Welcome to

TÜV Rheinland Vietnam

RISK ASSESSMENT
 Risk Tolerance Appears to be Lessening

The public and workers seem less tolerant of risk

 Past practices may be unacceptable today

 The public expects minimal risk or even demands zero risk

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Risk-Based Decision Support

•Common in Many Standards

•Screening Risks as a Decision Tool

•Documentation of the Basis of Decisions

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Concepts in Risk Assessment

• Everything we do incurs some risk.

• Risk is a function of event consequence and frequency.
• Ranking is somewhat subjective. Ranking is particularly valuable for risk comparison.
• Risks can be ranked using Risk Matrices
3x3 to 6x6 matrices appear to be the most common..
• The general guideline is that employees should be exposed to no more risk on the job than
they are outside of work.

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Risk Assessment

• Identify the hazards

• Assess the risks

• Reduce or eliminate the risk

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Difference Between Hazard and Risk

A hazard is a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to

property, damage to the environment or some combination of these

Risk is the likelihood of a specified undesired event

Risk assessment is the complex process of determining the significance or the

value of identified hazards

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 Common Terms & Acronyms

Risk - A measure of potential economic loss, human injury or environmental

damage in terms of the frequency of the loss or injury occurring and the
magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs
Scenario - A sequence of events that results in an Undesired Consequence.

Initiating Event - The event that initiates the sequence of events that leads to
the undesired consequence. The event that starts a scenario, or determines
how often (frequency) it occurs.
PFD - Probability of Failure on Demand. The probability a system will fail to
perform a specified function when required (demand).

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Risk Reduction

• Risk can only be reduced to zero by eliminating the activity

• Risk can always be reduced with a cost associated with the risk reduction measure

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Acceptable Levels of Risk

• What is acceptable to one is not acceptable to someone else

• Many industrial hazards are no longer accepted by the public and

the employees

• Risk Communication is based upon Risk Comparisons

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 ALARP
Tolerable Risk

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 Traditional Measures of Acceptability

• Regulations
• Industry practice
• Company practice
• Engineering judgment
• Now Formal Risk Assessment

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Probability or Frequency?

• Probability - The expression for the chance of occurrence of an event or an

event sequence. Probability is expressed as a dimensionless number ranging
from 0 to 1.

• Frequency - Number of occurrences of an event per unit time. Usually

expressed as a number having the units “occurrences per hour” or
“occurrences per year”. For example, failures per year.

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ACCIDENT AND LOSS STATISTICS

• Important measure of the effectiveness of safety programs

• Used for Comparisons

• Quantitative methods to characterize accident and loss

performance

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 USA Data
Incidence Rate
Based on number of accidents and/or fatalities per 100 worker
years, where a worker year is defined as 2,000 hours

IRInjury/Illness = (Number of Injury or Illness) X 200,000 hours

(Total number of hrs worked by all employees during that period)

IRLost Work Days = (Number of Lost Work Days) X 200,000 hours

(Total number of hrs worked by all employees during that period)

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FATAL ACCIDENT RATE

Reports the number of fatalities based on 1,000 employees working

their entire lifetime, where a lifetime is defined as 50 years at 2,000
hours/year

FAR = (Number of fatalities) X 108 hrs

(Total hrs worked by all employees during that period)

Fatality Rate = (Number of fatalities per year)

(Number of exposed people in the population)
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FAR

This is one method of setting a tolerable risk level. If a design team is

prepared to define what is considered to be a target fatal accident rate
for a particular situation it becomes possible to define a numerical
value for the tolerable risk.

Whilst it seems a bit brutal to set such targets the reality is that certain
industries have historical norms and also have targets for improving
those statistical results

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FAR

FAR can be used as basis for setting the tolerable rate of occurrence for a
hazardous event.

The generally accepted basis for quoting FAR figures is the number of fatalities
per one hundred million hours of exposure.

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Example

• Suppose a plant has an average of 5 persons on site at all times

and suppose that 1 explosion event is likely to cause 1 person to
be killed. The site FAR has been set at 2.0 × 10–8/hr.
• We can calculate the minimum average period between explosions
that could be regarded as tolerable, as follows:
• Fatality rate per year = (FAR/hr) × (hours exposed/yr)
= (2 × 10–8) × (5 × 8760)
= 8.76 × 10–4
• Avg. years per explosion = 1/8.76 × 10–4 = 1140 year

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FAR FOR DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES
(Source: F.P. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries)

Industry or Activity FAR

(deaths/108 hours)
Chemical 0.49
Paper 1.54
Food 3.28
Construction 3.88
Trucking 7.28
Staying at home 3.00
Rock climbing 4,000
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 CONVERSION OF FAR TO FATALITY RATE

FAR = 2

8 hour shift, 300 days/year.

What is the fatality rate?

Fatality rate = 2 x 10^(-8)/hr x 8x300 hr/yr

= 0.48 x 10^(-4) /yr

Therefore,

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Target Acceptable Risk

• Availability as a reverse measure of risk

• Government Mandates

Holland

• Common Targets

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 Is 99.9% Good Enough?

If 99.9% were considered “good enough”:

Your watch would be off by 1-1/2 minutes a day

The US postal service would lose 16,000 pieces of mail
every hour
22,000 checks would be deducted from the wrong account
every hour

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 Risk Estimate

• Severity
(extent of potential damage)
•Frequency
(probability or likelihood)

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 Accident
Severity Modify
Estimation System

System Hazard Risk Risk Operate

Description Identification Determination Acceptance System

Accident
Likelihood
Estimation

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 Sequence of a Hazard Scenario

Initiating Intermediate Final

Event Events Event

Operator Release
Level Injury from
Overfills From Tank
Increases Release
Tank

High Level Operator Personnel

Alarm Fails to in the
Fails Control Area

Dependent Events
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 Varied Approach

• Safety / Environmental Risks start with severity estimates

• Inspection / Reliability Risks start with frequency data / estimates

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 Ranking Severity

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Damage Estimate

• Leak

• Maximum extent of Downwind Dispersion

Fire / Explosion / Toxic exposure

• Personnel / Public Exposed

• Ignition potential for Flammables

• Failure of Mitigation

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 Worst Case Scenario

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 Ranking Frequency

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 Overall Risk

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 Decision Support .. Action Priority
Catastrhic Critical Moderate Minor

Often High Risk

Sometimes

Possible Moderate Risk

Rarely

Almost Never Acceptble Risk

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4 x 5 Risk Matrix

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

PROBABILITY AN INCIDENT WILL OCCUR

Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
A B C D E

Catastrophic I EXTREMELY HIGH MEDIUM

S E
E F HIGH
V F Critical II
E E
R C
I T Moderate III HIGH MEDIUM
T S
Y LOW
Negligible IV MEDIUM

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 Risk Matrix
PROBABILITY
Possi bi l i ty Possi bi l i ty
Possi bi l i ty
Practi cal l y Not Li k e l y of of
of Isol ate d
Impossi bl e To O ccu r O ccu ri n g Re pe ate d
In ci de n ts
S ome ti me In ci de n ts

Once in Once every Once every Once every > Once per
CONSEQUENCE > 25 years 12-25 years 3-12 years 1-3 years year

Harm to Harm to Bu si n e ss Re pu tati on

Pe opl e En vmn t Impact Damage 1 2 3 4 5
To t al lo s s o f Int ernat io nal
Fat alit ies
co nt ainment
>$2 M M
med ia A 10 20 30 40 50

Sig nificant lo s s
o f co nt ainment
Permanent
d is ab ilit y
>1 0 0 0 b b ls
Limit ed ab ilit y
$2 0 0 k-$2 M M Nat io nal med ia B 5 10 15 20 25
t o co nt ro l
Sig nificant lo s s
o f co nt ainment
Lo cal med ia
Ho s p it al s t ay >1 0 0 b b ls
Only wo rkp lace
$2 5 k-$2 0 0 k
Part ner imag e C 4 8 12 16 20
affect ed
M ino r lo s s o f
Day-away-fro m- co nt ainment M ino r
wo rk-cas e
DAFWC
<1 0 0 b b ls
Only wo rkp lace
$5 k-$2 5 k inho us e
rep o rt ing
D 2 4 6 8 10
affect ed

Slig ht lo s s o f
Simp le firs t –aid
t reat ment cas e
co nt ainment
<1 b b l
<$5 k No Imp act E 1 2 3 4 5

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RISK QUANTIFICATION
(QRA)

Probabilistic risk analysis methodology combines the time-varying hazard zones

that are produced by the hazard quantification codes with the probability of
occurrence of these zones, site specific weather conditions, local terrain,
population data, and ignition source data to determine the expected number of
fatalities and estimated extent of plant damage for each specific failure case,
assuming that each failure case occurs.

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HAZARD ZONES ANALYSIS

The release conditions from the failure case definitions are then processed using
the best available hazard quantification technology to produce a set of hazard
zones for each failure case. Computer software is quite commonly used to
produce profiles for the fire, explosion, BLEVE, and toxic hazards associated with
the failure case

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Consequence Analysis

• Source term modeling

• Dispersion modeling

• Fire and explosion modeling

• BLEVE and other consequences

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 Flow of liquid through a hole

Q m  ACo 2 g c Pg
where:
Qm = mass flow rate in lb/sec
A = cross-sectional area in ft2
 = density in lbm/ft3
gc = gravitational constant = 32.174 ft-lbm/lbf/sec2, and
Pg = gage pressure in lbf/ft2

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Vapor Dispersion

• Simple Gaussian models

• Dense gas models

• Computational Fluid Dynamics

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 28 July 2003
40 ITB
 Damage Estimation
Zone of Impact

• Weather

wind speed, atmospheric stability

• Mitigation Issues

• People /Public in Zone

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Fault Trees / Event Trees

Calculate frequency of undesired event from initiating event failure

data, combining probability of weather, ignition, failure of mitigation
systems, etc

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 US ARMY Chemical Weapon Destruction Project
Hazard Severity Level Definition

Agent Release Personnel

Severity Level In-Plant Injury/Illness System Loss

I—Catastrophic > IDLH outside engineering Illness, death, or injury involving >25% and/or >1 month
controls permanent total disability to repair

II—Critical ³ AEL outside of engineering Injury involving permanent partial 10% to 25% and/or
controls disability 1 week to 1 month to
repair

III—Marginal ³ AEL inside nonagent areas Injury involving temporary total <10% and/or 1 day to
disability 1 week to repair

IV—Negligible < AEL nonagent areas Injury involving only first aid or No system loss
minor supportive treatment downtime, or repairs
completed within 1 day

AEL = airborne exposure level (VX = 0.00001 mg/m3)

IDLH = immediately dangerous to life and health (VX = 0.02 mg/m3)

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 US ARMY Chemical Weapon Destruction Project
Hazard Frequency Level Definition (event/year)

Qualitative Agent Release Personnel

Frequency In-Plant Injury/Illness System Loss

A — frequent 1E–01 10.0 1.0

B — probable 1E–01 > 1E–02 10.0 > 1.0 1.0 > 1E–01

C — occasional 1E–02 > 1E–03 1.0 > 1E–02 1E–01 > 1E–02

D — remote 1E–03 > 1E–04 1E–02 >³ 1E–04 1E–02 >³ 1E–03

E — improbable 1E–04 > 1E–06 1E–04 > 1E–06 1E–03 > 1E–06

F — rare .> 1E–06 > 1E–06 > 1E–06

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 Severity Level
Qualitative
Frequency
I II III IV
(catastrophic) (critical) (marginal) (negligible)
A — frequent 1 1 1 3

B — probable 1 1 2 3

C — occasional 1 2 3 4

D — remote 2 2 3 4

E — improbable 3 3 3 4

F — rare 4 4 4 4

aAcceptability criteria:
RAC Description Resolution Authority
1 Unacceptable ASA
2 Undesirable PMCD
3 Acceptable with controls PMATA-Safety
4 Acceptable
ASA = Assistant Secretary of the Army / PMATA = Product Manager for Alternative Technologies and Approaches /
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PMCD = Office of Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
 Risk Control

Target Risk Risk inherent

Level in the process

SIS Alarms BPCS Other

Process

Risk

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Risk assessment

Risk assessment is like a captured spy. If you torture it long

enough, it will tell you anything you want.

William Ruckelshaus

Former EPA Administrator

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 From Reactive to Proactive

• Develop a program for risk management

• Train employees in risk principles
• Address key risks using these methods
• Make risk management a way of doing business – imbedded in the culture of the company as
a standard work process

28 July 2003
49 ITB
 RISK ASSESSMENT

is now
an integral requirement

of the world wide

Processing Industry

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