Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 8

5-8-2013

Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

James Seaton

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh

Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Seaton, James (1999) "Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article
8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized administrator of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact julian.aiken@yale.edu.
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

Law and Literature: Works, Criticism,

and Theory

James Seaton*

At a time when many departments of literature are discounting

literary criticism and scholarship in favor of cultural studies, the rise
of the law-and-literature movement is a welcome affirmation of
literature's relevance to the larger society. The search for relevance,
however, may lead one down blind alleys. This Essay reviews the
work of several prominent legal thinkers, arguing that they generally
have been misled in their search for legal insights in literary texts,
criticism, and theory. The first section discusses the ideas of Richard
Weisberg and Martha Nussbaum, who argue that great literary
works support their respective theories about the law. Their
arguments fail to persuade, both because they consider such a
narrow range of works and because their readings display more
special pleading than disinterested analysis. I then turn to the work
of two theorists who evaluate literary criticism for insight into the
interpretation of legal texts: Richard Dworkin and Stanley Fish.
Dworkin advocates the application of the methods of literary
interpretation to legal texts, while Fish proposes that both legal and
literary texts should be seen ultimately as rhetorical exercises.
Dworkin misunderstands the literary criticism on which his argument
relies, while Fish leaves interpretive questions in both law and
literature as he found them. Finally, I review the contribution of
Richard Posner-a long-standing critic of the notion that literary
analysis can add anything at all to the understanding of the law.
While Posner's criticisms of the excesses of the law-and-literature
movement are persuasive, his wholesale dismissal of literature as a
source of insight for the legal profession goes too far. Literature has
the potential to broaden and deepen the individual's understanding
of ethics, politics, and human relations in general. Thus, while I take
issue with the attempts made by Weisberg and Nussbaum to confine

* Professor, Department of English, Michigan State University.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 1

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

the insights available from literature within narrow ideological

boundaries and also with Dworkin's proposal to found a new literary
hermeneutics on his ideas about literary criticism, I maintain that
literature remains an important source of insight for all those
interested in questions of morality and justice, a class that surely
includes most lawyers, judges, and law professors.

I. LAW AND LITERARY MASTERPIECES: RICHARD WEISBERG AND

MARTHA NUSSBAUM
Both Richard Weisberg and Martha Nussbaum argue that
literature is on their side, that an unbiased, sensitive reading of great
literary works supports their theories about law. Their willingness to
look for support in poems and novels is a welcome sign that the
attempt of some professors of literature to condemn Western fiction,
poetry, and drama as little more than a repository of prejudices has
been less successful outside their home departments than within.
Both Weisberg and Nussbaum reject as well the notion, sponsored
by deconstruction before it became integrated into cultural studies,
that literary texts have no reference to anything beyond themselves.
They waste no time wondering if Paul de Man was right in doubting
"that literature is a reliable source of information about anything but
its own language."1 So far, so good. Unfortunately, both Weisberg
and Nussbaum, in their eagerness to commandeer the great works
for their own causes, demonstrate little more respect for the
complexity and depth of literary works than do those literary critics
who simply denounce them.
In Poethics, Richard Weisberg appeals to what he calls, with a
defiant directness, "the Great Books," the "mainstream texts of
literary art,"' and "the traditional canon."3 Martha Nussbaum in
Poetic Justice is more vague, referring instead to "the literary
imagination,"' "the structure of the literary experience,"5 the
"literary understanding,"6 and "the light of the poetic imagination,"'
phrases that sidestep the objections raised by academic feminists,
among others, to the "great books" or "the canon."' Weisberg, on

1. PAUL DE MAN, The Resistance to Theory, in THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY 3, 11 (1986).

2. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE
at xii (1992).
3. Id. at 119.
4. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE at xii (1995).
5. Id. at 87.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id. at 119.
8. In the Feminist Critical Revolution, an essay introducing her anthology The New
Feminist Criticism, Elaine Showalter affirms Sandra Gilbert's belief that feminist criticism

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 2
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

the other hand, notes the criticisms feminists such as Carolyn

Heilbrun have made about law and literature's focus on the classics
and answers them directly, asserting that "I do not think the case has
been made for Law and Literature's abandoning the canon just
because some feminists insist we do."9 In Weisberg's view, feminists
are generally right about the changes they are seeking but wrong in
thinking that the canon is their enemy. Taking it for granted that
feminism is a "progressive movement," Weisberg asks its adherents
to appreciate the usefulness of the traditional canon: "If the body of
masterpieces we have on hand-works of indisputable narrative
brilliance -contains within it the seeds of a radical departure for
Western culture, what more than knee-jerk response would lead a
progressive movement to jettison it in favor of the unknown?"1
Although Weisberg's references to "the canon" suggest that he
intends his thesis to hold for literary masterpieces from Homer to the
present, at times he restricts his argument to the more defensible
notion that there is a "self-destructive, autosubverting" quality to
much "mainstream nineteenth- and twentieth-century fiction."" In
defense of this thesis Weisberg could adduce the authority of the
great literary critic Lionel Trilling, who once noted that the works of
such modern masters as D.H. Lawrence, Joseph Conrad, and
Thomas Mann seem to affirm what Trilling calls "this chief idea of
modern literature," namely "the idea of losing oneself up to the
point of self-destruction, of surrendering oneself to experience
without regard to self-interest or conventional morality, of escaping
wholly from the societal bonds ... ""
Trilling, however, did not regard this phenomenon with the same
unqualified approval as Weisberg. Notions that seem liberating when
first gleaned from Heart of Darkness or Death in Venice or Sons and
Lovers become strangely platitudinous, even ideological, when they
serve as the slogans of an entire "adversary culture" that, just like
the larger culture, "generates its own assumptions and

demands "a complete and cataclysmic change in all our ideas of literary history and literary
meaning." ELAINE SHOWALTER, Introduction: The Feminist Critical Revolution, in THE NEW
FEMINIST CRITICISM 3, 10 (1985). According to Showalter:
Feminist critics do not accept the view that the canon reflects the objective value
judgments of history and posterity, but see it instead as a culture-bound political
construct. In practice, "posterity" has meant a group of men with the access to publishing
and reviewing that enabled them to enforce their views of "literature" and to define a
group of ageless "classics."
Id. at 11. Feminist criticism, she declares, "shares the same enemies" as other "avant-garde"
movements: "namely, those who urge a return to the 'basics' and the 'classics."' Id. at 16.
9. WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 122.
10. Id. at 119.
11. Id. at xii.
12. LIONEL TRILLING, On the Teaching of Modern Literature, in BEYOND CULTURE:
ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND LEARNING 3, 26-27 (1978).

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 3

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

preconceptions, and contrives its own sanctions to protect them."13

This anomalous situation led Trilling to propose "the view that art
does not always tell the truth or the best kind of truth," and
therefore needs to be subjected "in the interests of autonomy, to the
scrutiny of the rational intellect.""
Weisberg himself seems to take it for granted that no more
desirable historical possibility could present itself than the
opportunity to make "a radical departure" from the Western Judeo-
Christian tradition. Weisberg is certain that "the downfall of
Christian culture and all it represented" was highly desirable, the
necessary preliminary to "the rebuilding of a sound Western
culture."' 5 But where does that leave us in regard to the authority of
the literary masterpieces themselves, many of them indisputably part
of "Christian culture and all it represented"? Trilling, on the other
hand, does not suggest that the idea "of escaping wholly from the
societal bonds" is affirmed by literature as a whole but only by some
works of modern literature, leaving open the possibility of an appeal
from the moderns to the generations before them. 6 Trilling himself
has to go back only to the early nineteenth century to find poems
and novels whose affirmations are very different from those in the
modern masterpieces. In the works of John Keats, William
Wordsworth, and Jane Austen, for example, Trilling discovers
affirmations of the self and the self's relation to both society and
nature that are very different from the governing ideas of the
moderns.
Trilling sees in Keats's awareness of his own death an "implicit and
explicit commitment to the self even in the moment of its extinction"
that is stronger, more heroic, than anything he can find-in modern
literature.17 In Wordsworth and the Rabbis, Trilling observes that
Wordsworth's poetry reveals "a certain quality in him which makes
him unacceptable to the modern world,""8 a "quietism... an
affirmation of life so complete that it needed no saying."' 9 This
quietism, so different from the modern "predilection for the
powerful, the fierce, the assertive, the personally militant," 20 unites
Wordsworth with tragedians from Homer to Tolstoy, since "every

13. LIONEL TRILLING, Prefaceto BEYOND CULTURE, supra note 12 [n.p.].

14. Id.
15. WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 269 n.26.
16. See TRILLING, supra note 12, at 27.
17. LIONEL TRILLING, The Poet as Hero: Keats in His Letters, in THE OPPOSING SELF:
NINE ESSAYS IN CRITICISM 3, 43 (1978).
18. LIONEL TRILLING, Wordsworth and the Rabbis, in THE OPPOSING SELF, supra note 17,
at 104, 108.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id. at 117.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 4
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton 483

tragic literature owes its power to the high esteem in which it holds
the common routine, and the sentiment of being which arises from it,
the elemental given of biology."'"
Modern literature, in contrast, is marked by its "failure to conceive
the actuality of the life of common routine," a life lived within the
boundaries of laws and social convention, in favor of "the fantasy of
death."22 Meanwhile, Jane Austen's Mansfield Park commends to its
readers "the idea of society as a limiting condition of the individual
spirit," the very idea, according to Trilling, against which modern
literature mobilizes its fiercest energies.' And yet in discussing
Emma, Trilling also discovers in Austen a conception of the
possibilities of this limited self that holds out a "rare hope" more
generous than anything offered in contemporary literature.24
A brief consideration of works from only a slightly earlier time
than the modern period suggests that the characteristic productions
of modernism do not speak with the authority of literature in
general. It is, furthermore, by no means obvious that the great works
of the modern period allow alienation the last word, as Trilling
uneasily supposes and as Weisberg enthusiastically assumes. One
example must suffice. In a passage in which Mann considerately
italicizes the key sentence, The Magic Mountain's protagonist Hans
Castorp explicitly affirms a moral far more in accord with traditional
Christian morality than suits Weisberg's thesis:
I will keep faith with death in my heart, but I will clearly
remember that if faithfulness to death and to what is past rules
our thoughts and deeds, that leads only to wickedness, dark lust,
and hatred of mankind. For the sake of goodness and love, man
shall grant death no dominion over his thoughts.5
Lionel Trilling came to feel that even the great masterpieces of art
and literature could sometimes be wrong, while Richard Weisberg
seems certain that they always speak the truth. One cannot help but
feel, however, that there is more intelligent respect for the great
works in Trilling's troubled disagreements than in Weisberg's
certainty that the masterpieces share his program.
Martha Nussbaum seems convinced that "the literary imagination"
of any period fosters solidarity rather than the alienation Weisberg
emphasizes. She identifies "the literary imagination" with "the

21. Id. at 130.

22. Id. at 128-29.
23. LIONEL TRILLING, Mansfield Park,in THE OPPOSING SELF, supra note 17, at 181, 184.
24. LIONEL TRILLING, Emma and the Legend of Jane Austen, in BEYOND CULTURE, supra
note 12, at 28, 49.
25. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN 487 (John E. Woods trans., Vintage 1995)
(1924).

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 5

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

compassionate imagination."26 Literature's great social function, in

Nussbaum's view, is that it encourages us "to imagine one another
with empathy and compassion. 2 7 Nussbaum does acknowledge,
however, that even great works of literature do not always meet her
own standards of altruism, forcing her to admit that "not even the
literary imagination is free from blame."'
Nussbaum's Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public
Life is a small book-121 pages of text-that makes large claims.
The book's brevity owes something to the admirable succinctness of
Nussbaum's argument and something to her willingness to ignore
obstacles to those claims. Nussbaum bypasses, for example, the
obvious problem of deciding what books deserve to be called "great"
by simply avoiding the question. In doing so, however, she raises an
even larger difficulty. It is hard enough to make a case that "the
canon" endorses any particular point of view; it would seem to be a
much more difficult task to discover what "the literary imagination"
in general proposes on any specific topic. Does "the literary
imagination" encompass the imagination represented in best-sellers?
In Harlequin romances? In the westerns of Louis L'Amour or Zane
Grey? Poetic Justice doesn't bother to ask such questions, let alone
supply even provisional answers to them.
Nussbaum's sweeping generalizations about "the literary
imagination" are based on a remarkably small sample of works.
Walt Whitman's Song of Myself (first and foremost), Charles
Dickens's Hard Times, Richard Wright's Native Son, and E.M.
Forster's Maurice are the only works given extended treatment. Her
choice of authors suggests that she subscribes to traditional views
about literary worth; the authors she has selected are all major
literary figures. The "literary imagination" she discusses is
apparently the imagination embodied in the works of major authors,
not the-perhaps very different-imagination manifested in works
that make no claim to moral or artistic seriousness. Nussbaum's
choice of Walt Whitman, E.M. Forster, Richard Wright, and Charles
Dickens rather than, say, Margaret Mitchell, John Grisham, Louis
L'Amour, and Barbara Cartland commits her, tacitly but definitely,
to the notion that major literary figures report on human life with an
accuracy and depth superior to those authors whose main claim to
fame is the number of their books sold. If the first four are
considered more trustworthy witnesses than the second quartet, the
reason is that the first four possess greater literary eminence. It is

26. NUSSBAUM, supra note 4, at xviii.

27. Id. at xvii.
28. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 6
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

only on the condition that the reader is willing to grant the

independent stature of the works discussed that Nussbaum's use of
Song of Myself, Native Son, Maurice, and Hard Times may be
persuasive.
As it happens, at least two of the works chosen by Nussbaum,
Native Son and Maurice, have only a tenuous claim to the authority
possessed by acknowledged masterpieces. Richard Wright's Native
Son is surely an important work that continues to attract attention
for a variety of reasons. Almost since it was published, however,
there has been an ongoing debate about its stature as a product of
the literary imagination. A number of distinguished critics sharing
Wright's commitment to equality for African Americans have
questioned the literary quality of his most famous novel. In On
Native Grounds, Alfred Kazin in 1942 agreed with R.P. Blackmur
that "Wright-from the highest possible motives-had written 'one
of the books in which everything is undertaken with seriousness
except the writing."'2 9 Ralph Ellison, while honoring Wright's
courage and historic achievement, still felt compelled ("here I must
turn critic") to explicate the artistic limitations of Native Son by
suggesting that "Wright failed to grasp the function of artistically
induced catharsis. ' 30
For James Baldwin, Native Son exemplified the sort of protest
novel that, Baldwin argues, "so far from being disturbing, is an
accepted and comforting aspect of the American scene."31 Rather
than upsetting its readers, it reassures them, since "we receive a very
definite thrill of virtue from the fact that we are reading such a book
at all. '32 In Many Thousands Gone, Baldwin explains why the "long
and bitter summing up" of Max, Bigger's Communist party lawyer,
arouses "such a positive glow of recognition" in so many readers by
distinguishing two views of human life:
It is addressed to those among us of good will and it seems to
say that, though there are whites and blacks among us who hate
each other, we will not; there are those who are betrayed by
greed, by guilt, by blood lust, but not we; we will set our faces
against them and join hands and walk together into that dazzling
future when there will be no white or black. This is the dream of
all liberal men, a dream not at all dishonorable, but,
nevertheless, a dream. For, let us join hands on this mountain as

29. ALFRED KAzIN, ON NATIVE GROUNDS: AN INTERPRETATION OF MODERN

AMERICAN PROSE LITERATURE 301 (1956).
30. RALPH ELLISON, Remembering Richard Wright, in GOING TO THE TERRITORY 198,
211 (1987).
31. JAMES BALDWIN, Everybody's ProtestNovel, in NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 9, 14 (1955).
32. Id.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 7

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

we may, the battle is elsewhere. It proceeds far from us in the

heat and horror and pain of life itself where all men are
betrayed by greed and guilt and blood lust and where no one's
hands are clean."
For Baldwin, it is the task of the literary imagination to convey the
latter vision, which refuses the temptation to divide human beings
between the "we" who possess "good will" and those others who are
malicious. Martha Nussbaum at times seems more comfortable with
the former, which accords such transcendent importance to achieving
equality between human beings that the classifying of individuals on
the basis of whether or not they share this ideal becomes a
worthwhile project.
If Nussbaum had acknowledged the criticisms that have been made
about the literary quality of Native Son and explained why she
nevertheless considers it an exemplary work of "the literary
imagination," her discussion of it would have made a greater
contribution to her argument as a whole. As it is, a reader of Poetic
Justice is more likely to feel that Nussbaum's discussion of Native
Son succeeds in illustrating not her own thesis about the literary
imagination but James Baldwin's point about the "thrill of virtue"
that protest fiction can provide.
If Native Son provides, at least in Nussbaum's presentation, an
unconvincing illustration of "the literary imagination," E.M.
Forster's Maurice does no better. Nussbaum argues that Maurice
"makes its case for equal sexual liberty by showing the profound
worth of that liberty in its portraits of the flourishing of Maurice and
the stunted life of Clive, "who renounces his homosexual
relationship with Maurice for marriage?' Nussbaum's formulation
implicitly connects the literary value of Maurice with the
persuasiveness of the "case for equal sexual liberty" that she believes
it presents. Unless the novel can make its readers feel the "profound
worth" of sexual freedom by dramatizing the "flourishing" of one
character and the "stunted life" of another, however, its contribution
to debates about law and sexuality will be unimportant.
Unfortunately, Nussbaum's brief discussion fails to engage the novel
as a work of literature at all. Instead she simply takes its affirmations
at face value. When one considers Maurice as a work of fiction, as a
work of "the literary imagination," in Nussbaum's phrase, its
usefulness for her argument becomes doubtful.
Barbara Rosecrance's trenchant analysis in Forster's Narrative

33. JAMES BALDWIN, Many Thousands Gone, in NOTES OF A NATIVE SON, supra note 31,
at 18,35.
34. NUSSBAUM, supra note 4, at 99.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 8
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton 487

Vision notes limitations that not only reduce the novel's literary
standing but also vitiate its force as a witness on behalf of a "case for
equal sexual liberty."35 Her discussion is echoed by Richard Posner's
observation that "Forster was a novelist of great distinction, but
Maurice is his weakest novel."36 Rosecrance begins her discussion of
Maurice by noting that "[tihe two Forster novels with which Maurice
invites comparison, A Room with a View and The Longest Journey,
both expose the poverty of the homosexual novel."37 Rosecrance
points out that the novel's literary flaws affect its value as a socio-
political statement:
But not only does Maurice suffer from its limitation as a thesis
novel: at the heart of the thesis is a contradiction that prevents
even its narrow purpose from being realized. For despite his
assertion of fulfillment, Forster cannot overcome his
ambivalence about the homosexual condition, and throughout
the novel an inner schism undermines the brave ideology of his
postscript.'
Perhaps Forster intended his novel to demonstrate what Nussbaum
calls "the flourishing of Maurice and the stunted life of Clive," but
Rosecrance convincingly demonstrates that the dramatic effect of
the novel is by no means so straightforward. Her careful analysis
demonstrates that, contrary to Nussbaum's assertion and contrary,
apparently, to Forster's own intentions, "the novel's real center of
interest is not Maurice but Clive, whose inner harmony and moral
superiority Forster unambiguously endorses .... Clive receives the
greater authorial approval."39
On this reading Maurice reveals a tortured dividedness over
homosexuality, a complexity that belies Nussbaum's simple contrast
between "flourishing" and "stunting":
His [Forster's] equivocation pervades the portrait of Maurice,
and his confusions beset the novel's two love affairs. The result
is a novel whose interest lies not in its artistic claim, which is
slight, but rather in its expression of an inner conflict whose
psychological and social implications reflect their historical
context and reveal heretofore hidden aspects of the man.'
Unlike Native Son and Maurice, Hard Times is a major work by
one of the great novelists of the English language. Not

35. BARBARA ROSECRANCE, FORSTER'S NARRATIVE VISION 151 (1982).

36. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 321 (rev. ed. 1998).
37. ROSECRANCE, supra note 35, at 151.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 165.
40. Id. at 155.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 9

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

coincidentally, the novel proves more resistant to Nussbaum's

theorizing than either Maurice or Native Son, neither of which
provoke her to any criticism at all. Hard Times raises a number of
inconvenient difficulties. It exhibits "some sentimentality" and, more
seriously, portrays trade unions "in a light manifestly unfair."' 4' The
novel not only "falsely depicts the labor union movement,"' 2 it also
"does not rate high enough the harm involved in class hierarchy
itself, 4' 3 and provides a "somewhat glib and condescending solution"
to the issues it dramatizes.44 Worse yet, "Dickens also fails to take
note of harms caused to women by inequalities of autonomy that are
endemic to marriage as it was lived in his time."45
In the light of such criticisms, one wonders what it is that
Nussbaum sees in "the literary imagination" that makes it a useful
guide in appraising political and legal controversies. Her answer is
that although novels offer "a guidance that is, if promising, still
fallible and incomplete," they remain important because "the formal
structures implicit in the experience of literary readership" give us a
sense of "the importance of viewing each person as separate with a
single life to live."'6 Throughout PoeticJustice Nussbaum emphasizes
the notion that, whatever the explicit political affiliations of authors
may be, "the literary imagination" dramatically vivifies "the ideal of
full equality"4 ' of all human beings, encouraging readers to feel a
"truly equal concern" for all people, even those whom we would
otherwise ignore or reject.' Nussbaum is aware that "mass
movements frequently fare badly in the novel,' 49 and she finds it
understandable that "from the point of view of such movements the
novel is a dangerously reactionary form."' Nevertheless, the
accomplishment of the "literary imagination" in inducing readers to
value every life equally, to foster "a truly equal concern," is so
fundamental that it overrides for Nussbaum otherwise damning
objections.
Nussbaum's own reading of Hard Times demonstrates, however,
that "the literary imagination" cannot be trusted even this far. A
comparison with Nussbaum's discussion of Maurice will clarify the
issue. That novel, Nussbaum explains, encourages the reader to

41. NUSSBAUM, supra note 4, at 33.

42. Id. at 75.
43. Id. at 76.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Id. at 76.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 50.
48. Id. at 87.
49. Id. at 70.
50. Id. at 70-71.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 10
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton 489

appreciate the humanity of Maurice, although his friends, once they

become aware of his homosexuality, treat Maurice as though "he had
suddenly become a monster."5 Maurice's friends, Nussbaum
explicates, "simply cannot permit themselves to imagine for a
moment what it may be like to be him."52 They lack the central gift of
the literary imagination, "the ability to imagine what it is to live the
life of another person who might, given changes in circumstance, be
oneself or one of one's loved ones."53 To see anybody as a "monster"
is to deprive him or her of that full humanity in which we all share
equally.
Her discussion of Hard Times, however, reveals that the novel has
induced Martha Nussbaum herself to think of one of the characters,
Bitzer, not as a human being to whom one owes "truly equal
concern," but as a kind of monster, something less than human-and
to do so in response to, among other things, the color of his skin.'
According to Nussbaum, "as the novel shows us, Bitzer is chillingly
weird and not quite human. From our first glimpse of his 'cold eyes'
and his skin, 'so unwholesomely deficient in the natural tinge,' we
know that we are dealing with a monster."55 Nussbaum is right in
asserting that Dickens's treatment of Bitzer illustrates "a feature of
the genre, a feature of the way in which realist novels solicit and
cultivate the imagination,"' but she seems not to notice that it is a
"way" that vitiates her major thesis about the "literary
imagination's" commitment to "full equality."
Nussbaum wants to argue that "the structure of the literary
experience" fosters a commitment to equality because in reading we
identify with each of the characters with equal empathy. Thus, for
example, in going through Hard Times,
[t]he reader enters each of these lives not knowing, so to speak,
which one of them is hers-she identifies first with Louisa and
then with Stephen Blackpool, living each of these lives in turn
and becoming aware that her actual place is in any respects an
accident of fortune.57
This description of a reader's experience seems to owe more to John
Rawls's "veil of ignorance" than to the experience of actual readers
of fiction. Nussbaum's account of Bitzer has already made it clear
that she at least does not identify with all of the characters but only

51. Id. at 98.

52. Id. at 98-99.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 87.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 11

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

with some of them-and her discussion strongly suggests that

identification with some characters is furthered by the reader's
repulsion from others. Nussbaum may be right in claiming that
novels "undermine hierarchies of race and class and gender"; what
she fails to recognize is that those same novels establish their own
hierarchies, often more absolute than those they "undermine."58
Condemnation is just as intrinsic to the novel as compassion, and
hierarchy as much as equality.
Although Nussbaum's readings of Dickens, Forster, and Wright
fail to persuade, her reading of Walt Whitman seems convincing
enough. In Walt Whitman Nussbaum has found an author whose
major work explicitly advocates the sort of equality she wants to
believe is the implicit ideal of "the literary imagination" in general.
Whitman, indeed, goes perhaps further than Nussbaum herself in
affirming not only the equality of human beings to one another but
the spiritual equality of "every thing":

I swear I see now that every thing has an eternal soul!

The trees have, rooted in the ground.... the weeds of
the sea have.... the animals.
I swear I think there is nothing but immortality!59

There are difficulties, however, in identifying Whitman's vision with

that of the "literary imagination" in general, especially since
Whitman himself proudly emphasized that his poetry represented a
radical break with the literature of the past. In Democratic Vistas he
declared that "literature, strictly consider'd, has never recognized the
People, and, whatever may be said, does not to-day."' The old
literature, in Whitman's view, did not merely ignore ordinary people
but had been everywhere "the main support of European chivalry,
the feudal, ecclesiastical, dynastic world."'" According to Whitman
the old literature was downright hostile to democracy: "The great
poems, Shakspere [sic] included, are poisonous to the idea of the
pride and dignity of the common people, the life-blood of a
democracy."62 Whitman is surely right if he means to point out that
most readers will come away from a reading of a work like King Lear

58. Id. at 76.

59.WALT WHITMAN, Leaves of Grass, in WALT WHITMAN: COMPLETE POETRY AND
COLLECrED PROSE 1, 106 (Justin Kaplan ed., Literary Classics of the United States 1982)
(1855).
60. WALT WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in WALT WHITMAN: COMPLETE POETRY AND
COLLECTED PROSE, supra note 59, at 929, 944 (1867).
61. Id. at 933.
62. Id. at 955.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 12
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

with a renewed sense of the gulf between ingratitude and loyalty as

exemplified by, say, Goneril and Kent, rather than with a reinforced
feeling that all human beings are basically alright. Until Nussbaum is
willing to test her hypothesis about "the literary imagination" against
what Whitman calls "the great poems," her argument remains
incomplete. As Richard Posner shrewdly observes, Nussbaum's
"choice of works to discuss in Poetic Justice" is "as it were,
preselected."63

II. LAW AND LITERARY INTERPRETATION: RONALD DWORKIN

AND THE NEW CRITICISM

Ronald Dworkin does not invoke the authority of literary

masterpieces to support his reading of the Constitution, but he does
argue that interpreters of the Constitution should follow the example
set by literary critics who, according to Dworkin in How Law Is Like
Literature, assess interpretations of a work according to "which way
of reading (or speaking or directing or acting) the text reveals it as
the best work of art."' Dworkin compares his proposal to those put
forward by his two rivals: E.D. Hirsch's "author's intention theory 65
and Stanley Fish's idea that "interpretation creates a work of art and
represents only the fiat of a particular critical community."'
Richard Posner accurately points out that Dworkin's "aesthetic
hypothesis" is "reminiscent of the New Criticism,"67 ' a school whose

leading American practitioners included Cleanth Brooks, John

Crowe Ransom, and R.P. Blackmur. It does nothing to discredit
Dworkin's position to note that the approach he favors reached its
peak of influence around fifty years ago; given the current disarray
of literary studies, the era of the New Criticism begins to look like a
kind of golden age. The sort of close reading exemplified in Cleanth
Brooks's The Well Wrought Urn' did set a new standard of critical
attentiveness, and the textbooks produced by Brooks and Robert
Penn Warren, especially Understanding Poetry,69 eventually
"revolutionized the teaching of English literature" as Ren6 Wellek
notes.' Nevertheless, even in the heyday of the New Criticism in the

63. POSNER, supra note 36, at 324.

64. RONALD DWORKIN, How Law Is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146,
149 (1985).
65. Id. at 154.
66. Id. at 150.
67. POSNER, supra note 36, at 218.
68. CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN (1947).
69. CLEANTH BROOKS & ROBERT PENN WARREN, UNDERSTANDING POETRY: AN
ANTHOLOGY FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS 240 (1960).
70. RENI WELLEK, 6 A HISTORY OF MODERN CRITICISM 1750-1950, at 191 (1986).

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 13

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

forties and fifties the focus "on the work of art as an object in itself" 71
was challenged by Marxists, Freudians, myth critics, and many
others.'
Since the 1960s the prestige of the New Criticism has declined.
Ren6 Wellek, himself an admirer of the school, though not an
uncritical one, was forced to conclude in 1978 that "[t]oday the New
Criticism is considered not only superseded, obsolete and dead, but
somehow mistaken and wrong."'73 Although Dworkin acknowledges
in a general way that "critics themselves are thoroughly divided
about what literary interpretation is,"'7 his failure to discuss specific
schools, and especially the New Criticism, allows him to propose "to
use literary interpretation as a model"75 as though there were only
one "model" available: the one Dworkin offers as "the aesthetic
hypothesis,"'76 thereby gaining what seems an unearned rhetorical
advantage. In referring to the approach he is commending as the
"aesthetic hypothesis," he leaves the implication that he is not
turning merely to one critical school among others but rather
adopting an approach shared, in some variation or other, by literary
critics generally.
Dworkin's "aesthetic hypothesis" assumes that the methodology of
literary criticism both commits its practitioners to readings that cast a
text in as favorable a light as possible and then commands them to
disregard the intentions of its author in working out those readings.
Both assumptions are wrong. First, the notion that good criticism
always attempts to bring out the strengths of a work is not supported
by the actual practice of literary critics. Second, even New Critics
like Cleanth Brooks, whose work provides the strongest support for
Dworkin's theory, maintain a commitment to authorial intention
denied by the "aesthetic hypothesis."
All literary works are not masterpieces, just as all legislation is not
necessarily well-advised. The New Critical technique of close reading
can be used with devastating effect to bring out the shortcomings of
a poem or novel just as surely as it can reveal the hidden riches of a
masterpiece. Dwight Macdonald's close reading of James Could

71. WILLIAM HARMON & C. HUGH HOLMAN, New Criticism, in A HANDBOOK TO

LITERATURE 345, 345 (7th ed. 1996).
72. See, e.g., EDMUND WILSON, THE WOUND AND THE Bow (1965) (Freudian critique);
PHILIP RAHV, IMAGE AND IDEA (1949) (Marxist critique); NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF
CRITICISM (1957) (myth criticism).
73. WELLEK, supra note 70, at 144. Wellek's chapter on "The New Criticism" first
appeared as The New Criticism:Pro and Contra, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 28 (1978). It was also
reprinted in RENA WELLEK, THE ATrACK ON LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 87 (1982).
74. DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 148.
75. Id. at 158.
76. Id. at 149.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 14
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999l Seaton

Cozzens's By Love Possessed, for instance, persuasively and

hilariously demonstrated why that bestseller of the 1950s was not a
great work of literature after all, despite the adulation it had
received from critics who should have known better." Understanding
Poetry, a textbook by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren that
brought New Critical techniques to classrooms across the country,
proceeds on the assumption that students need to learn what makes
a bad poem bad as well as what makes a good poem good. James
Russell Lowell's After the Burialis included as an example of a poem
that is "an expression of deep personal grief" and yet "a bad
poem."78 Joyce Kilmer's Trees, the authors note, "has been very
greatly admired by a large number people," yet, they
'
uncompromisingly add, "it is a bad poem."
Just as literary critics are more willing to recognize that all poems
and novels are not masterpieces than Dworkin's theory requires,
likewise few critics, including the New Critics themselves, have
shared Dworkin's belief that interpretation must be "cut loose from
these associations with speaker's meaning or intention,"' although
this is a central feature of the "aesthetic hypothesis." Understanding
Poetry, for example, offers the following "proviso" for students to
keep in mind when "thinking of form" in regard to poetry: "Poems
are written by human beings and the form of a poem is an
individual's attempt to deal with a specific problem, poetic and
personal.""1
Brooks and Warren did not merely offer such advice to students,
they took it to heart in their own critical writing. If there is one book
whose explications embody the New Criticism at its best and most
characteristic, it is Cleanth Brooks's The Well Wrought Urn.' Here,
if anywhere, are examples of the kind of criticism that Dworkin's
"aesthetic hypothesis" is meant to affirm. The recognized ability of
such criticism to convey the beauty and insights of poetry seems to
affirm the validity of the "aesthetic hypothesis." If the "hypothesis"
has been tested and found to work so well in literary criticism, then
perhaps it deserves a trial in legal interpretation.
A close reading of The Well Wrought Urn itself, however, reveals
that Brooks nowhere "cuts loose" from the poet's "meaning or
intention." In a chapter on Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, for

77. See DWIGHT MACDONALD, By Cozzens Possessed, in AGAINST THE AMERICAN

GRAIN 187 (1983).
78. BROOKS & PENN WARREN, supra note 69, at 240.
79. Id. at 288.
80. DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 148.
81. Id. at xiv.
82. BROOKS, supra note 68.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 15

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

example, Brooks distinguishes his own approach from that of other

critics by noting that he neglects "Keats the man" only to emphasize
"Keats the poet."'83 Later Brooks characterizes his own specific focus
in a way that heightens rather than diminishes the role of the author:
"This is surely not too much to ask of the reader-namely to assume
that Keats meant what he said and that he chose his words with
care."' Brooks presents himself so emphatically as the defender of
Keats's own vision that it becomes far easier to see his criticism as an
attempt to recapture the author's original vision in all its complexity
and depth than as an effort to cut the author loose from the poem.
Similar examples demonstrating the critic's respect for the author
and authorial intention could be gleaned from the writings of any of
the New Critics and, indeed, from virtually any example of
significant literary criticism from any period or school, even if the
theory affirmed by the critic denies intentionality. As Stanley Fish,
himself a proponent of the notion that in interpretation "the reader
supplies... everything,"' points out, readers, whatever their
theoretical inclinations, cannot help but "positing an intention for an
utterance if they are in the act of regarding it as meaningful. ' Thus,
although Dworkin is quite right to feel that a good deal of literary
criticism-though by no means all-"attempts to show which way of
reading.., the text reveals it as the best work of art,"' he is wrong to
suggest that such an approach commits one to discounting the
author's "meaning or intention." It requires only that the critic
believe, on the basis of reputation or the direct evidence of the
author's work as a whole, that the writer is capable of greatness.
Posner points out that the New Critics' "hypothesis of total
coherence" works best when one is dealing with works whose
greatness has been attested by centuries of comparison and
reconsideration.88
Even in this favored situation, however, the "aesthetic hypothesis"
seems vitiated by a paradox. A masterpiece is likely to provide
revelations that surprise even the most experienced critic-
revelations that one may miss unless one is especially attentive to the
manifestations of a perspective presumptively wider and deeper than
one's own. Cleanth Brooks does not attempt to compete with John

83. Id. at 153.

84. Id. at 155.
85. STANLEY FISH, Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES 68, 77 (1989).
86. STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at
103, 177.
87. DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 149.
88. POSNER, supra note 36, at 247.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 16
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

Keats. The "aesthetic hypothesis," however, encourages and even

justifies a competition between Ronald Dworkin and James Madison
as to who, given the wording of the text, can produce the better
Constitution over the long haul. The same impulse arises in
interpreting religious texts. Does one turn to them to confirm one's
own moral insights or to confront a different, perhaps more
demanding, although seemingly less sophisticated perspective?
George Santayana speculated somewhat maliciously on the way the
problem appeared to the progressive Christians of nineteenth-
century Boston:
Jesus was a prophet more winsome and nearer to ourselves than
his predecessors; but how could any one deny that the twenty
centuries of progress since his time must have raised a loftier
pedestal for Emerson or Channing or Phillips Brooks? It might
somehow not be in good taste to put this feeling into clear
words.., nevertheless it beamed with refulgent self-satisfaction
in the lives and maxims of most of their followers."

III. LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND AUTHORIAL INTENTION:

RONALD DWORKIN AND E.D. HIRSCH

Dworkin turns to the "aesthetic hypothesis" in part because he

finds theories of interpretation based on the author's intention
unconvincing. At one point it seems as though Dworkin has no real
quarrel with some suitably capacious notion of authorial intention
but only with "the more doctrinaire authors' intention theories" that
force readers to restrict their interpretations "to what the author in
some narrow and constrained sense intended to put there." 'At
another point he suggests that the "complex and structured
intention" of a novelist must "embarrass any simple author's
intention theory,"'" thereby leaving open the possibility that a
complex theory might prove adequate to the novelist's complexity.
And when Dworkin concedes that "[n]o plausible theory of
interpretation holds that the intention of the author is always
irrelevant,"' it sounds as though the issue is practical rather than
theoretical, a matter of emphasis rather than principle. But the title
of the collection in which How Law Is Like Literature appears-A
Matter of Principle- suggests that the question of authorial intention
is, like the other issues he considers, finally "a matter of principle."

89. GEORGE SANTAYANA, CHARACTER AND OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (John
W. Yolton ed., Transaction 1991) (1920).
90. DWORKIN, supranote 64, at 154.
91. Id. at 163.
92. Id. at 155.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 17

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

496 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

If it is indeed a matter of principle one wonders why Dworkin

spends so much effort criticizing those "more doctrinaire" or
"simple" versions of a theory that he is determined to reject even in
its strongest version. One reason for suspecting that Dworkin's
strategy is rhetorical rather than intellectual is that he never tells us
who holds the "more doctrinaire" theories or, for that matter, who
holds any more complex theories. The only opposing theorist he
mentions is E.D. Hirsch, and he fails to tell us whether Hirsch's work
could be classified with the "more doctrinaire" theories, the "simple"
theories, or whether it belongs in some other, unnamed category.93
One can only suppose that Dworkin feels that Hirsch's theorizing
belongs in one or both of the two former categories, since he takes
only one short paragraph to dismiss it.
Yet Hirsch's theory of authorial intention does indeed provide
plausible responses to the objections Dworkin raises. In How Law Is
Like Literature, Dworkin insists that any theory of authorial
intention must restrict meaning to, at best, "the full set of
interpretive beliefs an author has at a particular moment, say at the
moment he sends final galleys to the printer."' Therefore, Dworkin
charges, "the author's intention school, as I understand it, makes the
value of a work of art turn on a narrow and constrained view of the
intentions of the author" because it ignores a characteristic "kind or
level of intention, which is the intention to create a work of art
whose nature or meaning is not fixed.., because it is a work of
art."95 Yet in Validity in Interpretation,Hirsch had pointed out that
"for some genres of texts the author submits to the convention that
his willed implications must go far beyond what he explicitly
knows."' Early in Validity in InterpretationHirsch observes that "it
is very possible to mean what one is not conscious of meaning ....
[T]he distinction between attended and unattended meanings is not
the same as the distinction between what an author means and what
he does not mean." 97
In later writings Hirsch went even further to meet the kind of
objections that Dworkin raises. In Meaning and Significance
Reinterpreted, Hirsch revised his conception of meaning in order to
take explicit account of the intention, shared by most poets,
novelists, and dramatists, "to communicate effectively in the
future"9' with readers in widely different circumstances. In doing so,

93. Id. at 153.

94. Id. at 157-58.
95. Id. at 158.
96. E.D. HIRscH,JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 123 (1967).
97. Id. at 22.
98. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, 11 CRmCAL INQUIRY 202,

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 18
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

Hirsch engages in exemplary self-criticism. Finding that his earlier

conception of the realm of meaning failed to leave sufficient room
for the future-oriented intentions of authors, he expands his
conception of the "domain of meaning" to include the possibility of
"new exemplifications [that] are embraced by original intention."'
Thus in reading one of Shakespeare's sonnets on love, for example,
the possibility of each reader thinking of different "exemplifications"
does not require that each has a different meaning in mind:
If you think of your beloved in reading Shakespeare's sonnet,
while I think of mine, that does not make the meaning of the
sonnet different for us, assuming that we both understand (as of
course we do) that the text's meaning is not limited to any
particular exemplification but rather embraces many, many
exemplifications. "°
Hirsch makes this point even more forcefully in his 1996 essay The
Validity of Allegory:
Authors normally intend that readers should go beyond the
authors' explicit intentions. Aware that their writing will be read
by strangers distant in space and time, authors want their
meanings to go beyond their own conscious intentions and the
constraints on meaning that are imposed by what they and their
contemporaries can conceive in their own time and place.
Shakespeare clearly expressed such an intention to go beyond
conscious intention when he predicted that his mistress would
continue to live posthumously in his sonnets, not only because
his verse is splendid but also because future lovers will apply his
words in unforeseen ways to their own lives."1
The criterion of authorial intention, in Hirsch's treatment, requires
not Dworkin's "narrow and constrained view of the intentions of the
author" but rather a large-minded willingness to consult "the spirit
of original meaning"" of the work as a whole even against the literal
sense of particular passages. The danger is not that the criterion will
allow too little but too much, that "in practice" it will be nothing
more than "a pious slogan" available to support "whatever
interpretation one wishes to defend."' 3 Hirsch does not deny that the
standard of original intention may be misused, but he argues that a
survey of the history of interpretation suggests that "[b]eing true to

205 (1984).
99. Id. at 215.
100. Id. at 210.
101. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Validity of Allegory, in CONVEGNO INTERNATIONALE SUL
TEMA: ERMENEUTICA E CRITICA 215,221 (1996).
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 228.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 19

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

the spirit has in fact been more than empty rhetorical gesture." °"
Interpretations are always debatable, but there is a clear difference
between those that at least aim at fidelity to the original and those
that practice what Hirsch calls "the hermeneutics of violence."'" °

IV. ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AS "EXTERNAL SKEPTICISM":

RONALD DWORKIN AND STANLEY FISH

No historical survey would convince Stanley Fish that either

Dworkin. or Hirsch were right; it is a cardinal point of his theory that
there is no neutral evidence, inside or outside of the text, to which
one can appeal. No matter how hard one looks, the "independent or
uninterpreted text" is nowhere to be found."6 Nor can one use the
historical context, or any kind of context, as a basis for interpreting a
literary or legal text, since "context is a product of interpretation and
as such is itself variable as a constraint.""'° Fish's point certainly is
persuasive when applied to his own theses; just as they are not based
on any sort of literary or historical evidence, so they cannot be
disproved by any. Like religious dogmas and metaphysical
propositions, Fish's key assertions are compatible with any and all
facts or events.
Just for that reason, however, they provide little or no practical
guidance in confronting the inescapable task of choosing between
rival interpretations of particular texts. Fish himself emphasizes that
his "anti-foundationalism" is "unable to give" any assistance at all in
regard to "knowledge, goals, purposes, strategies."" 8 Thus, in
discussing attempts to arrive at "the just bounds between church and
state," Fish refuses to offer any suggestion of his own beyond the
injunction to "figure out what you think is right and then look
around for ways to be true to it.""' This refusal is consistent with his
general thesis that "theory," his or anybody else's, has "no
consequences." " ' More accurately if less radically, theory has at least
no purely "theoretical consequences;" in other words, "the
consequences of theory.., are not the consequences of a practice
that stands in a relationship of precedence and mastery to other

104. Id.
105. Id. at 233.
106. STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationsin Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 87, 98.
107. FISH, supra note 86, at 103, 108.
108. STANLEY FISH, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory, Hope, and the Teaching of
Composition, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 342,355.
109. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2332 (1997).
110. STANLEY FISH, Consequences, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85,
at 315, 325.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 20
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

practices." ' What Fish calls "theory talk" may indeed have all sorts
of rhetorical effects, but none of these, in his view, could possibly
have anything to do with the logic of an argument, what Jirgen
Habermas calls the "unforced force of a better insight.""'2
Most works discussing the connections between law and literature
propose ways in which legal thinking might be improved by the study
of either works of literature or theories about literature and its
interpretation. Weisberg, Nussbaum and Dworkin all make such
proposals. Fish, however, makes none. Instead he advocates looking
at both law and literature from a perspective that sees both as
exemplifications of "the truth that all operations... are
'
rhetorical."" In turn "rhetoric" is simply "another word for force,""' 4
and "force" itself "is simply a (pejorative) name for the thrust or
assertion of some point of view," or, to put it another way, "force
' 5
is
just another name for what follows naturally from conviction.""
At times, Fish seems happy to affirm this thesis in a way that
emphasizes his radical break with common sense. Common sense
holds that there is a big difference between making a decision
because one chooses to do so and obeying an order made by
someone holding a gun to one's head. According to Fish's
philosophy, however, there is "finally no difference at all"116
' between

the former and the latter:

Or to put the matter another way: there is always a gun at your
head. Sometimes the gun is, in literal fact, a gun; sometimes it is
a reason, an assertion whose weight is inseparable from some
already assumed purpose; sometimes it is a desire, the urging of
a state of affairs to which you are already predisposed;
sometimes it is a need you already feel; sometimes it is a name-
country, justice, honor, love, God-whose power you have
already internalized. Whatever it is, it will always be a form of
coercion, of an imperative whose source is an interest which
speaks to the interest in you. And this leads me to a second
aphorism: not only is there always a gun at your head; the gun at
your head is your head; the interests that seek to compel you are
appealing and therefore pressuring only to the extent they
already live within you, and indeed are you. In the end we are
always self-compelled, coerced by forces-beliefs, convictions,

111. Id. at 337.

112. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 305
(Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1987) (1985).
113. STANLEY FISH, Rhetoric, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at
471,493.
114. STANLEY FISH, Force, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 503,
517.
115. Id. at 521.
116. Id. at 518.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 21

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

reasons, desires-from which we cannot move one inch away.11

Fish expends a good deal of ingenuity, even coining not one but two
"aphorisms," to encourage the reader to see things as they would
appear to a mind detached from all situations, free to see things as
they are "finally," as they are "[i]n the end."
Dworkin, whose putative errors Fish attacks with so much gusto in
essays with titles like Wrong Again"8 and Still Wrong After All These
Years, 9 has a point when he characterizes Fish's perspective as a
kind of "external skepticism"'2 ° that is irrelevant to the ongoing
concerns of literature and law. For Dworkin, Fish's brand of
skepticism is
skepticism brought to an enterprise from the outside, skepticism
which engages no arguments of the sort the enterprise requires,
skepticism which is simply tacked on at the end of our various
interpretive and political convictions, leaving them all somehow
unruffled and in place."'
Fish concedes as much when he declares that his "anti-
foundationalism" has no distinctive "knowledge, goals, purposes,
strategies"' ' to offer. Fish nonetheless agrees with Dworkin that
"external skepticism" is irrelevant to any conceivable practice.
Dworkin and Fish agree further that "external skepticism" describes
a mistaken attempt to, in Fish's paraphrase of Dworkin, "speak from
the outside and inside at once."'"
The two disagree, however, about whose work is more flawed by
such an attempt. Fish nominates Dworkin's Law's Empire, since the
mistake of the external skeptic "is the mistake that Dworkin himself
makes throughout the book. Indeed, it is the mistake that is the
book."' 24 This seems odd, since Fish himself notes that Dworkin in
Law's Empire is offering a principle, "law as integrity," that appears
anything but skeptical.'" Fish argues, however, that Dworkin's
promotion of law as integrity assumes the validity of "the general
claim of philosophy to be a model of reflection that exists on a level
superior to, and revelatory of, mere practice" - and the notion that

117. FISH, supra note 114, at 520.

118. See FISH, supra note 86:
119. See STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 356.
120. RONALD DwoRKN, On Interpretationand Objectivity, in A MAIlER OF PRINCIPLE,
supra note 64, at 167, 176.
121. Id. at 177.
122. FISH, supra note 108, at 355.
123. FISH, supra note 119, at 371.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 356.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 22
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

there is a realm beyond "mere practice" is, in Fish's view, the key
error that Dworkin's "law as integrity" shares with "external
skepticism."'" Dworkin, on the other hand, claims that it is "people
like Fish"'27 who most strikingly exemplify external skepticism. For
both Fish and Dworkin, the only skepticism worth taking seriously is
a limited skepticism, a skepticism about means rather than ends.
Thus the doubts of an "external skeptic" about the value of sports in
general would be irrelevant to the concerns of baseball players and
managers, while the skepticism of an analyst of the game who
doubted the value of home run hitters as opposed to batters who
could get on base frequently might be relevant."H In any case, Fish
agrees with Dworkin when the latter asserts "[t]his kind of
skepticism can make no difference to our own efforts to understand
and improve interpretation, art and law."'' Thus, their answers to
Dworkin's rhetorical question "What do we lose in giving it up?'M0
would seem to be the same: nothing very important.
An advocate of "external skepticism" might reply that something
very important would indeed be lost: the possibility of escaping at
least occasionally from our usual goal-oriented perspective to view
the world sub specie aeternitas, under the aspect of eternity. The
stance of the mystic or contemplative philosopher might well be
characterized as "external skepticism" without thereby impugning
the enterprise. Metaphysicians and theologians have argued that the
attainment of such a perspective is the height of wisdom, bringing
with it serenity and fulfillment. This defense would not be open to
Fish himself, since he views the world not as a source of
contemplation but rather "as a field of possibilities to be seized."'' It
is possible that some readers, delighted to find relief of any sort from
the anxieties of contemporary life, may feel only gratitude for the
verbal legerdemain by which Fish makes the case that "finally" and
"[i]n the end" the difference between making up one's own mind and
being threatened by a gunman is unimportant. Most of those
interested in the connections between literature and law, however,
are likely to turn to Fish's work not for therapy but for assistance in
clarifying, refining, and explicating the distinctions that enable them

126. Id. at 371.

127. DWORmN, supra note 120, at 172.
128. Fish observes that Dworkin's urging legal practitioners to practice law as integrity is
analogous to somebody telling baseball players that they have an "obligation to try and score
runs," as though some members of the team "thought it something else." FISH, supra note 119,
at 368.
129. DWORKIN,supra note 120, at 177.
130. Id.
131. STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We're Doing?, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 436, 465.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 23

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

to make the decisions confronting them as literary critics, lawyers,

legal scholars, and citizens. Unfortunately, the characterization of
the debates over such questions as rhetorical contests rather than as
searches for the truth provides little or no guidance in making these
decisions -decisions that remain unavoidable, however they are
characterized.

V. THE IRRELEVANCE OF LITERATURE? RICHARD POSNER

For Fish the incapacity of his "anti-foundationalism" to assist in
the resolution of specific questions of legal interpretation -an
inability that Fish not merely concedes but emphasizes -illustrates
not the limitations of his own approach but the validity of his general
contention that each interpretive community establishes its own
particular rules, rules that have no special standing outside that
community. In doing so he is not speaking as a literary scholar but as
a philosopher and metaphysician or, what comes to the same thing,
an anti-metaphysician. As Richard Posner pointed out in the first
edition of Law and Literature, "[ilt is not Fish the Milton scholar
who enters the lists; it is Fish the interpretive skeptic..."'32 Richard
Posner himself is something of a skeptic. He shares Fish's secular,
pragmatic outlook and, like Fish, refuses to accord literature its
traditional authority as a source of insight about human life and
moral judgment.
A reader of Fish's vehement essay on the first edition of Posner's
Law and Literature, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages:
33 is likely to come away thinking that
Posner on Law and Literature,'
the two disagree so sharply that in any dispute with either, one is
likely to have the other as an ally. When one looks more closely at
Don't Know Much, however, the rhetorical energy of the essay is
focused not so much on refuting Posner's theses as on suggesting that
Posner's book, "innocently occasional as it might seem," is actually
"part and parcel of a wholesale effort to restructure several key
American institutions in accordance with a very definite, and some
would say extreme, political and moral vision. ''
Posner, that is, is part of that "vast right-wing conspiracy" about
which most of us were alerted only when Hillary Clinton denounced
it on nation-wide television. In the "revised and enlarged" 1998
edition of Law and Literature, Posner does not reply in kind by

132. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 263

(1988).
133. FISH, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY, supra note 85, at 294.
134. Id. at 310.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 24
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

questioning Fish's good faith. In fact, he does not respond to Fish's

accusation at all. Instead, he addresses Fish's ideas on their own
merits, as though speculation about the personal motivations of their
author were irrelevant in considering their capacity for explicating
the relations between law and literature.
The major addition to the 1998 edition of Law and Literature is a
section entitled The Literary Turn in Legal Scholarship,"' the first
chapter of which is a critique of "The Edifying School of Legal
Scholarship." '36 Like Fish, Posner is suspicious of those who claim the
high moral ground. Just as Fish easily refutes the pretensions of
those Critical Legal Theorists who deconstruct traditional moralities
only to assert their own moral absolutes, so Posner has little
difficulty in demonstrating that literature is larger and more
complicated than even the most progressive doctrines. He argues
convincingly that the legal principles that Nussbaum, for example,
claims to derive from literature owe more to her own enlightened
thinking than to any consensus available from the classics, which, as
Posner points out, "are full of moral atrocities."'37 But the
momentum of the argument carries Posner too far. Rightly observing
that Nussbaum's humanitarianism, however admirable, is not
deducible from great works of literature, he cannot refrain from
himself extracting a doctrine from the same source. Declaring
roundly that "the world of literature is a moral anarchy," he
concludes that "immersion in it [literature] teaches moral
relativism." 38
In contrast to Nussbaum and Weisberg, both of whom affirm the
ideas they claim to discover in literature, Posner does not use his
discovery that literature teaches moral relativism as an argument in
favor of that doctrine. For Posner, what literature may seem to teach
is unimportant, since literature in any case is largely irrelevant to
moral inquiry. At times, he suggests that literature is irrelevant or
unimportant to any central human concern, so that he is finally
"obliged to consider why, if we do not read literature in order to
form better or truer opinions on matters of religion or politics, of
economics or morality, we read it at all."'39 After considering a
number of rather weak candidates ("We might read to improve our
reading skills;" "We might read literature to learn to express
ourselves better") Posner muses that in reading "we acquire
experience vicariously" and thereby "expand our emotional as well

135. POSNER, supra note 36, at 303.

136. Id. at 305.
137. Id. at 311.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 326.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 25

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

as our intellectual horizons."'" This seems uncomfortably close to

the traditional notions about literature's moral significance that
Posner wants to reject. Eventually he returns to his original refusal
of any moral relevance to literature, claiming finally that
'
"the moral
properties [of literature] are almost sheer distraction. 1141
If literature has nothing to offer by way of moral guidance, it
follows that it will have little to say about justice and thus about
ethical issues confronting judges, lawyers, and legal scholars. Posner
is right to assert that legal thinkers have little to learn from
contemporary literary theorists, and he is right to reject the efforts of
Weisberg and Nussbaum to align literature with their own moral
principles, but he is wrong, I think, to discount the contribution
literature makes to moral awareness and thus to our understanding
of justice and law.
In doing so, however, Posner seems to have the support of his
occasional adversary, Fish. Although Fish has been "reading
poetry... for a living" for decades, its significance for the rest of his
life now seems "entirely contingent and in [his] case almost non-
existent. 1 42 More generally, Fish disclaims any connections between
"aesthetic, political, and philosophical inclinations. ' 14 It is worth
noting, however, that Fish did not always deny the relationship
between literature and life. His first book, he wrote in its closing
paragraph, is based on "the assumption that poetry is significant
insomuch as it deals responsibly with the complexities of
existence."" In the book that made his critical reputation, Surprised
by Sin, Fish argued that Milton's ParadiseLost is truly educational,
since it teaches "the hardest
' 45
of all lessons, distrust of our own
abilities and perceptions.'
It would not be difficult to cite other similarly eloquent statements
affirming the significance of literature for moral and even political
reflection while rejecting mere didacticism. From Horace and
Longinus to Sir Philip Sidney to Ralph Ellison, the moral relevance
of literature has been proudly asserted by poets and writers and
accepted by the world at large. Perhaps the most impressive witness
in this particular case, however, is Posner himself. Over and over
again, he connects the greatness of a literary work to its moral depth.
He criticizes E.L. Doctorow's Ragtime in comparison to Kleist's

140. Id. at 326-27.

141. Id. at 332.
142. Stanley Fish, Truth and Toilets: Pragmatism and the Practices of Life, in THE
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM 418, 427 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
143. Id. at 425.
144. STANLEY FISH, JOHN SKELTON'S POETRY 260 (1965).
145. STANLEY FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST 22 (1967).

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 26
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

Michael Kohlhaas because "the spirit of the original is lost.... In

Doctorow's hands, Michael Kohlhaas becomes farce or fantasy6
rather than a meditation on the moral ambiguity of revenge.'
Meanwhile, Posner praises the Iliad because, among other things,
"[t]he Iliad teaches not only the excessive character of the passion 14 7
for revenge but also its fragility as a principle of social order.
Shakespeare, like Homer, is cited by Posner as a teacher of obvious
but important moral-political truths: "[T]he play [Hamlet] contains a
good deal of implicit criticism of revenge .... Hamlet also illustrates
the problem of the avenger's emotional excess."'" And when Posner
praises William Gaddis's A Frolic of His Own over Tom Wolfe's The
Bonfire of the Vanities because of the former's "greater depth,
resonance, and humanity, ' 1 49 he seems to be accepting entirely if
tacitly the old-fashioned view that literary quality and moral insight
are closely related though by no means identical.

VI. CONCLUSION
I began this essay by questioning the characterizations of literature
by some legal theorists. In doing so, I may have seemed to imply that
law professors and other legal scholars should stick to their own
discipline and leave literature to the accredited experts in the field.
Literature, however, is too important to be turned over to literature
professors. Literature's importance to judges, lawyers, and law
professors follows from its importance to human beings in general.
Likewise, the argument that literature has no special relevance for
legal studies depends on the larger claim that literature provides
little or no insight into human life in general. When Posner wants to
deny the pertinence of literature to legal studies, he first argues that
literature is irrelevant to moral questions of any sort. Posner argues
persuasively that literature does not provide vindication of the
favored doctrines that Weisberg and Nussbaum profess to discover.
There are, however, more substantial arguments for the relevance of
literature to life, and thus to law, than those offered by Weisberg and
Nussbaum.
Posner believes that the arguments about literature's relevance
may be subsumed into two traditions: the "aesthetic tradition,"
which he favors; and an "edifying tradition," which he opposes."5
However, it is not necessary to insist on edification as the end of

146. POSNER, supra note 36, at 71.

147. Id. at 73.
148. Id. at 77.
149. Id. at 36.
150. Id. at 306-07.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 27

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 479

literature in order to acknowledge that it offers us more than an

opportunity for aesthetic delight, precious as that is in itself.
Aristotle, for example, did not insist that poetry point to a moral, but
he nevertheless believed that "poetry is something more
philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history,"
because poetry tells us "the kinds of things a certain type of person
will.probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation," while
history merely reports back what certain people actually did do.151
History deals with "particular facts," while poetry is concerned with
"universal truths" about human life.152 In Aristotle's view, poetry
does not tell us what we should do-that is, it does not edify-but
rather informs us about the sort of things that people "probably" or
"necessarily" do. Aristotle's Poetics presents one highly influential
version of the traditional idea that literature is in some sense an
imitation of life.
This idea, dominant in Western culture until the Romantics,
carries with it the notion that literature provides a way of learning
about life without actually having to undergo experiences for
oneself. The mimetic theory of literature is no longer fashionable,
but it is nevertheless affirmed in practice by historians, sociologists,
and ordinary readers every day. We still read novels set in distant
countries to find out about how people live in faraway places, and we
read stories about war to learn about how people act in extreme
situations. Courtroom dramas are popular because, among other
reasons, non-jurists are curious about what it feels like to take part in
a trial. "Is it true to life?" remains an important criterion for judging
novels, short stories, and films, even though anti-foundationalists
skeptics insist that such questions should not be asked.
Literature, however, does far more than merely report on the way
things are in diverse locations, eras, and milieus, though it surely
does that. Literature, more than any other art, is a vehicle for moral
reflection and discrimination. There may be great works of music,
painting, and sculpture that seem to lack moral ramifications, but the
moral implications of great works of literature are inescapable,
which is not to say that they are necessarily obvious or unambiguous.
Even those literary works that avoid moralizing and philosophizing
cannot avoid implicit affirmations, perhaps all the more powerful
because they are not explicit.
It is of course true that writers differ in the virtues they commend
and the vices they condemn, explicitly or implicitly. The variety of

151. Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry (Poetics), in CLASSICAL LITERARY CRITICISM 29, 43-
44 (T.S. Dorsch trans., Penguin Books 1965).
152. Id. at 44.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 28
 Seaton: Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory

1999] Seaton

philosophies and religions endorsed by literary works, and even the

diversity of human qualities either applauded or scorned in poetry,
fiction, and drama, if considered with the requisite seriousness,
cannot help but check the human propensity to identify the goods
possible to human beings with what is considered good in one's own
circle. Experiencing literature can and often does deepen,
complicate, and qualify our moral judgments-a process different,
more subtle, and less immediately gratifying than what is usually
connoted by "edification." To say so much is to challenge Posner's
attempt to force one to choose between edification and aestheticism,
while also acknowledging why his own choice of aestheticism seems
at least momentarily plausible. Wide reading in the literary classics
certainly does lead one to doubt that all moral truth is contained in
any particular doctrine, a result that ideological absolutists would
find less than edifying. If such doubt constitutes "moral relativism,"
then Posner is right. There is a good deal of room, however, between
accepting one doctrine or ideology as the complete truth about life
and denying morality altogether.
The humanistic tradition in literary criticism brings literature to
bear on moral and political dilemmas not because any univocal
answer is forthcoming, but because literature provides a salutary
check on the human willingness to be satisfied with slogans,
especially those of one's own party. It is, of course, possible to use
literature merely as an instrument to advance an ideological agenda.
When confronted by such attempts, the humanistic critic has an
obligation to call attention to the variety and complexity of
literature. The breadth and depth of great literature are not evidence
of "moral anarchy," as Posner asserts, but they do limit the
legitimate influence of literature to the broadly moral rather than the
narrowly political. If law has nothing to do with justice, if legal
discussion is simply a struggle to gain power with words (for the
moment) rather than arms, then literature has no particular
relevance for the law. If, on the other hand, the law has something to
do with justice, and if legal studies involve reflection on human life
as well as the manipulation of symbols for rhetorical effect, then
those concerned with law have something to learn from literature.
I am not nearly so worried that literary works may be occasionally
misinterpreted by legal scholars as I am about the possibility that
lawyers, judges, and law professors, believing either that the
significance of literature may be summed up in a few words-as
Weisberg's and Nussbaum's theses suggest-or that literature has
nothing to teach them-as Fish and Posner suppose-may fail to
turn to poems, novels, and plays for insight about the law as an
aspect of the human condition.

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999 29

 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/8 30