David Hume (1711—1776)

“Hume is our Politics, Hume is our Trade, Hume is our Philosophy, Hume is our Religion.” This statement
by nineteenth century philosopher James Hutchison Stirling reflects the unique position in intellectual
thought held by Scottish philosopher David Hume. Part of Hume’s fame and importance owes to his
boldly skeptical approach to a range of philosophical subjects. In epistemology, he questioned common
notions of personal identity, and argued that there is no permanent “self” that continues over time. He
dismissed standard accounts of causality and argued that our conceptions of cause-effect relations are
grounded in habits of thinking, rather than in the perception of causal forces in the external world itself.
He defended the skeptical position that human reason is inherently contradictory, and it is only through
naturally-instilled beliefs that we can navigate our way through common life. In the philosophy of
religion, he argued that it is unreasonable to believe testimonies of alleged miraculous events, and he
hints, accordingly, that we should reject religions that are founded on miracle testimonies. Against the
common belief of the time that God’s existence could be proven through a design or causal argument,
Hume offered compelling criticisms of standard theistic proofs. He also advanced theories on the origin
of popular religious beliefs, grounding such notions in human psychology rather than in rational
argument or divine revelation. The larger aim of his critique was to disentangle philosophy from religion
and thus allow philosophy to pursue its own ends without rational over-extension or psychological
corruption. In moral theory, against the common view that God plays an important role in the creation
and reinforcement of moral values, he offered one of the first purely secular moral theories, which
grounded morality in the pleasing and useful consequences that result from our actions. He introduced
the term “utility” into our moral vocabulary, and his theory is the immediate forerunner to the classic
utilitarian views of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. He is famous for the position that we cannot
derive ought from is, the view that statements of moral obligation cannot simply be deduced from
statements of fact. Some see Hume as an early proponent of the emotivist metaethical view that moral
judgments principally express our feelings. He also made important contributions to aesthetic theory
with his view that there is a uniform standard of taste within human nature, in political theory with his
critique of social contractarianism, and economic theory with his anti-mercantilist views. As a
philosophical historian, he defended the conservative view that British governments are best run
through a strong monarchy.

Life

David Hume was born in 1711 to a moderately wealthy family from Berwickshire Scotland, near
Edinburgh. His background was politically Whiggish and religiously Calvinistic. As a child he faithfully
attended the local Church of Scotland, pastored by his uncle. Hume was educated by his widowed
mother until he left for the University of Edinburgh at the age of eleven. His letters describe how as a
young student he took religion seriously and obediently followed a list of moral guidelines taken from
The Whole Duty of Man, a popular Calvinistic devotional.

Leaving the University of Edinburgh around the age of fifteen to pursue his education privately, he was
encouraged to consider a career in law, but his interests soon turned to philosophy. During these years
of private study he began raising serious questions about religion, as he recounts in the following letter:

Tis not long ago that I burn’d an old Manuscript Book, wrote before I was twenty; which contain’d, Page
after Page, the gradual Progress of my Thoughts on that head [i.e. religious belief]. It begun with an
anxious Search after Arguments, to confirm the common Opinion: Doubts stole in, dissipated, return’d,
were again dissipated, return’d again [To Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March 10, 1751].
Although his manuscript book was destroyed, several pages of his study notes survive from his early
twenties. These show a preoccupation with proofs for God’s existence as well as atheism, particularly as
he read on these topics in classical Greek and Latin texts and in Pierre Bayle’s skeptical Historical and
Critical Dictionary. During these years of private study, some of which were in France, he composed his
three-volume Treatise of Human Nature, which was published anonymously in two installments before
he was thirty (1739, 1740). The Treatise explores several philosophical topics such as space, time,
causality, external objects, the passions, free will, and morality, offering original and often skeptical
appraisals of these notions. Book I of the Treatise was unfavorably reviewed in the History of the Works
of the Learned with a succession of sarcastic comments. Although scholars today recognized it as a
philosophical masterpiece, Hume was disappointed with the minimal interest his book spawned and said
that “It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinctions even to excite a murmur
among the zealots” (My Own Life).

In 1741 and 1742 Hume published his two-volume Essays, Moral and Political, which were written in a
popular style and were more successful than the Treatise. In 1744-1745 he was a candidate for the Chair
of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. The Edinburgh Town Council was responsible for
electing a replacement, and critics opposed Hume by condemning his anti-religious writings. Chief
among the critics was clergyman William Wishart (d. 1752), the Principal of the University of Edinburgh.
Lists of allegedly dangerous propositions from Hume’s Treatise circulated, presumably penned by
Wishart himself. In the face of such strong opposition, the Edinburgh Town Council consulted the
Edinburgh ministers. Hoping to win over the clergy, Hume composed a point by point reply to the
circulating lists of dangerous propositions, which was published as A Letter from a Gentleman to his
Friend in Edinburgh. The clergy were not swayed, 12 of the 15 ministers voted against Hume, and he
quickly withdrew his candidacy. In 1745 Hume accepted an invitation from General St Clair to attend
him as secretary. He wore the uniform of an officer, and accompanied the general on an expedition
against Canada (which ended in an incursion on the coast of France) and to an embassy post in the
courts of Vienna and Turin.

Because of the success of his Essays, Hume was convinced that the poor reception of his Treatise was
caused by its style rather than by its content. In 1748 he published his Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, a more popular rendition of portions of Book I of the Treatise. The Enquiry also includes
two sections not found in the Treatise: “Of Miracles” and a dialogue titled “Of a Particular Providence
and of a Future State.” Each section contains direct attacks on religious belief. In 1751 he published his
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which recasts parts of Book III of the Treatise in a very
different form. The work establishes a system of morality upon utility and human sentiments alone, and
without appeal to divine moral commands. By the end of the century Hume was recognized as the
founder of the moral theory of utility, and utilitarian political theorist Jeremy Bentham acknowledged
Hume’s direct influence upon him. The same year Hume also published his Political Discourses, which
drew immediate praise and influenced economic thinkers such as Adam Smith, William Godwin, and
Thomas Malthus.

In 1751-1752 Hume sought a philosophy chair at the University of Glasgow, and was again unsuccessful.
In 1752 his new employment as librarian of the Advocate’s Library in Edinburgh provided him with the
resources to pursue his interest in history. There, he wrote much of his highly successful six-volume
History of England (published from 1754 to 1762). The first volume was unfavorably received, partially
for its defense of Charles I, and partially for two sections which attack Christianity. In one passage Hume
notes that the first Protestant reformers were fanatical or “inflamed with the highest enthusiasm” in
their opposition to Roman Catholic domination. In the second passage he labels Roman Catholicism a
superstition which “like all other species of superstition. . . rouses the vain fears of unhappy mortals.”
The most vocal attack against Hume’s History came from Daniel MacQueen in his 300 page Letters on
Mr. Hume’s History. MacQueen scrutinizes the first volume of Hume’s work, exposing all the allegedly
“loose and irreligious sneers” Hume makes against Christianity. Ultimately, this negative response led
Hume to delete the two controversial passages from succeeding editions of the History.

Around this time Hume also wrote his two most substantial works on religion: The Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion. The Natural History appeared in 1757, but, on the
advice of friends who wished to steer Hume away from religious controversy, the Dialogues remained
unpublished until 1779, three years after his death. The Natural History aroused controversy even
before it was made public. In 1756 a volume of Hume’s essays titled Five Dissertations was printed and
ready for distribution. The essays included (1) “The Natural History of Religion;” (2) “Of the Passions;” (3)
“Of Tragedy;” (4) “Of Suicide;” and (5) “Of the Immortality of the Soul.” The latter two essays made
direct attacks on common religious doctrines by defending a person’s moral right to commit suicide and
by criticizing the idea of life after death. Early copies were passed around, and Hume’s publisher was
threatened with prosecution if the book was distributed as it was. The printed copies of Five
Dissertations were then physically altered by removing the essays on suicide and immortality, and
inserting a new essay “Of the Standard of Taste” in their place. Hume also took this opportunity to alter
two particularly offending paragraphs in the Natural History. The essays were then bound with the new
title Four Dissertations and distributed in January, 1757.

In the years following Four Dissertations, Hume completed his last major literary work, The History of
England, which gave him a reputation as an historian that equaled, if not overshadowed, his reputation
as a philosopher. In 1763, at age 50, he was invited to accompany the Earl of Hertford to the embassy in
Paris, with a near prospect of being his secretary. He eventually accepted, and remarks at the reception
he received in Paris “from men and women of all ranks and stations.” He returned to Edinburgh in 1766,
and continued developing relations with the greatest minds of the time. Among these was Jean Jacques
Rousseau who in 1766 was ordered out of Switzerland by the government in Berne. Hume offered
Rousseau refuge in England and secured him a government pension. In England, Rousseau became
suspicious of plots, and publicly charged Hume with conspiring to ruin his character, under the
appearance of helping him. Hume published a pamphlet defending his actions and was exonerated.
Another secretary appointment took him away from 1767-1768. Returning again to Edinburgh, his
remaining years were spent revising and refining his published works, and socializing with friends in
Edinburgh’s intellectual circles. In 1770, fellow Scotsman James Beattie published one of the harshest
attacks on Hume’s philosophy to ever appear in print, entitled An Essay on the Nature and Immutability
of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Hume was upset by Beattie’s relentless verbal
attacks against him in the work, but the book made Beattie famous and King George III, who admired it,
awarded Beattie a pension of £200 per year.

In 1776, at age sixty-five, Hume died from an internal disorder which had plagued him for many months.
After his death, his name took on new significance as several of his previously unpublished works
appeared. The first was a brief autobiography, My Own Life, but even this unpretentious work aroused
controversy. As his friends, Adam Smith and S.J. Pratt, published affectionate eulogies describing how he
died with no concern for an afterlife, religious critics responded by condemning this unjustifiable
admiration of Hume’s infidelity. Two years later, in 1779, Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
appeared. Again, the response was mixed. Admirers of Hume considered it a masterfully written work,
while religious critics branded it as dangerous to religion. Finally, in 1782, Hume’s two suppressed essays
on suicide and immortality were published. Their reception was almost unanimously negative.

Personal Identity

Regarding the issue of personal identity, (1) Hume’s skeptical claim is that we have no experience of a
simple, individual impression that we can call the self—where the “self” is the totality of a person’s
conscious life. He writes, “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but
the perception” (Treatise, 1.4.6.3). (2) Even though my perceptions are fleeting and I am a bundle of
different perceptions, I nevertheless have some idea of personal identity, and that must be accounted
for (Treatise, 1.4.6.4). Because of the associative principles, the resemblance or causal connection within
the chain of my perceptions gives rise to an idea of myself, and memory extends this idea past my
immediate perceptions (Treatise, 1.4.6.18 ff.). (3) A common abuse of the notion of personal identity
occurs when the idea of a soul or unchanging substance is added to give us a stronger or more unified
concept of the self (Treatise, 1.4.6.6).