ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1

1. Lagman v. Medialdea [G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017]

2. Santiago vs. Bautista [G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961]
3. Limkaichong v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009]
4. Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]
5. PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955]
6. Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]
7. David vs. Arroyo, [G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
8. Pormento vs. Estrada, [G.R. No. 191988, August 21, 2010]
9. Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority [G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993]
10. Joya vs. PCGG [G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993]
11. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
12. Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
13. Bugnay Construction & Devt. Corp. vs. Laron [G.R. No. 79983, August,1989]
14. Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994]
15. Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]
16. Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. [G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995]
17. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]
18. Kilosbayan vs. Morato [G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995]
19. Lozada vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-59068, January 27, 1983]

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Requisites of Judicial Review:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (ripeness)

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (cause of action)

SECTION 1
1. Lagman v. 1. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an
Medialdea
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to
the President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to
“undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other
hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to,
but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does
not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed
below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
accuracy of the facts presented before it.
2. The Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of
a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand,
Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated
by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification
of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to
review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.
3. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and
different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the
Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers.
4. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
 President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on
the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

5. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to

declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of
this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient
factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the
declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was
made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present
depends on the President
2. Santiago v. Main Doctrine: JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES;
Bautista REQUIREMENT.— Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
Petitioners before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
invoked determine what the law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of
Certiorari the contending parties.|||
because the
Board allegedly 1. CERTIORARI- In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action
commiited instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.'
grave abuse of (Section 1, Rule 67.)
discretion in the
oratorical REQUIREMENTS TO INVOKE CERTIORARI:
contest (which
is not allowed (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
since the law property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for
requires that the hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
body must
exercise judicial (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must
or quasi judicial have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on
powers for the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
certiorari to lie
and oratorical (3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign
contest, beauty power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the
conteests, etc. legislative or executive department.
are not subject
to judicial
review. 2. JUDICIAL FUNCTION - an act performed by virtue of judicial powers;
the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of
the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182).

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority,
and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'

It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of

the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department.

3. JUDICIAL POWER - 'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a

precise definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been
variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or
property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the
instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department of
government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its
construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the
judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons
to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety
of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or
emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer,
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of
questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or
property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in
hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto,
and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and
pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the
rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and
applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the
adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but
not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term
"judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine
a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.'

*Note: It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed,

 rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
3. Limkaichong 1. DECISION MUST BE PROMULGATED BEFORE IT BECOMES
v. COMELEC BINDING: A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the judge or
judges who signed the decision continued to support it. Thus, an
unpromulgated decision is no decision at all.

At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal deliberations of
the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes
binding only after it is validly promulgated. Until such operative act occurs,
there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from
the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, anyone who took
part in the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly
withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
4. Daza v. The issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does
Singson the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution.

Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our
powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party
respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be
brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important
constitutional issue raised may be addressed.

Note: Political Questions in proper cases now fall under the expanded
jurisdiction of Judicial Review
5. PACU v. 1. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately
Secretary of in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not
Education sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he
has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public.

2. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

3. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient.

4. Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases

and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
 incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution
are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.
6. Mariano Jr. v. 1. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW, WHEN CHALLENGED;
COMELEC REQUIREMENTS. — The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
(Dumlao v. COMELEC)|||

As applied in the case: Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering
that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
7. David v. 1. WHAT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACT: an unconstitutional act is
Arroyo not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it
is in legal contemplation, inoperative.

2. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY , EXCEPTION TO THE

MOOT AND ACADEMIC RULE:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise (OR EVEN IF) moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

3. LOCUS STANDI -Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a

court of justice on a given question.

3. PRIVATE SUITS - In private suits, standing is governed by the real-

parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on
his own right to the relief sought.

4. DIRECT INJURY TEST (Vera Doctrine): This Court adopted the direct
injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases.

5. LEGAL STANDING CAN BE RELAXED: The Court has adopted a rule

that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have
been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance.
(Standing may be relaxed, liberality doctrine of legal standing)

6. REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC SUIT: Taxpayers, voters, concerned

citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of

public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the

validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Note: Organizations may be given standing to sue to assert the rights of

their members (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Arroyo)

7. IN REVIEWING FACTUAL BASES – PERTAINS TO

DISCRETION OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS (Citing IBP v. Zamora
and Lansang v. Garcia)
 Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter
part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.

Citing IBP v. Zamora: While the Court considered the President’s calling-out
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that it is

incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support
his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.

Citing Lansang v. Garcia: Lansang adopted the test that:

Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President’s decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily.

Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. (W/N
the President acted arbitrarily)

8. Pormento v. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY:

Estrada
The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case
is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

There must be a live conflict of legal rights where a specific relief may be
decreed upon by the Court that will benefit any of the parties.
9. Macasiano v. 1. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo (Google: in isolation;
National without reference to facts or evidence). Judicial power is the "right to
Housing determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."
Authority
2. PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REQS:
 (a) there must be a justiciable controversy,

(b)the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse and

(c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved. True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as one for
prohibition or mandamus if it has far reaching implications and raises
questions that need to be resolved; but the exercise of such discretion
presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.

3. TAXPAYER SUIT NEED NOT BE ALWAYS ENTERTAINED: "as

far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of the discretion
as to whether or not it should be entertained."

10. Joya v. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL

PCGG REVIEW; REQUISITES. — The rule is settled that no question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.
2. TERMS "LEGAL STANDING" AND "INTEREST," DEFINED;
EXCEPTIONS TO THE LEGAL STANDING RULE; RELAXATION
OF THE RULE NOT WARRANTED. — The Court will exercise its power
of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the
legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the
party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. There are certain
instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized
by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. We need to
emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when
paramount public interest is involved. We find however that there is no such
justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
3. ACTIONS; MUST BE PROSECUTED IN THE NAME OF THE
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST. — We have held that one having no right
or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court
which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs.
4. WRIT OF MANDAMUS; WHEN AVAILABLE. — Although this
action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill
the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this
Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen
only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the
state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,
petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of
respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover,
petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public
of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional
right in this action for mandamus.
5. CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A TAXPAYER'S
SUIT. — A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the
disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that
petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from
private sources and not with public money.
6. ISSUES RAISED ON THE PRESENT PETITION, NOW MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. — For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must
be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and
academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since
the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public
officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date —
11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.
 7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES ON SPECIFIC MATTERS WHERE
THEY ACQUIRED EXPERTISE, GENERALLY BINDING AND
CONTROLLING. — This Court takes note of the certification issued by the
Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of
this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not
among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum. We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum.
Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to
undertake the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the
aid of competent experts, of important cultural properties and national cultural
treasures. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing
authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of
specialization to which they are assigned.

11. Legaspi v. 1. To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamus must have been
CSC instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from
the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be
an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be
enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.|||

2. when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,

the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
possesses the right.|||

3. "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it

embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and
existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought
are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.||

As applied in the case: The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed
with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of
the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the
present suit.||| . The results of the civil service exam are released to the public.
Hence there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed.
12. Dumlao v. No new doctrine
COMELEC

13. Bugnay 1. CERTIORARI GENERALLY NOT AVAILABLE AGAINST AN

Construction & ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS; EXCEPTION;
Devt. Corp v. REQUISITE. — While generally an order denying a motion to dismiss is
Laron interlocutory and not appealable, where such denial was issued with grave
abuse of discretion or is without or in excess of jurisdiction, the extra ordinary
write of certiorari and prohibition will lie.
2. MOTION TO DISMISS; LITIS PENDENTIA; REQUISITES. — On
the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause,
or litis pendentia, as a ground for dismissal, there must be between the action
under consideration and the other action
(1) identity of the parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions,
(2) identity of the rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts,
(3) the identity in both cases is such that the judgment which may be rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case. This ground is also referred to as lis
pendens or auter action pendant.
3. MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS; PRINCIPLE CONSTRUED. — A party
cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
4. TAXPAYER'S SUIT. — The doctrine of taxpayer's suit holds that only
when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public
funds raised by taxation will the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The essence of a
taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that
requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.
5. TAXPAYER'S SUIT; ESSENTIAL REQUISITE FOR THE SUIT TO
PROSPER. — However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the
taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in
interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.
6. FORUM-SHOPPING; SANCTION. — Forum-shopping, an act of
malpractice, is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that degrades the
administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Paragraph 17 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act.
Thus, said Paragraph 17 provides that no petition may be filed in the then
 Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals "if another
similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court"
and vice-versa. The Rule ordains that "(a) violation of the rule shall
constitute a contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal
of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against
the counsel or party concerned.
14. Kilosbayan 1. A PARTY'S STANDING IN THE HIGH COURT IS A
Inc. v. PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITY WHICH MAY BE SET ASIDE
Guingona WHERE ISSUES RAISED ARE OF PARAMOUNT PUBLIC
INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. — The preliminary issue on
the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues
raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers cases, this Court brushed aside
this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)."
Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it
"enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." We find the instant
petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised
are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those
involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering
as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barries which the respondents
tried to take advantage of.
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-
profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before
this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,
ruling, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
15. Philconsa v. We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for
Enriquez that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential
veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the
authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an
impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature
arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
 To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939];
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a

derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:

This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or

individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the
question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be
futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the
domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly,
if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch
that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise
file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a
Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office
(Memorandum, p. 14).

It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto

(Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the
presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when
the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of
the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power
ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
16. Tatad v. 1. TAXPAYER'S SUITS; PREVAILING DOCTRINE. — The prevailing
Garcia Jr. doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or
(1995) controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow the same when
only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and
Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989]). For as long as
the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice
but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
institute the present action.
17. Oposa v. JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL
Factoran Jr. QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. — It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the
(TLA Case- insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
1993) shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
 review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The
first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,'
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary."

Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In the case now before
us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . ."|||
18. Kilosbayan 1. "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE APPLICABLE
v. Morato
ONLY WHEN A CASE IS BEFORE A COURT A SECOND TIME
AFTER A RULING BY AN APPELLATE COURT. — Petitioners
argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine
of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable
considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it
is not its continuation. The doctrine applies only when a case is before a
court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
2. DEFINITION. — "Law of the case" has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.
3. "LAW OF THE CASE" DIFFERENTIATED FROM RES
JUDICATA. — As this Court explained in another case, "The law of the
case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely
expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been
decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusiveness of the
first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is
generally, if not universally, not final. It relates entirely to questions of
law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same
case."
4. "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE WILL NOT APPLY
WHERE THE PARTIES ARE THE SAME BUT THE CASES ARE
DIFFERENT. — It follows that since the present case is not the same
one litigated by the parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there
cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are
the same but the cases are not.
5. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT OR
PRECLUSION OF ISSUES; DOCTRINE CONSTRUED. — Nor is
inquiry into petitioners' right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related
doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an
issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.
6. DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO ISSUES OF LAW. —
It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion
of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least
when substantially unrelated claims are involved.
7. This exception to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion is
authoritatively formulated in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, as
follows: Sec. 28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by
a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the
parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: . . . (2) The issue
is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially
unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account
of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to
avoid inequitable administration of the laws.
8. QUESTION WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE
STANDING TO QUESTION THE EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT (ELA), A LEGAL QUESTION. — The question
whether petitioners have standing to question the Equipment Lease
Agreement or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the
ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the
PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R.
No. 113375) that petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the
1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of
their standing in the present suit.
9. RULE ON STANDING AND REAL PARTY-IN-
INTEREST, DIFFERENTIATED. — The difference between the rule
on standing and real party-in-interest has been noted by authorities thus:
"It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party-in-interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
(FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328
[1985]) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 7 L. Ed. 2d 633
[1962]) On the other hand, the question as to "real party-in-interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" (Salonga v.
Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil 125, 131 [1951])
10. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS ARE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. — In actions
for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it
(Ibañez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]), or who
claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally
excluded from it. (See De la Lara Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, G.R. No. L-13460, Nov. 28, [1958])
11. PARTIES WITH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST; "PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST,"
CONSTRUED. — These are parties with "a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase 'present substantial
interest' more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject
 matter of action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if
the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him." (1
MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 154-155 [1979])
12. PARTIES WITHOUT PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST IN THE EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT, NOT
ENTITLED TO BRING SUIT FOR ANNULMENT; CASE AT BAR.
— But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA
as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right to
intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the
execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity
of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may
be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on
Audit or before the Ombudsman. The Constitution requires that the
Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors of the people shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof including government-owned or controlled
corporations." (Art. XI, 12) In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized
to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a
government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise. (Rule 66, Sec. 2 [a] [d] For reasons set
for, we hold that petitioner have no cause against respondents and
therefore their petition should be dismissed.

Notes from Separate Opinions:

STARE DECISIS: The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a
court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a
similar situation.|||

RES JUDICATA; ASPECTS. — The doctrine of res judicata has dual

aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.|||

\Note from outside case: The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal
principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom.
In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based
upon the judgment.
19. Lozada v. 1. NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE; TAXPAYER'S SUIT; WHEN
COMELEC MAY IT BE ALLOWED. — It is only when act complained of which may
include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of
public money that the so-called taxpayer's suit may be allowed.
2. REQUISITE INTEREST TO IMPUGN VALIDITY OF A STATUTE;
NOT A CASE OF; COMELEC'S INACTION TO CALL SPECIAL
SESSION; CASE AT BAR. — The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must base a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of the enforcement
. In the case at bar, the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special
election to fill-up the existing vacancies in the Batasan Pambansa, standing
alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens.
Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind
alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because
of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all
citizens.
3. CONCRETE INJURY DEFINED. — Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution
When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance'' shared in substantially
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. (Ibid.)