Republic of the Philippines to execute the said decision. 9.

to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the
SUPREME COURT corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On
Manila the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969,
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment
SECOND DIVISION dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973 mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
vs. Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay
Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July
CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..."2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such
LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor,
CORPORATION, respondents. acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the
FERNANDO, J.: properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of
Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void."3 In
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo
challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the
then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I,1 declaring a decision final and total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.4
executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is
thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of
the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
nullified. gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino depends."5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of of the Philippines,6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine
Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of
at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
obstacle, could very well be imagined."7

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit
in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued
without its consent."8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego,9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an
employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that
effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which
has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by
the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be
garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of
the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12

In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the
Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.