Dollars and Sense
Dollars and Sense
Dollars and Sense
May | June
PAGE 7
2015
Will Abenomics Work?
&SENSE
PAGE 15
The Student
Loan
Crisis
and the
Debtfare State
TH E R E GUL AR S
5 active culture
Corinthian 100 Debt Strike
page 15 page 19
7 up against the wall street journal
The “Secular Stagnation” Debate
FEATUR ES
24 primer
9 The Student Loan Crisis and the Debtfare State Land Reform and Development
How the government helped make the debt trap the new normal.
SUSANNE SOEDERBERG 28 in review
Jennifer Taub, Other People’s Houses
15 Can “Abenomics” Revive Japan’s Economy?
Why we need a progressive alternative. 30 ask dr. dollar
JUNJI TOKUNAGA What Would Full Employment Cost?
19 A Way Out for Greece and Europe
Keynes’ Advice from the 1940s
MARIE CHRISTINE DUGGAN
Google at the Gate of the world. And that view is filtered ment, by funding research at universi-
On April 21, Google started giving pref- through a very small number of portals. ties, while the companies spend more
erence in search results to sites that The gatekeepers have real power, with- money on marketing than research.)
display well on mobile devices. A grow- out democratic accountability. Now, the proposed TransPacific
ing proportion of web activity takes “Don’t be evil” may be Google’s Partnership (TPP) would allow
place through smartphone screens, so motto. But power corrupts. —ZS pharmaceutical companies to add years
it is not an unreasonable policy. to their current patents, and even re-
patent known medications, quashing
However, the move provides a telling TPP: Tremendous competition from generic alternatives.
illustration of the concentration of pow-
er. Since Google’s February announce- Pharma Profits We only know details like these
ment of the new policy, businesses Do you worry that medical care might thanks to leaks, especially those pub-
have scrambled to update their website cost too little? Pharmaceutical com- lished by WikiLeaks. For some reason,
designs—a race in which bigger busi- panies do, even though the top com- negotiations for the TPP have been
nesses surely have the advantage. The panies reported profit rates of 20% or secret. Higher prices for medicine, ex-
change is also a boon to sellers of mobile more last year. porting more jobs, lowering wages,
and curtailing environmental protec-
tion. What’s not to like? —JW
CEOforPrez.org?
Former Hewlett-Packard CEO and
now presidential aspirant Carly Fiorina
forgot something on the way to the
Republican nomination—registering
the domain name CarlyFiorina.org.
A decidedly non-admiring member of
the public took advantage of the op-
portunity to grab the site, posting:
“Carly Fiorina failed to register this do-
main. So I’m using it to tell you how
many people she laid off at Hewlett-
Packard. It was this many: :( :( :( …”
The frowny-face emoticons go on for
rows and rows, then: “That’s 30,000
people she laid off. People with fami-
lies. And what does she say she would
have done differently? ‘I would have
done them all faster.’—Carly Fiorina.”
That made us think, what might
analogous websites look like for other
prominent presidential candidates? For
Chris Christie, maybe the number of
cars stuck in traffic during the infamous
Bridgegate incident. For Rick Perry,
perhaps a count of the federal agencies
devices. (Google is expanding that com- Since the 1980s, Big Pharma has suc- he wants to abolish (one … two …
ponent of its business.) In short, Google cessfully lobbied Congress to grant the oops, what was the third one again?).
says “Boo!” and the whole landscape of industry more and more years of mo- And for Hillary Clinton, the former sec-
commerce changes. nopoly control, allowing them to steadi- retary of state in an administration that
And the consequences are also politi- ly raise prices, ostensibly to pay for re- has killed thousands as “collateral dam-
cal, cultural, and social. What we see on- search and development. (In fact, much age” in drone strikes. Hmm … there’s no
line is a growing fraction of what we see of the research is paid for by the govern- emoticon for that, is there? —AR D&S
school because I owe too rowers.” Of course, this doesn’t mean All former-student testimonials on this
much money. that debt cancellation will be easy for page from Debt Collective website
former Corinthian students to win. (debtcollective.org/studentstrike).
H yman Minsky, one of the 20th cen- do so in a financially sustainable way. but to
”
tury’s leading theorists of financial — Lawrence Summers, “What to Do
about Secular Stagnation,” World Econ
fragility, used to say that there was Forum, Oct. 31, 2014. omic
nothing wrong with the discipline of “Does the U.S. economy face secular
macroeconomics that another Great stagnation? I am skeptical, and the sour
skepticism go beyond the fact that the ces of my
Depression wouldn’t cure. Today, al- U.S. economy looks to be well on the
employment today.” way to full
most six years since the official end of — Ben Bernanke, “Why Are Interest
the Great Recession, such an effect Rates So Low, Part 2: Secular Stagnatio
Bernanke’s Blog, Brookings Institutio n,” Ben
might finally be taking hold. n, March 31, 2015.
Economist (and former treasury
secretary and World Bank chief econo- The Secular Stagnation Debate
mist) Lawrence Summers is champion- Nearly five years into the economic re- Great Recession in 2008, the European
ing what he calls the “secular stagna- covery, the U.S. economy expanded by Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve
tion” hypothesis: the United States and just 2.4% in 2104, a far cry from the 4.1% Board did the same, with the Fed also
other industrialized economies have average for all other economic recover- buying long-term corporate and govern-
been suffering for nearly two decades ies since 1960. Even more importantly, ment bonds (engaging in “quantitative
from a chronic lack of demand—a secular stagnation is not just the “new easing”) in an attempt to bring down
shortfall of both private and public mediocre” since the Great Recession. long-term interest rates. “Interest rates
spending not just inducing a tempo- The U.S. economy has produced just two have been, and remain, very low,” Federal
rary recession, but causing long-term periods of rapid growth in the last twen- Reserve Chair Janet Yellen rightly cau-
(or “secular”) economic growth to slow. ty years—in the late 1990s and in the tions, “and if underlying conditions had
Summers maintains that underlying mid 2000s. Both were supported by low truly returned to normal, the economy
economic growth has declined to the interest rates, massive debt, and specula- should be booming.”
point that “it may be impossible to tive bubbles. Summers concludes that Today, short-term interest rates con-
achieve full employment, satisfactory the U.S. economy has been unable to trolled by central banks remain barely
growth and financial stability simulta- achieve adequate growth for a long above zero: 0.25% in the United States,
neously simply through the operation time, but that this has been “masked by 0.1% in Japan, and 0.05% in the euro-
of conventional monetary policy [that unsustainable finances.” zone. Such low interest rates leave cen-
lowers interest rates].” The signs of stagnation are even tral banks with practically no room to
It’s certainly ironic that Larry clearer around the world. The IMF has cut interest rates further to boost eco-
Summers is today’s chief proponent of repeatedly lowered its growth forecast nomic growth.
the secular stagnation hypothesis, since for Japan, which is mired in decades Real (inflation-adjusted) long-term
he played a key role in enacting policies of stagnation (see Tokunaga, “Can interest rates are down as well. Real
that contributed to stagnation. As trea- ‘Abenomics’ Revive Japan’s Economy?” interest rates on ten-year government
sury secretary under Clinton, he led the p. 15), and has done the same for the bonds in the Group of Seven (G7) in-
charge to deregulate derivatives trad- eurozone since 2007 (see Duggan, “A dustrialized countries (Canada, France,
ing, which would contribute mightily to Way Out for Greece and Europe, p. 19). It Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the
the financial crisis. And as chief eco- estimates growth in both Japan and the United States) have fallen from just
nomic advisor in the Obama adminis- eurozone at little more than 1% a year under 5% in the early 1990s to 0.6% at
tration, Summers quashed proposals to through 2020. the end of 2013.
enlarge the size of the fiscal stimulus, The mediocre growth persists despite What explains this decline in inter-
which would have gone a long way very low interest rates, embraced by gov- est rates? Expansionary monetary poli-
toward boosting growth. ernments to encourage borrowing and cy, initiated by central banks to lower
Nonetheless, should the secular boost spending. As far back as the early rates and counteract slowing econom-
stagnation hypothesis take hold, it 1990s, the Bank of Japan cut short-term ic growth, is part of the answer. For
could help open up space for policies interest rates by dramatically expanding Summers, however, the chief explana-
that could improve many people’s lives. the money supply. With the onset of the tion for the drop in the real interest
rate (the price of savings), is the chron- ing trade advantage.” But chalking up near-zero real interest rates for govern-
ic excess of savings (the supply of sav- excess savings entirely to developing- ment debt, public investment projects
ings) over investment (the demand for world trade policies, as Bernanke does— would generate enough revenue to ser-
savings). He calls this the “essence of not acknowledging the role of ever- vice the associated debt as long as those
secular stagnation.” Private savings rising domestic inequality and massive projects yielded any positive return. For
(largely retained earnings held by cor- debt burdens—is literally one-sided. those in the United States still concerned
porations) have exceeded private in- Moreover, changing exchange rates, as about the buildup of public debt,
vestment in the eurozone since 2001, Summer points out, merely transfers Summers has proposed that the U.S.
in Japan since well before 2000, and in spending from one country to another, government enact a carbon and gas tax
the United States since 2008 (after the instead of adding to it. to pay for infrastructure investments.
housing bubble burst). There are yet more radical implica-
tions of the stagnation hypothesis that
Demand-Side or Supply-Side? If the main problem get us closer to the roots of the ongoing
Summers attributes the excess of sav-
ings to too little private investment. A
is a shortfall in economic crisis. Among the factors that
Summers lists as contributing to a short-
shortfall of overall spending (or “aggre- private-sector fall of investment is income inequality.
Stagnant wages and booming profits
gate demand”) is holding investment
below the levels necessary for full em- demand, then the have reduced consumer spending and
ployment. In the middle of last year added to corporate retained earnings.
(second quarter 2014) business invest- public sector needs Worsening inequality—which Summers
ment in the G-7 countries stood at says threaten to turn the United States
12.4% of GDP, well below the 13.3% to boost spending. into a “Downton Abbey economy”—
level in 2008 and further behind the does not only diminish demand. It also
13.8% peak in 2001. On the other hand, if Summers is empowers moneyed interests to resist
That’s not the way former Fed Chair right and the main problem is a persis- public spending that would bring about
Ben Bernanke sees it. Yes, economic tent shortfall in private-sector demand continuous full employment.
growth is slow, interest rates are low, (in particular, due to lack of investment In the last analysis, the secular stag-
and private investment has fallen short demand), then the public sector needs nation problem is a political problem
of private savings. But Bernanke attri- to boost spending. For economist Paul rather than an economic one. With suffi-
butes that shortfall to a “savings glut,” Krugman, who has long maintained cient political will—and political
an over-supply of savings, rather than a that today’s economy suffers from a might—we could enact a program of
paucity of investment. What held back chronic lack of demand, that makes the large-scale public investment that would
economic growth (outside of the hous- secular stagnation hypothesis “a very put an end to secular stagnation.
ing sector) from 2002 to 2006, he ar- radical manifesto.” Investments in clean energy (retro-fitting
gues, was that China and other coun- homes, upgrading the electrical system,
tries with large trade surpluses saved A Radical Manifesto? building mass-transit) and education
more than they invested and used their The secular stagnation hypothesis (reducing class size, improving school
excess savings to buy U.S. securities. does have radical implications, some building, and boosting financial aid for
That helped to finance the housing more radical than others. students) are both worthwhile for their
boom, but also drove up the value of Summers, for instance, favors a pro- own sake and have been shown to effec-
the dollar, making Chinese exports gram of enlarged and sustained public tively create jobs.
cheaper for U.S. buyers, and causing investment, “a natural instrument to pro- Surely that would be far better than
domestic production to suffer. mote growth.” Public investment is, in- an economy that depends on financial
Does it really matter if the problem is deed, much needed. Net public invest- bubbles and unsustainable household
a glut of savings or a dearth of invest- ment (subtracting out depreciation) in debt to keep it from stagnating—and
ment opportunities? In fact, it does. The the United States fell from 1.5% of GDP that rewards the elites who stand in the
policy implications are quite different. in 2008 to just 0.5% of GDP in 2012, and way of needed reforms. D&S
If what’s plaguing the global economy is had actually turned negative in the euro-
Bernanke’s savings glut, the appropriate zone. And he has an answer for those J O H N M I L L E R is a professor of eco-
policy is to get emerging economies “ concerned that increasing public spend- nomics at Wheaton College and a mem-
to reduce interventions in foreign ex- ing would push government debt to ber of the Dollars & Sense collective.
change markets for the purpose of gain- unsustainable levels: In a world with S O U R C E S : Available at dollarsandsense.org.
Crisis
BY SUSANNE SOEDERBERG
and the
Debtfare State
B Y S U S A N N E S O E D E R B E RG
E DU C AT I O N A L D E B T H A S B E C O M E A T I C K I N G T I M E B O M B . W I T H
over $1 trillion in outstanding loan balances, the student loan industry has a lot in common with
the sub-prime mortgage industry, which went into a devastating crisis in 2007-8. Both rely on a
financial innovation called “asset-backed securitization” (see sidebar) to raise capital and to hedge
risk—in other words, to raise money for loans and to reduce the likelihood that investors will lose
their money. Student loans asset-backed securitization—or SLABS—means student loan agencies
package student debts and sell them to investors who expect to get their money back, plus interest, as
students pay back their loans. In theory, selling off nicely bundled packages of debt to investors allows
these institutions to turn around more quickly and make new loans. For this reason, SLABS is touted
as the main channel through which the lending industry moves funds from investors to students—
and so is supposed to be of mutual benefit to students, lenders, and institutional investors such as
hedge funds and pension funds.
Like the sub-prime housing industry, however, SLABS ultimately depends on the ability of borrowers
to meet their debt obligations. Herein lies the rub. Since as far back as the recession of 2001, the majority
of student debtors have not been able to get decent paying jobs upon leaving college.
Poor job prospects, as well as mounting costs of basic needs such as health care and housing, mean many
college graduates have not been earning enough to pay back their loans. Default rates on student loans have
been climbing since 2003. By 2012, student loans registered the worst delinquency rates in consumer
credit, worse than even mortgage debts and credit cards.
Despite the uneasy relationship between the profitable student loan industry and growing student debt
defaults, students continue to borrow to pay for college, and educational loans are the only form of con-
sumer debt to increase markedly since 2008. The industry has grown steadily over the past several decades
in lockstep with rapidly rising tuition and fees—and with the government’s prioritization of loan-based
funding over grants. To understand the growth of this risky business, we need to first grasp the basic alli-
ance between government and finance in the profitable world of student debt.
in 1991, debt collectors that specialize in student debt secondary markets. This can be understood as the
are permitted to tack on hefty collection (25%) and “commodification of debt.” The underlying assets
commission fees (28%) to the outstanding loan, for SLABS are student loans that have been sliced
making debt collection a highly lucrative business. and diced to create packages of debt obligations that
Private lenders are not the only ones benefiting are then sold to investors such as pension funds.
from the educational loan business. The Department SLABS has proven to be a lucrative device to hedge
of Education, which also securitizes its loans, is risk for investors, raise capital, and even to generate
believed to have generated $101.8 billion in revenue income when student loan debtors default (through
from student loans from 2008 to 2013. It does so derivative contracts such as credit default swaps,
largely by exploiting a spread between the low inter- which pay off in the event of default).
est rates it pays to borrow money (e.g., 2.52% based Once we peel away the complexities of SLABS,
on the 10-year Treasury bond rate in 2013) and we are left with the basic problem: the success of the
what it charges students (e.g., 6.8% for Stafford “investment” ultimately depends on the ability of
Loans (see glossary)). the debtor to earn enough money to pay the princi-
The basic premise driving SLABS is that power- pal of the loan, plus interest and fees. The alchemy
ful financial actors and institutions are able, through of finance cannot erase the risk of how hard it may
regulatory and legal sanctioning by the government, be for the student to ever repay the loan because the
to transform a debt obligation (student loan) into a student will struggle to find gainful employment
financial asset (SLABS) that can be traded on the after graduation. From this angle, SLABS—like all ››
MAY/JUNE 2015 l DOLLARS & SENSE l 11
S T U D E N T LO A N S A N D D E B T FA R E cancelled) more difficult to access. Granted, federal
student loans have long been exempt from dis-
forms of credit—rests on the ability of the state to charge (the release of a borrower from the obliga-
ensure that debtors (students) will repay the loan— tion to repay her/his student debt through bank-
no matter what their incomes may be. ruptcy) under Chapter 7, but some legal loopholes
were available to highly distressed debtors, particu-
Debtfare and Discipline larly holders of private student loans. The passage
For the student loan industry to continue to of BAPCPA makes it nearly impossible to pursue
expand and remain lucrative in the face of increas- debt relief under Chapter 7.
ing rates of delinquency and default, the state Second, BAPCA made it more difficult for
must discipline the debtors. In my recent book, highly indebted students to qualify for the other
Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry (2014), I remaining option for bankruptcy relief—Chapter
refer to this new feature of neoliberal gover- 13 (adjustment of debts). Student debtors filing
nance—emerging alongside the rollback of the under Chapter 13 can only be granted bank-
welfare state, dereliction of labor laws, and ruptcy protection if they prove “undue hardship.”
increased levels of precarity among working- and Undue hardship is determined through means-
middle-class Americans—as “debtfarism.” tested procedures making human suffering reduc-
ible to algebraic equations. (Congress refused to
Private lenders are not the only ones benefiting provide a clear and transparent definition of
“undue hardship,” opting instead to transfer
from the educational loan business.
responsibility for interpretation to the courts.)
The Department of Education is believed to have Chapter 13 also requires debtors to jump through
more hoops, such as mandatory pre-bankruptcy
generated $101.8 billion in revenue from credit counselling and a rigorous repayment plan
for three to five years before the courts discharge
student loans from 2008 to 2013. It does so “some” debt. Despite these obstacles, desperate
student debtors continue to file under Chapter 13
largely by exploiting a spread between the low to seek relief from dischargeable types of con-
interest rates it pays to borrow money and sumer credit, such as credit cards, medical debt,
and auto loans.
what it charges students. Third, BAPCPA added private student loans
to the types of educational loans that cannot be
discharged without adequate proof of undue
Debtfarism represents a set of institutional and hardship. This means that private lenders such
ideological practices aimed at regulating and nor- as Sallie Mae now enjoy the same state protec-
malizing the growing dependence on expensive tion from debtor bankruptcy as the federal gov-
consumer credit to meet basic needs, such as edu- ernment. Moreover, private educational lenders
cation. Personal bankruptcy law is a core regula- such as Sallie Mae have been granted powers to
tory feature of debtfarism, as it acts to deal with garnish the wages, tax refunds, and even Social
defaults in the student loan industry and to ensure Security benefits of delinquent debtors with no
the legal and moral obligation of debt—regardless statute of limitations.
of the borrower’s ability to repay. The debtfare state’s extension of super-creditor
For many students, the draconian changes to status to dominant private institutions like Sallie
the bankruptcy code with the enactment of the Mae deepens the hold corporations have over edu-
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer cation financing. One out of every five students
Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 represented a carries private loans, which have higher interest
major turning point. Among its notable features, rates than government loans and carry fees that
the BAPCPA was designed to keep student debtors add to the balance. Many students are turning to
out of bankruptcy in three ways. private loans to augment their federal loans due to
First, BAPCPA made relief under Chapter 7 the increasing costs of living (health care and rent)
(under which most debts are immediately and tuition (especially at for-profit colleges).
››
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (pronounced “AH-bay”)—won a landslide victory in the December 2014
Prime Minister
snap election for the House of Representatives, the lower house of the national parliament. The Liberal Shinzo Abe
Democrats and their partner party in the ruling coalition, the Komeito, won 326 of 475 seats, giving them laughing during
a two-thirds supermajority in the House of Representatives. a visit by
President
Why did Abe win so handily? Since the end of 2012, the Abe government has carried out an eco- Barack Obama
nomic revitalization program called “Abenomics”—its response to Japan’s ongoing economic stagnation, to Akasaka
the “lost decades” of the 1990s and 2000s. Abenomics consists of three “arrows”: aggressive monetary Palace in Tokyo,
April 24, 2104.
“quantitative easing,” massive fiscal stimulus, and “structural reforms” to the economy. The main reason
for Abe’s resounding victory is that he succeeded in persuading the electorate to stay the course, with Credit: Official
White House
slogans like “Abenomics is progressing” and “There is no other way to economic recovery.” Meanwhile, photo by Pete
he shifted voters’ attention away from more controversial matters, such as his plans to restart Japan’s Souza (public
nuclear power plants (which were shut down after the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster) and to domain).
bolster the country’s military forces.
Rather than leading to a rebound of domestic consumption and investment spending, which could
lift the economy as a whole, however, Abe’s neoliberal reforms would lead to rising inequality and con-
tinued stagnation. We certainly need significant public spending. The Abe government, however, has
carried out pork-barrel public projects that will not revive the Japanese economy in the long term, while
averting another recession. Rather, we must explore programs to facilitate the development of new
industries, such as renewable energy (RE), instead of the defense and nuclear power industries that the
Abe cabinet favors.
What Is Abenomics?
Abenomics has been mainly about more aggressive monetary “quantitative easing”—central bank pur-
chases of various kinds of bonds (other than short-term government bonds, purchases of which are
considered “conventional” expansionary monetary policy) from banks and other private owners of
financial assets. The Bank of Japan, the country’s central bank, has been engaging in “Quantitative
and Qualitative Monetary Easing” (QQE) since April 2013, with the goal of raising the inflation rate
to 2% within two years. ››
MAY/JUNE 2015 l DOLLARS & SENSE l 15
ABENOMICS The Effects of Abenomics So Far
The effects of aggressive monetary easing have,
According to advocates of Abenomics, infla- mainly, been limited to higher stock prices on the
tionary expectations driven by aggressive mone- Tokyo Stock Exchange and the drastic depreciation
tary easing would reduce real interest rates (that of the Japanese yen in foreign exchange markets.
is, interest rates adjusted for inflation, which are The Nikkei 225, the index for the Tokyo stock
calculated by subtracting the inflation rate from market (analogous to the S&P 500 for the New
the nominal interest rate). In turn, lower real York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ), has soared.
interest rates will make corporations willing to The yen, meanwhile, has depreciated by more than
borrow more, raising investment spending and 42% relative to the dollar in the last two years.
generating domestic employment. The increase Some have pointed to these developments as proof
in investment would lead to strong corporate that Abenomics is working.
profits, eventually translating into higher wages, In fact, these effects will not contribute to the
which would in turn increase consumption trickle-down dynamic that advocates of Abe’s pol-
spending by households. This is basically a form icy expect, for two reasons. First, aggressive mone-
of “trickle-down economics,” in the sense that, tary easing will not stimulate overall household
according to its advocates, strong corporate consumption spending. The dramatic stock mar-
profits would trickle down to everyone else in ket rally has sparked a “wealth effect,” which might
the economy. lead those who own a lot of financial assets—feel-
ing flush with their new riches—to spend more.
Rather than leading to a rebound of domestic Meanwhile, however, workers’ wages have not kept
pace with inflation. In addition, the Abe govern-
consumption and investment spending, which
ment introduced a sales tax hike, from 5% to 8%,
could lift the economy as a whole, Abe’s in April 2014. Such conditions tend to make ordi-
nary people reduce their consumption spending.
neoliberal reforms would lead to rising The benefits of trickle-down Abenomics clearly
have not reached everyone.
inequality and continued stagnation. Second, corporations, particularly big multina-
tionals, are hoarding their profits. Corporate profits
have been rising significantly, underpinned by the
drastic depreciation of the yen. This has boosted the
Under the QQE program, the Bank of Japan competitiveness of Japanese industry in global mar-
(BOJ) pledged to double the size of the monetary kets. But corporations have held onto most of these
base (currency in circulation plus banks’ reserves profits as internal reserves, rather than engaging in
on deposit at the central bank). By the end of investment spending that would lift the economy.
October 2014, unsatisfied with the results of the According to Japan’s Finance Ministry, the reserves
program, it decided to accelerate this enlargement of Japanese nonfinancial companies reached a record
of the monetary base. With the BOJ being twice 304 trillion yen (nearly $3 trillion) by of the end of
as aggressive as the U.S. Federal Reserve in its fiscal year 2013. As a consequence, Japan’s GDP
bond-buying, its balance sheet has gone above shrunk for two consecutive quarters, a common def-
50% of GDP. inition for recession, after the second quarter of
Economist Paul Krugman has strongly sup- 2014. (Figures for the first quarter of 2015 were not
ported Abenomics—“the sharp turn toward mon- available at this writing.)
etary and fiscal stimulus adopted by the govern-
ment of Prime Minster Shinzo Abe”—and hailed What Kinds of Policies Will Abe Push Now?
it as a model for other countries to emulate. In a Abe’s landslide victory in the snap election could
2013 column in the New York Times, he stressed not only enable him to stay in office until late
that Japan could be the first major country to 2018, making him longest-serving prime minister
climb out of the kind of recession and stagnation in Japan since World War II, but also give him
in which has also befallen Western countries since abundant political capital for further pursuing his
the global financial crisis in 2008. economic agenda.
I S T H E R E A WAY F O R G R E E C E T O H O N O R I T S D E B T S W I T H O U T
impoverishing its people? Most people see only two ways out of the current crisis: Either Greece services its
debts, and the wealth gap between creditor and debtor nations in Europe rises; or Greece defaults, and the
››
The signing of the
Anglo-American
European banking system is forced to write-down its assets by the value of the Greek IOUs. However, there loan agreement
is a third way: creditors could promise to spend the money they receive from Greece (in the form of debt ser- at the State
Department,
vice payments) on Greek imports or on long-term for-profit investments in Greece. This third way involves Washington, D.C.,
re-aligning institutional incentives so that the creditors only gain when the debtors themselves grow. Dec. 6,1945.
Problems like those Greece faces are not new. And, in fact, the best solutions are not new either. During Seated from left:
John Maynard
the Second World War, Britain faced a similar situation of trade deficits coupled with a cut-off of interna- Keynes, Lord
tional credit. John Maynard Keynes devised a solution which did not impose all the burdens on the debt- Halifax, James
ors by reducing wages. Instead, it would not be just debtor countries—but also creditor countries—that Byrnes, Fred
Vinson.
would have to “adjust.” The creditors would have to spend their surpluses (rather than building up reserves),
allowing the debtors, in turn, to grow their economies and pay back their debts. Dependence on the fickle UK National
whim of the foreign investor is the story line that unites the post-war British context with that of Greece Archives (public
today. In another similarity, the subtext for Greece, since it joined the eurozone in 2001, has been the need domain).
to increase its productive capacity and infrastructure so that its products—priced in euros—are produced
efficiently enough to compete with those from other eurozone countries. A solution like the one Keynes
proposed for Britain towards the end of the war would offer Greece the best way out today. ››
MAY/JUNE 2015 l DOLLARS & SENSE l 19
KEYNES AND GREECE Figure 1. As these moneys flowed in, they permitted
Greece to finance an excess of imports over exports
The Trap of Short-Term Debt which resulted in the growing current account defi-
The euro became Greece’s sole currency in 2002. cit shown in the bottom half of Figure 1.
This opened the door to marketers of credit from The fact that investors from other European
wealthier eurozone nations. The Greek government, countries were willing to lend to Greece was not the
firms, and households had previously been making problem. Rather, the problem was the short-term
payments in drachmas, which were considered nature of the loans. There are basically two types of
“funny money” by international investors because foreign investment: short-term and long-term.
the currency could lose value in a depreciation of its Portfolio investment and foreign bank accounts are
exchange rate relative to the euro. But after 2002, the both short-term purchases of paper assets. Foreign
Greeks began making payments in euros on loans direct investment, on the other hand, involves an
denominated in euros, so the creditors faced no risk institution in a creditor nation opening a physical
of exchange rate loss. No one had ever been so enthu- business in Greece as a subsidiary, or engaging in a
siastic before about lending to the Greeks. Between joint venture with a Greek business partner. Without
2005 and 2008, foreigners opened bank accounts or the option of a quick and easy exit, the direct inves-
moved into the country (capital account increases), tor has more of a stake in ensuring the growth of the
or invested in Greek stocks and government bonds business activity undertaken in Greece.
(portfolio investment), as shown in the top half of In 2008, foreign lenders provided Greece with
Figure 1. Greek short-term funds to the tune of 16.4 billion euros,
2010 Balance of2011
Payments, 2005-2008
2012
20.0 while foreign direct investment was barely one-
2005 2006 2007 2008 tenth that amount, only 1.7 billion euros! Such a
0.040.0
predominance of foreign portfolio investment and
30.0
-20.0 bank accounts is problematic because the flow can
Billions of Euros
20.0
reverse in the time it takes to push a button on a
Billions of Euros
-40.0
10.0
computer, giving the portfolio investor incentive
-60.0 0.0
to flee at even the slightest hint of trouble. As
-10.0
-80.0 Figure 2 shows, net portfolio investment demon-
-20.0
-100.0 strated its short-term nature by turning negative—
-30.0
into a net outflow from Greece—in 2010. The
-120.0
-40.0
outflow reached panic proportions by 2012.
Current FDI
AccountPortfolio
CapitalOther (Banks)
Account Direct Investment
When short-term investment dominates, foreign
Portfolio Investment Bank Accounts
creditors hold the debtor nation hostage. If the
Source: IMF Balance of Payments (billions of euros); bank accounts also include “other.” creditors don’t like the country’s public policies,
Note: The figures are based on the IMF balance-of-payments data. In this accounting system, foreign portfolio
investment (purchases/sales by private foreign sector or foreign governments of stocks and bonds) and foreign direct they can quickly sell off their holdings. Had the
investment are included in the “financial account.” The financial account “other” includes government-to-government
loans, bank loans, loans to and from international organizations, and trade credits.
eurozone wanted each nation to preserve its political
sovereignty, it should have put in rules to heavily
Figure 2. The Greek Financial Account: discourage short-term speculative loans between
Capital Flight from 2010 to 2012 eurozone partners. In fact, the opposite occurred.
2010 2011 2012
20.0
Greek entry into the eurozone was viewed as a mar-
keting opportunity for short-term credit from
0.0
financial institutions in wealthier nations.
-20.0 When foreign holders of Greek government
Billions of Euros
-40.0
bonds decided to sell in 2010, Greece was running a
fairly high trade deficit, on the order of 10% of GDP.
-60.0
It is possible for a nation to import more than it
-80.0 exports, but only so long as foreigners are willing to
-100.0 lend to or invest in the nation. In 2008, foreigners
were interested in lending to Greece, but the global
-120.0
economic crisis in 2009 made them jittery. By 2010,
FDI Portfolio Other (Banks) they no longer wanted to lend to the Greek
Source: Greek Article IV Report, IMF June 30, 2013 in billions of euros. “Other” refers mostly to bank accounts.
Billions of Euros
50.0
to cut off imports completely, since some are inputs
to the economy (such as computers) and others are 0.0
essential to subsistence (such as medicine).
Why did the international banking system step in -50.0
with the first 31.5 billion euro bailout? The answer is -100.0
that creditor institutions were unwilling to let Greece
default. Between 1990 and 2010, many banks made -150.0
loans around the world to borrowers who might Current Account Financial Account Capital Account IMF
never be able to pay those loans back. If the interna- Source: Greece: Article IV Report, IMF on June 30, 2013 (in billions of euros).
tional banking system were to admit that some loans
will never be repaid, then banks would have to write longer willing to buy them), so the government
down their assets by the amounts of those loans. reduced benefits (as the IMF was also urging). By
Greece is just the tip of the iceberg in that regard. The 2014, the Greek people had endured enough and
last thing that the international banking system wants voted the left-wing SYRIZA coalition in on a plat-
is for Greece to repudiate the loans. form to end IMF control of government policy.
IMF loans are designed to rescue the interna- IMF loans are not meant to rebuild a country,
tional banking system, rather than to assist the but rather to tide it over through a panic until the
debtor nation. That explains why the loans did not private sector is willing to lend to the country again.
end Greece’s problems. The IMF wanted Greece to
let holders of Greek bonds sell them off—for the Problems like those Greece faces are not new.
money that the IMF had newly lent. The IMF
hoped that the ability to liquidate Greek bonds
During the Second World War, Britain faced a
would deter the bondholders from actually selling. similar situation of trade deficits coupled with a
The IMF was playing a confidence game to prevent
portfolio investors from hitting the “sell” button. cut-off of international credit. John Maynard
The long-term solution for Greece, however, is
completely different. To reduce reliance upon foreign Keynes devised a solution which did not impose
financing, Greece would like to export more than it
imports. Winning over international buyers will all the burdens on the debtors by reducing wages.
require lowering Greek production costs. The way to
lower costs significantly and sustainably is to invest in
new technology and infrastructure that permits the If IMF loans fail to reverse a temporary panic, they
same workers to produce more during any given wind up growing dangerously large (look at 2010 to
period. However, the IMF insisted that Greece lower 2012 in Figure 3). As the SYRIZA government’s
the cost of production while also reducing imports finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, has pointed out,
(read: no more new technology) and ceasing to bor- “We have resembled drug addicts craving the next
row above emergency levels. Under those circum- dose. What [SYRIZA] is all about is ending the
stances, the only way for Greek products to gain any addiction.” Greece is in a bind: IMF loans are emer-
market share would be for wages to drop—by a lot. gency funds that cannot be used to improve produc-
Real wages did drop and unemployment rose to 27%. tive capacity, educate the people, or build infrastruc-
Many households had accumulated debt between ture. Wages and employment are falling at the same
2002 and 2010, and as they lost jobs, debt burdens time as social insurance, so the people are under-
relative to incomes rose. At the same time, the Greek standably bitter. If Greece leaves the eurozone now,
government could no longer borrow by issuing bonds the return to the drachma will put salaries back into
(because Europeans, including Greeks, were no drachma, which will not have the purchasing power ››
MAY/JUNE 2015 l DOLLARS & SENSE l 21
KEYNES AND GREECE should have their surpluses confiscated if they did
not spend it by the end of the year. He never antici-
of euros. All exits seem to lead to a lower standard of pated any confiscation actually taking place—like
living for the people of Greece and greater income any “use it or lose it” account, the point was to pro-
inequality between nations in Europe. vide an institutional incentive for the creditor to
spend the entire surplus by a certain time.
Enter John Maynard Keynes The second rule would have consisted in limiting
Let us now turn to Keynes’ suggestion for Britain at the types of spending that creditors could make to
the end of World War II. Like Greece today, Britain long-term investments, imports, or donations. This
at the time had a damaged industrial base and poor brings us to the way out for the eurozone and Greece.
infrastructure (due to Hitler’s bombs). Furthermore, It will be safe for Greece to repay its debts to the credi-
wealthy foreigners who had lent Britain money in a tor nations of Europe, if the eurozone nations agree
short-term way were trying to liquidate their British that the creditor nations will spend the money they
holdings just when Britain needed long-term credit. receive from Greece on Greek imports or long-term
In Britain’s case, the short-term holdings of foreign loans or joint ventures in Greece. Since Greece is not
money came in the form of the London bank exporting enough to pay for imports that will build
accounts of imperialists in South Africa, Canada, up its infrastructure, then by definition the eurozone
Australia, India, and other nations of the collapsing nations do not find it sufficiently enticing to buy
British Empire. These wealthy families wanted to imports from Greece. In this case, eurozone nations
transfer their money to New York banks, and to would make long-term investments in Greece so that
Greece could generate the capacity to produce
In 1944, chastened by two world wars and the imports that were appealing to Europe.
Perhaps this scenario seems too draconian—
rise of fascism, governments were willing to put forcing creditors to purchase from or make long-term
restrictions on how banks made money, and to investments in Greece on penalty of losing the income
from annual Greek debt payments. Consider, then,
commit to economic policies that would bring that the eurozone nations could simply make a rule
that every member nation would need to spend its
jobs and prosperity to the working class. trade surplus with other eurozone nations by end of
year, and that such spending take the form of imports,
long-term investment, or donations. (Portfolio invest-
import products from the United States as well. ment would be highly discouraged.) Each nation
Britain was running a trade deficit, and the rest of could import, invest in, or donate to the individual
the world was trying to remove funds all at the same country of its choice, but since any surplus would
time. In both respects, the situation was similar to have to be spent by a certain time, the effect would be
Greece today. to make every eurozone economy balance its interna-
Keynes gave considerable thought to the prob- tional payments. Imagine an inflatable rubber glove.
lem: How could Britain’s banks honor the commit- As air goes into one finger, that finger inflates. Once
ment to permit depositors to remove funds while that finger is filled, the air will naturally flow to
also rebuilding its industrial base? And he came up another finger. In the end all five fingers of the rubber
with a logical solution: put pressure on creditors as glove will be equally inflated. In just this way, if every
well as debtors to “adjust.” His logic was that debtors creditor nation must spend its current account sur-
always feel the pressure to make payments—on pain plus by the end of the year in other eurozone nations,
of cut-off from future loans, threat of asset seizure, then the entire eurozone economy will expand.
or other punitive measures (such as the threat today
of pushing Greece out of the eurozone). However, Postscript for Europe Then,
creditor nations do not feel a similar pressure to Prescription for Europe Now
spend what they get from exporting more than they Keynes’ plan did not pass at the Bretton Woods
import—i.e., running a trade surplus. They can Conference in 1944, but his proposal did influence
hoard the surplus by building up reserves. The first debate. The United States rejected the “use it or lose
rule for Keynes, then, was that creditor nations it” clause that would have required it to import
M A R I E C H R I S T I N E D U G G A N is a professor of
economics at Keene State College in New Hampshire. She
received her PhD from the New School for Social Re-
search in 2000. Since then she has taught macroeconom-
ics, history of economic thought, and economic history.
S O U RC E S: Marie Duggan, “Taking Back Globalization: A China-United Greek anti-austerity protests in May 2010.
States Counterfactual Using Keynes’s 1941 International Clearing Union,” Credit: Philly boy92, Wikimedia Commons,
Review of Radical Political Economics, 2013; Eric Helleiner, States and the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0
Reemergence of Global Finance (Cornell, 1994); Robert Skidelsky, Chapter 36: Unported License.
“Keynes ‘New Order,’” John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946 (Penguin, 2003).
Land Reform
A Precondition for Sustainable Economic Development
ever-deeper debt, etc. They provide, also, as a whole, and not just the elite.
Urban agriculture a form of private insurance system for The socioeconomic conditions
in the Daeya-dong
neighborhood of the city those clients who exhibit proper loyalty, would include a more egalitarian class
of Gunpo, South Korea, in contrast to social support systems structure in the rural sector, greater
July 2014. available to all—which would reduce incentives for farmers to increase their
the peasants’ vulnerability and the land- productivity due to owning the land
Credit: L4 Ferguson lord’s power. The consequence is that they work, greater farmer incomes al-
(Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike the state’s good-governance capacities lowing the farmers to send their chil-
3.0 Unported license). are distorted and corrupted, favoring the dren to school, better nutrition due to
narrow interests of the landlords and the higher caloric intake, and greater small-
political elite that is connected to them farmer purchasing power leading to
(often by kinship). greater demand for the products of
Transformative socio-political land labor-intensive manufacturing. The
reform for developing countries is sociopolitical democratization would
aimed at diminishing wealth inequali- mean the breaking of landlord power,
ties in the initial stages of develop- political stabilization resulting from the
››
Mass march at the 5th Congress of Brazil’s
landless workers’ movement, Movimento
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
(MST), Brasília, June 14, 2007.
Credit: Wilson Dias, Agencia Brasil
(Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Brazil license).
DOLLARS
screamed “moral hazard.” (This is the economy sits in its crosshairs. D&S
economic term for a situation in
&SENSE
which insurance makes someone less S T E V E N P R E S S M A N is a
careful. For example, people with car professor of economics and finance at
insurance may be a little more likely Monmouth University and author of Fifty REAL WORLD ECONOMICS
to leave their car unlocked because Major Economists (Routledge, 2013).
A R T H U R M A C E W A N is professor
emeritus of economics at UMass-Boston
and a Dollars & Sense Associate.