends the 17th Shangri- May 13 Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Subaraya, Indonesia
La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 3) May 13 China conducts the first sea trial of its first domestic aircraft carrier (through May 18)
Jun. 02 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) May 18 A Chinese H-6K bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South
Jun. 02 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting China Sea (pointed out as Woody Island, Paracel Islands)
(Singapore) May 21 The United States releases a new Iran strategy
Jun. 02 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting May 25 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through
(Singapore) to the East China Sea
Jun. 02 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting May 26 The Inter-Korean Summit
(Singapore) May 27 A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12
Jun. 02 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting nautical miles of Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
(Singapore) Jun. 03 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Jun. 03 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting advances to the Pacific Ocean
(Singapore) Jun. 04 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and
Jun. 03 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns
Jun. 03 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again
(Singapore) Jun. 04 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves
Jun. 18 Disaster Relief for Northern Osaka Prefecture to the East China Sea
Earthquake (through June 26) Jun. 12 U.S.-North Korea Summit
Jun. 29 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Jul. 06 Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding
Disaster (through August18)

Chief of Staff, GSDF
Ground Staff Office
Ground Component Eastern Army Headquarters (Asaka)
Ground Component Command Headquarters (Asaka)
Command
1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Eastern Army 1st Division Division Headquarters (Nerima)
1st Infantry Regiment (Nerima)
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Ainoura) 32nd Infantry Regiment (Omiya)
34th Infantry Regiment (Itazuma)
1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) 1st Field Artillery unit (Kitafuji)
1st Logistics Support Regiment (Nerima)
System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya)
Other units
Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) 12th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Somagahara)
2nd Infantry Regiment (Takada)
Special Forces Group (Narashino) 13th Infantry Regiment (Matsumoto)
Other units 30th Infantry Regiment (Shibata)
12th Field Artillery unit (Utsunomiya)
12th Helicopter Unit (Somagahara)
Northern Army Headquarters (Sapporo) 12th Logistics Support Unit (Shinmachi)
Northern Army 2nd Division Division Headquarters (Asahikawa) Other units
3rd Infantry Regiment (Nayoro)
25th Infantry Regiment (Engaru)
2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo)
26th Infantry Regiment (Rumoi) 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) 4th Engineer Group (Zama)
2nd Tank Regiment (Kamifurano) 5th Engineer Group (Takada)
2nd Field Artillery Regiment (Asahikawa) Other units
2nd Logistics Support Regiment (Asahikawa) Eastern Army Combined Brigade 31st Infantry Regiment (Takeyama)
Other units (Takeyama) 48th Infantry Regiment (Somagahara)
5th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Obihiro) Other units
4th Infantry Regiment (Obihiro) Eastern Air Group (Tachikawa)
6th Infantry Regiment (Bihoro)
27th Infantry Regiment (Kushiro)
Other units
5th Field Artillery Regiment (Obihiro) Middle Army Headquarters (Itami)
5th Logistics Support Unit (Obihiro)
Other unit

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D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 1 8

Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera

3 Preparation Advancement in defense capabilities ……………………………………… 19

PartⅠ Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 Overview Chapter 3 Issues in the International Community

Chapter 2 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

Ⅱ Working as an Australian Department of Defence Exchange

Chapter 5 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Defense of Japan 2018 questionnaire:

Collaboration with related countries

Japan-China-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting

1 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

March April May June

Current status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

● Possibility that the September 2017 nuclear test was a hydrogen

Ballistic missile development

● Deployment of several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching

Tokyo Carrier-based fighter

Sea of Japan Miyako Island

The PLA Navy and Yonaguni

*Locations and paths are for illustrative purposes; includes estimates

The number of Japan’s press releases on China’s military aircraft’s flights

3 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Military activities by Russia are generally becoming more active

Deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (for illustrative purposes)

Announcement of deployment of coastal Legend

Surface-to-ship missile Bal

Civilian airport designated

New Su-35 fighter

Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

Trends in the number of scrambles against Russian planes

Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Strengthening cooperation through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises

5 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Track record of high-level interactions (June 2017 to June 2018)

* NATO (three times)

7 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Recent programs of capacity building assistance (April 2017 to May 2018)

Uzbekistan Myanmar Mongolia Laos Vietnam ASEAN

Vessel maintenance, medical

Disaster response Humanitarian assistance and

Cambodia Sri Lanka Malaysia Indonesia Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea

1 Ballistic Missile Defense

What is a ballistic missile?

9 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Image of interception of a ballistic missile related to ballistic missile defense (Ministry of

tracking by warning and

Ballistic Missile Defense

Preparation from Peacetime

Maintaining surveillance and response capabilities

Deployment of main ballistic missile defense-related troops nationwide (image)

Waters where Aegis-equipped

Air Self-Defense Force BMD radar site (FPS-5)

11 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Nationwide PAC-3 maneuver deployment training

Enhancement of ballistic missile defense capabilities

“New Shield” in ballistic missile defense: Aegis Ashore

Aegis system test facilities in Hawaii (US)

What is Aegis Ashore?