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ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_30-1

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ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology

Katarzyna Jasko

Jagiellonian University, Poland

Arie W. Kruglanski

University of Maryland, U.S.A

Ahmad Saiful Rijal bin Hassan

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Rohan Gunaratna

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

In: Woodward M., Lukens-Bull R. (eds) Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives.

Springer, Cham

Author’s Note

Author Correspondence: Katarzyna Jasko, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University,

Ingardena 3, 30-060 Kraków, Poland. E-mail: katarzyna.jasko@uj.edu.pl

Katarzyna Jasko’s work on this paper was supported by grant from National Science Centre

(2011/03/B/HS6/01853). Arie Kruglanski’s work on this project was partially supported by

MINERVA grant 487940 from the Office of Naval Research and by CSTAB grant 529396 from the

Department of Homeland Security.

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Abstract

At the height of its power, ISIS was perceived as the biggest contemporary terrorist threat to

world security. In this paper, we analyze the phenomenon of ISIS and its unique history through

the lens of general social psychological principles that might have contributed to its stunning—

even if only temporary—success. We suggest that ISIS represents a special case of a radical

group born of the conjunction between psychological needs, an ideological narrative, and a

networking process. We describe the details of ISIS’s evolution and operation in order to shed

light on this threatening movement.

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“…O’ lions of al Tawhid across the dear land of Mesopotamia. I urge you to drench your swords

with the blood of your enemies before the day is over… There is no point in living when our

honor is being taken away and we are being ruled by the cross worshippers.’ I ask you, O’

soldiers of Islam − in the same way the aforementioned martyr ordered you before me − do not

miss this chance to join the convoy of martyrs during these holy days…”

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Founding Father of ISIS

Whether they be called “monsters” (David Cameron, 2014), “psychopathic monsters”

(John Kerry, 2015), “fighters on the back of pickup trucks” (Barack Obama, 2016), or “outlaws

of Islam” (King Abdullah II, 2015), ISIS is uniformly perceived these days as the biggest

contemporary terrorist threat to world security (PEW, 2017), one that overshadowed Al-Qaeda in

its military capability, material resources, ruthlessness, and ideological appeal. After a series of

military successes in 2014, ISIS managed to gain control over a territory “the size of Belgium”

with a population of more than 8 million people (Gilsinan, 2014, James et al., 2017). It forced

more than four million others to flee from their homes, causing an unprecedented refugee crisis in

Europe and the Middle East (UNHCR, 2016). ISIS propaganda, full of horrific images, dreadful

and shocking to world audiences, worked well as a recruitment tool attracting individuals from all

over the world to join its ranks. According to some estimates, more than 30,000 individuals from

at least 86 countries travelled to Syria and Iraq by the end of 2015 (The Soufan Group, 2015a).

After declaring the caliphate in June 2014, ISIS inspired attacks outside Syria and Iraq, which

killed more than 1,300 people and injured more than 2,000 others (Sanchez, Lister, Bixler,

O'Key, Hogenmiller, & Tawfeeq, 2016). Multiple extremist groups around the world- including

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groups in countries such as Nigeria, Philippines, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan- offered

their support and pledged allegiance to ISIS (IntelCenter, 2015).

These staggering numbers may create the impression that ISIS represents an entirely new

and unheard-of phenomenon. This perception would be only partially correct. ISIS has some

unique features but also ones that it shares in common with other extremist organizations. Its

unique circumstances include the personality of its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the

geopolitical situation in the Middle East following the U.S. led invasion of Iraq and the (Arab

Spring inspired) rebellion against Bashar al Assad’s rule in Syria. Nonetheless, ISIS also

constitutes a manifestation of the broader Salafi extremism that motivated the formation of Al

Qaeda (AQ), and, in a way, it represents the continuation of the AQ program of world dominion

through the use of other, more drastic means. Even more generally, ISIS represents a special case

of a radical movement born of conjunction between (1) individuals’ need for personal and

collective significance (Kruglanski et al., 2015), (2) an ideological narrative that portrays

violence as the road to significance and (3) a networking process that consolidates the narrative

into a socially shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). In what follows, we interweave the

unique and common elements of ISIS’s evolution and operation in order to shed light on this

threatening movement. As a preview of what is to come, we first describe the origins and history

of ISIS until the establishment of a caliphate in 2014 and ISIS distinctive ideology in comparison

to that of AQ. We subsequently address the strategy that ISIS uses in governing the territory

under its rule and analyze its psychological appeal.

History

The birth of ISIS

The origins of ISIS are inextricably tied to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, generally recognized

as the founding father of the organization. Even though Zarqawi laid the ideological foundation

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for ISIS, his early years were hardly the paragon of Islamic purity. In his teens, after the death of

his father, Zarqawi dropped out of school, engaged in petty theft, and was a heavy-drinker. To

prevent his further demoralization, his mother enrolled him in Islamist courses. An introduction

to Salafism, a doctrine promoting religious purity and literal interpretation of the Qur’ran, had a

transformative influence on Zarqawi, and prompted him to commit his life to pursuit of religious

glory. His career as an aspiring jihadist began in 1989 when he went to Afghanistan to join the

Mujahideen fight against the Red Army. Despite his hopes to prove his religious commitment on

the battlefield, he arrived in Afghanistan only to witness the war’s ending without a substantial

involvement in the fighting on his part (Warrick, 2015; Weaver, 2006).

Nonetheless, Zarqawi stayed in Afghanistan as a reporter, using that time as an

opportunity to construct a social network of likeminded extremists itching to resume the fight

against the perceived enemies of true Islam. In 1992, he returned to Jordan where he collaborated

with his spiritual teacher Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whose ideological sophistication and

advanced knowledge of Islam further strengthened Zarqawi’s commitment to the black and white

worldview endorsed by Salafism. In 1994, before they managed to execute a terrorist plot they

were spinning, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were both arrested for possession of guns and explosives. In

prison, Zarqawi got even closer to Maqdisi, but in contrast to the ideological leanings of his

mentor, he was more interested in putting theory into practice. While in prison, Zarqawi was

actively recruiting people to a new fighting group he was forming, and he quickly gained the

respect of other detainees for his charisma and leadership (Warrick, 2015).

In 1999, Zarqawi was released from prison through Jordan’s King Abdullah general

amnesty. By then he already had an operational plan and reached out to Osama bin Laden to get

the blessing and organizational support from the AQ leader. They met, but according to all

accounts, the meeting did not go very well for Zarqawi (Warrick, 2015). Bin Laden was offended

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by Zarqawi’s radical views on killing Muslims and by his arrogant and disrespectful behavior.

Zarqawi’s lack of sophistication, criminal past, and tattoos did not create a good first impression

on Bin Laden either (Weaver, 2006). Despite that, in recognition of Zarqawi’s initiative and

drive, Bin Laden agreed to finance him with AQ money to set up a training camp in Herat in

western Afghanistan.

Due to Zarqawi’s contacts and organizational skills, his terrorist cell grew fast, but in

2001, he was driven out of Afghanistan by the US invasion. He spent the next two years

travelling between Iran, Jordan, and Iraq to expand his network further. In early 2003, he

established in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar the Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad in Iraq, the

forerunner of ISIS (Gerges, 2016). At that time, Zarqawi was in close contact with another

jihadist group operating in Iraq - Ansar al Islam. In fact, his presence in Iraq, and his jihadist

connections, were used by Colin Powell in his address to the United Nations as a proof of

cooperation between Saddam Hussein and AQ (Powell, 2003). Ironically, none of those claims

were true, as AQ loathed Saddam’s regime and operated completely independently from the Iraqi

dictator (Weisman, 2006). Moreover, Zarqawi’s links to AQ were weaker than what the US

administration tried to present. Since their first encounter, Bin Laden had made repeated requests

that Zarqawi pledge allegiance to AQ, which he resolutely refused. If Powell’s accusations

succeeded in anything it was to elevate the value of Zarqawi’s brand on the international jihadist

market, catapulting him overnight from the status of an unknown fighter to that of a jihadist

superstar (Weaver, 2006). In the meantime, Zarqawi had been actively preparing for what he

envisioned would eventually occur. When the US invasion in Iraq happened, Zarqawi was ready.

US invasion of Iraq

Zarqawi’s strategy, later described in a book distributed online, “The Management of

Savagery”, was to draw the US into an exhaustive and long-lasting conflict, which would damage

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its image as a superpower. To that end, he planned to instigate a spiral of sectarian violence

between the Sunni and the Shias. Zarqawi hated the Shias and perceived them as traitors and

infidels. He predicted that use of violence on a massive scale would instill fear in these enemies

and at the same time impress the followers of the jihadist cause (Warrick, 2015).

His ambitions were lofty and his targets -- correspondingly grand. Within four months of

the launch of the U.S. invasion, Zarqawi’s network organized attacks on the UN headquarters, the

Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, and the Imam Ali Mosque, a Shiite shrine, in Najaf. In addition

to those spectacular assaults, Zarqawi significantly contributed to the spread of everyday violence

all across Iraq. A wave of videotaped hostage beheadings (Zarqawi’s signature mark), suicide

attacks, and truck bombings created chaos in Iraq, sending a clear signal to jihadists around the

world that Iraq was the new epicenter of the jihadi struggle, the place to travel to and join the

fight (Warrick, 2015).

The strategy of unfettered violence, much of it targeting the Shia, was a major bone of

contention between Zarqawi and bin Laden at that time. To be sure, AQ too advocated a fight

against the Shia, Jews, and “Crusaders” (Westerners), but its leaders worried about the

consequences of untamed violence for the organization’s image. For Zarqawi, the Shia were “an

enemy within”, and he regarded them as even more dangerous than the Crusaders, “the enemy

outside.” He also assumed that the anti-Shia strategy would eventually mobilize more Sunnis. In

a letter to bin Laden he wrote: “If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it

will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and

annihilating death at the hands of these Sabians.” (Zarqawi, 2004). Even though Osama bin

Laden had reservations about Zarqawi, and did not fully accept his strategy, he also saw him as

the most capable leader to advance the jihadi cause. Thus, despite the doctrinaire disagreements

with AQ, Zarqawi eventually pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004 (Pool, 2004) and

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his network became an official branch of AQ, earning the official label of Al Qaeda in Iraq

(AQI).

Zarqawi’s use of extreme violence, amplified by the media publicity that he skillfully

exploited, significantly contributed to his popularity (Stern & Berger, 2015); this was further

compounded by the flawed American strategy for rebuilding Iraq in the post-Saddam era. The

American approach was to base the new political order on groups neglected under Saddam’s

regime, Kurds and Shias, while the Sunnis were deliberatively sidelined. The Debaathification

Commission removed close to 100,000 Sunni members of the Baath party from government jobs,

leaving them unemployed and disenfranchised. Due to the Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections,

the new parliament was dominated by Shias representatives. Sunni perceptions of being

mistreated and powerless compounded the sectarian tensions (Gerges, 2016).

Additionally, the US efforts to deal with the developing insurgency deepened the rampant

sense of insecurity and further fueled support for Zarqawi’s network. Resistance was becoming

increasingly popular and it unified the actions of various militant groups operating at the time in

Iraq. Their rising popularity among uninvolved Sunnis was largely non-ideological. According to

David Ignatius (2015), most of the support came from “Iraq’s Sunni sheikhs, who feared and in

many cases despised the brutal Zarqawi, but couldn’t get tone-deaf U.S. officials in the

international Green Zone to take their problems seriously.” The attack on the Al Askari shrine in

Samarra on February 22, 2006 had especially deadly consequences for the unfolding civil war

between the Shia and the Sunni. Built in 944, Al Askari is one of Shia Islam’s holiest sites. The

bombing of the shrine led to an explosion of retaliatory mosque attacks, kidnappings, tortures,

and open street fighting between the Sunnis and the Shias. Although the US military denied that a

civil war broke out in Iraq, one day after the bombing of the shrine, no less than 1,000 civilians

were dead (Knickmeyer, 2010).

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The increasing pace of violence and escalation of the conflict communicated to leaders of

the Sunni tribes that the AQI did not guarantee their security either. They thus became ready to

cooperate with the Americans in exchange for stability and acknowledgment of their status.

Seizing on the opportunity, the US was keen to use their help. The decline of the AQI was

precipitated by a grand alliance of 25 Sunni tribes against it, known as Anbar Awakening.

Spreading from the Anbar area to other regions of Iraq, the Sunni leaders orchestrated a military

resistance to Zarqawi’s network (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Increased number of US troops and the

commitment of additional resources as well as the American coalition with the Sunnis had

significant impact and many influential AQI members were captured or killed as its consequence.

In June 2006, Zarqawi himself was killed in a US airstrike. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a.k.a

Abu Hamza al Muhajir, who replaced Zarqawi as a leader, carried out the plan Zarqawi had for

AQI and in October 2006 he announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This

proclamation unpleasantly surprised AQ leaders, who had previously warned Zarqawi against

this idea. Their objection stemmed from the conviction that making the move before the

organization consolidated its social base would hinder its ultimate political goals. Unclear

relations between a newly established state and AQ Core created confusion among jihadists

around the world. Al-Masri’s lack of management and military skills did not help (McCants,

2015). Consequently, the reach of AQI was declining. In the years that followed, not only was ISI

losing its popularity, but it was also losing its ground and organizational capacity. By 2009 the

movement Zarqawi had created was almost extinct and it seemed that more peaceful times for

Iraq were coming.

ISI makes a comeback

In discussing the factors that enabled ISI to make its terrifying comeback, almost

everyone mentions the radicalizing role of the US-organized Iraqi detention facilities such as

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Camp Bucca (Warrick, 2015). Facilities where Sunni religious radicals freely interacted with

members of Saddam’s Baath Party kept the flame of Sunni radicalism alive and turned prisons

into safe training and recruitment camps for the ISI. As one of ISIS leaders put it later: “If there

was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no IS now. Bucca was a factory. It made us all. It

built our ideology.” (as cited in Chulov, 2014).

Camp Bucca was closed in 2009, but the contacts and networks forged therein remained

active in the aftermath. According to intelligence sources, the majority of the ISIS leadership was

at some point incarcerated at Camp Bucca (McCoy, 2014). When on April 18, 2010, the ISI two

top leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, were killed by US strikes, Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi, an alumnus of Camp Bucca, emerged as the new leader. A scholar with a

doctoral degree, al-Baghdadi was originally described as shy and reserved. In 2004, he was

classified as posing no further security risk and was consequently released from Camp Bucca.

Even though he lacked military experience, his choice for ISI leader was encouraged and

supported by Samir al-Khlifawi - the head of ISI military section (Warrick, 2015).

One of the very first moves of al-Baghdadi was to appoint numerous former members of

Saddam Hussein's military and intelligence to leadership positions in the ISI hierarchy (Nakhoul,

2015; Sly, 2015). Given Powell's earlier (mistaken) allegation of collusion between the jihadi and

the Baathist movements, that alliance between former enemies was an ironic twist of history, and

in part an unintended consequence of American policies in the region. In 2012-2013, ISI made

further use of the skills and networks shaped in the prisons. In a daring campaign named

“Breaking the Walls” ISI organized breakouts at major prisons and injected further skilled and

ruthless militants back into the ongoing fight (Lewis, 2013).

When US troops were leaving Iraq in 2011, the country was far from a state of a stable

democracy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continued to antagonize the Sunni minority. He

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populated the Iraqi army with members of Shiite militias with connections to Iran perceived by

the Sunnis as wholly committed to their sectarian interests. Participation in the uprising against

AQI did not bring the Sunni tribes the political significance they hoped for. The idea to establish

a separate military based on the Sunni militias that fought in the awakening was abandoned.

Instead of integrating Sunni fighters into the Iraqi police and military, only less than 20% of them

were hired, leaving the remaining majority unemployed and disillusioned (Warrick, 2015).

Moreover, on grounds of the terrorist threat, al-Maliki ordered the imprisonment and killing of

many of the leaders of the Sunni resistance. Among others, he arrested the Sunni vice-president

Tareq al-Hashimi under unclear charges, which only increased the resentment felt in the Sunni

community against the Maliki government (Boghani, 2014).

A revenge for the uprising came also from the side of ISI, that assassinated many of the

Sunni tribal leaders in the Anbar province. In 2011, when the Iraqi version of the Arab spring

occurred, protests in Mosul and Fallujah were brutally repressed by governmental forces. After

the US military left Iraq, the barrier inhibiting a spiral of mutual violence disappeared. According

to Rick Welch (as cited by Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 98): “Maliki pushed the Sunnis so far that

they had to rise up. Tribal honor was on the line and revenge thinking was on the line. Maliki

made this crisis.” ISI skillfully exploited the grievances of Sunnis, who for the second time felt

abandoned by the government as well as left without recourse other than allying itself with ISI

under the new leadership of al-Baghdadi. When in June 2014 the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army

quickly abandoned the defense of Mosul and left it in ISIS hands, it occurred in part because ISI

had already won the support of the local Sunnis who joined the fight, this time on the side of ISI

(Al-Salhy & Arango, 2014).

The final factor that made it possible for ISI to survive the difficult times was the outburst

of the Syrian civil war. When social protests against Bashar al-Assad’s regime erupted in Syria in

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2011, ISI spotted a new opportunity to gain a footing there. In 2012, Baghdadi sent a number of

operatives to set up a Syrian branch. Although Jabhat al-Nusra, led by Abu Mohammed al

Jawlani, presented itself as support for the Syrian opposition forces, in reality its goal was to

create ground for a Syrian extension of the future caliphate. Many ISI fighters there found a

relatively safe place to continue the fight and develop the network (Warrick, 2015). That strategy

backfired the moment al-Nusra turned out to be more independent than Baghdadi had anticipated

or planned. Due to its high military value and its willingness to share power with the Syrian

opposition, Jabhat al-Nusra was regarded by the Free Syrian Army as a valuable collaborator

(Poole, 2014). However, that was not exactly what al-Baghdadi had aimed for. Following

Zarqawi’s ambitions, instead of just replacing Assad, Baghdadi wanted to establish an Islamic

transnational system that would erase the existing borders between Iraq and Syria.

In April 2013, al-Baghdadi surprisingly announced the merger of the ISI with al-Nusra

Front under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (translated also as “Islamic State

of Iraq and al-Sham”, ISIS). Al Jawlani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the respective leaders of al-

Nusra and AQ, rejected the merger, which led Baghdadi to create his own military representative

in Syria. In 2013 and 2014, ISIS successfully conquered the al-Raqqa province in Syria. After a

series of successes in Syria, ISIS aimed to reestablish its dominance in its original location – Iraq.

On June 29, 2014, the first day of the holy month of Ramadan, ISIS declared itself as a caliphate

with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph, calling on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him

(Warrick, 2015).

Ideology

At first glance, the ISIS ideology of Salafi-jihadism may appear indistinguishable from

that of AQ. Both view state and religion as inexorably bound together, such that all governance

and political decisions are to be based on strict interpretations of the sharia law. In fact, however,

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the two groups differ significantly on several issues related to Aqidah (creed) and Manhaj

(methodology). Specifically, the core dispute between AQ and ISIS focused on the excessive use

of takfir (excommunication) by ISIS, the proper way of establishing the caliphate, and the use of

End-Times narratives. And even though Zarqawi eventually pledged allegiance to Osama Bin

Laden, fundamental differences remained and eventually led to an open split of ISIS from Al

Qaeda.

Issues of creed (Aqidah)

Regarding the takfir (the act of excommunicating other Muslims by declaring them

infidels), ISIS holds a more stringent view and uses it far more often than AQ. Following

Zarqawi’s lead, ISIS ideology holds that Islam must be cleansed from within and that Muslims

who do not strictly follow their ISIS-authorized interpretation of Islam should be declared

apostates and put to death. In contrast, AQ considers killing Muslims as incompatible with the

wide-ranging jihadist project, as support from the Muslim umma would be weakened by the

killings of Muslims, whether Shia or Sunni. Whereas AQ had been committed to jihad against the

West and avoided, where possible, any impediment to its global campaign, ISIS considers the

Shiites heretics, condemning their practices (such as self-flagellation), and denying their basis in

the Qur’an or in any Prophetic tradition, and therefore branding them as apostates.

The proclamation of takfir also extends to other Muslims who stray from ISIS’

ideological precepts. A 40-point list issued by IS entitled ‘Aqidah wa Manhaj al-Dawlah al-

Islamiah fi al-Takfir (IS Creed and Methodology of Takfir, 2016) states that whoever embraces

democracy and secularism, and all governments that do not rule by the sharia law, are deemed

kafir or apostate, which legitimizes their killing.

As noted earlier, AQ leaders were put off by the scale and scope of violence perpetrated

by Zarqawi's group and accused IS of deviating from the true Islamic ‘aqidah’ (Bunzel, 2015).

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Indeed, a linguistic analysis of the propaganda released by both AQ and AQI leaders empirically

demonstrated these differences in their speeches, with AQ ideologues emphasizing their expertise

in regards to the “true” Islam, and AQI ideologues emphasizing the suffering of their people, the

necessity of violence, and their confidence in defeating the enemy (Cohen, Kruglanski, Gelfand,

Webber, & Gunaratna, 2016). In 2005, two AQ senior leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy head

of AQ, and Atiya Abd Rahman al-Libi, senior AQ ideologue, sent separate letters to Zarqawi

advising him to tone down the violence and to stay focused and committed to the global jihad

agenda. AQ leaders warned Zarqawi to stop displaying and posting online videos of beheadings

and other atrocities. Zawahiri argued that even if such tactic had some appeal for “zealous young

men” cruel images of horrific slaughter would eventually lose the support of ordinary Muslims

(Zawahiri, 2005). Zarqawi’s former mentor al-Maqdisi also reprimanded him for his permissive

approach to takfir, and urged him in a letter to tone down his hard-line stance and desist from

issuing any “sweeping proclamation of takfir” or “proclaiming Muslims to be apostates because

of their sins.” (as cited in Wood, 2015). Zarqawi blissfully ignored both calls.

Issues of methodology (Manhaj)

Establishment of the caliphate. The struggle between AQI and AQ intensified after the

establishment of ISI in 2006. The confusion among jihadists that followed was masked to

preserve a consistent image of the organization to the outer world, but the underlying conflict

persisted and grew ever more acute after the declaration of the caliphate in 2014 (McCants,

2015). AQ accused ISIS of ignoring the right manhaj (methodology) in determining the caliph

and of having no right to establish an Islamic state. Zawahiri explicitly rebuked the establishment

of IS in his statements. Specifically, he said that, “we will not accept anyone who imposes

himself on the people of the region, that is anyone who came to power without the consensus of

the population” (as cited in Habeck, 2015). In a video interview published by AQ’s media

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productions, Zawahiri explained that AQ’s manhaj is to unify the Muslim community and restore

the rightly-guided caliph based on consultations from the ulama. For leaders of AQ, caliphate

was a distant goal, to be approached only when the popular support of Muslims had been won.

They strongly frowned upon ISIS impatience, and its declaration of a caliphate after capturing

only limited swathes of land and short of seizing Baghdad or the rest of Iraq (Tran & Weaver,

2014).

End of Times narrative. Another contentious issue in the AQ-ISIS dispute was the

propagation of end of times narratives, which lent religious legitimacy to ISIS causes and were a

source of its general appeal to young Muslims (McCants, 2015). Many foreign fighters who

joined IS were indeed influenced by prophecies describing the ultimate fight between the forces

of good against evil in Syria – a prelude to the anticipated Yaumul Qiyamah (end of time). One

example is the alleged hadith (or sayings of the Prophet) whereby “Armies carrying the black

flag will come from Khurasan. No power will be able to stop them and they will finally reach

Eela (Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) where they will erect their flags.” AQ also rejected ISIS’s

‘doomsday narratives’. Instead, they favored the ‘far enemy’ rhetoric that viewed the U.S. and

the corrupt ‘apostate’ Arab regimes that support it as the prime target, and their replacement by

‘true’ Islamic governments as the primary mission (Byman, 2015).

Territoriality. Finally, ISIS was focused on expanding its influence by gaining territory

and calling on Muslims to perform hijra (migration) to join the caliphate. To be sure, ISIS

required territory to preserve its legitimacy as a caliphate. Their famous motto ‘baaqiya wa

tatamaddad’ (remaining and expanding) attracted thousands of Muslims who wished to live in a

caliphate system, governed by the sharia law (Zelin, 2015). For AQ, although state creation was

important, the first order of business was to ‘get rid’ of the enemy first, instead of focusing on

territorial conquest. Specifically, AQ has long strived to convince Muslims that jihad against the

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U.S. is their foremost obligation, and defeating the U.S. is their main objective. In contrast, ISIS

aimed for controlling the widest possible territory spanning across continents even when such

strategy seemed impossible to sustain in the long run.

In 2011, the Syrian revolution led to a final split between ISI and AQ. In contrast to the

plans of ISI leaders, Jabhat al Nusra did not aim to create a new state in Syria. Instead, it joined

the broader rebellion against Bashir al Assad’s regime and fought alongside more moderate rebel

forces, earning it credibility among the various elements of the Syrian opposition (Warrick,

2015). Thus, when al Baghdadi described the al Nusra as just an extension of ISI, al-Jawlani, the

leader of al-Nusra, immediately demurred. He stressed his loyalty to AQ Core by restating his

bay’a to Zawahiri and refusing to assimilate his group with ISI under the new ISIS label. Instead

he appealed to Zawahiri to settle the disagreement. In a letter that was leaked to the press,

Zawahiri ordered that the creation of ISIS should be cancelled and that Baghdadi should limit the

scope of his actions to Iraq (Gerges, 2016). Zawahiri’s personal peacemaker was sent to settle the

conflict but he was killed by ISIS in early 2014. In February 2014, after an eight-month power

struggle, AQ disavowed any relations with ISIS, accusing it of disobedience (Holmes, 2014).

Zawahiri’s position was backed up by influential clerics, including Zarqawi’s former mentor al-

Maqdisi, who also condemned ISIS’s extremism (Wilson Center, 2014). AQ and ISIS became

competitors for the support of the world’s jihadist movements. At least at the beginning, pledges

of allegiance (bayat) to ISIS that were flowing from a growing number of venues such as Nigeria,

Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, the Philippines, and Libya, confirmed its increasing popularity and

appeal on the jihadist market (IntelCenter, 2015).

Recruitment and Governance

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The ascendance of ISIS and its growing dominance over its competitors raised questions

about its workings, and basis of its success in issues of recruitment, particularly of foreign

fighters, and of governance. We address these questions in turn.

Recruitment of foreign fighters

Out of more than 30,000 foreigners who travelled to join ISIS by the end of 2015,

approximately half came in 2015. This marked a strong upward trend in recruitment, driven in

part by the exuberant reaction among ISIS supporters to the declaration of the caliphate. A

majority of the foreign fighters were volunteers from Arab countries in the Middle East and

North Africa, but an increasing number of recruits travelled to Syria and Iraq from Western

Europe, Balkans, Russia, and Central and South Asia (The Soufan Group, 2015a). Although most

were young men, the relatively high number of female recruits was unique, attesting to the

special excitement that ISIS has managed to engender among young people worldwide (Peresin,

2015). There were reports of entire families who, in their own words, were “willingly leaving the

so called freedom and democracy that was forced down our throat in the attempt to brainwash

Muslims to forget about their powerful and glorious past” (Akbar, 2015). Images of foreign

fighters burning their passports after they reached the desired destination in the ISIS-land further

reinforced the picture of individuals who enthusiastically had cut all ties with the despised past

and eagerly went on to turn a new page in becoming the first generation of denizens in the new

caliphate (Malik, 2014).

Analysis of the ways foreign fighters become attracted to ISIS shows some unintuitive

patterns. Although many believe that the social media was the main radicalization and

recruitment tool, it seems that the dissemination of extremists’ ideas through Facebook or Twitter

accounts was a facilitating factor, but not a sufficient condition for recruitment. As Richard

LeBaron, past director of the U.S. government's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism

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Communications, put it: “What the ISIS recruiters know, and what we know but often ignore, is

that social and other media are useful but not critical elements in radicalization and recruitment.

Social media provides access to a large audience but it rarely is an independent force that

mobilizes an individual to take off for the Turkish border. Otherwise there would be a lot more

recruits.” (LeBaron & McCants, 2015). Furthermore, if social media were primarily responsible

for the mobilization of foreign volunteers, the spread of new recruits should have been more or

less even across geographical and social boundaries. This was not the case, however: (1) foreign

fighters usually travelled in groups, predominantly clusters of friends, and (2) certain areas were

disproportionately represented as sources of new recruits. Places such as Bizerte and Ben

Gardane in Tunisia, the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and the Molenbeek district of Brussels are

well-known as jihadist recruitment hot spots (The Soufan Group, 2015b). This suggests that the

decision to join ISIS was greatly facilitated by one’s immediate social network, and that

successful recruitment was more personal and focused on the recruiter’s ability to forge close-

knit connections with potential volunteers (Holman, 2016; Reynolds & Hafez, 2017).

Available data contradict another popular myth, namely, that decisions about joining ISIS

were unpredictable and made without much consideration. The research team at University of

Maryland’s START Center (National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to

Terrorism) analyzed the pre-travel decision-making of fifty American ISIS volunteers. It was

found that, on the average, 19 months elapsed between the time a person first mentioned a desire

to travel and his or her attempt to follow through with it. Almost three quarters of that sample

was openly involved in radical social networks prior to deciding to travel, and more than half

expressed radical views at various times before departure (James, Jensen, & Tinsley, 2015).

Thus, if their leaving came as a surprise to family and friends, it was not because their decision

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was impulsive, but because the individual’s intimates failed to recognize the warning signs that

signaled her or his state of mind.

To understand the factors that facilitated the decision to become a foreign fighter,

researchers and journalists interviewed current and former members of ISIS who were willing to

talk, analyzed their social media content, and contacted the families that were left behind.

Various sources converge on a similar list of dominant motivations for both male and female

foreign ISIS volunteers (e.g., Atran, 2015; Horgan, 2014; Weiss & Hassan, 2015).

One subgroup of volunteers consisted of those who joined ISIS to escape their current life

and to find meaning and a new, positive identity (e.g., Tucker, 2015). They experienced rejection

and felt alienated in their communities; therefore, in search of an idealized alternative, they

turned to ISIS. Their motivational state was aptly depicted in the New York Times’ story on

“ISIS and the lonely young American”, which documented the transformation of a 23-year-old

Sunday school teacher into an ISIS recruit. The story precisely demonstrates how recruiters

exploited and deepened her sense of isolation and search for meaningful social connections in

order to attract her to their cause (“I felt like I was betraying God and Christianity (...) But I also

felt excited because I had made a lot of new friends.”; as cited in Callimachi, 2015). The

experience of alienation and the sense of victimhood is often a consequence of unjust treatment

that individuals suffer on account of their group membership. Building a utopian caliphate

satisfies the need for a valued social identity or personal significance which one has been unable

to find in his or her current communities. We elaborate on this motivation for significance in a

later section devoted to the psychological factors that prompt individuals to join ISIS.

While foreign fighters from Western countries were more likely to go abroad in order to

escape from their past and gain a sense of personal recognition, people travelling from Muslim

countries seemed to be more motivated by the perceived humiliation and suffering of their fellow

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Sunni Muslims brought on by the Western powers or by the Syrian regime (Weiss & Hassan,

2015). Interestingly, this quest for significance (whether of oneself as an individual or as member

of a mistreated group) is also evident among ISIS’s opponents. For instance, foreign fighters who

joined the Kurd forces to fight ISIS mention being fueled by anger in response to the massive

violence against their kind perpetrated by ISIS, as well as by excitement at the thought of being

able to help (Percy, 2015; Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016). The latter factor, thrill and a sense

of adventure, seems to be a motivating force in its own right (Miller & Mekhennet, 2015).

Finally, for many, joining ISIS offered a chance to upgrade their status either

economically (by earning money) or socially (by becoming an admired hero fighting for an

important cause), in both cases boosting their sense of personal significance (Weiss & Hassan,

2015).

Governance

Strategic terror. Establishment of the caliphate and the conquest of extensive and well-

populated territory made governance one of ISIS major challenges. From the available evidence,

it appears that ISIS, at least in its early days, rose to this challenge with great efficiency (Revkin

& McCants, 2015). The grand planner and architect of the Islamic State was Haji Bakr, a former

colonel in Sadam Hussein’s Iraqi Army, who served as counselor to the Calif, Abu Bakar al

Baghdadi. Bakr was killed in a fight with a rival faction in January 2014, and a search of his

house uncovered a notebook of approximately 30 pages containing a detailed blueprint for the

systematic conquest and governance of lands to be seized by ISIS (Reuter, 2015).

ISIS leadership structure was carefully crafted, such that if a given functionary was

captured or killed, another well-suited individual was ready to immediately assume his office and

take over his responsibilities. Beyond the Caliph and his deputies, the ISIS leadership structure

consisted of the 13 men strong military council, and alongside it a governing body of 8, the

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Shura. The latter supervised 10 departments that governed the various functions of the state in

domains of treasury, communication, the handling of foreign fighters, education, law, health,

environment, taxation, infrastructure, consumer protection and price control (Reuter, 2015). The

military organization of ISIS allowed considerable flexibility to local and regional commanders,

enabling operational flexibility in executing the decisions of the military council.

Operationally, the ISIS bureaucracy worked in accordance with two intertwined

principles: (1) legislative tightness, reinforced by (2) a system of severe punishments that

instilled a deep-seated fear in the population under ISIS control, thus forcing compliance with the

rules. Upon the conquest of a city, ISIS representatives articulated a set of rules and commands

that were disseminated in various ways to the inhabitants, for instance through the loud-speakers

of minarets, and through postings on the city’s billboards (Birke, 2015). At Raqqa, for instance,

the inhabitants were required to build walls around their houses so that the women in those

homes would not be visible. Women were prohibited from work, with the exception of nurses, or

sales ladies in women’s clothing stores (whose mannequins were appropriately removed;

McElroy, 2014). The city inhabitants were prohibited from leaving their settlements without state

permit which stipulated that should they fail to return as affirmed, their house and property would

be confiscated. The ISIS rules extended to multiple life domains, including things like the

prohibition to play soccer, don Western clothes, smoke or use alcohol. A person caught smoking

would have his fingers broken and would pay a 6000 Iraqi pound fine for every cigarette found in

his possession (Saul, 2015).

ISIS conquest of a village or a city would typically commence with a wave of executions

and beheadings whose strategic aim was to instill fear in the inhabitants and motivate them to

strictly adhere to all of ISIS rules and demands. Individuals suspected of homosexuality were

thrown from the roofs of houses, women were put to death by stoning, others were beheaded if

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convicted of immodesty, adultery, or treason (Sullivan, 2015b). Iraqi or Syrian security personnel

were summarily put to death upon ISIS takeover of a settlement. In parallel, the electric grid and

the water and sewer systems were quickly fixed, the city or village was cleaned up, and former

city officials who served the defeated power, were summoned to return to work and make the

place functional again. When ISIS conquered a given area, it took over the existing infrastructure,

leaving the local population with little choice other than join or else perish.

Essentially then, ISIS used strategic terror and surveillance to force people into

compliance. It used intimidation and false accusations to discourage even the slightest resistance

to its rule. According to interviews by the “Washington Post” (Sullivan, 2015), the majority of

residents in communities ruled by ISIS viewed it as an occupier rather than a liberating force, and

people cooperated with it simply out of fear. "There is no work, so you have to join them in order

to live," one man reported to the “Washington Post”. "So many local people have joined them.

They were pushed into Daesh by hunger." It was extremely difficult to leave ISIS-ruled territories

due to the ban on travel and widespread distrust within and between communities preventing

people from organizing any dissent for fear of being denounced and put to death.

Stability. To be sure, ISIS also desired to present itself as a bona fide state; to that end, it

attempted to convince people of its legitimacy rather than exclusively relying on the constant use

of intimidation and violence. Accordingly, ISIS complemented terror with a system of rewards

conditional on acceptance and support of its total dominance. Thus, fear was not the sole factor

that swayed people to side with ISIS. Although the quality of life under ISIS was low, it was

often higher than what had preceded its arrival. Life in a war zone under constant threat

motivated many to accept ISIS as the only entity capable of providing jobs and basic services,

including safety and the protection of property. For some, even the cruelty of Islamic State’s

justice system was superior to corruption of the Syrian governmental institutions (Sherlock 2015;

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Sullivan, 2015a). As Revkin (2016) notes, the stability that ISIS offered could be “particularly

appealing to people living in civil war contexts, where the collapse of preexisting legal

frameworks has created a fertile environment for looting, banditry, and land grabs."

In return for the social and economic order it provided, ISIS - akin to the Hobbesian

Leviathan - demanded a pledge of exclusive obedience. It also expected material support, either

in the form of obligatory tax payments or of military service. The latter, which early on was

voluntary, though strongly encouraged, subsequently morphed into a mandatory conscription in

some areas. ISIS’s income came from sources such as illicit trafficking in oil, bank theft,

kidnapping victims for ransom, and tax collection from population in the conquered areas

(Revkin, 2016).

Ideological education. Beyond its provision of stable governance, or perhaps as part and

parcel of it, ISIS took care of fostering the appropriate ideology among its people. Whereas

satisfaction of basic needs such as security and subsistence is important, it may not in itself

provide an appreciable sense of meaning and significance to individuals. Immersion in the ISIS

ideology was intended to convince individuals of the intrinsic value of accepting its rule.

Accordingly, everyone who joined ISIS was required to take a course in Shariah law. Apparently,

this ideological education was at least somewhat effective; even people who eventually defected

from ISIS admitted the value of the courses they attended and appreciate the way these deepened

their religious commitment (Speckhart & Yayla, 2015). Moreover, individuals who went through

such ideological preparation were expected to apply the teachings in their daily lives under close

surveillance by other group members, which presumably increases their commitment to the

ideology (Yayla & Speckhard, 2016).

Psychology

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ISIS successes reflect not only the organizational and military skills of its leaders but also

its astute exploitation of human psychology. It primarily tapped two sets of motives: (1) the needs

for security and stability, and (2) the needs for personal significance. The former need pertains

primarily to ISIS handling of populations under its rule; the second pertains to ISIS recruitment

of fighters for its cause. People’s needs for security and survival were engaged by ISIS policies of

fear and intimidation, which were designed to elicit submission and compliance by persons under

its jurisdiction. Specifically, by complying with ISIS commands and requirements, inhabitants of

territories under its governance assured their safety and ability to carry on with their daily lives.

The need for respect and significance was engaged by ISIS propaganda that promised glory to

those who voluntarily join its ranks and pledge loyalty to its cause. We address these issues

further in what follows.

Gratifying the quest for significance. Joining a fighting organization to earn glamour

and glory is hardly unique to ISIS members. A quick look at history shows that from times

immemorial youths flocked to foreign lands where fight for some cause lofty was being waged.

Crusaders who conquered Jerusalem in the Middle Ages, foreign volunteers to fight in the

Spanish Civil war, Western intellectuals who travelled to the Soviet Union in support of the

communist regime, demonstrate that distant causes often hold a strong attraction for individuals

(Cotee, 2015). To a large extent such attraction stems from the considerable personal significance

that individuals hope to achieve through volunteering.

The ISIS call to arms on behalf of the caliphate has an irresistible resonance from

individuals in search of personal significance. A strong need to matter is a basic human motive

recognized by many psychological theorists (Fiske, 2004; Frankl, 1969; Maslow, 1943). It

denotes the supreme importance to humans of being noticed, and receiving honor and esteem.

The quest for significance can be inflamed by a substantial personal loss such as experiences of

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failures, rejection, or suffering. It can also be induced by loss of collective significance, which the

extremist communicators graphically depict. Humiliation of Muslims by the West, their suffering

in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, or Bosnia, are described in vivid colors to highlight the affront

and dishonor that Muslims around the globe have been dealt. Frustrated youths without coherent

purpose and with uncertain prospects are particularly prone to resonate to the loss of significance

of Muslims as a group.

When people perceive themselves as rejected, victimized, and disrespected, they are

motivated to restore their sense of self-worth and meaning (Kruglanski, et al., 2015). Avenging

the humiliation and restoring one’s sense of lost significance can be highly motivating for young

Muslims and converts to Islam; even more motivating perhaps is the prospect of living the life of

a “true Muslim” that according to ISIS propaganda can only be attained in the caliphate. In short,

joining the fight for sacred causes such as the caliphate promises to bestow on individuals untold

glory and significance, whose allure they may find irresistible. Importantly, this psychological

dynamic is by no means restricted to ISIS supporters. It can equally motivate those who fight

against it, as illustrated by this quote from one of the fighters who joined the Kurdish forces:

“This time last year I was a stay at home mom/wife. Even though I knew my marriage was up in

flames I had still tried. I went through a very dark period in my life… After joining the Kurds and

seeing the problems first hand in other parts of the world my priorities were set straight again” (as

cited in Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016). These anecdotal examples are supported by

systematic research demonstrating greater probability of ideologically motivated violence among

individuals searching for significance (Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2016; Webber et al., 2017).

The ideological message. Identification of violence as a way of gratifying quest for

significance can be accomplished by the ideological narrative that paints the humiliation suffered

by Muslims at the hands of their Western detractors, which must be avenged by taking the fight

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to the enemy and violently punishing its populations. ISIS narrative highlights in addition the

glory of life in the caliphate and the tremendous significance gain it affords to those who come to

settle in its territory (McCants, 2015). The ideological narrative constitutes the message whose

contents aim to convince individuals through arguments and images (e.g. of atrocities allegedly

committed by Islam’s enemies) that significance quest should be their sacred end, and that

fighting ISIS enemies and/or moving to the caliphate is the assured means to that end.

Whereas militant movements are violent by definition, ISIS has taken brutality to extreme

ends through its frequent beheadings, massacres, burnings alive, rape, and the desecration and

destruction of cultural treasures of symbolic value to other religions (McCoy, 2014; Thompson,

2016). Though its unmitigated violence may be repulsive to some, it is apparently appealing to

many as attests the immense popularity of ISIS beheading videos and its unprecedented ability to

recruit fighters from nearly 100 different countries. The appeal of violence stems likely from the

fact that it is the most primordial way of asserting one’s dominance and status, prevalent in the

animal kingdom and widely employed by humans throughout history (Buss & Duntley, 2006). By

doing harm to others, humiliating them and making them suffer, one immediately proves one’s

superiority and power; in that sense, violent domination constitutes a unique way of affirming

one’s significance, nearly unparalleled in its ability to do so.

Also notorious is ISIS unmitigated use of sex, sex slaves as well as Muslim brides eager

to marry “real” Muslim heroes, as a way of enticing young males to join its ranks (Otten, 2017).

In addition to expressing dominance and power, hence gratifying young men’s quest for

significance, sex constitutes an intrinsically gratifying reward that likely enhances ISIS allure for

potential recruits. An impressive aspect of ISIS's psychological approach is its ability to involve

women in the organization and motivate them to settle in ISIS-held territories. Although women

have often been used as low-level fighters in terrorist organization in the past, their use in ISIS

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has been different. Namely, their main role in ISIS has been to act as righteous brides for ISIS

fighters and future mothers of the caliphate nation. To that aim, ISIS has launched special social

media campaigns that target only women. The main motivations of females joining ISIS seem to

be similar to those of men (Peresin, 2015). Females who have joined ISIS express a desire

to build an entirely new society based on strict religious principles. They wish to escape from

Western societies, which they perceive to be failing them and their religious values. In addition, a

vision of society where traditional gender roles are strictly obeyed, and where they can fulfill

their romantic wish to marry a foreign fighter, seem to appeal to many female recruits. Although

sharia law is strict about female participation in combat and forbids women from playing an

active role on the battlefield, women can nonetheless be assigned a unique role in ISIS'

enterprise, in which they exert social influence and through that means help ISIS control civilian

populations. Such roles may fulfill the expectations of those women who joined ISIS to feel more

empowered.

The social process in ISIS recruitment strategy. Finally, the social process of group

dynamics is how individuals come to be exposed to the ideological narrative and how they come

to believe its message. Through the charisma of communicators, and the pressure of peer

consensus, individuals come to “own” the significance quest as their goal and the fight in ISIS

ranks (or on ISIS behalf) as the means to that end. In that sense, the group process constitutes the

source of the ideological message, the appeal of that process determines the degree to which

individuals’ quest of significance is indeed aroused, and the means of violent extremism on ISIS

behalf is accepted as a way of attaining significance. The source function pertains to the

informational role fulfilled by terrorist networks. They act as an “epistemic authority”

(Kruglanski et al., 2005) whose consensus is taken as evidence for the validity of the ideological

message about which they agree. Moreover, presence of radicalized others may create a local

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norm that legitimizes violent behavior and makes it appear as less radical and thus easier to

perform. In addition, however, social networks fulfill a crucial emotional function: by accepting

the individual member and lending him or her appreciation and respect, they make him/her feel

empowered and capable of carrying out challenging tasks, including self-denial and self-sacrifice

carried out on ISIS behalf (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014).

One of ISIS’s apparent strengths is its ability to organize operational networks in various

world locations, and render them ready to launch violent activities against selected targets. A

recent trend, evident in ISIS organized attacks in 2014-2016, is to recruit family networks,

consisting, for instance, of siblings or even of a married couple. The Tsarnaev brothers

perpetrated the Boston marathon bombing of April 2013, the Kouachi brothers participated in the

Paris attacks of November 2015, and the Bakraoui brothers took part in the Brussels attacks in

March 2016. A familial network is in many ways ideal for terrorist purposes. Its members are

typically loyal to each other, committed to each other and in close communication with each

other. They are unlikely to betray each other or let each other down. It is, therefore, plausible that

ISIS recruiters are particularly keen to radicalize familial groups and that the recently observed

trend in that direction is strategic rather than accidental.

Individual Differences in the Propensity to Join ISIS: Profiles versus Processes

A major issue in the psychological debate about violent extremism was whether there

exists a profile of a violent extremist that can be identified and possibly used in security

screening of individuals in warranted circumstances. The profile question is a variant of an earlier

question that occupied researchers in the 1970s and 1980s, namely whether terrorists are

characterized by a unique psychopathology. The answer to the former question was a determined

‘no’ (Horgan, 2005; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011), which does not mean that some mentally

disturbed or borderline individuals could not become terrorists.

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And the answer as to whether violent extremists (e.g., the foreign fighters for ISIS)

exhibit a certain discernible profile turns out to be similarly negative. The volunteers to ISIS are

highly demographically diverse. They seem to be younger than those who joined AQ with the

fastest growing group being that of 12-17 years old. As compared with AQ too, we see a higher

rate of converts, mostly from poorer neighborhoods. Founders of AQ (e.g. bin Laden, and

Zawahiri) were mostly middle class, fairly well-educated, and married; present waves of

European recruits tend to be younger, less educated, poorer, single and from distressed inner city

areas. We also see these days a growing trend of recruitment from the middle classes, including

public employees, small businessmen, as well as a growing number of females involved.

Thus, it is difficult to discern any demographic profile common to those who join. Nor is

it likely that the many thousands who volunteered or tried to do so have a common psychological

profile and exhibit a similar personality type. That does not mean that the psychology of

volunteering for ISIS or other extremist organizations is unfathomable and doomed to remain an

unsolved mystery. All it means is that the commonality of those who join does not reside in their

demographic or psychological profile the way it has been defined by standard (demographic or

psychological) categories. Rather then looking for a common profile, it seems likely that the

volunteers to ISIS and other extremist groups share a common psychological process.

Accordingly, their diverse personalities and situations predispose them to join to the extent that

they bear on parameters of the process that propels individuals to radicalize.

Consider the need for significance, from the present perspective, a major determinant of

radicalization. Individuals may vary in their sensitivity to affront or rejection (e.g., due to their

genetic make up, culture, or socialization; Downy & Feldman, 1996) and hence to the extent to

which their significance quest would be aroused by perceived insults or discrimination. In that

regard, rejection-sensitive individuals may be more prone to radicalization than ones who are less

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rejection-sensitive. Similarly, some individuals may be more attuned to militant organization’s

narrative. Because the latter is typically cast in categorical “black versus white” (us versus them)

terms, individuals who are high on the need for cognitive closure, for example find such

ideologies more appealing, and hence are more likely to radicalize, than individuals who are low

on the need for closure (Webber et al., 2017). Finally, individuals who are dependent, or

conformist may be more attuned to the network pressures toward radicalization than individuals

who are independent and nonconformists (Merari, 2010). Thus, even though there may not be a

unique personality profile that characterizes violent extremists prone to volunteer to ISIS and

other similar organizations, certain individual characteristics relevant to determinants of the

radicalization process may certainly contribute to likelihood of radicalizing under the proper

circumstances.

Epilogue

At the time of this writing, ISIS is suffering major setbacks on the ground, with most of

its former territory having been re-taken by its adversaries. According to some estimates, by the

beginning of 2017, ISIS had lost control over 56% of its territory in Syria and 83% in Iraq (Jones

et al., 2017). Its financial assets were dramatically reduced (Heißner, Neumann, Holland-

McCowan, & Basra, 2016), and more than 60,000 ISIS fighters, including some of its key

leaders, were killed by the anti-ISIS coalition (Browne, 2017). At the same time, the influx of

new foreign fighters dropped significantly, from 2,000 people per month crossing the Turkey-

Syria border in late 2014, to as few as 50 per month in 2016 (Witte, Raghavan, & McAuley,

2016). Over the course of two years, ISIS has become a shadow of what it used to be at its peak,

and its power is expected to further deteriorate soon.

While these defeats mark the end of ISIS aspiration of establishing a pan-Islamic

Caliphate, most likely they will not eradicate its existence as a terrorist group, and the pursuit of

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its agenda through other means (James et al., 2017). The group already seems to be reorganizing

its strategy to adjust to its reduced capabilities. For instance, ISIS no longer encourages its

followers to join the ranks in Syria and Iraq, but instead calls for small-scale plots that do not

require extensive organizational support. Attacks in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—most

notably in Paris (2015), Jakarta (2015), Baghdad (2016), Manchester (2017), and Barcelona

(2017)—demonstrate the disruptive potential of relatively low-cost actions. A similar strategy

prescribed by earlier AQ documents viewed such attacks as a way to maintain a constant sense of

threat, to engage security forces at home, and to distract their attention from more substantial

operations that the terrorist group was planning abroad (Barr, 2017).

Related to this is the issue of foreign fighters returning to their home countries. Some

predict that the most likely outcome of the collapsing caliphate will be disillusionment among its

followers. While the move to announce a caliphate was bold and risky, the failure to realize it

will likely be demoralizing to ISIS supporters, and might severely curb their enthusiasm about

engaging in a similar enterprise again in the future. However, others fear that returning fighters

will remain disengaged only temporarily. While unsustainable in the long run, the utopia of a

modern caliphate may be captivating enough to keep many fighters committed to that goal. In

support of this notion, an analysis by German authorities showed that almost a half of the German

fighters returning from Syria and Iraq remained devoted to the cause of jihad (Cottee, 2017). The

psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) indeed predicts that encounter

with an unexpected failure, rather than resulting in abandonment of the cause, is met often with

reinvigorated efforts in its defense in order to justify to oneself one’s initial commitment.

Establishing footholds (villayats) outside of Syria and Iraq, in places like Philippines and

Indonesia, seems to be another way to survive the fall of the caliphate, and this method is

currently being utilized by ISIS and its affiliates. A particularly shocking example is ISIS’s recent

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seizure of a city in the southern province of the Philippines, which caused massive internal

emigration, large-scale property destruction, and prompted the introduction of martial law in the

entire province (Santos, 2017). Finally, some predict that ISIS will react to failure in the real

world with intensified efforts to maintain its credibility online, a path that it mastered as it rose to

power (Clarke & Winter, 2017).

To sum up, despite the shrinking power of ISIS, the degree of threat that it poses to global

security remains unclear. According to recent polls, most people around the world still perceive

ISIS to be a top-level threat (PEW, 2017). The goal of this paper was to look at the phenomenon

of ISIS and its unique history through the lens of general social psychological principles that

might have contributed to its stunning—if only temporary—success. Without neglecting the

geopolitical factors that made the rise of ISIS possible, we suggest that understanding human

psychology may be critical in gaining insights into its appeal and in guiding efforts toward the

de-radicalization of ISIS supporters. To the extent that another group will be able to create and

exploit a similar set of psychological conditions, it is likely that the defeat of ISIS will only be

temporary.

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