Angeles V.gaite

ANGELES VS.
GAITE
646 SCRA 309 (2011)
G.R. No. 176596
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint
was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent Velasco then filed a case against petitioner
for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 but the same was
ordered to be withdrawn by the DOJ Secretary upon the filing of a petition for
review by petitioner.
Petitioner then filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against
respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed. Petitioner then filed a
Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing the DOJs
Resolutions dismissing the administrative complaint she filed against respondent
Velasco. The OP asked respondent Velasco to file his comment thereto.
In his comment, respondent Velasco stated matters and information provided by

unimpeachable sources from the judiciary, schoolmates and close friends of Judge
ANGELES, which according to the latter is a direct attack on her character and
reputation as a public servant.
On the basis of such statements, petitioner filed a Complaint for four counts of libel
against respondent Velasco. However, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Adeliza
Magno-Gingoyon recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint for Libel due
to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with
the DOJ Secretary a Petition for Review assailing the dismissal of her complaint for
Libel as well as her motion for reconsideration. The Petition for Review was
dismissed by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zu (CSP Zu)
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions
dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the petition, citing MC No. 58, stating that
no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary
of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the
Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. An appeal or petition not clearly falling within the jurisdiction of
the Office of the President, as set forth above, shall be dismissed outright.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43assailing the OP
orders. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v.
Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all
executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified
political agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed
petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or
overturn the DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the
DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this present petition.
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t

diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
ISSUE:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power

of the President?
RULING:
NO, it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of

said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified
political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it
merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June
30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in

Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of
the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice
concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding
paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his
power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to
expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum
Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the
former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the
least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's
own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that
“There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of
the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim
martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).”
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental
law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary
of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered
as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the
President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No.
58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of
reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so
will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to
scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latter’s expertise in said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence
of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the
government.

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ANGELES VS.

In his comment, respondent Velasco stated matters and information provided by

Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t

W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power

NO, it does not diminish the power of the President

The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in

BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:

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