Assignment for July 5, 2019 (Friday)

Admissions and Confessions

1. Datoon v. Judge Kapili (2011) - ​Emman

Facts:

Jocelyn Datoon (Datoon) charged respondent Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Judge Kapili)
with Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross Misconduct amounting
to Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to an incident which occured at the
Salvacion Oppus Yñiguez Memorial Hospital (SOYMH) in Maasin City.

Datoon testified on her own behalf but presented no other witnesses.

Judge Kapili also testified on his own behalf and presented, as additional witnesses,
Judge Ma. Daisy Paler-Gonzales (Judge Paler-Gonzales), Efledo Hernandez
(Hernandez), and Rodulfo Orit (Orit).

Datoon averred that while was in the labor room of SOYMH waiting to give birth. She
was accompanied by her father, Jose Gagan (Gagan). Suddenly, they were disturbed
by the appearance of Judge Kapili who appeared to her to be drunk as his face was
reddish and his eyes were sleepy. She noticed a gun at his waist over his tucked-in
t-shirt and she became nervous. Judge Kapili entered the labor room calling "Lor, Lor,"
looking for his wife, Dr. Lorna Kapili (Dr. Kapili), a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist.
Not seeing his wife around, Judge Kapili left and entered the delivery room, but returned
to the labor room a few minutes later. Datoon was crying, as she was already having
labor pains at the time. Judge Kapili then pointed his gun at her and asked "What’s your
problem?" This caused her to start crying hysterically while saying "Please don’t sir,
have pity." At this time, she was lying in bed while Judge Kapili was standing at the left
side of the bed near her head. At that moment, a woman entered the room and
informed Judge Kapili of the whereabouts of Dr. Kapili, after which he left. Datoon
claimed that because of this incident, she was unable to go through normal delivery of
her baby and had to undergo caesarian operation instead.

In his Comment, Judge Kapili admitted being at SOYMH then but denied having a gun.
He related that he received several phone calls from a woman patient who was looking

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for his wife, Dr. Lorna Kapili. He tried to contact his wife by telephone, but she failed to
answer, prompting him to proceed to the hospital to look for her. He then proceeded to
the labor room where he saw Datoon who appeared to be in pain and was surprised by
his appearance. He was irked by her reaction so he approached her to ask what her
problem was.
Judge Kapili was of the belief that the complaint might have been orchestrated and
financed by the hospital administrator, Cielveto Almario (Almario), in retaliation for the
various letters he wrote to the hospital management and to various government
agencies criticizing the services of the hospital. Datoon denied entering into any
agreement with the hospital administrator.

Judge Paler-Gonzales of RTC, Branch 25, Maasin City, testified that she went to see
Datoon in the Provincial Library where the latter was working at the time; that Datoon
told her that the Complaint and Affidavit were already prepared by Almario; and that she
could not be certain if what was stated in her affidavit was true because she was
experiencing labor pains at that time.

In support of Judge Kapili’s position, Hernandez, Executive Assistant to the Governor of

Maasin City, stated in his Affidavit and testified that he talked to Datoon upon the
Governor’s instructions to verify the report that certain persons were extorting money
from Judge Kapili. During their conversation, Datoon was said to have stated that Judge
Kapili was carrying a clutch bag but never pointed a gun at her and she did not know
who prepared the affidavit for it was only brought to her for her signature.

ISSUE:

Whether Datoon’s testimony holds credence to prove her charges against Judge Kapili.

RULING:

No. In light of the evidence submitted in this case, the Court is of the view that the
charges against Judge Kapili were not sufficiently substantiated by Datoon who has the
burden of proof in administrative proceedings.

Datoon’s testimony was uncorroborated. She failed to present any witness to support
her charges. Although she presented the affidavit of her father, Gagan, who allegedly
witnessed the incident, she did not present him as a witness to corroborate her
testimony, or to refute Judge Kapili’s testimony that they had attempted to extort money
from him, despite the fact that he was present during the hearing. Neither did she

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present the old woman who, she claimed, was also in the room at the time of the
incident.

The Court cannot help but notice that Datoon’s testimony was also replete with
inconsistencies. As to where the gun was at the time Judge Kapili first entered the labor
room, her Complaint and Affidavit stated that while she "was waiting to give birth in the
labor room of the hospital, a man, who was drunk and holding a gun suddenly barged
into the room looking for one Dr. Lorna Kapili." On the other hand, during her testimony,
she stated that he was "carrying a gun on his waist" when he first entered the labor
room. She further testified that Judge Kapili was later holding a gun and pointing it at
her when he came back into the labor room.

Furthermore, it was highly unlikely that her crying would have caused Judge Kapili to
pull out his gun and point it at her, considering that he knew he was in the labor room of
the hospital where pregnant patients would be in labor and understandably in pain.
Datoon’s testimony is contradictory, inconsistent and contrary to human nature and
experience.

As to Judge Kapili’s alleged intoxicated state, Datoon only surmised that he was drunk
because his face was flushed and his eyes were sleepy. This was an unfounded
conclusion. His sleepy eyes could be attributed to the fact that it was 3:00 o’clock in the
morning, while his reddish face could be explained by his natural coloration, as
observed by the Investigating Justice. Moreover, Datoon admitted that Judge Kapili did
not smell of alcohol or liquor at the time of the incident.

Lastly, both Judge Paler-Gonzales and Hernandez testified that Datoon admitted to
them that she signed the Complaint and Affidavit without meeting the lawyers who
prepared the same. Hernandez further bared that Datoon admitted to him that Judge
Kapili never pointed a gun at her. On her part, Judge Paler-Gonzales testified that
Datoon admitted that she was not sure if the contents of her Complaint and Affidavit
were true because she was in pain at the time of the incident.

Datoon failed to address these accusations as she was not presented for rebuttal.
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that admissions of a party may
be given in evidence against him or her. Datoon’s admission against her interest, as
narrated by two credible and neutral witnesses, militates against the credibility of her
charges. The presumption is that no person would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration were true.

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2. Heirs of Clemeña v. Heirs of Bien (2006) - ​Larn

Facts​: This piece of land as one of three lots​ ​involved in two consolidated cases​ ​for
recovery of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by respondents’ predecessor
Irene Bien against petitioners’ predecessor Pedro Clemeña.

In his answer, Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and
that it was in his exclusive possession​.​ ​His claim of ownership was similarly based
on a sale by the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde to his
predecessor-in-interest.

Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial. The plaintiff,
Irene Bien, passed away in 1953 and was substituted by respondents. Not long after
that, petitioners succeeded the defendant Pedro Clemeña.

RTC rendered a decision declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the

land. Subsequently, however, the RTC reconsidered its findings with respect to
ownership. This time, it ruled that the contending parties had failed to prove their
respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in question still belonged to its
original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña.

Respondents appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s resolution of the
issues relating to the other two parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership
of the land

Petitioners’ contention: The land was never in their possession.

Issue​: WON Pedro Clemeña’s judicial admission binds him and his
successors-in-interest

Ruling​: ​YES​. ​Petitioners’ predecessor Pedro Clemeña alleged in his answer that
the land was in his exclusive possession​. ​That statement​, insofar as it confirmed
the allegation in the complaint that petitioners’ predecessor had retained possession of
the land in question,​ ​took on the character of a judicial admission ​contemplated in
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter
contradict it​.

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The ​exception​ is found only in those rare instances ​when the trial court​, in the
exercise of its ​discretion​ ​and​ because of ​strong reasons to support its stand​, may
relieve a party from the consequences of his admission.

Petitioners’ newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession of the

land cannot hold up against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they
were bound by the admission of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, their predecessor in the
litigation.​ ​Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.

Additional issue (only when judge will ask)​: WON Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony
was self-serving and therefore an improper basis for the damages awarded to
respondents

Ruling​: ​NO​. “Self-serving evidence,” perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a

concept much misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed as a weapon to
devalue and discredit a party’s testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the
sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. “Self-serving evidence”
is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent’s interest.​ ​The
term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in
his own interest at some place and time ​out of court​, and it does not include testimony
that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by
the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to
fraud and fabrication.​ ​In contrast, a party’s testimony in court is sworn and subject to
cross-examination by the other party,​ ​and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on
the ground that it is self-serving.

At any rate, for all their protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemeña’s
testimony, petitioners never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony
was inaccurate or untrue. As already observed, petitioners’objection is founded solely
on the mere fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the
case. ​Now, it is true that a party’s interest may to some extent affect his credibility
as a witness​.​ ​To insist otherwise would be the height of naiveté. ​Nonetheless, the
Court cannot subscribe to the view, implicit in petitioners’ argument, that a
party’s testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account solely of
his interest in the case​. Our justice system will not survive such a rule for obdurate
cynicism on the part of a court is just as odious to the administration of justice as utter
gullibility.

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Moreover, this Court held in ​National Development Company v. Workmen’s

Compensation Commission​ ​that ​interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a
party’s testimony​. Elsewhere it has been said that the interest of a witness does not
ipso facto ​deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be disregarded, and
the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness’ testimony as he finds
​ e give our complete assent. Petitioners’
credible and to reject the rest.​ ​To these ​dicta w
arguments to the contrary must be rejected.

Notes​:

The issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land is undeniably a
question of fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of law.

The Court is well aware, of course, that this rule has been watered down by a
slew of exceptions. Hoping to convince the Court to reverse the CA’s findings,
petitioners invoke a number of these exceptions, namely: (1) the factual findings of the
trial court and the CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is
against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant
facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.

But this case does not fall within any of these. For one, petitioners have shown
no contradiction between the findings of the CA and the RTC on the matter. And for
obvious reasons, our preceding disquisition on the conclusiveness of Pedro Clemeña’s
admission of the fact of possession makes the rest of the grounds invoked by
petitioners undeserving of even passing consideration.

Section 4, Rule 129​:

“An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.”

Ramirez v. Orientalist Co​.:

“An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making
such admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed
by the opposite party or not.”

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Cunanan v. Amparo:
“the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.”

3. DBP v. Radio Mindanao Network (2006) - ​Monique

FACTS: ​Respondent Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. owns several broadcasting stations
all over the country. Provident Insurance Corporation and DBP Pool of Accredited
Insurance covered respondent facilities under two Fire Insurance Policies. The Policy
also contained a provision that states “the Insured shall prove that such loss or damage
happened independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions.” Respondent’s
radio station in Bacolod City, was razed by fire allegedly cause by the CCP/NPA.
Respondent sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims were
denied because the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded in the insurance
policy.

Respondent filed a case against petitioner and Provident. Lt. Col Torres and SFO II
Rochar were presented as witnesses. Both were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred. Their
testimony was limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted and they were
informed by bystanders that “heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured
gasoline in it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting “Mabuhay ang NPA.”

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent; finding the evidence insufficient to
prove that the CCP/NPA was the author of the fire. Both insurance companies appealed
from the trial court’s decision but the CA affirmed the decision and denied the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, herein petition by DBP Pool of
Accredited Insurance Companies.

Petitioner assails the factual finding of both the trial court and the CA that its evidence
failed to support its allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e.,
members of the CPP/NPA caused the fire. Petitioner argues that private respondent is
responsible for proving that the cause of the damage/loss is covered by the insurance
policy,

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ISSUE on Admission: ​Did petitioner sufficiently prove that the cause of the loss or
damage was caused by an excepted risk i.e. caused by the CPP/NPA? (gamay ra
kaayo)

RULING: No. ​The CA went over the evidence on record and sustained the findings of
the trial court, to wit:

“To recapitulate, defendants-appellants presented the following to support its claim, to

wit: police blotter of the burning of DYHB, certification of the Negros Occidental
Integrated National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident, letter of alleged NPA
members Celso Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning of DYHB, fire
investigation report dated July 29, 1988, and the testimonies of Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres
and SFO III Leonardo Rochas. We examined carefully the report on the police blotter of
the burning of DYHB, the certification issued by the Integrated National Police of
Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared by SFO III Rochas and there We
found that none of them categorically stated that the twenty (20) armed men which
burned DYHB were members of the CPP/NPA. The said documents simply stated that
the said armed men were ‘believed’ to be or ‘suspected’ of being members of the said
group. Even SFO III Rochas admitted that he was not sure that the said armed men
were members of the CPP-NPA, thus:
...
In fact the only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-NPA had a hand in
the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres. However, though We found him to be
persuasive in his testimony regarding how he came to arrive at his opinion. We cannot
nevertheless admit his testimony as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA was really
involved in the incident considering that he admitted that he did not personally see the
armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was
presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness only and not an expert
witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the armed men with the
CPP-NPA is not admissible in evidence.

Anent the letter of a certain Celso Magsilang, who claims to be a member of

NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is not a party to the present
action, is likewise inadmissible in evidence under Section 22, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. The reason being that an admission is competent only when the
declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.”

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The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling or exceptional
reasons. It should be stressed that a review by certiorari under Rule 45 is a matter of
discretion. Under this mode of review, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing
only errors of law, not of fact​.

Moreover, when supported by substantial evidence, findings of fact of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties, which this Court will not
review unless there are exceptional circumstances. There are no exceptional
circumstances in this case that would have impelled the Court to depart from the factual
findings of both the trial court and the CA. Both the trial court and the CA were correct in
ruling that petitioner failed to prove that the loss was caused by an excepted risk.

ISSUE #2: ​Can the statement from the bystanders interviewed by Lt. Col. Nicolas
Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar claiming that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of the res gestae?

RULING: ​No. Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae
applies when the declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the
witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.

The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may
concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling
occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously
by the bystanders
and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood.

Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements while they
were
making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and

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opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where
hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these
utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not
remote.

At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements
were made may be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the
course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the
fact that they had been thus uttered.

While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2)
the] certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report
may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records,
nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the
perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA.

ISSUE #3: ​Is respondent responsible for proving that the cause of the damage/loss is
covered by the insurance policy pursuant to one of the provisions in the insurance
policy?

RULING: NO.​ An insurance contract, being a contract of adhesion, should be so

interpreted as to carry out the purpose for which the parties entered into the contract
which is to insure against
risks of loss or damage to the goods.

The “burden of proof” contemplated by the aforesaid provision actually refers to the
“burden of evidence” (burden of going forward).

As applied in this case, it refers to the duty of the insured to show that the loss or
damage
is covered by the policy. The foregoing clause notwithstanding, the burden of proof still
rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk
in order to escape any liability under the contract.

Particularly, in insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which
insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense
which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows
that an insurer seeking to

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defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of
proving that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a
proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the
insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which
it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.

Consequently, it is sufficient for private respondent to prove the fact of damage or loss.
Once respondent makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima facie case.

In this case, since petitioner alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence
shifted to petitioner to prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has sufficiently
proven that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of
evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to
show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from any liability. Unfortunately
for petitioner, it failed to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage or
loss was caused by an excepted risk.

4. People v. Lauga (2010) - ​Jeck

appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE the factual antecedents are as
follows:

on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening accused, being the father of
AAA had carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year old minor against her
will.

appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in
the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only
thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the
daughter of the appellant.

On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her
brother BBB and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a “bantay bayan” in the barangay.

On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge
against him was ill motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front

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of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a
disciplinary measure.

Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty of rape.

The CA affirmed the decision made by the RTC.

Issue: WON appellants alleged extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting,
without the assistance of a counsel, is inadmissible as evidence for violative of his
constitutional right?

Ruling: Yes. barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as

in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the
specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly
on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color
of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the
extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence. Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of
the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but
“from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”

Issue #2: WON BBB testimony is credible being that it is inconsistent with the victims
AAA?

Ruling: Yes. appellant argues that “where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot
stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and
their story a mere concoction.”

However, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that
they sought the help of a “bantay bayan.” Their respective testimonies differ only as to
when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the
testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed
account of the incident.

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the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial
or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as
they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.

This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds,resentment or revenge. It is highly improbable for
[AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to
fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to
greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.

5. People v. Janjalani (2011) - ​Job

DOCTRINE: ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR ​Sec 30 Rule 130

Elmer Andales- conductor

Members of Abu Sayaf:
Baharan and Trinidad- two men who planted bomb in bus
Asali-bomb maker / supplier of TNT

FACTS: ​On 14 February 2005, ​An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route.
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, two men got on the bus. According to the bus
conductor (Andales), the two men acted suspicious. As soon as the bus reached the
stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men alighted from the bus.
Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus.

Accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after
the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident​. In
another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role
in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing
that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were
the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
(extrajudicial confession)

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all

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entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated
murder charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not
guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus ​(judicial confession)​.
Baharan and Trinidad then changed their plea of “not guilty” to “guilty” for the crime of
multiple frustrated homicide.

Asali (turned state witness) testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad
the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused contend that the
testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

MAIN ISSUE: ​WON Asali’s testimony is admissible in evidence?

RULING: ​Yes. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a
co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy.
However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, ​if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission,
making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. In People vs Palijon, the
court ruled that we must make a distinction between ​extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the
confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s
co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has
the opportunity to cross- examine the declarant. ​Mercene’s admission implicating
his co- accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.”

ISSUE: ​The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused- appellants’ plea of guilt
despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of the said plea.

RULING: ​No. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that “all
trial judges ... must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for

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while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.” Thus, trial court judges
are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.— When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise
degree of culpability.

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another
charge—multiple murder —based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—one through an
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the
“searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for re- arraignment is not
warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.

6. Tan v. Rodil Enterprises (2006) - ​Mikko

Facts​: Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of a building owned by the Republic. Rodil

Enterprises subleased a space known as Botica Divisoria to Tan. Rodil Enterprises filed
a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Tan.
Rodil Enterprises argue that Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of
Sublease and was unable to pay despite repeated demands and refused to vacate the
premises.
Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the
building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said
premises pending the disposition and sale of the building. Tan based his claim on the
Renewal of Contract of Lease between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic.

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First level court recognized the agreement entered into in open court by
Tan and Rodil Enterprises to put an end to the civil case on the term that Tan will pay
the rent. Tan offered a compromise that he be allowed to pay the deposit and the
monthly rentals as they fall due. First level court denied the Motion and rendered
judgment in favor of Rodil Enterprises.
RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment and held that the offer to
compromise by Tan was not akin to an admission of fact.
CA reinstated the judgment of the first level court.

Issue​: Whether Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability as a sublessee of Rodil
Enterprises

Ruling​: Yes. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an
admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in
Trans-Pacific Industrial ​Supplies, Inc. v. CA, “​To determine the admissibility or
non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the
intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and
avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the
party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible.”
In the case at bar, the first level court found that petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the
petitioner’s liability in the form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a
proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by
the first level court as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner’s liability on the
sub-leased premises. Also, the existence of the Contract of Lease was not denied by
the petitioner.

Issue​: What is a judicial admission?

Ruling​: A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the

proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said
party cannot thereafter dispro​ve.

Res Inter Alios Acta

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1. Boston Bank v. Manalo (2006) - Dyann

FACTS: ​Manolo bought a parcel of land in the Xavierville Estate Subdivision.

the price of the lots was ₱348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the purchase price
payable on or before December 31, 1972; the corresponding Contract of Conditional
Sale would then be signed on or before the same date, but if the selling operations of
XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of the downpayment would fall due
then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from receipt
of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. in the meantime, the spouses
may introduce improvements thereon subject to the rules and regulations imposed by
XEI in the subdivision.

The spouses Manalo took possession of the property, constructed a house thereon, and
installed a fence.

However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos
failed to prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their
signature.

Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate
from OBM.

CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it
(CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction.​24 she
informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
property. When asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the documents to CBM.
However, she failed to do so.​25

CBM filed a complaint​27​ for unlawful detainer against the spouses.

In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM
filed its complaint against the spouses Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank.

plaintiffs, through counsel, proposed an amicable settlement of the case by paying

₱942,648.70, representing the balance of the purchase price of the two lots based on
the current market value.​37 However, the defendant rejected the same and insisted that
they pay ₱4,500,000.00, the current market value of the property.​38 The defendant

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insisted that it owned the property since there was no contract or agreement between it
and the plaintiffs’ relative thereto.

During the trial, the ​plaintiffs adduced in ​evidence the separate Contracts of
Conditional Sale executed between XEI and Soller;​39 Aguila,​40 and Santos-Roque​41
to prove that XEI continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of
OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs ordering defendants to execute and
deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale after payment of the sum of ₱942,978.70 .

CA rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC with modification that "₱942,978.70" is
changed to "₱313,172.34.

The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and the appellees
had ​executed a Contract to Sell over the two lots but declared that the ​balance of the
purchase price of the property amounting to ₱278,448.00 was payable in fixed
amounts​, inclusive of pre-computed interests, from delivery of the possession of the
property to the appellees ​on a monthly basis for 120 months, ​based on the deeds of
conditional sale​ executed by XEI in favor ​of other lot buyers​.46
​

Boston Bank filed a MR alleging that ​there was no agreement between XEI and the
respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and conditions
of the sale​.

Boston Bank, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA rulings. It
maintains that, the ​records do not reflect any schedule of payment of the 80%
balance of the purchase price, or ₱278,448.00​. Petitioner insists that ​unless the
parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including
the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing
contract of sale or contract to sell.​47

Petitioner asserts that there is ​no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and
conditions relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the
property (as agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision)
were also applicable to the contract entered into between the petitioner and the
Respondents. It insists that such a ruling is contrary to law, as it is tantamount to
compelling the parties to agree to something that was not even discussed, thus,
violating their freedom to contract​.

For their part, respondents argue that ​even if the ​manner and timeline for the
payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property is an essential

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requisite of a contract to sell, nevertheless, as shown by their letter agreement

with the OBM, through XEI, an agreement was reached as to the manner of payment of
the balance of the purchase price. They point out that such ​letters referred to the
terms of the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the
other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal
monthly installments (excluding the downpayment, but inclusive of pre-computed
interests). The respondents assert that XEI was a real estate broker and knew that the
contracts involving residential lots in the subdivision contained uniform terms as
to the manner and timeline of the payment of the purchase price of said lots.

Respondents further posit that the ​terms and conditions to be incorporated in the
"corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be executed by the parties would
be the same as those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by
lot buyers in the subdivision​.

ISSUE: Whether or not the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed in
favor of OTHER PREVIOUS LOT BUYERS, which contained uniform terms of 120
equal monthly installments, be evidence admissible to prove that the lot vendor
granted the same thing in subsequent contract to sell ?

RULING: NO.

We note that, in its letter to the respondents, XEI stated, in part, that respondents had
purchased the property "on installment basis."​71 However, in the said letter, XEI failed to
state a specific amount for each installment, and whether such payments were to be
made monthly, semi-annually, or annually.

There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling that, based on the terms of payment
of the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and the other lot buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the
₱278,448.00 with pre-computed interest of 12% per annum in 120-month installments.

Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of
payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of
conditional sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque.​76 They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this
Court.

The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase
price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute

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evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment of the ₱278,448.00.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing
at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern
of conduct or the intent of the parties.

Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of
business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay
the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with
pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such
terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents
adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other
lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales
agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct
on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the
purchase price of said lots in 120 months.

Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts
must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or
pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and
frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a
given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party
must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of
habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be
numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the
danger of prejudice and confusion.

NOTES:

We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to
sell to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of
the property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.

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A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and the price.

A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to

sell personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of
the parties. Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable
contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the
contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the
other, gives rise to a perfected sale.​57

The parties must also agree on the manner of payment of the price of the property to
give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale or contract to sell.

In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on
the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on
the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and
conditions relative to the sale.

2. Tamargo v. Awingan (2010) - ​Emman

FACTS:

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot
and killed along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no
leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the
Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled
Columna.

Columna admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged
as mastermind respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda. When
the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which
Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent

from Columna’s jail. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and
narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He

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stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Licerio also submitted
an affidavit of Columna dated wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in
his handwritten letter.

Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited

letter. He affirmed the affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to
obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
In another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his
statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats
to his life inside the jail.

In a decision the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because
she held that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of
evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators
were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against respondents

because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

RULING:

No. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator
under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators
provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the

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common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, was presented to prove the alleged
conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of
Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value
and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Note:

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides
that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against
them. The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him.
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

3. People v. Bustamante (2010) - ​Larn

Facts​: Two Informations were filed against the herein appellants, together with Carlito
Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid, charging them with the crimes of Murder and Arbitrary
Detention.

Neil Baluyot (Baluyot), Richard Delos Trino (Delos Trino), Herminio Jose (Jose),
Edwin Soriano (Soriano), Marcelo Bustamante (Bustamante), Carlito Lingat (Lingat) and
Elmer Salvador (Salvador), were arraigned where they all entered a plea of not guilty.

The records show that at around midnight of May 31, 1997, Romeleo Quintos
(Romeleo) and his friend, Ancirell Sales (Ancirell), went to the NAIA to fetch Rolando
Quintos (Rolando), brother of Romeleo, who was arriving from the United States. At the
arrival extension area of the NAIA, Ancirell alighted from the car driven by Romeleo to
check whether Rolando had already arrived. Upon his return, he was surprised to see

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Romeleo arguing with a man in uniform later identified as Soriano who arrested
Romeleo for expired license.

Romeleo vehemently denied the charge causing a heated altercation. Outraged,

Romeleo challenged Soriano to a gun duel. Thinking that Romeleo was a military man,
Soriano called for reinforcement. In a few minutes, Lingat and Bustamante arrived
followed by Jose. They asked Romeleo to hand over his license but the request went
unheeded. Thus, Jose seized the ignition key of the vehicle and ordered Romeleo to
alight from the vehicle but the latter refused. Thereupon, Soriano, Lingat, Bustamante
and Jose pulled Romeleo out of the vehicle and brought him to the Intelligence and
Investigation Division of the NAIA supposedly for questioning. At the IID-NAIA, it was
decided that Romeleo be brought to the Pasay General Hospital for examination where
he was found positive for alcoholic breath. Thereafter, Romeleo was brought back to the
IID-NAIA for further investigation.

Romeleo was shoved into a cell already occupied by prosecution witness

Noel Gabornes (Gabornes)​. Professing his innocence, Romeleo cursed and shouted
at Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, Lingat, Salvador and Abdulajid to
release him as he was only at the airport to fetch his brother. Jose ordered him to stop
but Romeleo persisted. Infuriated, Jose entered the cell and kicked the victim hard on
the stomach. Salvador also entered the cell followed by Baluyot while Delos Trino
stayed near the door. Romeleo was still reeling from the blow delivered by Jose when
Baluyot boxed him in the abdomen. Salvador also punched him at the solar plexus
causing the victim to writhe in pain at a corner of the cubicle. ​To avoid being hit,
Gabornes went outside the cell​.

Gasping for breath, Romeleo sought succor from Gabornes but the latter
declined, afraid to get involved. After a while, Gabornes asked Jose if he could go home
but the latter did not answer. Instead, ​Jose directed Salvador to transfer Gabornes
to an adjacent cell​. Thereafter, ​Gabornes overheard Jose saying “​tapusin na natin
ito”​ ​. Intrigued, ​Gabornes peered through the iron grill to see what was happening.
From his vantage point, he saw Baluyot handing a piece of grayish plastic cord to
Salvador. Thereafter, he heard Romeleo coughing and gasping for breath as if he
was being strangled. Peering closely, the witness saw Salvador and Abdulajid
twisting the cord with a piece of wood, “​garrote”​ style. Romeleo’s hand could be
seen trying to reach for the piece of wood in a backward angle in a vain effort to
stop the twisting. After a couple of minutes, Gabornes saw a body being carried
out of the cell.​ Delos Trino then approached Gabornes and said: “​Kung anong nakita
mo, nakita mo lang. Kung anong narinig mo, narinig mo lang. Sana huwag mo ng ikalat

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ito.”​ Fearing for his life, Gabornes promised not to tell anybody about the incident.
Thereafter, he was released.

Victim’s brother Rolando, Ancirell and Gavino, along with accused Soriano and
Lingat, immediately brought the victim to the San Juan De Dios Hospital aboard a police
car. Rolando and his companions carried the victim to the emergency room. Soriano
and Lingat remained in the vehicle but returned to the NAIA after a while. Romeleo was
declared dead on arrival by the attending physician. Gabornes later learned of the
victim’s identity through the newspapers.

RTC found the accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue 1​: WON the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to
warrant conviction

Ruling 1: YES​. It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if

credible, is enough to warrant conviction. ​Both the trial court and the CA found
Gabornes to be credible and whose testimony is entitled to full faith​.

As borne out by the records, Gabornes positively identified and categorically

pointed to appellants as the ones who conspired with one another to kill Romeleo. He
narrated the incident in a clear and convincing manner. He testified on the degree of
participation of each of the accused with regard to the killing of Romeleo inside the
IID-NAIA detention cell in such a manner that only an unbiased eyewitness could
narrate. Gabornes was not shown to have had any ill motives to testify falsely against
the appellants. ​As correctly observed by both the trial court and the CA, the fact
that Gabornes was previously arrested for being an unauthorized porter is not
enough reason for him to falsely accuse appellants of a very grave offense.

Issue 2: ​WON the CA correctly disregarded the affidavit of recantation of Gabornes

Ruling 2​: ​YES​. In the said affidavit, Gabornes denied that he was inside the detention
cell of the NAIA on June 1, 1997. Instead, he claimed that he was under the fly-over
near the NAIA playing a card game. Consequently, he averred that there is no truth to
his testimony given before the trial court pointing to the appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime.

The SC is not persuaded.

In ​People v. Ballabare,​ the SC ruled:

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“It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny
by the court and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the
testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any
recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a
retraction, this circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her
original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because
they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a
witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original
testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which
testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.”

As we have already discussed,​ Gabornes’ testimony given before the NBI

and the trial court was replete with details that only a person who witnessed such
gruesome crime could narrate. Even during cross-examination, he remained
steadfast in his account that the appellants were the ones who killed Romeleo​.
Also, both the trial court and the appellate court had several opportunities of taking a
hard look at the records of the case considering the motions for reconsideration filed by
the appellants. Both the CA and the RTC found beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants were indeed the authors of the crime.

4. Villanueva v. Sps. Branoco (2011) - ​Monique

FACTS: ​Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner) sued respondents, Sps. Branoco in
the RTC to recover a parcel of land and collect damages. Petitioner claims ownership
over the Property through purchase from Casimiro Vere in 1971 who, in turn, bought the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970. Respondents similarly claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase from Rodriguez in 1983 to whom Rodrigo donated the
Property in 1965. The trial court declared petitioner owner of the Property and ordered
respondents to surrender possession to petitioner. Respondents appealed to the CA
which granted the appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. Hence the instant
petition. Petitioner also claims ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s
combined possession of the Property for more than 10 years.

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ISSUE: ​Is respondent’s title superior to that of Petitioner?

RULING: Yes.​ It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez
under a perfected donation ​inter vivos i​ n 1965.

Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in
1965, Rodrigo “cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property
in favor of another.”​26 ​Thus, Rodrigo’s post- donation sale of the Property vested no
title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than
him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus
acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including
petitioner.

ISSUE: ​Has petitioner acquired title over the property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription?

RULING: No. ​The ten- year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through
possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted
possession coupled with just title and good faith.​28 ​There is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.​29 ​Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was the
owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the
Property through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed
in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property “in the concept of
an owner” (“​como
tag-iya​”​31​) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May
1965 and seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission
against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her,
including Vere and petitioner.

Indeed, petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982,
when she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere
bought the Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the
Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.

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Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of
ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the
Property for 30 years.​ ​Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.

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