0% found this document useful (0 votes)
63 views14 pages

Facts:: Francisco I. Chavez V. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, 2002-07-09

This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a joint venture agreement between the Public Estates Authority (PEA) and a private corporation (AMARI) to develop reclaimed land in Manila Bay. The key issue is whether AMARI can acquire ownership of the reclaimed land, which are considered public domain lands under the 1987 Constitution. Philippine law has long held that reclaimed lands retain their public character and can only be leased, not sold, to private parties to ensure public access. The Court ultimately ruled the joint venture agreement unconstitutional as it would result in AMARI gaining ownership of public domain lands.

Uploaded by

Pat Espinoza
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
63 views14 pages

Facts:: Francisco I. Chavez V. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, 2002-07-09

This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a joint venture agreement between the Public Estates Authority (PEA) and a private corporation (AMARI) to develop reclaimed land in Manila Bay. The key issue is whether AMARI can acquire ownership of the reclaimed land, which are considered public domain lands under the 1987 Constitution. Philippine law has long held that reclaimed lands retain their public character and can only be leased, not sold, to private parties to ensure public access. The Court ultimately ruled the joint venture agreement unconstitutional as it would result in AMARI gaining ownership of public domain lands.

Uploaded by

Pat Espinoza
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 14

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, GR No.

133250, 2002-07-09
Facts:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Ba... y
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA.
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring
to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"[2] under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI,
a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
Issues:
WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under
the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila
Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the... exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis... supplied)
Ruling:
In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed
lands and submerged areas for... non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the
Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim... judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands
covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the... terms of
the grant of authority."
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as
walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and... mines, until granted
to private individuals."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private...
parties
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the
lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the
title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise throughout the
Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights
and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.[46] The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a)Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable
public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time... declare what lands are open to disposition
or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited or classified
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural purposes,... and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-
General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and
are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed
of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands
of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise."
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable
by... constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and...
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain
that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws.
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law... governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then
declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these
lands... for public or quasi-public uses.
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section
58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain.
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that
the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the...
national government.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no
longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as
patrimonial property of the State
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain."
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public...
domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution.
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide
Submerged areas are those... permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of
the tide.
Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as... title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands.
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain would be... subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution... he 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural
lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a... recurrence of cases like
the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social
unrest.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from...
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the
592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources" and consequently "owned by the State."
As such, foreshore and submerged areas
"shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified."[72] The
President has the... authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering
the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified... parties.
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently
enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of
the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the
government... can alienate them.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation
of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a
person contracted by the National Government.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15
hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of... the
public domain open to disposition.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also
exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public... domain."
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public
domain.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does
not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and
open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,... There is no
express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed
from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
"shall belong to or be owned by PEA."
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government."
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial
or alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial... properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations.
The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals.
PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits
such sales.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to
public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands."
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of
PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership
previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of... acquiring ownership.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not... sell or transfer ownership
of these lands to private corporations.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.
In their present state, the 592.15... hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3,... Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2,... Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab... initio.
Principles:
The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership...
that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950,...
incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,... (b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,... and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another,[53] for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable
public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to... disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public... uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x... x."
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral
land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open... to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may
be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands
for agricultural purposes. x x x
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture,... shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five... years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
aking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased... and
the conditions therefor."
Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold...
alienable lands of the public domain only through lease
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, GR No. L-27873, 1983-
11-29
Facts:
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No. L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed
an opposition to the application of Roque... and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square
meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to
the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which
was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and
registered in his name.
Issues:
whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of
the... private applicants.
Ruling:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with... grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains
or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest... land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so... that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
s not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with... grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest...
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so... that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and
title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title
to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a... positive act of Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April 15, 1988)


Case Digest
Surface Rights of Landowner (Article 437)

Facts:

Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf
of his children. This application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and
Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok).

The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and that they have been
in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground that they have mineral
claims covering the property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land
in concept of owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting
their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.

Held:

No, the CA was incorrect.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above.
How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights?
Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.

The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural.

In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased
to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected.
As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so
and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 177168
August 3, 2015 Facts: A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) issued in Navy Officers’ Village
Association, Inc (NOVAI)’s name covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres
Bonifacio Military Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a larger
parcel of land which TCT’s under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The then
President Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes
certain parcels of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay
City. Thereafter, then President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded
Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in the provinces abovementioned and
declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be disposed of under the provisions of certain
laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare
and training center sites. The property was the subject of deed of sale between the
Republic and NOVAI to which the TCT was registered in favour of the latter. The Republic
then sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property was still part of the
military reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the subject of
sale. The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court
of Appeals reversed RTC’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the property covered by TCT
issued under the name of NOVAI is inalienable land of public domain and cannot be the
subject of sale. Held: Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not
have been validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of
proving that the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use or purpose. As
provided in Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those which are
intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are
intended for some public service”. In this case, the property was classified as military
reservation thus, remained to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the
public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the
President. Since there was no positive act from the government, the property had to retain
its inalienable and non-disposable character. It cannot therefore, be subject of sale
otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with
Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man
because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed
by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.

II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of
man.

HELD:

The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat,
the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's
Third New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress
were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not
so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore
lands.”

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

You might also like