Jurnal Orba (Indonesia Vietnam Masa Soeharto)

Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Soeharto
Author(s): LEO SURYADINATA

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 4 (March 1991), pp. 331-346
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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Contemporary Southeast Asia , Volume 12, Number 4, March 1991
Indonesia-Vietnam Relations
Under Soeharto
LEO SURYADINATA
This article attempts to examine bilateral relations between Indo-

nesia and Vietnam during the New Order government, with
special reference to the internal differences over the strategic threat
perception of China and the ASEAN stand on the Cambodian
question. It also discusses Indonesia's desire to play an effective
role as a regional power in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia and Vietnam are the two countries in Southeast Asia that
achieved their independence through revolution. As a result of this com-
mon historical experience, leaders of the two countries have emphasized
this point from time to time.1 They even argue that this common experience
has formed the basis of Indonesian-Vietnam relations.2 How true is this
assertion? What is the nature of their relations? Has the communist ideology
been a major factor in the relations between communist Vietnam and anti-
communist Indonesia? What has really determined bilateral ties and what
are the prospects? This article attempts to examine these questions with
special reference to the Soeharto period.
Origins of the Relations

Indonesia, which emerged after the 1945 Revolution, has had informal con-
tact with the Vietnamese since the 1940s. However, diplomatic ties between
Jakarta and Hanoi were only established after the Afro-Asian Conference
in Bandung in 1955. Jakarta set up a consulate-general in Hanoi in De-
cember 1955, three months after it had established a consulate-general
in Saigon.3 This policy of equidistance towards the two Vietnams was
331
332 Leo Suryadinata
eventually abandoned during the Soekarno period when revolutionary

fervour was growing. Indonesia's foreign policy was moving towards
the left.
In 1959, Ho Chi Minh was invited to visit Indonesia and was con-
ferred an honorary degree by an Indonesian regional university. In the
same year, Soekarno returned the visit. When the Vietnam War escalated,
the Indonesian élite, many of whom had been involved in the anti-colonial
movement, was sympathetic to the North Vietnamese. They often con-
sidered the South Vietnamese as puppets of the United States. On 10 August
1964 Soekarno finally decided to upgrade the diplomatic relations between
Jakarta and Hanoi to ambassadorial level.4 This led to the suspension
of diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Saigon. Jakarta also closed the
consulate office in Saigon.5
Soon after this, Indonesia decided to recognize the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) and allowed the establishment of its
representative office in Jakarta. Indonesian relations with communist states,
including North Vietnam, became much closer. Together with the People's
Republic of China (PRC), they formed what was known as the Jakarta-
Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang axis.® This was the so-called
honeymoon period, not only between Indonesia and the PRC, but also
between Indonesia and North Vietnam. However, the fall of Soekarno
after the 1965 coup and the rise of the anti-communist Soeharto government
abruptly ended this honeymoon period. Indonesia's foreign policy was
also adjusted. Nevertheless, Jakarta-Hanoi diplomatic ties were maintained
during the Soeharto era while Jakarta's relations with Saigon were never
resumed. This created an impression that Soeharto's Indonesia was still
close to Hanoi. This impression is not entirely correct.
A Subtle Shift
In fact, there was a gradual and subtle shift in Indonesian policy towards
Hanoi. It should be noted that after the 1965 coup, the Communist Party
of Indonesia (PKI) was dissolved and Marxism-Leninism was banned. Viet-
nam was critical of the new Indonesian authorities, and openly sided with
the PKI.7 It is not clear what happened to Jakarta-Hanoi relations after
October 1967, following the suspension of relations between Jakarta and
Beijing. There were two contradictory versions: Hardi, who was the Indo-
nesian ambassador to Hanoi between 1976 and 1979, maintained that there
was a severance of diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Hanoi prior to
1973. (Hardi did not make it explicit as to who took the initiative to break
the ties.) However, Adam Malik and others noted that the ties were never
severed.8 Why was there this confusion?
Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Soeharto 333
It appears that after the communist coup in 1965, Indonesia attached

lesser significance to its foreign relations with socialist/communist states.
However, there was no severance of ties between Jakarta and Hanoi. Even
with the PRC, the Indonesian Government called it a "freezing of diplo-
matic ties", although in reality, it was equivalent to suspension of relations.
However, unlike Indonesian relations with the PRC, Jakarta's relations
with Hanoi did not reach a critical point. The Indonesian ambassador
during that period was Soetrisno, an ex-senior journalist of the Bintang
Timur who is believed to have been a communist.® Soetrisno was recalled
but refused to return to Jakarta. Hanoi was critical of the new Indonesian
authorities and relations between the two countries became estranged,
but were not "frozen".10 When Soetrisno later look refuge in the PRC
and Eastern Europe, there was no Indonesian ambassador in North
Vietnam. Nevertheless, a chargé d'affaires headed the Jakarta mission
in Hanoi.
It would appear that Indonesian-Vietnam relations were maintained
because of several factors: first, North Vietnam did not play a significant
role in the 1965 coup although it was then an ally of the PRC. It is also
important to note that there is no "overseas Vietnamese community" in
Indonesia which is as influential as the ethnic Chinese minority. Secondly,
Adam Malik, with the endorsement of Soeharto, wanted to project a non-
aligned Indonesian foreign policy under the New Order. Thirdly, there was
a certain admiration among Indonesian leaders for the north Vietnamese
struggle against major Western powers.
However, during the New Order period, the Indonesian view towards
North Vietnam was divided. The nationalists (such as Adam Malik and
Ruslan Abdulgani) were indeed still sympathetic to North Vietnam (they
perceived North Vietnam more as a nationalist than a communist nation)
which had struggled against foreign domination, first against Imperial
China, and later against France and the United States.11 However, there
was an indication that some military leaders (for instance, Ali Murtopo)
were suspicious of the communist states (including North Vietnam). They
were more cautious when dealing with the Vietnamese.
The subtle change of policy took place as early as 1968 when Soeharto
visited Sihanouk's Cambodia. At the end of his visit, a communiqué was
published in which Jakarta expressed its continuing support for Sihanouk's
Cambodia. Although the communiqué also mentioned the struggle of the
Vietnamese people, Indonesia expressed its hope that a political rather
than a military solution would be achieved.12 It is quite different from
Soekarno's policy which advocated the military victory of the Viet Minh
(the Vietcong), alias National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV),
over the Saigon government.
334 Leo Suryadinata
Another example also shows that Soeharto' s Indonesia was very care-
ful in dealing with the NLFSV issue in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
meeting. In 1972, Indonesia and Malaysia walked out of the NAM foreign
ministers' meeting in Guyana because the NLFSV was admitted as a full
member rather than as an observer. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry
document (published in 1974) showed that Indonesia (represented by Malik)
was sympathetic to the NLFSV but did not feel that it should be granted
full NAM-member status, which is reserved for a sovereign state.13 (At
that time the NLFSV was still struggling to overthrow the South Vietnam
government). Perhaps the Indonesian (and also Malaysian) objection was
that this would not only create a precedent but also encourage rebellion,
which would not be in Indonesia's (and also Malaysia's) interest.
When Sihanouk was overthrown by Lon Noi, who was supported by
the United States, the Soeharto government did not oppose the new regime.
In 1970 it even sponsored the Jakarta conference advocating a peaceful
solution to the Indochinese problem.14 North Vietnam (at that time Jakarta-
Hanoi ties were no longer cordial) and other socialist states were invited
but all turned down the invitation. The boycott indicated that Hanoi con-
sidered Indonesian foreign policy as hostile towards the socialist bloc.
Improvement of Ties
Jakarta-Hanoi relations continued to be cold but official contacts were
maintained. Adam Malik was eager to have a working relationship with
the Vietnamese and the latter was also responsive towards Indonesia's
overtures. In 1973, Indonesia eventually sent an ambassador to Hanoi
without asking Vietnam to sever its links with the PKI. In fact, as late as
in 1976 Hanoi still wanted to invite the PKI in exile to attend its Communist
Party congress.
It is important to note that Indonesia did not object to Vietnam con-
ducting a dual-track foreign policy (that is, state-to-state and party-to-party
relations). It was interested in maintaining contact with Vietnam. To do
this, Jakarta even sent civilian ambassadors to Hanoi rather than military
men as had been the practice soon after the coup. First, it was Usep
Ranuwidjaja (of the Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI) and in 1976,
Hardi, who was also from the PNI.15 According to Hardi, Soeharto told
him that "he was not yet able to put a military or a career diplomat as an
ambassador in Hanoi. On the contrary, in order to have frank discussions
with the Vietnamese government, a nationalist is needed to head the
Indonesian representative office in Hanoi".16 Why was Jakarta eager to
communicate with the Vietnamese? Perhaps, it had something to do with
Adam Malik who was keen to project the non-aligned image of post-coup
Indonesia. Soeharto and his generals might also have felt that it was
important to cultivate Vietnam because of its strategic position vis-à-vis
the PRC.
When Hardi took over the ambassadorship, he wanted to persuade
the Vietnamese not to recognize and assist the PKI, which was an illegal
movement in Indonesia. He went to see Nguyen Co Thach who was then
the deputy foreign minister of Vietnam.17 However, a top party leader who
was with Thach in his office told Hardi that Vietnam would not abandon
its support for the PKI. Hardi asked him whether or not this was the
official view of Hanoi. Nguyen Co Thach hurriedly explained that it was
not. "It was the standpoint of the Communist Party of Vietnam," said
Thach.18 This confirms that Vietnam was still pursuing the dual-track policy
(similar to the PRC). In addition, Vietnam was supporting the Fretilin in
East Timor and opposed the Indonesian annexation of the ex-Portuguese
colony.19 Hardi also noted that the Vietnamese Government was very
hostile towards the Indonesian embassy personnel in Hanoi. Despite this
hostility, Jakarta never "froze" its relations with Hanoi nor condemned
Vietnamese ties with the PKI. The explanation lies in the Indonesian
military's perception of Vietnam - the military did not think that Vietnam
would pose a security threat to Soeharto's Indonesia.
Towards the end of 1976 when Vietnam was planning to hold a com-
munist party congress, Hardi learnt that the PKI leaders in Beijing were
to be invited. He then went to see Phan Hien, the then Deputy Foreign
Minister, to register his concern. He said that Indonesia would protest
strongly if the PKI leaders were invited.20 A few days later, the Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry informed Hardi that Hanoi had made a decision not to
invite the PKI leaders to attend the Vietnamese Party Congress in 1976.21
Hardi thus thought that Vietnam was making a wise decision as a result
of his diplomatic offensive.22 In fact, Hanoi had decided to distance itself
from Beijing. It was during this congress that the Vietnamese purged all
the pro-Chinese elements within the Vietnamese Communist Party, and
the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi deteriorated.23 The decision
not to invite the PKI, which was pro-Beijing, was not a loss to Vietnam.
In fact, it won a friend. As the rift between Hanoi and Beijing widened,
the Vietnamese attitude towards Indonesia also improved greatly. Appar-
ently, Vietnam intended to gain Indonesian support in its confrontation
with the PRC.
Before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Pham Van Dong made
a trip to the region offering a treaty of friendship to the ASEAN states.
He also promised that Vietnam would not interfere in the domestic affairs
of these countries. Even in the United Nations, the Vietnamese who used
to be ardent supporters of Fretilin, abstained during the discussion on the
336 Leo Su ryadinata
East Timor issue in T978.24 It was clear that Vietnam was attempting
to woo Indonesia in its anticipated dispute with the PRC over the Kam-
puchean issue.
In December 1978, at the invitation of Heng Samrin (who was in-
stalled by the Vietnamese) Vietnam invaded Cambodia which was under
the Khmer Rouge. The ASEAN states, including Indonesia, expressed
their disapproval and urged Vietnam (without mentioning its name) to
restrain and withdraw its troops.25 In February 1979 when the PRC invaded
Vietnam in order "to teach Vietnam a lesson", the ASEAN states made a
similar statement.26
The Indonesian newspapers, especially the army dailies, Angkatan
Bersenjata and Ber ita Yudha, were very restrained in their reporting of
the Sino-Vietnamese war. It was either straight reporting or quoting from
foreign sources about the war.27 On 5 March 1979, however, there was an
editorial in the Angkatan Bersenjata which commented on a meeting
between Soeharto and Hussein Onn (then Malaysian Prime Minister) in
Jakarta. The editorial also mentioned the Sino-Vietnamese war. Interestingly,
the army daily regretted the behaviour of the Vietnamese in Cambodia.
It said that Pham Von Dong had visited the ASEAN states and had pro-
mised not to assist the rebels in other Southeast Asian countries and that
Vietnam was prepared to live in peaceful co-existence (in accordance with
the Afro-Asian principle) with its neighbours. But the daily noted that Dong
had not kept his promise because Vietnam had helped the Cambodian
rebels to take over Phnom Penh and establish a government.28 The daily
also said that China had invaded Vietnam because the Pol Pot regime that
it supported had collapsed and the ethnic Chinese were being harassed
by the Vietnamese. ASEAN (including Indonesia) was extremely concerned
with the situation.
On 7 March 1979, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to contact the
conflicting parties to help solve the conflict, and on the following day
there was also a report that Chinese troops would be withdrawn.29 Again
in the editorial of Angkatan Bersenjata , the army daily commented that
the announcement was encouraging. It stated that Vietnam had requested
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the new Foreign Minister of Indonesia, to use
his good offices in helping to solve the border dispute between Hanoi
and Beijing. There was also a report that Indonesia was prepared to be
the host for the negotiations between Hanoi and Beijing.30 However, the
next day Mochtar made a statement denying the offer. Both the Foreign
Ministry and the Army were careful in expressing their opinion on the
Sino-Vietnamese war.
Although some of the military leaders were disappointed that the
Vietnamese had broken their promise (that Hanoi would not interfere with
Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Soeharto 33 7
the internal affairs of other countries), they were alarmed by the Chinese
willingness to resort to force to settle its differences with Vietnam. It was
clear that soon after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the Indonesian
attitude towards the Vietnamese changed. As noted earlier, prior to the
war, some military leaders, despite their sympathy for the North Vietnam-
ese, had remained suspicious of their communist ideology. However, after
the war, there was a clear indication that the Indonesian military saw
the region in strategic terms and was more concerned with the PRC's
behaviour. The Indonesian military feared that the PRC might use military
means to solve conflicts , in the future and, hence, reconfirm the notion
that China is a long-term threat.
General Benny Murdani, then chief of the Military Intelligence Body
was reported to have visited Hanoi twice. The first was in May 1980
when he flew to Hanoi, and the other was in early 1981 when the United
Nations was discussing the Kampuchean issue. On both trips he wanted
to sound out Vietnam on the same issue.31 It was also reported that on
his second trip he discussed the border dispute with Vietnam over the
Natuna Islands. In fact, the Vietnamese said that the planned continental
shelf negotiations in Jakarta would depend in part on ASEAN's stance in
the United Nations over the Kampuchean issue.32 The result of the visit
was not announced. However, there was a report that Vietnam had given
up its claim over the Natuna Islands.33 It was later reported that both
countries had made no headway in the boundary talks.34 In 1982, General
Murdani made another trip to Hanoi but there was no information on
this trip.35 It is very likely that Murdani was trying to promote closer
co-operation with the Vietnamese.
It was this strategic concern - that of the possible expansion of the
PRC towards the south - which caused the Indonesian military to be
more friendly with Vietnam after 1979. It was not surprising, therefore,
that Soeharto and Hussein Onn decided to announce the Kuantan Prin-
ciple in March 1980 - to prevent Vietnam from further draining its own
resources. It also attempted to prevent Vietnam from being entrenched in
the Soviet camp.
Two Positions
The Department of Foreign Affairs and the military did not share the
same views concerning Vietnam, especially regarding the Kampuchean
issue. It was reported that the Foreign Affairs Department, then represented
by Mochtar, was more in line with the common stand of the ASEAN states.
It considered the Vietnamese behaviour in Kampuchea to be aggressive
338 Leo Suryadinata
and going against the international norm of the territorial integrity of a sov-
ereign state.36 This stand, of course, got the support of President Soeharto.
However, the military group was sympathetic to the Vietnamese venture.
According to a reliable source, the Indonesian military leaders, including
Benny Murdani, agreed that the Vietnamese had the right to unifý the
south and even the whole of French Indochina, just as Indonesia had the
right to liberate West Irian (now Irian Jaya) and "integrate" East Timor
into Indonesian territory.37 However, this view was not made public. The
Indonesian leaders were cautious in public, but it is apparent that there
was a dual Indonesian policy towards Vietnam.
It seems that the military's view of Vietnam gradually prevailed over
that of the Foreign Affairs Department, and ultimately also received the
support of Soeharto. In 1984, for instance, one can see that the Indo-
nesians took a greater initiative in trying to solve the Kampuchean issue
by having better relations with the Vietnamese. It has been argued that
Soeharto had since 1984 wanted to be recognized as a regional leader.
It is not surprising then that Indonesia decided to sponsor the thirtieth
anniversary of the Bandung Conference in Jakarta and to help solve the
Kampuchean problem. Later, Indonesia also wanted to contest the chair-
manship of the NAM conference.
Closer Ties
The year 1984 is important because it was in that year that Indonesia, or
àt least the military, took a major initiative in order to win over the Viet-
namese. In March 1984, Benny Murdani went to Vietnam again.38 During
his visit, Murdani, then the Army Chief of Staff, publicly stated that
Vietnam did not pose any threat to Southeast Asia.
His statement created an uproar among the ASEAN states, especially
Thailand and Singapore who perceived Vietnam as the immediate threat.
He later clarified his statement that it did not mean that he was happy
if "Vietnam remains in Kampuchea". But he did not revise his statement
on the threat issue. In fact, he noted that this was also the assessment of
the military leaders in Jakarta. Murdani was quoted as having said that
he held that view before visiting Vietnam, and reconfirmed this view after
the trip.39 Following Murdani's visit, there was also an announcement
that Hanoi planned to send a military attaché to Jakarta.40 Later in the
year, Murdani gave an interview to Reuters stating that "Vietnam and the
rest of Southeast Asia should forge closer ties to face the potential threat
from a strong China in the next century".41 It is interesting to note that
General Murdani, who is staunchly anti-communist, was perceived to be
Hanoi's "special friend". The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that
when he was moved from the post of armed forces chief to defence minister
in the 1988 Cabinet reshuffle, the Vietnamese Embassy in Jakarta was busy
"sounding out other embassies if Murdanťs new post will mean the erosion
of what Hanoi views as a special bilateral relationship with Indonesia".42
The Indonesian attempt to develop better relations with Vietnam can
also be seen in the visit of the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
Thach in March 1984 and the holding of the first Indonesia-Vietnam
seminar prior to Thach' s visit. The seminar was sponsored by the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) but it was clear that it
had received the green light from Soeharto and Hankam (Department of
Defence and Security). The seminar was held in Hanoi and the Indonesian
delegation included those from the CSIS and the government (also from
the military). The Vietnamese delegation included high-ranking leaders
such as Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Co Thach. However, the seminar did
not result in any concrete resolution.
The visit of Thach was particularly significant because he was received
by Soeharto. Mochtar later disclosed that Soeharto had suggested a possible
modification of the ASEAN proposals when he met Thach. According to
Mochtar, Soeharto suggested that Hanoi take part in a proposed inter-
national force that would police gradual withdrawals of Vietnamese troops.
This was aimed at allaying Vietnamese fears that the proposals, contained
in ASEAN appeals for Kampuchean independence launched in September
1983, did not take Hanoi's security interests into account.43 However, one
source also reveals that Soeharto suggested that Vietnam hold West Irian-
type elections in Kampuchea which would legitimize the Vietnamese
presence in Kampuchea. However, Thach made a blunder and rejected
the proposal out of hand.
Mochtar, who later said that it was a golden opportunity that Thach
missed, admitted that the proposal had not been endorsed by the ASEAN
states. One source argued that Soeharto would convince his ASEAN
counterparts once the Vietnamese accepted the offer.44 Perhaps Indonesia
felt that the proposal would eventually be accepted by the other ASEAN
states. However, since it was not accepted by Thach, there was no need
to discuss this among the ASEAN members. Mochtar later stated that
Indonesia was "calling off overtures on Cambodia".45
In fact, the overtures did not stop as evidenced in the second Indonesia-
Vietnam seminar and the visit of the Vietnamese Defence Minister. The
second seminar was held in February 1985 in Jakarta and it was attended
by some high level Vietnamese as well.46 The CSIS reported that there was
no new development on the discussion of the international issue, and the
stumbling block was still the question of the Khmer Rouge. Hanoi refused
to accept the Khmer Rouge as part of the government. One day after the
340 Leo Suryadinata
meeting, there was a discussion between the CSIS and the Indonesian
parliament's foreign relations committee. Jusuf Wanandi, a leader in the
CSIS, argued at the meeting that if the situation dragged on, Vietnam would
encounter major setbacks economically. He said that "it was the chal-
lenge to Indonesia to find a way out to solve the Kampuchean problem".47
Apparently, Indonesia felt that solving the Kampuchean problem was one
of its responsibilities as a regional power.
In April 1985, Vietnamese Defence Minister Van Tien Dung visited
Indonesia. Towards the end of the visit, Murdani announced that an
agreement had been reached that Hanoi would send a military attaché. A
wire report also stated that an agreement was signed between Jakarta and
Hanoi on military co-operation, which caused concern among Indonesia's
ASEAN partners.48 Mochtar who was returning from a NAM conference
in New Delhi, however, denied categorically that there had been such
an agreement. Apparently, there was a conflict between Mochtar and
Murdani over the issue. However, it appears that the military's move
towards Vietnam continued.
Mochtar, who was under pressure, had to look for another solution
for the Kampuchean issue. Towards the end of his term, he proposed a
"cocktail party", or "proximity talks", with Vietnam, which later developed
into the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) in 1988.49 Mochtar went to Hanoi
to persuade the Vietnamese to agree to a meeting, and the latter eventually
agreed to come to Jakarta mainly because of the changing international
situation. As Beijing and Moscow were attempting to improve their rela-
tions, the Vietnamese were under pressure to give some concessions.
Hence, they agreed to go to Jakarta to meet the representatives of the
coalition government. JIM I, which was held in Bogor (a Jakarta suburb),
did not produce significant results but it was a breakthrough in the sense
that all the conflicting parties were able to meet and talk for the first time.
Again, the problem of the Khmer Rouge was the stumbling block for the
solution of the Kampuchean problem. Phnom Penh and Hanoi wanted to
exclude the Khmer Rouge from future negotiations while ASEAN wanted
to involve the Khmer Rouge, at least for the time being.
The Kampuchean problem was not solved largely because of the
Khmer Rouge issue. It is believed that Jakarta wanted Beijing to put pres-
sure on the Khmer Rouge, and the announcement of the normalization
of relations between the two countries in Tokyo in February 1989 was
supposed to have been linked with the issue.50 It was thought that the
Chinese would make concessions, but Jakarta denied this.
However, JIM II, which was held a few days prior to the announce-
ment of Sino-Indonesian normalization, was unsuccessful in that no
agreement was reached among the warring factions. The Khmer Rouge
was still the issue, as the ASEAN partners insisted that any solution to
the Kampuchean problem should involve the former. Efforts to find a
solution to the Kampuchean problem thus continued. In July 1989, Indo-
nesia and France co-sponsored the Paris International Conference on
Cambodia (ICC). The warring factions again attended the meeting but
there was still no agreement. Soon after the Paris conference, Japan hosted
a meeting between Hun Sen and Sihanouk in Tokyo where the two leaders
agreed to form a new coalition government to represent Cambodia at the
United Nations, known as the Supreme National Council. The council
would consist of six members from the Hun Sen regime and six from
the CGDK (Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea). But this was
not accepted by the Khmer Rouge which intensified its military operations
against the Hun Sen regime. However, there was no clear winner in the
battle-field.
In February 1990 there was an informal meeting again in Jakarta
aimed at finding a solution to the Kampuchean problem. Prior to this,
Sihanouk and Hun Sen met in Bangkok and some agreement was reached.
However, when the informal meeting in Jakarta took place, Hun Sen,
who had met the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, changed his mind.51 Hun
Sen insisted that the solution should guarantee that there would be no
possibility for the genocidal regime, that is, the Khmer Rouge, to return
to power. The CGDK began to accuse the Vietnamese of a continuing
presence in Cambodia although the Vietnamese claimed that their troops
had been withdrawn in September 1989 as scheduled.52 The talks failed
again and Ali Alatas, the new Indonesian Foreign Minister, was extremely
disappointed.53
However, Indonesia continued to have a dual policy towards Vietnam.
On the one hand, Indonesia still honours the ASEAN stand that in any
solution to the Kampuchean problem, the Khmer Rouge should be involved;
on the other hand, Jakarta and Hanoi continue to cultivate close bilateral
relations. In June 1990, a high-level delegation of Vietnamese leaders led
by General Vo Nguyen Giap was invited by Benny Murdani. Giap was
also met by Soeharto in the presidential office at Bina Graha. Using the
opportunity, Giap conveyed his government's invitation to Soeharto to
visit Hanoi. The invitation was accepted but the date of the visit was to
be decided later.54 During the visit, Giap expressed his gratitude to the
Indonesians and stressed the friendship between the two countries.
In July 1990, Washington announced its new policy towards Vietnam
and changed its stand on the Kampuchean coalition government in the
United Nations. It stated that it no longer supported the CGDK in the
United Nations. This was a result of the growing Soviet-American accord
on regional conflicts.55 The American decision, which was taken without
342 Leo Suryadinata
prior consultations, created an uneasiness among the ASEAN member

states. When asked about the American move, Alatas was quoted as saying
that ASEAN would adjust to the developments accordingly but it would
still present a united stand.56 Soeharto in his opening speech at the ASEAN
ministerial conference in Jakarta also stated that the ASEAN states should
show their solidarity but at the same time adjust to the changing inter-
national situation.57 In other words, Indonesia would attempt to persuade
the other ASEAN states to be more flexible in solving the Kampuchean
issue. The United States and the ASEAN members eventually agreed to
have a Supreme National Council (SNC) to replace the CGDK in the United
Nations. However, the composition of the SNC at the last minute became
a problem again. The Jakarta meeting on the SNC in September 1990
ended inconclusively, causing another great disappointment in Indonesia.58
However, Indonesia did not give up. The matter was pursued again during
the Soeharto visit to Beijing and Hanoi in November 1990.
In his visit to Beijing, Soeharto and his party discussed various issues,
one of which was the Kampuchean problem. After meeting the Chinese
leader, the Indonesian delegation also talked with Sihanouk and leaders
of other warring parties in Beijing (except Hun Sen). Both Indonesia and
China wanted Sihanouk to head the SNC but Phnom Penh disagreed.
When Soeharto and his delegation went to Hanoi, the Kampuchean issue
was also on the agenda. However, no concrete agreement was reached.
Although there Was no significant result on the Kampuchean issue,
the Indonesian delegation succeeded in gaining Vietnamese support for
the other issues: Vietnam understood the Indonesian position on East
Timor and "would help Indonesia explain the position to other coun-
tries".59 Vietnam agreed to support Indonesia as the host for the coming
Non-Aligned Conference if Jakarta was nominated.60 Hanoi also agreed
that the dispute over the Natuna islands should be settled as soon as
possible in order to benefit both sides, and a special meeting on the matter
was to be scheduled in Hanoi. In return, Vietnam would gain a series of
economic assistance moves from Indonesia, as shown in several treaties
signed by the two countries.61
Conclusion
Indonesian-Vietnamese relations under Soeharto are a function of Jakarta's

policy towards both Beijing and ASEAN. They are a function of the former
because Indonesia sees Vietnam as a buffer against China. This is based
on its strategic thinking rather than their common revolutionary exper-
ience. In addition to this thinking, it appears that Indonesia after the
1982 general election had aspired to be a regional leader and was eager
to settle the Kampuchean problem under Jakarta's leadership. Common

historical experience is a factor only when it coincides with national
interests as defined by the Indonesian élite in power. Otherwise, the factor
would be conveniently overlooked.
However, Indonesia under Soeharto was frustrated because Vietnam
did not respond to its overtures, which were, in fact, quite beneficial to
the Vietnamese. There was also a desire on the part of Indonesia to settle
the boundary dispute with Vietnam through friendship and negotiations.
Again, Jakarta made slow progress on this matter. Nevertheless, the strategic
thinking appears to be in the minds of the military leaders in Indonesia.
Jakarta's policy towards Vietnam is also a function of its relations
within ASEAN. Soeharto considers ASEAN important because it serves
certain useful purposes. First, it provides Indonesia with a leadership
role, and secondly, it provides the region with political stability which is
needed for the ASEAN states to develop economically. Not surprisingly,
Jakarta went along with the other ASEAN states to have a common stand
on Kampuchea.
Nevertheless, Indonesia's dual policy towards Kampuchea will con-
tinue. Despite many failures, it seems that Soeharto is still interested in
having the Kampuchean problem solved under Jakarta's leadership. After
all, Soeharto's Indonesia perceives itself as a regional power which should
play a leading role in regional affairs.
NOTES
1. This is especially true of Indonesian leaders. In a recent editorial of an Indonesian

military newspaper, it was noted that the common struggle against the colonialists for
independence was the reason for Indonesia to maintain diplomatic ties with Vietnam
until today. "Kunjungan Presiden Soeharto Ke Vietnam" [President Soeharto's Visit to
Vietnam], Berita Yudha, 20 November 1990.
2. Although the leaders of the two countries emphasized their common experiences in
the struggle for independence, it is worth noting that in the 1980s the emphasis on
common interests shifted somewhat. Both sides, especially the Vietnamese, stressed
their convergence of interest in facing China. For instance, Cao Xuan Pho, a Vietnamese
historian, stated that Vietnam and Indonesia "have both been victims of Chinese
expansionism and hegemonism", in "Vietnam-Indonesia Concurrences: Past and
Present", Indonesian Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1985): 217. Pham Binh, former deputy Foreign
Minister of Vietnam, cited Murdani as being in agreement that "Vietnam and the rest
of Southeast Asia should forge closer ties to face the potential threat from a stronger
China in the next century", in "New Possibilities for a Peaceful Solution in Southeast
Asia", Indonesian Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1985): 205.
3. Dua Puluh Lima Tahu n Depárteme n Luar Negeri 1945-1970 [20 Years of the Department
of Foreign Affairs] (Jakarta: Deplu, 1971), p. 37.
344 Leo Suryadinata
4. See Cao Xuan Pho, "Vietnam-Indonesia Concurrences", p. 221. See also Franklin B.
Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno
to Suharto (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 131.
5. Dua Puluh Lima Tahun Depárteme n Luar Negeri, p. 40; and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 131.
6. See Soekarno's speech delivered on 17 August 1965, "Menemukan Kembali Revolusi
Kita" [Meeting our Revolution Again], cited in Dua Puluh Lima Tahun Depárteme n
Luar Negeri, p. 294. For a discussion on this axis, see Peter Christian Hauswedell,
"The Anti-Imperialist International United Front in Chinese and Indonesian Foreign
Policy 1963-1965: A Study of Anti-Status Quo Politics" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University,
1976), especially pp. 242-92.
7. A Vietnamese writer in 1985 claimed that from the beginning Vietnam did not side
with the PKI and, therefore, relations between Jakarta and Hanoi were fine. See
Cao Xuan Pho, op. cit., p. 219. This contradicted the reality. Hardi, Indonesian ambas-
sador to Hanoi in 1976, noted that when he assumed the ambassadorship, Hanoi still
supported the PKI. See Hardi, Api Nasionalisme: Cuplikan Pengalaman [The Fire of
Nationalism: Notes of My Experiences] (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 205.
8. Hardi in his memoirs stated that at one time there was a break in diplomatic relations
between Hanoi and Jakarta. The ties were only resumed in 1973. See Hardi, op. cit.,
p. 203. However, no other writers have explicitly mentioned the severance of relations.
Adam Malik, on the other hand, stated clearly in 1976 that Indonesia had always
maintained diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. See Sepuluh Tahun Politik Luar
Negeri Orde Baru [Ten Years of the New Order's Foreign Policy] (Jakarta: Yayasan
Idayu, 1976), p. 12.
9. Information provided by a researcher in the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs.
10. Dr Lie Tek Tjeng stated that it was impossible for Jakarta to have severed diplomatic
ties with Hanoi. The absence of an Indonesian ambassador does not indicate the
suspension of diplomatic relations (Discussion, 1990). Lt. General Purbo S. Suwondo
also commented that the ties were not suspended but there was a downgrading of
relations between Jakarta and socialist/communist states after the 1965 coup (Dis-
cussion, 1990).
11. Lie Tek Tjeng, "Vietnamese Nationalism: An Indonesian Perspective", National
Resilience, no. 1 (March 1982), pp. 72-75.
12. For the text of the communiqué, see Komunike Repubiik Indonesia dan Negara2
Asia-Pasifik 1962-1969 (Communiqués of the Republic of Indonesia and Asia-Pacific
Nations, 1962-1969] (Jakarta: Departemen Luar Negeri R.I., no date), pp. 99-100.
13. Suli Suleiman, Politik Luar Negeri Bebas Aktif Bepublik Indonesia [The Republic of
Indonesia's Independent and Active Foreign Policy] (Direktorate Research Departemen
Luar Negeri, Penerbitan no. 008/1973), p. 20.
14. For a fuller discussion on the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia, see Lau Teik Soon,
Indonesia and Regional Security: The Jakarta Conference on Cambodia, Occasional
Paper No. 14 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972).
15. Hardi, op. cit., pp. 205-6. It should be noted that Hardi's memoirs are informative
although they may not always be accurate on some historical facts. The section on
his service in Vietnam gives us rare insights into Indonesian relations with Vietnam
in the mid- and late 1970s which cannot be found elsewhere.
16. Ibid., p. 199.
17. Ibid., pp. 205-7.
18. Ibid., p. 207.
19. Ibid., p. 211.
20. Ibid., p. 207.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. On the Sino-Vietnamese split in 1976, see William Tbrley, "Vietnam Since Reunification",
Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Information Agency, March-April
1977), p. 38. See also William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 340. For the names of Vietnamese leaders who
were purged because of their pro-Beijing attitude, see Jaap van Ginnekan, "The Third
Indochina War: The Conflicts between China, Vietnam and Cambodia" (1983), p. 16.
24. Hardi, op. cit., p. 211.
25. Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesia in 1979", Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980), p. 135. See also Angkatan Bersenjata, 22 February 1979.
26. Angkatan Bersenjata, 22 February 1979.
27. I have formed the above conclusion after examining the two newspapers. However,
other Indonesian newspapers appear to be critical of the PRC. Merdeka, for instance,
was the strongest in its condemnation of Beijing.
28. "Editorial", Angkatan Bersenjata, 5 March 1979.
29. Angkatan Bersenjata, 8 March 1979.
30. Ibid., 9 March 1979.
31. Guy Sacerdoti, "The Troubleshooter's Thp", Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 September
1981, p. 12. It should be noted that the subsequent report in the Far Eastern Economic
Review by Susumu Awanohara only mentioned one trip by Murdani in 1981. Murdani
made another trip only in 1982.
32. Ibid., p. 13.
33. New Straits Times, 13 August 1982; and Bangkok Post, 13 August 1982.
34. New Straits Times, 26 November 1984; and Straits Times, 26 November 1984.
35. Susumu Awanohara, "A Meeting of Minds", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February
1984, p. 19.
36. Initially, Mochtar was rather critical of the establishment of the Indochinese Federation.
However, in 1984, he softened his stand. He only argued against the means used by
the Vietnamese to realize their objectives. Mochtar was asked by a Tempo reporter:
"Do you have any objections to the establishment of a kind of federation comprising
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos with Hanoi as a big brother?" Mochtar answered, "If
this is done through aggression, just like the way it is done now, of course, we have
objections. But we never protested the posting of the Vietnamese troops in Laos." See
Tempo, 24 March 1984, p. 19.
37. Discussion with an Indonesian scholar, 1985. However, Dr Lie Tek Tjeng in his article
also made this point but he was referring to Indonesian nationalists. See note 11.
38. Straits Times, 17 February 1984; and 27 February 1984.
39. Susumu Awanohara, "Murdani's Modification", Far Eastern Economic Review , 8 March
1984, p. 36.
40. Straits Times, 23 February 1984.
41. Originally published in Jakarta Post, 18-20 December 1984. Cited in Pham Binh,
"New Possibilities for a Peaceful Solution in Southeast Asia", Indonesian Quarterly
13, no. 2 (1985): 205.
42. Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 April 1988, p. 11.
43. Nation Review, 17 March 1984.
44. In Mochtar's interview with Tempo, he stated that "the offer contained risks for
Indonesia. If they were accepted by Vietnam, we would have made serious efforts to
convince our colleagues in ASEAN". Tempo, 24 March 1984, p. 19.
45. Straits Times, 22 May 1984.
346 Leo Suryadinata
46. Nawala CSIS 4, no. 5 (March 1985): 3-4.

47. Ibid., p. 4.
48. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1985, p. 17.
49. Chang Paomin, "Kampuchean Conflict: The Diplomatic Breakthrough", Pacific Review
1, no. 4 (1988): 429-37.
50. Asahi Shimbun considered the Cambodian issue as one of the major factors for normali-
zation. Cited in Tempo, 4 March 1989, p. 15.
51. "Tajuk Rencana", Kompas, 3 March 1990.
52. It is interesting to note that Nguyen Co Thach "conceded in New York when he met
Secretary Baker a few weeks ago [that) several thousand military advisors do remain
in Cambodia". See "Solomon Points to Issues Vietnam Must Deal With", Official
Text (US Embassy in Singapore), 7 December 1990.
53. Alatas was quoted as saying, "God knows how hard we have tried to pull them together
and reduce their differences. Now it is the task of the Cambodian peoples themselves
to show their eagerness and seriousness that they want to stop the killing and to end
the tragedy in their country", Kompas, 3 March 1990.
54. Kompas, 5 July 1990.
55. See the article by Steven Erlanger which was first published in New York Times, and
reprinted in Straits Times, 23 July 1990.
56. "Alatas Doubts US Move will Help to Bring Peace", Straits Times, 23 July 1990.
57. Soeharto was cited as saying that "Asean should maintain a commensurate capacity
for continuous dynamic adaptation while maintaining a unity stance and move towards
its common aims". Straits Times, 25 July 1990.
58. "Alatas Kecewa Pemimpin Kamboja Belum Menangani Isu Sabenarnya" [Alatas
Disappointed with Cambodian Leaders' Failure to Face the Real Issues], Kompas,
5 September 1990.
59. I have compared various reports published in Indonesian newspapers, and this point
was only mentioned in Kompas, 21 November 1990.
60. Kompas , 21 November 1990.
61. Indonesia would provide Vietnam with the fertilizer and oil which it badly needed.
See Kompas, 21 November 1990. Jakarta signed a series of agreements/treaties with
Hanoi "ending Vietnam's 15-year isolation in the region". Jakarta Post, 22 November
1990.
Leo Suryadinata is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science,

National University of Singapore.

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Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Soeharto

Author(s): LEO SURYADINATA

This article attempts to examine bilateral relations between Indo-

Origins of the Relations

eventually abandoned during the Soekarno period when revolutionary

It appears that after the communist coup in 1965, Indonesia attached

prior consultations, created an uneasiness among the ASEAN member

Indonesian-Vietnamese relations under Soeharto are a function of Jakarta's

to settle the Kampuchean problem under Jakarta's leadership. Common

1. This is especially true of Indonesian leaders. In a recent editorial of an Indonesian

46. Nawala CSIS 4, no. 5 (March 1985): 3-4.

Leo Suryadinata is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science,

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