VOL.

216, NOVEMBER 26, 1992 25

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 96492.November 26, 1992.

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO

MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA
DELOS REYES, respondents.

Agrarian Reform Law; Appeal; Settled is the rule that only

questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—It is clear that petitioners
are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented
and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the
respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in
arriving at the trial court and appellate court’s findings of fact.
We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put
finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

26

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant

case.

Same; Same; Rules of Court shall not be applicable in

agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.—Finally, we rule
that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”)
although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the ‘Rules
of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a
suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and
are admissible in evidence.’

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In agrarian cases, the quantum

of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence.—
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is
no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule
was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on
June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989).
In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the
Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is: ‘Substantial
evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is
required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial,
for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the
weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.’”

PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Eufracio S. Marquez for petitioners.
     Leopoldo C. Sta. Maria for private respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio

Mananghaya question the respondent
1
Court’s decision
promulgated on November 22, 1990, which affirmed with
modification the

_______________

1 Decision, CA-G.R. No. SP 20528 (CAR), penned by Justice

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VOL. 216, NOVEMBER 26, 1992 27

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

2
 2
agrarian court’s decision promulgated January 10, 1990,
which ordered them and the other defendants therein to,
among others, restore possession of the disputed
landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela
Cruz. Said respondent court’s decision is now final and
executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo,
the other defendants in the agrarian court and, also, the
other petitioners in the respondent court, since they did not
appeal the same.
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of
the respondent Court, the same shall be quoted verbatim
and are as follows:

“It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein
defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46
and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay
Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters
and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production
of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela
Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on
September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of
Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots;
that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in
conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and
that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to
vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.
Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of
possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly
elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy
relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots. Claiming
that they have always exercised

______________

Alfredo L. Benipayo and concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco and

Fortunato A. Vailoces.
2 Decision of the RTC, Branch XLVI, 3rd Judicial Region, San Fernando,
Pampanga acting as an agrarian court; penned by Judge Norberto C. Ponce.

28

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their

official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and
claimed moral damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of
P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment,
sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and
approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other
taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also demanded
actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees
(Answer, pp. 77-78).
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza
was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the same.
Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to
supervise the harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing
thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the
gross harvest the seeds used and the expenses incurred), in a
bonded3 warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the
court.”

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the

appealed agrarian court’s decision with the modification
that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which
was modified, states as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff

and against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:

1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the land-

holding subject of the action to the plaintiff and enjoining
said defendants and any person claiming under them to
desist from molesting them or interfering with the
possession and cultivation of the landholding descripted in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square
meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan Mendoza, and devoted
principally to the production of palay, as evidenced by a Certification
from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued on July 30, 1984.

2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the

two landholding in question and to respect the tenancy
rights of plaintiff

_____________
 3 Op cit., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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VOL. 216, NOVEMBER 26, 1992 29

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

with respect to the same;

b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto

plaintiff 220 cavans of palay or its equivalent in cash of
P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984, and every
harvest time until defendants finally vacate and surrender
possession and cultivation of the landholding in question
to plaintiff.
c) The prayer for moral damages, not having been
sufficiently proved, the same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs
of suit.

The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the

deposits of the harvests ordered by the Court from which the
planting and harvesting expenses have been paid to defendant
Olympio Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the Court or the
warehouses as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then 4
the
balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally.”

Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a

Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for the
consideration of the Court:

“[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly
and severally, with the other defendants, for the harvests of the
litigated property, Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof
starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest
time thereafter until the possession and cultivation of the
aforestated landholding
5
are finally surrendered to the private
respondent.”

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable

jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and Severino
Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46,
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the same
Estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes
from Olympio Mendoza’s father, Juan, and which he later
donated to the Barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba,
Pampanga, for the 6construction of the Bahay Pare
Barangay High School. As to their supposed par-
______________

4 Original Records, pp. 565-566.

5 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 7; Rollo, p. 62.
6 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo, p. 65.

30

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

ticipation in the dispossession of private respondent from

the disputed landholding, petitioners present the
September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal
Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga 7
Provincial
Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, wherein private
respondent’s complaint against petitioners and the other8
defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583
was dismissed, to show that private respondent’s
9
“point is
already settled and considered closed.” Lastly, petitioners
claim that they were included in the present controversy
10
so
that their political career would be destroyed.
Private respondents deny petitioners’ allegations and
contend that it was petitioners who conspired with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only
from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain
that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they were ejected
and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106
was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment,
as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least
P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private respondents, who
are entitled to the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the
farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian
Reform Law, should be compensated for the lost income by
the petitioners who are solidarily 11
liable with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo.
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine
all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the
trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent
appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at
the trial court and appellate court’s findings of fact. We
shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead
put finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under

________________
 7 Annex “B”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 20-21.
8 Prescribing Penalties for the Unlawful Ejectment, Exclusion, Removal
or Ouster of Tenant-Farmers from their Farmholdings.
9 Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 65-66.
10 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 17.
11 Private respondents’ Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 73-74.

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VOL. 216, NOVEMBER 26, 1992 31

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

12
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent
13
the exceptions which
do not obtain in the instant case.
We agree with the appellate court in its ratiocination,
which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss the appeal. Said
the Court:

“In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she ‘is the

tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the
Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a
total area of 23,969 square meters, more or less x x x’ (Complaint,
Records, vol. 1, p. 1). However, during Violeta’s testimony, she
clarified that actually only Lot No. 46 containing an area of
23,000 square meters is the one involved in the dispute. Lot No.
106, which contains an area of 19,000 square meters, is not
included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10,

______________

12 Decision, Misa vs. CA, G.R. No. 97291, August 5, 1992, pp. 4-5.
13 The case of Medina v. Asistio, G.R. No. 75450, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224 (1990)
enumerates several instances when findings of fact may be passed upon and
reviewed by this Court, none of which obtain herein:
“(1)When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]); Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).”
Ibid.,p. 5.

32

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

1989, p. 5; May 8, 1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated

by plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court
that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case
before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The
inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the
testimony of the witness should not be taken against appellee not
only because there was no showing that she intended to mislead
defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the
suit. It would appear that Lot No. 106 had been included in the
complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olimpio’s
father.
We also concur with the trial court’s finding on the
participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of
appellee. They not only knew Olimpio personally, some of them
were even asked by Olimpio to help him cultivate the land, thus
lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olimpio,
together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her
workers from entering the land through ‘strong arm methods.’
(Decision of RTC, Records, vol. II, p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it
favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson
(Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented
and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946
provides that the ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same
provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and
counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required
is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence
rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect
on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26,
1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the
Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

‘Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence,

as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such
 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there
is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial
court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
14

evidence is entitled to belief.’”

_______________

14 Decision, CA-G.R. SP 20528 (CAR), pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 28-29.

33

VOL. 216, NOVEMBER 26, 1992 33

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado and

Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.

Note.—In agrarian cases, all that is required is

submission of substantial evidence not preponderance of
evidence (Gonzales, Jr. vs. Alvarez, 182 SCRA 15).

——o0o——

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