https://jakebrysondancel.blogspot.com/2016/07/case-digest-caltex-v-palomar.

html

Caltex vs Palomar
G.R. No. L-19650, 29 September 1966 (18 SCRA 247)
En Banc, Castro (p): 9 concurring

Facts:
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
Station will dispense during a specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration,
nor purchase of Caltex products were required.

Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Issues:
W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of the
Postal Law

Held:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case
is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question
of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to
prevent.

Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements
of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a
sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or
purchase of a merchandise was required for the priviledge to participate.

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https://www.coursehero.com/file/28565995/Chapter-2-3-Case-Digestsdocx/

Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs (G.R. No. 28463, 31 May 1971, 39 SCRA 268)
Pg. 104 &151-152 (Footnote)

Facts:

Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of
wheat flour,and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from
December 1963 to July1964, petitioner exported pollard and/or bran, which was loaded from lighters
alongside vessels engaged in foreigntrade while anchored near the breakwater. The respondent assessed
the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the saidexportations in the sum P7,948.00, which assessment
was paid by petitioner under protest. The petitioner complainedthat such wharfage dues is contrary to law
on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported inthe Philippines, they are
merely waste and not the product, which is the flour produced. That way, it would not be liableat all for the
wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs.

Issue:

Whether the language of Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code could be interpreted as what
Republic Flour Mills,Inc. understood?

Ruling:

No. The language of Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code appears to be quite explicit: "There
shall be levied,collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on
products of the Philippines . . .exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton
as a fee for wharfage . . . " Even without unduescrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the
goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms ofthe above section. It does take a certain
amount of hairsplitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner "waste"resulting from the production
of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner’s flourmills in the Philippines.There is the
fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the legislative purpose.
WhatCongress intended is not to be frustrated. Its objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt
as to the meaning ofthe language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought
to be attained. No undue reflectionis needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of
a statute may be contracted, the probability thatother exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If
petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the samedesire to be excluded from the
operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympatheticconsideration. It is
desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be
keptclosed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a c lear legislative
mandate. That kind ofapproach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. It does not now.

https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2016/12/21/rcadi-v-lrc-and-rd-of-davao-digest/

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RCADI v. LRC and RD of Davao DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
TOPIC: Nationality of a corporation
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission
and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, G.R. No. L-8451, December 20,1957

Facts:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of
sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is corporation sole organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
Registry of Deeds Davao (RD) required RCADI to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its members were
Filipino Citizens. As the RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the deed of sale, the matter
was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) en consulta for resolution. LRC hold that
pursuant to provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution, RCADI is not
qualified to acquire land in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at leat 60% of the capital,
properties or assets of the RCADI is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. LRC also denied the
registration of the Deed of Sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such requisite. RCADI’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for mandamus.

Issue:
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the
corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire
private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.

Ruling:
RCADI is qualified.
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the
supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the
faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the
political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by
that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs
from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their
authorities and receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon
these branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of “radiation”. We have to
realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over
the globe, the universality that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in
the practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are
separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they
are incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of their
temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of
their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country
who embrace the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the
Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of
any other country of the world. The same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the
corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines, which is not altered by the change of citizenship
of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation sole.

We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the
rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct
from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with
the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.

3
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed
by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage
whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities
located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and
on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as
such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful
connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.

In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific
provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of
corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so, then
the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was
never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.

https://www.scribd.com/document/386391803/8-Tanada-vs-Cuenco-g-r-No-l-10520-Digest

TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET.AL.

G. R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
H.
FACTS:

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party electedrespondents Cuenco & Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal uponthe nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The
two seats, originally forminority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet
the Constitutionalmandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party
SenatorTañada.Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondentsas staff
members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination bySen. Primicias on behalf of
the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2,Art. 6 of Philippine Constitution, since 3 seats on
the ET are reserved for minoritysenators duly nominated by the minority party representatives.
Furthermore, asrespondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at baris a
violation not only of Tañada's right as Citizens Party member of ET, butrespondent Macapagal's right to
an impartial body that will try his election protest.Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction
against respondents (cannotexercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents
is passed.Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointmentof ET members,
since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since
Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present
action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

ISSUES:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2. 2.WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate

4
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction.

[G. R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957]

TAÑADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS:

Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado asmembers of the same
Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power,authority of jurisdiction to
direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b)
that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to
nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominatetwo (2) more Senators."

RULING:

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts.To begin with, unlike
the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77Phil., 192)-relied upon by the
respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does notseek to compel the latter, either
directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House.
Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shallchoose six (6) Senators to be members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.Secondly, although the
Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of t he Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the
author of a veryenlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall
beexercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have
beenvalidly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of
acoordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same,
thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertainupon whom
devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are
merely seeking to det ermine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done
or attented by either an executive official or the legislative."
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon
t h e constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into
the legality of stat ut es enact ed by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by
theExecutive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that
of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.In fact, whenever
the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into
the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have,not only jurisdiction to pass
upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evadedwithout violating the fundamental law
5
and paving the way to its eventual destruction.As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction
hinges on the question whether the issuebefore us is political or not.In short, the term "political
question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum(supra), it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by thepeople in th eir sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government." It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
calledupon to decide whet her the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate

https://www.scribd.com/document/167431050/Salaysay-vs-Castro-Digest

Purpose of Statutory Construction

NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, Acting Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, Petitioner,vs.
HONORABLE FRED RUIZ CASTRO, Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines,G.R. No.
9669 January 31, 1956 Montemayor, J.

KEY TAKE-AWAY OR DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that an exception or a proviso must be strictly construed
specially whenconsidered in an attempt to ascertain the legislative intent.

RECIT-READY / SUMMARY
Salaysay, the Vice-Mayor elected and currently the acting Mayor of San Juan del Monte upon his filing of
candidacy to run asMayor, brought this action of Prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents

And

to order Respondents todesist and refrain from molesting, interfering or in any way preventing Petitioner
from performing his duties as
acting
Municipal Mayor and prohibiting Sto. Domingo from performing or attempting to perform any of those
powers and dutiesbelonging to Petitioner.

FACTS
1. Engracio E. Santos - duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the Petitioner
Nicanor G. Salaysay isthe duly elected Vice-Mayor. In September 1955 and for some time prior thereto,
Santos was under suspension from hisoffice due to administrative charges filed against him and so
Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 ofthe Revised Administrative Code providing that in
6
case of temporary disability of the Mayor such as absence, etc., hisduties shall be discharged by the Vice-
Mayor.2.

In the same month, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of
Mayor. On thesame date Salaysay was advised by Respondent Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual of
Rizal that in view of hisautomatic cessation as Vice-Mayor due to his having filed his certificate of candidacy
for the office of Mayor, and in viewof the appointment of Sto. Domingo, as acting Vice-Mayor by the
President of the Philippines, and because hehaddirected Sto. Domingo to assume the office of Mayor
during the suspension of Mayor Santos, he (Salaysay) should turnover the office of Mayor to Sto.
Domingo.3.

Salaysay refused. He contended that his case does not come under section 27 of the Election Code for the
reason thatwhen he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he was actually holding said
office.

ISSUES / RATIO ARTICLES/LAWS INVOLVED

1. W/N a Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor may beregarded as actually holding the office of Mayor.Section 27 of
the Revised Election Code

HELD
It is evident that the general rule is that all Government officials running for office must resign. The
authority or privilege to
keep one’s office when running for the same office is the exception. It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that an
exception or a proviso must be strictly construed specially when considered in an attempt to ascertain the
legislative intent.Generally speaking, since Salaysay is discharging the duties and exercising the powers of
the office of Mayor he might beregarded as actually holding the office; but strictly speaking and
considering the purpose and intention of the Legislaturebehind section 27 of the Revised Election Code, he
may not and cannot legitimately be considered as actually holding theoffice of Mayor.In conclusion, we
believe and hold that a Vice-
Mayor acting as Mayor does not “actually hold the office” of Mayor with
in themeaning of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180; that a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of
candidacy for the office ofMayor, even while acting as Mayor, is considered resigned from the office
of Vice-Mayor for the reason that is the only office
that he “actually holds” within the contemplation of secti on 27 of the Revised Election Code and the office
he is running for(Mayor) is naturally other than the one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); and that
having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, heautomatically lost all right to act as Mayor.Petition for prohibition is
denied, with costs. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.

OPINION (CONCURRING) OPINION (DISSENTING)

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CITY OF BAGUIO VS. MARCOS

https://lexphil.blogspot.com/2013/11/city-of-baguio-v-marcos-gr-no-l-26100.html

Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral
proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio
Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case
on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation
of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on
the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the
issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA
931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of
Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act
reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about
to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years
next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which
should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date
of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in
the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.

G.R. No. L-5060 – 15 Phil. 85 – Political Law – Police Power – Limitations on Private
Ownership – General Welfare

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit to have his carabao slaughtered for human
consumption. His request was denied because his carabao was found not unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the
trial court. His counsel argued that the law requiring one to acquire a permit before slaughtering a carabao
is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

8
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.” The wisdom behind said law: the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a “reasonably
necessary” limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a
desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected

G.R. No. L-41106 September 22, 1977LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitionerVS.GEORGE A.

EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, BUREAU OF LABORRELATIONSDepartment of Labor and
FEDERATION OFFREE WORKERS (F.F.W), respondentsFERNANDO, J.:Topic: Legislative intent, purpose and
meaning.FACT: Petitioner sought to be nullified is an order of Respondent George A. Eduvala, then the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, requiring a referendum election among the Petitioners.
It is ascertain to their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended
that there was no authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election, and the Respondent
and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.ISSUE:Whether or not there is a statute authorizing respondents
and giving them jurisdiction for holding of such referendum election.