Pasei Vs Drilon Case Digest PDF

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON

G.R. No. 81958 (June 30, 1988)

FACTS:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," filed a petition with
the court challenging the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment. They claimed that there is a "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. They also claimed that the
it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.

ISSUE:

Whether the Department Order is unconstitutional

LAW:

Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution - The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.

COURT HISTORY:

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was originally filed with the Supreme Court

RULING:

No. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory
reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order
No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-
the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. It is incorrect to say that
Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions
of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety." Department Order No.
1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the
right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid
qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes
an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature,
but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.

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