Ray-Ban History en
Ray-Ban History en
Ray-Ban History en
Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden find a rich seam in the archives of de
Rothschild frères for the history of Royal Dutch Shell and the global oil industry
Bnito’s kerosene supply which rose and fell with the vagaries of the Russian oil industry. For
their part, Rothschilds nursed suspicions about the probity of the brothers Marcus and Sam
Samuel who ran Samuel & Co. and Shell Transport. In addition, Lane despaired of the Samuels’
mismanagement at Shell Transport, which led to his angry resignation from the board in
December 1902. Impetuous expansion and imprudent financial policies rendered Shell
Transport’s position increasingly precarious, despite large dividends from Asiatic. By 1905 the
company was virtually bankrupt, forcing Samuel & Co. to seek a merger with Royal Dutch.
To his frustration, Lane found himself casting around for information during the 1906
merger talks between Royal Dutch and Shell Transport. Though meeting frequently in the exec-
utive committee of Asiatic, Deterding and Marcus Samuel kept Lane at arm’s length because
they wished to exclude Bnito. In the original plan Royal Dutch and Shell Transport were to
become holding companies by transferring their assets to a single, integrated operating com-
pany. This plan foundered, however, on the twenty-one year term set by the Asiatic agreement
with the intention, according to Lane, of leading to a merger between the three main sharehold-
ers. Deterding and Samuel then considered alternatives such as buying the Rothschilds’ share in
Asiatic or taking over Bnito, before giving up such ideas because neither Royal Dutch nor Shell
Transport had the money for them. In the end they settled for a very complicated structure,
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forming what became known as the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, in which the two holdings
owned three operating companies: Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij for exploration, pro-
duction and manufacturing, Asiatic for marketing, and Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company for
storage and transport. Royal Dutch and Shell Transport owned the Group in the famous 60–40
proportion, but Rothschilds continued to hold 33 per cent of Asiatic shares. From an equal
partner in a tripartite agreement, Rothschilds had become a minority party entirely dependent
on the good will of the majority, all the more important since successive amendments and read-
justments had made Asiatic’s accounting so fearfully complicated that even Lane admitted to no
longer fully understanding them.
The differences between the partners in Asiatic widened when, following its formation in
1907, the Group embarked on a tremendous expansion into all major oil producing areas then
known: Romania, Russia, Egypt, the United States, Mexico, and Venezuela. The Group’s expan-
sion in Russia was partly effected by the acquisition, in 1912, of Rothschilds’ oil interests in
Baku. From being a fellow oil producer, the Paris firm had now become a mere shareholder,
rendering Lane’s supervisory task all the more difficult. His close relationship with Deterding
and his active role on the Royal Dutch board ensured that Rothschilds and Royal Dutch/Shell
remained on very good terms. At the same time his letters to Paris yield matchless insights con-
cerning Royal Dutch/Shell and Deterding. In October 1913, for instance, Lane commented on:
the peculiar character of Mr Deterding. His mind is so active, so suspicious and so ready
to take offence, that it is always advisable if possible to keep him outside the sphere of
action until the last moment, and persuade him to leave himself into the hands of some-
one in whom he has the utmost confidence and knows his weaknesses, and is able to lead
him on sound and equitable lines and prevent his bursting away in some petulant mood
and out of pique adopting a regrettable course.²
However, the First World War drove a deep wedge between the Group and Rothschilds by over-
turning the conditions underlying the successive agreements between them. At the same time
Royal Dutch/Shell’s operations in the Western hemisphere rapidly outpaced those in the Asian
market, undermining Asiatic’s original conception and purpose. Lane put up a courageous bat-
tle to defend Rothschilds’ interests, accepting the fairness of adjusting conditions while fight-
ing to obtain the best terms, but as the war progressed selling out became an increasingly
attractive option. The two sides reached agreement in January 1918, five years before the Asiatic
agreement was due to expire.
By selling its share in Asiatic – the purchase price paid for in Royal Dutch shares – de
Rothschild frères’ relationship with Royal Dutch/Shell entered a new phase: first Bnito had
actied as a supplier to Shell Transport, then came the partnership in Asiatic, this in turn became
a minority position following the Royal Dutch and Shell merger, and now the sale of Asiatic
meant that at a stroke Rothschilds became Royal Dutch’s single biggest shareholder. With the
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end of his active involvement with Asiatic, Lane’s correspondence in the Roubaix files
inevitably loses some of its importance for Royal Dutch/Shell history although Rothschilds
remained a highly esteemed business partner, treated to singular privileges such as confidential
updates on the Group’s trading and likely profits, and attendance at board meetings by repre-
sentatives visiting London.
At the same time, the mutual ties perceptibly slackened. In 1921 Deterding’s somewhat rude
insistence on support from Rothschilds in a tax dispute with the Dutch government raised eye-
brows in Paris. Subsequently the correspondence declined in frequency and assumed a more
factual tone. Lane’s death in 1926 marked a further stage in the gradual distancing between
Rothschilds and Royal Dutch/Shell. By 1933 little remained of the formerly close relations.
That year Deterding picked a sorry quarrel with Rothschilds when the firm declined to support
one of his hobby horses, the fight against Communism and the Soviet Union. Though not
overtly anti-Semitic, Deterding’s letters in the matter show the insidious effects of the Nazi
propaganda absorbed during his sojourns in Germany following his purchase of a
Mecklenburg hunting estate. The fact that his colleagues on the Royal Dutch board failed to
stop his disastrous action underlines just how far the Group and Rothschilds had drifted apart.
Joost Jonker is Lecturer and Research Fellow in Economic History at Utrecht University, with financial
history and business history as special interests. Jan Luiten van Zanden is Professor of Economic History at
Utrecht University and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam).
He has published widely on the economic history of Western Europe and Indonesia from the Middle Ages to
the present. The authors collaborated with Stephen Howarth and Keetie Sluyterman on the four-volume A
History of Royal Dutch Shell (Oxford: Oxford University Press; Amsterdam:Boom Publishers, 2007).
notes
1 Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden, A History 2 Archives nationales du monde du travail (Roubaix),
of Royal Dutch Shell. Voume. 1: From Challenger to Joint 132 aq 199, correspondence 1913, Lane to Baron
Industry Leader, 1890‒1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Edouard de Rothschild, 21 October 1913.
Press; Amsterdam: Boom Publishers, 2007).
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