G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006 John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, People of The Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006 John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, People of The Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006 John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, People of The Philippines, Respondent
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the charges filed against the petitioners except one should be quashed
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
The petition has no merit and there is no duplicity of charges in the case at bar. As
explained by the Supreme Court in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is duplicity of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.
The Court also ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the
accused for more than one offense. The charges against the petitioners in accordance
with the violation P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law),
RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) is considered as mala prohibita while the violation of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is considered as mala in se. With this, the charge
against the petitioners in violating Article 365 of the RPC cannot absorb the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, because a mala in se felony cannot absorb
a mala prohibita crimes. The former is considered as a felony because of its criminal
intent or negligence while the latter is considered as a crime because of the special laws
enacting them. With this, the Court denied the petition and affirm the decision of the
lower courts.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. The defendant-appellant is criminally liable. The law which the defendant-
appellant violated is a statutory provision, thus, the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. Even if the defendant-appellant has no intent to intimidate the electorate or
to violate the law, when he carried his revolver inside the fence of the electoral precinct,
he committed the act complained of willfully, with this, the act prohibited by the
Election Law was complete. The Supreme Courts also explained that, in acts mala
prohibita, it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done while in acts mala
in se, there must be a criminal intent. With this, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
appealed by the defendant-appellant.