Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact(<Special

Title Issue>Forests and the Sea in the Southeast Asian Maritime

World)

Author(s) Non, Domingo M.

Citation 東南アジア研究 (1993), 30(4): 401-419

Issue Date 1993-03

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56477

Right

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Textversion publisher

Kyoto University
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No.4, March 1993

Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

Domingo M. NON*

Moro piracy during the Spanish period in the Philippines caused an epoch of wholesale
misery for the inhabitants. A Spanish writer described the period as a chapter of Philip-
pine history "written in blood and tears and nourished in pain and suffering" [Fernandez
1979: 203]. Piracy also hampered the social and material growth of the country. But its
most devastating effect was the socio-psychological impact of the turmoil in shaping the
relationship of the Moro and Christianized inhabitants.
Thus, this essay will attempt to re-examine the history of Moro piracy to determine its
motives and the extent of its impact on the present society.

Geographic and Demographic Setting

The Philippines is an archipelago consisting of more than 7,000 islands and islets with a
total land area of more or less 114,830 square miles, stretching almost a thousand miles
from north to south [Agoncillo and Guerrero 1982: 1]. The country has a rugged and
irregular coastline with a total length of 10,850 statute miles, about twice as long as that of
the United States of America. Luzon is the biggest island, followed by Mindanao and
some island in the Visayas [Philippine Agricultural Staff 1975: 1].
Such irregularity results in the contours which are suitable for numerous fine harbors
and land locked straits. All big and small islands have natural harbors that can accom-
modate large ships. In stormy weather these harbors, located strategically from north to
south, provided refuge to ships [Agoncillo and Guerrero 1982: 7].
During the pre-Spanish period, native villages mainly comprised of scattered farms,
while only a few were clustered, notably in the Kingdoms of Sulayman in Manila and of
Humabon in Cebu. However, with the coming of the Spaniards, the colonial government
for administrative convenience organized a new community structure for the inhabitants.
This was supervised by the friars. In the new set-up, the scattered houses were clustered
in towns called "pueblos." At the center of every town was a church, a town plaza and
the government building called "tribunal" [Zaide 1961: 29].

* Social Science Department, College of Arts and Sciences, Mindanao State University, General Santos City
9500, Philippines (Visiting Research Scholar, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University,
from April 1992 to March 1993)

401
 The Motives of the Piratical Raids

Many writers on Moro raids or Moro piracy in the Philippines during the Spanish period
attributed the Moro incursions in the Christian communities to plainly religious motiva-
tion. This line of thinking was easily accepted because the parties involved on one side
were Muslims and on the other, Christians. However, to accept this line of reasoning is
like concluding that Abdul and Juan fought each other because the former a Muslim and
the latter a Christian, without getting into the real reason why. It is worth noting that dur-
ing the Spaniards' first fifty years in the Philippines, their relations with the Moros were
cordial [Scott 1982: 46]. What turned this cordial relationship into enmity is worth
examining to understand fully the motives of the massive piratical raids conducted by the
Moros against the Christian communities.
Meanwhile, to fully understand the change in the Moro-Spanish relations and the
motivation of the former in their intensified raids against the Christian communities in the
Visayas, Luzon and some parts of Northern Mindanao is to know the socio-political and
economic structure of the society existing at the time of the Spanish arrival in 1521. It was
noted that Islam had already acquired a firm hold among the rulers in Sulu and
Magindanao who began to wield political influence in the neighboring islands. Moreover,
with the Borneans, these rulers dominated the trade in the area. According to Scott:

Chinese goods were brought to Manila in seagoing junks and carried into the
archipelago in shallow-draft Moro outriggers and Moro outposts on the north coast
of Mindoro guaranteed this monopoly on domestic distribution. Then an east-west
trade route carried Indian wares from Portuguese Malacca along the coast of Borneo
direct to the international entreports of Butuan and Cebu, while a Moluccan branch
of the same route crossed the Sulu archipelago, passed through the Basilan Strait and
veered south of Sarangani. [ibid.: 47]

At this juncture of political and economic development in the archipelago, the

Spaniards arrived and later established permanent settlements in strategic places which
directly competed with the Moros and Borneans in the area. Hence, naturally, the latter
reacted strongly as they had been used to exerting political and economic influence on the
inhabitants. As Majul commented:

It is understandable why the people of Brunei would be unhappy about the com-
ing of the Spaniards in the Philippines. For this was not only an intrusion into their
commercial activities but a threat to their expanding political influence considering
that the royal families of Manila and Sulu were related to that of Brunei. [Majul
1978: 81]

402
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

Consequently, the Moros and Borneans conducted raids on the Spanish-held set-
tlements. However, these incursions reached a peak only in the decade of the 1750s.
Accordingly, this phenomenon was spurred by the great market demand for slave labor for
the Dutch East Indies. Sometimes the slaves were not sold for money but were exchanged
for arms and ammunition. Obviously, these raids presented a source of power. Further,
slaves had a considerable role in the socio-political and economic life of the Moros, who
used them for housework, fieldwork, and craftwork. Thus, a French writer commented
that "without slavery, the Moros cannot live for it was the base of their wealth and hap-
piness.» Moreover, their possession of slaves brought them power and influence [Loyre
1985-86: 26].
In fact, in the Tausog society, slave-holding was the primary form of investment and
slaves were used as a unit of production and medium of exchange. In 1850, the estimated
number of slaves or their descendants in Sulu constituted fifty percent of the population.
Thus, we can see clearly the extent of the role of slaves in their economic undertakings.
Further, Warren stated that "the intensity of Balinguingui raiding by 1830 was closely tied
to the Sulu economy" [Warren 1981: 181, 201] and part of their social system [Warren
1971: 41]. Obviously, the foregoing served as the unifying force for wholesale slavery.
Actually, slavery was already part of the socio-political and economic structure in the
Philippine archipelago even before the coming of the Spaniards [Zaide 1957: 41].
Moreover, these practices were considered dubious under Islamic law. However, these
were the most common activities of the Moros or Muslim Filipinos. Hence, we can safely
assume that piratical raids and slavery were merely a continuation of the pre-Spanish tradi-
tions of plundering neighboring kingdoms for economic gain and to reduce their political
threat [Loyre 1991: 66-67]. In fact, successful raiders were regarded as popular heroes
and held in high esteem. These practices though were abandoned by the Christianized
Filipinos because of their fear of the Spaniards [Scott 1991: 49-51].
Nevertheless, the scale and intensity of slave raids increased during the Spanish
period, when the rewards of the slave market became more enticing with the demand for
slaves in the Dutch East Indies. It should also be noted that the earlier scattered set-
tlements of the natives were grouped by the Spaniards into a "presidio" near the Church
for easy administration. This made the entire community an easy target for slavery by the
capturing raiders. Further, the relatively weak resistance shown by the inhabitants was
due to the Spanish policy of prohibiting them from carrying any form of arms, which they
might have used for self protection against the raiders. Actually, the prohibition was
intended to control bandits, who had become daring and destructive. This policy,
however, least affected the lawless elements, and thus the general populace was rendered
helpless before the Moro raiders [Dery undated: 9]. As such, we can safely assume that
the motives of the Moro piratical raids on the Christian communities were primarily
economic in nature as well as for the survival of their socio-political and economic struc-
ture. Moreover, piracy at that time was a world wide phenomenon.
403
 As to the religious angle claimed by most writers, that the raids were reaction to the
zealous propagation ofthe Christian faith by the missionaries, this is not very convincing.
If this had been the case, why did the Moros conduct inland raids against the tribal or non-
Christian communities in Mindanao [Loyre 1991: 18; Scott 1991: 146; Suazo 1980: 1-68;
Saleeby and Gayangos 1976: 129, 138; Espinosa 1974: 25; Schlegel 1979: 18]? The
Lanun (Iranun) and Balinguingui tribes also conducted raids among the inhabitants of
Borneo and Malaya [Warren 1981: 239], including Badjaos [Warren 1971: 49]. Because

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Map 1 Routes of the Piratical Raids

404
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

of the extent of these incursions, according to Dr. Hood Salleh of the National University
of Malaysia, the people in Borneo on the north and west coasts of Malaya used the word
"Lanun" in referring to pirates. Most of these people themselves were Muslims. Hence,
if the motive of the piratical attacks was simple vengeance against the Christian mis-
sionaries in propagating their faith among the inhabitants of the archipelago, why were
attacks on other Muslim communities, notably the Badjaos (one of the 13 ethno-linguistic
groups belonging to the Moros), and the captured people brought to slavery? Even after
the Spanish rule, the Tausugs continued to practice piracy, but by that time it was commit-
ted against the Badjaos, Yakans and fellow Tausogs [Kiefer 1969: 180].

The Patterns of Piratical Raids and Their Social and Economic Costs

The Moro piratical raids against the Christian settlements started in June 1578 [Reed
1967: 94]. These spread all over the archipelago and were conducted with impunity by
organized fleets carrying weapons of destruction almost equal to those of the Spaniards
[Foreman 1980: 132]. For over two and half centuries the pirates spared not one
inhabited island in the archipelago of nightmare. Piratical expeditions were conducted by
various Moro groups, namely: Magindanao, Malanao (Maranao), Lanun (Iranun),
Sangil (Mindanao Island group), Tausog, Samal, Badjao and Balinguingui (Sulu
archipelago group). There were also foreign participants in this enterprise. They were
the Ternateans, Borneans and Camacones. The Christians captured in ealier raids were

Fig. 1 Mora Pirates' Ship

Source: Adapted from Warren [1981].

405
made slaves and used extensively in the incursions as oarsmen of the pirates' vessels, free-
ing the pirates' hands from odd jobs especially during naval encounters [MajuI1978: 122].
The term "Moros" is a Spanish word derived from the Latin " Mauros , " the name
given to inhabitants of the ancient Roman province of Mauritania in the northwest Africa,
who were Muslims. Thus, "Moro" was used by the Spaniards for anyone who was
Muslim [RasuI1970: 3]. Because of the piratical raids of the Moros in the Christian com-
munities, the word "Moros" became synonymous with pirates and raiders.
In conducting their raids, the pirates adopted several methods of attack as dictated by
circumstances. The earlier method was the surprise attack in force. The townspeople
would be caught unaware and hence be unable to mount or organize resistance. Later, as
the townspeople constructed fortresses and stone churches in which to take refuge during
the attacks, the pirates laid a siege to their defences. Finally, when the defenders were
weakened by hunger and fatigue, the pirates would storm them. Later, however, as fron-
tal attacks became less effective, the pattern of Moro incursions changed from large-scale
frontal attack to smaller, scattered raids against fishermen, traders and smaller settlements
[Cruikshank 1985: 90] and the pirates, especially in small groups, resorted to sneak attacks
on unsuspecting victims. With this method, the pirates usually hid in mangroves and
coves and posed as fishermen. Each group was composed of from two to six outrigger
Moro boats, while a bigger ship lay in hiding or was anchored in the pirates' base, which
was usually located at the backdoor of a Christian town and serve as a rendezvous point for
them in attacking nearby inlands or coastal towns. Among the islands used by pirates as
bases were Mindoro, Burias, Samar, Leyte, Biliran, Masbate, Polilio and Paragua.
The following were some of the more devastating incursions and the responses to
them of the colonial government and inhabitants, which imposed great social and
economic costs on the community in general.
In the Visayan region, sometime in 1589, pirates raided Antique and captured many
of the inhabitants for slavery. The raid was repeated the following year and the
inhabitants suffered the same fate. For fear of further attack, the townspeople abandoned
the town and fled to the mountains [Zuniga 1973: 460].
In 1599, Moro pirates from the Magindanao group, numbering 3,000 men in 50
boats, plundered with impunity the coastal towns of Panay and other Visayan islands like
Negros and Cebu [Zaide 1957: 309]. Between 1750 and 1757, the number of persons pay-
ing tribute to the Spaniards in the town of Kalibo on the island of Panay decreased from
1,174 to 549.
The island of Leyte was subjected to several incursions in 1754 especially during the
months of March, June and July. Its two largest towns of Sogod and Maasim were totally
burned to the ground. The smaller villages of Hinundayan, Cabalcan and Liloan were
likewise reduced to ashes. In Palompon though the inhabitants sought refuge in the stone
church during the attack, they were left destitute afterwards. Their houses were looted
and burned and their fishing boats and farm implements were lost. Hence, they could
406
 D. M. NON: Mora Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

neither farm nor fish.

In one of the raids in Romblon, 101 of the inhabitants of Odiongan were captured.
After the raid, the population dropped from 230 to 70. In Bantan, 67 inhabitants were
also taken in slavery. In July 1754, Dumaguete and Siquijor were attacked. The
districts of Balamban and Batayan were raided and many of the inhabitants were taken
captives for slavery. The Calamianes group of islands was also not spared. Between
June and August 1754, Linapacan and Basuanga were reportedly attacked repeatedly. In
these incursions, many of the inhabitants were also taken into slavery. However, the
most unfortunate island was Biliran, where the entire populace was taken into slavery.
In Mindoro, the population was also greatly reduced. In 1735, the island had only a
population of 2,634 heads of families down from 3,169 a year earlier. At Dumali, the
eastern point of Mindoro, the entire coast was totally depopulated including the coves of
Pinamalayan and nearby places. The Calavite point in the town of Bilim was also
deserted. These places were used by the pirates as hide-outs [Zuniga 1973: 108-110].
Sometime in 1750s, the pirates also anchored in the Piloto river near Bongabon and cap-
tured 150 townspeople. Of these captives, 50 were from Bulalacao and Manaol [Bernad
1968: 127-129]. As such, the inhabitants of nearby towns shied away from these places
for fear of being captured.
In view of the grave depopulation in this island, D. Rafael Maria de Aguilar, the
Governor-General of the Philippines (1793-1806), encouraged the establishment of set-
tlements in Mindoro by exempting the settlers from paying the required tribute for several
years until such time when the regular towns were established. A magistrate was sent to
Calapan, a relatively safe place in Mindoro, to promote the program.
In Luzon, Bataan also suffered depopulation due to piratical incursions, especially in
the towns of Bagac, Cabcaben and Morong [Zuniga 1973: 119, 357]. Bicol region was
also heavily attacked by pirates. In 1636, the town of Iguey in Sorsogon was raided and
totally burned. Its residents were either killed or taken captive for slavery. Consequently,
the town ceased to exist. In June of the same year, while most of the citizens were out in
the fields, the pirates entered the town of Baco [Gerona 1982: 106]. Caught off guard by
the raid, 200 of the townspeople were apprehended [Bernad 1968: 55]. The rest of them
were either killed or escaped to the forests. A village in Balusan was attacked five times in
1746. The town and the church were burned and the villagers were carried away to
slavery. In July 1754, while the townspeople of Matnog were tending their fields, the
pirates raided and burned their houses. Many of the citizens were left dead by the
wayside. In the years 1737,1740,1749 and 1781 many of piratical attacks were recorded
in the coastal towns of Sorsogon which resulted in the burning of several towns, massacres,
and the capture of many for slavery [Realubit 1983: 21].
In Albay, the port of Pantao, an important shipyard in Bicol was attacked on 18
October 1616 [Gerona 1982: 105]. In 1754, more towns were despoiled by the pirates.
In these pillages, 38 were captured from Bao, 12 from the town of Albay and 67 from other
407
towns [Bernad 1968: 132]. In 1628 another shipyard In Camarines, Bicol was also
destroyed by the marauders [Gerona 1982: 106]. In 1758, the Bishop Manuel Matos
wrote to the King of Spain that 12 towns in Camarines had been invaded and about 8,000
inhabitants killed [Realubit 1983]. The report of the Father Provincial of the Franciscans
in 1770 indicated that Bicol towns were very poor because the inhabitants could not trade
externally due to Moro dominance in the seas. As oflate 1826, the entire western coast of
the region of Bicol was deserted [Dery undated: 10].
In June 1754, Balayan and Batangas towns were assaulted. In both cases, the
townspeople fled to the forests for safety while their homes were reduced to ashes. In the
same year, the town of Catanawan in Tayabas province was also razed to the ground
[Bernad 1968]. Meanwhile, various reports from 1818 to 1860 indicated that the last
heavy Moro raids occurred and reached as far as the Ilocos region [Dery undated: 8].
In Mindanao, from 1750 to 1757, almost all the towns in the districts of Butuan and
Caraga and the islands of Siargao were marauded and burned down, making the entire
area seem like a desert. Only the little military outpost of Linao was left unmolested, pro-
bably because it was too far inland and appeared unprofitable for a piratical raid. The
raiders netted 300 captives from Butuan, 2,000 from Caraga, and 1,600 from Siargao,
who were later either slain or sold as slaves. Only a few were able to flee to the forests to
escape from the disaster [Bernad 1968: 127-128].
Another catastrophe was the invasion of Tandag in 1754. During the foray, the peo-
ple sought refuge in the fort. However it was blockaded by the pirates. After four and a
half months of siege, the defenders were weakened by starvation and fatigue and their
resistance collapsed. The entire garrison was taken over by pirates and many civilians
perished. The survivors suffered the same fate as those captured before them. A
Recollect missionary tried to escape by hurling himself from a parapet to the shore below.
All the town's valuables including the cannons were carted away by the raiders.
In 1750, the coastal villages of Layuan, Langaran and Palilan in the province of
Misamis, located near the mouth of a river, suffered terribly at the hands of the
marauders. In Langaran, 80 citizens were captured while Palilan and Layuan, the village
chieftain and Gobernadorcillo, respectively, were killed.
On 9 July 1754, a well-organized raid was conducted by the pirates in Lubungan.
They traveled by sea in 36 large boats and many smaller crafts. They were about 2,000
men composed of Moros from various tribes, namely, Malanaos, Magindanaos, Lutaos
and Tausogs. There were also few renegade Christian and Chinese engineers who helped
them execute a more efficient manuever. The town was burned through the night and all
the next day. In an effort to blockade the town, they laid siege to the defenders'
stockade. They also constructed breastworks and dug up trenches to seal off the town.
Twenty-eight moving towers with wooden wheels were made and ladders were prepared
for the final assault. However, a pirate sentinel saw a reinforcement party on its way from
Dapitan. Fearing a confrontation with a big contingent, the marauders abandoned their
408
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

siege and sailed away [ibid.: 134-139].

Simultaneosly with the attack in Lubungan, another flotilla of pirates composed of 25
boats with 1,000 men landed in Palompon. Upon seeing their arrival, the townspeople
panicked but managed to seek refuge in the church. In the confusion, the pirates set fire
to the rectory and sacristy and ringed the church with trenches and breastworks. The
church was subjected to heavy cannon fire and flaming darts. On the third day, the
pirates stormed the church by using moving towers which were erected like Roman tor-
toises with guns mounted to shoot directly into the interior and create confusion among the
people inside. Ladders were brought to the church windows so the pirates could forcibly
enter, but the effort failed. On the fifth day, after several failures in wearing and tearing
down defenses of the church, the pirates decided to give up the siege and sailed away.
Iligan was also raided by the Malanaos in the same year. The fort where the
populace sought sanctuary was surrounded by the marauders, and intense fire was
exchanged. However, after two months of hopeless siege, the pirates finally gave up.
Initao, another small town between Iligan and Cagayan de oro, was also attacked. Since
they lacked a stone fort, the townspeople defended themselves with a stockade. With the
arrival of a relief party to the town's rescue, the pirates sailed away [ibid.: 128, 143].
During the Moro raids, the marauder harvested the crops abandoned by the
inhabitants hiding inside their refuge. The latter suffered epidemics due to lack of food,
water and proper sanitation within the sanctuary [Cruikshank 1985: 89].
Aside from the above pattern of raids, another pattern of incursion was adopted by
the pirates. Loyre noted that the Malanaos conducted inland raids among their neighbor-
ing tribal communities [Loyre 1985-86: 18]. Moreover, the Magindanao also raided
their tribal neighbors and pushed them farther into the interior. The victims were
Tirurays [Schlegel 1979: 25] and B'laans [Espinosa 1974: 21]. Loyre commented that this
kind of plunder was usually practised by the poorest datus, who organized piratical raids to
accumulate wealth and establish power. These raids were conducted by only a few men,
rather than the larger numbers of people and ships deployed in attacking coastal villages.
The Malanaos generally conducted raids to the east of the Lake region in Sebugan [Loyre
1985-86: 20-21]. Their prey were probably the Manubos, Bagobos and Bukidnons.
During the period of piracy, staying in the coastal towns and villages entailed the
great risk of being captured for slavery. Moreover, crossing the sea was equally
dangerous since it was infested with pirates. Take the case of two Jesuit priests who were
aboard a "caracoa" enroute to Mindoro. While not very far from the shore, they were
attacked by the three "joangas" carrying Bornean and Camacone pirates. To escape, the
"caracoa" sailed ashore and the priests escaped to the forest leaving everything behind.
Hungry, fatigued and their feet covered with wounds they finally arrived Naujan after 20
days of wandering in the forest.
A worse experience was the one that befell the Archbishop of Manila, Hernando
Guerrero, and his party. On their way to a pastoral visit in Mindoro, they were attacked
409
at sea by pirates in six galliots. Had their boat not been staunch and swift, they would
have been captured or killed on the high seas. However, the pirates followed them
ashore. Although the archbishop eluded captivity, most of his party did not. Only a few
were captured for ransom while the rest were murdered [Bernad 1968: 54].
Sometime in 1859, a certain Maria Biermosa of Sebuyan, Capiz and three others,
while on their way to the former's farm in Baybay, Leyte were captured at sea by pirates
[De la Costa 1965: 204]. Even to go fishing in big rivers was dangerous, as pirates' boats
frequently visited these places. Zuniga once witnessed from the mountain top several
fishermen who were taken into captivity. These were the times when it was not safe to go
to coast, since the Visayan seas were crawling with little fleets of Moro pirates. Thus
desolation was everywhere as the plunder and burning of towns, seizing of vessels, capture
of citizens and other atrocities by the pirates continued [Zuniga 1973: 107, 111]. From
1599 to 1604, the Moro pirates netted an average of 800 captives a year [Majul 1978:
213] . This period was not yet the peak of the piratical incursions. One can imagine the
nightmare of the towns and villages that were being depopulated at the peak of the pirates'
raids, and the traumatic impact on families whose members were captured by the pirates
for slavery.
With these depredations, the Spanish civil, military and ecclesiastical authorities
adopted measures to bring the piratical incursions in check and minimize the havoc
wrought among the populace. Among the measures taken were the construction of for-
tresses and stone churches to serve as sanctuaries for the people from the pirates' assaults.
Stockades were also erected to strengthen the defenses of towns. Watchtowers were built
in strategic places to look out for pirates' ships and to forewarn townspeople, giving them
ample time to organize an orderly defense of their community. Among the fortresses, the
one in Zamboanga served as the headquarters and chief naval station of the Spaniards in
the south. However, its maintenace was a great burden on the treasury. In 1738, the
fixed annual expenses of the Zamboanga fort and its equipment were 17,500 pesos, while
the incidental disbursements were estimated at 7,500 pesos. This sum did not include the
cost of the armed fleet stationed at the fort, which also entailed enormous expenses.
Moreover, the fort was described as a "sepulchre for the Spaniards" [Foreman 1980:
133]. Including other forts in various parts of the archipelago which Spain maintained to
check piracy, the colonial government spent 50,000 pesos a year and about the same
amount was appropriated for the construction of boats and expenses for expeditions.
These expenses imposed a great economic burden on the colonial government [Zuniga
1973: 448-451].
On the other hand, the construction of forts, watchtowers and other structures for
defense in various towns, in most cases, was left in the hands of the inhabitants alone
through the leadership of their parish priests. Thus, the parish priests employed many
means to erecting these structures. At times, the priest pleaded with the natives to donate
lime and stone and supervised the building to completion. The problems in pushing the
410
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

projects through were innumerable. The priests had to use a combination of threat, gen-
tle persuasion, punishment and many other tricks to motivate the natives to work without
exasperating them [ibid.: 104-105].
Simultaneous with the massive erection of these structures in various towns all over
the archipelago was the construction of ships for use against the Moro pirates. Moreover,
ships were necessary and paramount to the colonial economy of the archipelago, notably
the galleon trade. The ships were built in areas where both timber and workers were
available in abundance. The most prominent shipyard at that time was in Cavite. There
were also shipyards in Arevalo (Panay), Bagatao (Albay), Marinduque, and Masbate. In
connection with this, civilians were obliged to render work through the "polo system."
They were organized into work gangs and drafted to work in the shipyards and cut wood
from the forests. The cutting of timber in the forests involved six to eight thousand men
staying for three months in the mountains. This meant they had to leave their homes and
farms for long periods of time [Schumacher 1979: 79]. In 1619, the Governor-General
Alonzo Fajardo de Tenza reported that the native population was being reduced because
of deaths suffered in gatherings logs for the shipyards. Consequently, because of the polo
system in the shipyard and in the cutting of logs from the forests for shipbuilding, the
earlier prosperity enjoyed by the native populace ended [Cushner 1971: 117-119]. This
was further compounded by the services the natives had to render in constructing defense
structures for their towns.
In over two and a half centuries of Moro piracy, thousands of inhabitants were
murdered while more were taken as captives for slavery. Villages and towns were burned
and churches were looted of their ornaments and jewels. Local trade was greatly inter-
rupted. Many of the inhabitants along the coast did not wish to risk their lives and
escaped captivity by fleeing to the highlands. This utmost desolation and havoc were
perpetuated and mitigated against the welfare and development of the citizens in the col-
ony . As such, the period of piracy was an epoch of misery, bloodshed and material loss.

Measures to Check the Piratical Raids

To neutralize the piratical incursions in the archipelago, the Spanish authorities initiated
several measures to counter the depradations. Of the defense measures, one was the con-
struction of fortresses in various towns, which were augmented by a network of watch-
towers in strategic places along the coasts. Thus, the townspeople could be given warning
of any approaching piratical raid. Moreover, the forts were supplemented by small fleets
of armed galleys and frigates that patrolled the Visayan coasts. The major command
posts were located in Manila, Cavite, Cebu, Iloilo [Reed 1967: 95], Zamboanga and 11-
igan [Bernad 1968: 43].
In the late sixteenth century, the Spanish colonial officials commenced the construc-
tion of coastal "presidios" in the Visayas [Reed 1967]. Meanwhile, other coastal towns
411
 Fig. 2 Spanish Fort of Iligan
Source: Adapted from Saber [1980].

Fig. 3 The Spanish Fort at Zamboanga

Source: Adapted from Foreman [1980].

Fig. 4 The Moro Watchtower, Church and Convent at Dumaguete, Negros

Source: Adapted from Reed [1967].

412
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

and villages built forts for their own defenses after the Governor-General had given
approval to the parish priests to build fortresses in their own towns by employing the
native inhabitants at no expense to the colonial government. As the Spanish authorities
in 1799 passed on to the native population the burden of conducting the wars against the
Moro raiders, the earlier prohibition banning the natives from carrying arms was eased
[Dery undated: 9]. Thus, the defenses were handled by the citizens through the supervi-
sion of the priests.
To intercept the piratical expeditions in the Visayan region, acting Governor-General
D. ] uan Cerezo was persuaded by the]esuits to build the garrison fortress of Zamboanga
in 1634. The fort plan was even prepared by a]esuit priest, Father Vera. However, with
the threat posed by the Chinese corsair Cogsen to Manila in 1662, Zamboanga was aban-
doned to allow its forces to strengthen the defense of Manila. Half a century later,
recognizing the importance of the Zamboanga fort to check the piratical attacks in other
islands, the King of Spain ordered its reconstruction, which was completed only in 1718
during the incumbency of Governor-General Fernando Bustamante [Zuniga 1973:
446-447]. During the protracted struggle with the Moro pirates, Zamboanga was further
fortified and became the headquarters of the Spaniards in the south [Foreman 1980: 133].
Between the islands of Paragua and Panay, in the island of Cuyo, the natives con-
structed a stone fort complete with bulwarks and ammunition at no expense to the govern-
ment. To the north of Paragua, a garrison was stationed in the town of Culion and a fort
was constructed in Inapacan by the inhabitants under the guidance of the priest. On the
other hand, the citizens of the island of Lutaya and smaller adjacent islands formed a town
with the capital in Lutaya. In the construction of their fort they were provided with funds
by General Rojas and arms and ammunition by the government, while the natives han-
dled the defense without any compensation [Zuniga 1973: 461].
In Balayan, the townspeople constructed a fort with the church and convent inside
and at the other end of the town a small castle on top of a small hill. It was used as a watch-
tower to monitor and give warning of the approach of pirates. This castle was provided
with cannons. Batangas and Bauang also constructed their own forts to protect
themselves from incursions. The Batangas fort was made of stone while that of Bauang
was made of wood. Moreover, the churches of the towns were very close to the forts with
its ramparts at all corners serving as defenses. Taal also constructed a fort. Later,
C alapan and Sabang of Mindoro had fortresses too [ibid.: 102-103, 113].
In Samar, each town r"aised earthworks around its church and the residence of the
parish priest where a few pieces of artillery were mounted. It was here where the citizens
took refuge at times of attack and defended themselves with a few pieces of artillery,
muskets and poisoned arrows [De la Costa 1965: 205]. In San Ignacio Strait, which
almost merged Samar and Leyte, an Augustinian priest, Father Callazo erected a small
fort in each of the five islets and provided them with artillery. Thus the pirates were
prevented from passing through the strait to the eastern side of Samar and Leyte. This
413
left them no recourse but to take to the open sea at the southeast of Leyte and Mindanao,
where they had not normally ventured before [Zuniga 1973: 435]. Aside from the above
defense structures, the parish priests of several towns in Cebu continued to organize other
systems of defense which were found to be effective not only to protect themselves but also
their croplands, houses and other implements necessary for their economic undertakings.
One method involved the construction of ships known as "barangayanes, " which
were especially designed to give chase to the Moro "pancaos." These crafts proved faster
than the pirates' ships. Thus, the moment the Moro pirates were sighted by the guards in
the watchtowers, the Christian towns were given the alarm. Immediately, the natives on
duty in several towns would launch their "barangayanes" and assemble at a pre-
determined spot at sea to confront the marauders. Having better vessels, they were able
to ward off the attacks and prevent the marauders from landing their shores. Under the
direction of their respective parish priests, the towns assisted each other and worked
together in mutual defense. Because of this, Moro pirates did not dare to show
themselves, especially near the island of Cebu [De la Costa 1965].
In Mindanao, aside from Zamboanga, through the leadership of a Jesuit priest,
FatherJose Ducos, a stone fort was constructed in Misamis to guard the entrance in Pangil
Bay where the pirates used to pass in attacking the border towns and in marching inland.
In the districts of Caraga, there were three fortresses manned and maintained by the
colonial government. These were in Tandag, Catel and Linao. Other towns of the
districts also had their own forts, but these were manned and defended by the natives
[Zuniga 1973: 441-443].
Aside from the various defense measures adopted in checking the piratical incursions,
the Spaniards dispatched several retaliatory expeditions against the pirates' strongholds to
weaken their capability to launch raids.
In 1754, Governor Arandia Obando sent two fleets to Mindanao to try to stem the
tide of Moro piracy. One fleet was sent to Zamboanga to deal with the pirates of the
south. The other fleet was sent to Iligan to confront the pirates of northern Mindanao.
This northern fleet left Manila in January, but was refitted and reinforced in Cebu. It
arrived at Iligan in April and got into action only in June when its commander arrived.
The commander's late arrival cost him his position, which was given instead to the Jesuit
missionary Father Ducos. Governor Obando's successor had even conferred upon the
priest the title of Capitan General of the Armada of Iligan.
The armada of Father Ducos had a complement of some 700 men, of whom 200 were
Spaniards while the majority were natives, particularly Boholanons. There were also
several boats manned by residents of Iligan and Initao. This naval squadron had the sup-
port of land forces which included several Bukidnon warriors under their respective chief-
tains.
In an effort to seal off the usual exits of the Moro pirates during their attacks, the fleet
deployed in three places. Four Boholano boats were assigned to guard the mouth of
414
 D. M. NON: Mora Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

Liangan River, while the Galera San Philippe with smaller boats from Iligan patrolled the
mouth of Linamon River near Iligan. The Galera Triunfo together with a few smaller
vessels were stationed at Misamis to patrol Pangil Bay and were engaged in the greatest
number of combats with the pirates. The report of their successful engagements reached
Manila on 27 January 1755. After his success, Father Ducos found little difficulty in get-
ting the civil and military authorities to listen to his suggestions for the defense of
Mindanao [Bernad 1968: 43-44].
In 1722, Governor-General Anda decided to destroy the hide-outs of the pirates in
Mindoro by sending four companies of Spanish troops and native soldiers to Mamburao.
The pirates were encamped in a "cota" made of palisades mounted with cannon and stones
lingers. Since the Spaniards were worn out upon arrival, they deferred their attack.
Thus, under the cover of darkness the pirates had the opportunity to slip out of their
"cota" and disperse in the forest where the soldiers could not flush them out. However,
the Spaniards burned their lair including the houses and boats. After Mamburao, other
places in Mindoro like Balite and other known hiding places of the pirates were also raided
but always the pirates were able to escape into the forests. However, they no longer
enjoyed the security they once felt in Mindoro [Zuniga 1973: 111-112].
The Spaniards were convinced that only by actual conquest of the Sulu archipelago
and effective occupation of it could they effectively cortrol piracy [De la Costa 1965: 212].
So in 1848, Governor Urbiztondo personally led an expedition to root out the Balingu-
ingui pirates from their principal base. The fort of Sepac was taken by the soldiers after
fierce resistance from the defenders. The assault was a scene of horror, with piles of
corpses and dark flames devouring the houses of the Balinguingui. Many of them killed
their own wives and daughters to save them from falling into the enemies' hands. Their
losses were heavy. To prevent an epidemic, 340 bodies were burned [ibid.: 207-208].
Jolo was also massively attacked on 11 February 1851 which resulted in the capture of
the town. The reigning Sultan Mohammed Pulalon fled to the interior with his principal
datus.
At the close of the expedition, a treaty was signed between the Spaniards and the
Sultan of Sulu which provided for annual payment of 1,500 pesos to the Sultan and 600
pesos each to three datus on condition that they would suppress piracy and promote
mutual trade.
However, in 1876, since the incursions of pirates and the temerity of their chiefs had
again attained large proportions, an expedition headed by Vice Admiral Malcampo was
mounted with the objective of enforcing submission of the Sulu sultanate. Although the
Sulu expedition was not a complete success, Spanish flags were hoisted in several places
including Jolo until the end of the Spanish rule in 1898 [Foreman 1980: 140].
On 15 April 1887, Colonel Juan Ariola, the Spanish Governor of Sulu, acting on his
own responsibility, ordered a steam gunboat to Maybun, the Sultan's capital, with orders
to open fire at daybreak. That same night, Colonel Ariola together with his troops
415
marched across the country towards Maybun. The next morning, while the Moros and
the gunboats were exchanging fire, Colonel Ariola attacked on the land side. The Moros,
though surprised, fought like lions but were completely routed. The seat of the sultanate
was totally razed to the ground. It was the most crushing defeat ever inflicted on Sulu, the
center of piracy [ibid.: 144]. The Spaniards sent expeditions to Lake Lanao region as
early as 1640. Bermudez de Castro with 500 Boholanos was sent by Governor-General
Corcuera to subdue the Maranaos. Lacking logistical support, the troops were
withdrawn and sent to Iligan.
The operation against the Lake Lanao inhabitants was only resumed in 1891 under
the command of Governor-General Valeriano W eyler, who built a chain of fortifications
from Iligan to the lake. The campaign against Marawi was not a total success. Thus in
1894 Governor-General Blanco concluded that effective control of the Lake Lanao region
could only be secured with a fleet oflight armed steamships. On 10 March 1895, with the
steam gunboats, Governor-General Blanco's expedition succeeded in planting the Spanish
flag upon the fort of Marawi. On 16 October 1895, the combined land and water forces
under the command of Governor-General Blanco wrought havoc upon the Maranaos.
Their "cotas" were destroyed while the movements of their boats were monitored. Thus,
the Maranaos retreated to the hills [Saber 1980: 28-31]. However, the victory of the
Americans over the Spaniards in 1898 caused the latter to abandon the region.
Despite the earlier defense measures, the Moro pirates continued to plague the Chris-
tian inhabitants with their hit-and-run raids. To check this depradation, a few enterpris-
ing and wealthy Spaniards and foreign merchants secured steamboats armed for defense to
navigate the waters of the archipelago [Foreman 1980: 132]. Moreover, the colonial
government purchased four steam-powered gunboats for use against the Moro pirates [De
la Costa 1965: 200].
This kind of naval strength increased during the incumbency of Governor-General
Norzagaray (1857-1860), who added 18 steam gunboats to the fleet. According to Dr.
Tan, the introduction of the steam gunboats put an end to the earlier naval superiority of
the pirates. Thus, with the naval superiority of the colonial government, the swift boats of
the pirates which earlier dominated the seas in the archipelago were easily overtaken and
warded off. Moreover, the pirates' villages became vulnerable to naval bombardment
[Tan 1977: 11-12]. The diplomatic success of Spain in Europe also prevented the Sultan
of Sulu from securing material assistance including arms from European countries like
England to fight against the colonial government [De la Costa 1965: 211].

The Impact of Piracy

Today, the ruins of watchtowers in strategic places, scattered along the coasts of Luzon,
Visayas, and northern Mindanao, stand as silent reminders of the dreaded Moro piratical
attacks made almost every year in the Christian communities for two and a half centuries.
416
 D. M. NON: Moro Piracy during the Spanish Period and Its Impact

Some of these ruins were the watchtowers in Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Cebu, Dumaguete and
Siquijor [Reed 1967: 90-11 0], the Bicol region [Realubit 1983: 21], the Iloilo
coastline and bell tower in the same city [Fontecha 1989-90: 33-34], and in Mindanao.
Aside from these watchtowers are the remnants of stone forts in various parts of the
archipelago [Picornell 1977: 110-126] and of massive stone churches. A Jesuit writer
pointed out that this kind of church was built to provide refuge for the native inhabitants
during the piratical raids, and were strong enough to withstand battering and can-
nonading [Bernad 1968: 128].
As consequence of the devastating piratical raids, many of the coastal inhabitants who
could not bear further incursions moved inland for safety. In the Province of Tayabas, its
old capital was transferred inland as a precaution against another attack. And for the
same reason, the towns Sariaya, Cavinte and Tiaong were also relocated inland [Zuniga
1973: 419]. Other inland settlements were also founded, and this paved the way for the
development of the interior, which was once inhabited only by the Negritos and
Remontados or Cimarones.
This also led to the establishment of Christian settlements in Mindanao, as the
Boholanon troops used in the campaign against the northern Mindanao pirates were
encouraged to settle near the Maranao pirates' lairs and check their piratical activities
[Bernad 1968: 158].
This colonization program to establish Christian communities in Moroland was con-
ceived by Governor-General Blanco to check piracy at the least expense to the government
[Saleeby and Gayangos 1976: 164-165]. This program was also adopted by the suc-
ceeding colonial government as a measure to check the "Moro Problem" [Tan 1977: 27].
Meanwhile, the Commonwealth government, then the National government, made use of
the resettlement program in Mindano not only as a solution to the Mindanao problem but
also as a safety valve for the brewing social volcano in Luzon and Visayas brought on by
the agrarian disputes. The solution proved effective, but became palliative and created a
volatile atmosphere in Mindanao, as it heightened the mutual distrust between the Chris-
tian Filipinos and the Moros, which culminated in the so called "Muslim-Christian Con-
flict" in the 1970s.
At present, though the conflict has subsided, the mutual distrust between the groups
still exists. The spate of reported bombing incidents in Zamboanga City, where grenades
were thrown allegedly by Christians at Muslim gatherings and vice versa, seem to bear
this out. These incidents are but the legacy of the piratical raids that continue to haunt
both the Christian Filipinos and the Moros.

Conclusion

Moro piracy during the Spanish period was a Moro reaction against the Spaniards, who
had displaced them from the political and economic dominance they once enjoyed in the
417
region.
Furthermore, slavery was not the consequence of piratical raids. As noted, it was
part of pre-Hispanic activities in the region. However, its immense proportion during the
piratical attacks could be attributed to the lucrative demand for slave labor in the Dutch
East Indies. Thus, it became the source of excessive wealth for the slave-traders. Also
during this period, the Christianized Filipinos were vulnerable to the raiders since they
had been disarmed by the Spaniards and hence could not ably defend themselves against
the incursions. Thus, many were taken into slavery.
Since most of the marauders were Muslims and most of the victims were Christians,
the unfortunate historical incidents only heightened the mutual distrust between the Chris-
tian and Muslim Filipinos' - a relationship that continues to hound them to the present
day. Thus, piracy during the Spanish period shaped Muslim-Christian relations. As
such, the war in Mindanao in the 1970s, which was dubbed as the "Muslim-Christian Con-
flict," was but the continuance of hostile relations between these groups.

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Dery, Luis C. undated. Mora Raids in Luzon and the Visayas, 1571-1896. Unpublished Mimeograped
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Period: Focus on Iloilo. The Journal oj History (Philippine Historical Society) 34--35: 29-37.
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Journal oj History (Philippine Historical Society) 30-31: 17-26.
Reed, Robert Ronald. 1967. Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and
State. Journal of East Asiatic Studies (University of Manila) 2 (March): 1-167.

419