Written Submissions
Written Submissions
Written Submissions
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
present case?
three ways:-
has said that in complex conditions of modern industry more complicated tests
11
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law Of Torts, ( Wadhwa & Company, Nagpur, 25th –ed, 2006) p.139
2
(1947) 1 DLR 161
2
than the traditional control tests have often to be applied. The control test
and therefore in recent years it has not been treated as an exclusive test. 3
complex test involving (1) control; (2) ownership of the tools; (3) chance of
profit; (4) risk of loss; and control in itself is not always conclusive.4
(c) In the present case the defendant paid daily wages to the fisherman on the
training and required infrastructure and equipment like boats, nets etc.
while fishing. This satisfies all the conditions of the test laid down by LORD
(d) Whether the act done by Mallavi was wrongful and in the course and
scope of employment?
It is most humbly submitted that an employer forbids certain acts. But it does
not follow from this that an act done in defiance of the prohibition is thereby
placed outside the scope of employment. If it were so, the employer would
only have to issue specific orders not to be negligent in order to escape liability
3
Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief inspector of Shops and Establishments, (1974) 3 SCC 498 ; M/s P.M.
Patel and Sons v. Union of India (1986) 1 SCC 32, p.39
4
Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd, (1947) 1 DLR 161, p. 169
for his employee’s negligence.5 The House of Lords Has laid down the rule as
follows:6
There are prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment, and prohibitions which
only deal with conduct within the sphere of employment. A transgression of a prohibition of
the latter class leaves the sphere of employment where it was, and consequently will not
prevent recovery of compensation. A transgression of the former class carries with it the
In the case of Canadian Pacific Rly. Co. v. Lockhart7 holding the defendants
It was not the acting as driver that was prohibited, but that non-insurance of the
motor car, if used as a means incidental to the execution of the work which he was employed
to do. It follows that the prohibition merely limited the way in which, or by means of which,
the servant was to execute the work which he was employed to do, and that breach of the
prohibition did not exclude the liability of the master to third parties
(e) It has been expressly mentioned in the facts that the defendant prohibited
the fisherman from leaving the boat and getting into the water. Yet the
5
Margaret Brazier and John Murphy, Street on Torts,(Butterworths, London, 10th – ed, 1999), p.518
6
Plumb v. Cobden Flour Mills Co. Ltd. (1914) AC 62, p.67 (per Lord Dunedin)
7
(1942) AC 591, (1942) 2 All ER 464 (The defendants had prohibited driver from driving uninsured cars on
company’s business. In breach of this instruction S drove an uninsured car negligently while engaged on
company business and injured the plaintiff.)
8
(1942) AC 591, p.601
fisherman jumped into the water. This act of defiance of the master’s orders is
Therefore this shows that the firm is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of
the fisherman which directly led to the injury caused to the plaintiff.
2. Whether the Defendant can avail the defense of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria?
(f) Volenti Non Fit Injuria The principle that a person who knowingly and
The maxim volenti non fit injuria ‘is founded on good sense and justice. One
who has invited or assented to an act done towards him cannot, when he suffers
the defendant.12
(g) The fact that the plaintiff jumped into the water knowing full well the risks
the principle.
‘The American rule is that the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply where the
plaintiff has, under an exigency caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, consciously
and deliberately faced a risk, even of death, to rescue another from imminent danger of
personal injury or death, whether the person endangered is one to whom he owes a duty of
9
Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (8th – ed.)
10
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law Of Torts, ( Wadhwa & Company, Nagpur, 25th –ed, 2006) p.94
11
Smith v. Baker & Sons, (1891) AC 225
12
Woolridge v. Summer, (1962) 2 All ER 978
13
Goodhart, ‘Rescue And Voluntary Assumption of Risk’
favor of a policeman who had been injured in stopping some runaway horses
with a van in a crowded street. The policeman who was on duty in the police
station, not in the street darted out and was crushed by one of the horses while
he was stopping them. It was also held that the rescuer’s act need not be
after reflection may often be acting more reasonably than one who acts upon
impulse.15
(h)There are several reasons why volenti non fit injuria is no answer to the
rescuer’s claim. In the first place, it is now clear that he founds upon a duty
owed directly to himself by the defendant and not upon one derived from that
emergency and that someone would expose himself to danger in order to effect
a rescue then he owes a duty directly to the rescuer. To go on to hold that the
14
(1935) 1 K.B., p.156-157
15
ibid at p.158-159
16
cf. Reeves v. M.P.C., (2000) 1 AC 360
In the second place, a rescuer acts under the impulse of duty, moral or social
and does not, therefore, exercise that freedom of choice which is essential to
precedes the claimant’s act of running the rescue. The claimant does not assent
at the time. All he knows is that someone is in a position of peril which calls
man?
The principle is the same when the plaintiff is under no legal duty 19 to effect
the rescue, for example, a passer by who is injured while rescuing a little girl
from the danger of being run over by a lorry 20, or a doctor who descends a gas
filled well to attempt to rescue two workmen overcome by fumes 21. The
principle is that if one person by his own negligence causes another person to
17
Frost v. CC. South Yorkshire (1999) 2 AC 455, p.509
18
Baker v. T.E. Hopkins & Sons Ltd. (1959) 1 W.L.R. 966, p.976, per Morris L.J.
19
Ogwo v. Taylor (1988) AC 431, 443
20
Morgan v. Aylen (1942) 1 All ER 489
21
Baker v. T.E. Hopkins & Sons Ltd. (1959) 1 W.L.R. 966
person, acting bravely and promptly and subjugating any timorous concern
over concern for his own well being or comfort, may attempt a rescue.22
(j)Hence the plaintiff in the present case acted due a perilous and urgent
situation even though he was aware of the risk faced in saving the fisherman.
He acted under an impulse of a moral and social duty as any reasonable man
‘The reasonable man here must be endowed with qualities of energy and
degree a desire to save human life when in peril.’24 And even if his duty to
intervene were merely a moral one, still ‘the law does not think so meanly of
helpless person being put in danger that some able bodied person should
22
ibid at 966, 976, 977
23
(1935) 1 K.B., p.156-157
24
(1935) 1 K.B., p.162
25
Pollock, Torts (15th – ed.), adopted by Maugham L.J.in Haynes v. Harwood
(l) It is most humbly submitted that in the present case the plaintiff before
jumping into the water, to save the fisherman, could have reasonably foreseen
that he may suffer an injury. Since he was not a good swimmer it can be
foreseen that the sea water might enter his ears, eyes etc. The plaintiff was a
man of great courage, grit and determination. Even though he knew of the
inherent risks, his desire to save the fisherman’s life is a reasonable act under
(m) Lord Kenyon, in the case of Stone v. Cartwright26 said, ‘the action must be
brought against the hand committing the injury, or against the owner for whom
The plaintiff was injured due to the wrongful act of the defendant. When he
went to rescue the defendant, the sea water entered his ears and caused
permanent loss of hearing. It can also be reasonably assumed that due to the
salinity of the sea water, he lost his eyesight during the course of saving the
fisherman.
The plaintiff was a courageous and determined young man who dreamt of
joining the army. Due to the loss of eyesight he was rejected from the army and
Since this was a consequence of the wrongful act of the fisherman, the
PRAYER
26
(1795) 6 TR 411,412
Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble District Court of
And further, grant any other relief or pass any other order in favour of the
Plaintiff, which the Honourable Court may so deem fit in the ends of equity,